People vs. Velasco [G.R. No. 110592.

January 23, 1996] 252 SCRA 135

Facts:

In 1991, buy bust operation, accused-appellant Velasco, doing laundry; one officer designated poseur-buyer.
Appellant handed over less than 1 gram of shabu in exchange for a 50peso marked bill
After the exchange and upon pre-arranged signal, couching teammates rushed to the
scene and immediately apprehended the appellant. When the police officers asked
appellant to open her pockets, they found five more decks of shabu.
Defenses of the appellant are denial and frame-up, as she maintained that the six decks
of shabu were planted evidence.
Accused appeals: 1. that the trial court erred in admitting the decks of shabu in evidence
against her because they were obtained through a warrantless arrest and search and 2.
that appellant likewise assails the jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over the case

Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which

provides that:

SEC. 5. Arrest without a warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Ruling:
there is no showing that appellants apprehension was marred by such official abuse.
Appellant failed to establish that Pat. Godoy and the other members of the buy-bust team
are policemen engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous activities who were motivated
either by the desire to extort money or exact personal vengeance, or by sheer whim and
caprice, when they entrapped her.
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the principle that
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great respect, must
prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had been
framed
As to the issue of whether or not R.A. 7691 operated to divest the Regional Trial Court of
jurisdiction over appellants case, we rule in the negative.It has been consistently held as a
general rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is to be determined by the
law in force at the time of the institution of the action.[23] Where a court has already obtained
and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final
determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such
proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly
provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending
before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive

effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of a statute.
Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement of the action and could not be ousted by the
passage of R.A. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of
which to criminal cases is, to stress, prospective in nature.
THEREFORE: the judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo against the accusedappellant Yolanda Velasco y Pamintuan is AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that the
proper imposable sentence should be the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor as the minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as the
maximum thereof. However, it appearing from the records that the appellant has been in jail
for more than 4 years and 2 months,[26] thereby having served more than the maximum
imposable penalty, her immediate release from custody is hereby ordered, unless she is
otherwise detained for some other cause

G.R. No. 93173 September 15, 1993

SAAVEDRA Vs. DOJ 226 SCRA 438

Facts:

In July 1987, Private respondent Ramos sold their shares of stocks of PPI to
petitioner Saavedra for 1.2M payable in instalments, with an automatic rescission
clause in case any installment was not paid on its due date.
By September 1987, there was unpaid balance about 200k, where petitioner withheld
payment because the sellers failed to comply with their warranties; it was deposited
in escrow instead, subject to release once the warranties were complied with.
In November, petitioner filed a civil complaint for damages against Ramos alleging
that he (petitioner) was the President and principal stockholder of the company.
Respondent Ramos questioned petitioner's capacity to sue in behalf of PPI, claiming
that petitioner ceased to be its president when the sale of the PPI, shares of stock to
him was automatically rescinded on 15 September 1987.
Ramos and group executed a document Rescission of MOA and filed a case with
SEC to declare it valid and legal.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the SEC;
denied; went to SC; SC upheld the jurisdiction of the SEC and ruled that under Sec.
5, par. (b), of P.D. No. 902-A, the SEC has "primary and exclusive" jurisdiction over
the twin issues of ownership and automatic rescission, they being intracorporate
disputes. The Civil Case for damages where then suspended.
On December, while the SEC case was pending, Ramos filed a perjury (Criminal)
case against Saavedra when he declared that he was the president of PPI in his
declaration in the civil case which was then suspended.
In July 1988, Prosecutor found probable cause for filing information and charging
petitioner for perjury, evidenced by a Secretarys Certificate dated December 1987
that Ramos was then and there declared as president following the automatic
revocation of MOA

Petitioner went to DOJ to review the resolution but the latter uphold the prosecutors
finding of probable cause for perjury. Motion to reconsider also was filed but again
denied by DOJ; Petitioner then filed for review on certiorari to SC (rule 65)
Petitioner contends that respondent DOJ gravely abused its discretion when it
affirmed the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor that he made a "deliberate
assertion of falsehood" on the basis of the conclusion that automatic rescission had
set in. For, the jurisdiction to rule on that question of automatic rescission is lodged
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Since the issue has not yet been
resolved, the DOJ should have deferred the proceedings.

Ruling:

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot and will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal 12 having been so placed within its special competence under a regulatory
scheme. In such instances the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the
administrative body for its view on the matter in dispute.
Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question which is within the legal
competence of an administrative body prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative agency to ascertain technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
administered, 14 much less can the Provincial Prosecutor arrogate to himself the
jurisdiction vested solely with the SEC
Public respondent DOJ in attempting to justify the action of the Provincial Prosecutor
avers that the latter is empowered to make a preliminary ruling on the matter for the
purpose of finding probable cause against petitioner, and that petitioner may raise the
pendency of the issue before the SEC as his defense at the trial proper.
We are not persuaded. The duty of a prosecutor during preliminary investigation is not
only to find evidence to warrant continuation of the criminal process against an accused.
Of equal importance, and it has been repeated often enough, is his duty to protect the
innocent from hasty, expensive and useless trials. 16 This duty, in addition to the
"primary and exclusive" jurisdiction of the SEC, demands the outright termination of the
criminal prosecution of petitioner which, at the very outset, was already bereft of factual
and legal bases.
APPLICABLE PROVISION: Rules of Court - RULE 111 Sec 6 and 7:
o Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court
conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed
in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action
at any time before the prosecution rests. (6a)
o Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b)

the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. (5a)

Be that as it may, the outcome of SEC Case No. 3257 is not determinative of whether or
not the charge for perjury against petitioner can prosper. Even if private respondent
Ramos succeeds in proving the validity of the automatic rescission of the sale before the
SEC, it does not necessarily mean that the criminal prosecution has basis. 4 elements of
the crime of perjury to be taken into account in determining whether there is a prima
facie case, to wit: (a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an
affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in that statement
or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood;
and, (d) that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or
made for a legal purpose.
Verily, there is grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the Resolution of 25 July
1988 finding a prima facie case for perjury against petitioner. A fortiori, the assailed DOJ
Resolutions must be struck down as having been issued without sufficient factual and
legal bases. Correspondingly, the Information filed with the Pasig Trial Court pursuant
thereto must likewise be dismissed.

Galvez vs. CA 237 SCRA 685 G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994

People vs. Repiroga 357 SCRA 819 G.R. No. 138451. May 17, 2001
PEOPLE V. REPIROGA
17 May 2001
Facts: A was a member of the Philippine Army. A complaint was filed before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor charging A with murder. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
conducted a preliminary investigation and later recommended the filing of an information.
Issues: Should the preliminary investigation be conducted by an authorized military officer
before any information could be filed against AFP members? Does the authority to file
charges against him lies within the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman?
Held: No. There is nothing in Art. 71 of CA 408 that exclusively vests the authority on a
military officer to conduct preliminary investigation in cases involving members of the AFP. It
simply mentions an investigating officer who shall examine available witnesses requested
by the accused, without reference to his being a military officer. Given the foregoing, the
contention of A that the authority to file charges against him lies within the jurisdiction of the
Office of the Ombudsman cannot be upheld. Under AO 8, the power of the Ombudsman to
conduct preliminary investigation over a military case may be exercised together with any
provincial or city prosecutor or his assistants since all prosecutors are now deputized
Ombudsman prosecutors. It is only in the prosecution of cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan where the Ombudsman enjoys exclusive control and supervision.

Accused-appellant's contentions may be narrowed down to four (4) issues: first, whether the
trial court, a civil court and not a court-martial, had jurisdiction over his person who was then
a military officer as well as over the offense; second, whether the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation; third, whether the filing
of the Information was proper since he failed to file his counter-affidavit during preliminary
investigation; and, fourth, whether he acted in lawful self-defense.
A preliminary investigation guarantees the accused his right to submit counter-affidavits and
present evidence. However, if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed,
does not submit counter-affidavits within the 10-day period, the investigating officer shall
base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.[18] During the prescribed
period, accused-appellant failed to present his counter-affidavit despite due notice. Hence,
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation did not err when
he resolved the case solely on the basis of complainants evidence and, for his own
negligence, accused-appellant cannot now blame the investigating officer. Rule 112 Sec 3(d)
PP vs. Eduarte G.R. No. 88232 February 26, 1990 182 SCRA 750
Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65) RTC order dismissing the criminal information for concubinage
filed against private respondents, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Facts: In July 1986, upon complaint of wife Alma Aggabao, an information against private
respondents Elvino Aggabao and Villa Suratos for the crime of concubinage allegedly
committed in September 1983 was filed by Provincial Fiscal in RTC of Cabagan, Isabela. Upon
being arraigned, private respondents entered a plea of not guilty, and filed a motion to dismiss.
RTC dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction (should be under inferior courts because the
imposable penalty is 6m1d to 4y2m. The prosecution contends that the penalty of destierro for
the concubine is 6m1d to 6yrs, well within the jurisdiction of RTC. Motion for reconsideration still
unsuccessful.
Hence, Sol. Gen. petitioned to SC under Rule 65.