Professional Documents
Culture Documents
FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando
Guerrero, discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the
witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office.
Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion
edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto published an article against the
Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of
the Spanish Penal Code provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers
of the Crown. Hence, the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in
force and can be applied in the case at bar?
HELD: No.
REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256
of the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King.
However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings
nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change
of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means
that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The
Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be political in nature for it is about
the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that it is a
general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. Hence, Article 256 of
the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present
case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.
Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay
Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February
8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking
over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by
virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term
of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election
Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to
have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional
Constitution.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC
Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become
inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw,
therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act
of 1982 should still govern.
Francisco vs. HR
Ernesto Francisco, Jr. vs. The House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
Carpio Morales, J.:
Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution
which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). Then on June 2,
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on June 2,
2003 and the second impeachment complaint filed was on October 23, 2003, it
violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
July 22, 2012
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012
Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was
added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC
one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each
having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held
in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the
House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph
G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit
in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner
has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the
controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory that
the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent
and mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of either
divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution.
Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses
exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is
to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a
representative from Congress, it should mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that
petitioner has no real interest in questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs
current composition. The respondents also question petitioners belated filing of
the petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of
judicial review have been met in this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with
eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to
the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
(1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have standing to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that
he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine
qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal
branch of government is put in issue.The Court disagrees with the respondents
contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official
nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on
the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official
nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the
JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and
nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this
regard, the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest
magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the
country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of
the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of
the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and
unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post,
but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification
of legal blunders.
(2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution
is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether
the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in
either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The
seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to
provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact
legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision
does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.
The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but
any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however
does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by
itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions
have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in
effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a
manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional
conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In
fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
Prefatory Statement:
Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), "the State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service xxx." Would the Comelec's act of
disqualifying the so-called "nuisance" candidates violate this
ISSUE:
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right
nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in
the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of
Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State
Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not selfexecuting, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to
the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II,
the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of
the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the
courts.Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact
positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into
public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is
to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the
clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and
reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be
subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases
such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to
countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was
not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but
amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be
sourced.The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be
subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to
seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on
"Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally
without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality
is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant
to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the
case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or
the burdens which they create.The rationale behind the prohibition against
nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a
bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling
interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly.
Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in
conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the
greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased
allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization
of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into
the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the
candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The
poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the
electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance
candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was
disqualified.
investigation on the same subject, issued another assessment for estate tax
worth P202,262.40 and inheritance taxed worth P267,402.84 with a total amount
of P469,665.24. In January 1955, Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, Morocco (an
international zone [foreign country] in North Africa). At the time of her death, she
was a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier. She however left some
personal properties (shares of stocks and other intangibles) in the Philippines.
The designated administrator of her estate here is Antonio Campos Rueda.
In the same year, the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) assessed the estate for
deficiency tax amounting to about P161k. Campos Rueda refused to pay the
assessed tax as he claimed that the estate is exempt from the payment of said
taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code which provides:
That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal
property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign
country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax
of any character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not
residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which
the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption
from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible
personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign
country.Campos Rueda was able to prove that there is reciprocity between
Tangier and the Philippines.However, the CIR still denied any tax exemption in
favor of the estate as it averred that Tangier is not a state as contemplated by
Section 22 of the Tax Code and that the Philippines does not recognize Tangier as
a foreign country.
Issues:
Respondents reply to the request for exemption of taxes, etc.:
(1) There is no reciprocity as it did not meet the requirements mentioned in
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Tangier is a mere principality
and not a foreign country.
(Note: As argued, section 122, in relation to the case, grants certain exemption of
taxes provided that reciprocity be met and for reciprocity to be met, Tangier
must be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122).
(2) Respondent denied request for exemption because the law of Tangier is not
reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
(3) Respondent demanded the payment of the sums of 239,439.49 representing
deficiency estate and inheritance tax including ad valorem penalties, surcharges,
interests and compromise penalties.
The Court of Tax Appeals ruled:
(1) Tangier allows a similar law for the exemption of taxes. Such exemption is
sufficient to entitle Antonio Rueda to the exemption benefits. There is no lacking
of reciprocity.
The Collector of Internal Revenue asked a question of law:
(1) Whether the requisites of statehood is necessary (sine qua non) for the
acquisition of international personality.
(2) Whether acquisition of international personality is required for a foreign
country to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code.
The Supreme Court referred the case back to the Court of Tax Appeals to
determine whether the alleged law of Tangier did grant the reciprocal tax
exemption required by Section 122.
Held:
(1) Requisite of Statehood is necessary.
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state,
it is required in line with Pounds formulation that:it be a politically organized
sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of
2012 Posted
Facts: William Reagan imported a tax-free 1960 Cadillac car with accessories
valued at US $ 6,443.83, including freight, insurance and other charges. After
acquiring a permit to sell the car from the base commander of Clark Air Base,
Reagan sold the car to a certain Willie Johnson Jr. of the US Marine
Corps stationed in Sangley Point, Cavite for US$ 6,600. Johnson sold the same,
on the same day to Fred Meneses, a Filipino. As a result of the transaction, the
Commissioner rendered Reagan liable for income tax in the sum of P2,970.
Reagan claimed that he was exempt as the transaction occurred in Clark Air Base,
which as he contends is a base outside the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Reagan was covered by the tax exemption.
Held: The court ruled in the negative. The Philippines, as an independent and
sovereign country, exercises its authority over its entire domain. Any state may,
however, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. It may allow another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. By doing so, it by no
means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. The
areas retain their status as native soil. Clark Air Base is within Philippine
territorial jurisdiction to tax, and thus, Reagan was liable for the income
tax arising from the sale of his automobile in Clark. The law does not look with
favor on tax exemptions and that he who would seek to be thus privileged must
justify it by words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be
misinterpreted. Reagan has not done so, and cannot do so.
Republic v Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 155832)
FACTS:
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Commissioner Daza gave
written authority to two lawyers to sequester any property, documents, money,
and other assets in Leyte belonging to Imelda Marcos. A sequestration order was
issued against the Olot Resthouse in Tolosa, Leyte. Imelda Marcos filed a motion
to quash claiming that such order was void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the
PCGG Rules and Regulations. The Rules required the signatures of at least 2
PCGG Commissioners.The Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped
from questioning the sequestration since by her acts ( such as seeking permission
from the PCGG to repair the resthouse and entertain guests), she had conceded
to the validity of the sequestration. The Republic also claims that Imelda failed to
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribetaking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was
impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were
begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption
against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11
senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging
evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an
uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel
resigned after casting his vote against Estrada
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and
joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to
be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He
added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the
seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his
post. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at
EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.
Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in
cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for
judgment confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I
EDSA II
exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government.
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of
the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from
it cannot be the subject of judicial review
intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and
the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review.
presented a political question;
involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling
on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct
calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of
disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the
disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as
President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in
the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or omission
before, during and after January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and
subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona
Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment
Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses
of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as
the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature
and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada
can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily.
That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the
de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed
by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision
of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him
with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as
such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are
incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the
judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily
manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present
enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the
judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the
cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the
publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that
the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not
a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing
to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory.
What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international
law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the
execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and
continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it.
Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the
rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994
square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the
exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210
sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope
of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise
treaty-based rights.
right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to
absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary
international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international
community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well as the Scarborough
Shoal, as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS
and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate
their own maritime zones in short, they are not to be enclosed within the
baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is
because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already
depart from the provisions of UNCLOS that the demarcation should follow the
natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal through effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones
where we exercisetreaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise
sovereignty
b. contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we
can enforcecustoms, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we
have the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive
economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf this is covered
by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.
Razon v. Tagitis
December 3, 2009
Brion
Paolo Q. Bernardo
If you can, please go beyond the summary-doctrine boxes; especially so you
understand the ratio of the Court. Apologies for the delay AND length; as for the
length, I omitted a lot of facts I deemed irrelevant. Lastly, please see the
dispositive.
SUMMARY: Engr. Morced N. Tagitis was last
seen in Jolo, Sulu. His disappearance was
reported to the Jolo Police Station. It was
unacted upon for a month and hencee Mary B. Tagitis
of Amparo
against certain
dispute:
1. the sufficiency in form and substance
of the Amparo petition filed before
the CA;
2. the sufficiency of the legal remedies
the Tagitis took before petitioning for
the writ;
3. the finding that the rights to life,
liberty and security of Tagitis had
been violated;
4. the
sufficiency
of
evidence
supporting the conclusion that Tagitis
was abducted;
5.
the conclusion that the CIDG
Zamboanga was responsible for the
abduction; and,
6. generally, the ruling that the respondent discharged the
DOCTRINE:
On the test for the sufficiency of a petition for
writ of amparo:
To read the Rules of Court requirement on
pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo
situation, the test in reading the petition should
be to determine whether it contains the details
available to the one filing the petition under the
circumstances, WHILE presenting a cause of
action showing a violation of the victims rights
to life, liberty and security through State or
private party action.
On whether enforced disappearance is a proper
ground for a writ of amparo:
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the
FACTS:
Engr. Morced N. Tagitis is a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior
Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship
Programme
He was last seen in Jolo, Sulu.
Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of
of Amparo
scholar and
answer that Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf
group;
Information from persons in the military who do not want to be identified stated that Engr. Tagitis is in
the
hands of the uniformed men; and according to reliable information received by Tagitis, subject
Engr. Tagitis is in
the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with
the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest
attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different
terrorist groups.
Tagitis filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato
At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the Tagitis from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen.
Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
Thereafter, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force Tagitis of the PNP did not
appear to be exerting
dispute:
3. the finding that the rights to life, liberty and security of Tagitis had
been violated; t
4. the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conclusion that Tagitis was
abducted;
5. the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga was responsible for the
abduction; and,
6. generally, the ruling that the respondent discharged the burden of
proving the allegations of the petition by substantial evidence
ISSUES:
1. WON the petition for writ of amparo filed is sufficent in form and substance;
2. WON an enforced disappearance is a proper ground for issuance of a writ of
amparo;
3. WON there was an enforced disappearance in this case;
4. WON the PNP may be held accountable;
RULING:
1. Yes;
2. Yes;
3. Yes;
4. Yes;
RATIO:
1. In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondents
Amparo petition, the petitioners contend that the petition violated Section
5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule.
a. SPECIFICALLY, the petitioners allege that Tagitis failed to, in her
petition:
i. allege:
any ACT or OMISSION the petitioners committed in violation of
Tagitis rights to LIFE, LIBERTY, and SECURITY
in a complete manner HOW Tagitis was ABDUCTED, the persons
RESPONSIBLE for his DISAPPEARANCE, and the respondents
SOURCE of INFORMATION;
the abduction was committed at the petitioners instructions or
with their consent;
any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in the
performance of their duties in the investigation of Tagitis
disappearance;
ii. implead the members of PNP-CIDG regional office in Zamboanga
alleged to have custody over her husband;
iii. attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations;
iv. specify what legally available efforts she took to determine the fate or
whereabouts of her husband.
b. The petitioners state that a petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be
signed and verified and shall allege, among others, as stated in Section 5
of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
i. (c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of
the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with
the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
ii. (d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names,
personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority
or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation,
together with any report;
iii. (e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine
the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the
person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
c. The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) of the Rule
to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual
violation of a victims rights.
i. As in any other initiatory pleading,the pleader must of course state
the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the
evidentiary details.
ii. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in
light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a
situation of uncertainty; hence the one filing the petition may not be
able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or
who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where
the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be
hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance.
d. To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing
the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should
be to determine whether it contains the details available to the
one filing the petition under the circumstances, WHILE
presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victims
rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party
action.
i. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, to determine if the
required elements--namely, of the disappearance, the State or
private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to
life, liberty or security-- are present.
e. Applying these rules in the present case, the petition amply recites in its
paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly
dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter
was nowhere to be found despite efforts to locate him.
i. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7, in relation to
paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable information, police
operatives were the perpetrators of the abduction.
ii. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis rights to life, liberty and security
were violated when he was "forcibly taken and boarded on a motor
vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence
operatives," and then taken "into custody by the respondents police
intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically by the
CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an earnest
attempt of the police to involve and connect [him] with different
terrorist groups."
f. If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of
supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule.
i. This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one
that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly
followed.
g. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the
requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the
facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an
affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled.
h. Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an
alleged disappearance must have been made, specifying the manner and
results of the investigation.
i. The Court rejected the petitioners argument that the Tagitis's petition
did not comply with the Section 5(d) requirements of the Amparo
Rule, as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and
his companions immediately reported Tagitis disappearance to the
police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they were relatively certain
that he indeed had disappeared.
2. The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo in an ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE situation.
a. The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof."
i. However, while the Rule covers "enforced disappearances"
this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this
jurisdiction.
b. The Court clarifies that it does not rule on any issue of criminal
culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is
an issue that requires criminal action before our criminal courts based on
existing penal laws.
i. Its intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance
has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this
disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to
address it.
c. The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations,
under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold.
i. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are
undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
g.
h.
i.
j.
4. The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No.
6975, otherwise known as the "PNP Law," specifies the PNP as the
governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and prevent crimes,
effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist
in their prosecution."
a. The PNP-CIDG is the "investigative arm" of the PNP and is mandated to
"investigate and prosecute all cases involving violations of the Revised
Penal Code, particularly those considered as heinous crimes."
LGC (1991), require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic
consultations. No project or program be implemented unless such consultations
are complied with and approval mus be obtained.
Article VII (Executive Department)
Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Article X. (Local Government)
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the province, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions on Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
this constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous
regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by
a majority of the votes cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting
favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall
provide for legislative powers over:
1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.
The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.
ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed
by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1
hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the
present constitution and laws shall come into force upon signing of a
comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework. The presidents authority is limited to proposing constitutional
amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that the required
amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a plebiscite.
MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.
Sec. 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."
to the
purpose.
Initiative
on
the
Constitution
which
refers
to
petition
proposing
through a
reject a
legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes,
namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an
act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a
law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative
bodies.
(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.
(e)
on the
referred to as the
Panlalawigan,
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may
be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
(c)
c.1.
rejected,
amended
or
repealed,
c.2.
c.5.
the
case
the
c.3.
c.4.
as
the
that
it
signatures
reason
is
not
of
the
of
be;
proposition;
or
one
may
the
petitioners
reasons
exceptions
or
therefor;
provided
registered
voters;
herein;
and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by
the legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed
validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%)
of the registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters
therein; Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of one
in a province or each
9. Effectivity
of
Initiative
or
Referendum
Proposition. (a)
the
Sec. 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000)
registered voters in case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of
provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in
case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local
legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or
amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30)
days from its presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and
registered representative may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice
thereof to the local legislative body concerned.
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially
Secretary of Local Government or his designated
of
autonomous regions, ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60)
days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from
notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number
of
signatures.
(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated
representative, in the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a
representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned
in a public place in the autonomous region or local government unit, as the case
may be. Signature stations may be established in as many places as may be
warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections,
through
whether or not the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to
obtain the required number is a defeat of the proposition.
(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall
then set a date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to
the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval
within ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the Commission, as
provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty (60)
days in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall
then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall be certified
and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.
Sec. 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. If the proposition is approved by a
majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification
by the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the local
legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of
votes, the proposition is considered defeated.
Sec. 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall
not be exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal
powers of the local legislative bodies to enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall
adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall be canceled. However,
those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the
manner herein provided.
Sec. 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. Any proposition or
ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum
as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local
legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom, and
may be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body within (3/4)
of all its members: Provided, however, that in case of barangays, the period shall
be in (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months.
Sec. 17. Local Referendum. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof,
any local legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous
region, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays for the approval or
rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved.
Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission
within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case
of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the
proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to
this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative
body to enact the said measure.
IV. Final Provisions
Sec. 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election
Code and other election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act,
shall apply to all initiatives and referenda.
Sec. 20. Rules and Regulations. The Commission is hereby empowered to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act.
Sec. 21. Appropriations. The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial
implementation of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the
General Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act.
Sec. 22. Separability Clause. If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid
or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and
effective.
Sec. 23. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5
and 6: That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to
12%, after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase
the VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because
such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue
that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant
be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this
refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the
government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said
that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions
provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege
that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance
will make the recommendation.
Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which
are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power
which can never be delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete
as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and
to determine the expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and
not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise which determines the
validity of its delegation.
For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps
out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12%
rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a
duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose
the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the
existence of a fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national
government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
1%. If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by
legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it
describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his
authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward.
she and her children had suffered from petitioners abusive conduct; that
petitioner had threatened to cause her and the children physical harm for the
purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; that she was actually deprived of
custody and access to her minor children; and, that she was threatened to be
deprived
of
her
and
her
childrens
financial
support.
Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10, 1998 in Makati City.
They have three children, gun and pointed the barrel of his gun to his head as he
wanted to convince her not to proceed with the legal separation case she filed;
she hid her fears although she was scared; RTC issued a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO),4 which we quote in full:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 9262, otherwise known as the AntiViolence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) effective for thirty (30) days from date of receipt
is
hereby
issued
against
respondent
Ralph
P.
Tua.
ordered to:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary1. Enjoin from committing and
threatening to commit personally or through another, physical, verbal
and emotional harm or abuse against the herein petitioner (respondent)
and
other
family
and
household
members;
2. Restrain from harassing, annoying, texting, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating with the petitioner (respondent) whether
directly or indirectly or engaged in any psychological form of
harassment;
3. Stay away from the petitioner (respondent) and other family and
household members at a distance of 100 meters radius from the place of
residence of the plaintiff and likewise to stay away from the residence,
school, place of employment and other places frequented by the herein
petitioner (respondent), and other family and household members.
4. Give and deliver the three (3) minor children of the petitioner
(respondent) to the [latter] who shall have their temporary custody
pending the determination of whether or not a permanent protection
order shall issue.VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY
LAW. The Sheriff of this Court, the PNP Imus, Cavite, or any Officers of
the Law are hereby commanded to effect this Order immediately and to
use necessary force and measures under the law to implement this
Order.
petitioner denied respondents allegations and alleged, among others,
that he had been maintaining a separate abode from petitioner since
November 2004; that it was respondent who verbally abused and
threatened him whenever their childrens stay with him was Petitioner
contended that the issuance of the TPO on May 23, 2005 is
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed
and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility,
criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since time is of the
essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented, the
court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice
and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy
and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to
protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or
to
prevent
such
violence,
which
is
about
to
recur.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative
of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment
which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which
the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC
may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her
tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required
before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace
that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to
the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is
protection of women and children from violence and threats to their
personal
safety
and
security.
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the
immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent
requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days
from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the
merits
shall
likewise
be
indicated
on
the
notice.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones
defense. To be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court;
one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is
no denial of procedural due process.1
Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court
of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. Hence,
the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness
and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature.15
The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders
is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or
disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before
the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such
rights.16crallawlibrary
are
We
quote
again
Section
15
thus:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
not
of
RA
9262
persuaded.
for
ready
reference,
order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of
the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30)
days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior
to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the
immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court
sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the
service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the
merits of the issuance of a PPO.
Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the
application after ex parte determination that there is basis for the issuance
thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent need not be notified or be present
in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the courts
discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine
that the violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO
have been committed.It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion
when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 18
We find that the CA did not err when it found no grave abuse of discretion
committed
by
the
RTC
in
the
issuance
of
the
TPO.
The factual matters herein raised by petitioner should be presented during the
hearing on the merits on the issuance of the Permanent Protection Order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 161658
November 3, 2008
(2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive
result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will
confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and
tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as
contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents,
undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall
be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's
work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous
drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for
suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the
Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense
having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years
and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the
national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be
positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15
of this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued
Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said
resolution read as follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.WHEREAS, Section 1,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;WHEREAS, by
requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know
the quality of candidates they are electing and they will be assured that
only those who can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency would be elected x x x.SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates
for public office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004
Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory
drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing
laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for
re - election in the May 10, 2004 elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in
addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.Pimentel invokes as legal
basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born
citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident
of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day
of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)
qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the
Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165
and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to
undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all
candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is
no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand
the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact
a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid
down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?
Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they
constitute undue delegation of legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He
points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for
senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age,
and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for
senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted
upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend
or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade,
or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the
Constitution.
Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should
be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and
void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must
conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.8 In the
discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have
no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever
limits it imposes must be observed.9 It ought to be made abundantly clear,
however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its
having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility
requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
confidentiality of the test results."35 Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the
employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or
evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the
intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper
safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is
relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the
country and thus protect the well - being of the citizens, especially the youth,
from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this
through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a
national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test.36
To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is
substantial enough to override the individual's privacy interest under the
premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender,
age group, and social - economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the
sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would
be an investor's dream were it not for the illegal and immoral components of any
of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law
public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a
laid back stance with respect to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement
agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of
preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat
of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds
that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy
on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by
the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug
test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees
also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil
Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high
standard of ethics in the public service.37 And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the
test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be
accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost
responsibility and efficiency.38
Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the
ground of undue delegation of power hardly commends itself for concurrence.
Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to
give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary
and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be
conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the
case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as
contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of
officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the company's work rules.
In either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the
persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned
way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the
confidentiality of the test results are established.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the
constitutional landscape.39 In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of
the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with
the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or
entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has
become imperative, as here.
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by
the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily
consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.40 To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical
test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and
declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he
lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen
since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly
explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first
defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person
must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act
to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino
citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized
and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,[28] of Filipino mothers who, upon
reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized
citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not
Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those
born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were
likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to
perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers
before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are
natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are
considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who
are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of
citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have
to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine
citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable
law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to
go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.A final
point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge"
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the House.[29] The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check
"whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.[30] In the absence thereof, there
is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the
decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter
for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire
into the correctness of the assailed decision.[31] There is no such showing of
grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can
still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same
in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to,
or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry
in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the
son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to
recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.