Vagueness and Truth by Convention

Author(s): Dharmendra Kumar

Source: Analysis, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Mar., 1969), pp. 129-130
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Committee
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3327826
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VAGUENESS AND TRUTH BY CONVENTION

By DHARMENDRA

KUMAR

in ExperienceandTheotythat two kinds of

propositions, 'open nomic' and 'closed nomic', differingin
the extent of truth by convention may be expressedby sentences containing 'inexact' predicates like 'swan', 'white', 'magnetised piece of
iron'. He also speaks of 'mixed nomic propositions', but they must
satisfy his definition of 'closed nomic proposition' or of 'open nomic
proposition'and cannotbe 'a third'kind. But his argumentfor admitting
open nomic propositionsand thus for distinguishingtwo kinds of truthby-convention requires an erroneous assumption which his own
observationsdo not support.
K6rner says:
the sentence'All magnetisedpiecesof ironattractiron filings'. . comes
to expressan opennomicproposition,whenthe predicate'x is a magnetisedpieceof iron'is modifiedin sucha waythatonlyobjectswhichattract
iron filings qualifyfor membershipof the class correspondingto the
modifiedpredicate(p. 76).
He contends that either use of the predicate'leaves open the possibility
of neutral candidates'(p. 76) which 'can be ... correctly made either
members or non-membersof the class' (p. 28). From this, he thinks, it
follows that the truth of the proposition expressedby All Ps areQs may
not be 'preservedwhen the neutralcandidatesfor the relatedclasses are
considered'(p. 74), if P andQ are relatedlike 'magnetisedpiece of iron'
in the 'modified' use and 'attractsiron filings' (briefly, 'M' and 'A').
Expressing a proposition immune to 'counter-instancesarising from
neutral candidates',therefore, requires a further 'convention . . . forbidding such election' he says (p. 75).
The assumption requiredfor K6rner's conclusion may be brought
out by considering the three situations in which one may suppose the
termination of an object's neutral candidatureto provide a counterinstance to the proposition that all Ms are As, supposing that both 'M'
and 'A' admit of neutral candidates. These are: (a) the object x is a
positive candidatefor being an M (or for the applicationof 'M') and a
neutralcandidatefor being an A; (b) x is clearlya non-A or a negative
candidatefor being an A and a neutral candidatefor being an M; (c) x
is a neutral candidatefor being an M and also for being an A. The
notion of a neutral candidaterules out (a) and (b). There will be no
point in distinguishing,nor possibility of systematicallydistinguishing,
positive candidates from neutral candidates for the application of a
predicate like 'M' if (a) is allowed. By prefixing 'qualifies' to the
expressioncorrespondingto 'A' in his schema(p. 74) of sentencesintroKmrnersays
PROFESSOR
universal

129

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130

VAGUENESS AND TRUTH BY CONVENTION

ducing predicateslike 'M', perhapsK6rnerhimself meansto rule out (a).

An object's negative candidaturefor being an A is for the same
reasoninconsistentwith its neutralcandidaturefor being an M. Ko6rner's
statementof the relationshipbetween 'M' and 'A', regardedas the statement that every positive candidatefor being an M is a positive candidate
for being an A, should be equivalentto the statementthat every negative

for beinganM. K6rner

candidatefor beinganA is a negativecandidate
out
and
a
reason
for
(a) by attributingthe
ruling
(b)
provides deeper
of
or
neutral
to qualifications
'borderline
candidates'
and
possibility
of
a
in
for
the
terms
of
class
'similarities
membership
disqualifications
to standardmembersand non-members'
and dissimilarities
(p. 26) or
and
neutral
Since
admits
of
standardexamples counter-examples.
'M'
for
its
as
candidates,the conditions
applicationmay well be given
ostensively,if objects capableof serving as standardexamplesand
are available,although K6rner has given them
counter-examples
pieceof iron'in the 'unmodified'
verballyin termsof 'N' ('magnetised
for the
sense)and 'A', thus attributingan object'sneutralcandidature
for 'N', 'A', ratherthanto
applicationof 'M' to its neutralcandidature
Ms. Buttheostensive
to standard
incompleteover-allorgestaltsimilarity
of
would
as
a
standard
'M'
require
counter-example
taking
explanation
of an M an objectwhichis capableof servingas a standardexampleof
of an A. It is obviousthat an
an N and a standardcounter-example
an
from
such
objectby being a neutralratherthan a
objectdiffering
is
more
even
N
certainlya negativeM, and(b)is thusimpossible.
positive
out
ruled
is
by the necessityof using only standardAs as
(a) similarly
standardMs.
While situations(a) and (b) are simplyimpossible,(c) requiresan
for 'M'
inconsistentway of terminatingan object'sneutralcandidature
for 'M' can be terminatedvia neutral
and 'A'. If neutralcandidature
for 'N' andfor 'A', it cannotbe terminatedindependently
candidature
of the terminationof the latter. Sincean object'sneutralcandidature
for 'N' and 'A', andnot vice
for 'M' dependson its neutralcandidature
in
the
former
terminated
it
can
be
versa,
way. But the decisionto
only
a neutralM a non-M,
make
A
as
a
non-A
can
a
neutral
only
regard
termination
of its possible
it
not
a
and
the
that
is
neutral
N;
supposing
a
counter-instance
for
cannot
candidature
'N'
neutral
obviously
provide
to the propositionthatall Ms areAs.
If 'M' is regardedas applyingpositivelywhen both 'N' and 'A'
apply positively,and neutrallywhen either both 'N' and 'A' apply
neutrallyor one appliespositivelyand the otherneutrally,then 'M' is
for 'N andA', andthe propositionthatall Ms are As is
an abbreviation
'true by definition',as Krnmerunwittinglysays (p. 73) of an 'open
nomic' proposition which he claims to be 'empirical in so far as' it
allows a conjecture regarding the decisionto treat possible neutral
candidatesas members(p. 74).
Delhi

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