Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2
1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar
stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and
children; respondent never came to Manila
except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov.
24, 1977);
2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the
latter comes to Manila (p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24,
1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).
Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the
respondent stated that:
1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador
Hotel to meet respondent; the latter had male
companions at the hotel but he did not see any
woman companion of respondent Aznar;
2. He usually slept with respondent at the
Ambassador Hotel and ate with him outside the
hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn,
Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).
The Court notes that throughout the period of the
investigation conducted by the Solicitor General,
respondent Aznar was never presented to refute
the allegations made against him.
In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have
any knowledge of the allegations in the complaint. As special
defense, respondent further alleged that the charge levelled
against him is in furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck
vengeance against respondent by reason of the latter's
approval of the recommendation of the Board of Trustees
barring complainant from enrollment for the school year 19731974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise
contended that the defense did not bother to present
respondent in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General because nothing has been shown in the hearing to
prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the
complainant.
Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General
made a categorical finding to the effect that respondent had
carnal knowledge of complainant, to wit:
From the foregoing, it is clear that
complainant was compelled to go to Manila
with respondent upon the threat of
respondent that if she failed to do so, she
would flunk in all her subjects and she would
never become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50,
tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent was
Chairman of the College of Medicine,
complainant had every reason to believe
him.
It has been established also that
complainant was brought by respondent to
Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three days
where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge
of her upon the threat that if she would not
give in to his lustful desires, she would fail in
her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1"
3
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in
issue, to satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper person to
enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense
with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of
the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As
once pronounced by the Court:
When his integrity is challenged by evidence,
it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal
and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and
show proofs that he still maintains the
highest degree of morality and integrity,
which at all times is expected of him. ... In
the case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil.
303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the
Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty
to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty, he may not always expect
the State to perform it for him. If he fails to
meet the obligation which he owes to
himself, when to meet it is the easiest of
easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand
and expect that same full and wide
consideration which the State voluntarily
gives to those who by reasonable effort seek
to help themselves. This is particularly so
when he not only declines to help himself but
actively conceals from the State the very
means by which it may assist him (Quingwa
SCRA 439 [1967]).
The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant
is partly to blame for having gone with respondent to Manila
knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with
children, respondent should merely be suspended from the
practice of law for not less than three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47).
On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion
dated April 18, 1989 alleges that since a period of about ten
(10) years had already elapsed from the time the Solicitor
General made his recommendation for a three (3) years
suspension and respondent is not practicing his profession as
a lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as having
been suspended during the said period and the case
dismissed for being moot and academic.
We disagree.
Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because
respondent reneged on a promise to marry (Quingwa v.
Puno, supra). More importantly. complainant's knowledge of of
respondent's marital status is not at issue in the case at bar.
Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation for sexual
intercourse not because of a desire for sexual gratification but
because of respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear
that if she would not accede, she would flunk in her subjects.
As chairman of the college of medicine where complainant was
enrolled, the latter had every reason to believe that respondent
could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for
respondent would deem it "worthwhile to inform the the Court
that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich
man in his own right and in fact is not practicing his profession
before the court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere suspension for a limited
period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose.
The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his
profession as a lawyer, does not render respondent a person
of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character
precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission
thereto. Good moral character is a continuing qualification
necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law. The
ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members
the highest standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA
591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept of
immoral conduct, as follows:
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. A member of the bar should have
moral integrity in addition to professional
probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix
an inflexible standard as to what is grossly
immoral conduct or to specify the moral
delinquency and obliquity which render a
lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member
of the bar. The rule implies that what appears
to be unconventional behavior to the
straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community' (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf
possessing the intellect of a child became
pregnant by reason of intimacy with a
married lawyer who was the father of six
children, disbarment of the attorney on the
ground of immoral conduct was justified (In
re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a
married man with children, to have taken advantage of his
position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking
complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila
where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that
she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby
DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll
of Attorneys.
4
SO ORDERED.
ROSALIE
CASTRO,
25, 2005
DALLONG-GALICINAO
A.C. No. 6396
v.
ATTY.
VIRGIL R.
October
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled
invectives at a Clerk of Court. Members of the bar decorum
must at all times comfort themselves in a manner befitting their
noble profession.
Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bambang,
Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she filed with the Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP)
a Complaint-Affidavit[1] with
supporting
documents[2] against respondent Atty. Virgil R. Castro for
Unprofessional Conduct, specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule
7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[3] The charge in the complaint is summed up as
follows:
Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and VicePresident of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya Chapter. On 5 May 2003,
respondent went to complainants office to inquire whether the
complete records of Civil Case No. 784, entitled Sps. Crispino
Castillano v. Sps. Federico S. Castillano and Felicidad
Aberin, had already been remanded to the court of origin,
MCTC Dupax del Norte, Alfonso Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It
must be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record
of either party in Civil Case No. 784.
Complainant informed respondent that the record had
not yet been transmitted since a certified true copy of the
decision of the Court of Appeals should first be presented to
serve as basis for the transmittal of the records to the court of
origin. To this respondent retorted scornfully, Who will certify
the Court of Appeals Decision, the Court of Appeals? You
mean to say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certified
true copy? Surprised at this outburst, complainant replied, Sir,
its in the Rules but you could show us the copy sent to the
party you claim to be representing. Respondent then replied,
Then you should have notified me of the said requirement.
That was two weeks ago and I have been frequenting your
office since then, but you never bothered to notify me.
Complainant replied, It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the
said requirement.
Respondent then answered, You mean to say it is not
your duty to remand the record of the case? Complainant
responded, No, Sir, I mean, its not our duty to notify you that
you have to submit a copy of the Court of Appeals decision.
Respondent angrily declared in Ilocano, Kayat mo nga saw-en,
awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay? (You mean to say you dont care
anymore? Is that the way it is?) He then turned and left the
office, banging the door on his way out to show his anger. The
banging of the door was so loud it was heard by the people at
the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a hearing was taking
place.[4]
After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still
enraged, and pointed his finger at complainant and
shouted, Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo
nga ibales kaniak ah!(Vulva of your mother! If you are
harboring ill feelings against my client, dont turn your ire on
me!) Complainant was shocked at respondents words but still
managed to reply, I dont even know your client, Sir.
Respondent left the office and as he passed by complainants
5
MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and
there being no authorization from either the parties to
represent them, respondent had no right to impose his will on
the clerk of court.
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states:
Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly
or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is
the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor,
to give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.
Through his acts of constantly checking the
transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 784, respondent
deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel
of record of that case. It does not matter whether he did so in
good faith.
Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities
relating to Civil Case No. 784, respondent acted rudely
towards an officer of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk
of court and uttered at her the most vulgar of invectives. Not
only was it ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering that
he did all these to a woman and in front of her subordinates.
As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,[16] respondent
ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only
bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and
erode public respect for it.[17] These acts violate Rule 7.03,
Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to wit:
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflect on
his fitness to practice law, now shall he,
whether in public or private life behave in
scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall
avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility demands that lawyers conduct themselves with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers.
Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal
profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly
towards each other and otherwise conduct themselves without
reproach at all times.[18]
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating
Commissioner, respondent did not categorically deny the
charges in the complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy narration
of the prefatory facts of the case as well as of the incident on 5
May 2003.
Complainant also alleged in her ComplaintAffidavit that respondents uncharacteristic behavior was not an
isolated incident. He has supposedly done the same to Attys.
Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy Lambino, the latter
having filed a case against respondent pending before this
Court.[19] We, however, cannot acknowledge such allegation
absent any evidence showing the veracity of such claim. No
affidavits to that effect were submitted by either Atty. Asuncion
or Atty. Lambino.
6
compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with
four of his clients in the aforementioned civil case which, in
effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might
have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to
terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed
against it. Complainant averred that such an act of
respondents was unbecoming of any member of the legal
profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not
one of his co-respondents had taken part in the negotiation,
discussion, formulation, or execution of the various ReAdmission Agreements complained of and were, in fact, no
longer connected at the time with the Pangulayan and
Associates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he
claimed, had nothing to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q97-30549 and were executed for the sole purpose of effecting
the settlement of an administrative case involving nine
students of AMACC who were expelled therefrom upon the
recommendation of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal. The
students, namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil
Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon, Melyda B. De Leon,
Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and
Cleo B. Villareiz,, were all members of the Editorial Board of
DATALINE, who apparently had caused to be published some
objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member
Student Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, and
after a series of hearings, it found the students guilty of the use
of indecent language and unauthorized use of the student
publication funds. The body recommended the penalty of
expulsion against the erring students. Jksm
The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable
R. Aguiluz V, AMACC President, gave rise to the
commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March
1997 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon
City. While the civil case was still pending, letters of apology
and Re-Admission Agreements were separately executed by
and/or in behalf of some of the expelled students, to wit: Letter
of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo,
assisted by his mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22
June 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated
31 March 1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter
Melyda B. De Leon and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May
1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22
May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother, and ReAdmission Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the AMACC
President; letter of apology, dated 22 September 1997, of Cleo
Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October 1997 with
the AMACC President; and letter of apology, dated 20 January
1997, of Michael Ejercito, assisted by his parents, and ReAdmission Agreement of 23 January 1997 with the AMACC
President.
Following the execution of the letters of apology and ReAdmission Agreements, a Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997,
was filed with the trial court where the civil case was pending
by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and
Associates Law Offices for defendant AMACC. A copy of the
manifestation was furnished complainant. In his Resolution,
dated 14 June 1997, Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court thereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
7
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan
is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon his receipt
of this decision. The case against the other respondents is
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of
respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and
furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
ATTY. IRENEO L. TORRES and MRS. NATIVIDAD CELESTINO,
Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSE CONCEPCION JAVIER,
Respondent. Adm. Case No. 5910 September 21, 2005
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By complaint[1] dated November 26, 2002, Atty. Ireneo L. Torres
and Mrs. Natividad Celestino (complainants) charge Atty. Jose
Concepcion Javier (respondent) for malpractice, gross
misconduct in office as an attorney and/or violation of the
lawyers oath.
The charges stemmed from the statements/remarks made by
respondent in the pleadings he filed in a petition for audit of all
funds of the University of the East Faculty Association (UEFA),
as counsel for the therein petitioners UEFA then Treasurer
Rosamarie Laman, and his wife-former UEFA President
Eleonor Javier, before the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR),
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) against herein
complainants, docketed as NCR-OD-0105-004-LRD (audit
case),[2] and from the pleadings filed by respondent in another
labor case as counsel for the one hundred seventy six (176)
faculty members of the University of the East complainants
against herein complainant Atty. Ireneo L. Torres, et al.,
[3]
docketed as NCR-0D-0201-0005-LRD (attorneys fees case).
[4]
8
With respect to the attorneys fees case, respondent
claims that Atty. Torres did not in his Answer confront the issues
thereof but instead mock[ed] his wife and fabricat[ed] and
distort[ed] realities[16] by including malicious, libelous and
impertinent statements and accusations against his wife which
exasperated him.[17] A portion of Atty. Torres Answer in the
attorneys fees case reads:
xxx
To repeat, if respondent Atty. Torres has any
common sense at all, he should stop making
irrelevant, libelous and impertinent allegations
in his pleadings. This means changing his
standard tactic of skirting the main issues by
injecting a web or a maze of sham,
immaterial,
impertinent
or
scandalous
matters.[21] (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent adds that he merely wanted to bring to the
BLRs attention that Atty. Torres had the habit of hurling baseless
accusations against his wife to embarrass her, including one for
unjust vexation and another for collection and damages both of
which were dismissed after trial on the merits, thus prompting
9
falsification of public document reasoning out
that they made untruthful statements in the
narration of facts in the basic petition.
Respondent Torres is a member of
the Philippine Bar. But what law books is he
reading?
He should know or ought to know
that the allegations in petitioners pleading are
absolutely privileged because the said
allegations or statements are relevant to the
issues.[26] (Underscoring supplied)
The Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) found respondent guilty of violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility for using inappropriate and
offensive remarks in his pleadings.
The pertinent portions of the Investigating Commissioners
Report and Recommendation read:
Respondent admits that he was
angry when he wrote the Manifestationand
alleges that Complainant implicated his wife
in a burglary. Moreover, Respondent alleges
that Complainant has been engaged in
intimidating and harassing his wife.
It appears that herein Complainant and herein
Respondents wife have had a series of
charges and counter-charges filed against
each other. Both parties being protagonists in
the intramurals within the University of the
East Faculty Association (UEFA). Herein
Complainant is the President of the UEFA
whereas Respondents wife was the former
President of UEFA. Nevertheless, we shall
treat this matter of charges and countercharges filed, which involved the UEFA, as
extraneous, peripheral, if not outright
irrelevant to the issue at hand.
xxx
Clearly, [r]espondents primordial
reason for the offensive remark stated in his
pleadings was his emotional reaction in view
of the fact that herein Complainant was in a
legal dispute with his wife. This excuse
cannot be sustained. Indeed, the remarks
quoted above are offensive and inappropriate.
That the Respondent is representing his wife
is not at all an excuse.[27] (Underscoring
supplied)
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be reprimanded.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), by Resolution[28] of October 7, 2004, adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
The Report of the IBP faulting respondent is welltaken but not its recommendation to reprimand him.
It is well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that for
reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course of
judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions
and motions, are absolutely privileged so long as they
are pertinent and relevant to the subject inquiry, however false
or malicious they may be.[29]
10
point out that Atty. Torres erred in advancing such an
argument, but personally attacked Atty. Torres mental fitness
by stating that the undersigned thinks that even a dim-witted
first-year law student would not oblige with such a very serious
charge, and [r]espondent Torres is a member of the bar [b]ut
what law books is he reading.
FIRST DIVISION
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672
Complainant,
P
resent:
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.Respondent, in his defense, denied
knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of
the said calling card.[7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation,report and recommendation.[8]Based on
testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report
and recommendation,[9]found that respondent had encroached
on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule
8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule
against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid
agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 [12] of the
Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that
11
respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any
repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of
respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by
respondent into complainants professional practice in violation
of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by
respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves
constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must
adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyers services
are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN
HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY
TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND
OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION
OR
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of
law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not
advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. [13] To
allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize
the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics
estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high
character of service to which every member of the bar is
called.[14]
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR
PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT
DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT
LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment.[16]
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03
of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR
ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST,
ENCOURAGE
ANY
SUIT
OR
PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS
CAUSE.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of
almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or
through an agent in order to gain employment) [17] as a measure
to protect the community from barratry and champerty.[18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of
the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by
Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that
respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited
from referrals suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano
in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory
hearing.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice
was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labianos word that
respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited
employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of
the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR,
settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another
lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise
of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.
[20]
Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having
these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from
12
prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that
respondent was personally and directly responsible for the
printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for
violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately
from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines,
and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all
courts.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
1. On
November
22,
2000
Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiffs counsel in Civil
Case 7040, filed a reply with opposition to
motion to dismiss that contained abusive,
offensive, and improper language which
insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a
falsified document in court.
5. The
Court
had
warned
Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case
against repeating his unethical act; yet he
faces a disbarment charge for sexual
harassment of an office secretary of the IBP
Chapter inCamarines Norte; a related
criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and
criminal cases for libel and grave threats that
Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October
2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to
falsify the daily time record of his son who
worked with the Commission on Settlement
of
Land
Problems,
Department
of
Justice. When
Atty. Barandon declined,
Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him with
inflammatory language.
13
the case to the IBP for resolution of Atty. Ferrers motion for
reconsideration.[8] On May 22, 2008 the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation[9] of the Investigating Commissioner that
denied Atty. Ferrers motion for reconsideration.[10]
14
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of
the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the
legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves
honorably and fairly.[20] Atty. Ferrers display of improper
attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the
performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the
court, before the public and the court, was a patent
transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to
uphold.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
15
to
Investigating
16
misunderstanding and misappreciation of facts. Thus, she is no
longer interested in pursuing the case. This motion was not
acted upon by the IBP.
17
At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the
letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office listed Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as
senior partners. She admitted that the first two are not lawyers
but paralegals. They are listed in the letterhead of her law
office as senior partners because they have investments in her
law office.[20] That is a blatant misrepresentation.
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must
possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the
legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater
importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of
18
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He
explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a
lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily EstiponaHao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the same
date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty.
Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as
the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said
party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001
that he was entering his appearance as counsel for
Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the
REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as
counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC
praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the
lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of
law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, [1] the Court
elucidated that:
19
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law
when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and
filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence
clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he
was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional
right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes
possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer
of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The
practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably
strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of
Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law
even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of
court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a fullfledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent
should know that two essential requisites for becoming a
lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.[9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends
that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a
private client in any court or administrative body since
respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11
May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and
presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated
that he was resigning effective upon your acceptance.[10] ViceMayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11
May 2001.[11] Thus, the evidence does not support the charge
that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On
the
charge
of
grave
misconduct
and
misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before
the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to
practice law.
20
reinstatements, minus what they have earned elsewhere in the
meantime" and that the eight seasonal workers "be readmitted
to their positions as seasonal workers of respondent company
(Biscom), with back wages as seasonal workers from the time
they were not rehired at the start of the 1955-1956 milling
season on October 1, 1955 up to the time they are actually
reinstated, less the amount earned elsewhere during the
period of their lay-off."
Respondents Biscom, Jalandoni and Guillen appealed
direct to this Court. 3 On March 28, 1963, this Court dismissed
the appeal, without costs. Ground: Petitioners therein did not
seek reconsideration of CIR's decision of November 13, 1962.
The judgment became final.
Upon the ten complainants' motion to name an official
computer to determine the actual money due them, CIR, on
June 4, 1963, directed the Chief Examiner of its Examining
Division to go to the premises of Biscom and compute the back
wages due the ten complainants.
On August 9, 1963, the Chief Examiner reported that the
total net back wages due the ten complainants were
P79,755.22. Biscom and the complainants moved for
reconsideration: Biscom on August 17, 1963; complainants on
September 24, 1963.
In the interim, Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez (a
respondent herein) filed on July 15, 1963 in the same case
CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu a "Notice of Attorney's Lien."
He alleged therein that he had been the attorney of record for
the laborers in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu "since the
inception of the preliminary hearings of said case up to the
Supreme Court on appeal, as chief counsel thereof"; that he
"had actually rendered legal services to the laborers who are
subject of this present litigation [CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu]
since the year 1956, more or less"; that the laborers "have
voluntarily agreed to give [him], representing his attorney's fees
on contingent basis such amounts equivalent to 25% thereof
which agreement is evidenced by a Note"; and that the 25%
attorney's fee so contracted is "reasonable and proper taking
into consideration the length of services he rendered and the
nature of the work actually performed by him."
On September 25, 1963, Atty. Fernandez filed an
"Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien," which in part reads:
3. That the laborers, subject of this present litigation,
sometime on February 3, 1956, had initially voluntarily
agreed to give Undersigned Counsel herein,
representing his Attorney's fees on contingent basis,
such amounts as equivalent to Thirty Per Cent (30%)
of whatever money claims that may be adjudicated by
this Honorable Court, copy of said Agreement, in the
local Visayan dialect and a translation of the same in
the English language are hereto attached as annexes
"A" "A-1" hereof;
4. That subsequently thereafter, when the aboveentitled Case was already decided in their favor,
Arsenio Reyes, in behalf of his co-laborers who are
also Complainants in this Case begged from the
Undersigned Counsel herein that he reduce his
attorney's fees to Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) only for
the reason that they have to share and satisfy also
xxx
xxx
21
Petitioners herein, Atty. Carbonell, Amalgamated
Laborers' Association, and the ten employees, appealed from
the June 25, 1964 resolution of CIR, direct to this Court.
1. Petitioners press upon this Court the view that CIR is
bereft of authority to adjudicate contractual disputes over
attorneys' fees. Their reasons: (1) a dispute arising from
contracts for attorneys' fees is not a labor dispute and is not
one among the cases ruled to be within CIR's authority; and (2)
to consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a case over
which CIR may validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard the
special and limited nature of said court's jurisdiction.
These arguments are devoid of merit.
The present controversy over attorneys' fees is but an
epilogue or a tail-end feature of the main case, CIR No. 70ULP-Cebu, which undoubtedly is within CIR's jurisdiction. And,
it has been held that "once the Court of Industrial Relations has
acquired jurisdiction over a case under the law of its creation, it
retains that jurisdiction until the case is completely
decided, including all the incidents related
thereto." 5 Expressive of the rule on this point is this
4. It is well settled that:
A grant of jurisdiction implies the
necessary and usual incidental powers
essential to effectuate it, and every regularly
constituted court has power to do all things
reasonably necessary for the administration
of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction,
and for the enforcement of its judgments and
mandates, even though the court may thus
be called upon to decide matters which
would not be within its cognizance as
original causes of action.
While a court may be expressly
granted the incidental powers necessary to
effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of
jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive
legislation, implies the necessary and usual
incidental powers essential to effectuate it (In
re Stinger's Estate, 201 P. 693), and, subject
to existing laws and constitutional provisions,
every regularly constituted court has power
to do all things that are reasonably
necessary for the administration of justice
within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the
enforcement of its judgments and
mandates. So demands, matters, or
questions ancillary or incidental to, or
growing out of, the main action, and coming
within the above principles, may be taken
cognizance of by the court and determined,
since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority
over the principal matter, even though the
Court may thus be, called on to consider and
decide matters, which as original causes of
action, would not be within its
cognizance (Bartholomew vs. Shipe, 251
S.W. 1031), (21 C.J.S. pp. 136-138.)
22
noted, too, that petitioner Atty. Carbonell did not file any notice
of Attorney's Lien.
3. We strike down the alleged oral agreement that the
union president should share in the attorneys' fees. Canon 34
of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms clear and
explicit. It says: "No division of fees for legal services is proper,
except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or
responsibility." The union president is not the attorney for the
laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president.
An agreement whereby a union president is allowed to share in
attorneys' fees is immoral. Such a contract we emphatically
reject. It cannot be justified.
4. A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of
recovery an attorney is to receive in a suit "should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including
the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should
always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness." 11
Lately, we said: 12
The principle that courts should reduce
stipulated attorney's fees whenever it is found under
the circumstances of the case that the same is
unreasonable, is now deeply rooted in this
jurisdiction....
xxx
xxx
xxx
23
the twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees awarded herein.
As to how much, this is a function pertaining to CIR.
6. We note that CIR's cashier was authorized on June
25, 1964 to disburse to Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez the sum
of P19,938.81 which is 25% of the amount recovered. In the
event payment actually was made, he should be required to
return whatever is in excess of the amount to which he is
entitled in line with the opinion expressed herein. 15
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the award of twenty five
per cent (25%) attorneys' fees solely to respondent Atty.
Fernandez contained in CIR's order of March 19, 1964 and
affirmed by said court's en banc resolutions of April 28, 1964
and June 25, 1964, is hereby set aside; and the case is hereby
remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations with instructions
to conduct a hearing on, and determine, the respective shares
of Attorney Leonardo C. Fernandez and Attorney Jose Ur.
Carbonell in the amount of P19,938.81 herein awarded as
attorneys' fees or both. No costs. So ordered.
A.C. No. 9881
June 4, 2014
(Formerly CBD 10-2607)
ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
For resolution by this Court is the dismissal by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors of the
administrative Complaint for DISHONESTY against
respondent, Atty. Manuel Molina. Atty. Molina allegedly advised
his clients to enforce a contract on the complainant's client who
had never been a party to the agreement.
The facts are as follows:
The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a four-unit
compound named "Times Square" at Times Street, Quezon
City. The neighbors are the following: 1) Mr. And Mrs. Gregorio
M. Abreu, clients of Atty. Paguia; 2) Mr. And Mrs. Wilson Lim,
clients of respondent Molina; 3) Dr. and Mrs. Eduardo Yap; and
Dr. Belinda San Juan.
The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract with the other
unit owners save for Mr. Abreu. The agreement, covered by a
document titled "Times Square Preamble," establishes a set of
internal rules for the neighbors on matters such as the use of
the common right of way to the exit gate, assignment of
parking areas, and security. Mr. Abreu, the client of
complainant, Atty. Paguia, was not a party to the contract since
the former did not agree with the terms concerning the parking
arrangements.
On 4 February 2010, Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for
Dishonesty1 with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline against
Atty. Molina2 for allegedly giving legal advice to the latters
clients to the effect that the Times Square Preamble was
binding on Mr. Abreu, who was never a party to the contract.
24
Boards resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.
(Underscoring supplied)
In this case, Atty. Paguia received notice of the Boards
resolution on 21 March 2013, as evidenced by a registry return
receipt. To this date, this Court has yet to receive a petition for
review from Atty. Paguia. Thus, for his failure to file a petition
for review with the Court within 15 days, this case is deemed
terminated pursuant to the above mentioned Section 12(c).
Nevertheless, we have gone over the records but we have no
reason to deviate from the findings of the IBP Board of
Governors.
When it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two
things are to be considered: quantum of proof, which requires
clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is
on the complainant.12
In the present case, we find that the Complaint is without
factual basis. Complainant Atty. Paguia charges Atty. Molina
with providing legal advice to the latters clients to the effect
that the Times Square Preamble is binding on complainants
client, Mr. Abreu, who was not a signatory to the agreement.
The allegation of giving legal advice, however, was not
substantiated in this case, either in the complaint or in the
corresponding hearings. Nowhere do the records state that
Atty. Paguia saw respondent giving the legal advice to the
clients of the latter. Bare allegations are not proof.13
Even if we assume that Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal
advice, he still cannot be held administratively liable without
any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or malice.
The rule on mistakes committed by lawyers in the exercise of
their profession is as follows:
An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an
honest mistake or error, an attorney is not liable. Chief Justice
Abbott said that, no attorney is bound to know all the law; God
forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney or a counsel,
or even a judge, is bound to know all the law. x x x.14
The default rule is presumption of good faith. On the other
hand, bad faith is never presumed.1wphi1 It is a conclusion to
be drawn from facts. Its determination is thus a question of fact
and is evidentiary.15 There is no evidence, though, to show that
the legal advice, assuming it was indeed given, was coupled
with bad faith, malice, or ill-will. The presumption of good faith,
therefore, stands in this case.
The foregoing considered, complainant failed to prove his case
by clear preponderance of evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
adopting and approving the Decision of the Investigating
Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10628, July 01, 2015
25
IBP Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30, 2013, the
IBP Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case
against Orlando, finding that a transgression of the MCLE
compliance requirement is not a ground for disbarment as in
fact, failure to disclose the required information would merely
cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the
pleadings from the records. Neither did the IBP Commissioner
find any violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to warrant
any administrative liability on the part of Orlando, considering
that the communication between Orlando and Marcelo, who
are brothers, was done privately and not directly addressed to
Maximino nor intended to be published and known by third
persons.
In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's
Report and Recommendation and dismissed the case against
Orlando, warning him to be more circumspect in his dealings.
Maximino moved for reconsideration17 which was however
denied in a Resolution18 dated May 3, 2014 with modification
deleting the warning.
Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review
on certioranri.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP
correctly dismissed the complaint against Orlando.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
26
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by
Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both
employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against
Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T.
larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of Ethics and
Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross
Dishonesty, and Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an
Order dated 14 October 2004 from the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit
to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public
document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by
Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the
Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31
August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by
one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office
based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon
each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed
against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty.
Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had
yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him
the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature
appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not
his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to
attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed
an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on the
Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and
submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty.
Bancolo's affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay
and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of
falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the
Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the
falsification of the counsel's signature posed a prejudicial
question to the Complaint's validity. Also, the Office of the
Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification of
Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against
Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1
August 2005 denying that he falsified the signature of his
former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as
evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A.
Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder
Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia's case and that the
Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed
by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo's instructions.
Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss
the cases for falsification of public document and dishonesty
filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the
original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against
Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of
27
manifested that they were submitting their disbarment
complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP.
Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties
were directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27
October 2006, the IBP received complainants' position paper
dated 18 October 2006 and respondents' position paper dated
23 October 2006.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating
Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP,
submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty.
Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended
for two years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be
admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in
their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating
Commissioner opined:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo
admitted that his signature appearing in the complaint filed
against complainants' Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia
with the Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not
refute the findings that his signatures appearing in the various
documents released from his office were found not to be his.
Such pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his
obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows
a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the
aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent was busy
cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally.
After all respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not
just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled that this
practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the act a
sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents
ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent
lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines'
Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays
lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the
law firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to
exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge
of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the
principle of "command responsibility". x x x.
xxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned
practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law
up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law
firm designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office.
It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to
find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all
lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As a partner, it is his responsibility to provide
efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that
carry the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could
have known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty.
28
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v.
Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist
in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public
interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of
law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject
to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a
lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons
and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his
professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to
make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on
his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that
the preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work
involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for
members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolo's authority and
duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may
not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of
Court, counsel's signature serves as a certification that (1) he
has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief there is good ground to support it; and
(3) it is not interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing one's
signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the
responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to
the document.
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007,
Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a victim of
circumstances or of manipulated events because of his
unconditional trust and confidence in his former law partner,
Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take any steps to
rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia
denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain
his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with
Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however,