USCA1 Opinion

November 9, 1995

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

_________________________

No. 95-1469

PAUL S. DOPP,
Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

JAY A. PRITZKER,
Defendant, Appellee.

_________________________

ERRATA SHEET
ERRATA SHEET

The opinion of

this court

issued on October

corrected as follows:

On cover sheet

change "Mahoney" to "Mahony"

26, 1995,

is

October 26, 1995

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

_________________________

No. 95-1469

PAUL S. DOPP,
Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

JAY A. PRITZKER,
Defendant, Appellee.

_________________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge]

__________________________

_________________________

Before

Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges,

______________

and Saris,* District Judge.

______________

_________________________

Roger R. Crane, Jr.,

___________________

with whom Todd B. Marcus

______________

and Bachner,
________

Tally, Polevoy & Misher LLP were on brief, for appellant.

___________________________
Gael Mahony, with
___________

whom Frances s. Cohen, Joshua M. Davis,

_________________ ________________

Hill & Barlow, Salvador Antonetti-Zequeira, and Fiddler, Gonzalez

_____________ ___________________________
_________________
& Rodriguez were on brief, for appellee.
___________

_________________________

_________________________

_______________
*Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.
_____________

This case comes to

us not as a

stranger.

Following a jury verdict finding the defendant, Jay A.

Pritzker,

liable to

Dopp,

in the sum of

his

erstwhile partner,

$2,000,000, the district

several post-trial motions.

491

(D.P.R. 1991) (Dopp I).

______

See Dopp
___ ____

plaintiff Paul

S.

court disposed of

v. HTP Corp., 755 F. Supp.

_________

On appeal, we upheld the liability

verdict

but vacated both the

jury's damage award

and the trial

court's rulings in connection with equitable relief.

HTP Corp., 947 F.2d 506 (1st

_________

court

then

conducted

entitlement to various

series

of special

revised

judgment.

Cir. 1991) (Dopp II).

_______

second

forms of

findings

See
___

The district

trial

to

redress.

The

jury returned

district

court entered

and the

Dopp v.
____

See Dopp v.
___ ____

determine

HTP Corp., 831

__________

F.

Dopp's

Supp. 939

(D.P.R. 1993) (Dopp III).

________

Both sides expressed dismay

After

court's

hearing

a gaggle

of

with the revised judgment.

appeals, we

affirmed

the district

denial of a resultory remedy; upheld the jury's award of

full damages

(originally,

$17,000,000) on

condition

that

the

plaintiff remit

the excess

new trial absent a

the

over $14,171,962; ordered

remittitur; and set aside the

district court had imposed

pursuant to P.R.

a limited

sanctions that

Laws Ann. tit.

32, app. III, R.44.1(d) & 44.3(b) (1984 & Supp. 1989).

v.

Pritzker, 38
________

F.3d 1239

(1st

Cir. 1994)

See Dopp
___ ____

(Dopp IV).
_______

These

rulings necessitated a remand.

Our

warning that

this

seemingly

endless

litigation

showed signs of having "taken on a life of its own," id. at 1255,

___

proved prophetic.

When

the

court, the wrangling continued.

orders in an

effort to close

strikes

separate

six

chords.

confident that the reader

parties returned

to the

district

Judge Pieras issued a battery of

the case.

We

Dopp now appeals.

write

somewhat

who hungers for more detail

He

sparingly,

will find

no shortage of it in earlier opinions.

First:
First:
_____

add

On remand, Dopp beseeched the district court to

prejudgment interest to the damage award.

to do so.

Dopp assigns error.

The court refused

We see none.

This is "a diversity case in which the substantive

law

of Puerto Rico supplies the basis of decision."

at 1252.

Thus, a federal

court must give effect to Rule 44.3(b)

of the Puerto Rico Rules of Civil Procedure.

plaintiff

recovers

defendant to have been

add prejudgment

Dopp IV, 38 F.3d

_______

money

damages and

Under that rule, if

court

finds the

guilty of obstinacy, the court

must then

interest to the verdict.

the

See id.; see

___ ___ ___

Leon Lopez v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d

__________
_______________________________

(1st Cir.

also De
____ __

116, 126

1991); Fernandez v. San Juan Cement Co., 118 P.R. Dec.

_________
___________________

713 (1987).

Here,

obstinacy.

Dopp, in the

court

however, there

is

no basis

for

a finding

of

See Dopp IV, 38

___ _______

F.3d at 1253-55.

Accordingly,

when

aftermath of

our latest opinion,

asked the

lower

to add prejudgment interest, the court demurred.

It ruled

that,

vehicle

absent

by

obstinacy,

which a

Puerto

court

Rico law

as opposed

furnished

to

no

other

jury or

other

factfinder

genre.1

under

could impose prejudgment interest in a case of this

We

agree:

Puerto Rico

where

law,

prejudgment

the Civil

interest is

Code expressly

available

so provides.

See, e.g., P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31,

___ ____

44.3(b).

Here, Dopp points

authorizing the

to no

add-on that he

provision is, as the

3025, 3514;

P.R.R. Civ. P.

provision in the

seeks.

The absence

Civil Code

of any such

district court recognized, fatal

to Dopp's

claim.

Second:
Second:
______

In

district court should

increased

payment.

have acted

the dollar amount of

vein, Dopp

contends that

ex cathedra, as
__ ________

the verdict to

it were,

the

and

reflect delay in

This contention is triply flawed.

In the

on a

a related

first place, Dopp rests

statute that he

did not

his argument primarily

mention below.2

Yet, "[i]f

any

principle is settled in this circuit, it is that, absent the most

extraordinary circumstances, legal

in

the lower

court

cannot be

theories not raised

broached for

the first

squarely

time on

____________________

1At

the

time

of

instructed to consider
Dopp's damages, and
omission of such
that avenue.

the

second

trial,

the

jury

the time value of money as

Dopp did

not preserve an

an instruction.

He

was

not

an element of

objection to

the

has, therefore, foreclosed

See Toscano v. Chandris, S.A., 934 F.2d 383, 384-85

___ _______
______________

(1st Cir. 1991).

2The

statute,

P.R. Laws

Ann. tit.

31,

7,

provides in

pertinent part:

When there is

no statute applicable

the case at issue,

accordance

with

to

the court shall decide in

equity,

natural justice, as

which

means

embodied in the

principles of jurisprudence

that

general

and in

accepted

and established usages and customs,

shall be

taken into consideration.

appeal."

Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union,

______________________________________________________

Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.
_____________
_____________________

1992).

seal the

The

circumstances here are not out of

bargain, Dopp

offered no

argumentation based on

statute in his opening appellate brief.

an argument omitted from

the ordinary.

To

this

It is hornbook law that

an appellant's opening brief is

deemed

waived, notwithstanding its belated emergence in the reply brief.

See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Chemlawn Corp., 904 F.2d 83, 87 (1st Cir.

___

____

_________

______________

1990).

In the second place, this argument is barred by the so-

called mandate

rule.

In

attempting to sustain

the $17,000,000

damage award, Dopp asserted a variety of theories that he claimed

justified the higher award.

rejected his

asseverations.

See Dopp IV, 38 F.3d at 1248-51.

___ _______

Under

the

mandate rule

We

which

provides in substance that "[a] decision of an appellate tribunal

on a particular issue,

issue

during all

unless vacated or set aside,

subsequent stages

of

governs the

litigation in

the nisi

prius court, and thereafter on any further appeal," United States

_____________

v. Rivera-Martinez,
_______________

931 F.2d

denied, 502 U.S. 862 (1992)

______

148,

150 (1st

Cir. 1991),

cert.
_____

Dopp is precluded from relitigating

the

point.

The bar

erected by

the mandate rule

remains firm

despite the fact that a party, the second time around, drapes his

contention in

Bell,
____

988

slightly

F.2d 247,

different garb.

250-51 (1st

Cir.

See
___

United States
_____________

1993); see
___

v.

also United
____ ______

States v. Connell, 6 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that

______
_______

interests

of

consistency

and

judicial

economy

dictate

that

litigants

not

be

allowed

"[s]erial

bites

at

the

appellate

apple").

In

the third place, the Puerto

never applied section

none of

the Puerto Rico

commonwealth's

stride

sour.3

7 in

Rico Supreme Court has

the manner that

cases that

courts would

Dopp suggests,

he cites indicate

be willing

to take such

and

that the

a lengthy

in a contract case based on a commercial transaction gone

Having in mind

that Dopp

chose the federal

forum, the

lack of precedent sounds a death knell for his claim.

See Martel
___ ______

v. Stafford, 992 F.2d 1244, 1247 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that
________

a plaintiff who

opts for a

available state forum may

"federal forum

in preference to

not expect the federal court

an

to steer

state

law into unprecedented configurations"); Porter v. Nutter,

______
______

913 F.2d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1990) (similar); Kassel v. Gannett Co.,
______
___________

875 F.2d 935, 949-50 (1st Cir. 1989) (similar).

Third:
Third:
_____

Dopp

have permitted him

remittitur

interest

after

insists that

to decide

it

had

and enhancement

the district

anew whether he

denied his

of the

remand, Dopp faced a simple choice:

would accept

motions

verdict.

court should

for

the

prejudgment

We think

not.

On

he could take his chances on

____________________

3Dopp

relies principally on two cases.

The first, Rojas v.

_____

Maldonado, 68 P.R. 757 (1948), is a wrongful death action dealing

_________
with

the

measurement and

suffering into money

contract

translation

damages.

damages (which,

under

of

a bereaved

The case has

Puerto

Rico

parent's

no application
law,

are

to

to

be

measured as of the date of the actionable breach).

offering,

Suro v. E.L.A.,
____
______

wrongful death action.

a

111 P.R. Dec.

564 (1981),

It deals with how a court

decedent's lost future earnings.

Dopp's second

See id.
___ ___

is also a

should measure

at 569-70, 574-75.

The Suro opinion has no relevance to the issue at hand.

____

another trial or he could accept the remittitur and have judgment

entered in

found

that

the reduced amount.

Dopp elected

The district

the latter

course.

court supportably

This

finding is

reviewable

F.2d at

only for abuse of discretion.

120 n.3.

Given Dopp's

court, we discern no hint of

See De Leon Lopez, 931

___ _____________

serial filings in

the district

abuse either in the finding that he

elected the remittitur or in the timing of his election.

Fourth:
Fourth:
______

Money

judgments in

ordinarily carry postjudgment interest

1961(a),4

that

this

surprisingly,

and the parties

case

comes

(the date on

which the

more

the

there is a rub:

$2,000,000 in

actions

until paid, see 28 U.S.C.

___

statute's

else

agree

sweep.

Not

Dopp seeks postjudgment interest

damages not from

district court entered

recent jury verdict) but

which the district

civil

who agree on little

within

on the first

federal

from March 23,

court entered

judgment on

December 13,

judgment on

1993

the

1990 (the date on

the initial

jury

verdict).

He has no such entitlement.

The relevant

resulted

facts are

as follows.

The

first trial

in a jury verdict of $2,000,000, and the district court

entered judgment in that amount.

"its relief-related

We vacated the judgment

aspects."

Dopp II, 947

_______

F.2d at 520.

____________________

4The statute reads in relevant part:

Interest
judgment

shall
in

be

allowed

civil

any

case recovered

district court. . . .

money
in

Such interest shall be

calculated from the date

judgment. . . . .

28 U.S.C.

on

1961(a) (1988).

of the entry of the

in all

The

parties then retried

the case

on damages and

Dopp $17,000,000 (later reduced

that postjudgment interest should

the jury

to $14,171,962).

awarded

Dopp theorizes

accrue on the first $2,000,000

in damages from the date of the vacated judgment rather than from

the

date of the larger

second

jury verdict.

judgment that was

For his

part,

entered following the

Pritzker maintains

that

postjudgment interest should run only from the latter date.

The premier authority

on this point is Kaiser Alum. &

_______________

Chem. Corp.
____________

v.

Bonjorno, 494
________

following a jury

U.S.

verdict for the

granted the defendant's

827

(1990).

In

plaintiff, the district

motion for

a new trial

award.

The

second trial

produced

proved impervious to appellate review.

1961(a),

see supra
___ _____

postjudgment interest

note

4, the

on the

a damage

award

is "not

The

supported

verdict that

28 U.S.C.

say

In such circumstances,

the least,

to believe

that

be calculated

Court reasoned that,

by the

evidence,

damages have not been ascertained in any meaningful way."

836.

the

support

Court concluded

entire award should

from the entry of the second judgment.

when

a larger

Interpreting

Supreme

court

limited to

issue of damages on the ground that the evidence did not

the

Kaiser,
______

the

Id. at
___

"[i]t would be counterintuitive, to

that Congress

intended postjudgment

interest to be calculated from such a judgment."

Kaiser
______

verdict

controls

here.

The first

from which we found it "[i]mpossible

Id.
___

trial

yielded

. . . to determine

what sort of damages the jurors thought they were awarding or how

they arrived at the

stated figure of $2,000,000."

Dopp II, 947

_______

F.2d at

crush of

513.

In other words,

tabloid stories recounting Elvis

visible means

cases in

of support.

which postjudgment

interest can

11, 16

(1st Cir.

judgment is not

like the

current

sightings, lacked any

These indicia are

date of the second judgment.

F.2d

the judgment,

characteristic of

only accrue from

the

See Cordero v. De Jesus-Mendez, 922

___ _______
_______________

1990) (explaining

"basically sound" and

that, when

the first

"lacks an evidentiary

or

legal basis," postjudgment interest should run only from the date

of the second judgment).

We

need

indicated at the

uncertainty

damage

not

time, the

that we

award."

beat

could

Dopp II,
_______

this

drum

incessantly.

first judgment was

not "decipher

947 F.2d

so riddled

the character

at 514.

We

As

we

with

of the

confessed our

inability

to

divine

whether

the

sum

awarded

by

the

jury

represented full or accessory damages; what election of remedies,

if

to which

the

verdict represented inconsistent or duplicative remediation.

See
___

id.
___

any, the

plaintiff had

at 515-16.

judgment,

The

coupled

participants had

suggests that

way in March

made; and

lack of

with

our

the extent

clarity

that marked

determination

a hand in producing the

the damages were

of 1990.

that

all

first

the

chaos, see id. at 516,

___ ___

not ascertained in

One simply cannot

the

a meaningful

say on this

scumbled

record either that the evidence supported the initial judgment on

damages

or that the second

judgment was a

mere modification of

the first.

Dopp seeks to avoid this result by reliance upon Bailey

______

10

v.

486

Chattem, Inc., 838 F.2d 149, 153-55 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
_____________
_____ ______

U.S. 1059

(1988).

The Bailey
______

facts, that where the damages

lesser

interest

court decided,

on specific

found in a second trial include

amount found by the jury in the first trial, postjudgment

on the

lesser

amount may

run from

the

date of

the

original judgment.

Bailey's reasoning
______

Kaiser
______

See id.
___ ___

at 154.

survives the

Assuming, arguendo,
________

Court's subsequent decision

a matter on which we take no view

assistance to Dopp's cause.

first judgment was

in

the opinion is of no

In Bailey, unlike in this

______

precise in

that

terms of exactly

case, the

what the

money

damages represented, and it was vacated only because the court of

appeals

found

the trial

element of damages

errant

instruction

to be inadequate.

instruction, it was

proven with

judge's

regard to

on a

See id.
___ ___

crystal clear what

particular

Apart from

the

the evidence had

the defendant's liability,

what remedies

were being sought, and what damages were in fact determined to be

due.5

Of course,

it is possible

that this court

could hark

back

to

the

actually

jury's

had been

original

verdict,

determined, and

speculate

surmise, in

about

light of

what

human

____________________

5To

supplement Bailey, Dopp hawks a string of Tenth Circuit

______

cases that stress

the importance, in applying section 1961(a) to

serial judgments, of
judgment

assessing the extent to

has been reversed.

v. Hegler, 818 F.2d

______

which the original

See, e.g., Northern Natural Gas Co.

___ ____ ________________________

730, 737 (10th Cir. 1987),

cert. dismissed,
_____ _________

486 U.S. 1063 (1988); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Philips Petroleum Co.,
_________________
_____________________
607 F.2d
(1980).
we

335, 336 (10th Cir.

These cases afford Dopp scant succor.

upheld

initial

1979), cert. denied, 446

_____ ______

the

jury's

U.S. 936

Here, even though

liability determination,

we

found

the

damage award to be completely inscrutable and vacated it

entirely.

11

experience, what the

Pritzker.

Later,

retrial, a

could

jury was

with the

second appeal,

saying about the

harm caused

benefit of hindsight

and countless legal

by

informed by

maneuverings, we

attempt to peel off the layers of litigation and return to

the starting place with some better inkling of what that long-ago

verdict

proper

might have

function.

ambiguity

and

dependable means

meant.

But reasoning

The hallmarks

uncertainty,

and

of dispelling

were not ascertained

in any

of

the

Dopp

the mist.

backward is

not our

first judgment

has

not

Because

meaningful way by

produced

were

any

the damages

the first

jury,

postjudgment

interest runs

only

from the

next

point

date

of the

second

judgment.

Fifth:
Fifth:
_____

Dopp's

counsel, the law firm of

represented

to a

contingency fee

Agreement) throughout the protracted

25%

elected

"enter a

LP&M

agreement (the

Under the Agreement, LP&M was to receive

verdict, the district court indicated

full damages as his

Judgment which will

fees to [LP&M]."

former

litigation between Dopp and

of "all amounts recovered" in the litigation.

second jury

his

Ledesma, Palou & Miranda (LP&M).

Dopp pursuant

the Pritzker interests.

implicates

anodyne of choice,

include the payment

Dopp III, 831

________

F. Supp. at 959

Following the

that, if Dopp

the court might

of attorneys'

n.30; see also

___ ____

id. at 960
___

n.31.

Although this suggestion

during the ensuing appeal,

slipped from

sight

it proved to be a harbinger of things

to come.

We issued our opinion

in Dopp IV on October
_______

28, 1994.

12

A petition

for rehearing

mandate then issued.

consumed

some additional

On February 10, 1995, Dopp,

time.

Our

through LP&M,

filed a motion in the district court.

lid that

this court

had placed

In it, he acknowledged the

on full damages

($14,171,962),

calculated the portion of the award that Pritzker was entitled to

extinguish by

reason of

certain litigated credits,6

and prayed

that the district court order immediate payment of the net amount

remaining.

The

explanation

concerning

credits, a line

equal to 25%

"Ledesma,

court

included,

how

best

item in the amount

of the

Palou &

entered

purported

motion

reduced award

Miranda."

final

to deduct

as

to

of

calculate

an

intricate

the

litigated

of $3,542,990.50

a figure

of full

labelled

On March

judgment

which,

$3,542,990.50 from

redirect that amount to LP&M.

part

damages

10, 1995,

among

the district

other

Dopp's recovery

things,

and to

In the meantime, trouble erupted in paradise.

14, LP&M, despite

leave

to

withdraw

simultaneously

but

as

filed a

several pending

payment).

having done

motions

his

yeoman work for

counsel.

Dopp,

pleading signifying

(including

the

Dopp, moved

for

acting

se,

his desire

motion

for

The district court granted LP&M's motion

denied Dopp's

omnibus pleading

as moot,

On March

pro

to drop

immediate

to withdraw,

stating

that the

March 10 judgment "addressed all pending issues."

____________________

6We

discussed

the

litigated credit issue

F.3d 53, 65-74
(1995).

It

complicated
at some

serve no

surrounding the

length in Pritzker
________

(1st Cir. 1994),

would

questions

cert. denied, 115

_____ ______

useful

discussion here.

13

purpose to

v. Yari,
____

42

S. Ct.

1959

rehearse

that

Dopp assigns error to the portion of the final judgment

that earmarks funds

payment

for LP&M.

In his

view, the direction

is unconstitutional because LP&M

action, and any

is not a

judgment purportably rendered

for

party to the

for or against

non-party is void.

We

claimed

need not

probe this

point too

deeply.

The fees

by LP&M are hotly disputed (earlier this year, LP&M sued

Dopp for payment

in a

separate suit that

is currently

pending

before

made no

a different judge of the district court), the court below

findings to

underbrace

the direction

for payment

(we

cannot tell, for example, what the court knew of the fee dispute,

or the basis on which it resolved any controversy), and the court

offered

no rationale

intervened

in

this

for its

action

order.7

and

the

Moreover, LP&M

district

court

has not

has

not

appropriately asserted in personam jurisdiction over it.

__ ________

These

omissions cast

a pall

over the

court's order.

The tenet is that remand is required when a district court offers

no explanation

of a ruling, makes no findings, and the basis for

the ruling cannot confidently be discerned on appeal.

Pearson v. Fair, 808 F.2d 163, 165 (1st Cir. 1986)

_______
____

see also
___ ____

Domegan v.
_______

Fair, 859 F.2d

____

See, e.g.,
___ ____

(per curiam);

1059, 1066 (1st

Cir. 1988)

(warning

that,

without

any

explication

of

trial

judge's

____________________

7It
court

is possible,

of course,

into following this course

his motion for payment.

however, we would
payment was

the district

by inserting the

line item in

See supra p. 12.

___ _____

not find

crafted

that Dopp lured

by the

Even if this were so,

an estoppel because
beneficiary

of the

payment, LP&M, then acting as Dopp's counsel.

14

the motion

for

direction

for

reasoning, the court of appeals is "sometimes forced to remand in

order to apprehend

bare

minimum,

the basis

several

for decision below").

things

intelligently review the propriety

First, the law

assert a

claim of right

garnishment

and

If, after

an

to a portion

of a

opportunity

before

can

otherwise

of the judgment

lien).

to

action or

Second, Dopp

contest

the

law

and elucidate its

(say, by

must be

firm's

accomplished, the

direction for payment is proper,

specific findings

we

of the direction for payment.

these two things have been

court concludes that a

set forth

happen

intervene in the

or impressment

given notice

claim.8

firm must

must

Here at

it must

ratio decidendi.
_____ _________

Since none of these essential ingredients have yet been prepared,

we

vacate the direction for

payment and remand

to the district

court for further proceedings limited to that issue.9

Sixth:
Sixth:
_____

Last and

least, Dopp asks us to

bill of costs he submitted below.

our

knowledge

request

has not

to this

yet

pass upon the

Because the district court to

addressed

court is premature.

that submission,

See Mason
___ _____

Dopp's

v. Belieu, 543
______

____________________

8We take no position on the

merits of the fee dispute or on

the degree to which that dispute may or may not be susceptible to

resolution within the four corners of the instant case.

9Although the size of LP&M's fee arguably affects the amount

of at

least one

litigated credit

have

an impact on Pritzker's

not

cross-appeal either from

sum

certain to

credits.

LP&M or

Before

attitude, stating

us,

and, thus, could

net payment to

computation of

Pritzker maintains

that he "takes

need not

the

no position in

over the propriety of including LP&M

Appellee's Brief at 15 n.8.

Dopp, Pritzker did

the trial court's

from its

conceivably

allocation of a

the litigated
same

hands-off

th[e] dispute"

within the judgment proper.

Thus, on remand, the

consider Pritzker's interests in

district court

its further treatment

of this issue.

15

F.2d 215, 222 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852 (1976).
_____ ______

We need go no

in

determining

that the

appeal, should not

interest or

further.

The district court did not err

award of

be augmented by

enhanced to reflect the

full

damages, as

the addition of

capped on

prejudgment

delay in payment.

the court err in determining that the plaintiff made

Nor did

a valid and

binding

election to

remit the excess of

accept the

remedy of

full damages

the award over $14,171,962.

affirm the court's rulings in these respects.

We, therefore,

At the

same time,

we direct that postjudgment interest on the reduced award

accrue, at the federal

from

as

December 13, 1993.

it

calls

and to

statutory rate, see 28 U.S.C.

___

should

1961(a),

Finally, we vacate the judgment insofar

for Pritzker

to

pay

a portion

of

the proceeds

directly to LP&M, and we remand for further proceedings solely in

regard to

that aspect of the

taxed in favor of the appellee.

It is so ordered.
It is so ordered.
________________

matter.

Costs on

appeal shall be

16