CFO

/ 116025

2006 2013 A CFO
CFO
CEO CFO

CFO

Fama and Jensen1983

Stiles and
Taylor2001

CFO
CFO
CFO

Brickley and Zimmerman2010

CFO

Duchin Matsusaka and Ozbas2010 Kimbrough

and Wang2014 LehnPatro and Zhao2009

CEO

2011
4%

Fama and Jensen1983

Adams and Ferreira2007 Bedard et al 2014

CFO CEO
Jiang et
al 2010 Kim et al 2011

CFO CFO

2005

CFO
CEO

Ge et al 2011 CFO
CEO

* 71272051 NCET 13
0707 2015KJA001
2005 2010 CFO CFO

27

CFO CEO

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2015 CFO

CFO

2015

CFO

1
1 CFO

CFO

CFO CFO
CFO

CFO
CFO

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Cho and Hambrick2006

CFO
CEO 2010 CEO
CFO CEO
CFO
CFO CEO
2006 Feng et al 2011 CFO

CEO CEO

CFO CEO CEO

CEO
Philippon and Bergstresser2006

CFO

Cheng and Warfield2005

CEO CEO

CEO

CFO
CFO
CFO

2009 CFO

CFO
CEO

CEO
CEO
CFO CEO
CFO
CFO CFO
CFO
CFO
CEO

CEO
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28

 2 CEO CFO

CFO

Jiang and Kim2014 2014
2013 CFO

Guay et al 2006
2014

Jones
2
CFO

CFOdual CFO CFOdual

1 0

2010 2008

CEO
CEO CEO CEO

CEO

CFO CFO
2009
CFO
CEO

CFO
3
3 CFO

2006 2013 A
ST * ST
10
9475 CCE
CFO CSMA
CSMA
1%

1

CEO
CEO CEO
1
1

absDACC
F
CFOdual
Size
Leverage
Growth

2013

Jones 1991

1 0
CFO CFOdual 1 0

1 0

MB

OA

= /

LOSS

1 0

Exshr

Boardsize
Independence
Institute
Shrcr1
ATO
Invrec

BIG10
State
Suspect

Opnion

2014 10 1
0
1 0
OE 0 0. 001
1 0

1 0

29

CEOshr
CEOtherboard

CEO 1 0
CEO 1 0

CEOchair

CEO 1 0

CEOtenure

CEO

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Analyst
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Otherboards

Education

Expertise
Cogroup
Tenure

+
+

State i +

1
0
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0
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CFO
2008
CFO

CFO 0. 2% 5. 5% CFO
4. 13 12
3 CFOdual

CFO

12345
CFO CPAACCA 1 0
CFO 1 0
CFO

3
CFO

absDACCit = 0 + 1 CFOdual it + 2 Sizeit + 3

Leverageit + 4 Growthit + 5 MBit
+ 6 OAit + 7 LOSSit + 8 ExShr it
+ 9 Boardsizeit + 10 Independenceit
+ 11 Instituteit + 12 Shrcr1 it + 13
ATOit + 14 Invrecit + 15 BIG10 it

+ 16 State i + 17 Suspect it + 18
1
+
Logit F = 0 + 1 CFOdual it + 2 Size it + 3
Leverage it + 4 Growth it

absDACC

0. 068

0. 072

0. 001

0. 446

9475

0. 083

0. 276

9475

Industry + Year

Industry + Year

2
+

2
0. 068 0. 001 0. 446F 0. 083
8. 3% CFOdual 0. 237 CFO
23. 7% 1 CFO
2006 2008

CEO
1 0

CEOpower it +

5 MB it + 6 OA it + 7 LOSS it
8 ExShr it + 9 Boardsize it + 10
Independence it + 11 Institute it + 12
Shrcr1 it + 13 Opnion it + 14
CEOpower it + 15 BIG10 it + 16

CFOdual

0. 237

0. 425

9475

CFOshare

0. 002

0. 007

0. 055

9475

Tenure

4. 131

1. 464

12

9475

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Ceopower

State

big10

Analyst

Leverage

absDACC

0. 020 *

0. 020 *

0. 005

0. 042

0. 034

0. 028

0. 073

0. 021

0. 0432

0. 011

0. 035

0. 075

0. 075

0. 085

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0. 014

0. 043

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0. 012

0. 010

State
big10
Analyst
Leverage

0. 040

0. 038

0. 040

0. 095

0. 035

0. 075

0. 075

0. 085

0. 017

0. 017 *
0. 088

0. 015
0. 021
0. 030

0. 017

0. 017
0. 081

0. 088

0. 013
0. 002

0. 022

0. 021

0. 013

0. 001

0. 203

1
0. 118

0. 022
0. 1178

0. 012

0. 053

30

0. 014
0. 049

Pearson Spearman

0. 035

0. 081
0. 055

0. 054

0. 207

0. 015

1% 5% 10%


CEO CFO CEO
CFO
CEO CFO
CEO 2
4

CFO
1

CFO
CFO
1 2
4 CFOdual 0. 003
0. 379 5% 1% CFO
CFOdual = 0 CFO CFOdual = 1

1 CFO

CEO
2 3 CEO
1
2 5 CEO
1 2 CFOdual 0. 002 0. 469
2 5% CEO
1 2 CFOdual 0. 003
0. 330 1 10%
2 1% 1
CEO CFO
2 CEO CFO
5
CEO

CEO

0. 379

3. 76

Size

0. 002

2. 27

0. 277

4. 94

Lev

0. 035

6. 65

2. 003

8. 27

0. 62

0. 005

0. 51

0. 329

1. 16

Mb

2. 07

Growth

CFO

CFOdual

0. 003

0. 020 3. 76

OA

0. 169

6. 01

0. 676

0. 66

Loss

0. 035

9. 29

0. 045

0. 26

Exshr

0. 004

0. 68

Boardsize

0. 006 *

1. 95

0. 004

0. 33

Independence
Institute

0. 020

0. 004

1. 24
3. 15

3. 53

0. 265

0. 93

2. 37

0. 375

4. 19

1. 81

CEO power

0. 001

0. 76

ATO

0. 003 *

1. 78

Invrec

0. 025

State

suspect

0. 003

0. 004

2. 01

0. 841

Big10

3. 42

0. 365

1. 387

0. 716

0. 014 3. 30

Shrcr1

0. 269

3. 02

0. 015

0. 15

0. 820

2. 80

3. 59
1. 65

Opnion

0. 154

4. 78

4. 299

3. 75

0. 158

0. 093

9475

9475

1 T 2
Z 1 T White
* 1% 5% 10%

CEO

CFOdual

T /Z

/ 2

0. 002

0. 68

0. 152

2447

0. 469

2. 24

0. 138

2447

1. 94

0. 174

7028

0. 330

2. 82

0. 103

7028

0. 001

0. 38

0. 173

4390

1. 71

0. 155

4390

0. 006

2. 81

0. 154

5085

0. 593

3. 93

0. 154

5085

1
2

0. 003

0. 249

31


1 2 CFOdual 0. 001 0. 249
2 10%
1 2 CFOdual 0. 006
0. 593 1% 1
CFO
2 CFO

CFO
CFO
3

CFO
CFO
CEO
CFO

CFO

CFO

CFO

CFO
CFO

CFO
CFO

CFO

CFO
PSM
CFO
1 2
1 2 3

Logit promoteit = 0 + 1 Sizeit + 2 OAit + 3

DI it + 4 Growthit + 5 Leverageit + 6
Independenceit + 7 Boardsizeit + 8
Instituteit + 9 Analysts it + 10 BIG10 it
+ 11 Shrcr1 it + 12 Statei + 13 CFOshareit +
14 Otherboardit + 15 Educationit + 16
Expertiseit + 17 Cogroupit + 18 Tenureit
+

Industry + Year +

2 PSM DID
CFO
CFO
Heckman et al 1997
CFO CFO
CFO CFO
CFO CFO
CFO CFO

CFO
CFO
CFO

2006 2013 A
CFO
CFO

CEO

Propensity Score
MatchingPSM PSM
CFO

CEO

1 PSM
PSM
CFO
CFO

CFO
CFO

32

CFO
CEO CEO

CFO

 CFO

CFO

CFO CEO

2009

4 6 10
2010 CFO
11 36 38
2014
2 81 94
2013
9 144 153
2013 CEO CFO
1 158 167
2013

1 4 14
2012
2 143 150
2010 CEO

4 142 153
2015
4 70 72
2013
3 27 35
2006 CEO CFO
5 26 34
2010 2010 CFO
7 38 49
2014 CFO
12 32 38
2015 CFO
7 56 62
2011
1 126 139
Adams B and D Ferreira 2007 A Theory of
Friendly Boards Journal of Finance62 1 217 250
BedardJ C Hoitash and U Hoitash 2014
Chief Financial Officers as inside Directors Contemporary Accounting esearch31 3 787 817

BrickleyJ A and J L Zimmerman 2010 Corporate Governance Myths Comments on Armstrong Guay
and Weber Journal of Accounting and Economics 50 2
235 245
ChengQ and T Warfield 2005 Equity Incentives
and Earmings Management Accounting review26 2 441
476
ChoT S and D C Hambrick 2006 Attention as
the Mediator between Top Management Team Characteristics and
Strategic Change The Case of Airline Deregulation Organization Science17 4 453 469
ColesJ L N D Danieland L Naveen 2008
Boards Does One Size Fit All Journal of Financial Economics87 2 329 356
Duchin J G Matsusakaand O Ozbas 2010
When Are Outside Directors Effective Journal of Financial Economics96 2 195 214
FamaE F and M C Jensen 1983 Separation of
Ownership and Control Journal of Law and Economics26
2 301 325
FengM W GeS Luoand T Shevlin 2011
Why Do CFOs Become Involved in Material Accounting Manipulations Journal of Accounting and Economics 51 1
21 36
GeW D Matsumotoand J L Zhang 2011 Do
CFOs Have Style An Empirical Investigation of the Effect of
Individual Cfos on Accounting Practices Contemporary Accounting esearch28 4 1141 1179
Heckman J J H Ichimura and P E Todd
1997 Matching as an Econometric Evaluation Estimator Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Programme The review of
economic studies64 4 605 654
Jiang F X and K A Kim 2015 Corporate Governance in China A Modern Perspective Journal of Corporate
Finance32 3 190 216
Jiang J X K Petroni and I Y Wang
2010 CFOs and CEOs Who Have the Most Influence on
Earnings Management Journal of Financial Economics 96
3 513 526
KimJ B Y Liand L Zhang 2011 CFOs Versus CEOs Equity Incentives and Crashes Journal of Financial
Economics101 3 713 730
Kimbrough M D and I Y Wang 2014 Are
Seemingly Self Serving Attributions in Earnings Press eleases
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635 667
PhilipponT and D Bergstresser 2006 CEO Incentives and Earmings Management Journal of Financial Economics80 3 511 529

33

Abstracts of Main Papers

AccountingTrustCivilization
Liu Feng
I try to explore the role and value of accounting in society from the perspective of Economic Darwinism and Trust When Accounting is framed into
the society developmentit might be defined as the cost effective trusting device in human society Going furtheraccounting might be regarded as the
basis for the birth and development of human being civilization

A eview and Perspective of the Frontier Issues in Accounting esearch Based on the Articles
of the Academic Members in the National Accounting Leading Talent Training Program
Tian Zhixin et al
The Ministry of Finance established the National Accounting Leading Talent Training Program in 2006and has selected five classes The academic
members in the national accounting leading talent training program are the most active group in china accounting researchers Through reviewing the articles of researchers of the program published in 23 Chinese journalsthis paper analyze the frontier issues of china accounting issues It reveals when be
selected into the programthe number of published articles increased and the inter cooperation got strengthened Specificallyarticles in financial
management increased rapidlythe research methods and theories applied in these articles got enriched We put forward a number of suggestions in light
of the identified problemsincluding pay more attention to the management characteristic of accounting researchstrengthen management accounting researchand government accounting researchand build accounting theory suitable to China's domestic features

A Study of Cost Accounting Based on the Coupling Concept of Person and Object
Hu Chunhui Zhang Jinchang
The development path of cost accounting and the formed contrast of Activity Based Costing between theoretical innovation and practical application
show thatthe development logic of cost accounting is to transfer from the combinationto thefusionof cost accounting and cost management In the
age that treats wisdom as the core factor of productionthe key factor for enterprise value creation is transferred from the consumption of material to the application of people's wisdom People and the behavior driven by wisdom determines the cost difference of the productsalso determines the enterprise's
value creation The core content of human based costing is to putperson and behavioras the key fulcrum of cost accounting and accounting costto
use the behavior beam level and chain structure driven by customer needs as the path of the resource consumption and the collectionto reveal the behavior value and behavior responsibility by analyzing the coupling degree human and materialto achieve organic fusion of accounting and management This
form of cost accounting can clearly defines the characteristics of the actor'sresponsibilityand contributionit will lead actor to try it best to management self behaviorand achieve a high degree of integration between cost management and cost accounting in human behavior level

Can CFO Inside Directors Help Board Supervision

Sun Guangguo Guo ui
Board supervision is one of board's fundamental roles It is widely acknowledged that independent directors are mainly responsible for board supervision Howeverthis paper investigates the effect of CFO inside directors on board supervisory efficiency Based on a sample of 2006 2013 Chinese A
share listed non financial companiesthis paper finds that as a wholeCFO inside directors improve board supervisory function This effect is complementary to various outside corporate governance mechanismsand is especially effective in balancing CEO power and solving corporate governance
problems in state controlled enterprises Our results enrich studies of board functions and that of CFO mechanisms In additionthis paper also sheds
light on how to construct board and improve board supervision in practice

Accounting Comparability of Acquirers and Long term Stock eturns

Liu uizhi et al
This study examines whether accounting information comparability of acquiring firms contributes to acquirer's long term stock returns based on MA
events initiated by listed companies from 2006 to 2011 in China We predict and find that acquisitions lead to increases in information uncertainty of acquiring firmsand the change in information uncertainty is negatively related to accounting comparability of acquirers We also find that the relation between the change in information uncertainty and the long term stock returns of acquiring firms is significantly negative after controlling for the relative deal
sizethe unexpected earnings and agency problem etc al Our results suggests that accounting information comparability of acquiring firms can reduce the
information uncertainty due to MA strategy implemented by acquirersthereby increasing the value creation effect of MA in acquiring firms This study contributes to the MA literature in that it improves our understanding of how accounting information comparability of acquirers affect its long term returnsand therefore has implications for the government and the relevant regulatory authorities to optimize capital allocation in the context of MA

The Monitoring Effect of Non executive on Overinvestment

Evidence from China's A share Listed Companies
Hu Shiyang Lu Zhengfei
This paper investigates the monitoring effect of non executive directors on overinvestment and investigates the monitoring effect of directors of controlling shareholders and directors of non controlling shareholders on overinvestment Further study shows that both directors of controlling shareholders
and directors of non controlling shareholders have a negative effect on overinvestment The negative effect of directors of controlling shareholders on overinvestment will be suppressed by the act of CEO duality and the separation of cash flow rights and control rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder

96