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Mausumi Das
Lecture Notes, DSE
Dynamic Macro
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Thus the same equity-e ciency trade-o (which was present in the
earlier developement literature, e.g., Mirlees) shows up again: in the
absence of majority-voting, a re-distribution of wealth from rich to
poor (beyond ) is actually ine cient!
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y for k h < k;
yh =
; where y > y .
y for k h = k.
Notice that marginal return to investment around k is innitely high;
and is zero before and after.
Thus if there was a market for capital where households/rms could
lend or borrow from one another, once again there would be a ow of
to the
funds from the capital-rich households (with k h > k)
h
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= F (KtS , HtS )
> 0; FKK , FHH < 0
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KtS
HtS
= f
rts
= f0
KtS
HtS
KtS
HtS
f0
KtS
HtS
KtS
HtS
KtS
HtS
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=r .
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(r ) = k.
This in turn implies that the wage rate for skilled labour is xed at:
w S = f (k )
f 0 (k ) (k ) .
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One unit of unskilled labour can be converted into one unit of skilled
labour by investing
(i) one full time period (in acquiring skills);
(ii) a xed investment of h units of the nal commodity.
The xed investment h has to be paid upfront - before skill formation
begins.
Notice that since skill formation also require a time investment of one
full period, those who engage in skill formation cannot work for one
time period.
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Preferences of an Agent:
Consider an agent with a second period income y .
The agent spends this income in own consumption (c) and in bequest
for his child (b).
His preference is represented by the following utility function
(identical for all agents):
U (c, b ) = log c + (1
The agent maximises the above utility function subject to his second
period budget constraint:
c + b = y.
Optimal solution:
= y ;
b = (1 )y .
c
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) log ((1
)y )
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= [ log + (1
= M + log y .
) log(1
)] + log y
The second period earning on the other hand depends on the skill
formation decidion undertaken by the agent in the rst period of his
life.
Let us now analyse the optimal occupational/skill formation choice of
an agent.
Given his inherited wealth level xt , a forward-looking agent endowed
with perfect foresight will choose his skill and therefore occupation so
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(1 + i )d = (1 + r )d + z
Das (Lecture Notes, DSE)
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1 + r
>r
1
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Case I
= (1 + r )(xt
h ) + w S
Case I
= (1 + r )(xt + w N ) + w N
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(1 + r )(xt
h ) + w S
i.e., w S
w N
= (1 + r )(xt + w N ) + w N
= (1 + r ) w N + h
Case II
= w S
(1 + i )(h
xt )
Case II
= (1 + r )(xt + w N ) + w N
xt ) > (1 + r )(xt + w N ) + w N
(1 + r ) 2 + w N + (1 + i )h
i.e., xt >
i r
(1 + i )(h
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w S
f
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(1 + r ) 2 + w N + (1 + i )h > w S > (1 + r ) 2 + w N + (1 + r )h
The latter part of Assumption 1 implies that rich agents (with
xt = h) would always prefer to go for skill formation.
The rst part of Assumption 1 ensures that there exists a positive
cut-o wealth level f (< h ) such that
agents with f < xt < h would prefer to go for skill formation by
borrowing;
but for agents with 0 5 xt 5 f , the cost of repayment is too
high and they prefer to remain unskilled.
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dD0 (x0h ) = L
Out of these L young agents, let Lx0 denote that measure of young
agents at time 0 who have an inherited wealth level x0h 5 x :
Zx
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Similar conclusion would hold even for the long run average
income. (Verify)
Notice that a direct redistributive policy that taxes the wealth of the
rich and gives it to the poor such that post- redistribution the
proportion of people with wealth level > x goes up, would make the
economy better o in the long run (in an average sense).
Also notice that any random redistribution can actually make the
economy worse o in the long run!!
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>
A
Lx0
L
.
B
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Whither Growth?
But what about growth?
The Galor-Zeira model exhibits no growth - in the long run all agents
reach their respective steady state levels of income and wealth and so
does the economy.
However one can derive similar conclusions in terms of the long run
growth rate of the economy if we slightly modify the model in the
following way:
Assume that credit market in completely missing;
Allow for a Harrod-Neutral technical progress in both sectors such that
labour productivity in the cottage sector grows at the constant rate n
while labour productivity in the modern sector grows at the constant
rate m (m > n);
Assume that xed investment requirement for skill formation also
grows at the same rate as modern sector productivity: m
In this modied structure one can now show that the higher inequality
implies lower average growth in the long run.
(Try this exercise)
Das (Lecture Notes, DSE)
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