1

Falsified/altered evidence

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 1302, 1391 and 1543. April 26, 1991.]
PAULINO VALENCIA, Complainant, v. ATTY.
ARSENIO FER. CABANTING, Respondent.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, Complainant, v. ATTY.
DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U.
JOVELLANOS and ATTY. ARSENIO FER.
CABANTING, Respondents.
LYDIA BERNAL, Complainant, v. ATTY. DIONISIO C.
ANTINIW, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY AND
CLIENT; PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS. Public policy
prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary
relationship involved. It is intended to curtail any
undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed
may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty and
disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition
would constitute malpractice (In re Attorney Melchor
Ruste, 40 O.G. p. 78) and is a ground for suspension.
(Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIES WHILE LITIGATION IS PENDING.
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel
concerned, applies only while the litigation is pending.
(Director of Lands v. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez v.
Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A THING IS IN LITIGATION WHILE A
CERTIORARI IS STILL IN PROGRESS; CASE AT BAR. In
the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer
Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment,
there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing
is said to be in litigation not only if there is some
contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the
moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action
of the judge. (Gan Tingco v. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81).
Logic dictates, in certiorariproceedings, that the
appellate court may either grant or dismiss the
petition. Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes
under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated when
the judgment of the trial court become final while
a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress.
Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in
this case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art.
1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly,
this malpractice is a ground for suspension.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF
WITNESSES; AFFIRMATIVE TESTIMONY IS GIVEN
GREATER WEIGHT THAN NEGATIVE TESTIMONY. It is
asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and
received the sum of P200.00 in consideration of his
executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva"
which would show that Paulino bought the property.
This charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is settled
jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is given
greater weight than negative testimony (Bayasen v.
CA, L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos v. CA, Et
Al., L-40804, Jan. 31, 1978). When an individuals
integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough
that he deny the charges against him; he must meet
the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator
and show proofs that he still maintains the highest
degree of morality and integrity which at all time is
expected of him. (De los Reyes v. Aznar, Adm. Case No.
1334, Nov. 28, 1989).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF A FARMER WHO
FINISHED ONLY GRADE IV ON DELICATE SUBJECT GIVEN

CREDENCE. Although Paulino was a common farmer

who finished only Grade IV, his testimony, even if not
corroborated by another witness, deserves credence
and can be relied upon. His declaration dwelt on a
subject which was so delicate and confidential that it
would be difficult to believe the he fabricated his
evidence.
6. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY AND
CLIENT; FIRST DUTY OF A LAWYER IS NOT TO CLIENT
BUT TO ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. A lawyer owes
entire devotion to the interest of his client (Santos v.
Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622), but not at the expense of truth.
(Cosmos Foundry Shop workers Union v. La Bu, 63
SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client
but to the administration of justice. (Lubiano v.
Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his clients
success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to
and must always be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his clients cause
in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he
can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to illegal
means for his clients interest. It is the duty of an
attorney to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him, such means as are consistent
with truth and honor. (Pangan v. Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).
7. ID.; DISBARMENT; NOT MEANT AS PUNISHMENT BUT
INTENDED TO PROTECT THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE. Membership in the Bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. By far, the most important of
them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the
court. (In re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court
may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show his
unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili v.
CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore, is not
meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of
livelihood but is rather intended to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this function should be competent, honorable
and reliable in order that courts and the public may
rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega v. Sison,
125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the
high standards of the law profession.
8. ID.; ID.; RESPONDENT LAWYER SHOULD BE GIVEN
OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES.
Procedural due process demands that respondent
lawyer should be given an opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses against him. He enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of the charges against
him until the contrary is proved. (Santos v. Dichoso, 84
SCRA 622). The case must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. (Camus v. Diaz, Adm.
Case No. 1616, February 9, 1989). Since Atty. Antiniw
was not accorded this procedural due process, it is but
proper that the direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be
stricken out.
9. ID.; ID.; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE DOES NOT
RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF CASE; EXCEPTION. In view
also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the
complainant, Administrative Case No. 1543 should be
dismissed. Although the filing of an affidavit of
desistance by complainant for lack of interest does not
ipso facto result in the termination of a case for
suspension or disbarment of an erring lawyer. (Munar v.
Flores, 122 SCRA 448), We are constrained in the case
at bar, to dismiss the same because there was no
evidence to substantiate the charges.
10. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; HEARSAY. The
additional
charge
against
Atty.
Antiniw
in
Administrative Case No. 1391 is predicated on the
information furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based
on the personal knowledge of Constancia L. Valencia:
hence, hearsay. "Any evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not
based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on
the knowledge of some other person not on the
witness stand." (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium,

2
6th ed., vol. 2, 1989, p. 486). Being hearsay, the
evidence presented is inadmissible.

(Exhibits 3 and 3-A). On March 14, 1973, a writ of

execution was issued.

11. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY;

CAMARADERIE AMONG LAWYERS IS NOT PROOF OF
CONSPIRACY. Besides, the camaraderie among
lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of
brotherhood among them. One of the fourfold duties of
a lawyer in his duty to the Bar. A lawyer should treat
the opposing counsel, and his brethren in the law
profession, with courtesy, dignity and civility. They may
"do as adversaries do in the law: strive mightily but
(they) eat and drink as friends." This friendship does
not connote conspiracy.

On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of

the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the remaining
portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer
Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex "A" of
Administrative Case No. 1302).

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar
respondents Dionisio Antiniw, Arsenio Fer Cabanting
and Eduardo Jovellanos (the last named, now an MCTC
Judge) for grave malpractice and misconduct in the
exercise of their legal profession committed in the
following manner:
1. Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391
In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short)
and his wife Romana allegedly bought a parcel of land,
where they built their residential house, from a certain
Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro Raymundo the
original owner. However, they failed to register the sale
or secure a transfer certificate of title in their names.
Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held
in the house of Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos to settle the
land dispute between Serapia Raymundo (Serapia in
short) another heir of Pedro Raymundo, and the
Valencia spouses since both were relatives and distant
kin of Atty. Jovellanos. Serapia was willing to relinquish
ownership If the Valencias could now documents
evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of sale
written in the Ilocano dialect. However, Serapia
claimed that the deed covered a different property.
Paulino and Serapia were not able to settle their
differences. (Report of Investigating Judge Catalino
Castaeda, Jr., pp. 21-22).
On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty.
Arsenio Fer Cabanting, filed a complaint against
Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. V-2170,
entitled "Serapia Raymundo, Plaintiff, versus Paulino
Valencia, Defendant." (Report, p. 11)
Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the
Valencias engaged the services of Atty. Dionisio
Antiniw. Atty. Antiniw advised them to present a
notarized deed of sale in lieu of the private document
written in Ilocano. For this purpose, Paulino gave Atty.
Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay the person who
would falsify the signature of the alleged vendor
(Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 7). A "Compraventa
Definitiva" (Exh. B) was executed purporting to be a
sale of the questioned lot.
On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a decision in favor of
plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. The lower court expressed
the belief that the said document is not authentic.
(Report, p. 14).
Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under
Rule 65, with Preliminary Injunction before the Court of
Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to provide a
workable solution concerning his house. While the
petition was pending, the trial court, on March 9, 1973,
issued an order of execution stating that "the decision
in this case has already become final and executory"

On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment

proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1302)
against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that said counsel
allegedly violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as
well as Article II of the Canons of Professional Ethics,
prohibiting the purchase of property under litigation by
a counsel.
On March 21, 1974 the appellate court dismissed the
petition of Paulino.
On October 14, 1974, Constancia Valencia, daughter of
Paulino, filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as
Administrative Case No. 1391) against Atty. Dionisio
Antiniw for his participation in the forgery of
"Compraventa
Definitiva"
and
its
subsequent
introduction as evidence for his client; and also,
against Attys. Eduardo Jovellanos and Arsenio
Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property allegedly
in violation of Article 1491 of the New Civil Code; and
against the three lawyers, for allegedly rigging Civil
Case No. V-2170 against her parents.
On August 17, 1975, Constancia Valencia filed
additional charges against Atty. Antiniw and Atty.
Jovellanos as follows:
"1. AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW:
"In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw fraudulently
and in confabulation with one Lydia Bernal had a deed
of sale, fabricated, executed and ratified before him as
Notary Public by one Santiago Bernal in favor of Lydia
Bernal when as a matter of fact said Santiago Bernal
had died already about eight years before in the year
1965.
"2. AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS:
"In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos, fraudulently
and in bad faith, in confabulation with Rosa de los
Santos as vendee had, as Notary Public, executed and
ratified before him, two (2) deeds of sale in favor of
said Rosa de los Santos when as a matter of fact the
said deeds were not in fact executed by the supposed
vendor Rufino Rincoraya and so said Rufino Rincoraya
had filed a Civil Case in Court to annul and declare void
the said sales." (p. 7, Report)
2. Administrative Case No. 1543.
A deed of donation propter nuptias, involving the
transfer of a piece of land by the grandparents of Lydia
Bernal (complainant) in favor of her parents, was lost
during the last world war. For this reason, her
grandmother (the living donor) executed a deed of
confirmation of the donation propter nuptias with
renunciation of her rights over the property.
(Complaint, p. 1). Notwithstanding the deed, her
grandmother still offered to sell the same property in
favor of the complainant, ostensibly to strengthen the
deed of donation (to prevent others from claiming the
property).
On consultation, Atty. Antiniw advised them to execute
a deed of sale. Atty. Antiniw allegedly prepared and
notarized the deed of sale in the name of her
grandfather (deceased at the time of signing) with her
grandmothers approval.

3
Felicidad Bernal-Duzon, her aunt who had a claim over
the property, filed a complaint against her (Lydia
Bernal) and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for falsification of
a public document. (Complaint, pp. 1-2) The fiscal
exonerated the counsel for lack of evidence, while a
case was filed in court against Lydia Bernal.
On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment
proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1543)
against Atty. Antiniw for illegal acts and bad advice.
Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this
Court dated December 9, 1974, the resolution of the
Second Division dated March 3, 1975 and the two
resolutions of the Second Division both dated
December 3, 1975, Administrative Cases Nos. 1302,
1391 and 1543 were referred to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Upon formal request of Constancia L. Valencia and
Lydia Bernal dated March 3, 1976, all of these cases
were ordered consolidated by Solicitor General Estelito
P. Mendoza per his handwritten directive of March 9,
1976.
On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of
these cases to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
When Atty. Jovellanos was appointed as Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judge of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan,
We referred the investigation of these cases to Acting
Presiding Judge Cesar Mindaro, Regional Trial Court,
Branch
50,
Villasis,
Pangasinan,
for
further
investigation.
In view of the seriousness of the charge against the
respondents and the alleged threats against the person
of complainant Constancia L. Valencia, We directed the
transfer of investigation to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
The three administrative cases were raffled to Branch
XVII of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, under the
sala of Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr.
After investigation, Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr.,
recommended the dismissal of cases against Atty.
Jovellanos and Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting; dismissal of
Administrative Case No. 1543 and the additional
charges in Administrative Case No. 1391 against
Antiniw
and
Judge
Jovellanos;
however,
he
recommended the suspension of Atty. Antiniw from the
practice of law for six months finding him guilty of
malpractice in falsifying the "Compraventa Definitiva."
The simplified issues of these consolidated cases are:
I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject
property in violation of Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code.
II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are
guilty of malpractice in falsifying notarial documents.
III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in
rigging Civil Case No. V-2170.
I
Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:
The following persons cannot acquire by purchase,
even at a public of judicial auction, either in person or
through the mediation of another:
x

(5) . . .this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by

assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to
the property and rights which may be the object of any

litigation in which they make take part by virtue of

their profession.

Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the

fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended to curtail
any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client.
Greed may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty
and disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition
would constitute malpractice (In re Attorney Melchor
Ruste, 40 O.G. p. 78) and is a ground for suspension.
(Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel
concerned, applies only while the litigation is pending.
(Director of Lands v. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez v.
Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer
Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment,
there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing
is said to be in litigation not only if there is some
contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the
moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action
of the judge. (Gan Tingco v. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81).
Logic dictates, in certiorari proceedings, that the
appellate court may either grant or dismiss the
petition. Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes
under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated when
the judgment of the trial court become final while
a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress.
Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in
this case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art.
1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly,
this malpractice is a ground for suspension.
The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute
malpractice. There was no attorney-client relationship
between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that
the latter did not take part as counsel in Civil Case No.
V-2170. The transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor
by the Canons adverted to.
II
It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and
received the sum of P200.00 in consideration of his
executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva"
which would show that Paulino bought the property.
This charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is settled
jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is given
greater weight than negative testimony (Bayasen v.
CA, L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos v. CA, Et
Al., L-40804, Jan. 31, 1978). When an individuals
integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough
that he deny the charges against him; he must meet
the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator
and show proofs that he still maintains the highest
degree of morality and integrity which at all time is
expected of him. (De los Reyes v. Aznar, Adm. Case No.
1334, Nov. 28, 1989).
Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished
only Grade IV, his testimony, even if not corroborated
by another witness, deserves credence and can be
relied upon. His declaration dwelt on a subject which
was so delicate and confidential that it would be
difficult to believe the he fabricated his evidence.
There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty.
Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale, and
its subsequent introduction in court prejudices his
prime duty in the administration of justice as an officer
of the court.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his
client (Santos v. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622), but not at the
expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shop workers Union
v. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not

4
to his client but to the administration of justice.
(Lubiano v. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his
clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of
law and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his
clients cause in utmost earnestness and with the
maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to
resort to illegal means for his clients interest. It is the
duty of an attorney to employ, for the purpose of
maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as
are consistent with truth and honor. (Pangan v. Ramos,
93 SCRA 87).
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. By far, the most important of them is
mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In
re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may
suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show his
unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili v.
CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore, is not
meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of
livelihood but is rather intended to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this function should be competent, honorable
and reliable in order that courts and the public may
rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega v. Sison,
125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the
high standards of the law profession.
The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Antiniw
and Atty. Jovellanos should be dismissed for lack of
evidence.
During the proceedings in Administrative Case No.
1543, Lydia Bernal testified in full on direct
examination, but she never submitted herself for crossexamination. Several subpoenas for cross-examination
were unheeded. She eventually requested the
withdrawal of her complaint.
Procedural due process demands that respondent
lawyer should be given an opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses against him. He enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of the charges against
him until the contrary is proved. (Santos v. Dichoso, 84
SCRA 622). The case must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. (Camus v. Diaz, Adm.
Case No. 1616, February 9, 1989). Since Atty. Antiniw
was not accorded this procedural due process, it is but
proper that the direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be
stricken out.
In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by
the complainant, Administrative Case No. 1543 should
be dismissed. Although the filing of an affidavit of
desistance by complainant for lack of interest does not
ipso facto result in the termination of a case for
suspension or disbarment of an erring lawyer. (Munar v.
Flores, 122 SCRA 448), We are constrained in the case
at bar, to dismiss the same because there was no
evidence to substantiate the charges.

III
There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers
involved in these administrative cases conspired in
executing the falsified "Compraventa Definitiva" and
rigged the Civil Case No. V-2170.
Atty. Jovellanos is a distant kin of the Raymundos and
Valencias. In fact, he and the Valencias are neighbors
and only two meters separate their houses. It would
not be believable that Atty. Jovellanos, a practicing
lawyer, would hold a meeting with the heirs of Pedro
Raymundo in his house with the intention of inducing
them to sue the Valencias. Atty. Jovellanos even tried to
settle the differences between the parties in a meeting
held in his house. He appeared in Civil Case No. V-2170
as an involuntary witness to attest to the holding of the
conference.
Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof
of conspiracy, but a sign of brotherhood among them.
One of the fourfold duties of a lawyer in his duty to the
Bar. A lawyer should treat the opposing counsel, and
his brethren in the law profession, with courtesy,
dignity and civility. They may "do as adversaries do in
the law: strive mightily but (they) eat and drink as
friends." This friendship does not connote conspiracy.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring:
1. Dionisio Antiniw DISBARRED from the practice of
law, and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll
of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer Cabanting SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for six months from finality of
this judgment; and 3. Administrative Case No. 1391
against Attorney Eduardo Jovellanos and additional
charges therein, and Administrative Case No. 1543
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[A.C. NO. 13021, A.C. No. 13912, A.C. No. 15433 :
June 30, 2008]
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, Complainant, v. ATTY.
DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal for reinstatement to the Bar of
respondent Dionisio C. Antiniw.
The record shows that respondent was disbarred and
his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys on April 26,
1991 in a consolidated Decision 4 of this Court, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in

Administrative Case No. 1391 is predicated on the
information furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based
on the personal knowledge of Constancia L. Valencia:
hence, hearsay. "Any evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not
based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on
the knowledge of some other person not on the
witness stand." (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium,
6th ed., vol. 2, 1989, p. 486). Being hearsay, the
evidence presented is inadmissible.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring:

1. Dionisio Antiniw DISBARRED from the practice of
law, and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll
of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer Cabanting SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for six months from finality of
this judgment; and 3. Administrative Case No. 1391
against Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos and additional charges
therein, and Administrative Case No. 1543 DISMISSED.

The additional charge filed by Constancia L. Valencia

against Atty. Jovellanos in Administrative Case No.
1391 was not proved at all. Complainant failed to prove
her additional charges.

In the aforesaid consolidated Decision, respondent was

found guilty of malpractice in falsifying a notarized
deed of sale and subsequently introducing the same as
evidence for his client in court.

5
Respondent's motion for reconsideration of the
consolidated decision disbarring him was denied by the
Resolution of August 26, 1993.5 In the same Resolution,
the Court also held with respect to respondent's plea
for mercy and compassion that:
x x x the same is merely NOTED until such time as he
would have been able to satisfactorily show contrition
and proof of his being again worthy of membership in
the legal profession.
Subsequently, in a Manifestation dated September 17,
1993,6 respondent proffered his apologies to the Court
for his shortcomings as a legal practitioner asserting
that if there was an offense or oversight committed
against the legal profession, it was due to his sincere
belief that he was doing it honestly to protect the
interest of his client. He pleaded that, pending his
submission of proof showing that he is again worthy of
membership in the Bar, he be permitted to continue
with his notarial work. In a Resolution dated October
19, 1993,7 the Court denied respondent's plea in the
aforesaid Manifestation.
On January 4, 1994, respondent filed a Petition dated
December 8, 19938 praying for leave to submit proof of
his being again worthy to be re-admitted to the legal
profession. Attached to the Petition were testimonials,
affidavits and sworn certifications of known and
outstanding members of his community at Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, as well as manifestos and resolutions of
groups and associations representing various sectors
thereat, all attesting to his honesty, worthiness,
respectability and competency as a lawyer and as an
elected Board Member in Pangasinan. In a Resolution
dated January 27, 1994,9 the Court denied said
petition. A Letter dated February 1, 199510 which was
sent to the Court by Bishop Jesus C. Galang, D.D. of the
Diocese of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, pleading for
respondent's reinstatement, was noted in the Court's
Resolution dated March 14, 1995.11
Respondent filed an Appeal for Reinstatement dated
March 8, 1996,12 declaring that since his disbarment,
he had embarked on and actively participated in civic
and humanitarian activities in the Fifth District of
Pangasinan where he was again elected for the third
time as a Provincial Board Member and for which
activities he received Plaques of Appreciation and
Recognition,
Resolution/Letters,
Awards
and
Commendations from local government officials of
Pangasinan and different groups and associations in
the province, all showing that he is worthy to once
again practice the legal profession. His appeal,
however, was denied by the Resolution dated April 23,
1996.13
On December 17, 1996, respondent filed a Plea for ReAdmission dated December 8, 1996,14 reiterating his
earlier plea for the lifting of his disbarment. The plea
was also denied on January 28, 1997.15
On September 1, 1997, respondent again filed a Plea
for Judicial Clemency and Reinstatement to the Bar
dated August 30, 1997,16 submitting in support thereof
the favorable indorsements, letters and resolutions
from the Pangasinan Chapter of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP); the Executive Judges of the
Regional Trial Courts at Lingayen and Urdaneta,

Pangasinan; the Provincial Prosecutor's Association of

Pangasinan; Eastern Pangasinan Lawyer's League; the
Provincial Board of Pangasinan; Rotary Club of
Urdaneta; and the past National President of the IBP,
Atty. Numeriano G. Tanopo Jr. The foregoing plea was
merely noted by the Court on October 14, 1997.17
The following year, respondent filed an Appeal dated
July 8, 1998,18 reiterating therein his apologies to the
Court and promising that should he be given back his
license to practice law, he will live up to the exacting
standards of the legal profession and abide by the
Code of Professional Ethics and the Lawyer's Oath.
Among the written proofs appended to his appeal was
the Letter dated June 18, 1998 19 from Bishop Galang, of
the Diocese of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, wherein he
reiterated
his
earlier
plea
for
respondent's
reinstatement.
In a Letter dated July 13, 1998 20 received by this Court
on July 23, 1998, Bishop Galang withdrew his letter
dated July 10, 1998 recommending respondent's
reinstatement for being misled into signing the same.
Thereafter, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion
dated December 22, 1998,21 wherein he pointed out
that more than seven (7) years had elapsed from the
time of his disbarment and that others who were
likewise disbarred but for a shorter duration, namely
Attys. Benjamin Grecia and Benjamin Dacanay, 22had
already been reinstated to the law profession. Among
the attachments to respondent's Manifestation was
Resolution No. 98-7c dated 6 July 1998 issued by the
IBP,
Pangasinan
Chapter,
strongly
indorsing
respondent's
plea
for
judicial
clemency
and
reinstatement, and the letter dated June 18, 1998 from
Bishop Galang supporting his reinstatement to the Bar.
In a Resolution dated February 9, 1999, 23 the Court
noted (a) the letters dated June 18, 1998 and July 13,
1998 of Bishop Galang; (b) Appeal dated July 8, 1998
and Manifestation and Motion dated December 22,
1998 both filed by respondent. Respondent was also
required to comment on Bishop Galang's letter dated
July 13, 1998 within ten days from notice.
In his Comments with Motion dated March 23,
1999,24 on Bishop Galang's letter dated July 13, 1998,
respondent denied the existence of a letter dated July
10, 1998 of Bishop Galang but acknowledged the
existence of the letter dated June 18, 1998.
Respondent averred that if the Bishop was indeed
referring to the June 18, 1998 letter, he never misled or
had any intention to mislead the bishop into signing
the same. By its Resolution dated June 22, 1999, 25 the
Court noted the aforesaid Comments with Motion of
respondent
An Appeal Reiterating Earlier Petition, Appeal, Pleas
and Motion for Reinstatement to the Bar dated August
28, 199926 was filed by the respondent on September
21, 1999. In a Resolution dated November 16,
1999,27 the Court noted said appeal and denied for lack
of merit respondent's prayer that his Plea for Judicial
Clemency and Reinstatement dated September 1, 1997
and Manifestation and Motion for Reinstatement dated
December 22, 1998 be approved and given due
course.

6
Thereafter, respondent's wife, Manuela A. Antiniw, sent
to the Court a Letter of Appeal dated February 7,
2000,28 asking for clemency in behalf of her husband
and affirming therein that her husband had for eight
(8) years continuously pleaded for his reinstatement
and that he had submitted proof by way of testimonials
of (a) his character and standing prior to his
disbarment, (b) his conduct subsequent to his
disbarment, and (c) his efficient government service.
Attached to the letter of respondent's wife was a sworn
testimonial of one of the complainants in the
consolidated administrative cases, Lydia Bernal,
attesting to the respondent's character reformation.
The aforesaid letter was noted by the Court in a
Resolution dated 28 February 2000.29
Respondent filed a Plea for Judicial Clemency and
Reinstatement dated March 19, 2001, 30 therein
asserting that the long period of his disbarment gave
him sufficient time to soul-search and reflect on his
professional conduct, redeem himself, and prove once
more that he would be able to practice law and at the
same time uphold the dignity of the legal profession.
The Court, in its Resolution of June 26, 2001, 31denied
the aforesaid plea.

Respondent then filed a Plea for Reinstatement to the

Bar dated February 28, 2002,38 stating therein that for
the past ten (10) years since he was disbarred, he had
deeply regretted having violated his obligations as a
lawyer; that he realized the gravity of his mistakes; and
that because of such disbarment, he even lost his
chance to be permanently appointed as City
Administrator of Urdaneta City and/or as City Legal
Officer, after his stint as a Provincial Board Member in
Pangasinan for three (3) consecutive terms. In the
event his disbarment is lifted, respondent then
promised never to cause dishonor again to the legal
profession and to abide by the ideals and canons
thereof. Attached to his Plea for Reinstatement to the
Bar were certifications from various civic and religious
groups attesting to his good moral character and to his
worthiness to be a member of the legal profession. In a
Resolution dated April 23, 2002, 39 the Court noted the
aforesaid Plea. Subsequently, the Court required the
IBP to Comment on the aforesaid respondent's Plea
through its Resolution dated July 23, 2002.40
In its Comment of September 9, 2002, 41 the IBP,
through
its
Commission
on
Bar
Discipline,
recommended the following:

By its Indorsement dated September 10, 2001,32 the

Office of the Chief Justice referred to the Bar Confidant
the letter dated August 24, 2001 33 of Assistant
Commissioner Jesse J. Caberoy of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) requesting comment on the
contention of respondent that the disbarment of a
lawyer only prevents him from practicing his profession
and does not operate to divest him of his earned
eligibility by passing the Bar examination. In a Letter
dated September 20, 2001, 34 respondent cited
pertinent
provisions
of
the
Omnibus
Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and
other pertinent Civil Service Laws in support of his
aforementioned stand. The aforesaid Letters dated
August 24, 2001 and September 20, 2001, of CSC
Assistant Commissioner and respondent, respectively,
were noted by the Court's Resolution dated November
20, 2001.35 Likewise in said Resolution, the letters were
referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
evaluation, report and recommendation.

Considering that the respondent has shown that he has

been repentant of what he had done which was a gross
violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Canon of
Professional Ethics and that he has been completely
reformed and is therefore worthy to be reinstated in
the Roll of Attorney's as evidenced by Certifications of
different religious and civic groups, it is recommended
that he be allowed to again practice the legal
profession.

In its Report and Recommendation dated January 25,

2002,36 the OBC opined that the eligibility vested in a
successful bar candidate would not be prejudiced or
forfeited by his disbarment and the matter of enjoying
first - grade eligibility by passing the Bar, in relation to
the position of City Administrator, should be
determined by the CSC. Nevertheless, the OBC was of
the view that the controversy between the CSC and
respondent could not be considered as already ripe for
judicial determination. Thus, the OBC recommended
that the CSC, through Assistant Commissioner
Caberoy, and respondent be advised to institute the
corresponding legal remedy before the proper court.

The aforesaid comment was noted and referred to the

IBP
Board
of
Governors
for
comment
and
recommendation by the Resolution dated December 3,
2002.43

In a Resolution dated February 12, 2002, 37 the Court

held that it could only resolve actual controversies
brought before it and would thus, refrain from
rendering advisory opinions. Accordingly, the Letter
dated August 24, 2001 of Assistant Commissioner
Caberoy and Letter dated September 20, 2001 of
respondent were merely noted.

On
June
6,
2006,
the
Court
issued
a
Resolution45 referring the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for study and recommendation.

It is, however recommended that he be placed on

probation, meaning that the reinstatement should only
be temporary and that he be placed under observation
for one year.
If during the period of one year, he proves that he has
completely lived up to the high standards of the legal
profession, by then it will be recommended that his
reinstatement as a member of the Bar be made
permanent.42

The IBP Board of Governors issued its Resolution No.

XVI-2005-99, dated March 12, 2005 44 resolving as
follows:
xxx to approve respondent's Plea for Reinstatement
and recommend the reinstatement of Atty. Dionisio C.
Antiniw as member of the bar immediately.

On March 23, 2007, the OBC submitted its Report and

Recommendation,46 to wit:
Indeed the high standards of the Bar require an
impeccable record but our findings show that

7
respondent has been sufficiently punished for the last
fifteen (15) years of his disbarment and he has
sufficiently reformed to be a worthy member of the Bar.
In all candor, he promises the Court that should he be
reinstated to practice the legal profession, he will
faithfully abide by the ideals, canons and ethics of the
legal profession and by his oath as a lawyer.
xxx
In the light of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted
that the disbarment of respondent DIONISIO C.
ANTINIW from the practice of law be LIFTED and he be
allowed to resume the practice of law.47
We agree with the foregoing recommendations of the
Office of the Bar Confidant and the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline as affirmed by the IBP Board of
Governors.
Respondent was disbarred from the practice of law
pursuant to the Decision promulgated on April 26,
199148 which pertinently reads, as follows:
There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty.
Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale, and
its subsequent introduction in court prejudices his
prime duty in the administration of justice as an officer
of the court.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his
client. (Santos v. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622) but not at the
expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers Union
v. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not
to his client but to the administration of justice.
(Lubiano v. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his
client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of
law and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his
client's cause in utmost earnestness and with the
maximum skill he can marshall, he is not at liberty to
resort to illegal means for his client's interest. It is the
duty of an attorney to employ, for the purpose of
maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as
are consistent with truth and honor. (Pangan vs Ramos,
93 SCRA 87).
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. By far, the most important of them is
mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In
re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may
suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show his
unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili v.
CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore, is not
meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of
livelihood but is rather intended to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this function should be competent, honorable
and reliable in order that courts and the public may
rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega v. Sison
125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the
high standards of the law profession.49
However, the record shows that the long period of
respondent's disbarment gave him the chance to purge
himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and
repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and
capacity to live up once again to the exacting
standards of conduct demanded of every member of

the bar and officer of the court. During respondent's

disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for
his professional infraction, he has been persistent in
reiterating his apologies and pleas for reinstatement to
the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to
show that he has regained his worthiness to practice
law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as
attested to by numerous civic and professional
organizations, government institutions, public officials
and members of the judiciary.
In Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,50 the
disbarment of a lawyer was lifted for the reasons
quoted hereunder:
The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for
three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him
sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect
on his professional conduct, redeem himself and prove
once more that he is worthy to practice law and be
capable of upholding the dignity of the legal
profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas
for compassion and reinstatement show that he is
ready once more to meet the exacting standards the
legal profession demands from its practitioners.51
Moreover, it is well-settled that the objective of a
disciplinary case is not so much to punish the
individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of
justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from
the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court.
Restorative justice, not retribution, is our goal in
disciplinary proceedings.52
Guided by this doctrine and considering the evidence
submitted by respondent satisfactorily showing his
contrition and his being again worthy of membership in
the legal profession, the Court finds that it is now time
to lift herein respondent's disbarment and reinstate
him to the august halls of the legal profession, but with
the following reminder:
[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental
fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality
and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal
profession are the conditions required for remaining a
member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying
the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as
guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate
disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to
discipline its members is not only a right but a
bounden duty as well x x x. That is why respect and
fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members. 53
Likewise, respondent is enjoined to keep in mind that:
Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws, as he is their sworn
servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them
under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society,
argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a
pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic.54

8
WHEREFORE, the disbarment of DIONISIO C. ANTINIW
from the practice of law is LIFTED and he is therefore
allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 100643. August 14, 1992.]
ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
Morong, Rizal, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
RIZAL, Morong, Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS,
Quezon City, and AGUEDO
EUGENIO, Respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT; FINAL UPON
LAPSE OF REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF APPEAL AND NO
APPEAL PERFECTED. Petitioner fails to refute the
ruling of respondent appellate court that the issues
presented in the intent case had been previously raised
before and decided upon the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 21392, which decision became final and
executory, and in fact already entered in the judgment
book by reason of petitioners failure to seasonably file
an appeal or a motion for reconsideration. This is fatal.
It has been repeatedly held that finality of judgment
becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary
period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. The decision
therefore of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
21392 had attained finality, there being no appeal nor
motion for reconsideration interposed. Likewise, it is
settled jurisprudence that once a decision becomes
final, the Court can no longer amend, modify, much
less set aside the same.
2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; LAND REGISTRATION
PROCEEDING; PROCEEDING IN REM; PERSONAL NOTICE
NOT REQUIRED TO VEST AUTHORITY TO COURT. As
early as 1910, in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, We already
ruled
that
land
registration
proceedings
are
proceedings in rem, not in personam, and therefore it
is not necessary to give personal notice to the owners
or claimants of the land sought to be registered, in
order to vest the courts with power or authority over
the res. Thus, while it may be true that no notice was
sent by registered mail to petitioner when the judicial
reconstitution of title was sought, such failure,
however, did not amount to a jurisdictional defect.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION THEREOF, SUFFICIENT
NOTICE TO VEST COURT JURISDICTION. In Register of
Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila, Br.
170, We said that" [t]he purpose of the publication of
the notice of the petition for reconstitution in the
Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such
a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to
oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30)
days before the date set by the court for hearing the
petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings
in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it." Thus,
notice of hearing by proper publication in the Official
Gazette is sufficient to clothe the court with
jurisdiction, and the mere fact that a person purporting
to have a legitimate claim in the property did not
receive personal notice is not sufficient ground to
invalidate the proceedings.
4. ID.; ID.; CAUSE OF ACTION; CANNOT BE LITIGATED
TWICE BY VARYING FORMS OF ACTION. Shorn of its

finery, CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 merely re-echoes the

issues raised in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 which as
become res judicata. Verily, petitioners action to annul
the order of the trial court allowing reconstitution
duplicates its earlier motion to set aside the said order,
which was granted but later reversed by the appellate
court which reversal became final and executory due
to petitioners failure to file an appeal within the
reglementary period. A party cannot, by varying the
form of action or adopting a different method of
presenting his case, escape the operation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action shall
not be twice litigated.
5. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; RULE 10.02 OF CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; VIOLATED WHEN
LAWYER MISREPRESENT CONTENTS OF DECISION.
However, the phrase "without notice to the actual
occupants of the property, Adez Realty, in the above
quoted second paragraph on page 3 of the Petition for
Review, is not found in the decision penned by
Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera for respondent
Court of Appeals. It now appears as part of a material
statement of fact in the decision of the court a quo
when actually it is not. This to Us is a prima facie case
of attempting to mislead [Rule 10.02, Canon 10,
Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or
the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as in fact that which has not
been proved] this Court, a serious offense which
constitutes willful disregard of a lawyers solemn duty
to act at all times in a manner consistent with truth.
RESOLUTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The petition filed on December 28, 1990, by Adez
Realty Incorporated before the Court of Appeals,
docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 23773, sought to
annul the order of the accused-appellant of Morong,
Rizal, dated November 20, 1984, allowing the
reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12662.
The petition likewise sought to set aside in effect the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
21392 dated July 31, 1990.
On April 30, 1991, respondent Court of Appeals 1
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On June 26,
1991, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was
denied. The respondent court, in dismissing the
petition, said that: (a) the petition is a reiteration of the
issues raised before it 2 earlier in CA-G.R. CV No.
21392, promulgated July 31, 1990, and since no motion
for reconsideration or appeal by certiorari with the
Supreme Court was filed, the same became final and
executory, and consequently entered in the judgment
book on October 11, 1990; and, (b) the accusedappellant of Morong, Rizal, had jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the issue then being one of venue and
not of jurisdiction, which can be waived if not timely
objected to in a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Sec. 4,
Rule 4, of the Rules of Court.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, where petitioner raises four (4) issues
which nevertheless may be simplified into the
following: whether the accused-appellant of Morong,
Rizal, may acquire jurisdiction over reconstitution
proceedings involving real property situated in Quezon
City, and whether publication of the notice of the
petition in two (2) successive issues of the Official
Gazette and its posting in the bulletin board of the
accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, is sufficient
compliance with Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 26.

9
Wittingly or unwittingly, petitioner fails to refute the
ruling of respondent appellate court that the issues
presented in the intent case had been previously raised
before and decided upon the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 21392, which decision became final and
executory, and in fact already entered in the judgment
book by reason of petitioners failure to seasonably file
an appeal or a motion for reconsideration. This is fatal.

the said order, which was granted but later reversed by

the appellate court which reversal became final and
executory due to petitioners failure to file an appeal
within the reglementary period. A party cannot, by
varying the form of action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case, escape the operation of
the principle that one and the same cause of action
shall not be twice litigated. 13

It has been repeatedly held that finality of judgment

becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary
period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. 3 The
decision therefore of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 21392 had attained finality, there being no
appeal nor motion for reconsideration interposed.
Likewise, it is settled jurisprudence that once a
decision becomes final, the Court can no longer
amend, modify, much less set aside the same. 4 In
fact, in Dueas v. Mandi, 5 We held that the "trial court
and the appellate court may have committed an error
in the assignment or partition of the eight parcels of
land to the parties in this case, but considering that
their judgments are now final, the error, assuming that
one was committed, can no longer be amended or
corrected." In Icao v. Apalisok, 6 We ruled that even the
subsequent discovery of an erroneous imposition of a
penalty will not justify correction of the judgment after
it has become final. We have also declared that,
subject to settled exceptions, once a judgment
becomes final, all the issues between the parties are
deemed resolved and laid to rest. 7 To allow the Court
of amend or reverse a decision which has attained
finality will result in endless litigations. 8 Indeed, every
litigation, CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 included, must come
to an end.

Be that as it may, there appears to be no cogent

reason to disturb, as to other matters, the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals in its decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, promulgated July 31, 1990, the
same having become final and executory. Accordingly,
We affirm the assailed decision promulgated April 30,
1992, and resolution issued June 26, 1991, by
respondent Court of Appeals.

Moreover, petitioner already had the opportunity to set

aside the questioned order of the trial court when its
Motion to Set Aside and/or Annul the Order of
Reconstitution, filed more than a year after the
issuance of the questioned order, was granted by the
trial court, however erroneous may be the procedure
pursued and the consequently relief granted. Petitioner
then simply failed to maintain vigilance over its
perceived rights when it did not file a timely appeal
from the adverse decision of the appellate court, thus
allowing the said decision to become final.

However, the phrase "without notice to the actual

occupants of the property, Adez Realty, in the above
quoted second paragraph on page 3 of the Petition for
Review, is not found in the decision penned by
Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera for respondent
Court of Appeals. It now appears as part of a material
statement of fact in the decision of the court a quo
when actually it is not. This to Us is a prima facie case
of attempting to mislead 14 this Court, a serious
offense which constitutes willful disregard of a lawyers
solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent
with truth.

Besides, as early as 1910, in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, 9

We already ruled that land registration proceedings are
proceedings in rem, not in personam, and therefore it
is not necessary to give personal notice to the owners
or claimants of the land sought to be registered, in
order to vest the courts with power or authority over
the res. 10 Thus, while it may be true that no notice
was sent by registered mail to petitioner when the
judicial reconstitution of title was sought, such failure,
however, did not amount to a jurisdictional defect. 11
In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, Metro
Manila, Br. 170, 12 We said that" [t]he purpose of the
publication of the notice of the petition for
reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the
whole world that such a petition has been filed and
that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause
may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set
by the court for hearing the petition. It is the
publication of such notice that brings in the whole
world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it." Thus, notice of
hearing by proper publication in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to clothe the court with jurisdiction, and the
mere fact that a person purporting to have a legitimate
claim in the property did not receive personal notice is
not sufficient ground to invalidate the proceedings.
Shorn of its finery, CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 merely reechoes the issues raised in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392
which as become res judicata. Verily, petitioners action
to annul the order of the trial court allowing
reconstitution duplicates its earlier motion to set aside

Meanwhile, the Court adverts to the Petition for Review

filed in behalf of petitioner Adez Realty, Inc., by ATTY.
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY. On pages 2-4 of the Petition,
counsel purports to quote, as he does, the questioned
decision when he alleges
"The facts of the case, as found by the Court of
Appeals, are the following:
x

After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the

questioned order dated November 20, 1984, without
notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez
Realty,
granting
the
applicants
petition
for
reconstitution in the name of the deceased Elias
Eugenio" (Italics supplied)

ACCORDINGLY, the challenged decision and resolution

of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
23773 are AFFIRMED and the instant petition is
DISMISSED.
ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is ordered to SHOW
CAUSE within five (5) days from notice why he should
not be disciplinary dealt with for intercalating a
material fact in the judgment of the court a quo
thereby altering and modifying its factual findings with
the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order
to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus failing to live
up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar.
Costs against petitioner Adez Realty Incorporated.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 100643. October 30, 1992.]
ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING
JUDGE, RTC, BR. 79, Morong, Rizal, PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF OF RIZAL, Morong, Rizal, REGISTER OF
DEEDS, Quezon City, and AGUEDO
EUGENIO, Respondents.

10
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS, COUNSEL BOUND BY ACTS OF HIS
SECRETARY WHO MERELY FOLLOWS HIS ORDERS; CASE
AT BAR. After due deliberation, the Court En Banc
brushed off as simply unsatisfactory and incredible
counsels explanation that it was his secretary who
committed the mistake. This "passing-the-buck" stance
of counsel was already aptly treated in Adaza v.
Barinaga (104 SCRA 684), where the Court observed
thus "Making the law office secretary, clerk or
messenger the scapegoat or patsy for the delay in the
filing of pleadings, motions and other papers and for
the lawyers dereliction of duty is a common alibi of
practising lawyers. Like the alibi of the accused in
criminal case, counsels shifting of the blame to his
office employee is usually a concoction utilized to
cover up his own negligence, incompetence, indolence
and ineptitude." The case of petitioner is no better; it
can be worse. For, how could the secretary have
divined the phrase "without notice to the actual
occupants of the property. Adez Realty," without
counsel dictating it word for word? Could it have been
a providential mistake of the secretary as it was very
material, and on which could have hinged the fate of a
litigants cause? Whatever be the truth in this regard,
counsel cannot elude administrative responsibility
which borders on falsification of a judicial record to
which, by his inveigling, he unfortunately drags his
secretary. Indeed, by no means can he evade
responsibility for the vicious intercalation as he
admittedly dictated and signed the petition. It is the
bounden duty of lawyers to check, review and recheck
the allegations in their pleadings, more particularly the
quoted portions, and ensure that the statements
therein are accurate and the reproductions faithful,
down to the last word and even punctuation mark. The
legal profession demands that lawyers thoroughly go
over pleadings, motions and other documents dictated
or prepared by them, typed or transcribed by their
secretaries or clerks, before filing them with the court.
If a client is bound by the acts of his counsel, with more
reason should counsel be bound by the acts of his
secretary who merely follows his orders. The instant
case originated from a petition for reconstitution of title
over a parcel of land. Section 13 of R.A. 26, in relation
to Sec. 12 of the same statute, on which petitioner
bases one of his causes of action, provides among
others that notice should be given to the occupants or
persons in possession of the property. Compliance
therewith is a material requirement for granting a
petition for reconstitution of title. The inserted phrase
"without notice to the actual occupants of the property,
Adez Realty," was just the right phrase intercalated at
the right place, making it highly improbable to be
unintentionally, much less innocently, committed; and
by the secretary at that. All circumstances herein
simply but strongly sustain Our belief. Certainly,
making it appear that respondent Court of Appeals
found that no notice was given to the occupants of
subject property when in fact it did not make such a
finding is a clear indication not merely of
carelessness in lifting a portion of the assailed decision
but a malicious attempt to gain undue advantage in
the sporting arena of fairplay and, more importantly, to
deceive and misguide this Court, which is the final
arbiter of litigations.
2. ID.; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; RULE
10.02, CANON 10, CHAPTER III THEREOF; MISQUOTING
OR INTERCALATING PHRASES IN TEXT OF COURT
DECISION, A CLEAR AND SERIOUS VIOLATION OF
LAWYERS OATH; CASE AT BAR. The distortion of
facts committed by counsel, with the willing assistance
of his secretary, is a grave offense and should not be
treated lightly, not only because it may set a
dangerous precedent but, rather, because it is a clear
and serious violation of ones oath as a member of the
Bar. Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of
Professional Responsibility directs that" [a] lawyer shall
not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents

of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing

counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a
fact that which has not been proved." Misquoting or
intercalating phrases in the text of a court decision
constitutes willful disregard of the lawyers solemn
duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with the
truth. A lawyer should never venture to mislead the
court by false statements or quotations of facts or
laws. Thus, in Bautista v. Gonzales (182 SCRA 151), We
suspended respondent for six (6) months for, among
others, submitting to the lower court falsified
documents, representing them to be true copies. In
Chavez v. Viola (196 SCRA 10), We suspended
respondent counsel for five (5) months after he filed an
Amended Application for Original Registration of Title
which contained false statements. The case at bar,
although akin to the aforementioned cases, has more
serious and far-reaching repercussions. Those who
attempt to misguide this Court, the last forum for
appeal, should be dealt with more severely lest We be
made unwilling instruments of inequity and injustice.
Indeed, counsel has demonstrated his wanton
disregard for truth and fairplay even before the Highest
Court of the land. Worse, he compounded his
unprofessional mischief by laying the blame on his
hapless secretary whose duty it was simply to obey
him.
3. ID.; PRACTICE OF LAW; NATURE THEREOF; DUTY OF
LAWYERS TO COURT. It is well to repeat, perhaps to
the point of satiety, what We have already said ." . .
that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
One of those requirements is the observance of
honesty and candor. It cannot be gainsaid that
candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential
for the expeditious administration of justice . . . A
lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to
satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the administration
of justice would gravely suffer . . . It is essential that
lawyers bear in mind at all times that their duty is not
to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are
above all . . . sworn to assist the courts in rendering
justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they
advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For
this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court."
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF
COURT OF APPEALS GENERALLY BINDING UPON THE
SUPREME
COURT.

Well-entrenched
in
our
jurisprudence is the rule that, save in certain instances,
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding
upon this Court.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In Our Resolution of 14 August 1992, We directed ATTY.
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel for petitioner Adez
Realty, Inc., to "SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from
notice why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for
intercalating a material fact in the judgment of the
court a quo 1 thereby altering and modifying its factual
findings with the apparent purpose of misleading this
Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus
failing to live up to the standards expected of a
member of the Bar."
In his EXPLANATION of 1 September 1992, Atty.
Benjamin M. Dacanay "humbly prostrates himself
before the Honorable Court and throws himself at, its
mercy," and explains that

11
". . . whenever he prepares petitions either for the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, he, dictates to
his secretary and if portions of the decision or order to
be appealed from have to be quoted, he simply
instructs his said secretary to copy the particular pages
of the said decision or order.
"In the case at bar, he did instruct his secretary to copy
the corresponding pages in the decision of the Court of
Appeals. Somehow, however, some words were
intercalated on a particular paragraph noted by the
Honorable Court he regrettably is at a loss to explain.
He remembers, however, that at the time he was
preparing the petition at bar there were other
pleadings necessitating equal if not preferential
attention from him which could perhaps be the reason
why his secretary committed a very grievous mistake.
Such mistake though he does not condone and he feels
upset at the turn of events." 2
Attached to his EXPLANATION as Annex "A" is an
Affidavit 3 of Alicia A. Castro, purportedly his Secretary,
stating among others that
"3. . . . in the preparation of the petition for review
on certiorari filed with the Supreme Court, it was Atty.
Benjamin M. Dacanay who dictated to me the contents
of said petition;
"4. . . . in the preparation of the petition, he told me, as
he is wont to do whenever he prepares a petition, to
copy the particular pages in the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 entitled Adez
Realty, Inc., petitioner versus The Hon. Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, Branch 79 (not 89
as stated in the Affidavit), Et Al., respondents;
"5. . . . when I copied the particular pages of the
decision of the Court of Appeals as instructed by Atty.
Benjamin M. Dacanay, I did as instructed, but it .was
only after our office received the copy of the decision
of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 100643 . . . that Atty.
Dacanay confronted me and asked me where I got that
portion which was added to the particular paragraph
noted by the Supreme Court, that it was only then that
I realized the mistake I committed;
x

"7. . . . I surmise that the error could have been due to

the fact that ADEZ REALTY, Inc. has so many cases
being handled by the law office that I presume I could
have copied or my intention was distracted by other
pleadings atop my table at the time."
Upon receipt of the EXPLANATION of counsel, the First
Division referred his case en consulta to the Court En
Banc which accepted and took cognizance of it in view
of the possible sanction that may be imposed on a
member of the Bar.
After due deliberation, the Court En Banc brushed off
as simply unsatisfactory and incredible counsels
explanation that it was his secretary who committed
the mistake. This "passing-the-buck" stance of counsel
was already aptly treated in Adaza v. Barinaga, 4
where the Court observed thus
"Making the law office secretary, clerk or messenger
the scapegoat or patsy for the delay in the filing of
pleadings, motions and other papers and for the
lawyers dereliction of duty is a common alibi of
practising lawyers. Like the alibi of the accused in
criminal cases, counsels shifting of the blame to his
office employee is usually a concoction utilized to
cover up his own negligence, incompetence, indolence
and ineptitude."
The case of petitioner is no better; it can be worse. For,
how could the secretary have divined the phrase

"without notice to the actual occupants of the property,

Adez Realty," without counsel dictating it word for
word? Could it have been a providential mistake of the
secretary as it was very material, and on which could
have hinged the fate of a litigants cause? Whatever be
the truth in this regard, counsel cannot elude
administrative
responsibility
which
borders
on
falsification of a judicial record to which, by his
inveigling, he unfortunately drags his secretary. Indeed,
by no means can he evade responsibility for the vicious
intercalation as he admittedly dictated and signed the
petition.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to check, review and
recheck the allegations in their pleadings, more
particularly the quoted portions, and ensure that the
statements therein are accurate and the reproductions
faithful, down to the last word and even punctuation
mark. The legal profession demands that lawyers
thoroughly go over pleadings, motions and other
documents dictated or prepared by them, typed or
transcribed by their secretaries or clerks, before filing
them with the court. If a client is bound by the acts of
his counsel, with more reason should counsel be bound
by the acts of his secretary who merely follows his
orders. 5
The instant case originated from a petition for
reconstitution of title over a parcel of land. Section 13
of R.A. 26, in relation to Sec. 12 of the same statute, on
which petitioner bases one of his causes of action,
provides among others that notice should be given to
the occupants or persons in possession of the property.
Compliance therewith is a material requirement for
granting a petition for reconstitution of title. The
inserted phrase "without notice to the actual occupants
of the property, Adez Realty," was just the right phrase
intercalated at the right place, making it highly
improbable to be unintentionally, much less innocently,
committed, and by the secretary at that. All
circumstances herein simply but strongly sustain Our
belief. Certainly, making it appear that respondent
Court of Appeals found that no notice was given to the
occupants of subject property when in fact it did not
make such a finding is a clear indication not merely
of carelessness in lifting a portion of the assailed
decision but a malicious attempt to gain undue
advantage in the sporting arena of fairplay and, more
importantly, to deceive and misguide this Court, which
is the final arbiter of litigations.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that,
save in certain instances, factual findings of the Court
of Appeals are binding upon this Court. 6 The distortion
of facts committed by counsel, with the willing
assistance of his secretary, is a grave offense and
should not be treated lightly, not only because it may
set a dangerous precedent but, rather, because it is a
clear and serious violation of ones oath as a member
of the Bar. Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the
Code of Professional Responsibility directs that" [a]
lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent
the contents of a paper, the language or the argument
of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision
already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment,
or assert as a fact that which has not been proved"
(Emphasis supplied).
Misquoting or intercalating phrases in the text of a
court decision constitutes willful disregard of the
lawyer s solemn duty to act at all times in a manner
consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never
venture to mislead the court by false statements or
quotations of facts or laws. Thus, in Bautista v.
Gonzales, 7 We suspended respondent for six (6)
months for, among others, submitting to the lower
court falsified documents, representing them to be true
copies. In Chavez v. Viola 8 We suspended respondent
counsel for five (5) months after he filed an Amended

12
Application for Original Registration of Title which
contained false statements.
The case at bar, although akin to the aforementioned
cases,
has
more
serious
and
far-reaching
repercussions. Those who attempt to misguide this
Court, the last forum for appeal, should be dealt with
more severely lest We be made unwilling instruments
of inequity and injustice. Indeed, counsel has
demonstrated his wanton disregard for truth and
fairplay even before the Highest Court of the land.
Worse, he compounded his unprofessional mischief by
laying the blame on his hapless secretary whose duty it
was simply to obey him.
It is well to repeat, perhaps to the point of satiety, what
We have already said
". . . that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of
such privilege one of those requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor. It cannot be
gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the
courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of
justice . . . A lawyer, on the other hand, has the
fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation.
Otherwise, the administration of justice would gravely
suffer . . . It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all
times that their duty is not to their clients but rather to
the courts, that they are above all . . . sworn to assist
the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and
only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive
interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required
to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court." 9
WHEREFORE, We find ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY,
counsel for petitioner, guilty of intercalating a material
fact in a judicial Decision elevated to Us on certiorari,
thereby altering its factual findings with the apparent
purpose, and no other, of misleading the Court in order
to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus miserably
failing to live up to the standards expected of him as a
member of the Philippine Bar. Consequently, ATTY.
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is hereby DISBARRED effective
immediately from the practice of law.
Let copies of this Resolution be served personally on
Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay at his given address at
Mezzanine Floor, WIL-VIC Building, 125 Kamias Road,
Quezon City, entered upon his personal records, and
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
the courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 100643. December 12, 1995.]
ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Br. 79, Morong
Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR QUEZON
CITY, and AGUEDO EUGENIO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty.
Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a material
fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals, which he
appealed to this Court on certiorari, thereby altering
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with the
apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to
obtain a favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty.
Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law. 1

On 20 November 1992 movant filed a Motion for

Reconsideration and Leave to Offer Evidence Re
Charge of Unauthorized Intercalation in a Judicial
Record dated 18 November 1992. He claimed that the
inserted words were written by his client, the President
of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of the petition to be
filed before the Supreme Court and unwittingly
adopted by movants secretary when the latter
formalized the petition. He manifested that he would
not risk committing the act for which he was found
guilty considering that he was a nominee of the Judicial
and Bar Council to the President for appointment as
regional trial judge. 2 But the Court on 3 December
1992 denied the motion for want of a compelling
reason to justify a reversal of the questioned
resolution. 3
On 23 February 1994 movant Dacanay filed a Motion to
Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was already 62 years
old, has learned his lesson from his mistake, was
terribly sorry for what he had done, and in all candor
promised that if given another chance he would live up
to the exacting demands of the legal profession. He
appended to his motion certifications of good moral
character from: Fr. Celso Fernando, Parochial Vicar,
Parish of St. Michael Archangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr.
Lauro V. Larlar, OAR, Rector, San Sebastian CollegeRecoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM, Chairperson,
Center for Housing and Ecology Development
Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriguez, College of
Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Judge Pedro T.
Santiago, Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon City; Judge
Teodoro P. Regino, RTC Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge
Antonio P. Solano, RTC Br. 86, Quezon City; and
Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC Br. 35, Quezon City. 4
However, on 11 August 1994 the Court denied the
motion. 5
On 1 December 1994 movant again filed an Ex-Parte
Motion to Lift Disbarment alleging among others that
he had been deprived of his means to life; he had
pursued civic, religious and community work,
especially for the poor and the underprivileged short of
extending legal assistance because of his incapacity;
he had admitted "with profound regret and with utmost
humility his commission of an unpardonable mistake
and ask(ed) that he be given another chance;" and, he
was "remorseful for what he has done and comes to
this Honorable Court with a contrite heart." 6
His wife Norma M. Dacanay likewise wrote the Court on
1 December 1994 saying that while she did not
condone what her husband had done, it had been her
fervent wish that the Court took a second look into its
decision disbarring her husband as her entire family
had been traumatized by his disbarment. 7
On 6 March 1995 movant sent a letter addressed to the
Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court
reiterating his Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment of 1
December 1994. Thus
I am truly penitent for the serious offense I committed
and admit full responsibility for it. I realize it was
dishonest and unfair to pass the blame to my secretary
who was merely following my instructions. The
intercalation was my own act and I am justly punished
for it.
Your Honors, I do not question your decision but I only
beg for your mercy. I have a wife and children to
support but my only means of livelihood has been
withdrawn from me. I am destitute and desperate and
can only turn to you for relief . . .
Looking back, I cannot imagine how I could have even
thought of blackening the law profession, to which I
owe so much. Please let me redeem myself by
admitting me back to its precincts, where I swear to
live strictly according to its canons . . . 8

13
On 21 March 1995 the Court noted the letter of 6
March 1995 of movant Dacanay.
On 4 August 1995 movant again prayed for his
reinstatement
It has been 33 long months since my disbarment,
during which time I have been struggling to make both
ends meet to provide for my wife and three children.
Please give me the chance to prove that I am a
reformed offender who will henceforth do nothing
whatsoever to dishonor the legal profession. 9
On 12 September 1995 the Court noted respondents 4
August 1995. 10
On 17 November 1995 movant once more wrote the
Court
I humbly acknowledge again that I committed a
grievous offense for which I was justly punished at the
time with the extreme sanction of disbarment.
I have been suffering much since my disbarment more
than 36 months ago, but it is my wife and children who
have suffered more for my transgression. Although
innocent, they bear with me the stigma and burden of
my punishment. 11
The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for
three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him
sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect
on his professional conduct, redeem himself and prove
once more that he is worthy to practice law and be
capable of upholding the dignity of the legal
profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas
for compassion and reinstatement show that he is
ready once more to meet the exacting standards the
legal profession demands from its practitioners.
Accordingly, the Court lifts the disbarment of Benjamin
M. Dacanay. However he should be sternly warned that

[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with

conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental
fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality
and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal
profession are the conditions required for remaining a
member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying
the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as
guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate
disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to
discipline its members is not only a right, but a
bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect and
fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members . . . 12

Promulgated:
September 26, 2006

ATTY.
JOSE
A. SUING,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Complainants, via a complaint[1] filed before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), have sought
the disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Suing (respondent) on
the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of Lawyers
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.[2]
Herein
complainants
were
among
the
complainants in NLRC Case No. 00-040318098, Microplast, Inc. Workers Union, Represented by its
Union President Zoilo Ardan, et al. v. Microplast,
Incorporated and/or Johnny Rodil and Manuel
Rodil, for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) and Illegal
Dismissal, while respondent was the counsel for
the therein respondents. Said case was consolidated
with
NLRC
Case
No. 00-04-0316198, Microplast Incorporated
v.
Vilma
Ardan,
et
al., for Illegal Strike.
By Decision of August 29, 2001,[3] Labor Arbiter
Ariel Cadiente Santos dismissed the Illegal Strike case,
and declared the employer-clients of respondent guilty
of ULP. Thus, the Labor Arbiter disposed:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered, the complaint for illegal
strike is dismissed for lack of merit.
Respondents Microplast, Inc.,
Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil are
hereby declared guilty of Unfair Labor
Practice for union busting and that the
dismissal of the nine (9) complainants
are declared illegal. All the respondents
in NLRC Case No. 00-04-03161-98 for
illegal
dismissal
are
directed
to reinstate all the complainants to
their
former
position with
full
backwages from date of dismissal
until actual reinstatement computed as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY

from the practice of law is LIFTED and he is therefore
allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment of
the required legal fees. This resolution is effective
immediately.

xxxx
3. CRISANTO CONOS
Backwages:
Basic Wage:
2/21/98 10/30/99 = 20.30 mos.
P198.00 x 26 days x 20.30 = P104,

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
RENERIO
SAMBAJON,
RONALD
SAMBAJON,
CRISANTO
CONOS, and
FREDILYN
BACULBAS,
Complainants,
- versus -

A.C. No. 7062

[Formerly CBD Case No. 041355]

504.40
10/31/99 10/31/00 = 12 mos.
P223.50 x 26 days x 12 = 69,
732.00
11/01/00 8/30/01 = 10 mos.
P250.00 x 26 days x 10 = 65,000.00
P239,236.40
13th Month Pay:
1/12 of P239,236.40 = 19,936.36
SILP
2/16/98 12/31/98 = 10.33 mos.
P198.00 x 5 days x 10.33/ 12 =

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

852.22

14
1/1/99 12/31/99 = 12mos.
P223.50 x 5 days x 12/12 =
1,117.50
1/1/00 10/30/01 = 20 mos.
P250.00 x 5 days x 20/12
= 2,083.33
4,053.05
P263,225.81
xxxx
7. RONALD SAMBAJON
(same as Conos) 263,225.81
8.FREDELYN BACULBAS
(same as Conos) 263,225.81
9. RENEIRO SAMBAJON (same as
Conos) 263,225.81
Total Backwages P2,370,674.38
Respondents
are
jointly
and
severally liable to pay the above-mentioned
backwages including the various monetary
claims
stated
in
the
Manifestation
dated August 24, 1998 except payment of
overtime pay and to pay 10% attorneys fees
of all sums owing to complainants.
[4]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Decision having become final and executory, the

Labor Arbiter issued on September 2, 2003 a Writ of
Execution.[5]
In the meantime, on the basis of individual
Release Waiver and Quitclaims dated February 27, 2004
purportedly signed and sworn to by seven of the
complainants in the ULP and Illegal Dismissal case
before Labor Arbiter Santos in the presence of
respondent, the Labor Arbiter dismissed said case
insofar as the seven complainants were concerned, by
Order dated March 9, 2004. [6]
Herein complainants, four of the seven who purportedly
executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims, denied
having signed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the
said documents or having received the considerations
therefor. Hence, spawned the administrative complaint
at bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with
his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, frustrated the
implementation of the Writ of Execution by presenting
before the Labor Arbiter the spurious documents.
In a related move, complainants also filed a criminal
complaint for Falsification against respondent, together
with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, before the
Prosecutors Office of Quezon City where it was docketed
as I.S. No. 04-5203.[7]
In his Report and Recommendation [8] dated September
27, 2005, IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag, who
conducted an investigation of the administrative
complaint at bar, recommended that respondent be
faulted for negligence and that he be reprimanded
therefor with warning, in light of his following
discussion:
The issue to be resolved is whether or
not respondent can be disbarred for his
alleged manipulation of four alleged
RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by
herein complainants who subsequently
disclaimed the same as bogus and
falsified.

A lawyer takes an oath when he

is admitted to the Bar. By doing so he
thereby becomes an Officer of the
Court on whose shoulders rests the
grave responsibility of assisting the
courts in the proper, fair, speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
Mindful of the fact that the
present proceedings involve, on the
one hand, the right of a litigant to seek
redress against a member of the Bar
who has,
allegedly caused
him
damaged, either through malice or
negligence, while in the performance of
his duties as his counsel, and, on the
other, the right of that member of the
Bar to protect and preserve his good
name and reputation, we have again
gone over and considered [the] aspects
of the case.
All the cases protesting and
contesting the genuineness, veracity
and due execution of the questioned
RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM
namely: Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Recall,
Appeal
and
Falsification
are PENDING resolution
in
their
respective
venues.
Arbiter
Ariel
Cadiente Santos, who was supposed to
know the identities of the herein
complainants is not impleaded by the
complainants when it was his solemn
duty and obligation to ascertain true
and real identities of person executing
Release Waiver with Quitclaim.
The old adage that in the
performance of an official duty there is
that presumption of regularity unless
proven otherwise, such was proven in
the January
28,
2005clarificatory
questioning . . . :
xxxx
. . . In the case at bar, the
question
of
whether
or
not
respondent actually committed the
despicable act would seem to be
fairly
debatable
under
the
circumstances.[9] (Emphasis
and
underscoring supplied)
The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Resolution No.
XVII-2005-226, approved and adopted the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Hababag.
After the records of the case were forwarded to
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), the Director for
Bar Discipline of the IBP[10] transmitted additional
records including a Motion to Amend the Resolution
No. XVII-2005-226[11] filed by respondent.
One of the complainants, Renerio Sambajon
(Sambajon), by Petition[12] filed before the OBC,
assailed the IBP Board Resolution. The Petition was
filed three days after the 15-day period to assail the

15
IBP Resolution. Sambajon explains that while his
counsel received the Resolution on February 27, 2006,
he only learned of it when he visited on March 16,
2006 his counsel who could not reach him, he
(Sambajon) having transferred from one residence to
another.
Giving Sambajon the benefit of the doubt
behind the reason for the 3-day delay in filing the
present petition, in the interest of justice, this Court
gives his petition due course.
In respondents Motion to Amend the IBP Board
Resolution, he does not deny that those whom he met
face to face before Commissioner Hababag were not the
same persons whom he saw before Labor Arbiter Santos
on February 27, 2004. [13] He hastens to add though that
he was not familiar with the complainants as they were
not attending the hearings before Arbiter Santos.
[14]
Complainants[15] and their former counsel Atty.
Rodolfo Capocyan[16] claim otherwise, however. And the
Minutes[17] of the proceedings before the National
Conciliation Mediation Board in a related case, NCMBNCR-NS-02-081-98, Re:
Microplast,
Inc.,
Labor
Dispute, which
minutes
bear
respondents
and
complainants signatures, belie respondents claim that
he had not met complainants before.
Respondent, who declared that he went to the
Office of the Labor Arbiter on February 27, 2004 on the
request of his clients who told him that on February 27,
2004 the seven claimants w[ould] be at the office of
Arbiter Santos [to] submit their respective quitclaims
and waivers, heaps on the Labor Arbiter the
responsibility of ascertaining the identity of the parties
who executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. But
respondent himself had the same responsibility. He was
under obligation to protect his clients interest,
especially given the amount allegedly given by them in
consideration of the execution of the documents. His
answers to the clarificatory questions of Commissioner
Hababag do not, however, show that he discharged
such obligation.
COMM. HABABAG:
But is it not a fact [that it is] also your
duty to ask.. that the money of
your client would go to the
deserving employee?
ATTY. SUING:
I did not do that anymore, Your
Honor, because
there
was
already as you call it before a
precedent in February of 1998
when my client directly made
settlement to the nine or eight
of the seventeen original
complainants, Your Honor, and I
did not participate. Hindi po
ako nakialam don sa kanilang
usapan because it is my belief
that the best way, Your Honor,
to have a dispute settled
between the parties is that we
let them do the discussion, well
let them do the settlement
because sometimes you know,

Your Honor, sad to say, when

lawyers are involved in a
matters [sic] of settlement the
dispute does not terminate as
in this case, Your Honor.
xxxx
COMM. HABABAG:
Yes. What made you appear on
said date and time before
Arbiter Santos?
ATTY. SUING:
I was called by my client to go
to
the
office
of
Arbiter
Santos, number
one, to
witness the signing of the
documents of Quitclaim and
Waiver; number 2, so that
according to them someone as
a lawyer will represent them in
that proceedings.
COMM. HABABAG:
My query, did it not surprise you
that no money was given to
you and yet there would be a
signing of Quitclaim Receipt
and Release?
ATTY. SUING:
I am not, your Honor, because it
happened before and there were no
complaints, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
Just because it happened
before you did not bother to
see to it that there is a voucher
so you just rely on your
precedent, is that what you
mean?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor, because I
always
believe
that
the
parties who are talking and it is
my client who knows them
better than I do, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
So, you
just
followed
the
instruction of your client to be
present at Arbiter Cadiente
Santos office because there
would be signing of Quitclaim
Receipt and Release, it that
clear?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:

16
[You] [d]id not bother to ask your
client where is the money intended
for the payment of these workers?
ATTY. SUING:
I did not ask.
COMM. HABABAG:
You did not asked [sic] your client who
will prepare the documents?
ATTY. SUING:
As far as the documents
concerned, Your Honor.

are

COMM. HABABAG:
The Quitclaim Receipt and Release?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor, I remember this. They
asked me before February of 1998.
COMM. HABABAG:
When you say they whom are you referring to?
ATTY. SUING:
Im referring to my client, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
They asked me attorney can you please
prepare us a document of
Quitclaim and Waiver or give
us a simple [sic] of Quitclaim
and Waiver. I do recall that I
made one but this document,
Your Honor, is only a single
document where
all
the
signatories named are present
because my purpose there
really, Your Honor, is that so
that each of them will be there
together and they will identify
themselves, see each other
para ho siguradong sila-sila
yong
magkakasama
at
magkakakilanlan. x x x x
And when the signing took
place in February of 2004 it
was made for any [sic]
individual,
Your
Honor, no
longer the document that I
prepared when all of the
seven will be signing in one
document.
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay. You did not inquire from
your client whom [sic] made
the changes?
ATTY. SUING:
I did not anymore because, Your Honor,
at the time when I was there,
there are already people there,
the seven complainants plus
another woman.[18] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY
TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE
SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE
HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
To be sure, respondents client Manuel Rodil did
not request him to go to the Office of Labor Arbiter
Cadiente to be a mere passive witness to the signing of
the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. That he was
requested to go there could only mean that he would
exert vigilance to protect his clients interest. This he
conceded when he acknowledged the purpose of his
presence at the Office of Labor Arbiter Santos, thus:
ATTY. SUING:
To go there, Your Honor, and
represent them and see that
these document[s] are properly
signed and that these people
are properly identified and
verified them in front of Arbiter
Ariel
Cadiente
Santos.
[19]
(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
That there was an alleged precedent in 1998 when a
group of complainants entered into a compromise
agreement with his clients in which he did not
participate and from which no problem arose did not
excuse him from carrying out the admitted purpose of
going
to
the
Labor
Arbiters office
that
[the
complainants] are properly identified . . . in front of
[the] Arbiter.
Besides, by respondents own information, Labor
Arbiter Santos was entertaining doubts on the true
identity of those who executed the Release Waiver and
Quitclaims.[20] That should have alerted him to
especially exercise the diligence of a lawyer to protect
his clients interest. But he was not and he did not.
Diligence is the attention and care
required of a person in a given
situation and is the opposite of
negligence. A lawyer serves his client
with diligence by adopting that norm of
practice expected of men of good
intentions. He thus owes entire
devotion to the interest of his client,
warm zeal in the defense and
maintenance of his rights, and the
exertion of his utmost learning, skill,
and ability to ensure that nothing shall
be taken or withheld from him, save by
the rules of law legally applied. It is
axiomatic in the practice of law that
the price of success is eternal diligence
to the cause of the client.
The practice of law does not require
extraordinary
diligence (exactissima

17
diligentia) or that extreme measure of
care and caution which persons of
unusual prudence and circumspection
use for securing and preserving their
rights. All that is required is ordinary
diligence (diligentia) or that degree of
vigilance expected of a bonus pater
familias. x x x[21] (Italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
And this Court notes the attempt of respondent
to influence the answers of his client Manuel Rodil when
the latter testified before Commissioner Manuel
Hababag:
COMM. HABABAG:
May pinirmahan dito na Quitclaim
Receipt and Release. Ito ho ba
sinong may gawa nitong Receipt
Waiver and Quitclaim?

asking kung sino ang nagdala ng

mga dokumento?
MR. RODIL:
Yong mga tao.
xxxx
COMM. HABABAG:
Simple ang tanong ko ha. Intindihin
mo
muna. Kanino
mo
inabot
ang bayad sa nakalagay dito sa
Release waiver and Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL:
Kay attorney po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Pag sinabi mong kay attorney
tinutukoy mong attorney?

sinong

MR. RODIL:
Sila po.

ATTY. SUING:
Yong ibinigay na pera pambayad saan, yon
ang tanong.

COMM. HABABAG:
Ibig mong sabihin ibinigay sa yo to
ng complainant o sinong nag-abot
sa iyo nitong Receipt Waiver and
Quitclaim?

COMM. HABABAG:
Sundan mo ang tanong ko ha. Ako
ang
nagtatanong
hindi
ang
abogado mo.

MR. RODIL:
Si Atty. Suing po.

MR. RODIL:
Opo.

ATTY. SUING:
In fact, ang tanong sa iyo kung
ibinigay daw sa iyo yong mga
dokumentong ito or what?

COMM. HABABAG:
Huwag kang tatawa. Im reminding you
serious tayo dito.
MR. RODIL:

COMM. HABABAG:
Okay, uulitin ko ha, tagalog na ang
tanong ko sa iyo ha hindi na
English. Ito bang Release Waiver
and Quitclaim sino ang may gawa
nito, sino ang nagmakinilya nito?

Opo serious po.

COMM. HABABAG:
Sabi mo may inabutan kang taong pera?

MR. RODIL:
Kami yata ang gumawa niyan.

MR. RODIL:
Opo.

COMM. HABABAG:
Pag sinabi mong kami yata ang
may gawa sino sa inyong mga
officer, tauhan o abogado ang
gumawa nito?

COMM. HABABAG:

MR. RODIL:
Matagal na ho yan eh.
xxxx
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay. Pangalawang gusto kong
itanong. Sino ang naghatid nito kay
Ariel
Cadiente
Santos
para
pirmahan ni Ariel Cadiente Santos?
MR. RODIL:
Si attorney po.

Ang sagot mo kay attorney. Sinong

attorney ang tinutukoy mo?
MR. RODIL:
Atty. Suing po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay.
ATTY. SUING:
Your Honor,
COMM. HABABAG:
Pabayaan mo muna. Ill come to
that.
Magkano
kung
iyong
natatandaan ang perang inabot
kay Atty. Suing?

ATTY. SUING:
Wait.
I
did
not
bring
the
documents. The Commissioner is

MR. RODIL:
Yan ang hindi ko matandaan.

18
x x x x[22] (Emphasis
underscoring supplied)

and

Thus, not only did respondent try to coach his client or

influence him to answer questions in an apparent
attempt not to incriminate him (respondent). His client
contradicted respondents claim that the Release
Waiver and Quitclaim which he (respondent) prepared
was not the one presented at the Arbiters Office, as
well as his implied claim that he was not involved in
releasing to the complainants the money for and in
consideration of the execution of the documents.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called
upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is an
instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part
that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the
administration of justice constitutes misconduct.
[23]
While the Commission on Bar Discipline is not a
court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a
judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality
an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its
officers or an examination into his character.[24]
In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr.[25] the respondent lawyer was
found guilty of gross misconduct for his attempts to
delay and obstruct the investigation being conducted by
the IBP. Nonetheless, this Court found that a suspension
of one month from the practice of law was enough to
give him the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the
virtuous path of the legal profession.
While the disbarment of respondent is, under
the facts and circumstances attendant to the case, not
reasonable, neither is reprimand as recommended by
the IBP. This Court finds that respondents suspension
from the practice of law for six months is in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing,
is found GUILTY of negligence and gross misconduct
and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of Six (6) Months, with WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[A.M. No. RTJ-90-580. April 27, 1993.]
EDUARDO R. BALAOING, Complainant, v. JUDGE
LEOPOLDO CALDERON, Respondent.
[A.M. No. RTJ-676. April 27, 1993.]
EDUARDO R. BALAOING, Complainant, v. HON.
SANTIAGO MALIWANAG, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; COUNSELS WANTON DISREGARD OF
COURTS STERN WARNING NOT TO AGAIN FILE
BASELESS
AND
FRIVOLOUS
ADMINISTRATIVE
COMPLAINTS AND HIS ADAMANT REFUSAL TO ABIDE BY
CANON 11, RULE 11.03 AND RULE 11.04, CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IS GROUND FOR
DISBARMENT. Complainant Balaoing went out of

bounds when he filed his baseless and frivolous

administrative complaints against respondent Judges
Calderon and Maliwanag, with no other plain and clear
purpose than to harass respondent Judges, and thus,
exact vengeance on them for rendering adverse
judgments against him and his clients. These acts of
complainant Balaoing run counter to the explicit
mandate of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit: CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND
MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO
JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS . . . Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall
abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts. Rule 11.04
A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the
case. We have painstakingly reviewed the records of
these cases and find the present administrative
complaints of Atty. Balaoing against Judge Calderon, Jr.
and his OIC Leonor Maniago, and against Judge
Maliwanag, just as frivolous and baseless as the
previous ones. Like before, his present complaints are
based on his personal interpretation of the law and not
on material allegations of fact, substantiated by solid
evidence. This We cannot countenance. Complainant
Balaoings wanton disregard of Our stern warning not
to again file baseless and frivolous complaints which
only clog the already full dockets of this Court instead
of serve the ends of justice, and his adamant refusal to
abide by the above-quoted provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which serve to regulate a
lawyers conduct in this jurisdiction, have shown
complainant Balaoings unfitness to hold the license to
practice law.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is the latest of the several administrative
complaints filed by Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing against
different judges of Olongapo City and Zambales.
The first complaint was dated February 17, 1989,
entitled "Atty. Balaoing v. Hon. Jaime Dojillo as Judge of
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Olongapo City, Et. Al."
Said complaint was dismissed for lack of merit through
this Courts Resolution dated September 18, 1990.
Further, Atty. Balaoing was required to show cause why
he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for having
suppressed certain material facts of which he was
charged with knowledge, and for having engaged in
forum shopping. On September 26, 1990, Atty.
Balaoing submitted his "Explanation and Motion for
Reconsideration." In a Resolution 1 of the Court En
Banc, said motion for reconsideration was DENIED, his
explanation was DECLARED UNSATISFACTORY and he
was SEVERELY CENSURED for having instituted a
patently unfounded and frivolous administrative action,
and WARNED that the commission by him of the same
or similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.
The second administrative complaint filed by Atty.
Eduardo R. Balaoing was against Judge Santiago
Maliwanag, RTC, Branch 71, Iba, Zambales, charging
them with grave misconduct for their alleged failure
and refusal to issue the corresponding writ of execution
(pending appeal) prayed for by complainant in his
motion filed in Civil Case No. 983-1 (CA-G.R. No.
01234), entitled "TEOFILO ZABALA, Et. Al. v. EUGENIO
BUENO." The Court was disturbed by complainant
Balaoings unrestrained use of unsavory, even
defamatory and offensive language against respondent
Judge. One glaring example narrates: ". . . It is well to
advise Judge Maliwanag not to be wearing his brief
(short) while in his chamber during office hours; it is
downright undignified, especially so when his body has
traces of fungus, which was have been afflicted during
his 26 years as Assistant City Fiscal of Olongapo City, a
dirty city." (This was vehemently denied by respondent

19
Judge.) The Court, in a Resolution 2 En Banc, dated
December 4, 1990, resolved to:
(1) DISMISS the complaint;
(2) SUSPEND complainant from the practice of law for
one (1) year; and
(3) IMPOSE upon complainant a FINE of ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), for Violation of the
Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with
a stern warning that subsequent similar infractions
shall be dealt with more severely.
Notwithstanding the above warnings, censure and
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year,
Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing is again before this Court
with more administrative complaints filed against not
only one, but two judges, the Honorable Leopoldo T.
Calderon, Jr. and the Honorable Santiago Maliwanag, of
Olongapo City and Zambales, respectively.
On September 25, 1990, Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing filed
a sworn letter-complaint 3 against Judge Leopoldo T.
Calderon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75,
Olongapo City, for misconduct, grave abuse of
authority and malicious delay in the administration of
justice, allegedly committed as follows:
"Complainant alleges that in the matter of
implementing the Supreme Court Circular mandating
continuous trial, there is no way for it to succeed in so
far as respondent Judge is concerned since the latter
does not follow the Circular and merely treats it as
directory; that at the start of court sessions, it has
been the practice of respondent Judge to automatically
grant postponements and deferments of the hearing of
cases to a later hour whenever his OIC, Leonor
Maniago, makes a manifestation in open court that a
certain lawyer or party called up requesting that
his/her case be postponed or be called later in the day;
that respondent Judge drinks a lot with lawyers close to
Mayor Gordon and fraternizes with them openly; that
with respect to respondents personal driver, the latter
receives his salary both from Mayor Gordon as a casual
employee and from the Supreme Court as a judicial
aide; and, that respondent Judge sanctions the set up
of having his legal researcher, Jaime Dojildo, Jr., to work
under the supervision of an OIC who, according to
complainant, is grossly inefficient and a notorious
swindler with no background in law.
Complainant further alleges that respondent Judge has
been maliciously delaying the disposition of several
cases pending in his sala.
a. Civil Case No. 418-0-88, where complainant is the
counsel for the plaintiff, was filed in 1988. Since the
respondent Judge allowed the defendants to keep on
postponing the hearings, to date, the case remains
pending, without any hearing, for more than one (1)
year;
b. Sp. Proc. No. 285, where complainant is the counsel
for the Petitioner, the case was submitted for decision
on (sic) September 1989. To date, no decision has yet
been rendered on the case to the prejudice of the
petitioner who is now very old and sickly;
c. In Civil Case No. 157-0-89, where complainant is the
plaintiff, respondent Judge in cahoots with his Deputy
Sheriff, unlawfully prevented the implementation of the
Writ of Possession;
d. In Civil Case No. 253-0-90, where complainant is the
Petitioner, the application for the immediate issuance
of mandatory injunction was filed on April 27, 1990. To
date the same has not yet been acted upon by the
respondent Judge." 4

A second letter-complaint 5 dated October 5, 1990,

was again filed by Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing against the
same Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr. and his Officer-inCharge (OIC) Leonor Maniago charging them both with
misconduct, grave abuse of authority and malicious
delay in the administration of justice relative to Civil
Case No. 201-0-89, entitled "Eduardo R. Balaoing v.
Santiago
Maliwanag
and
Romeo
Enriquez."
Complainant Balaoing, who is the plaintiff in both
cases, alleges that respondent Judge abused his
authority by refusing to declare in default the
defendants in the above-entitled cases despite their
repeated failure to attend the pre-trial conferences and
to submit their pre-trial briefs. Complainant further
avers that at the scheduled hearing, on October 5,
1990, respondent Judge did not call complainants
case, and was told only three (3) hours later that the
reason was because of the motion filed by him for
respondent Judges inhibition, which the latter
allegedly refused to resolve.
With respect to the other respondent OIC Leonor
Maniago, complainant Balaoing alleges that when he
came out of the courtroom, he was castigated by the
former for allegedly calling her notorious, swindler,
insane, etc.
Respondent Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr. filed his
Comment 6 on November 13, 1991. He asserts that the
present administrative complaint filed against him by
complainant Balaoing was precipitated by incidents in
Civil Case No. 190-0-89 entitled "Atty. Eduardo R.
Balaoing v. Eliseo Gavilan, Et. Al." for Damages,
wherein defendant Gavilan defaulted. All the other
cases mentioned in the letter-complaint were allegedly
included to merely embellish the charges.
The factual backdrop of the Gavilan case shows that
complainant Balaoing won in a foreclosure case against
one Eliseo Gavilan. After the foreclosed properties (a
house and lot) were sold in a public auction, where
complainant Balaoing was the highest bidder, a
Certificate of Sale was issued and the same was
registered. Respondent Judge, however, allegedly
prevented the implementation of the writ of
possession, to the prejudice of complainant Balaoing.
In his Comment, respondent Judge explained that the
reason why he quashed the writ of possession he
earlier issued in favor of complainant Balaoing was due
to the fact that Gavilans widow, Alice, and her
children, were residing in the foreclosed properties
and, more importantly, the period to redeem the said
properties had not yet expired. This action of
respondent Judge allegedly infuriated complainant
Balaoing, hence, his filing of several suits, one after the
other, against respondent Judge, namely:
"a) a Motion for Inhibition of respondent Judge in the
Gavilan case and in the other cases mentioned in his
present administrative complaint, alleging, among
other things, that respondent Judge is guilty of "mental
dishonesty" and "grossness of ignorance of the laws;"
b) a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, to prevent
respondent Judge from further acting in the Gavilan
case and to nullify the Order of the Quashal of the Writ
of Possession rendered in his favor;
c) Civil Case No. 425-0-90, entitled "Balaoing v. Judge
Leopoldo Calderon, Jr.," for Damages, the causes of
action of which were anchored on the events that
transpired in the Gavilan case; and
d) a Petition to cite respondent Judge in contempt filed
with the Court of Appeals for expunging his motion for
inhibition.
When the redemption period in the Gavilan case had
expired without the heirs redeeming the property,

20
respondent Judge issued a writ of possession in favor of
complainant Balaoing. But up to the present time,
complainant Balaoing has not yet taken possession of
the same, showing thereby his apparent disinterest.
As to the application of complainant Balaoing for a writ
of injunction and restraining order in Civil Case No.
253-0-90, respondent Judge explains that before he
could finish hearing the evidence of the parties in
support of and in opposition to the petition for issuance
of the ancillary writ prayed for, complainant Balaoing
filed another Motion for Inhibition of respondent Judge
to hear his cases. Nevertheless, respondent Judge
denied the motion for the issuance of the writ prayed
for failure of complainant Balaoing to show a clear right
over the property and that irreparable injury would visit
him if the writ would not be issued.
With regard to the charge of grave misconduct,
respondent Judge vehemently denies the same. Thus,
"7.1 The charge that the undersigned drinks "whisky
like water" is a canard. The undersigned is not a
habitual imbiber of liquor as he suffers from an
occasional high blood pressure and migraine. Since
undersigned became a judge, he never "patronized"
with any lawyer.
7.2 The undersigned applies the Mandatory Continuous
Trial Scheme in his cases. If there were occasional
lapses, it was because of the abnormal case load which
is now more than 500 cases.
7.3 Court Aide Antonio Faustino does not receive any
compensation from the City Government. He was,
before being appointed by the Supreme Court to such a
position, a casual employee of the City government.
Upon his assumption to his present duty, he ceased to
receive compensation from any other source.
x

7.5 Atty. Jaime Dojillo was the duly appointed

researcher in my sala. When he was promoted as
Assistant Clerk of Court, upon his request, the
Executive Judge allowed him to do researches for me.
He is now
a Trial Attorney in the PAO.
8. The undersigned has conducted the trial of cases
and had disposed of the same consistent with the
Rules of Court and various Supreme Court rulings and
circulars . ."
Other respondent OIC Leonor Maniago adopted the
allegations in respondent Judges Comment, and
alleged further that she has "faithfully performed her
duties and obligations under the law to administer
justice in accordance with her authority and without
any impartiality, (sic) whatsoever." 8
Consolidated with this administrative case is A.M. No.
R-676-RTJ, entitled "Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing v. Hon.
Santiago Maliwanag," wherein the former charges the
latter with gross ignorance of the law for allegedly
issuing a patently unjust order.
Respondent Judge Maliwanag, in his Comment dated
September 2, 1986, denied the charge and alleged
among others, that his order was issued based on
jurisprudence, equity and justice, in order to prevent
an unjust and inequitable execution of the judgment
and an injustice perpetrated by a lawyer on the
unlearned and poor couple from the barrio.
In a Memorandum to then Chief Justice Marcelo B.
Fernan, dated September 12, 1990, the Office of the
Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of
Atty. Balaoings complaint against Judge Maliwanag on
the ground that the same failed "to specifically show

and prove the facts constituting the charge of gross

ignorance of the law. The allegation of the complainant
are not only laconic and general but they are also
based on mere and personal, interpretations of the
complainant on the law instead of material allegations
of facts." 9
As shown above, complainant Balaoing has a penchant
for filing administrative charges against judges, in
whose sala he has pending cases, whenever the latter
render decisions or issue orders adverse to him and/or
his clients. In Bagamasbad v. Judge de Guzman, Jr., 10
We have already admonished lawyers to be more
prudent in filing administrative charges against
members of the judiciary. It is true that "The lawyer
owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and
the exertion of his utmost learning and ability . . . No
fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity should
restrain him from the full discharge of his duty . . . But
it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust
of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without
the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not
permit, much less does it demand for him for any
client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or
chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not
that of his client. 11 Here, complainant Balaoing went
out of bounds when he filed his baseless and frivolous
administrative complaints against respondent Judges
Calderon and Maliwanag, with no other plain and clear
purpose than to harass respondent Judges, and thus,
exact vengeance on them for rendering adverse
judgments against him and his clients.
These acts of complainant Balaoing run counter to the
explicit mandate of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND
MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO
JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
x

Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,

offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
Courts.
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge
motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.
We have painstakingly reviewed the records of these
cases and find the present administrative complaints of
Atty. Balaoing against Judge Calderon, Jr. and his OIC
Leonor Maniago, and against Judge Maliwanag, just as
frivolous and baseless as the previous ones. Like
before, his present complaints are based on his
personal interpretation of the law and not on material
allegations of fact, substantiated by solid evidence.
This We cannot countenance.
Complainant Balaoings wanton disregard of Our stern
warning not to again file baseless and frivolous
complaints which only clog the already full dockets of
this Court instead of serve the ends of justice, and his
adamant refusal to abide by the above-quoted
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which serve to regulate a lawyers conduct in this
jurisdiction, have shown complainant Balaoings
unfitness to hold the license to practice law. The
Philippines abounds in lawyers. But as Justice Malcolm
puts it, "the Philippines do not need so-called lawyers
who . . . have no ethical standards, and who are a
disgrace to a great and noble profession . . . (F)or what
is needed in the Philippines is not a greater quantity,
but a finer quality, of professional men and women, . . .
who have a sincere understanding of the high
requirements of the legal profession . . ." 12

21
Complainant Balaoing has utterly failed to live up to
the duties and responsibilities of a member of the legal
profession.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative
complaints are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Complainant Eduardo R. Balaoing is hereby DISBARRED
and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this decision be furnished to
the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and spread on the personal records of
complainant. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET
AL., Petitioners, vs. HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL
ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt
Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L.
Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala
and Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling;
and Morton F. Meads.
RESOLUTION
SANCHEZ, J.:
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to
respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the
Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of
record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito
R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto,
members of the Bar, with the suggestion that
disciplinary action be taken against them. On
November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-cause
order.
The following statements, so the Solicitor General
avers, are set forth in the memoranda personally
signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:
a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary)
have made these false, ridiculous and wild statements
in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against
MacArthur International. Such efforts could be
accurately
called
"scattershot
desperation"
(Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27, 1968,
pp. 13-14, three lines from the bottom of page 13 and
first line page 14).
b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays
bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of the
petitioners. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum
and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum Brief, dated
April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom of the
page).
c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change
their claims and stories not only from case to case but
from pleading to pleading in the same case.
(Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum, Ibid., p.17,
sixth, seventh and eighth lines from bottom of the
page).
MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by
Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly

for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates,

and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor General points out,
contain the following statements:
d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the
applicable law due to the misrepresentation and
obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence,
par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10,
1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled
that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject
any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives
to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a
government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus
difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling,
even under many of the incumbent justices, that the
Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision
that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute
manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 after judgment herein was rendered - and signed by
Vicente L. Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys.
Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and Associates, asked
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice
Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from
considering, judging and resolving the case or any
issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967.
The motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the
Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president
of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the
false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31,
1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered
in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect
prejudging and predetermining this case even before
the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the
motion states "[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the
President a short time before the decision of July 31,
1968 was rendered in this case." The appointment
referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board
of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy
discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of
side comments projecting what is claimed to be the
patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It
enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion,
brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that
"unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that
there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of
"petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored
party directly benefited by the said decision." The
"incidents" cited are as follows:
(a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law
has not been declared unconstitutional.
(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in
the above-entitled case.
(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of
law and the right to adduce evidence as is the
procedure in all previous cases of this nature.
(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in
the first place when the appeal from a denial of a
motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor

22
capable of leading to a wholesome development of the
law but - only served to delay respondent for the
benefit of the favored party.
(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not
maintain the status quo but destroyed it, and the
conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for
a reason, not for no reason at all.
(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in
the said decision which the Honorable Supreme Court
has refused to correct.
(g) the two main issues in the said decision were
decided otherwise in previous decisions, and the main
issue "right to reject any or all bids" is being treated on
a double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme
Court.
(h) the fact that respondent believes that the
Honorable Supreme Court knows better and has
greater understanding than the said decision
manifests.
(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two
hundred million dollars by said decision - without an
effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the
facts through presentation through the trial court,
which is elementary.
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again
for himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala
and Associates, in writing pointed out to this Court that
the statements specified by the Solicitor General were
either quoted out of context, could be defended, or
were comments legitimate and justifiable. Concern he
expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his
clients. It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney
could not plead such thoughts, his client would be
deprived of due process of law. However, counsel
sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to
"Supreme Court" appearing on line 7, paragraph 2 of
the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily
deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion, which in full
reads:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of
our judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen
messengers of God in all matters that come before
them, and that no matter what the circumstances are,
their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto
eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of
considering that any emanation from their mind or pen
could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or
unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an
issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala
daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in
contempt of court - seemingly totally oblivious or
uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle
involved - and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to
inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an
accused who is also his correspondent in two other
cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it
outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious
deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many
of our government officials are just amoral?
And, in addition, he attempted to explain further
subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof.

It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L.

Santiago filed his compliance with this Court's
resolution of November 21, 1968. He there stated that
the motion to inhibit and third motion for
reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that
he alone should be held responsible therefor. He
further elaborated on his explanations made on
November 21, 1968.
On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his
explanations by saying that he already deleted
paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted
from his rough draft but that it was still included
through inadvertence.
On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel
for MacArthur, registered an amended motion to
inhibit. While it repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief Justice
Concepcion and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it
left but three paragraphs of the original motion to
inhibit, taking out the dissertation on judicial ethics and
most of the comments attacking the decision of this
Court of July 31, 1968.
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be
stated that as early as October 7, 1968, he insisted in
withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the
lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did not
agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two
justices. According to him, "[t]he present steps (sic)
now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and
judicial conscience."
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29,
1968, he took pains to say that the questioned
statements he made were also taken out of context
and were necessary for the defense of his client
MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that those
statements lifted out of context would indeed be
sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20(f), Rule
138, had been violated.
On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by
Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred that the
Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the
charge against him because it is one of civil contempt
against a party and the charge is originally cognizable
by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and 10,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also stressed that said
charge was not signed by an "offended party or
witness", as required by law; and that the Solicitor
General and his assistants could not stand in the stead
of an "offended Party or witness."
We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his
explanation of December 2, 1968, as further clarified
by a supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he
manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm
in this case was neither authorized nor consented to by
him or any of his associates; that on July 14, 1967, one
Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's behalf, offered to
retain his services, which was accepted; that Meads
inquired from him whether he could appear in this
case; that he advised Meads that this case was outside
his professional competence and referred Meads to
another lawyer who later on likewise turned down the
offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and he
agreed to terminate their previous retainer agreement;
that he had not participated in any manner in the

23
preparation or authorship of any pleading or any other
document in connection with this case.
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his
side of the case. In brief, he denied participation in any
of the court papers subject of our November 21, 1968
order; claimed that he was on six months' leave of
absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as
one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his
permission to have his name included as counsel in all
of MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072), even
while he was on leave of absence.
Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3,
1969.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14,
1969, respondent MacArthur, through new counsel,
Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a special
appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth motion for
reconsideration without express leave of court. Said
motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and
contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by
the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when
in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of
the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the
above-entitled case - which condition is prohibited by
the New Rules of Court - Section 1, Rule 51, and we
quote: "Justices; who may take part. - ... . only those
members present when any matter is submitted for
oral argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication ..." This requirement is especially
significant in the present instance because the
member who penned the decision was the very
member who was absent for approximately four
months or more. This provision also applies to the
Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio
Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International
Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in the
Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably
either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine
Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965,
required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of
the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on
grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of
property and /or to the United States Government,
either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the
grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary
vested rights by the Philippine Government without
either compensation or due process of law - and
invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the
cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium,
amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually,
until restitution or compensation is made.
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July
18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show
cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof
why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court."
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return.
He there alleged that the said fourth motion for

reconsideration was already finalized when Atty.

Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and requested
him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion;
that he turned down said request twice on the ground
that he did not know anything about the case, much
less the truth of the allegations stated in the motion;
that "the allegations in said motion were subsequently
explained to the undersigned counsel together with the
background of the case involved by Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago and by one Morton F. Meads"; that upon
assurance that there was nothing wrong with the
motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the
same; that he was misled in so signing and the true
facts of the allegations were not revealed to him
especially the oral argument allegedly made in the
case.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling,
this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved "to require Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing
their answer to the said return [of Atty. Caling] and at
the same time to show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago and Morton Meads, should not be dealt with
for contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969;
and ... to direct that the three, Atty. Juanita M. Caling,
Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally
appear Before this Court on Thursday, August 27,
1969, at 9:30 a.m., on which date the contempt
proceedings against all of them will be heard by this
Court."
On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his
explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling's
statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign
the motion. The truth, according to Santiago, is that
one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked him
if he knew of a lawyer nearby who could help him file
another motion for reconsideration, and he (Santiago)
mentioned Atty. Caling; he there upon accompanied
Meads to Caling, told Caling of Meads' desire and left
Meads with Caling. Santiago insists that he never
prepared the motion and that he never even read it.
On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads'
version is as follows: On July 14, 1969, he went to Atty.
Santiago's office with the fourth motion for
reconsideration which he himself prepared. Santiago
started to read the motion and in fact began to make
some changes in Pencil in the first or second paragraph
when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new
lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked
Santiago if he could recommend one. They then went
to Caling whose office was on the same floor. Santiago
introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing
the fourth motion to Caling. While Caling was reading
the document, Santiago left. After reading the motion,
Caling gave his go-signal. He signed the same after his
name was typed therein. The motion was then filed.
According to Meads, from the time he entered the
office of Santiago to the time the motion was filed, the
period that elapsed was approximately one hour and a
half. Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes
and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes.
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads
asserts that the quotation from the Rules of Court set
forth in the fourth motion for reconsideration has not
been taken out of context because said quotation is
precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a
complete quotation and that it is a common practice in

24
court pleadings to submit partial quotations. Meads
further contends that the announced plan to bring the
case to the World Court is not a threat. In fact, his
answer also included a notice of appeal to the World
Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L.
Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral
argument with respect to the second contempt
incident. We shall now discuss the first and second
contempt incidents seriatim.
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In
his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find
language that is not to be expected of an officer of the
courts.
He pictures
petitioners
as
"vulturous
executives". He speaks of this Court as a "civilized,
democratic tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest
that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes
our decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous and
illegal" in a presumptuous manner. He there charges
that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in
this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even
before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless
manner two justices of this Court for being interested
in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the
favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the
decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose
son was appointed secretary of the newly-created
Board of Investments, "a significant appointment in the
Philippine Government by the President, a short time
before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered." In
this backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would seem
that the principles thus established [the moral and
ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority
by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to
itself." He puts forth the claim that lesser and further
removed conditions have been known to create
favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for
a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the
Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to
engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a
particular cause or party." Implicit in this at least is that
the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible
todelicadeza, which could make their actuation
suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief
Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from
the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion
that their relationship did affect their judgment. He
points out that courts must be above suspicion at all
times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of confidence
for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be
allowed to happen in our country, "although the
process has already begun."
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6
which contained language that is as disrespectful. But
we cannot erase the fact that it has been made. He
explained that, he deleted this paragraph in his rough
draft, which paragraph was included in the motion filed
in this Court only because of mere inadvertence. This
explanation does not make much of a distinguishing
difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it was
belatedly made but also because his signature
appeared on the motion to inhibit which included
paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 describes with
derision "many of our judicial authorities" who "believe

that they are the chosen messengers of God in all

matters that come before them, and that no matter
what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly
ordained by the Almighty unto eternity." It depicts
them as seemingly "incapable of considering that any
emanation from their mind or pen could be the product
of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or
favoritism for a party or an issue." After citing acts of
two judges of first instance, he paused to ask: "What is
the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright
dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in
moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our
government officials are just amoral?"
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated
mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent
MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism" for
petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored
party directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is
a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a warning to
this Court about loss of confidence, and paragraph 10
makes a sweeping statement that "any other justices
who have received favors or benefits directly or
indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of
any board-petitioner, or their agents or principals,
including
the
President",
should
also
inhibit
themselves.
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's
accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur
made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole
court. For, inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any
other justices who have received favors or benefits
directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any
members of any board-petitioner or their agents or
principals, including the president." The absurdity of
this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the
justices of this Court are appointed by the President
and in that sense may be considered to have each
received a favor from the President. Should these
justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving
the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not
certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof
would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We
would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite
system of government operating in this country.
Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the
unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed
effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to
downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross
disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts
much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly
not an expression of faith, counsel's words are
intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of
disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we
have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967),
20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By now, a lawyer's
duties to the Court have become common place.
Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for
lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells
out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics
which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not
for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial

25
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it
peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the
courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more.
The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct
that should be 'with all good fidelity ... to the courts.'
Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to
the courts can only be maintained by rendering no
service involving any disrespect to the judicial office
which he is bound to uphold.' "
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice."1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority
of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice." 2 Faith in the
courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the
continuity of government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people."3 Thus has it been said of a
lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn
and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice."4
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the
statement that it was necessary for the defense of his
client. A client's cause does not permit an attorney to
cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers
must always keep in perspective the thought that
"[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice, oathbound servants of society, their first duty is not to their
clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of
justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly
subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics."5 As rightly
observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his well-known
treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position,
lacks the power to defend himself and it is the
attorney, and no other, who can better or more
appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbent
of the judicial position.6 From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm
continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for
attorneys under certain conditions to maintain
respectful obedience to the court. It may happen that
counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than
the justice of the peace or judge who presides over the
court. It may also happen that since no court claims
infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decisions.
Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of
the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary
for the orderly administration of justice."7
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited
are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds
in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that
undermines and degrades the administration of justice.
The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice8 - is thus transgressed. Atty.
Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We
analyze the statements pointed out to us by the
Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses
petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and wild
statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the
courts against MacArthur." He brands such efforts as
"scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition

of petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying bare "the

immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He
charges petitioners with opportunistically changing
their claims and stories not only from case to case but
from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such
language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing
of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends
the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to say
that these statements were taken out of context. We
have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements.
They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of
offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said
that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession." 9 It is
Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from
all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause
with which he is charged." 10
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young,
83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the accused
convicted of murder made use of the following raw
language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a
poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his
boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his
own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold
fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. A
simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and
that would transform him into a new man. Once in a
small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! This poor
ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth,
protection and stability was given to do the forbidden
deed." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace
to the bar and an affront to the court."
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor
General or his assistants may not be considered
offended parties in this case. This Court may motu
proprio start proceedings of this nature. There should
be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish
him for contempt under the circumstances. For,
inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial
officers, and of all other persons in any manner
connected with a case before it, in every manner
appertaining thereto." 11
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has
misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court, as an officer of the court in the performance
of his official duties; and that he too has committed,
under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct
tending to degrade the administration of justice. He is,
therefore, guilty of contempt.
3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano
C. Regala. It was improper for Atty. Santiago to have
included the name of the firm of Atty. Regala without
the latter's knowledge and consent. Correctly did
Regala insist - and this is confirmed by the other
lawyers of respondents - that he had not participated in
any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case.
Regala did not even know that his name was included
as co-counsel in this case. He is exonerated.
4. Last to be considered with respect to the first
contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne
out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also

26
involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings
subject of the contempt citation. He should be held
exempt from contempt.
5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt
incident. The fourth motion for reconsideration is,
indeed, an act of contumacy.
First. It was filed without express leave of court. No
explanation has been made why this has been done.
Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out
of context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows:
"Justices; who may take part. - ... only those members
present when any matter is submitted for oral
argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication ..." However, the provision in its entire
thought should be read thus SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. - All matters
submitted to the court for its consideration and
adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for
consideration and adjudication by any and all of the
Justices who are members of the division of the court
at the time when such matters are taken up for
consideration and adjudication, whether such Justices
were or were not present at the date of submission;
however, only those members present when any
matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in
its consideration and adjudication, if the parties or
either of them, express a desire to that effect in writing
filed with the clerk at the date of submission. 12
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did
not attempt to explain this point.
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why
such a distorted quotation came about - the portion left
out was anyway marked by "XS" which is a common
practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of
Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his
conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically
states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer
knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads is
admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to
see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon
this Court. There was a qualification to the rule quoted
and that qualification was intentionally omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take
the case to the World Court and/or the United States
government. It must be remembered that respondent
MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the
decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so,
unnecessary
statements
were
injected.
More
specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur "will
inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of [the]
Philippine government officials in the bidding of May
12, 1965 ... to the World Court" and would invoke "the
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of
all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government,
including the sugar price premium, amounting to more
than fifty million dollars annually ... ."
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of
this Court to decide the case in its favor. A notice of
appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in
Meads' return. There is a gross inconsistency between
the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An

appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has

already abandoned any move to reconsider that
decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to
the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a
change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no
aboveboard explanation.
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this
Court that he should be exempted from the contempt
charge against him. He knows that he is an officer of
this Court. He admits that he has read the fourth
motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While
he has been dragged in only at the last minute, still it
was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name
should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in
character.
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having
prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. He
cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him
even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of
contempt.
8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His
insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth
motion for reconsideration and that he had not even
read the same is too transparent to survive fair
appraisal. It goes against the grain of circumstances.
Caling represents before us that it was Santiago who
convinced him to sign the motion, who with Meads
explained to him the allegations thereof and the
background of the case. Caling says that if not for his
friendship with Santiago, he would not have signed the
motion. On the other hand, Meads states that Santiago
began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration
and even started to make changes thereon in pencil.
We must not forget, too, that according to Meads
himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time
with Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. It is
highly improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth
motion for reconsideration during all that time.
Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for
respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned
from his position as such lawyer. He has control of the
proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should be
within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon
16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded
him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to
restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those
things which the lawyer himself ought not to do,
particularly with reference to their conduct towards
courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If
a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should
terminate their relation."
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never
be protected where infraction of ethics meets with
complacency rather than punishment. The people
should not be given cause to break faith with the belief
that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To
preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield
to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we
prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in
a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice.
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again
that, if only for one reason, this Court had really no
alternative but to decide the main case against

27
respondent MacArthur. As we held in our decision of
July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere to the
terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. For, this
invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not
accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. And We
repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company
[MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite
bond." 13 It would not require the adroit mind of a
lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond.,
contrary to the instructions to bidders, is not entitled to
any consideration.
It should be emphasized, too, that because the
decision herein was by a unanimous Court, even if the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not
taken part in the decision on the merits of this case,
the result would have been the same: MacArthur's
cause would just the same have failed.
For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:
1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt
of court, and fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000,
and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds Attys. Graciano C.
Regala and Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty
of contempt of court; and
2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M. Caling
guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton F. Meads,
P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. Caling, P200.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the
Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for whatever action
he may deem proper to take in the premises against
Morton F. Meads who is an alien.
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the
Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such action as he
may deem proper in relation to the disbarment or
suspension of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran
Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a
copy of this decision to the personal records of
Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and
Juanito M. Caling. So ordered.

EN BANC
[A.C. - CBD No. 471. June 10, 1999]
LT. LAMBERTO P. VILLAFLOR, complainant, vs.
ALVIN T. SARITA, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
The case under consideration is an administrative
case originated from a sworn affidavit complaint filed
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines by Lt.
Lamberto P. Villaflor seeking the disbarment of Atty.
Alvin Sarita for disregarding the temporary restraining
Order issued by the Court of Appeals in relation to the
case
entitled Lamberto
Villaflor
vs.
Biyaya

Corporation. Records show that despite the issuance

of the TRO by the Court of Appeals, respondent still
filed before the Municipal Trial Court an Urgent Exparte Motion
for
the
implementation
and/or
Enforcement of the Writ of Demolition, which was
granted by MTC Judge Amatong.
The Court ruled that the facts and evidence
obtaining in the instant case clearly reveal respondents
failure to live up to his duties as a member of the Bar
in accordance with the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Lawyers Oath and Section 20(b),
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, thus warranting
disciplinary
sanction.
Particularly,
respondent
committed immeasurable disservice to the judicial
system when he openly defied the TRO issued by the
Court of Appeals. By such act, he deliberately
disregarded or ignored his solemn oath to conduct
himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity to the
courts. Accordingly, the Court imposed on herein
respondent the penalty of suspension for two years
from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all
rights and privileges appurtenant to membership in the
Philippine Bar.
SYLLABUS
1.

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; CODE OF

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; IT IS THE
DUTY OF A LAWYER TO UPHOLD THE DIGNITY
AND AUTHORITY OF THE COURT, TO WHICH
HE OWES FIDELITY, ACCORDING TO THE
OATH HE HAS TAKEN; CASE AT BAR.- The facts
and evidence obtaining in this case clearly reveal
respondents failure to live up to his duties as a
member of the Bar in accordance with the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Lawyers Oath and
Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, thus
warranting disciplinary sanction. As an officer of
the court, it is the duty of a lawyer to uphold the
dignity and authority of the court, to which he
owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken.
It is his foremost responsibility to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice
and judicial officers. The highest form of respect to
the judicial authority is shown by a lawyers
obedience to court orders and processes. Atty.
Alvin T. Sarita committed an immeasurable
disservice to the judicial system when he openly
defied the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals. By
such act, he deliberately disregarded or ignored
his solemn oath to conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity to the courts. He
neglected his duties to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers, and to act with candor, fairness and good
faith to the courts.

2. ID.; ID.; COURT ORDERS ARE TO BE RESPECTED

NOT BECAUSE THE JUDGES WHO ISSUE THEM
SHOULD BE RESPECTED, BUT BECAUSE OF
THE RESPECT AND CONSIDERATION THAT
SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO THE JUDICIAL
BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT; CASE AT
BAR.- Moreover,
even
assuming ex
gratia
argumenti that the TRO issued by the Court of
Appeals was ambiguous in its phraseology,
respondent should have carried out the intent and

28
the spirit of the said TRO rather than choose to be
narrowly
technical
in
interpreting
and
implementing the same.
In De Leon vs.
Torres, this Court said: We desire to call attention
to the fact that courts orders, however erroneous
they may be, must be respected, especially by the
bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers of
the courts. Court orders are to be respected not
because the judges who issue them should be
respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the
judicial branch of the Government. This is
absolutely essential if our Government is to be a
government of laws and not of men. Respect
must be had not because of the incumbents to the
positions, but because of the authority that vests
in them. Disrespect to judicial incumbents is
disrespect to that branch of the Government to
which they belong, as well as to the State which
has instituted the judicial system. Not only did
respondent disobey the order of the Court of
Appeals, he also misled the trial court judge into
issuing the order to implement the writ of
demolition which led to the destruction of the
family home of complainant. In doing so,
respondent violated his oath of office and Canon
10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall
not do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of
any in court. Surely, such conduct of respondent
is starkly unbecoming of an officer of the court.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This administrative case originated from a sworn
affidavit-complaint[1] dated 14 March 1997, filed before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission
on Bar Discipline, by Lt. Lamberto P. Villaflor seeking
the disbarment of Atty. Alvin T. Sarita for disregarding
the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by the
Court of Appeals in relation to the case entitled
Lamberto Villaflor vs. Biyaya Corporation, et al. [2] now
pending with the same court.
Respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is the counsel of
Biyaya Corporation, the plaintiff in the ejectment
case[3] filed against complainant Lt. Lamberto P. Villaflor
before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 53, of
Kalookan City. Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Romanito
A. Amatong decided the ejectment case in favor of
Biyaya
Corporation. Complainant
appealed
this
decision to the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City,
Branch 131,[4] which affirmed the decision of the
MTC. Not satisfied with the decision of the RTC,
complainant brought the case on appeal before the
Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA G.R No.
50623.[5] Losing no time, complainant also filed with
the Court of Appeals an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to prevent
the impending demolition of his family home.
In a Resolution dated 27 December 1996, the
Court of Appeals granted the prayer for a TRO, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a restraining order
forthwith issue against defendants-appellees including

the public respondent Judge or Sheriff or any person

under him from evicting and demolishing the family
house of the movant, pending appeal. x x x
SO ORDERED.
The TRO was specifically addressed to, and
personally served on, the Presiding Judge of RTC,
Branch 131, Kalookan City; the Sheriff/Deputy Sheriff,
RTC Branch 131, Kalookan City; Atty. Alvin T. Sarita; and
Atty. Romeo F. Barza.[6] Despite the TRO issued by the
Court of Appeals, respondent on 8 January 1997, filed
before the MTC an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the
Implementation and/or Enforcement of the Writ of
Demolition[7] which had already been issued by the trial
court as early as 12 August 1996. In his motion which
is quoted hereunder, respondent stated the reason why
he did not heed the TRO:
1. That last January 7, 1997, plaintiff received
a Resolution dated December
27,
1996 from the Thirteenth Division of the
Court of Appeals granting the issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
2. A
close
scrutiny
of
the
aforesaid Resolution including the Notice of
Resolution and the Temporary Restraining
Order show that it was directed to the
Honorable Presiding Judge (Honorable
Antonio J. Fineza) of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, Branch
131 and to the assigned (deputy) sheriff
thereon and NOT to this Honorable Court
and its deputy sheriff.
3. The only conclusion therefrom is that
the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court is
not restrained nor prohibited from
enforcing and/or implementing its judicial
process such as the subject writ of
demolition.
XXX
On 9 January 1997, Judge Amatong granted the
motion of respondent and issued an order [8] for the
implementation of the writ of demolition. The
demolition order was actually carried out the next day,
or on 10 January 1997, by the deputy sheriff of the
lower court.[9]
In response to the situation, complainant filed
before the Court of Appeals an action for Indirect
Contempt against respondent, Biyaya Corporation,
Judge Amatong, And the Register of Deeds of Kalookan
City.
The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 20
February 1997, found respondent and his codefendants, Judge Amatong and Biyaya Corporation,
guilty of indirect contempt. The dispositive portion of
the resolution states:
WHEREFORE,
in
the
light
of
the
foregoing
disquisitions, defendants-appellees Biyaya
Corporation and MTC Judge Ramonito Amatong, and
their
counsel,
Atty. Alvin
Sarita are
hereby
adjudged GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT as they are

29
hereby fined to pay the amount of P30,000.00 each, as
per SC Administrative Circular No. 22-95, amending
Section 6, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, with a warning
that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
Atty. Alvin Sarita is likewise REPRIMANDED for his
contemptuous or improvident act despite receipt of Our
Restraining
Order,
without
prejudice
to
any
further administrative sanctionthe injured party may
seek in the proper forum.
Describing
the
unfortunate
respondent, the Court of Appeals said:

behavior

of

Specifically, the Court is convinced that Atty. Alvin

Sarita should answer for contempt of court for
misleading if not deceiving the defendant-appellee MTC
Judge into doing a precipitate act of implementing the
writ of demolition of appellants family house which
is restrained by this Court, or for making false
allegations that led his clients to commit a
contemptuous act.(Cu Unjieng vs. Mitchell, 58 Phil.
476.) His misinterpretation of the resolution is no
defense otherwise, all lawyers can effectively avoid
restraining orders of the higher court by arguing
around the bush.[10]
The Court of Appeals also granted the prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction and ordered Biyaya Corporation and Judge
Amatong to immediately restore the demolished family
house of complainant or, return to him the estimated
value of the same.
Thereafter, complainant filed a case for
disbarment against respondent before the IBP
Commission
on
Bar
Discipline. The
commissioner[11] assigned to investigate the case
issued an order[12] dated 3 September 1997, directing
respondent to file his answer or comment to the
complaint. The period of time allotted to answer the
complaint lapsed without respondent submitting his
comment. On 8 December 1997, an order[13] was issued
by the investigating commissioner requiring the parties
to attend the hearing of the case on 10 February
1998.Respondent failed to appear therein. The hearing
was postponed and reset to 6 March 1998. A notice of
hearing[14] was sent to respondent but again he failed
to attend the proceeding. After giving respondent
enough opportunity to face the charges against him,
which the latter did not avail, the case was submitted
for resolution on 6 March 1998.[15]
The commissioners report dated 10 September
1998, recommending the disbarment of Atty. Alvin T.
Sarita stated in part:
As clearly established in the resolution of the
Honorable Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals
in its disquisition on his culpability, Atty, Sarita is liable
not only for deliberately misleading if not deceiving the
defendant-appellee MTC Judge into violating the
appellate courts restraining order, but also for making
false allegations that led his clients to commit a
contemptuous act;
As a member of the Bar, Atty. Sarita is mandated by his
oath to obey the laws as well as the duly constituted

authorities therein and not to do any falsehood nor

consent to the doing of any in court;
In filing his urgent ex-parte motion to implement the
writ of demolition issued against the residence of the
complainant, Atty. Sarita was well-aware that what he
was seeking to do was specifically restrained by the
court of Appeals in no uncertain terms. Even if we were
inclined, in a gesture of utmost liberality, to hold for
Atty. Saritas (sic) and resolve any doubts in his favor,
we are simply overwhelmed by the thought that as a
lawyer, Atty. Sarita knew quite well or must have
known quite well that what he was asking for in his
motion was violative not only of an order from the
second highest court but more personally was violative
of his own oath as a lawyer;
The findings of the Court of Appeals says it all. What all
the more moves the undersigned to recommend the
ultimate penalty of disbarment against Atty. Alvin T.
Sarita is the evident, even palpable disdain, in which
he clearly holds this Office in particular, and the
Integrated Bar in general. Nowhere is this disdain more
felt than in Atty. Saritas deliberate and pointed refusal,
not only to file an Answer to the complaint against him
but also his unjustified refusal to appear before this
Office despite repeated notices. It appears that Atty.
Sarita is beyond caring for whatever sanctions this
Office may recommend against him. Surely, he cannot
turn his back on the possibility that the complainants
prayer may be granted given the seriousness of his
(Saritas) misdeeds. But then, considering that Atty.
Sarita has no compunctions about misleading a judge
of the Metropolitan Trial Court into disregarding and
violating an order from the Court of Appeals, it is no
surprise that he would ignore the Commission on Bar
Discipline;
We recommend for the disbarment of Atty. Alvin T.
Sarita.
In its 4 December 1998 Resolution, the IBP Board
of Governors resolved to adopt the findings of the
investigating commissioner, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED
and
APPROVED,
the
Report
and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent
Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is DISBARRED from the practice of
law.
The facts and evidence obtaining in this case
clearly reveal respondents failure to live up to his
duties as a member of the Bar in accordance with the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Lawyers Oath
and Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, thus
warranting disciplinary sanction.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of a lawyer
to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, to
which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has
taken. It is his foremost responsibility to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers.[16] The highest form of respect to the

30
judicial authority is shown by a lawyers obedience to
court orders and processes.

severe and, hereby reduce it to suspension for two (2)

years from the practice of law.[21]

Atty. Alvin T. Sarita committed an immeasurable

disservice to the judicial system when he openly defied
the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals. By such act,
he deliberately disregarded or ignored his solemn oath
to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of
his knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity to
the courts. He neglected his duties to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers,[17] and to act with candor, fairness and
good faith to the courts.[18]

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is

hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice
of law and from the enjoyment of all rights and
privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine
Bar, effective immediately.

Moreover, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that

the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals was ambiguous
in its phraseology, respondent should have carried out
the intent and the spirit of the said TRO rather than
choose to be narrowly technical in interpreting and
implementing the same. In De Leon vs. Torres,[19] this
Court said:
We desire to call attention to the fact that courts
orders, however erroneous they may be, must be
respected, especially by the bar or the lawyers who are
themselves officers of the courts.Court orders are to be
respected not because the judges who issue them
should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial
branch of the Government. This is absolutely essential
if our Government is to be a government of laws and
not of men. Respect must be had not because of the
incumbents to the positions, but because of the
authority that vests in them. Disrespect to judicial
incumbents is disrespect to that branch of the
Government to which they belong, as well as to the
State which has instituted the judicial system.
Not only did respondent disobey the order of the
Court of Appeals, he also misled the trial court judge
into issuing the order to implement the writ of
demolition which led to the destruction of the family
home of complainant. In doing so, respondent violated
his oath of office and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides that a
lawyer shall not do any falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in court. Surely, such conduct of
respondent is starkly unbecoming of an officer of the
court.
Respondents behavior also exhibited his reckless
and unfeeling attitude towards the complainant. By
disobeying the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals, he
inflicted deep physical and moral injury upon
complainant and his family by making them
homeless. Obviously, it did not matter to him whether
complainant and his family would still have a place to
stay as long as he won the case for his client. We would
like to emphasize that a lawyers responsibility to
protect and advance the interests of his client does not
warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and
malicious
intentions
against the other party.
[20]
Respondent failed to live up to this expectation.
We find the complaint against respondent fully
substantiated by the evidence. However, we believe
that the penalty of disbarment imposed by the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is too

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar

Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
RENATO M. MALIGAYA, A.C. No. 6198
Complainant,
-versusATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR.,
Respondent.
Promulgated: September 15, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge
Advocate Generals Service is before us on a charge of
unethical conduct for having uttered a falsehood in
open court during a hearing of Civil Case No. Q-9938778.[1]
Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for
damages filed by complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a
doctor and retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, against several military officers for whom
Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the
February 19, 2002 hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla
said:
And another matter, Your Honor. I was
appearing
in
other
cases
he
[complainant Maligaya] filed before
against the same defendants. We had
an agreement that if we withdraw
the case against him, he will
also withdraw all the cases. So,
with that understanding, he even
retired and he is now receiving
pension.[2] (emphasis supplied)
Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding
Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a number of
clarificatory questions and thereafter ordered Atty.
Doronilla to put his statements in writing and file the
appropriate pleading.[3] Weeks passed but Atty.
Doronilla submitted no such pleading or anything else
to substantiate his averments.
On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint
against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline. [4] The

31
complaint, which charged Atty. Doronilla with
misleading the court through misrepresentation of
facts resulting [in] obstruction of justice, [5] was referred
to a commissioner[6] for investigation. Complainant
swore before the investigating commissioner that he
had never entered into any agreement to withdraw his
lawsuits.[7] Atty. Doronilla, who took up the larger part
of two hearings to present evidence and explain his
side, admitted several times that there was, in fact, no
such agreement.[8] Later he explained
in his memorandum that his main concern was to settle
the case amicably among comrades in arms without
going to trial[9] and insisted that there was no proof of
his having violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the lawyers oath. [10] He pointed out, in
addition, that his false statement (or, as he put it, his
alleged acts of falsity) had no effect on the
continuance of the case and therefore caused no actual
prejudice to complainant.[11]
In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia
A. Navarro submitted a report and recommendation
finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a
falsehood in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility[12] and
recommending that he be suspended from the
government military service as legal officer for a period
of three months.[13] This was adopted and approved in
toto by the IBP Board of Governors on August 30, 2003.
[14]

There is a strong public interest involved in

requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court,
participate in the dispensation of justice, to behave at
all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor.
[15]
The common caricature that lawyers by and large
do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act
honestly should not become a common reality.[16] To
this end, Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility state:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR,
FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
By stating untruthfully in open court that
complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty.
Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical
conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyers oath to
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court, of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but
restatements. His act infringed on every lawyers duty
to never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial
officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law. [17]
Atty.
Doronillas
unethical
conduct
was
compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal to
acknowledge the impropriety of what he had
done. From the very beginning of this administrative
case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the untenable position
that he had done nothing wrong in the hearing of Civil
Case No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in doing so even
after having admitted that he had, in that hearing,

spoken of an agreement that did not in truth

exist. Rather than express remorse for that regrettable
incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived
attempt to evade responsibility, professing that the
falsehood had not been meant for the information of
Judge Daway but only as a sort of question to
complainant regarding a pending proposal to settle the
case.[18]
The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla,
remarkable only for its speciousness,[19] cannot absolve
him. If anything, it leads us to suspect an unseemly
readiness on his part to obfuscate plain facts for the
unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts. There is
in his favor, though, a presumption of good
faith[20] which keeps us from treating the incongruity of
his
proffered
excuse
as
an
indication
of
mendacity. Besides, in the light of his avowal that his
only aim was to settle the case amicably among
comrades in arms without going to trial, [21] perhaps it is
not unreasonable to assume that what he really meant
to say was that he had intended the misrepresentation
as a gambit to get the proposed agreement on the
table, as it were. But even if that had been so, it would
have been no justification for speaking falsely in court.
There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace
among disputants that, in any way, makes it necessary
under any circumstances for counsel to state as a fact
that which is not true. A lawyers duty to the court to
employ only such means as are consistent with truth
and honor[22] forbids recourse to such a tactic. Thus,
even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the doubt
and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the
parties to settle the case amicably, we must call him to
account for resorting to falsehood as a means to that
end.
Atty. Doronillas offense is within the ambit of Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which in part
declares:
A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit x x x or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice x x x.
The suspension referred to in the foregoing
provision means only suspension from the practice of
law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBPs
recommendation for Atty. Doronillas suspension from
the government military service. After all, the only
purpose of this administrative case is to determine
Atty. Doronillas liability as a member of the legal
profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the
military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to
order, as a penalty for his breach of
legal ethics and the lawyers oath, his suspension from
employment in the Judge Advocate Generals Service.
Of course, suspension from employment as a military
legal officer may well follow as a consequence of his
suspension from the practice of law but that should not
be reason for us to impose it as a penaltyfor his
professional misconduct. We would be going beyond
the purpose of this proceeding were we to do so.
Therefore, we shall treat the IBPs recommendation as
one for suspension from the practice of law.

32
At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBPs
recommendation on the duration of Atty. Doronillas
suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances
that mitigate his liability somewhat. First, we give him
credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during
the investigation, the falsity of the statement he had
made in Judge Daways courtroom. Second, the
absence of material damage to complainant may also
be considered as a mitigating circumstance. [23] And
finally, since this is Atty. Doronillas first offense, he is
entitled to some measure of forbearance.[24]
Nonetheless,
his
unrepentant
attitude
throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells
us that a mere slap on the wrist is definitely not
enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away
from the practice of law to recognize his error and to
purge himself of the misbegotten notion that an effort
to compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in
court.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO
MONTHS. He is WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar misconduct shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his
personal record and copies furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court
Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Commanding General of the
AFP Judge Advocate Generals Service.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 5161, August 25, 2015
RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S. TORRES AS A
MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For resolution is the Petition 1 filed by respondent
Rolando S. Torres (respondent) who seeks judicial
clemency in order to be reinstated in the Roll of
Attorneys.
Records show that respondent was administratively
charged by his sister-in-law, complainant Isidra TingDumali (complainant), for "presentation of false
testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to
advise against, the forgery of complainant's signature
in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and
gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of
profiting from such forgery."2 The particular charges
are:
According to the complainant, the respondent took
advantage of his relationship with her and her brothers
and used his profession to deprive them of what was
lawfully due them even if it involved the commission of
an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to
the respondent the following acts or omissions:

1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and

failed to advise against, the perjury committed by his
wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
dated 11 November 1986, wherein the two made it
appear that they were the sole heirs of the late
spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully
well that the same was false. He presented that
document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the
transfer of the title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of
his wife and Miriam. The lot was later sold to Antel
Holdings[,] Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already
made to, and received by, Felicisima and Miriam.
2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and
failed to advise against, the forgery of complainant's
signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603
when he knew that she was in Italy at that time
working as an overseas contract worker. He even
presented the falsified document to the Register of
Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the property
in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in law
Marcelina. The forgery or falsification was made to
enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc.
Payment was received and misappropriated by
Felicisima and Marcelina.
3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re: Petition for
Judicial Reconstitution of the Original Copy. and
Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot
No. 1605 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Cavite, filed by complainant's sisters Marcelina and
Felicisima on 24, October 1995, the respondent made
gross misrepresentation and offered false testimony to
the effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only
children and legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente
Ting and Julita Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a
new title in their names. With the reconstituted title,
and with the express conformity of the respondent,
Felicisima and Marcelina were able to sell Lot 1605 to
Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and profited from
the sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial
payment was even received pending the reconstitution
proceedings.
4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross
and false misrepresentations for the purpose of
profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer
through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full payment
for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of
reconstitution would be released within a month when
he knew that it would be impossible because he
presented evidence in the reconstitution case only on
12 August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money,
he even used the stationery of the Philippine National
Bank, of which he was an employee. 3
In a Resolution4 dated April 14, 2004, the Court found
merit in the complaint and, thus, held respondent
guilty of gross misconduct and of violating the lawyer's
oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, resulting in his disbarment
from the practice of law:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find
respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of the lawyer's oath, as well
as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of
continuing membership in the legal profession. He is
thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law,
and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys, effective immediately.
x x x x5
Aggrieved, respondent filed on May 20, 2004 a Motion
for Reconsideration6 of the aforesaid Resolution, which

33
the Court denied with finality in the Resolution 7 dated
June 29, 2004.

not be limited to certifications or testimonials

of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges
associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative
case for the same or similar misconduct will
give rise to a strong presumption of nonreformation.

Unperturbed, he filed on September 15, 2004 a Motion

for Leave to File and Admit Second Motion for
Reconsideration,8 which the Court denied for lack of
merit in the Resolution 9 dated November 9, 2004,
stating that "[n]o further pleadings will be
entertained."
On January 26, 2006, respondent filed an Ex-Parte
Motion to Lift Disbarment10 begging that compassion,
mercy, and understanding be bestowed upon him by
the Court in that his disbarment be lifted. The same
was, however, expunged from the records in a
Resolution11 dated June 13, 2006.
Still insistent, respondent wrote letters addressed to
former Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga 12 and former
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, 13 reiterating his
pleas for compassion and mercy. However, these
letters were similarly expunged from the records in a
Resolution14 dated September 5, 2006, considering the
previous directive that no further pleadings will be
further entertained in this case. These were followed
by numerous submissions either seeking his
reinstatement to the bar15 or the reduction of his
penalty of disbarment to suspension, 16 all of which
were either expunged from the records17 or denied18by
the Court.
More than ten (10) years from his disbarment, or
on June 23, 2015, respondent filed the instant Petition
once more seeking judicial clemency from the Court to
reinstate him in the Roll of Attorneys.
The Court's Ruling
"Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It is not a natural, absolute or constitutional
right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather,
a special privilege granted and continued only to those
who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual
attainment and in moral character. The same reasoning
applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When
exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement,
the Court should see to it that only those who establish
their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law
will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to
the practice of law are never permanently closed on a
disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal
profession as well as to the general public to ensure
that if the doors are opened, it is done so only as a
matter of justice."
"The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the
practice of law is whether the Iawver has
sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in
conduct and character. Whether the applicant shall
be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great
extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The lawyer
has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership
in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or
her character and standing prior to the disbarment, the
nature and character of the charge/s for which he or
she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to
the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in
between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement."20
In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for
Judicial Clemency21 the Court laid down the following
guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency,
to wit:
1.

There 'must be proof of remorse and

reformation. These shall include but should

2.

Sufficient time must have lapsed from the

imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reform.

3.

The age of the person asking for

clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can be
put to good use by giving him a chance to
redeem himself.

4.

There must be a showing of promise

(such as intellectual aptitude, learning or
legal acumen or contribution to legal
scholarship and the development of the
legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for
public service.

5.

There must be other relevant factors and

circumstances
that
may
justify
clemency.22 (emphases
and
underscoring
supplied)

Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the

Court finds that the instant petition is not
meritorious.
While more than ten (10) years had already passed
since his disbarment on April 14, 2004, respondent's
present petition has failed to show substantial proof of
his reformation as required in the first guideline above.
The principle which should hold true not only for judges
but also for lawyers, being officers of the court, is that
judicial "[c]lemency, as an act of mercy removing any
disqualification, should be balanced with the
preservation of public confidence in the courts. Thus
the Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is
merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of
potential and promise are indispensable."23
In this case, the only ostensible proof of reformation
that respondent has presented is a Certification 24dated
June 5, 2015 signed by Reverend Nelson D. Feranil,
Administrative Pastor of the Buenavista Evangelical
Church in General Trias, Cavite, which generally states
that respondent, "before and after his disbarment," has
been "assisting the poor and indigent litigants in our
community," and that "he has been very active in
spreading the [w]ords and gospel of the Almighty
God[,] being an active member of the Couples of Christ
FFL." Aside from these bare statements, no other proof
was presented to specify the actual engagements or
activities by which respondent had rendered free legal
services to indigents or had ministered to the members
of his community or church, hence, insufficient to
demonstrate any form of consistency in his supposed
desire to reform.
The other testimonials which respondent submits,
particularly that of Atty. Teofilo Pugeda Jr., who stated
that "[a]s a former law practitioner, [respondent] is
humble, simple, and respectful to fellow lawyers, Court
Personnel, and the Presiding Judge," and that
"[h]e used to give free legal advice and assisted
indigent litigants in their court cases,"25 and that of
Atty. Manuel Medina, retired City Prosecutor of Cavite,
who stated that "[d]uring my years as Prosecutor x x x

34
I always met him in the Regional Trial Court of Cavite
City where I can say in all honesty and candor that
he was an exemplary officer of the court, punctual[,]
and always prepared in handling his court cases," 26 all
relate to conduct or attributions prior to respondent's
disbarment; hence, these are incompetent evidence to
prove his reformation which connotes consistent
improvement subsequent to his disbarment.
In similar vein, the testimonials attached to his
previous Motion for Reconsideration27 filed on May 20,
2004 which he now incorporates in support of his
present petition,28 is equally insufficient to conclude
that he has already reformed. This is because all these
testimonials were executed in May 2004. 29 Thus, they
can only attest to respondent's conduct or attributions
a mere month removed from his disbarment on April
14, 2004.
More significantly, it should be discerned that the root
cause of respondent's disbarment was his fraudulent
acts against his sister-in-law, the complainant herein.
However, no proof was presented to show that he had
reconciled or even attempted to reconcile with her so
as to show remorse for his previous faults. The
dismissal of the criminal complaint against him
for Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents,
filed by complainant is no proof of remorse since the
same was based on lack of probable cause. 30 Likewise,
its dismissal,' could not prove that he was actually
innocent of the administrative charges against him,
since the parameters and considerations of an
administrative case are evidently different from that in
a criminal case. As in this case, the lack of probable
cause against respondent as found by the prosecutor
does not negate his administrative liability already
adjudged by this Court. That the prosecutor found that
respondent "merely rendered legal services to the Ting
siblings"31 does not mean that he rendered the same in
accordance with the lawyer's oath and ethical canons.
To add, no other evidence was presented in his Petition
to demonstrate his potential for public service, or that
he - now being 68 years of age 32 - still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by
giving him a chance to redeem himself. Thus, the third
and fourth guidelines were neither complied with.
While the Court sympathizes with the predicaments of
disbarred lawyers - may it be financial or reputational
in cause - it stands firm in its commitment to the public
to preserve the integrity and esteem of the Bar. As held
in a previous case, "in considering [a lawyer's]
application for reinstatement to the practice of law, the
duty of the Court is to determine whether he has
established moral reformation and rehabilitation,
disregarding
its
feeling
of
sympathy
or
pity."33 Ultimately, with the above discussed guidelines
not complied with, the Court has to be objective and,
therefore, denies the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015
ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant, v. ATTY.
CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint 1 for disbarment filed by
Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty. Christine Antenor-Cruz

Limpin for allegedly filing a false General Information

Sheet (GIS) with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon 1 2 and Rule
1.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The facts are culled from the pleadings.
In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los
Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter as
President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the
Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned from his post
effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to St. Lukes
Medical Center as the Vice President for Finance.
On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate
Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another
corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC
a GIS for LCI for updating purposes.
The
GIS4identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of
Directors (BOD) and President.
Mired with allegations of anomalous business
transactions and practices, on December 18, 2008, LCI
applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC.
On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing
him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and
President of LCI when she knew that he had already
resigned and had never held any share nor was he
elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of
LCI. He also never received any notice of meeting or
agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be
taken up. He has never accepted any appointment as
Chairman and President of LCI.
Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC
listing Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of the
BOD and President of LCI. She argued that the GIS was
provisional to comply with SEC requirements. It would
have been corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI
filed for voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter. She
averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good
faith and that her certification served to attest to the
information from the last BOD meeting held on March
3, 2008.5
She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a
stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on October 13,
2008, she sent Guarin a text message and asked him
to meet with her so he may sign a Deed of Assignment
concerning shareholdings. Guarin responded in the
affirmative and said that he would meet with her on
Friday, October 17, 2008. Guarin, however, neglected
to show up at the arranged time and place for reasons
unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the strength of Guarins
positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on November
27, 2008.
To belie the claim that LCI never held any board
meeting,
Atty.
Limpin
presented
Secretarys
Certificates dated May 16, 20066, May 22, 20067, and
June 13, 20078 bearing Guarins signature.
Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending
criminal complaints against the directors and officers of
LCI, where she and Guarin are co-respondents: Senator
Roxas, et al. v. Celso de los Angeles, et al.9 and SEC v.
Legacy Card, Inc.10 In those proceedings, Guarin raised
as a defense that the November 27, 2008 GIS was
spurious and/or perjured. She averred that this Court
held that when the criminal prosecution based on the
same act charged is still pending in court, any
administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same
act must await the outcome of the criminal case to
avoid contradictory findings.11 During the mandatory
preliminary
conference,
however,
both
parties
stipulated that the complaint filed by Senator Roxas
was dismissed as to Guarin.12

35
Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to
present sufficient evidence to warrant disbarment. She
stated that merely presenting the GIS does not
constitute as proof of any unethical conduct,
harassment and malpractice.
In its Report,13 the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin
violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 14 of the CPR and
thus recommended that she be suspended from the
practice of law for three months. It noted that based
on the submissions of the parties, Guarin was never a
stockholder of LCI consequently making him ineligible
to be a member of the BOD. Neither was there proof
that Guarin acted as the President of LCI but was a
mere signatory of LCIs bank accounts. This made the
verified statement of Atty. Limpin untrue.15
Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los
Angeles had the authority to appoint or designate
directors or officers of Legacy. Atty. Limpin was aware
that this procedure was not legally permissible.
Despite knowing this to be irregular, she allowed
herself to be dictated upon and falsely certified that
Guarin was a stockholder, chairman and president of
the company. The Secretarys Certificates with
Guarins signature Atty. Limpin presented were of no
moment since in these Guarin merely acceded to
become a signatory of bank accounts and these do not
show that Guarin was a stockholder.
The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013
Resolution16 adopted in toto the CBD Report. Atty.
Limpin moved for reconsideration17 but was denied in
the March 21, 2014 Resolution18 of the IBP Board of
Governors.
We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP.
Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule
1.02 of the CPR.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is
to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek
exceptions as loopholes.19 A lawyer who assists a
client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in
violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.20
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. As
Justice Malcolm stated [t]he serious consequences of
disbarment or suspension should follow only where
there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the
respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is
innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed
his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with
his oath.21
Grounds for such administrative action against a
lawyer may be found in Section 27, 22 Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office and (2) any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice.
After going through the submissions and stipulations of
the parties, we agree with the IBP that there is no
indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation
and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a seat in the
BOD and be the president of the company.23 It is
undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that
Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she
posits that she had made the same in good faith, her
certification also contained a stipulation that she made
a due verification of the statements contained therein.
That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a
Deed of Assignment is inconsequential: he never
signed the instrument. We also note that there was no
submission which would support the allegation that
Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in
filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty.

Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform

to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and
Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to
be swayed by the business practice of having Mr. de
los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and
officers of the corporation despite the rules enunciated
in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of
such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02
of the CPR.
However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpins
action in submitting a false document we see it fit to
increase the recommended penalty to six months
suspension from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C.
Limpin GUILTY of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine
A.C. Limpin from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 10132, March 24, 2015
HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO REPRESENTED BY
DAVID ALILANO, Complainants, v. ATTY. ROBERTO
E. EXAMEN, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint 1 for disbarment filed before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by the heirs
of Pedro Alilano against Atty. Roberto E. Examen for
misconduct and malpractice for falsifying documents
and presenting these as evidence in court thus
violating the Lawyers Oath,2 Canons 1,3 104 and
19,5 and Rules 1.01,6 1.02,7 10.01,8 and 19.019 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Pedro Alilano and his wife, Florentina, were the holders
of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-23261
covering a 98,460 sq. m. parcel of land identified as Lot
No. 1085 Pls-544-D located in Paitan, Esperanza, Sultan
Kudarat. Pedro and Florentina died on March 6, 1985
and October 11, 1989, respectively.
It appears that on March 31, 1984 and September 12,
1984 Absolute Deeds of Sale10 were executed by the
Spouses Alilano in favor of Ramon Examen and his
wife, Edna. Both documents were notarized by
respondent Atty. Roberto Examen, brother of the
vendee. Sometime in September 1984, Spouses
Examen obtained possession of the property.
On January 12, 2002, the heirs of Alilano filed a suit for
recovery of possession before the Regional Trial Court
of Sultan Kudarat against Edna Examen and Atty.
Roberto Examen.11 It was during this proceeding that
Atty. Examen introduced into evidence the March 31,
1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute Deeds of Sale.

36
On November 15, 2003,12 the heirs of Alilano filed this
complaint alleging that Atty. Examen, based onBarretto
v. Cabreza,13 violated the notarial law when he
notarized the absolute deeds of sale since a notary
public is prohibited from notarizing a document when
one of the parties is a relative by consanguinity within
the fourth civil degree or affinity within the second civil
degree. It is also alleged that Atty. Examen notarized
the documents knowing that the cedula or residence
certificate number used by Ramon Examen was not
actually his but the residence certificate number of
Florentina. Atty. Examen also falsely acknowledged
that the two witnesses personally appeared before him
when they did not. Lastly, it is alleged that despite
knowing the infirmities of these documents, Atty.
Examen introduced these documents into evidence
violating his oath as a lawyer and the CPR.
In his defense, Atty. Examen pointed out that there was
no longer any prohibition under the Revised
Administrative Code for a notary public to notarize a
document where one of the parties is related to him by
consanguinity and affinity.14 With regard to the use of
Florentinas residence certificate as Ramons, Atty.
Examen said that he was in good faith and that it was
office practice that the secretary type details without
him personally examining the output. 15 In any event,
he reasoned that the use of anothers residence
certificate is not a ground for disbarment and is barred
by prescription based on IBP Resolution No. XVI-200413 dated January 26, 2004 where it was proposed that
the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar
Discipline Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Section 1,
Rule VIII, be revised to include a prescription period for
professional misconduct: within two years from the
date of the act.16
In its Report and Recommendation, 17 the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty.
Examen liable for breach of the Notarial Law and
introducing false Absolute Deeds of Sale before court
proceedings. It stated that there was ample evidence
to support the complainants contention that the
Spouses Alilano did not voluntarily and knowingly
convey their property, i.e. denials under oath by
attesting witnesses and NBI Report by Handwriting
Expert Jennifer Dominguez stating that Pedro Alilanos
signature in the September 1984 Absolute Deed of Sale
was significantly different from the specimen
signatures. It also noted that Ramon Examens
residence certificate number, date and place of issue
were also falsified since the residence certificate
actually belonged to Florentina Pueblo. It thus
recommended that the penalty of disbarment be
imposed.
The IBP Board of Governors (BOG) in its June 26, 2007
Resolution18 adopted the IBP CBDs report but modified
the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a
period of two years and a suspension of Atty. Examens
Notarial Commission for a period of two years.
Atty. Examen moved for reconsideration. In its Notice
of Resolution, the IBP BOG denied the motion for
reconsideration. It also modified the penalty imposed
to suspension from the practice of law for a period of
one year and disqualification from re-appointment as
Notary Public for a period of two years.19
We agree with the IBP that Atty. Examen is
administratively liable and hereby impose a modified
penalty.
In disbarment cases the only issue that is to be decided
by the Court is whether the member of the bar is fit to
be allowed the privileges as such or not. 20 It is not
therefore the proper venue for the determination of
whether there had been a proper conveyance of real

property nor is it the proper proceeding to take up

whether witnesses signatures were in fact forged.
NO PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS FOR ACTS OF
ERRING MEMBERS OF THE BAR
In Frias v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada,21 the Court En Banc
opined that there can be no prescription in bar
discipline cases. It pointed out this has been the policy
since 1967 with the Courts ruling in Calo, Jr. v.
Degamo22 and reiterated in Heck v. Santos23 where we
had the chance to state:
If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would
be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as
lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no
private complainant would immediately come forward,
they stand a chance of being completely exonerated
from whatever administrative liability they ought to
answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the
integrity of the practice of law as well as the
administration of justice. No matter how much time
has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act
complained of and the time of the institution of the
complaint, erring members of the bench and bar
cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This
categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous
members of the bench and bar, to deter them from
committing acts which violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the
Lawyers Oath. x x x
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from the
commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative
complaint
will
not
erase
the
administrative culpability of a lawyer. (Italics
supplied)24
We therefore ruled in Frias, that Rule VIII, Section 1 of
the Rules of Procedure of the IBP CBD was void and had
no legal effect for being ultra vires and thus null and
void.25
This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case
of Bengco v. Bernardo,26 where the Court stated that
putting a prescriptive period on administrative cases
involving members of the bar would only serve to
embolden them to disregard the very oath they took as
lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no
private complainant would immediately come forward,
they stand a chance of being completely exonerated
from whatever administrative liability they ought to
answer for.
Atty. Examens defense of prescription therefore is of
no moment and deserves scant consideration.
THE SPANISH NOTARIAL LAW OF 1889 WAS
REPEALED BY THE REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE OF 1917
Prior to 1917, governing law for notaries public in the
Philippines was the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889.
However, the law governing Notarial Practice is
changed with the passage of the January 3, 1916
Revised Administrative Code, which took effect in
1917. In 2004, the Revised Rules on Notarial
Practice27 was passed by the Supreme Court.
In Kapunan, et al. v. Casilan and Court of Appeals, 28 the
Court had the opportunity to state that enactment of
the Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish
Notarial Law of 1889. Thus:
It is petitioners contention that Notary Public Mateo
Canonoy, who was related to the parties in the
donation within the fourth civil degree of affinity, was,
under Articles 22 and 28 of the Spanish Notarial Law,

37
incompetent and disqualified to authenticate the deed
of donation executed by the Kapunan spouses in favor
of their daughter Concepcion Kapunan Salcedo. Said
deed of donation, according to petitioners, became a
mere private instrument under Article 1223 of the old
Civil Code, so that under the ruling laid down in the
case of Barretto vs. Cabreza (33 Phil., 413), the
donation was inefficacious. The appellate court,
however, in the decision complained of held that the
Spanish Notarial Law has been repealed with the
enactment of Act No. 496. We find this ruling to be
correct. In the case of Philippine Sugar Estate vs.
Poizart (48 Phil., 536), cited in Vda. de Estuart vs.
Garcia (Adm. Case No. 212, prom. February 15, 1957),
this Court held that The old Spanish notarial law
and system of conveyance was repealed in the
Philippines and another and different notarial
law and system became the law of the land with
the enactment of Act No. 496.29 (Emphasis
supplied)

its face. For this reason, notaries public must

observe with utmost care the basic requirements
in the performance of their duties. 32 (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)

In this case, the heirs of Alilano stated that Atty.

Examen was prohibited to notarize the absolute deeds
of sale since he was related by consanguinity within
the fourth civil degree with the vendee, Ramon. The
prohibition might have still applied had the applicable
rule been the Spanish Notarial Law. However, following
the Courts ruling in Kapunan, the law in force at the
time of signing was the Revised Administrative Code,
thus, the prohibition was removed. Atty. Examen was
not incompetent to notarize the document even if one
of the parties to the deed was a relative, his brother. As
correctly observed by the IBP CBD:

Under Chapter 11, Section 249 of the Revised

Administrative Code provided a list of the grounds for
disqualification:

At the time of notarization, the prevailing law

governing notarization was Sections 231-259, Chapter
11 of the Revised Administrative Code and there was
no prohibition on a notary public from notarizing a
document when one of the interested parties is related
to the notary public within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or second degree of affinity.30
Note must be taken that under 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, Rule IV, Section 3(c), a notary public is
disqualified among others to perform the notarial act if
he is related by affinity or consanguinity to a principal
within the fourth civil degree, to wit:
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. A notary public
disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:

Thus under the prevailing law at the time of

notarization it was the duty of the notary public to
comply with the requirements of the Notarial Law. This
includes the duty under Chapter 11, Section 251 of the
Revised Administrative Code:
SEC. 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of
cedula [residence] tax. Every contract, deed, or other
document acknowledged before a notary public shall
have certified thereon that the parties thereto have
presented their proper cedula [residence] certificates
or are exempt from the cedula [residence] tax, and
there shall be entered by the notary public as a part of
such certification the number, place of issue, and date
of each cedula [residence] certificate as aforesaid.

SEC. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission. The

following derelictions of duty on the part of a notary
public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first
instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his
commission:
xxxx
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper
notation regarding cedula certificates.
xxxx
In Soriano v. Atty. Basco,33 the Court stated that
notaries public are required to follow formalities as
these are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected.
Thus, the Notarial Law requires them to certify that a
party to the instrument acknowledged before him has
presented the proper residence certificate (or
exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter
its number, place of issue and date as part of the
certification. Failure to perform his duties results in the
revocation of a notarys commission. The Court said:

is

xxxx
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor,
descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of
the principal within the fourth civil degree.
That Atty. Examen was not incompetent to act as a
notary public in the present case does not mean that
he can evade administrative liability under the CPR in
conjunction with the provisions of the Notarial Law.
NOTARIES PUBLIC MUST PERFORM THEIR DUTIES
DILIGENTLY AND WITH UTMOST CARE
In Nunga v. Atty. Viray,31 this Court stated:
[N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The
protection of that interest necessarily requires that
those not qualified or authorized to act must be
prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts,
and the administrative offices in general. It must be
underscored that the notarization by a notary public
converts a private document into a public document
making that document admissible in evidence without
further proof of the authenticity thereof. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon

As a lawyer commissioned as a notary public,

respondent is mandated to discharge with fidelity
the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such
duties being dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest. Faithful observance
and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath
in an acknowledgment are sacrosanct. He cannot
simply disregard the requirements and solemnities of
the Notarial Law.34(Emphasis supplied)
Here, based on the submission of the complainants, it
is clear that the residence certificate number used by
Ramon Examen and as notarized by Atty. Examen in
both Absolute Deeds of Sale was not in fact the
residence certificate of Ramon but Florentinas
residence
certificate
number.35
Atty.
Examen
interposes that he was in good faith in that it was office
practice to have his secretary type up the details of the
documents and requirements without him checking the
correctness of same.
A notary public must discharge his powers and duties,
which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy
and fidelity.36 Good faith cannot be a mitigating
circumstance in situations since the duty to function as
a notary public is personal. We note that the error
could have been prevented had Atty. Examen diligently
performed his functions: personally checked the
correctness of the documents. To say that it was his
secretarys fault reflects disregard and unfitness to
discharge the functions of a notary public for it is he

38
who personally acknowledges the document. He was
behooved under Section 251, Chapter 11 of the
Revised Administrative Code to check if the
proper cedulas were presented and inspect if the
documents to be acknowledged by him reflected the
correct details. This Court cannot stress enough that
notarization is not a routinary act. It is imbued with
substantive public interest owing to the public
character
of
his
duties37.
Atty. Examen posits that the failure of a notary to make
the proper notation of cedulas can only be a ground for
disqualification and not the proper subject for a
disbarment proceeding. We disagree.
In violating the provisions of the Notarial Law, Atty.
Examen also transgressed the his oath as a lawyer,
provisions of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
and willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
By his negligent act of not checking the work of his
secretary
and
merely
perfunctorily
notarizing
documents, it cannot be said that he upheld legal
processes thus violating Canon 1 of the CPR. Neither
can it be said that he promoted confidence in the legal
system. If anything, his acts serve to undermine the
functions of a diligent lawyer. He thus ran afoul Rule
1.02 of the CPR. We cannot stress enough that as a
lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the
trust and confidence reposed by the public in the
integrity of the legal profession.38 A lawyers mandate
includes thoroughly going over documents presented
to them typed or transcribed by their secretaries.39
The Court notes that the case between the parties is

not the first that reached this Court. In Edna Examen

and Roberto Examen v. Heirs of Pedro Alilano and
Florentina Pueblo,40 Atty. Examen and his sister-in-law
questioned via a petition for certiorari 41 the propriety of
three Court of Appeals Resolutions relating to a case
involving Lot No. 1085 Pls-544-D this time with respect
to its fruits. There the Court of Appeals (CA) after
giving Atty. Examen 90 days to file his appellants brief,
denied a second motion for extension of time merely
on the basis of a flimsy reason that he had misplaced
some of the transcript of the witnesses testimonies.
The CA did not find the reason of misplaced transcript
as good and sufficient cause to grant the extension
pursuant to Section 12,42 Rule 44 of the Revised Rules
of Court. It stated that it was a flimsy and lame
excuse to unnecessarily delay the proceedings.43 The
CA was of the opinion that defendant-appellants,
herein respondent, motion was a mockery of the
procedural rules.44 This Court denied the petition for
various procedural defects.45
With respect to the penalty imposed, given that Atty.
Examen not only failed to uphold his duty as a notary
public but also failed to uphold his lawyers oath and
ran afoul the provisions of the CPR, the Court deems it
proper to suspend Atty. Examen from the practice of
law for a period of two years following this Courts
decision in Caalim-Verzonilla v. Pascua.46
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto E. Examen is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO
(2) YEARS.
In addition, his present notarial
commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is
DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public
for a period of two (2) years from finality of this
Decision. He is further WARNED that any similar act
or infraction in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of
the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Department of Justice and all courts
in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.