Professional Documents
Culture Documents
BIBLIOGRAPHY No, 5
Deception
Operations
by
Dr. Gary J. Bjorge
January 1986
lllllllllllimillllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllL
'COMBAT
STUDIES
INSTITUTE)
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiMiiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiiir
HISTORICAL
BIBLIOGRAPHY No. 5
Deception
Operations
by
Dr. Gary J. Bjorge
January 1986
Illlllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
COMBAT
iSTUDIES
INSTITUTE!
Illlllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllf
CONTENTS
PREFACE
I. DECEPTION
A. Books
B. Articles
C. Government Reports, Manuals,
and Studies
1
5
11
86-2537
19
21
27
31
PREFACE
The focus of this bibliography is on deception at the operational level of war. However, because successful deception at
this level depends on successful tactical-level deception and excellent camouflage and concealment, material on these related
topics is also included.
All of the sources cited in this bibliography can be found
in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Many of the books and magazine articles that
are cited are available in large public libraries around the
United States. Numerous items, however, exist only in a specialized library such as CARL. To assist readers in locating the
items cited in this bibliography, CARL document numbers (N
numbers) and Defense Technical Information Center numbers
(DTIC numbers) are provided for sources that have them. To
ensure the widest distribution for this bibliography, no classified
sources have been cited.
I. DECEPTION
Part ABooks
1. Beaumont, Roger. Maskirovka: Soviet Camouflage, Concealment and Deception. College Station, TX: Texas A&M
University System, 1982.
In Soviet terminology, concealment, camouflage, and deception are unified under the word maskirovka. This study shows
how systematic and thorough the Soviets are in their approach
to maskirovka at all levelsstrategic, operational, and tactical.
Beaumont discusses methods of maskirovka and the relationship
between maskirovka and surprise, presenting historical examples
of successful Soviet maskirovka operations. The military applications of Soviet research into the psychology of awareness, perception, and reaction to surprise are also discussed. The author
expresses his concern about the ability of Americans to cope
with Soviet maskirovka stratagems.
2. Betts, Richard K. Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1982.
Ways in which deception contributes to achieving surprise
are examined in this book. Betts analyzes the nature of deception and the reasons why it succeeds. He describes the successful use of deception by Hitler in World War II, Israel in the
Six-Day War, Egypt in the October War, and the Soviet Army
during its 1945 Manchurian campaign. Possible future Soviet
deception operations along the central NATO front are discussed.
3. Brown, Anthony Cave. Bodyguard of Lies. New York:
Harper & Row, 1975.
The major strategic- and operational-level deception operations carried out by British and American forces during World
War II are described in detail in this excellent, well-documented
book. The evolution of deception planning and operations during
the war comes alive as the author describes Allied deception
efforts and German reactions to them. This is an excellent study
of how to organize and implement deception operations.
4. Cruickshank, Charles. Deception in World War II. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1980.
This book contains descriptions of the most significant deception operations carried out during World War II in the areas of
Europe and North Africa, including some of a diplomatic nature.
Deception techniques and methods, the need for thorough planning and security, and the great benefits that can result from
deception are described. This book shows how the U.S. Army's
attitude changed from skepticism toward deception to one of advocacy as World War II progressed and the value of deception
became clear.
5. Daniel, Donald C., and Katherine L. Herbig, eds. Strategic
Military Deception. New York: Pergamon Press, 1982.
This excellent book consists of sixteen essays almost equally
divided between the theory and the practice of deception. Among
the theoretical articles are analyses of the nature and the process of deception. The deception operations that are examined
include German, American-British, and Soviet operations during
World War II; Chinese deception practices during the Chinese
Civil War; and Egyptian deception in their 1973 war with Israel.
This book is must reading for the student of deception.
6. Eisenhower, John S. D. The Bitter Woods. New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1969.
The contribution of deception to the success of the German's
Ardennes offensive is discussed. Chapter 9, "Allied Intelligence
is Befuddled," examines the reasons why Allied intelligence
failed to correctly assess German capabilities and intentions.
The conclusion is that because German deception encouraged
the Allies to believe what they wanted to believe, indications of
German preparations for an attack were explained away by the
Allies or simply discounted.
7. Garthoff, Raymond L. Soviet Military Doctrine. Glencoe, IL:
Free Press, 1953.
Chapter 16, entitled "Deception, Surprise, and Security,"
describes the place of deception in Soviet military doctrine. Passages on deception in Soviet field regulations and other publications are quoted. Examples of successful Soviet deception operations during World War II are presented.
8. Gooch, John, and Amos Perlmutter, eds. Military Deception
and Strategic Surprise. Totowa, NJ: Frank Cass and
Co., 1982.
The six essays in this book deal primarily with the theory
of deception and strategic-level deception. They present a good
picture of the dynamics of deception and the potential benefits
of deception. Examples of operational-level deception are mentioned in some of the essays to illustrate certain points.
9. Montagu, Ewen. The Man Who Never Was. Philadelphia:
J. P. Lippincott Co., 1954.
This book describes "Operation Mincemeat/' the dumping
of the body of a fictitious British officer into the sea off Spain
as part of the deception plan for the invasion of Sicily. The
author originated the idea and helped carry it out, and his detailed description of these events gives a special insight into
how deception operations are planned and implemented. The
analysis of German reactions to the deception presents useful
lessons in the psychology of deception. This deception operation,
which caused the Germans to redeploy significant forces away
from Sicily, stands as a classic example of a wartime ruse.
10. Owen, David. Battle of Wits: A History of Psychology and
Deception in Modern Warfare. London: Leo Cooper,
1978.
This book discusses deception and psychological warfare as
practiced in the twentieth century. Examples are drawn primarily from World War II, but there are also examples from
World War I, the Korean War, the Arab-Israeli wars, the brushfire wars of the 1950s and 1960s, and the Vietnam War. The
need to outthink the enemy is stressed, and deception is shown
to be an important way to accomplish this goal. A large portion
of this book is devoted to the use of intelligence agents and
strategic deception, but the role of deception in such military
operations as the Battle of El Alamein and the Normandy
landing is also discussed.
11. Perrault, Gilles. The Secret of D-Day. Boston: Little, Brown,
and Co., 1965.
This book contains one of the best accounts of the deception
accompanying the Normandy landings. The detailed description
of German reactions to Operation Fortitudethe Allied deception
effortshows what it takes for a deception operation to be
successful.
12. The Tangled Web. By the editors of the Army Times.
Washington, DC: Robert B. Luce, 1963.
This book consists of fifteen chapters, each one a description
of a successful deception operation. The greatest number of ex-
amples are from World War II, but there are also examples from
World War I, the Philippine pacification campaign, and the Civil
War.
13. Vigor, P. H. Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory. New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1983.
This book is primarily an examination of how Soviet doctrinal thought on using conventional forces in the nuclear age
has developed. The key to using conventional forces in this new
era is the ability of forces to achieve a rapid and decisive victory. Surprise is one essential element in achieving such a victory, and surprise is, in turn, dependent in large measure upon
successful deception operations. This book discusses the high
value placed upon deception by the Soviet Army. Special attention is given to the use of deception by Soviet forces during the
Manchurian campaign of August 1945.
14. Whaley, Barton. Codeword Barbarossa. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1973.
This is an excellent, thoroughly documented study of the reasons why Germany had complete strategic surprise when it suddenly attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. Whaley examines the successful German deception effort and develops a new
explanation for understanding why Stalin was fooled by Hitler.
He shows how disinformation reduced ambiguity in Stalin's
mind, making him more certain, yet wronger, about German
intentions.
15.
Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1969. CARL N17417.4 A-E.
This exhaustive, major study begins with a general description of deception theory and the practice of deception in warfare.
It then presents analyses of 168 battles from 16 wars during
the years 191468 to show how important deception operations
are at both the strategic and the tactical level. The author concludes that at both levels the use of deception is more than ten
times more likely to result in surprise than is reliance on cover
alone.
Part BArticles
16. Brown, J. Tuck, Col. "Countersurveillance." Field Artillery
48 (May-June 1980):4447.
This article examines cover and deception from the perspective of Countersurveillance. Particular attention is given to the
use of smoke, decoys, and disguises. The author advocates
greater Army use of large-area smoke screens.
17. Croizat, V. J., Col. "Mislead the Enemy/' Marine Corps
Gazette 43 (October 1959):5253.
Colonel Croizat, USMC, believes that deception, properly
used, may well be the decisive element for determining victory
or defeat on the battlefield. He advocates that the commanders
of all units, from the largest to the smallest, become deception
conscious and also intelligence conscious, because in his opinion,
accurate intelligence on the enemy is absolutely crucial for conducting a successful deception operation.
18. Dashevskiy, Ya, Lt. Gen. "Camouflage, Concealment, Deception: Organization and Execution." USSR Report: Military Affairs no. 1525 (24 July 1980):4656. Translated by
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service from the Russian article entitled "Organizing and Executing Operational Camouflage, Concealment and Deception" in
Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal [Military history journal],
(April 1980):4652.
This article emphasizes the importance of centralized planning and control in operations that involve operational camouflage, concealment, and deception. Examples from World War II
show the Soviet Army's use of operational camouflage, concealment, and deception in a variety of situations. The author notes
that successful operational camouflage, concealment, and deception contributed to many victories and states that this type of
operational support is still important in modern-day operations.
19. Deutsch, Harold C. "The Influence of ULTRA on World
War II." Parameters (December 1978):215.
This article is primarily a general description of Ultra's tremendous contribution to the Allied war effort. However, Professor Deutsch does discuss Ultra's role in deception operations,
noting that it crippled most German deception efforts and
allowed the Allies to measure the success of their own deception
10
This article is a good general summary of the various elements that are part of deceptionincluding secrecy, security, demonstration attacks, and feints. Historical examples of successful deception operations are presented.
38. Stevens, Jennie A., and Henry S. Marsh. "Surprise and Deception in Soviet Military Thought." Part 1: Military
Review 62 (June 1982):211; part 2: Military Review
62 (July 1982):2435.
This two-part article provides a good review of Soviet
thinking on surprise and deception at the tactical, operational,
and strategic levels. Part 1 focuses on surprise, while part 2
concentrates on deception. Soviet use of concealment, imitation,
demonstration maneuvers, and disinformation is examined in
detail. The difficulty of carrying out a deception operation is
also discussed.
39. Szkoda, W. E., Capt. "Camouflage and Deception." Armor
70 (September-October 1961):4853.
Captain Szkoda discusses deception techniques that are especially relevant to tanks. The successful British deception effort
at the Battle of El Alamein is examined in some detail.
40. Westenberger, Paul H., Maj. "Beware the Russian Ruse."
Marine Corps Gazette 48 (January 1964):2731.
This article describes many acts of deception carried out by
the Soviet Army in World War II, including the use of Russian
units dressed in German uniforms. The importance of deception
within the Soviet Army is illustrated.
41. Ziemke, Earl F. "Operation Kreml: Deception, Strategy, and
the Fortunes of War." Parameters 9 (March 1979):7283.
This article discusses the possible influence the German deception plan, Kreml, may have had on Eastern Front campaigns
during the summer of 1942. Kreml was intended to make the
Russians believe that the main German thrust during the 1942
campaign season would be directed at Moscow. The great Soviet
strategic retreat on the southern flank during the summer of
1942 is seen as a possible response to this German deception
plan.
August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945. Leavenworth Papers no. 8. Fort
11
12
13
14
15
16
59. U.S. Army Air Force. Camouflage School. Operational Deception. March Field, CA, 1943. CARL MF N2366A.
This textbook from the Army Air Force Camouflage School
reviews the basic components of deception operations. There are
specific sections on operational planning, staff procedures, the
means of deception, and enemy intelligence. Historical examples
of successful deception operations, mostly from World War II,
are presented in an appendix.
60. U.S. Army Ground Forces. Army War College. "German
Methods of Legitimate Deception." Washington, DC,
1944. CARL N4910.
This item is a two-page listing of thirty-two types of tactical
deception used by the German Army in World War II.
61. U.S. Army Security Agency. "Verbatim Extracts from the
Official History of the 23d Headquarters Special
Troops." Arlington, VA, n.d. CARL N17272.62A.
This document summarizes the deception operations carried
out by the 23d Headquarters Special Troops during the period
1 July 1944 through 24 March 1945. Extracts from selected afteraction reports describe the variety of methods (including spoof
radio, dummy equipment, special effects, and sonic workings)
used to deceive the enemy. The contribution of deception operations to U.S. Army operations is shown.
62. U.S. Department of the Army. Army Regulation 52521, Tactical Deception (TAC-D) Policy (Including Camouflage,
Countersurveillance, and Concealment). Washington,
DC, 1982.
This regulation sets forth the Army's TAC-D policy, describes the role of TAC-D in combat operations, and identifies
objectives and assigns responsibilities for TAC-D. The various
Army commands are directed to develop capabilities at corps
echelons and below to use TAC-D during day-to-day operations,
mobilization, periods of international tension, and war. This
means having the ability to hide the real through camouflage,
Countersurveillance, and concealment and the ability to portray
the false through deception. A glossary is included and it defines TAC-D as: "Actions at Corps level or below which mislead
the enemy and induce him to do something counter to his interests. It includes manipulating, distorting, or falsifying evidence
available to the enemy to ensure security to real plans, operations, or activities."
17
63. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 902, Tactical
Deception. Washington, DC, 1978.
This manual divides military deception into two levels, strategic and tactical. Tactical deception is defined as short-term
actions undertaken by a corps or lower-level unit within the battle area to mislead the enemy and induce him to do something
counter to his interests. The five chapters of this manual look
at the nature of deception, the means of deception, deception
planning, ideas for deception, and deception training. Historical
examples of deception are presented throughout the manual and
in one of the appendices. Information on how to apply deception
to field training exercises, ideas and techniques for electronic
deception, and a sample deception plan are contained in other
appendices. This manual is devoted primarily to deception at
battalion level and below. It does not address deception at the
operational level of war.
64. U.S. Department of the Army. Pamphlet no. 20201, Military Improvisation During the Russian Campaign.
Washington, DC, 1951.
This short pamphlet was prepared for the U.S. Army by a
group of former German generals and general staff officers. It
describes combat methods that the Germans improvised to meet
the special conditions of the Eastern Front. One section in chapter 6 describes deceptive supply movements.
65. U.S. Department of the Army. Pamphlet no. 20230, Russian
Combat Methods in World War II. Washington, DC,
1950.
The information in this pamphlet was gathered from a group
of former German generals and general staff corps officers who
had extensive experience on the Eastern Front. Chapter 13 discusses camouflage, deception, and propaganda. The Russians are
praised for their skill and effectiveness in carrying out camouflage and deception operations. They are noted for their strict
camouflage discipline and their use of many deception measures
to achieve surprise.
66. U.S. Department of the Army. Office of the Chief of Military History. Deception and Cover Plans. [Foreign Military Studies nos. P-044 ac]. Washington, DC, 1952.
CARL N17570.
This item is a collection of three manuscripts on deception.
Each one was written by a high-ranking German officer on the
18
19
20
operations. Subsequent sections discuss the physical characteristics of smoke, smoke-generating substances, equipment and
means for generating smoke, the use of smoke agents by naval
forces, the principles of the use of smoke in ground combat,
and calculations for the use of smoke. The material is often
quite detailed and technical. This is a good source on the subject of smoke.
70. Willemer, Wilhelm, Oberst, et al. Camouflage. U.S. Army
Europe, Historical Division, 1953. CARL Nl7500.20.
This thorough study discusses the importance of camouflage
and its use in virtually every type of military situation. An appendix contains a description of how the Panzer Lehr Division
incorporated camouflage into its operations in Normandy during
June and July 1944. In the face of unchallenged Allied air superiority, the German Army used camouflage to survive, but its
mobility and effective firepower were seriously diminished.
Part BArticles
71. Auten, Chesley, Capt., and Douglas O. Jones, WO1. "The
Mission is Subdued." U.S. Army Aviation Digest 21
(August 1975):69.
This article describes how a helicopter unit camouflaged its
positions during a training exercise at Fort Bliss, Texas.
72. Chulanov, A., Lt. Col. "Concealment and Surprise/' Soviet
Military Review (January 1981):2930.
This brief account of a tactical training exercise presents a
lesson in the use of camouflage to conceal forces and achieve
surprise in the attack.
73. "Communist Camouflage and Deception." Air University
Quarterly 6 (Spring 1953):90100.
This article discusses the use of camouflage and deception
by communist forces during the Korean War. Many aerial photographs are presented to illustrate a great variety of camouflage
techniques.
74. Deen, Grady, M. Sgt. "Camouflage." Infantry 64 (NovemberDecember 1974):5051.
Master Sergeant Deen is concerned about the deterioration
of Army training in the use of camouflage. He believes that
camouflage should be recognized as an essential element in all
military operations and be given command emphasis at all
levels of the Army. Camouflage techniques are discussed.
75. DeWitt, B. B., Maj. "Camouflage: A Neglected Art." Marine
Corps Gazette 45 (December 1961):4650.
Major DeWitt considers good intelligence to be the key to
successful operations, and he wants U.S. forces to do more to
keep the enemy from having good intelligence. In his view, more
attention must be paid to concealment and especially to what
he calls deceptive camouflage, i.e., the use of dummies and decoys to deceive the enemy. This article is a good review of the
value of camouflage at the tactical level.
76. Ellsen, J., Commander, and J. Jarnekull. "To See, But Not
to Be Seen." Armada International 6 (May-June 1982):
64+.
Camouflage techniques that can counter reconnaissance carried out by radar, infrared sensors, television, and lasers are
21
22
23
24
25
91. Smith, Philip R. Jr. "Now You See ItNow You Don't."
Army Digest 26 (January 1971):5760.
This article reviews the place of camouflage in war. The
U.S. Army's historical tendency to disregard the use of camouflage is mentioned, and the hope is expressed that the experiences of the Vietnam War will increase interest in camouflage.
92. Spanier, Tom. "Camouflage in the Electronic Battlefield."
Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest (October 1977):
3840.
This article is in the form of an interview with Tom Spanier,
a representative of the Sullivan Company of San Francisco.
This company is one of the oldest makers of camouflage in the
United States and has had U.S. Army contracts to design and
develop camouflage against modern sensors. Mr. Spanier discusses camouflage in general terms and also in terms of his
company's products. He believes that camouflage can be effective on the electronic battlefield and will greatly improve the
survivability of forces that use it.
93. Sylvester, A. T. "Camouflage for Battle Survival." National
Defense 63 (July-August 1978):4849+.
The importance of camouflage and the difficulty of camouflaging weapons from a growing number of increasingly sensitive sensors are discussed in this article. The U.S. Army's use
of pattern painting and camouflage screens is described.
94. Yelshin, N., Lt. Col. "Camouflage in the Desert." Soviet
Military Review 8 (August 1975):1819.
In the course of describing how to camouflage forces in a
desert, this article presents a clear picture of the importance
placed on camouflage and deception by the Soviet Army. It is
stated that World War II experiences show that an expenditure
of effort on camouflage will be returned a hundredfold. The
camouflage techniques described by the author show great care
and attention to detail.
95. Zimon, Henry A., Capt. "The Bushmasters." Air Defense
Magazine (October-December 1975):811.
An exercise at Ft. Bliss, Texas, in which a Hawk battery
was successfully concealed from visual and electronic surveillance is described. Techniques of desert camouflage are discussed.
28
29
U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 520, Camouflage. Washington, DC, 1968.
This field manual is a comprehensive guide to camouflage.
The principles involved in concealing or disguising troops, vehicles, weapons, and field installations are discussed. Many
photos and figures are used to illustrate camouflage techniques.
This field manual is almost twenty years old, and for that
reason, many of the camouflage techniques available today are
not described.
105. U.S. Forces, European Theater. General Board. "Smoke
Generator Operations and Organization." N.p., 1946.
CARL R12896.69.
This report examines the use of smoke in the European theater during World War II and makes recommendations for future
smoke generator unit organization and equipment. The General
Board expresses its belief that World War II experiences validate
the value of smoke operations but is concerned that future developments in radar and infrared sensing may render smoke
obsolete.
106.
U.S. Navy. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Division of Naval Intelligence. Air Intelligence Group.
Photo Interpretation Center. Japanese Camouflage.
Anacostia, DC, U.S. Naval Air Station, n.d.. CARL
R14200.
This work is a collection of photographs used to instruct
photographic interpreters. The basic methods of camouflage used
by the Japanese are illustrated.
107.
30
vidual soldiers, small positions, and fortifications and the construction of dummy weapons and decoy positions. Japanese skill
at improvisation using materials available on the spot is
discussed.
Deception
Historical Examples from World War I and Before: 12, 15, 27,
35.
Nature and Theory: 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 20, 22, 23, 28,
33, 34, 37, 47, 48,; 52,, 54, 55, 62, 63, 66.
Operational and Strategic: 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 24,
29, 33, 44, 47, 48, 49, 51, 66.
Tactical: 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 24, 31, 32, 39, 43, 44, 47, 48, 53,
60, 61, 63.
British Army: 3, 4, 5, 11, 15, 39, 59, 67.
German Army: 2, 5, 6, 14, 15, 25, 31, 41, 51, 59, 64, 66.
Japanese Army: 15.
Soviet Army: 1, 2, 5, 7, 13, 15, 26, 29, 33, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 45,
46, 47, 49,150/, 52 65 66U.S. Army: 3, 4, 5, 11, 15, 30, 47, 48, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59,
61, 62, 63.
32
86-2537-2500-22 May 86
jmimimmimimiiNiiiimiiimNNmiNNiimiiimimmiiiNm