Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No. 13-2365
ALBERT DAVIDSON, as Guardian of Marilyn Davidson;
REGINA DAVIDSON, as Guardian of Marilyn Davidson,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
ELIN HOWE, as Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of
Developmental Services,
Defendant, Appellee.
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Thompson, Circuit Judge,
and Smith,* District Judge.
LYNCH,
Chief
Judge.
Plaintiffs
Albert
and
Regina
transfer from the Fernald Developmental Center, her home since 1985
and which was being closed, to her new home at the Wrentham
Developmental
("ICFs")
for
Center.
the
Both
are
intellectually
Intermediate
disabled
Care
Facilities
operated
by
the
been
rendered
moot
by
Marilyn's
completed
transfer
to
-2-
We also
close Fernald, described as "by far the most costly of the ICFs to
run and the most seriously noncompliant with the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990[, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.]."1
M.D. ex
In 2008, after
litigation
Massachusetts.2
concerning
the
intellectually
disabled
in
See
proceedings
leading
up
to
Marilyn's
transfer
from
Fernald.
Id.
objected
and
DDS
referred
the
matter
to
the
Davidson I,
465 Mass. App. Ct. at 465, 985 N.E.2d at 865; see Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 123B 3.
administrative
magistrate.
The
magistrate
approved
the
sought
state
judicial
review
of
the
Davidson I,
465 Mass. App. Ct. at 465, 985 N.E.2d at 865; see Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 30A, 14(7). Plaintiffs appealed the Superior Court decision;
in April 2013, the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed.
I, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 465, 985 N.E.2d at 865.
Davidson
At this point,
On August
22, 2013, DDS held a meeting with plaintiffs and Fernald and
Wrentham staff members to update Marilyn's Individual Transition
Plan ("ITP"). Under the updated ITP, Marilyn was scheduled to move
to Wrentham on October 22, 2013.
On October 18, 2013, plaintiffs filed a complaint in
federal district court alleging that the ITP for Marilyn's transfer
violated the federal Medicaid statute and various implementing
regulations.4
That
same
day,
plaintiffs
filed
motion
for
preliminary
Plaintiffs
district court held a second hearing, during which the court denied
plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief on the ground that the
regulations cited in the original complaint did not create a
private right of action, but nonetheless allowed plaintiffs to file
an amended complaint.5
Marilyn was
In their briefs,
plaintiffs took the position the case was not moot because they say
they have ongoing claims for declaratory and injunctive relief as
to Marilyn's care and so fall under an exception to the mootness
doctrine, and because they have a remaining claim for damages from
the transfer. At oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs agreed that
the declaratory and injunctive relief originally sought, both
regarding Marilyn's now-inactive ITP, are now moot.
"The doctrine of mootness enforces the mandate that an
actual controversy must be extant at all stages of the review, not
merely at the time the complaint is filed."
ACLU,
Absent a
More
-8-
Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911); see, e.g., In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 744 F.3d 211, 218-19 (1st Cir. 2014);
ACLU, 705 F.3d at 56-57.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983). Plaintiffs must show that "(1) the
challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully
litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was
a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be
subjected to the same action again."
-9-
They now
care,
in
regulatory requirements.
contravention
of
unspecified
Medicaid
alleged that adherence to the ITP for Marilyn's transfer from one
ICF to another would result in undue harm to Marilyn by requiring
her to transition without adequate precautions.
See
-10-
the
Commonwealth's
Eleventh
Amendment
immunity
from
suit
for
See, e.g., In re
13C
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure 3533.3 (3d ed.
2003) (emphasis added).
"[A]
suit
by
private
parties
seeking
to
impose
Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). This is true whether the named defendant
is the state itself or, as here, a state official in her official
capacity.
(1st Cir. 2002) ("As a general matter, the Eleventh Amendment bars
suits in federal courts against unconsenting states (including
'official capacity' suits against state hierarchs)."); see also
Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) ("[A]
suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is
not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the
official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against
the State itself." (citation omitted)).
This case does not fit into any exception to Eleventh
Amendment
immunity.
First,
Congress
may
abrogate
state's
waiver only where stated 'by the most express language or by such
-12-
Hosp.
v.
Scanlon,
473
U.S.
234,
246-47
(1985),
or
by
may
abrogate
the
States'
constitutionally
rely
do
not
contain
anything
approaching
an
Fla.
U.S.
44,
55
(1996);
see
also
Fla.
Dep't
of
Health
&
Rehabilitative Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150
(1981)
(per
curiam)
(holding
state
immune
from
suit
where
contrary.
As to waiver, "[s]tates do not waive their Eleventh
Amendment
immunity
merely
by
participating
in
the
Medicaid
program."
2002); see also Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673 ("The mere fact that a
State
participates
in
program
through
which
the
Federal
Nor does a
de
la
Comunidad
de
la
Playa
de
Ponce,
Consejo de
Inc.
v.
Gonzlez-Feliciano, 695 F.3d 83, 104 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 54 (2013).
III.
We
remand
this
case
to
the
district
court
with