Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972

Elements of carnapping
Carnapping is defined as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things.<ref>Republic Act No. 6539, Sec. 2</ref> There is no
arguing
that
the
anti-carnapping
law
is
a
special
law,
different
from
the crimes ofrobbery and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. The anti-carnapping law
particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles.<ref>People vs. Tan, G.R. No.
135904, 21 January 2000</ref> The elements of the crime of carnapping are:<ref>People
vs. Roxas, G.R. No. 172604, 17 August 2010</ref>

1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;

Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the
consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using
force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of
the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.

2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle;
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking
of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to
gain.The term gain is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit
which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus,
the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owners consent constitutes gain.

3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;

4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things.

A motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain,
without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without violence or
intimidation of persons, or with or without the use of force upon things.<ref>Republic Act
No. 6539, Sec. 2</ref> A careful comparison of this special law with the crimes
of robberyand theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit:
unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken
without the latter's consent.<ref>People vs. Tan, G.R. No. 135904, 21 January 2000</ref>
Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within
the purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment of
said statute.<ref>People vs. Tan, G.R. No. 135904, 21 January 2000</ref>
Unlawful taking
As an element common to theft, robbery and carnapping, unlawful taking its import,
intention and concept should be considered as also common to these crimes.<ref>People
vs. Tan, G.R. No. 135904, 21 January 2000</ref> A felonious taking may be defined as the
act of depriving another of the possession and dominion of movable property without his
privity and consent and without animus revertendi. Thus, an unlawful taking takes place
when the owner or juridical possessor does not give his consent to the taking; or, if the
consent was given, it was vitiated; or where an act by the receiver soon after the actual
transfer of possession constitutes unlawful taking.<ref>People vs. Tan, G.R. No. 135904, 21
January 2000</ref>
When property stolen is found in the possession of a person who is unable to give a
satisfactory explanation of his possession thereof, he may be deemed to have committed
the crime of theft of said property.<ref>People vs. Sia, G.R. No. 137457, 21 November
2001</ref> The application of this presumption validly applies to a case of carnapping for,

indeed, the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping is the same and, had
it not been for the enactment of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the unlawful taking of the motor
vehicle would certainly fall within the purview of either theft or robbery.<ref>People vs. Sia,
G.R. No. 137457, 21 November 2001</ref> See Disputable presumptions.
It involves a motor vehicle
The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 defines a motor vehicle as any vehicle propelled by any
power other than muscular power using the public highways, but excepting road rollers,
trolley cars, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts,
amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles, which run only on
rails or tracks, and tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used exclusively for
agricultural purposes. Trailers having any number of wheels, when propelled or intended to
be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be classified as separate motor vehicle
with no power rating.<ref>Republic Act No. 6539, Sec. 2</ref>
There is nothing in the law that requires a license to use a public highway to make the
vehicle a "motor vehicle" within the definition given the anti-carnapping law.<ref>Izon vs.
People, G.R. No. L-51370, 31 August 1981</ref> Any vehicle which is motorized using the
streets which are public, not exclusively for private use, comes within the concept of motor
vehicle.<ref>Izon vs. People, G.R. No. L-51370, 31 August 1981</ref> Highways are always
public, free for the use of every person. If a vehicle uses the streets, with or without the
required license, it comes within the protection of the law, for the severity of the offense is
not to be measured by what kind of streets or highway the same is used; but by the very
nature of the vehicle itself and the use to which it is devoted. Otherwise, cars using the
streets but still unlicensed or unregistered as when they have just been bought from the
company, or only on test runs, may be stolen without the penal sanction of the anticarnapping statute, but only as simple robbery punishable under the provision of the Revised
Penal Code.<ref>Izon vs. People, G.R. No. L-51370, 31 August 1981</ref>
A motorized tricycle, even if not licensed to use a public highway, is a motor vehicle under
the provision of the Anti-Carnapping Act.<ref>Izon vs. People, G.R. No. L-51370, 31 August
1981</ref>
Penalty for Carnapping
Any person who is found guilty of carnapping shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle
taken, be punished by:<ref>Republic Act No. 6539, Sec. 14</ref>

When the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or

force upon things - imprisonment for not less than fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months and not more than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. In Mercado vs.
People,<ref>G.R. No. 149375, 26 November 2002</ref> the accused broke a quarter
window of the Isuzu Trooper to gain access to it, thus demonstrating that force was
used upon the vehicle. The Supreme Court applied the Indeterminate Sentence
Law and imposed an indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months to twenty-two (22) years.

When the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of

any person, or force upon things - by imprisonment for not less than seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months and not more than thirty (30) years.

In People vs. dela Cruz,<ref>G.R. Nos. 141162-63, 11 July 2002</ref> the accused were
charged separately with the crimes of carnapping and murder, which means that they
cannot be convicted with qualified carnapping. As none of the qualifying circumstances were
alleged in the information, the accused could only be convicted with carnapping under the
first clause of R.A. 6539, Section 14, with a penalty of not less than fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months and not more than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty is an indeterminate sentence of

fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months, as maximum. As to the homicide, the penalty is reclusion temporal, the range of
which is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no modifying circumstance, the accused
was sentenced to a prison term of eight (8) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In People vs. Paramil,<ref>G.R. Nos. 128056-57, 31 March 2000</ref> the accused were
separately charged and convicted with carnapping under the second clause of Section 14,
with a penalty of not be more than seventeen years and four months and not more than
thirty years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed on each of
accused for carnapping is an indeterminate sentence of 17 years and 4 months, as
minimum, to 30 years, as maximum. With respect to the crime of murder, since the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not alleged in the information,
accused should be held liable only for the crime of homicide defined under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, considering that the aggravating circumstance of abuse
of superior strength attended the killing of the victim, the penalty of reclusion
temporalprovided under said article was imposed in its maximum period. Applying again the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the indeterminate sentence of prision mayor, as minimum,
andreclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum, was imposed.
Qualified carnapping or aggravated form of carnapping
When the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof - the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.<ref>Republic Act No. 6539, Sec. 14, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which took effect on 31 December 1993</ref> Three
amendments were made by Republic Act No. 7659 on Section 14 of R.A. 6539, viz: (1) the
change of the penalty of life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape,
and (3) the change of the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." The latter makes clear the
intention of the law to make the offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-avis paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Codeon robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons. As such, the killing (or the rape) merely qualifies the
crime of carnapping which for lack of specific nomenclature may be known as qualified
carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated form. In short, considering the
phraseology of the amended Section 14, the carnapping and the killing (or the rape) may be
considered as a single or indivisible crime or a special complex crime which, however, is not
covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.<ref>People vs. Mejia, G.R. Nos. 118940-41
and G.R. No. 119407, 7 July 1997</ref> Since Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539 uses the words "IS
KILLED," no distinction must be made between homicide and murder. Whether it is one or
the other which is committed "in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof" makes
no difference insofar as the penalty is concerned.<ref>People vs. Mejia, G.R. Nos. 11894041 and G.R. No. 119407, 7 July 1997</ref>
However, this should be distinguished from People vs. Pavida, et al.,<ref>G.R. Nos. 127125
& 138952, 6 July 1999</ref> and similar cases, wherein the accused were charged with two
separate informations with "Simple Carnapping" and "Murder", and convicted of these two
separate crimes, and not "Carnapping in the Aggravated Form," although the facts showed
that the accused-appellants killed the driver of the carnapped vehicle in the commission of
the carnapping.
In the 2001 case of People vs. Sia,<ref>G.R. No. 137457, 21 November 2001</ref> which
involves the death of the driver, the Supreme Court applied Article 63 (2) of theRevised
Penal Code, relating to the application of indivisible penalties when there neither mitigating
or aggravating penalty. The lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed.

Separate crimes of carnapping and robbery with homicide

Carnapping does not necessarily absorb robbery with homicide. Carnapping refers
specifically to the taking of a motor vehicle. It does not cover the taking of cash or personal
property which is not a motor vehicle. The taking of the tricycle constitutes a violation of the
anti-carnapping law, while the taking of the cash by hitting him with a stone and stabbing
him in the chest constitutes the crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code.<ref>People vs. dela Cruz, G.R. No. 174658, 24 February
2009</ref>