Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory
relief, and that the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest as described in the rules submitted by the
appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
4) Ratio
Declaratory Relief is the interpretation of several constitutional provisions. Based on Section 1
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person
interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance.
Requisites for Declaratory Relief:
- There is justiciable controversy
- The controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse
- The party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy
- The issue is ripe for judicial determination
* The Caltex Hooded Pump Contest? is a mere gratuitous distribution of property by
chance?. It does not qualify as a lottery due to the lack of consideration. An act to be deemed
as a lottery must constitute a (1) prize, (2) chance, and (3) consideration. The participants are not
required to do anything or purchase anything from Caltex in order to participate in the contest.
The true test for having consideration is whether the participant pays a valuable
consideration for the chance, and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something
of value in return for the distribution of the prize.?
by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a
strike.
The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July
1982 order issued by the court a quo. It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of
said court, or whoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking
any further action on the civil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of dismissing
it. It also made permanent the restraining order issued on 5 August 1982.
Paat v. CA
GR 111107, 10 January 1997 (266 SCRA 167)
Second Division, Torres Jr. (p): 4 concurring
Facts: On 19 May 1989, Victoria de Guzmans truck was seized by Department of Environment
and Natural Resources personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya while on its ways to Bulacan from
San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan because the driver could not produce the required documents for the
forest products found concealed in the truck. On 23 May 1989, Aritao CENROs Jovito Layugan
issued an order of confiscation of the truck. Its owner, De Guzman, failed to submit the required
explanation within the reglementary period set by Layugan. On 22 June 1989, DENR Regional
Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained the Alitao CENROs action of confiscation and
ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree 705, as amended
by Executive Order 277. De Guzman filed for reconsideration but was denied.
The case was appealed to the Secretary of DENR. Pending resolution, however, a suit for
replevin (Civil Case 4031), was filed by De Guzman and company against Layugan and
Baggayan with the RTC Cagayan (Branch 2), contending that the only the court is authorized to
confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in the transporting illegal forest products, pursuant to the
second paragraph of Section 68. De Guzman further contended that the seizure is illegal, as she
did not use the truck in the commission of the crime (of qualified theft under Article 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code, punishable under Section 68), as allegedly admitted by the Regional
Executive Director, releasing her from criminal liability. The trial court thereafter issued a writ
ordering the return of the truck to De Guzman. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court sustained the trial courts order ruling that the question
involved is purely a legal one. Hence, the petition.
Issues:
Held: The construction that conveyances are subject of confiscation by the courts exclusively
(pursuant to Section 28, paragraph 2) unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably
reduces the other provision of Section 68-A, aside to the fact that conveyances are not mentioned
nor included in the former provision. In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way
as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light
of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given
such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended. In the case at bar, the phrase to dispose of the same is broad enough to cover the act
of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be
made in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Further, when the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court
ratiocination or rationalization of the law. The language of the amendatory executive order, when
it eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and inserted the words shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, meant that the act of
cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority
constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the 16 October decision and 14
July 1992 resolution of the CA, made permanent the restraining order promulgated on 27
September 1993, and directed the DENR secretary to resolve the controversy with utmost
dispatch.
People v. Mapa
GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur
Facts: Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in an
information dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Code
in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 and
as further amended by RA 4. Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of being a
secret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the lower court
rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for
one year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated to
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor is
exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm
Held: The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts
of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used
in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms are
in possession of such public officials and public servants for use in the performance of their
official duties; as those firearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of
the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails.
It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretation
come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without
them. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made for a secret agent.
Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer speaks
with authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in People
v. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment
of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and
detection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a peace officer equivalent even
to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879, Thus, in the present case,
therefore, the conviction must stand.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.
Held: The Court, through its majority, defended itself by holding that the Court does not
legislate but merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then
secured by Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and later
by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the
1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201,
2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950. Further, it reiterated its ruling in People vs.
Licera: that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute
itself, pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which decrees that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdictions
legal system. It argues that the application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is
part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Courts application or
interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law
purports to carry into effect. Yet, the Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant to Article
9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that No judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. Thus, even the
legislator himself recognizes that in certain instances, the court do and must legislate to fill in
the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and
therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply.
the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently
proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven
existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or
medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential
marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband
and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7)
interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and
(8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision;
concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
pension for widow and children, and hospitalization and medical benefits. Upholding the Board that the
pension awards are made effective only upon approval of the application, this would be dependent
upon the discretion of the Board which had been abused in this case through inaction extending for 12
years. Such stand, therefore does not appear to be, or simply is not, in consonance with the spirit and
intent of the law. Gasilaos claim was sustained.
The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court a quo, ordering the Board of Administrators of
the Philippine Veterans Administration (now the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) to make Gasilaos
pension effective 18 December 1955 at the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 per month for each
of his then unmarried minor children below 18, and the former amount increased to P100.00 from 22
June 1957 to 7 August 1968; and declaring the differentials in pension to which said Gasilao, his wife
and his unmarried minor children below 18 are entitled for the period from 22 June 1969 to 14
January 1972 by virtue of Republic Act 5753 subject to the availability of Government funds
appropriated for the purpose.
Salvatierra v. CA
GR 107797, 26 August 1996 (261 SCRA 45)
First Division, Hermosisima (p): 3 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: In 1930, Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and without any issue. He was survived by his
legitimate brothers: Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio and Macario, and sister Marcela, all surnamed
Salvatierra. His estate consisted of three parcels of land (Cadastral Lot 25, covered by Tax Declaration
11950, Cadastral Lot 26, covered by Tax Declaration 11951, and Cadastral Lot 27, covered by Tax
Declaration 11949). On 4 May 1966, Macario Salvatierra sold Lot 26 to his son, Anselmo Salvatierra by
means of a deed of sale, and in consideration of P1,000.00. Meanwhile, Marcela sold her share to
Venancio. Bartolomes share was sold by his heirs to Tomas. On 24 September 1968, an Extrajudicial
Partition with Confirmation of Sale was executed by and among the surviving legal heirs and
descendants of Enrique Salvatierra. After the partition, Venancio owned 1041 square meters consisting
of Lot 27 and portion of Lot 26 (which is approximately 749 square meters), Anselmo owned 405
square meters of Lot 26, while the heirs of Tomas owned 1,116 square meters, the whole of Lot 25.
Thereafter on 15 June 1970, Venancio sold the whole of Lot 27 and a 149 square meter portion of Lot
26 to spouses Lino Longalong and Paciencia Mariano. It was discovered in 1982 through a relocation
survey that the 149 square meter portion of Lot 26 was outside Longalongs fence as Anselmo
Salvatierra was able to obtain a title in his name (Original Certificate of Title 0-4221) covering the
whole of Lot 26). Efforts to settle the matter at the barangay level proved futile because Purita
Salvatierra (widow of Anselmo) refused to yield to the demand of Lino Longalong to return to the
latter the 149 square meter portion of Lot 26.
Longalong filed a case with the Regional Trial Court for the reconveyance of the said portion of Lot 26.
The court a quo dismissed the case on the grounds that Longalong failed to establish ownership of the
portion of the land in question, and that the prescriptive period of four years from discovery of the
alleged fraud committed by defendants predecessor Anselmo Salvatierra within which plaintiffs should
have filed their action had already elapsed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision,
ruling that a vendor can sell only what he owns or what he is authorized to sell; and as to the coowner of a piece of land, he can of course sell his pro indiviso share therein to, but he cannot sell
more than his share therein. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether Longalong is entitled to reconveyance of the 149 square meters in Lot 26
Held: When the terms of the agreement are clear and unequivocal, the literal and plain meaning
thereof should be observed, pursuant to Article 1370 of the Civil Code (If the terms of a contract are
clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulation shall control.) Contracts which are the private laws of the contracting parties, should be
fulfilled according to the literal sense of their stipulations, if their terms are clear and leave no room
for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, for contracts are obligatory, no matter what
their forms maybe, whenever the essential requisites for their validity are present. In the present
case, there is no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the extrajudicial partition (Extrajudicial
Partition with Confirmation of Sale). Since Macarios share (later Anselmos) is only 405 of the 749
square meters comprising Lot 26, Venancio was entitled to the remaining 344 square meters of Lot
26, 149 square meters of which was sold to Longalong. Supplemented by the holding that the
prescriptive period on reconveyance is ten years and not four years, as held in Caro v. CA, Longalong
is entitled to reconveyance as his complaint was filed five years after the constitution of Anselmos
fraudulent Original Certificate of title.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for want of merit, with costs against petitioners.
to law, in serving the interest of his client. He is not to fall prey to the vice of literalness. The law as an
instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought to be
fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant
being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right.
The Department of Labor had the right to construe the word grant as used in its rules implementing
PD 1123, and its explanation regarding the exemptions to PD 1123 should be given weight; but, when
it is based on misrepresentations as to the existence of an agreement between the parties, the same
cannot be applied. There is no distinction between interpretation and explaining the extent and scope
of the law; because where one explains the intent and scope of a statute, he is interpreting it. Thus,
the construction or explanation of Labor Undersecretary is not only wrong as it was purely based on a
misapprehension of facts, but also unlawful because it goes beyond the scope of the law.
The writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the commission, and
ordered the company to pay, in addition to the increased allowance provided for in PD 1123, the
negotiated wage increase of P0.80 daily effective 1 April 1977 as well as all other wage increases
embodied in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, to all covered employees; with costs against the
company.
established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or
not. Even if contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is
to enforce it is given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same
must be declared as null and void. So long, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the
provisions of the law, they are valid. Where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or
repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed. A
rule is binding on the Courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its
scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in
agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. Further, administrative interpretation of
the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy Minister of Labor, and
reinstated the 25 August 1975 decision of the Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Labor Ministers 7 September 1976 order, and
reinstated with modification (deleting the interest payments) the 24 March 1976 decision of the NLRC
affirming the 30 October 1975 resolution of the Labor Arbiter.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed resolution, with costs against appellant.
8. The use of word alone after President in third sentence is a lapse in draftsmanship,
a literal import deemed redundant
After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the Court found the
use of the word alone after the word President in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is,
more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. In the 1987 Constitution, the clear and
expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first
sentence. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence the word alone after the
word President in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers
in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint
officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in him, without
need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence. The word alone
in the third sentence, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935
Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence. This redundancy cannot
prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential
appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence, are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
9. President authorized Commissioner of Bureau of Customs; Commissioner not included
with the first group of appointment
The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the
first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The
1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of heads of bureaus from appointments that
need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the President is
expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tarifff
and Customs Code of the Philippines, Section 601, as amended by PD34 on 27 October 1972).
10. Laws approved during the effectivity of previous constitution must be read in harmony
with the new one
RA 1937 and PD 34 were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the
President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads
of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the
result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves
on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, no
longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Perfecto v. Meer
GR L-2348, 27 February 1950 (85 Phil 552)
First Division, Bengzon (p): 8 concur.
Facts: The 1935 Constitution provides in its Article VIII, Section 9, that the members of the Supreme
Court and all judges of inferior courts shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. It also provides that until Congress shall
provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of
sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos. When Justice Perfecto
assumed office, Congress had not provided otherwise, by fixing a different salary for associate
justices. He received salary at the rate provided by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a
year.
The Collector of Internal Revenue required Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary
as member of the judiciary. The latter paid the amount under protest. He contended that the
assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon
would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether the imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the Judiciary amount
to a diminution thereof., and thus violate the Constitution.
Held: The imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the judiciary amounts to a
diminution thereof. If said imposition would not be considered as a diminution, it would appear that,
in the matter of compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is on a par with the
Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of affairs. Further, the Constitution
provides that judges shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for
their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Thus,
next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a
fixed provision for their support. In the general course of human nature, a power over a mans
subsistence amounts to a power over his will. The independence of the judges as of far greater
importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.
Exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a gratuity or privilege. It is
essentially and primarily compensation based upon valuable consideration. The covenant on the part
of the government is a guaranty whose fulfillment is as much as part of the consideration agreed as is
the money salary. The undertaking has its own particular value to the citizens in securing the
independence of the judiciary in crises; and in the establishment of the compensation upon a
permanent foundation whereby judicial preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are
qualified by talent, knowledge, integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a private fortune
as to make an assured salary an object of personal concern. On the other hand, the members of the
judiciary relinquish their position at the bar, with all its professional emoluments, sever their
connection with their clients, and dedicate themselves exclusively to the discharge of the onerous
duties of their high office. So, it is irrefutable that the guaranty against a reduction of salary by the
imposition of a tax is not an exemption from taxation in the sense of freedom from a burden or service
to which others are liable. The exemption for a public purpose or a valid consideration is merely a
nominal exemption, since the valid and full consideration or the public purpose promoted is received in
the place of the tax.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.
Endencia v. David
GR L-6355-56, 31 August 1953 (93 Phil 696)
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 6 concur
Facts: Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue collected income taxes from Justices
Endencia and Jugo, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court respectively. The lower court held that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs.
Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice
Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of
the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes. Respondent, through the Solicitor General
contended that the collection was done pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 590 which Congress
enacted to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, if not
to counteract the ruling on the Perfecto Case.
Issue: Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a
public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has
found and decided otherwise.
Held: The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public
official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and
decided otherwise. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate
a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting
said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a
previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. In the case at bar,
Section 13 of Republic Act 590 interpreted or ascertained the meaning of the phrase which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office, found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution,
referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof
by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary. The Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make
and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the
basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. Allowing the
legislature to interpret the law would bring confusion and instability in judicial processes and court
decisions.
Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is
assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution
or carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong
exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to
the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to
interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the
Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then
the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Therefore, the
doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer to the effect that the collection of income tax on
the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution, is reiterated.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, affirming the ruling in Perferto v. Meer and holding the
interpretation and application of laws belong to the Judiciary.
Aglipay v. Ruiz
GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.
Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons.
Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he
considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce
the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney, the
Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for
printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained
unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.
Held: Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion
and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power
that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the
purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino
people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored the aid of Divine Providence, in order to
establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy, they thereby manifested their intense
religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and
nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.
Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
advantageous to the Government. Of course, the phrase advantageous to the Government does
not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public money or
property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the case at bar, the issuance
of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or
religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of the
issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an event considered of international importance to
give publicity to the Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead
of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a map of the Philippines, the location of the City of
Manila, and an inscription that reads Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.
the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine,
Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case,
Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then
become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting
of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony,
when a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall
be chosen over the former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization
and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the
Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per
shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
Tanada v. Tuvera
GR L-63915, 24 April 1985 (136 SCRA 27)
En Banc, Escolin (p): 1 concur, 2 concur with reservation, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts: Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6, Article IV of
the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. They maintain that since the
subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public
duty, they are proper parties for the petition. The respondents alleged, however through the SolicitorGeneral, that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. They
further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectiveness of laws where the laws provide for their own effectivity dates. Thus publication is not
indispensable.
Issue: Whether publication is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of laws
Held: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does
not provide for its effectivity date for then the date of publication is material for determining its
date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it equates the effectivity of
laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 however, considered in the light of other statutes applicable
to the issue does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignorantia legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one. Further, publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make the
said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. In the present case, Presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. The
implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is
an operative fact, which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and that unless so published, they shall have
no binding force and effect.
Primicias v. Urdaneta
GR L-26702, 18 October 1979 (93 SCRA 462)
First Division, de Castro (p): 8 concurring, 1 on leave, 1 did not take part.
Facts: On 13 March 1964, Ordinance 3 (Series of 1964) was enacted by the Municipal Council of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Ordinance is patterned after and based on Section 53, 5 paragraph 4 of Act
3992, as amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law). On 20 June 1964, RA 4136 (Land Transportation and
Traffic Code) became effective. Section 63 explicitly repealed Act 3992.
On 8 February 1965, Juan Augusto B. Primicias was driving his car within Urdaneta when a member of
Urdanetas Municipal Police asked him to stop. He was told, upon stopping, that he had violated
Municipal Ordinance 3 (S. 1964), for overtaking a truck. The policeman then asked for plaintiffs
license which he surrendered, and a temporary operators permit was issued to him. This incident took
place about 200 meters away from a school building, at Barrio Nancamaliran, Urdaneta. Thereafter, a
criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta against Primicias for violation of
Ordinance 3 (S. 1964).
Due to the institution of the criminal case, Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of said
ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction for the purpose of restraining
defendants Municipality of Urdaneta, Mayor Perez, Police Chief Suyat, Judge Soriano and Patrolman
Andrada from enforcing the ordinance. The writ was issued and Judge Soriano was enjoined from
further proceeding in the criminal case. On 29 June 1966, the Court of First Instance Lingayen held in
its decision that the ordinance was null and void and had been repealed by RA 4136. The writ of
preliminary injunction against Judge Soriano definite and permanent. It also restrained Perez, Suyat,
and Andrada from enforcing said ordinace throughout Urdaneta, ordering them to return the plaintiffs
drivers license, and to pay the cost of the suit. The public officials appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the ordinance is valid.
Held: The general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. The ordinances validity should
be determined vis-a-vis RA 4136, the mother statute (not Act 3992), which was in force at the time
the criminal case was brought against Primicias. Further, when the Municipal Council of Urdaneta used
the phrase vehicular traffic (Section 1, Ordinance) it did not distinguish between passenger cars and
motor vehicles and motor trucks and buses. Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its
clearness, definiteness and certainty are all the more important so that an average man should be
able with due care, after reading it, to understand and ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for
particular acts or courses of conduct. Thus, as the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any
classification of its thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38, RA
4136. The Ordinance refers to only one of the four classifications mentioned in paragraph (b), Section
35. The classifications which must be based on Section 35 are necessary in view of Section 36 which
states that no provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance or resolution
specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those provided in this Act. The ordinance, therefore
in view of the foregoing, is void.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision.
CIR v. CA
GR 115349, 18 April 1997 (271 SCRA 605)
Third Division, Panganiban (p): 4 concurring
Facts: Private respondent, the Ateneo de Manila University, is a non-stock, non-profit educational
institution with auxiliary units and branches all over the Philippines. One auxiliary unit is the Institute
of Philippine Culture (IPC), which has no legal personality separate and distinct from that of private
respondent. The IPC is a Philippine unit engaged in social science studies of Philippine society and
culture. Occasionally, it accepts sponsorships for its research activities from international
organizations, private foundations and government agencies. On 8 July 1983, private respondent
received from Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) a demand letter dated 3 June 1983, assessing
private respondent the sum of P174,043.97 for alleged deficiency contractors tax, and an assessment
dated 27 June 1983 in the sum of P1,141,837 for alleged deficiency income tax, both for the fiscal
year ended 31 March 1978. Denying said tax liabilities, private respondent sent petitioner a letterprotest and subsequently filed with the latter a memorandum contesting the validity of the
assessments. On 17 March 988, petitioner rendered a letter-decision canceling the assessment for
deficiency income tax but modifying the assessment for deficiency contractors tax by increasing the
amount due to P193,475.55. Unsatisfied, private respondent requested for a reconsideration or
reinvestigation of the modified assessment.
At the same time, it filed in the respondent court a petition for review of the said letter-decision of the
petitioner. While the petition was pending before the respondent court, petitioner issued a final
decision dated 3 August 1988 reducing the assessment for deficiency contractors tax from
P193,475.55 to P46,516.41, exclusive of surcharge and interest. On 12 July 1993, the respondent
court set aside respondents decision, and canceling the deficiency contractors tax assessment in the
amount of P46,516.41 exclusive of surcharge and interest for the fiscal year ended 31 March 1978. No
pronouncement as to cost. On 27 April 1994, Court of Appeals, in CA-GR SP 31790, affirmed the
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Not in accord with said decision, petitioner came to Supreme
Court via a petition for review.
Issues:
construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to tax laws and the provisions of a taxing act are
not to be extended by implication. In case of doubt, such statutes are to be construed most strongly
against the government and in favor of the subjects or citizens because burdens are not to be imposed
nor presumed to be imposed beyond what statutes expressly and clearly import. In the present case,
Ateneos Institute of Philippine Culture never sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged
in a business apart from and independently of the academic purposes of the university. Funds received
by the Ateneo de Manila University are technically not a fee. They may however fall as gifts or
donations which are tax-exempt as shown by private respondents compliance with the requirement
of Section 123 of the National Internal Revenue Code providing for the exemption of such gifts to an
educational institution.
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals. The
Court ruled that the private respondent is not a contractor selling its services for a fee but an
academic institution conducting these researches pursuant to its commitments to education and,
ultimately, to public service. For the institute to have tenaciously continued operating for so long
despite its accumulation of significant losses, we can only agree with both the Court of Tax Appeals
and the Court of Appeals that education and not profit is motive for undertaking the research
projects.
(LGC) expressly provides that All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees [sic], executive
orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part of parts thereof which are inconsistent
with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. With that
repealing clause in the LGC, the tax exemption provided for in RA 6958 had been expressly repealed
by the provisions of the LGC. Therefore, MCIAA has to pay the assessed realty tax of its properties
effective after January 1, 1992 until the present.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the challenged decision and order of the RTC
Cebu; without pronouncement as to costs.
Serfino v. CA
GR L-40858, 15 September 1987
Second Division, Paras (p): 4 concurring.
Facts: On 25 August 1937, a parcel of land was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor (OCT
1839). On 14 December 1945, he sold said land in favor of Nemesia D. Balatazar (TCT No. 57-N, 18
January 1946). OCT 1839 was lost during the war and upon petition of Nemesia Baltazar, the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental ordered the reconstitution thereof. Pursuant thereto, OCT 14-R
(1839) was issued on 18 January 1946 in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. On that same day, TCT 57N was issued in the name of Nemesia Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT 14-R (1839). On 15
August 1951, Nemesia Baltazar, sold said property to Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., and the latter did
not present the documents for registration until 17 December 1964 to the Office of the Registry of
Deeds. Said office refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by
another certificate of title, TCT 38985, in the name of Federico Serfino. On 19 November 1964, the
spouses Serfinos mortgaged the land to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a loan in the
amount of P5,000.00; which was inscribed in TCT No. 38985.
The Lopez Sugar Central instituted an action to recover said land; and the lower court rendered a
decision ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 38985; issuance of a new TCT in the name of plaintiff;
and the payment of the plaintiff PNB the loan of spouses Serfinos secured by said land. Both parties
appealed from this decision of the trial court. Ruling on the assignment of errors, the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification in its decision setting aside the decision of
the trial court declaring plaintiff liable to PNB for payment, however, ordering the plaintiff to reimburse
the Serfino spouses of the sum P1,839.49, representing the unpaid taxes and penalties paid by the
latter when they repurchased the property. Hence, the appeal by the spouses Serfino and PNB to the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the auction sale of the disputed property was null and void.
Held: The assailed decision of the appellate court declares that the prescribed procedure in auction
sales of property for tax delinquency being in derogation of property rights should be followed
punctiliously. Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for the
protection of the tax payers, but also to allay any possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer
and the public officials called upon to enforce such laws. Notice of sale to the delinquent land owners
and to the public in general is an essential and indispensable requirement of law, the non-fulfillment of
which vitiates the sale. In the present case, Lopez Sugar Central was not entirely negligent in its
payment of land taxes. The record shows that taxes were paid for the years 1950 to 1953 and a
receipt therefor was obtained in its name. The sale therefore by the Province of Negros Occidental of
the land in dispute to the spouses Serfinos was void since the Province of Negros Occidental was not
the real owner of the property thus sold. In turn, the spouses Serfinos title which has been derived
from that of the Province of Negros Occidental is likewise void. However, the fact that the public
auction sale of the disputed property was not valid cannot in any way be attributed to the mortgagees
fault. The inability of the Register of Deeds to notify the actual owner or Lopez Sugar Central of the
scheduled public auction sale was partly due to the failure of Lopez Sugar Central to declare the land
in its name for a number of years and to pay the complete taxes thereon. PNB is therefore entitled to
the payment of the mortgage loan as ruled by the trial court and exempted from the payment of
costs.
The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed decision, with modification that PNB mortgage credit must
be paid by Lopez Sugar Central.
Manahan v. ECC
GR L-44899, 22 April 1981 (104 SCRA 198)
First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring.
Facts: Maria E. Manahan, the petitioner, is the widow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of Enteric
Fever while employed as classroom teacher in Las Pias Municipal High School, Las Pias, Rizal, on 8
May, 1975. The deceased was in perfect health when he entered government service on 20 July 1969,
and that in the course of his employment in 1974, he was treated for epigastric pain. He succumbed
to enteric fever on May 8, 1975. Thus, the petitioner filed a claim with the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) for death benefit under Presidential Decree 626. In a letter dated 19 June
1975, the GSIS denied the claim on a finding that the ailment of Nazario Manahan, Jr., typhoid fever,
is not an occupational disease, and that enteric fever or paratyphoid is similar in effect to typhoid
fever, in the sense that both are produced by Salmonella organisms.
The petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the
decision of the GSIS on a finding that the ailment of the deceased, enteric fever, was not induced by
or aggravated by the nature of the duties of Nazario Manahan, Jr. as a teacher. Thus, the appeal.
Issue: Whether the Workmens Compensation should be resolved in favor of the worker
Held: The Transitory and Final Provisions of the New Labor Code provides that all actions and claims
accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be determined in accordance with the laws in force at
the time of their accrual and under the third paragraph of Article 292, Title II (Prescription of Offenses
and Claims), workmens compensation claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code and during
the period from 1 November 1974 up to 31 December 1974 shall be processed and adjudicated in
accordance with the laws and rules at the time their causes of action accrued Hence, this Court
applied the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act, as amended, on passing upon petitioners
claim.. The illness that claimed the life of the deceased may had its onset before 10 December 1974,
thus, his action accrued before 10 December 1974. Still, In any case, and case of doubt, the same
should be resolved in favor of the worker, and that social legislations like the Workmens
Compensation Act and the Labor Code should be liberally construed to attain their laudable
objective, i.e., to give relief to the workman and/or his dependents in the event that the former should
die or sustain an injury. Pursuant to such doctrine and applying now the provisions of the Workmens
Compensation Act in this case, the presumption of compensability subsists in favor of the claimant.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and ordered the GSIS to pay the petitioner the
amount of P6,000.00 as death compensation benefit and P600.00 as attorneys fees, to reimburse the
petitioners expenses incurred for medical services, hospitalization and medicines of the deceased
Nazario Manahan, Jr., duly supported by proper receipts, and to pay administrative fees.
Villavert v. ECC
GR L-48605, 14 December 1981 (110 SCRA 233)
First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring
Facts: Domina N. Villavert, the petitioner, is the mother of the late Marcelino N. Villavert who died of
acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis on 12 December 1975 employed as a Code Verifier in the Philippine
Constabulary. The deceased also performed the duties of a computer operator and clerk typist. On 11
December 1975, the deceased reported as usual to the Constabulary Computer Center in Camp
Crame. He performed his duties not only as Code Verifier but also handled administrative functions,
computer operation and typing jobs due to shortage of civilian personnel. Although he was
complaining of chest pain and headache late in the afternoon of said day, he was required to render
overtime service until late in the day, typing voluminous classified communications, computing
allowances and preparing checks for the salary of PC-INP personnel throughout the country for
distribution on or before 15 December 1975. Gasping for breath, perspiring profusely, and mumbling
incoherent words while asleep, and when he was not able to regain consciousness, he was rushed to
the University of the East-Ramon Magsaysay (UERM) Memorial Hospital where he died at 5:30 am.
The NBI stated that the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is still unknown, although most
research data agree that physical and mental stresses are strong causal factors in the development of
the disease.
On 18 March 1976, she filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under PD 626, as
amended, with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). GSIS denied the claim on the
ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is not an occupational disease and that the petitioner had
failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino N. Villavert
and the nature of his employment. The petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC). On 31 May 1978, the ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS denying the claim.
Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether the petitioner is entitled to her sons death benefits.
Held: The Medico Legal Officer of the NBI stated that the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic
pancreatitis (acute inflammation with hemorrhagic necrosis of the pancreas) is still unknown despite
extensive researches in this field, although most research data are agreed that physical and mental
stresses are strong causal factors in the development of the disease. There is no evidence at all that
Marcelino N. Villavert had a bout of alcoholic intoxication shortly before he died, neither is there a
showing that he used drugs; negating the association provided by Principles of Internal Medicine (by
Harrison 7th Edition, p. 1571). From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino N. Villavert
died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties
he performed as code verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary.
Further, Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall
be resolved in favor of labor.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and ordered the GSIS to pay the petitioner death
benefits in the amount of P6,000.00.
Held: The formal defects in the appeal of the Security Agency were not fatal defects. The lack of
verification could have been easily corrected by requiring an oath. The appeal fee had been paid
although it was delayed. Failure to pay the docketing fees does not automatically result in the
dismissal of the appeal. Dismissal is discretionary with the Appellate Court and discretion must be
exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice. Failure to pay the
appeal docketing fee confers a directory and not a mandatory power to dismiss an appeal and such
power must be exercised with sound discretion and with a great deal of circumspection, considering all
attendant circumstances. Moreover, as provided for by Article 221 of the Labor Code in any
proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in
Courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the
Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process.
Further, Articles 106 of the Labor Code provides that in the event that the contractor or subcontractor
fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and
severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work
performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly
employed by him, and Article 107 provides that the provisions of the immediately preceding Article
shall likewise apply to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an
employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or
project. In the case at bar, petitioner became an indirect employer of respondents-complainants when
petitioner entered into a Contract of Services with the Security Agency and the latter hired the
complainants to work as guards for the former. However, the petitioners liability should be without
prejudice to a claim for reimbursement against the Security Agency for such amounts as petitioner
may have to pay to complainants. The Security Agency may not seek exculpation by claiming that
petitioners payments to it were inadequate. As an employer, it is charged with knowledge of labor
laws and the adequacy of the compensation that it demands for contractual services is its principal
concern and not any others.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment under review, without prejudice to petitioners right to seek
reimbursement from Calmar Security Agency for such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to
complainants. Costs against the private respondent.
on the premises. In the present case, no gasoline was stored in the burned bodegas, and that Bodega
No. 2 which was not burned and where the gasoline was found, stood isolated from the other insured
bodegas.
The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the judgment appealed from, thus affirming it; with
costs against the appellant.
answers, the petitioner introduced documentary evidence that it had the authority to engage in the
insurance business at the time it filed the complaints.
The Supreme Court consolidated and granted the petitions, reversed and set aside the CFI decisions.
In L-34382 (Civil Case 71923), Eastern Shipping Lines and Angel Jose Transportation Inc. are ordered
to pay the Home Insurance Company the sum of P1,630.22 each with interest at the legal rate from 5
January 1968 until fully paid. Each shall also pay one-half of the costs. The Court dismissed the
counterclaim of Angel Jose Transportation Inc. In L-34383, N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen or its agent
Columbian Phil. Inc. was ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P2,426.98 with interest at the legal
rate from 1 February 1968 until fully paid, the sum of P500.00 attorneys fees, and costs. The Court
dismissed the complaint against Guacods, Inc.
Co v. Republic
GR L-12150, 26 May 1960 (108 Phil 775)
First Dvision, Bautista Angelo (p): 6 concurring
Facts: Petitioner was born in Abra and his parents are both Chinese. He owes his allegiance to the
Nationalist Government of China. He is married to Leonor Go, the marriage having been celebrated in
the Catholic church of Bangued. He speaks and writes English as well as the Ilocano and Tagalog
dialects. He graduated from the Abra Valley College, and finished his primary studies in the Colegio
in Bangued, both schools being recognized by the government. He has a child two months old. He has
never been accused of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not opposed to organized
government, nor is he a member of any subversive organization. He does not believe in, nor practice,
polygamy. Since his birth, he has never gone abroad. He mingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a
democratic form of government and stated that if his petition is granted he would serve the
government either in the military or civil department. He is a merchant dealing in the buy and sell of
tobacco. He also is part owner of a store in Bangued. In his tobacco business, he has a working capital
of P10,000.00 which he claims to have been accumulated thru savings. He contributes to civic and
charitable organizations like the Jaycees, Rotary, Red Cross and to town fiestas. He likes the customs
of the Filipinos because he has resided in the Philippines for a long time. During the year 1956, he
claims to have earned P1,000.00 in his tobacco business. With respect to the store of which he claims
to be a part owner, he stated that his father gave him a sum of less than P3,000.00 representing onefourth of the sales. Aside from being a co-owner of said store, he receives a monthly salary of P120,00
as a salesman therein. He took a course in radio mechanics and completed the same in 1955. He has
no vice of any kind. He claims that he has never been delinquent in the payment of taxes. But he
admitted that he did not file his income tax return when he allegedly received an amount of not less
than P3,000 from his father which he claims to have invested in his tobacco business.
Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. After hearing, the court ordered that a
certificate of naturalization be issued to petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date the
decision becomes final and all the requisites provided for in RA 503. The government appealed the
decision of the trial court, raising the facts that did not state what principles of the Constitution he
knew, although when asked what laws of the Philippines he believes in, he answered democracy.;
that he stated that his father had already filed his income tax return, when asked why he did not file
his income tax returns; and that he presented his alien certificate of registration, but not the alien
certificates of registration of his wife and child.
Issue: Whether petitioner failed to comply with the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify
him to become a Filipino citizen.
Held: The scope of the word law in ordinary legal parlance does not necessarily include the
constitution, which is the fundamental law of the land, nor does it cover all the principles underlying
our constitution. Further, Philippine law requires that an alien to conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with
the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living. In the present case, in
so stating that he believes merely in our laws, he did not necessarily refer to those principles
embodied in our constitution which are referred to in the law; the belief in democracy or in a
democratic form of government is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of the law that one
must believe in the principles underlying our constitution. Further, petitioner failed to show that he has
complied with his obligation to register his wife and child with the Bureau of Immigration as required
by the Alien Registration Actl; and further failed to file his income tax return despite his fixed salary of
P1,440.00 a year and his profit of P1,000.00 in his tobacco business, and received an amount less
than P3,000 from his father as one-fourth of the proceeds of the sale of the store, the total of which is
more than what is required by law for one to file an income tax return.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, hold that the trial court erred in granting the
petition for naturalization, without pronouncement as to costs.
Guerrero v. CA
GR L-44570, 30 May 1986 (142 SCRA 136)
Second Division, Gutierrez (p): 4 concurring, 1 taking no part.
Facts: On 8 August 1963, RA 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead the
agricultural leasehold system. In 1969, Apolinario Benitez was taken by Manuel and Maria Guerrero to
take care of their 60 heads of cows which were grazing within their 21-hectare coconut plantation
situated at the Subprovince of Aurora, Quezon. Benitez was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut
within the plantation where he and his family stayed. In addition to attending to the cows, he was
made to clean the already fruitbearing coconut trees, burn dried leaves and grass and to do such other
similar chores. Harvest time which usually comes every 3 months. For his work related to the
coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the proceeds from the copra he processed and sold in the market. For
attending to the cows he was paid P500 a year.
On 10 September 1971, RA 6389 amending RA 3844 declared share tenancy relationships as contrary
to public policy. Sometime in the early part of 1973, Benitez was refrained from gathering nuts from
the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare part of the plantation from where he used to gather nuts. He
felt aggrieved by the acts of defendants and he brought the matter to the attention of the Office of
Special Unit in the Office of the President in Malacaang, Manila. This led to an execution of an
agreement whereby defendants agreed to let plaintiff work on the 16-hectare portion of the plantation
as tenant thereon and that their relationship will be guided by the provisions of RA 1199 (Agricultural
Tenancy Act of the Philippines).
In July 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the plantation
with threats of bodily harm if he persists to gather fruits therefrom. The Guerreros assigned Rogelio
and Paulino Latigay to do the gathering of the nuts and the processing thereof into copra. Defendants
Guerreros also caused to be demolished a part of the cottage where Benitez and his family lived, thus,
making the Benitez feel that they meant business. Hence, the case for reinstatement with damages.
Issue: Whether Benitez is a tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law to warrant reinstatement to
the plantation
Held: Longstanding possession is an essential distinction between a mere agricultural laborer and a
real tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law, a tenant being one who has the temporary use and
occupation of land or tenements belonging to another for the purpose of production. A hired laborer
who built his own house at his expense at the risk of losing the same upon his dismissal or termination
any time, is more consistent with that of an agricultural tenant who enjoys security of tenure under
the law. Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy relationships.
Cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land but also includes the
promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of
the earth by general industry. Agreement to share the produce or harvest on a tercio basis that is, a
1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the landowners bolsters the tenancy claim. The agricultural laborer
works for the employer, and for his labor he receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the
employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the share tenant participates in the agricultural produce.
His share is necessarily dependent on the amount of harvest. Once a tenancy relationship is
established, the tenant has the right to continue working until such relationship is extinguished
according to law. In the present case, besides these indications, the agreement made on 2 May 1973
is clear and categorical term that the Benitez is a tenant. Arguing that the intent was different, being
that of a hired farmhand, the law existing at that time the agreement was made militate against the
claim. Benitez did not commit any of the causes that would warrant his ejectment, and thus, was
unlawfully deprived of his right to security of tenure and the Court of Agrarian Reforms did not err in
ordering the reinstatement of respondent as tenant and granting him damages therefor.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and affirmed the CA decision. No costs.
Bello v. CA
GR L-38161, 29 March 1974 (56 SCRA 509)
En Banc, Teehankee (p): 10 concurring.
Facts: On 25 August 1970, spouses Juan and Filomena Bello were charged for estafa before the City
Court of Pasay for allegedly having misappropriated a ladys ring with a value of P1,000.00 received by
them from Atty. Prudencio de Guzman for sale on commission basis. After trial, they were convicted.
Petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the adverse judgment to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Pasay City, but the prosecution filed a petition to dismiss appeal on the ground that since the case
was within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the CFI and the trial in the city court had
been duly recorded, the appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals as provided by
section 87 of the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296, as amended. The CFI per its order of 29 October
1971 did find that the appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals but ordered the
dismissal of the appeal and remand of the records to the city court for execution of judgment.
Thereafter, the City court denied petitioners motion for having been erroneously addressed to this
court instead of to the CFI ignoring petitioners predicament that the CFI had already turned them
down and ordered the dismissal of their appeal without notice to them and that as a consequence it
was poised to execute its judgment of conviction against them.
Petitioners spouses then filed on 14 January 1972 their petition for prohibition and mandamus with the
Court of Appeals against the People and City Court. The Solicitor General did not interpose any
objection whichever viewpoint is adopted by the Honorable Court in resolving the two apparently
conflicting or clashing principles of law, i.e.. finality of judicial decision or equity in judicial decision.
The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition on 17 December 1973, after finding that the
city courts judgment was directly appealable to it. Although recognizing that the CFI instead of
dismissing appeal, could have in the exercise of its inherent powers directed appeal to be endorsed to
the Court of Appeals, it held that since petitioners did not implead the CFI as principal party
respondent it could not grant any relief at all even on the assumption that petitioners can be said to
deserve some equities. With their motion for reconsideration denied, petitioners filed the petition for
review.
Issue: Whether the formal impleading of the Court of First Instance is indispensable and the
procedural infirmity of misdirecting the appeal to Court of First Instance are fatal to the appellees
cause
Held: The construction of statutes is always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to
defeat the purpose of the legislator and it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as
to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity and therefore a literal interpretation is to
be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Thus, in the construction of its own Rules of
Court, the Court is all the more so bound to liberally construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination
and unfairness and to supply the void by holding that Courts of First Instance are equally bound as the
higher courts not to dismiss misdirected appeals timely made but to certify them to the proper
appellate court.
The formal impleading of the CFI which issued the challenged order of dismissal was not indispensable
and could be overlooked in the interest of speedy adjudication. The Court of Appeals act of
dismissing the petition and denying the relief sought of endorsing the appeal to the proper court
simply because of the non-impleader of the CFI as a nominal party was tantamount to sacrificing
substance to form and to subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural technicality.
The procedural infirmity of petitioners misdirecting their appeal to the CFI rather than to the Court of
Appeals, which they had timely sought to correct in the CFI itself by asking that court to certify the
appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court, should not be over-magnified as to totally deprive
them of their substantial right of appeal and leave them without any remedy.
The Supreme Court set aside the CA decision dismissing the petition and in lieu thereof, judgment was
rendered granting the petition for prohibition against City court, enjoining it from executing its
judgment of conviction against petitioners-accused and further commanding said city court to elevate
petitioners appeal from its judgment to the CA for the latters disposition on the merits; without costs.
The Supreme Court held that there is no proof of the necessity of opening the street through the
cemetery from the record. But that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of
charge, which answers every purpose of the City. The Supreme Court, thus, affirmed the judgment of
the lower court, with costs against the appellant.
Matabuena v. Cervantes
GR L-28771, 31 March 1971 (38 SCRA ___)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of
Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as husband and wife in a common law
relationship. They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13 September 1962.
Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to Felix, questioned the
validity of the donation claiming that the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies
to a common-law relationship. She had the land declared on her name and paid the estate and
inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962. On 23
November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was made before Cervantes
marriage to the donor. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether the Article 133 of the civil code apply to donations between live-in partners.
Held: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during
the marriage, policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality
require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary to public
policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of
undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in ancient law.
Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be
remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. It is a principle of statutory construction that what
is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose
discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.
The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower court; (2) declared the
questioned donation void and recognized the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to
the property; and (3) remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in
accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs.
People v. Santayana
GR L-22291, 15 November 1976 (74 Phil 25)
Second Division, Concepcion Jr. (p): 4 concur, 1 took no part, 1 designated to sit in 2nd division
Facts: On 19 February 1962, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was appointed as Special Agent by then
Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On 9 March 1962, Col. Maristela issued an undated
certification to the effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol
described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special
agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his official duty
and for his personal protection. On 29 October 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in
possession of the firearms and ammunition without a license to possess them. An investigation was
conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case
underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged. Hence, the case was
appealed to Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was liable for illegal possession of firearms
Held: The appointment of a civilian as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a peace officer
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879 (People v.
Macarandang). In the present case, Santayana was appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority
to carry and possess firearms. He was issued a firearm in the performance of his official duties and for
his personal protection. Application of license was unnecessary, according to Col. Maristela, as the
firearm is government property. No permit was issued, according to Capt. Adolfo Bringas as he was
already appointed as a CIS agent. Even if the case of People vs. Mapa revoked the doctrine in the
Macarandang case, this was made only on 30 August 1967, years after the accused was charged.
Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellants appointment as secret
agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, conformably with the recommendation of the
Solicitor General, and acquitted Jesus Santayana, canceling the bond for his provisional release; with
costs de oficio.
People v. Estenzo
GR L-35376, 11 September 1980 (99 SCRA 651)
First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur
Facts: In a decision dated 28 September 1940 by the Cadastral Court, Lot 4273 of the Ormoc
Cadastre was declared public land. Respondent Aotes filed on23 February 1972 a petition to reopen
the decision of the Cadastral Court under Repuplic Act 931 as amended by Republic Act 6236. Aotes
claim that since the time limit for filing applications for free patents and applications for judicial
confirmation of incomplete and imperfect titles have been extended up to 31 December 1980, the
reopening of cadastral cases is also extended until 31 December 1980. The judge denied the
opposition for lack of sufficient merit on 9 May 1972, and rendered decision on 22 July 1972 after due
hearing, declaring Lot 4273 public land and adjudicating said lot in favor of the Aoetes in undivided
interest in equal share of each. Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, petitioners filed the
instant petition.
Issue: Whether the extension provided for under RA 6263 also applies to Re-opening of Cadastral
Proceedings.
Held: Under the legal maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (Express
Mention is Implied Exclusion), the express mention of one thing in a law, as a general rule, means the
exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is
based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. If RA 6236 had intended
that the extension it provided for applies also to reopening of cadastral cases, it would have so
provided in the same way that it provided the extension of time to file applications for free patent and
for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. The intention to exclude the reopening of
cadastral proceedings or certain lands which were declared public land in RA 6236 is made clearer by
reference to RA2061 which includes the reopening of cadastral cases, but not so included in RA 6236.
Thus, RA 6236, the very law on which Aotes bases his petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings
fails to supply any basis for respondents contention. It will be noted that while RA 2061 fixed the time
to reopen cadastral cases which shall not extend beyond 31 December 1968, no similar provision is
found in RA 6236 expressly extending the time limit for the reopening of cadastral proceedings on
parcels of land declared public land. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the extension as provided
for by the RA 6236 makes no reference to reopening of cadastral cases as the earlier law, RA2061,
expressly did. Truly, the extension provided for by RA 6236 applies only to the filing of applications for
free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not to reopening of
cadastral proceedings like the instant case, a proceeding entirely different from filing an application
for a free patent or for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
The Supreme Court set aside the 22 July 1972 decision of the respondent Judge and reiterating the 28
September 1940 decision of the Cadastral Court; without pronouncement as to costs.
Mutuc v. Comelec
GR L-32717, 26 November 1970 (36 SCRA 228)
First Division, Fernando (p): 7 concur, 2 on leave, 1 concur in separate opinion
Facts: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for
the position of a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, from using jingles in his mobile units
equipped with sound systems and loud speakers on 22 October 1970. Petitioner impugned the act of
respondent as violative of his right to free speech. Respondent however contended that the
prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful
for candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign
origin. It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped
voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the phrase and the like.
Issue: Whether the taped jingles fall under the phrase and the like.
Held: Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any
enumeration are applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It
is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind
referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its
distribution. The Constitutional Convention Act contemplated the prohibition on the distribution of
gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate
responsible for its distribution (distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of
pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
and cigarettes, and concluding with the words and the like.). Taped jingles therefore were not
prohibited.
The Supreme Court decision was made to expound on the reasons behind the minute resolution of 3
November 1970. The Supreme Court permanently restrained and prohibited the Comelec from
enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its order banning the use of political taped
jingle, pursuant to the SC resolution of 3 November 1970; without pronouncement as to costs.
People v. Manantan
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)
En Banc, Regala (p): 7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable
cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon
defendants plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as
justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is
within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support
thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a
justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting
on various motions and pleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon
the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General.
Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code
Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted
from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim casus omisus can
operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. The application of the
rule of casus omisus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but
rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the term
judge includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity,
including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the
Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no
necessity to include the justice of peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term
judge, including therein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the
courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case for
trial on the merits.
Sanciangco v. Rono
GR L-68709, 19 July 1985 (137 SCRA ___)
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 10 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 took no part
Facts: Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City, in the 17 May
1982 Barangay elections. Later, he was elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils
(ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association. As the President of the
Association, petitioner was appointed by the President of the Philippines as a member of the Citys
Sangguniang Panlungsod. On 27 March 1984, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the 14
May 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao
Alliance. He was not successful in the said election. Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of BP 697,
petitioner informed Vice-Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
that he was resuming his duties as member of that body. The matter was elevated to the Minister of
Local Government Jose A. Roo, who ruled that since petitioner is an appointive official, he is deemed
to have resigned from his appointive position upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.
Issue: Whether the accused is considered resigned from the latters filing of a certificate of candidacy
for the Batasan.
Held: Although it may be that Section 13(2), Batas Pambansa 697, admits of more than one
construction, taking into sconsideration the nature of the positions of the officials enumerated therein,
namely, governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or barangay officials, the legislative
intent to distinguish between elective positions in section 13(2), as contrasted to appointive positions
in section 13(l) under the all-encompassing clause reading any person holding public appointive office
or position, is clear. It is a rule of statutory construction that when the language of a particular
section of a statute admits of more than one construction, that construction which gives effect to the
evident purpose and object sought to be attained by the enactment of the statute as a whole, must be
followed. A statutes clauses and phrases should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. The
legislative intent to cover public appointive officials in subsection (1), and officials mentioned in
subsection (2) which should be construed to refer to local elective officials, can be gleaned from the
proceedings of the Batasan Pambansa. Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, as he was appointed by the President as a member of the
Citys Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of his having been elected President of the Association of
Barangay Councils, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan elections.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and denied the writs prayed for, holding that there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the officials; without costs.