Historical Concepts in Political Science: The Case of "Revolution"

Author(s): James Farr

Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1982), pp. 688-708
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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HistoricalConceptsin Political Science:

The Case of "Revolution
JamesFarr,Ohio State University
Historicalconceptsare repeatedlyused for descriptionand explanationin political science, despitetheirattemptedprohibitionby the receivedview of generaltheory.Historical
conceptsare of two kinds. They are eitherthose conceptswithhistoriesof theirown in the
sense that theirmeaningschangewithpoliticalchanges,or theyare those conceptsthat delimita specifichistoricalperiod. "Revolution" is a concept of the formerkind largelybecause it is an essentiallycontestedconcept betweenrevolutionaryactors as much as it is a
theorists'concept. Only a conceptualhistorycan captureits full meaning.Recentattempts
to fashionan ahistoricalconcept of "revolution" fail, so it is argued here. Moreover,we
should expectfutureconceptualchanges,not only in "revolution"but in most of our key
politicalconcepts; and such futureconceptual change is unpredictablein principle.Given
thesevarious methodologicalconsiderations,we should abandon the receivedimage of politicalscience as an immatureversionof physics.Rather,political science is an essentially
historicalscience.

Concepts,like individuals,have theirhistories,

and are just as incapable of withstanding
theravagesof timeas are individuals.

Kierkegaard

Here's a fine revolution,if we had the trickto see't.

Shakespeare

Politicalsciencehas oftenbeensomething
of a scavenger
discipline,
fromotherdisciplines
borrowing
theirtriedif notalso trueideas.On the
wholethisscavenging
has beenproductive
dienough.The many-faceted
mensions
of politicallifehavebeenat leastpartially
illuminated
bytheoriesand methodsfirstdevelopedin psychology
or sociology,
economics
or statistics.
of scienceHowever,in at leastone area-the philosophy
our scavenging
has been less thanilluminating.
Searchingnot so much
fortheories
or methodsas forscientific
our scavengself-understanding,
inghas broughthomean imageof scienceappropriate
less to political
sciencethanto thenaturalsciences.But thisimagehas workedits will
nonetheless.
The naturalsciences,it is said,providepoliticalsciencewith
a modelof whatany scienceshould,nay must,be like. Untilpolitical
scienceproducesconceptsand theories
withthescopeof thosedeveloped
*1 am especiallyindebtedto Terence Ball for his commentsand criticisms.I would
also like to thank Roger Benjamin, Russell Hanson, W. Phillips Shively,and Stuart Thorson fortheirhelpfulsuggestionson an earlierversionof thisessay.
AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience,Vol. 26, No. 4, November1982
0092-5853/82/040688-21$01.80
of Texas Press
01982 bytheUniversity

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THE HISTORICAL CONCEPT OF REVOLUTION

689

science-if
in thenaturalsciences,it willremainan infantor immature
thenameof "science"at all.
indeedit deserves
enoughto be someto thisview,whichis well-received
According
must
theircontent,
concepts,whatever
theoretical
thingof an orthodoxy,
in space and time.Insofaras theyare to have a
unlimited
be formally
theory,conceptsmustbe trulyuniversaland
role in generalpredictive
forall times.Thisis fairlyadequateas a
ahistorical,
holdingin principle
forpolitical
butit servesas a prescription
of physicaltheory,
description
conceptsthatare tensed,temporally
politicaltheory,
In empirical
theory.
periodof humanhistoryare exof a delimited
or indicative
restricted,
injunction.In short,a historical
cludedby an a priorimethodological
of
playsno properpartin our conceptualunderstanding
understanding
to searchout historical
politics.The receivedviewenjoinsus, therefore,
removing
obstaclesin theway
theiruse, thereby
conceptsand proscribe
in politicalsciencewhenahisprogress
it promises
of science.Conversely,
forthem.
toricalconceptsaresubstituted
"Revolution"providesa conceptualcase in point.Not onlyhave
buttherehavebeendifferent
in history,
revolutions
therebeendifferent
who envision
in history.
For politicalscientists
conceptsof "revolution"
of revolution,
or morebroadlya generaltheoryof polita generaltheory
thatcriesout forcorthisis an infelicity
ical changeand development,
to the
rection.An ahistoricalconceptof "revolution,"one referring
of revolutions
bothpastand possible,mustsomehowbe found.
universe
view.
This,at least,is thereceived
thereceivedview,usingas myexIn thisessayI intendto criticize
Now thereceivedviewhas
conceptof "revolution."
amplethehistorical
not wantedfor critics,eitheras an accountof the naturalsciences
(Suppe,1977;Toulmin,1972)or of thesocialand politicalsciences(Gunlittleattennell,1975; Nelson,1975; Moon, 1975). Butto myknowledge
conceptsand itsimpacton
tionhas beenpaid to thenotionof historical
of politicalscience. "Revolution,"I shall argue,
our understanding
conceptin politius withone of manyexamplesof a historical
presents
cal science.A historical
conceptis eitherone whosescope is temporally
periodor one whosemeaningis mutable
to a specifichistorical
restricted
and changesalong withthe changingpracticesand beliefsof political
is an exampleof thelatter,
thoughcharacteristically
agents."Revolution"
of conceptslike
The
mutability
of
former.
the
it is connected
withthose
valueof theoryin
placeslimitson thenatureand predictive
"revolution"
shouldforceus to repoliticalscience.This mutability
anyconceivable
considerthereceivedviewof conceptsand theoryand indeedthewhole
of thenaturalsciences.
imageof sciencescavengedfromthephilosophy
of
self-understanding
Thustheobjectof mycriticism
is an inappropriate
politicalconceptsand theories,notthepracticeof politicalsciencetout

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690

JamesFarr

court.We politicalscientistshave, I fear,learnedthe wronglessons

fromthephilosophy
of science.Insteadof superimposing
upon political
sciencea viewof scientific
methodappropriate
to the naturalsciences,
we shouldproceedas postpositivist
philosophers
of sciencedo in fact
now proceed-withan eye to the actualpracticeof science.My more
positive
viewof politicalscienceas a historical
sciencewill,I hope,prove
to be morecongenial
to thepracticeof politicalscienceitself.
My argument
proceedsas follows.In the firstsectionI surveythe
variouscharacterizations
of theoryin politicalscience,the preeminent
one beingthe deductive-nomological
model. In that model,concepts
must,if theyare to dischargetheirscientific
duty,be transhistorical.
Next,I considerand criticizeone recent,thoughby no meansunique,
exampleof thereceivedview,whichalso takesthe conceptof "revolution"as a case in point.Readersof thisJournalwillperhapsremember
"An Ahistoric
Viewof Revolution"
byCraigMcCaughrin.
His viewof a
postindustrial
revolution
is interesting,
but, I shall argue,hardlyahistoric.His failureto makehis case convincingly
is instructive,
however,
inasmuch
as it inclinesus towardsa Weberian
viewof conceptualchange
in politicalscience.In thethirdand crucialsectionI further
clarifythe
notionof a historical
conceptand tryto showwhyconceptualchangeis
an ineliminable
featureof politicallife.Two sensesof historical
concepts
are distinguished,
aboveand beyondthewayconceptsmaybe said to be
in anyscience,including
historical
physics.In thefourthsection,withan
I suggestwhyno modeof concept
eyelessto thepastthanto thefuture,
formation
can predictfuture
conceptualchangeor removethespecterof
historical
concepts.Consequently,
no trulygeneralor ahistorical
theory
of revolution
is possible.Finally,I shallbriefly
outlinetheimplications
of myargument
forthelogicof politicalinquiry.
Politicalscience,I conclude,is now,and mustnecessarily
be, an essentially
historical
discipline.
The ReceivedView of Theoryand Concepts

Whatpassesfortheoryin politicalsciencecharacteristically
inspires

controversyof at least two kinds. Theoristsdisagree,on the one hand,

whethera particulartheoryis true or false, potentor sterile,progressive
or ad hoc; and, on the other,theydisagreeabout what a theoryis or is
supposedto do. Controversiesof the firstsort are of a substantivekind;
the latterof a logical or pragmatickind. The firstare resolved, when
theyare resolved,by testing,whichsounds straightforward
but is in facta

and assuredly
fairly
complexmatter
neveras simpleas theearlyverificationistand falsificationist
is in someway
Buttesting
intimated.
programs
in factualor empirical
grounded
considerations,
at leastwhenone theory

competeswithothertheoriesand all withthe facts. But controversiesof

the second kind about the natureof theoryseem even less capable of be-

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THE HISTORICAL CONCEPT OF REVOLUTION

691

inggroundedor resolved.It is no wonderthenthatwhenreadingthe

characteritextswe finda numberof different
manyscope-and-methods
zationsoftheory.
a theorycan be
abstraction
and complexity,
On a scaleof increasing
or data;
not(yet)foundedon experience
1. a conjecture
schemathatproposesa lanor interpretive
2. a conceptualframework
and describepoguageor setof conceptswithinwhichwe identify
liticalphenomena;
into analytior observations
3. a typology
thatseparatesexperiences
and perhapsproposessomekindof empirielements,
callydistinct
theelements;
between
cal relationships
based on a singlecausal relationship
4. a statement
or generalization
between
twoor morevariables;
of suchgeneralizations;
5. a nondeductive
setor concatenation
of laws.
hierarchy
6. a deductive
Becauseour concernis withpoliticaltheorieswe neednot consider
theories
thatassumea morecomplexor abstractformthanthesixthand
foundonlyin certainareas in thenaturalscithatare characteristically
and even retheoriesare fullyformalized
science
ences.Some natural
forexampleto thosein theorettheories,
ducedto stillmorefundamental
attainablein contemporary
ical physics.But theseare beyondanything
theopoliticalscience.(Nor,I mightadd, needwe considerherewhether
Despitea definite
or realistically.
instrumentally
riesare bestinterpreted
streakin Americanpoliticalscience,I ratherthinkthatmost
pragmatist
are realists;but,eitherway,thisdoes not weighupon
politicaltheorists
ourpresent
concerns.)
betweenthem
but disagreement
1-6 varyconsiderably,
Alternatives
becausethesixth-thedeductive-nomois in one crucialwaysuperficial
logical(D-N) model-is theothers'telos.The sixthbuildsupon 1-5, do1-5 pointtowardthesixth,someingtheirworkand more.Conversely,
versionsof it, the
as looseror watered-down
timesbeingcharacterized
Indeedthis
stateof knowledge.
giventhecurrent
bestthatcan be offered
evenbioof theoryis oftenaccountedforby an evolutionary,
teleology
of science.One oftenhearsthatconceptual
logical,modelof thegrowth
indicatea "natuor singlecausalrelationships
or typologies
frameworks
stageof science.As sciencematures,it evolvestowardsthe
ral history"
D-N model.
characterizaamongdifferent
The D-N modelthusreignsparamount
faare sufficiently
tionsof theoryfoundin politicalscience.Its features
hierarchy
here.A theoryis a deductive
miliarto meritonlybriefmention
referto theoretical
lawscharacteristically
of laws.The mostfundamental
contentbycertainrules.Lowerlevelgenentities
and aregivenempirical

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692

JamesFarr

eralizations,
as well as particularevents,are explainedwhentheyare
subsumedunderappropriate
laws. Thus a particulareventis explained
whena statement
describing
it is deducedfroma set of statements
that
includesboth a law (or laws) and singularstatements
of initialand
boundaryconditions.
Muchhangsthenon thenatureof theselaws and
conditional
statements.
Laws are true(or not-yet-falsified)
empirical
generalizations.
Theymakeuniversal
(or statistical)
claimsaboutthesystematicrelationships
betweentwoor moreclassesof events.'Theyformnot
onlythebasisforexplanation
butforprediction
as well:indeeda generalizationthatcannotpredict,cannotexplaineither,
and therefore
is no
law at all. Moreover,
and thissetsthestageforthepartplayedby conceptsin scientific
theories,
lawsmustbe of unlimited
scope,eventhough
theyare subjectto certainconditions.
But thoseconditions
cannotspecifyparticular
spatio-temporal
processesor events.Laws musthaveimplicationsforall the processesand eventstheygeneralizeabout,wherever
or whenever
theyare found.Whereasthisis almosttrivially
trueof the
naturalsciences,it is of momentous
importance
forpoliticalscience.For
its generalizations
if theyare
mustbe cross-cultural
and transhistorical
evento be candidatesforlawlikestatus.Generalizations
thatare in other
respectslawlikeare unacceptable
in principle
if theyreferto particular
societies
or to particular
historical
erasor epochs.Theseare stringent
rein lightof whatpassesfortheoryand
quirements,
to be sure,especially
law-governed
explanation
in politicalscience(Nelson,1975). But thisis
the receivedviewnonetheless,
and it is withinthisframework
thatthe
theoretical
function
of conceptsis to be understood.
is a particularly
vexedand vexingissuein politiConceptformation
cal science,but thismuchis clear:conceptsare dependent
on theories.
Empiricists
simplyfailedto providea setof basicconceptswithinwhich
observations
between
could be neutrally
expressedin orderto arbitrate
competing
theories.Even ordinary,
ostensibly
rock-bottom
observations
presuppose
somekindof observation
theory.
Observations,
liketheconwhichtheyare expressed,
ceptswithin
aretheory
laden.
Theoryladennessis a featurenot onlyof the contentof concepts
butof theirformas well.Twoaspectsarerelevant
here.First,in theD-N
model-a theoryof theories,
unias it were-conceptsmustbe formally
versaland makeno temporalor historic
reference.
Onlyin thiswaycan
' I have excludedan account of statisticalor probabilisticexplanationbecause theirinclusion here would not change the argument.Though statisticalor probabilisticexplanations are importantto political scienceand do make a differentformalclaim about explanation, neverthelessthe conditional statements,and the concepts withinwhich both the
conditionalstatementsand the laws are cast, mustnot make particularspatial or temporal
model on these
(or historic)reference.In short,what holds for the deductive-nomological
issues,holds forstatisticalexplanationsas well. There is no need thento divertattentionby
relatedmodels of explanation.
proliferating

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THE HISTORICAL CONCEPT OF REVOLUTION

693

scope. In Carl Hempel'sterms,theotheyfigurein laws withunlimited

whatmakingno reference
reticalconceptsmustbe "purelyqualitative,"
location"
soeverto objects or eventswitha fixed "spatio-temporal
(Hempel,1965,p. 268f). Conceptslike "Ming" or "medieval"(to use
two of Hempel'sexamples)fail to be purelyqualitativebecause they
concept(a noTheyare one kindof historical
reference.
makehistorical
tionto be morefullydevelopedin thethirdsection)and, accordingto
discourse.Second,
the D-N model,mustbe excludedfromtheoretical
conceptsare said to be theorists'fictionsand theorists'fictionsalone.
of "exindependent
utility,
solelyfortheirtheoretical
Theyare fashioned
withpoliticalactors'concepts
suchas congruence
ternal"considerations,
or (dis)continuity
withprevioususes of the concept.(Indeedthesetwin
in theloosercharacterizaconceptsare also implicit
aspectsof theoretical
aboveas 1-5,evenif,as it mightturnout,they
tionsof theory
presented
are lessteleologically
inclinedtowardtheD-N modelthanmostmethodconceptsare to be
ologistssuppose.In each of thosecharacterizations,
evenif actual
solelybytheorists,
and fashioned
reference
without
historic
pass musterundertheD-N model.)In
do nototherwise
politicaltheories
solelyforacademicpurposesarethe
conceptsfashioned
short,ahistorical
onlyones appropriateto any genuinepoliticaltheoryworthyof the
name.
enough.But itsprincipal
Now this-thereceivedview-is consistent
the practiceof onlysome sciencesat the exflawis thatit illuminates
penseof others.The bestthatcan be said in politicalscienceis thatthe
D-N modelfunctions
as an ideal towardswhichpracticeaspires.Now
to
thereis nothingwrongwithideals,but theveryfirstmethodologists
gap betweentheidealand therealarethemselves
pointouttheincredible
proponentsof the receivedview. Their assessmentscharacteristically
that politicalscienceis immature,primitive,
amountto indictments:
the nameof science"(Brodbeck,1968,p. 2). I find
"barelydeserving
withthatthanI
undulyharsh,butI am lessconcerned
theseassessments
the acam withtheconsistent
failureof thereceivedviewto illuminate
repeatedly
tualongoingpracticeof a politicalsciencewhosepractitioners
acconcepts.I hope to sketcha moreilluminating
relyupon historical
countbelow.But firstletus bringthereceivedviewto bearon theconbe susIf the claimsit makescannotin principle
ceptof "revolution."
tained,as I arguetheycannot,we willhave evenmorereasonto turn
self-underand scientific
forourmetatheoretical
elsewhere
underpinnings
standings.
A RecentExample:"Revolution"
wouldbe possiIn thereceivedview,a genuinetheoryof revolution
werepossible.Such is
ble onlyif an ahistorical
conceptof "revolution"

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694

JamesFarr

the case arguedrecentlyby Craig McCaughrinin thisJournalin an essay

appropriatelytitled "An AhistoricView of Revolution" (McCaughrin,
1976). His essay is importantbecause it articulatesand illustratesa more
generallyshared view in political science. But beyond its representativeof concepts,and
ness, it confrontshead-on the problemof the historicity
it advances a thesisabout the role that conceptualchange plays in politithe author does not take his own thesis
cal change itself.Unfortunately,
seriouslyenough.
McCaughrinbegins by lamentingthe obsolescenceof politicaltheopoliticalchange. He suggeststhat in
riesbroughtabout by unprecedented
the process of modernizationand development not only do polities
change. but the verymechanismsby whichtheychange also change. Revolution is a veritableparadigmof such change. McCaughrin avers that
sensitiveto this,
earlierstudentsof revolutionhave been insufficiently
however.When diagnosingpast revolutionsthey have simplytaken for
grantedpast (or most recent)conceptsof "revolution,"whichis to take
forgrantedwhatrevolutionsare and mustof necessitybe. Unfortunately,
this has renderedcurrenttheory"historybound" (p. 646). McCaughrin,
by contrast,is interestedin the changingpropertiesof revolutionsand in
in revolutionsto come as we
offeringa prognosis of transformations
move into a postindustrialera (p. 639). Thus in anticipatingboth new
causes of revolutionand an entirelynew concept of "revolution,"2McCaughrinhopes to have provided what no predecessorhas, namely,a
glimpseof an "ahistoricor timeless-hence, theoretic-recordof revolution" (p. 637), one ostensiblydesignedto save fromobsolescenceany futuretheoryof revolution.
in the means, aim,
As for "revolution,"he foreseestransformations
focus,and scope. This implies,among otherthings,thatin the futurethe
conceptwill referto upheavals that are less violent,less predicatedupon
society-widemobilization,and directedless at levelingsocial hierarchies
than at merelyredirecting
social policy.McCaughrinconcludesthat "the
currentconceptcould be reworkedto capturethesenewerpatternsof upfromrevolurevolutionas-we-know-it
heaval, allowingus to differentiate
tion de novo. Until then such a concept remainshistorical,adequately
depictingpast but not prospectivecrisesof the social order" (p. 643). As
for changesin the causes of revolution,McCaughrinplaces great weight
on "advanced levels of materialaffluence,role complexity,and power
dispersion"(p. 646). Unpacked, this impliesfirstthat futurerevolutionaries may be inspiredby an entirelynew concept and moral vision of a
2 For the sake of argument,McCaughrin's distinctionbetween the concept and the
causes of revolutionmay be accepted. However,the distinctionis not always easily maintained,especiallyin the case of revolution.JohnDunn arguesthat the causal "uniformities
as can readilybe identifiedseem on the whole more like lexical preconditionsfor applying
thecategory'revolution'at all" (Dunn, 1972, p. 241).

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THE HISTORICAL CONCEPT OF REVOLUTION

695

culture(and not merelyby the systemhavingfailedto

postmaterialistic
conceived).Second, "secularity
values as currently
gratify
materialistic
nationalism
ratherthanideologymay steerthe rebelinto revolution,"
attitude
toand communal
tieshavingbeenabandonedfora cost-benefit
wardloyalty(p. 645). Finally,the rulingclass may lose social control
ratherthan
overrevolutionaries
in whollynewwaysbecauseof rigidity
ratherthandefeatovercritical
reduction
in elitepowerand by stalemate
issuesof publicpolicy.
designed
of a newtheoryof revolution
Herethenare therudiments
McCaughrin
new formsof revolution.
to explainnot old but entirely
confessesthat the validityof his speculationsabout conceptualand
thoughhe urgesthattheir"plausicausalchangeis "fornowunknown,"
bilityis apparent"(p. 647). If now,a fewyearslater,theyseemlessthan
At any rate,Mcplausible,so muchthe luckierare we forhindsight.
Caughrinclaimsthatif thefutureturnsaroundand proveshis speculaoffered
tionsnot onlyplausiblebut true,thenhe willhave successfully
or timeless
conceptof "revolution."
politicalsciencean ahistoric
rethisaccount,we shouldnotethatMcCaughrin's
Beforecriticizing
marksabout "revolution"are applicableto historical(and ahistorical)
conceptsin general.By "historic"conceptshe seemsto mean(withsome
either"past" or "actual" concepts(pp. 637, 643); whereas
ambivalence)
those
by "ahistoric"conceptshe seemsto mean(withmoreambivalence)
or "theoretic"
whichare either"timeless,""potential,""prospective,"
forprecisely
themethis instructive
(pp. 637,643,648). The ambivalence
odologicalreasonsthatinformour discussion.For whilethe temporal
by
appearto be mostwarranted
adjectives
(like"past" or "prospective")
"potential,"or "acgeneralusage,theotheradjectives(like"theoretic,"
concernswithprediction,
methodological
tual") resultfromhis explicitly
Not surprisingly
then,Mcand theoryconstruction.
conceptformation,
manneras "an explanatory
in thereceived
sysdefinesa theory
Caughrin
hisspace and time"(p. 637). Therefore,
temthatis reliablethroughout
but only in
toricalconceptscannotfigurein theoriesor predictions,
of ex post factoknowlanalysesthatare, at best,"elegantexpressions
any politicaltheoryworthyof its name
edge" (p. 637). And further,
historical
conceptsintoahistorimustthenhavesomewayto transform
howthismightbe possible:
cal or theoretical
ones.McCaughrin
suggests
one thattakes
"We mightevenneeda newmodeof conceptformation,
commondiscourse,but the
or (by extension)
not just past occurrences
as its pointof departure.Concepts
fullrangeof possiblealternatives
fromactualeventsalone,buta
wouldno longerbe formeda posteriori,
priori,fromall eventsdeemedpossible"(p. 648).
he admits,on
bordering,
This finalboldnessin conceptformation,
analto finda concluding
"sciencefiction"(p. 648), allowsMcCaughrin

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696

JamesFarr

ogy with theories constructedin the natural sciences, particularlyby

"physiologistsand biologists" when they "predictnew formsof matter
and life far beyondthe bounds of common sense or intuition"(p. 648).
He ends witha familiarrallyingcry: "It is now time for the studentof
societyto take that step too" (p. 648). Here then is a plea for unified
science and the promise that an immaturepolitical science can finally
transcendits historicalor ex post facto characterand severonce and for
all its methodologicalties with history.Political science, or at least its
theoryof revolution,is finallyon the brink of deservingthe name of
"science."
These cheeryconclusionsabout the natureof politicalinquirycan be
reached, I suggest, only because McCaughrin does not take seriously
enoughhis own thesisabout politicaland conceptualchange. But he sets
us on the right,essentiallyWeberian,path nonetheless:polities change;
the
the mechanismsof politicalchange also change; and characteristically
concepts that identifythese changes are themselvessubject to change.
When discussingthe conceptof "culture,"Webermade the generalpoint
that social conceptsare "necessarilysubject to change" and went on to
draw appropriately
historicalconclusionsforour methodology:
The historyof the social sciencesis and remainsa continuousprocess. . . This
dependson thesetting
concept-formation
processshowsthatin theculturalsciences,
of theproblem,and thatvarieswiththecontentof cultureitself.The relationship
between
of all
conceptand realityin theculturalsciencesinvolvesthetransitoriness
in oursciencewerealwaysuseful
at theory-construction
Thegreatattempts
syntheses.
forrevealing
thelimitsof thesignificance
of thosepointsof viewwhichprovided
advancesin thesphereof thesocialsciencesare subtheirfoundations.
The greatest
and taketheguiseof
stantively
tiedup withtheshiftin practicalculturalproblems,
1949,pp. 105-6).
concept-formation
(Weber,

Webertendershere a methodologicalthesisabout concept formationand

theorychange premisedon an ontological thesis about social and culturalchangeitself.Here, as so often,ontologyprefiguresmethodology.
We find McCaughrinthen in preciselythe kind of situationWeber
to
describes.Here we are (so he claims) on the vergeof a transformation
a postindustrialsocietywhose emergentpropertiesinclude entirelynew
formsof revolution.Currenttheoryis being sweptaway as new concepts
and theoriesattemptto accommodatea transformed
reality.If theseconcepts and theorieswithstandcritical scrutinyand empiricalvalidation,
politicalsciencewill advance in the guise of concept formationand theand its advance will have been materiallytied up witha
ory construction,
shiftto a postindustrial
society.
The methodologicalimplicationsof this shift,should it occur,are of
interestto us. But one mightalso be skepticalabout McCaughrin'ssubstantivespeculations.One mightdoubt, for example,thatrevolutionswill
become less violent.In the firstplace violencehas not invariablydefined

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THE HISTORICAL CONCEPT OF REVOLUTION

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"revolution,"as the Bloodless or Glorious Revolutionof 1688 attests.

One historianeven called 1688 a "new typeof revolution"for that very
reason (Trevelyan,1965, p. 56). (I hasten to add, however,that its glorious and bloodless characterwas made possible by the veryinglorious
and bloody revolutionof the 1640s.) But most revolutionsbeforeand after 1688 have in factbeen violent,as have revolutionary
movementssince
McCaughrin'sessay was published.Doubtless theywill continueto be violent, even in advanced industrialsocieties, particularlyas more and
more of the materialconditionsnecessaryfor a postindustrialconsciousness erode and returnus to fundamentalconflicts over scarce basic
goods. Thus we mightalso expect revolutionsto continueto be motivated by class hatredaimed at levelingsocial hierarchies,not merelyat
redirectingsocial policy. Moreover,McCaughrin surprisingly
suggestsa
shiftfrom"ideology" to "secularity"as a motivatingreason for revolution. Recentrevolutionsin Iran or Nicaragua or even Poland (if Solidarity's resistancebe a revolution)surely fail to support this thesis. But
cases like theseaside, a claim more consistentwithhis thesison conceptual changewould be that the veryconceptof "ideology" mightundergo
changes. Surely"individualcost-benefit"(McCaughrin'sversionof secular motivation)is every bit as "ideological" as national loyaltyor any
other reason for supportingor underminingthe political system. We
should thenbe temptedto speak less of the end of ideologythan of the
reemergence
of ideologyin a new guise. Finally,one mightbe profoundly
skepticalabout the entirethesisof a wholesaletransformation
to a postindustrialsociety.Perhaps the changes that promptedpolitical scientists
to speculate about postindustrialsocietyin the firstplace were temporary, transitory,and local and may be receding as quickly as they
emerged.(If ten years ago postscarcityideologistsand the New Left announced a postindustrialrevolution,then the new Malthusiansand the
New Rightare now announcingthe counterrevolution.)
The truthin McCaughrin'sspeculationsis the intuitionthat revolutions-and the concept
of "revolution" itself-will differin importantrespectsin the future,
even if (as seemsmostlikely)theywill not take the particularformabout
whichhe speculates.But for the sake of argumentlet us waive this substantiveskepticismand accept at face value the validityof McCaughrin's
speculations.
However novel and interesting,the conceptual transformations
in
"revolution"that McCaughrinevisionshardlypoint to an abistoricconcept of "revolution," even if they prove correct. Rather, what McCaughrinshows us, despitewhat he says in the textand in his Table 1, is
not an ahistoricalbut simplya new historicconceptof "revolution"possiblygoodfor (some) futurerevolutions.
McCaughrin'snew concept of
(futurehistoric)revolutions,even if correct,will provide a synthesis,as

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JamesFarr

Weberputsit,betweentheoryand realityapplicableonlyto a postindustrialera,just as previousconceptsprovidedsyntheses

holdinggood for
industrial
and preindustrial
eras.So McCaughrin's
conceptwillnotcover
form.I
all formsof revolution
butonly(theas-yet-unseen)
postindustrial
therefore
concludethatMcCaughrinfailsto providethe promisedahistoricviewof revolution
and thathis failureis instructive
inasmuchas
otherswho also do not takeconceptualchangeseriously
enoughwould
also inevitably
fail. Once again Weberprovidesmorereliableguidance
thanthatafforded
bythereceivedview.
HistoricalConcepts
"Revolution"is clearlya proteanconcept,as mutableas the situationsin whichit arises.But our discussionso farhas leftmanyissues
in the claimsthat"revolution"is a historicalconceptand
compressed
thatconceptualchangeattendspoliticalchange.Threequestionsnaturallyarise.First,whatprecisely
do we meanby "historicalconcepts"?
Second,whyare theyso pervasivein politicalscience?And third,what
aretheimplications
of theseconceptsforthelogicof politicalinquiry?
Let mebeginto clarify
thesequestionsbynotingan important
point
aboutscientific
conceptsas such,a pointlargelyobscuredby positivist
philosophyof science.Even in the naturaland formalsciences,like
physics
or mathematics,
we findhistorical
concepts.Manyrecenthistoriminded
of
cally
philosophers science-amongthemKuhn,Toulmin,Shapere,Lakatos, and Laudan-have shownhow key scientificconcepts
undergochangeas theybecomesuccessively
theoembodiedin different
ries.Thusa physicalconceptlike"atom,"a medicalconceptlike"syphilis,"or a mathematical
willchangemeanings
conceptlike"number,"
as
it becomesabsorbedintonew theories.The meaningof a conceptin a
newtheory
neednot,and characteristically
willnot,be absolutely
incomwiththemeaningof thatconceptin an earliertheory.
mensurable
There
willbe overlapsand shadingsof meaningand thelike.Buttherewillnot
be strictidentity
of meanings
either,
and tracinga conceptualhistory
of
sucha conceptwillilluminate
theoretical
changeif not theoretical
progress(Toulmin,1972).This kindof conceptualchangeis internalto the
practiceof science:it dependssolelyon thetheorists'
languageand their
theories.
competing
Therecan be littledoubtthattheconceptsin politicalsciencewillbe
to changessimilarto thosein thenaturaland formalsciences.
susceptible
But conceptsin politicalsciencewill be historicalin two further
ways
of whichI shallattempt
in a moment).First,polit(thefullerelucidation
ical conceptswillbe historical
not onlyforreasonsinternal
to scientific
practicebut because the conceptsthat politicalagentsuse will also
changeas theirbeliefsand practices
change.Thisis essentialforpolitical
theorists
becauseagents'conceptsset theverymatterto be investigated

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THE HISTORICAL CONCEPT OF REVOLUTION

699

in politicalscience,and thereis no analogyto thisin thenaturalsciences

whoseobjectdomaincontainsno agentswithconceptsof theirownthat
mustbe attended
to. Second,thescopeof someconceptsin politicalsciencewillhaveexplicittemporaldemarcation
and willreferonlyto a limitedregionor timespanof humanhistory.
Thereis no analogyto thisin
the naturalsciences,either.For even thougha conceptlike "atom"
changes(and is therefore
historical
in thewayjustallowedfor),itsscope
remainsuniversalacrosschangesin meaning.That is, the conceptof
"atom,"whether
in Democritus's
prescientific
theoryor in modernsubparticlephysics,does not referto temporally
restricted
entitiesfound
onlyin particular
historical
periods.It refers
universally
acrosshistory
to
basicelements
of matter.
Thus if we allowthatthereare historical
conceptsin thenaturaland formalsciences,thenwe mightsaythatconcepts
in politicalscienceare doublyor eventreblyhistorical.
But thisabbreviatestheargument
unnecessarily,
and burdensit witha weightit neednot
bear.Let me nowunpack,withsomecare,thesetwofeatures
of political
in wayseven
scienceconceptsin orderto showhow theyare historical
morefundamental
thanareconceptsin thenaturalsciences.
Let us beginby notingthat "revolution"is an actor'sconceptas
muchas a theorist's
concept,and revolutionaries
(likeall politicalactors)
hold theoriesabout themselves
and about politicsin general.It is of
courseno secretthatsome of the greatesttheorists
of revolution
have
beensomeof thegreatest
revolutionaries.
For revolutions
aremadeup of
in termsof theactor's
actionsor performances
thatare partlyidentified
intentions.
Theseintentions
are framedwithina network
of beliefsand
practices,and thesebeliefsand practicesare partlyconstituted
by the
conceptsagentshold about them.Thus fora theorist
to identify
an explosivesetof eventsas a "revolution"
(as opposedto, say,a riot,rebelthatis, all thoseother
lion,revolt,reform,
remonstrance,
or restoration,
formsof politicalbehaviorwithwhichrevolution
formsa naturalfamily
butare otherwise
different,
as familymembers
go) dependsat leastinitiallyon the revolutionaries'
own intentions,
beliefs,and concepts,and
of
moreespecially
Our veryidentification
theirconceptof "revolution."
revolution
hangsinitiallyand in largemeasureon the revolutionaries'
ownconceptsand self-identifications.
Withoutthemwe standin considof revolution
is
erableperilof misidentifying
whatit is thatthetheorist
to theorize
about.Needlessto say,thereis no analogof thisin thenatutheirrevolutions.
ralsciences,
however
trueit is thatplanetsgo through
Thisis notto say thatrevolutionaries'
conceptsare in anywaysaclikeall politrosanctor abovecriticism
and amendment.
Revolutionaries,
ical actors,maybe misinformed,
mayuse theirconceptslooselyor ellipor
or fromfalse-consciousness,
tically,
maysufferfromself-deceptions
may act in such a way as to bringabout whollyunintendedconse-

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700

JamesFarr

quences. So theoristsof revolution(like politicaltheoristsgenerally)may

need to modifyactors' concepts for inclusionin their theories.But at
least two conditionsmust be met for such modificationto representan
advance on actors' concepts. First, the modification must incur far
fewer,if any,of the liabilitiesafflictingthe actors' concepts,and second,
it mustincurno new significantliabilitiesof its own (Ball, 1978). Note,
however,that these conceptual alterationsare still fundamentallyparasitic upon actors' concepts. Even when, for example, we identifysome
set of actions or consequencesas unintended,we presupposean identification of what was intendedin the firstplace. This turnsus again to actors' originalconcepts.Therefore,the constitutivenatureof politicalactors' concepts is crucial for political theories, perhaps especially for
theoriesof revolution,even if furtherconsiderationsmake themonly initiallyor partiallydecisive(Maclntyre,1973).
the meaningof "revolution"will itselfbe contestedby
Furthermore,
revolutionaries,and thereforeby differenttheoristsof revoludifferent
tion. One need only look at the ongoing Iranian Revolutionto see how
wildlypolarized and contestedthe meaningof "revolution"can become
and to understandthe life-and-deathimportanceof these conceptual issues. In thisway we can say that "revolution"is not only an actors' concept, but a contestedconcept among actors, and perhaps even an essentiallycontestedconcept,at least inasmuchas thereis no neutralor final
courtof appeal to fix a singlemeaning.Revolutionarieswill disagreeon
"revolution" because their revolutionarybeliefs and practices differ.
Moreover,contestsconcerning"revolution"will oftenbe fiercestduring
periods of greatestchange, and the meaningsof "revolution"will vary
considerablyfromone revolutionaryera to another.It is no doubt true,
as Marx noted afterthe aborted revolutionof 1871, that "preciselyin
periods of revolutionarycrisis, revolutionariesconjur up the spiritsof
the past to theirserviceand borrow fromthem names, battle cries, and
costumesin orderto presentthe new scene of world historyin thistimehonoreddisguiseand thisborrowedlanguage" (Marx, 1963, p. 15). Thus
we can speak of a traditionor, betterperhaps, of several traditionsof
revolution.But later revolutionariesalso refashiontheirstrategies,their
organization,and theirideas about revolutionin lightof past revolutions
(as well as in lightof new situationsand new rulerswho also studypast
revolutionsin orderto preventthem),and thus theycan come to refine,
revise,or whollytransformthe meaningof "revolution"itself.So it was
that the poet Ezra Pound could argue in 1934, in one of the more patheticepisodes of his later life, that "the fascistrevolutionis infinitely
more interesting
than the Russian revolutionbecause it is not a revolution accordingto preconceivedtype" (Pound, 1934, p. 24). Ideology notthe generalconceptualpoint is well-taken.Revolutionaries
withstanding,

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THE HISTORICAL CONCEPT OF REVOLUTION

701

(and theoristsof revolutiongenerally)have always engagedin thishistoricallyevolvingconceptualenterpriseand doubtlesswill continueto do so.

The meaningof "revolution"must thereforebe a complex and historicallyevolvingproduct. There will be no single meaning timelessly
available forthe forgingof a trulygeneraltheoryof revolution.Practical
necessitymay well requirethat a definitionof "revolution"be stipulated
in orderto delimitthe fieldand thus allow the theoristto get on withthe
constructionof a (more limitedand historicallyspecific)theoryof revolution.This is an obvious and importantobservation,but it cannot carry
the weightfrequentlyassigned to it by adherentsof the receivedview,
namely,that stipulatinga definitionwill somehow pave the way to general predictivetheoryand vitiatethe historicalconsiderationsbefore us.
For stipulativedefinitions,like actors' conceptsthemselves,are contestable and susceptibleto preciselythe same process of conceptualchange.
They do not end the historicity
of politicalconcepts,but are, rather,absorbed into that historicity.
Reflectingon a concept similarin structure
to "revolution," Nietzsche remarked: "The concept of "punishment"
possesses in fact not one meaning,but a whole synthesisof meanings
. . .all conceptsin which an entireprocess is semioticallyconcentrated
elude definition;only that whichhas no historyis definable" (Nietzsche,
1969, p. 80). The full meaningof "punishment,"like "revolution,"will
be discovered,therefore,in a historyof its various uses. Indeed "revolution" not onlyhas a history;it is a history.
Only a conceptualhistorycan recoverthe full meaningof "revolution" or similarhistoricalconcepts. Such a conceptualhistorywill narrate a traditionof inquiryand of revolutionarypracticein which "revolution" figures, in which both continuitiesin meaning and radical
changesin meaningare noted. Indeed "revolution"providesmaterialfor
one of the most interestingexamples of conceptual history.A decisive
change in meaningoccurredin or around the early eighteenthcentury
whenthe classical view of "revolution,"understoodas a returnof a restorationto an original startingpoint, was abandoned for the modern
view that "revolution"marks a completeseverancewiththe past and a
total restructuring
of societyby the overturningand replacementof one
class or orderby another.But even afterthe achievementof a modernor
postclassical consensus on this basic point, disagreementson the full
meaningof "revolution"have been legion, and conceptualnoveltiesand
innovationsabound. The richconceptualhistoryof "revolution"remains
to be told in full(forbeginningssee Hatto, 1949; Snow, 1962; Griewank,
1965; Calvert,1970; and Wills, 1978).
Historicalconceptslike "revolution,"then,are conceptswithhistoriesof theirown. This is the firstand most importantof two classes of
historicalconcepts found in political science. These concepts are not

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JamesFarr

timeless,and thoughtheymake no explicittemporalreference,theyare

neverthelessembodied in, referto, and are partiallyconstitutiveof historicallymutableactions,practices,and beliefs.Nodal points along their
historieswill be marked by differentmeaningsof the concept. In this
first class of historical concepts Weber would include "culture,"
Nietzsche "punishment,"and Marx "labor" (Marx, 1973, p. 103). Besides "revolution,"we should also include relatednotionslike "development," "civil war," and "mobilization," as McCaughrin does (McCaughrin, 1976, p. 648). Other historical concepts of this first kind
mightinclude "party," "democracy,""education," "class," "ideology,"
"conservatism,""liberalism,"and "state." We should also include such
foundationalconcepts as "science," "politics," and even "rationality."
Althoughless interesting
and more problematicmethodologically(as argued by Przeworskiand Teune, 1970, p. 30), nominal adjectives, like
"American," "Federalist," "Marxist," "Christian," or "Quaker," might
also be includedin thisgroup. The historicalpoint is that what is "revolutionary,""partisan," "political," "democratic," "scientific,"or what
is "American," "Christian,"or "Quaker" might(and in thesecases most
emphaticallydo) differat differenttimes, for example in 1650 or 1680
and again in 1950 or 1980. If politicalscientistsseekinggeneralor timeless theories choose to disregard these historical considerations,they
stand in considerableperil of conceptualanachronismand thus of misidentifying
relevantactions,practices,and beliefs.One need only consider
how an exclusivepreoccupationwithtwentiethcenturypoliticalconcepts
mightlead (and at timeshas led) to misunderstanding
and misidentifying
thosepracticesor phenomenareferredto as "revolution"by Thucydides,
Polybius, or even Locke; "party" by the Levellersor the early Whigs;
"faction" by Madison and Hamilton; the "middle rank" by James Mill
or David Hume; or "moral science" by Hume or John Stuart Mill.
Therefore,only by understandingthe meaningof historicalconcepts in
the contextof theiractual use will we be able to understandpoliticallife,
and thiswill invariablybe a historicalunderstanding.
Faced with what mightbe a potentiallyambiguous situation,political scientistscharacteristically
invokea second class of historicalconcepts
to fixthe timesof those of the firstclass. These historicalconceptsmake
primafacie referenceto some temporallocation in history.That is, these
concepts, unlike the first,have explicit temporal referents.I have in
mind concepts like "primitive," "ancient," "classical," "medieval,"
"modern," or "nth" century.They also include "early," "developed," or
"late," as well as all those thingswhichare "proto-," "neo-," "pre-," or
"post-" (as in postindustrial).All thesedelimitan explicittemporalreference in some particularstretchof history,even thoughtheirdates or periods are oftenhard to fixprecisely.

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THE HISTORICALCONCEPT OF REVOLUTION

703

fused with those of the first

This second class is characteristically
class to create hybridhistoricalconcepts, like "classical revolutions,"
"modernguerilla
science," "medieval Christianity,"
"seventeenth-century
warfare,"or "postindustrialdevelopment."The upshot is that a theorist
of, say, modern revolutionwill have to recognizethat the concept of
uses, and that qualifyingit
"revolution"itselfhas a historyof different
as "modern" means historicallydelimitingit in a furtherway.This might
mean datingthe firstmodernrevolutionin 1642 or 1688, 1776 or 1789,
or perhapsas late as 1848 or even 1917. Similarstricturesapply to most
theoriesin politicalscience, particularlytheoriesof the partysystem,of
society.Thus politimodernizationand development,or of postindustrial
cal scientistswho debate whichstipulativedefinitionsto adopt and which
historicalinstancesto includeor excludefromtheirtheoriesengage in an
essentiallyhistoricalenterprise.
Predictionand the Futureof HistoricalConcepts
No one should disputethe factthatboth kindsof historicalconcepts
are used in explanationsand theoriesin politicalscience. But this fact is
lamentedby many political scientists.Acceptingthe receivedview as a
theyclaim that we must
baseline for theirmethodologicalprescriptions,
renderall our concepts ahistoricalif we are to have genuine or "timeless" theory(McCaughrin, 1976, p. 648). But this, I think, turns the
matteron its head: we should, on the contrary,accept the existenceand
the
the repeateduse of historicalconceptsas a baseline for reconsidering
receivedview itself.Before takingsome tentativesteps towards that reconsideration,I should firstlike to emphasizethat no mode of concept
formationcan ever unerringlydeliverus fromthe specterof historical
concepts.In short,the use of historicalconceptsin politicalsciencehitherto should not be chalked up to certainmethodologicaldeficienciesto
be remediedas our science matures.Historicalconceptsare in all likelihood ineliminable,and we should expectthemto influencethe futureof
anytheoreticalpoliticalscience.
Let us recall McCaughrin'sdiscussion for a moment. He failed to
providea genuinelyahistoricview of revolution.But apart fromthis he
also speculated,more generally,on the need for a "new mode of concept
formation,one that takes not just past occurrencesor (by extension)
commondiscoursebut the full range of possible alternativesas its point
of departure.Conceptswould no longerbe formeda posteriori,fromactual eventsalone, but a priori, from all events deemed possible" (McCaughrin,1976, p. 648). But clearlythiswon't wash.
As a matterof logic, "the fullrangeof possible alternatives"is only
the logical backgroundof any empiricaltheory.And it takes this as "its
pointof departure"only in a formalsense. Any empiricalstateof affairs

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JamesFarr

is conceptuallyor logicallypossible. (AfterHume, that is what it means

to be an empiricalstate of affairs.)The significantthingabout theoretical or scientificinvestigation,
however,is thatit providessome means for
choosing between possible concepts for the organization of empirical
data. But theoreticalconceptsare not literallyopen to "all eventsdeemed
possible" (again, exceptin the most formalsense). Rather,otherconsiderationsdominate concept formation,particularlythe currentstate of
theoreticalknowledge.Thus, pace McCaughrin,when physiologistsand
biologistspredictheretoforeunknownmodes of life,theydo not literally
proceedfromall eventspossible but only fromhighlyarticulatedtheories
of evolution;otherwise,science would trulybe science fiction.Even McCaughrin'sown speculationsabout "revolution" depend upon a theory
of modernizationand postindustrialdevelopment.Had he literallyfollowed his own advice about practicinga "new mode of concept formation," he would have had to have entertainedinfinitely
more conceptual
possibilities.And he would have had no sound basis for decidingamong
them,nor for rejectingthose he most wants to reject (namely,all previous ones).
Finally,no othermode of conceptformationor theoryconstruction
can deliverus fromthe recurringspecterof historicalconcepts. Escape
would be possible only if we could predictthe future,includingfuture
conceptualchange. But this we cannot do. Besides the manyotherproblems associated withprediction,conceptualchangecannotbe predictedin
principlebecause we would have to have at our disposal the very conceptsthathave yetto be articulated.Should theybe at our disposal, then
is espewe can no longerspeak of predictingthem.This unpredictability
cially the case withthose infinitelylarge numberof conceptsconnected
withthe growthof knowledge.Sir Karl Popper has argued convincingly,
and I thinkconclusively,
that "if thereis such a thingas growinghuman
knowledge,thenwe cannot anticipatetoday what we shall know only tomorrow.. . No scientificpredictorcan possibly predict, by scientific
methods,its own futureresults.Attemptsto do so can attaintheirresult
only afterthe event,when it is too late for a prediction;theycan attain
their result only after the predictionhas turned into a retrodiction"
(Popper, 1960, p. xii; see also Maclntyre,1973, p. 331). Popper developed his argumentwith an eye solely to the developmentof scientific
knowledge.But in fact it applies more broadlyto all social and political
institutions,practices and beliefs-including organizations, strategies,
techniques, ideologies, and world views-that are influenced by the
in social
growthof knowledge,particularlyby the deliberateintervention
phenomenaon the basis of social and politicaltheory.Indeed, it is upon
this intervention
that the policy sciences are at all possible. Needless to
occurs we change social situations,oftenuninsay,once thisintervention

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THE HISTORICAL CONCEPT OF REVOLUTION

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tentionally,
and thismakes possible furthergrowthof knowledge,thereby
pavingthe way for furthersocial and conceptualchange. No doubt this
processis neverending. It is thisthat Weberhad in mind whenhe spoke
of "the transitorinessof all syntheses"of concept and reality(Weber,
1949, p. 105). Our epistemologicalsituation dictates that we cannot
know what futuresyntheseswill look like. It is simplyin the nature of
historicalconcepts,such as "revolution,""party,""democracy,"or "politics," that the futureclass of instancesto whichtheywill apply will remain open and undetermined.In sum, we should expect futureconceptual change, and consequently we should expect the continued use,
emergence,and transformation
of historicalconcepts.Genuinelyahistorical conceptsare not to be expected,at least foran indefinitely
large class
of politicalphenomena.
A HistoricalPolitical Science
The recurrenceof specificallyhistoricalconceptsin political science
should not be cause for embarrassment,
apology,or skepticism,for such
conceptsare not lamentablysecond-best.Historicalconceptsneithervitiate the constructionof (suitablyhistorical)theoriesand explanationsnor
do theyjeopardize a politicalscience,at least one that embracesthe historicalcharacterof its subject matterand its modes of inquiry.Historical
historiconcepts,in short,allow us to reconsidersome of the interesting
cal featuresof politicalinquirythathave been all but lost in the received
logic of inquiry.Here I mustbe brief,but, I hope, suggestive.
To begin with,historicalconcepts figurein generalizationsor laws,
let us call them "historicallaws," whichpurportto cover only a limited
period of time. Therefore,withintheirset of statementsof initial and
boundaryconditionswill be found one or more tensedor temporallyrestrictedstatementsthat specifya particularperiod of history.That is,
pace the receivedview, theyare not and do not pretendto be timelessor
trulyuniversal(Weber,1949, pp. 80, 159ff.;Ball, 1972). Nonetheless,historicallaws do performexplanatoryand theoreticalfunctions.They are
not merelyaccidentalsummaries,because theyare capable of supporting
subjunctiveand counterfactualconditionals(at least for the periods designatedby theirscope conditions).And althoughtheydo not make longtermpredictionspossible-or rather,theyseverelylimitthe range of predictions-theynonethelessmake sound retrodictions
possible. Therefore,
historicallaws and conceptswill figurein explanationsthat may properly
be called "historical"explanations.Such explanationsmay well appear in
fact as "elegant expressionsof ex post facto knowledge" (McCaughrin,
1976, p. 637). But this is not to be belittled.This is the best that has
been offeredand, giventhe recurrenceof historicalconceptsand our in-

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JamesFarr

abilitiesto predictthe futuregrowthof knowledgeor conceptualchange,

it is the best we can expect.
Consequently,historicallaws and explanationsare backed by theories that have, and accept, limitedhistoricalscope. Whetherwe conceive
of theoryas a conceptualframeworkor as a deductivehierarchyof laws
ways presentedin the firstsection,all must
or in any of the intermediary
countenancehistoricalconceptsand be modifiedaccordingly.So a theory
neocolonial revof revolutiondesignedto explain, say,twentieth-century
olutionsor (possible future)postindustrialrevolutionswill not and need
not account for the classical European revolutionsof 1642, 1688, or
1789,and vice versa. I am temptedto say thatno generaltheoryof revolutionis possible. Theoriesthat tryto be trulygeneralall too frequently
faults.First,theyconceptualize
fall victimto one of severalcharacteristic
"revolution"so broadly that distinctionsbetweenit and other formsof
political phenomenaare obliterated.Thus the theoryof revolutiongets
absorbedinto theoriesof internalconflict,collectiveviolence,or political
instability.Or, second, "revolution" gets conceptualizedless broadly to
but still broadly enough to cover all revolupreserveits distinctiveness
tions hitherto.But now the causes available to explain the wealthof examplesthemselvesbecome impoverished,and we get truismsor near-analytictruthsin the guise of theory.Or, third,in tryingto be general,all
possiblecauses are includedin the theory.This enforcesan a priorioverof revolution,and the theorybecames rathermore like an
determination
etiologicalcatalogue. (For summariesof the bewilderingarrayof causal
antecedentsof revolutionthat have been incorporatedinto theories,see
Eckstein, 1965; Stone, 1966; Kramnick, 1972; and Hagopian, 1974).
These may not be faultsof necessity,built into the veryproject of general theorizing,and perhaps they can be rectified.But the pursuitof
trulygeneraltheorywill stillcome a cropperwhen it comes to predicting
futurerevolutions,at least those futurerevolutionsthatare partiallyconstitutedby new conceptsof "revolution."This is what I have argued cannot be done. So the pursuitof generalor timelesstheoryshould be abandoned for theoriesof explicitlyhistoricalscope. They stillperformmany
of hisrequisitetheoreticaltasks,includingthe formationand refinement
in
generalstill
varying
degrees
is
they
are
more,
toricalconcepts. What
ized, withinthe historicparameterstheyclaim to cover.Therefore,theobetween
ries of historicscope attemptto stake down that large territory
descriptivechronologies of unique instances and the impossible-toachievetheoriesof some universaland timelesskind.
Finally,then,we mightwant to thinkof the social and politicalsciences as historical sciences. They are surely sciences insofar as they
organizedknowledgethat goes beyond particusearch for systematically
lars and chronology.And yet the level of generalityat whichtheymove

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THE HISTORICAL CONCEPT OF REVOLUTION

707

is historicallylimited.This may be true of the disciplineof historyas

well as of the social sciences.That is, historymay well be a social science
(as the "new historians"tell us), but the social sciences are historical
nonetheless.
In concluding,I can only hope that my intentionshave not been
nor my argumentmisread.My messageis not antiscience
misunderstood,
historicism.There has
not do I counsel a returnto nineteenth-century
been no call for abandoning all generalizationsor theoriesin search of
idiographicexplanations;nor have any dubious notionsof psychological
empathyor historicalprojectionbeen peddled. Nor is the argumentpredicated on believingthat literallyall concepts in political science are or
mustbe historical.There may in fact be some genuinelyahistoricalconcepts, though I am at a loss to provide any reallygood examples that
would meet general consensus. Perhaps the more physiologically
groundedconceptsof political psychologymay be genuinelyahistorical,
or at least effectively
ahistoricalgiventhe greattime periods over which
species change. But those concepts consideredhere, like "revolution,"
"party,""democracy,""politics,"or "science,"surelyare not candidates.
I daresaywe will continueto be primarilyconcernedwith these and related conceptsin theoriesof politics,even though,as I have been arguing, theirmeaningwill change along with materialchanges in political
lifeitself.Moreover,I trustthat thesetentativesteps towardsreconsidering the logic of politicalinquirydo justiceto politicalscienceas presently
or conceivablypracticed.Our practicecan, however,only be enrichedby
Political theorycan betterachieve
a more historicalself-understanding.
its aim by adopting a more appropriatelyhistoricalself-consciousness.
This is surelypreferableto the partingindictmentof the receivedview
that unfailinglycharacterizes-nay,patronizes-the social and political
sciencesas infantor immaturesciences, as if theywere pubescentway
thensurelyWeberput
stationsto hard science. If thisbe our terminology
it better,if more generously,by sayingthat the social sciences are those
sciences "to whom eternal youth is granted." Weber's point of course
stronglyemphasizesthe historicalcharacterof social-scientificmethod.
The historicaldimensionsimplycannot and should not be read out of
our science. Only a dogmatic adherenceto an inappropriatemodel of
methoddrawn from a ratheroutmoded view of natural science would
lead us to believeotherwise.
Manuscriptsubmitted15 September1981
Final manuscriptreceived9 December 1981

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708

JamesFarr
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