MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE vs. V.M.

REALTY CORPORATION

Heirs of the Estate of JBL Reyes vs City of Manila

SYNOPSIS
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the
Municipality of Paraaque filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
134, on September 20, 1993 a complaint for expropriation against private
respondent over two parcels of land with a combined area of about 10,000
square meters located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila and
covered by Torrens Certificate of Title No. 48700. Allegedly, the complaint was
filed for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by
providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project.
In an Order dated February 4, 1994, the trial court authorized petitioner to take
possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an
amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax
declaration. Private respondent filed its answer alleging in the main that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a
resolution and not to an ordinance as required by the Local Government Code.
The trial court then nullified its February 4, 1994 order and dismissed the case.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's resolution. Hence, this
petition.

FACTS: Petitioners acquired a favorable judgment of eviction against

respondents Abiog and Maglonso. In 1998, the said judgments became final and
executory. Consequently, writs of execution were issued.
During the pendency of the complaints for unlawful detainer, respondent City filed
a case for the expropriation of the same properties involved in the ejectment
cases. The trial court allowed respondent City to take possession of the property;
it denied the motions for intervention and injunction, and, after allowing
respondent City to oppose the motion to dismiss, dismissed the complaint for
expropriation.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and found that
respondent City properly exercised its right to expropriate the subject properties.
Petitioners appealed the CA decision to this Court. Thereafter, on motion of
respondent occupants, the Court of Appeals issued protective orders that
required the parties to maintain the status quo (prohibiting any ejectment)
pending this Courts resolution of the appeal. Petitioner now questions the legality
of the CAs expropriation order and the propriety of its act enjoining the execution
of the final judgments in the ejectment cases.

Issue: Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent
domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the petition is not meritorious. The power of
eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may
delegate the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and
public utilities. A local government unit may therefore exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the
latter's control and restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in
other legislations. AIDTHC
A local government unit, like the Municipality of Paraaque, cannot authorize an
expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body.
The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a
law for the purpose. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or
opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. The fact that there is no cause
of action is evident from the face of the complaint for expropriation which was
based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is
equivalent to lack of cause of action. On the other hand, the principle of res
judicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the same
property when all the legal requirements for its valid exercise are complied with.

ISSUES: Whether the respondent City may legally expropriate the subject
properties, considering that a negative finding will necessarily moot the issue of
the propriety of the protective orders of the Court of Appeals.
Did the city of Manila comply with RA 7279 (Secs.9-10) when it expropriated
petitioners properties?
HELD: Whether respondent City deprived petitioners of their property without due
process of law depends on whether it complied with the legal requirements for
expropriation. Before respondent City can exercise its power of eminent domain,
the same must be sanctioned and must not violate any law. A local government
unit can only exercise powers granted to it by the legislature since it is only a
mere creation of the latter.
Basis of Manila Citys expropriation:
Local Govt Code: Sec. 19 Eminent Domain. LGU, through its chief executive +
acting pursuant to an ordinance, may exercise Eminent Domain for: public
use/purpose or benefit of the poor and the landless upon payment of just
compensation. Provided, there is a valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner, and was not accepted.
LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon filing of the
expropriation proceedings & making a deposit with the proper court of at least
15% of the propertys fair market value based on its current tax declaration
amount to be paid for the expropriated property determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value at the time of its taking
RA 409 (Revised Charter of the City of Manila):

Power of Manila City to expropriate private property in the pursuit of its urban
land reform and housing program.
Respondent City, however, is also mandated to follow the conditions and
standards prescribed by RA7279 (the Urban Development and Housing Act of
1992). Sec. 9 Priorities in Land acquisition Acquire lands for socialized housing
in the following order:
(a) Those owned by Govt, subdivisions, instrumentalities + GOCCs and
subsidiaries
(b) Public, Alienable lands
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands
(d) Those w/in declared areas Areas of Priority Devt, Zonal Improvement Sites, &
Slum Improvement Sites not yet acquired
(e) BLISS (Bagong Lipunan Improvement Sites & Services) not yet acquired
(f) Privately-owned lands
Priorities not apply when on-site devt is found more practicable &
advantageous to beneficiaries
LGU give budgetary priority to on-site devt of Govt lands
Sec. 10 Modes of Land Acquisition include:
Community Mortgage
Land swapping
Land assembly/consolidation
Land banking
donation to the Govt
Joint venture agreement
Negotiated purchase
Expropriation
Provided:
Only resort to expropriation when other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted
Exempt parcels of land owned by small property owners
Revert and escheat abandoned property to the State in a proceeding analogous
to Rule 91, RoC

Republic of the Philippines v Feliciano and IAC

Facts: The appeal was filed by 86 settlers of Barrio of Salvacion, representing the
Republic of the Philippines to dismiss the complaint filed by Feliciano, on the
ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent.
Prior to this appeal, respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of
First Instance against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land
Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land
consisting of four lots. The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to
be the private property of Feliciano and the rest of the property, Lots 2, 3 and 4,
reverted to the public domain. The trial court reopened the case due to the filing
of a motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of the trial court by 86
settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for more than 20
years under claim of ownership. The trial court ordered the settlers to present
their evidence but they did not appear at the day of presentation of evidence.
Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the case
was submitted for decision and the trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano. The
settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration. The case was reopened to
allow them to present their evidence. But before this motion was acted upon,
Feliciano filed a motion for execution with the Appellate Court but it was denied.
The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the
Philippines cannot be sued without its consent and hence the action cannot
prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.
Issue/s: Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a
parcel of land.
Discussions: A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted,
except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly
or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be
misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the
proceedings.
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly.
but must be construed in strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the
Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must
emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by
an act of the legislative body.
No. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case.
The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an
action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the
State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of
property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action
in personam. It is an action directed against a specific party or parties, and any
judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff,
the private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of the Philippines,

represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic

Act No. 3844.
The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled
jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has
consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of
statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the
instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such
consent.
Manila v IAC
Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died and was buried in North Cemetery which lot was
leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June
6, 2021. The wife paid the full amount of the lease. Apart, however from the
receipt, no other document embodied such lease over the lot. Believing that the
lease was only for 5 years, the city certified the lot as ready for exhumation. On
the basis of the certification, Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and
removal of the remains of Vicencio. His bones were placed in a bag and kept in
the bodega of the cemetery. The lot was also leased to another lessee. During
the next all souls day, the private respondents were shocked to find out that
Vicencios remains were removed. The cemetery told Irene to look for the bones
of the husband in the bodega. Aggrieved, the widow and the children brought an
action for damages against the City of Manila; Evangeline Suva of the City Health
Oce; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery; and Joseph
Helmuth, the laer's predecessor as ocer-in-charge of the said burial grounds
owned and operated by the City Government of Manila. The court ordered
defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of another lot. The CA armed
and included the award of damages in favor of the private respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a
governmental, or a corporate or proprietary function of the City of Manila
HELD: The City of Manila entered into a contract of lease, which involve the
exercise of proprietary functions with private respondent Irene Sto. Domingo. The
city and its officers therefore can be sued for any violation of the contract of lease.
Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such
endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and
through its city government in conformity with law, and in its proper corporate
name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers
are twofold in character-public, governmental or political on the one hand, and
corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those
exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public
welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal
powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of
the community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate. In

McQuillin on Municipal Corporation, the rule is stated thus: "A municipal

corporation proper has . . . a public character as regards the state at large insofar
as it is its agent in government, and private (so called) insofar as it is to promote
local necessities and conveniences for its own community (Torio v. Fontanilla, 85
SCRA 599 [1978]). In connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it
may acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and private or
proprietary capacity. The New Civil Code divides such properties into property for
public use and patrimonial properties (Article 423), and further enumerates the
properties for public use as provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the
squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public
service paid for by said provisions, cities or municipalities, all other property is
patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla, supra), petitioner
City of Manila is liable for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to
verify and check the duration of the contract of lease. The contention of the
petitioner-city that the lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5, series of
1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5) years only beginning
from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said administrative order covers new
leases. When subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for
exhumation, the lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in full force and effect.
San Diego v Municipality of Mindoro
Facts: The municipality of Naujan issued Resolution 46 awardingthe concession
of the Butas River and the Naujan Lake to SanDiego. Contract: 5 years, from
January 1, 1948 to December 31,1952, lease of "the exclusive privilege of
erecting fish corrals alongthe Butas River beginning from its junction with the San
AgustinRiver up to the Naujan Lake itself," for annual rental of P26,300.00.Upon
petition by the lessee, however, the said council reduced theannual rental by 20%
by virtue of Resolution 59, series of 1949. OnSeptember 5, 1950, the lessee
requested for a five-year extensionof the original lease period. The request was,
for some time, leftpending before the municipal council, but on December 1,
1951,after the lessee had reiterated his petition for extension, for thereason that
the typhoon "Wanda", which took place that month,destroyed most of his fish
corrals, the council adopted Resolution222, series of 1951 extending the lease for
another five (5) yearsbeginning January 1, 1952, with the express condition that
theplaintiff would waive the privilege to seek for reduction of theamount of rent
which was to be based on the original contract.After the resolution had been
approved by the Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro, the lessor and the lessee,
on December 23, 1951,contracted for the extension of the period of the lease.
The contractwas approved and confirmed on December 29, 1951 by
Resolution229, series of 1951, of the municipal council of Naujan whose termwas
then about to expire. Pursuant to the said contract, the lesseefiled a surety bond
of P52,000.00 and then reconstructed his fishcorrals and stocked the Naujan
Lake with bagus fingerlings.On January 2, 1952, the municipal council of
Naujan, this timecomposed of a new set of members, adopted Resolution 3,

series of 1952, revoking Resolution 222, series of 1951. On the same date,the
new council also passed Resolution 11, revoking Resolution 229of the old council
which confirmed the extension of the leaseperiod. The lessee requested for
reconsideration and recall of Resolution 3, on the ground, among others, that it
violated thecontract executed between him and the municipality on December23,
1951, and, therefore, contrary to Article III, section 1, clause 10of the Constitution.
The request, however, was not granted.On September 4, 1952, the lessee
instituted this proceedings in thecourt below seeking to have Resolution 3, series
of 1952, of themunicipal council of Naujan, declared null and void, for
beingunconstitutional,
and
praying
for
an
order
enjoining
the
defendantmunicipality from conducting a public bidding for the leasing of
theNaujan fisheries to any person other than the plaintiff during theperiod from
January 1, 1953 to December 31, 1957.Answering the complaint, the defendant
asserted the validity of Resolution 3, series of 1951, alleging by the way of
special defensethat the resolution authorizing the original lease contract,
reducingthe lease rentals and renewing the lease are null and void for nothaving
been passed in accordance with law. Defendant further putup a counterclaim for
the amount representing the illegal reductionof 20% of the original rentals, plus
the sum of P2,191.60 per monthbeginning December 1, 1952 until the case shall
have beenterminated. After trial, the lower court rendered judgmentupholding the
validity of the lease contract, as well at is extension,and declaring Resolution 3,
series of 1952, null and void. Themunicipality of Naujan has taken this appeal.
Issue: WON Resolution No. 3, series of 1952, revoking Resolution 222, series of
1951, of the municipal council of Naujan is valid.
Held: The municipal council of Naujan acted aright in adopting Resolution 3,
series of 1952, now in question. In consonance with the principles enunciated
above, Resolution 59, series of 1947, reducing the rentals by 20% of the original
price, which was also passed without public bidding, should likewise be held void
since a reduction of the rental to be paid by the lessee is a substantial alternation
in the contract, making it a distinct and different lease contract which requires the
prescribed formality of public bidding. There seems to be no necessity of passing
on the validity of Resolution 46, series of 1947, for defendant-appellant,
apparently, did not mean to have it annulled, as may be seen from its prayer in
the court below and also in this appeal. At any rate, the validity of said resolution
does not alter our finding to the effect that Resolution 59, series of 1949, and
Resolution 222, series of 1951, are illegal and void; and that Resolution 3, series
of 1952, is valid.
The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied as against a municipal corporation to
validate a contract which it has no power to make, or which it is authorized to
make only under prescribed conditions, within prescribed limitations, or in a
prescribed mode or manner, although the corporation has accepted the benefits
thereof and the other party has fully performed his part of the agreement, or has
expanded large sums in preparation for performance. A reason frequently
assigned for this rule is that to apply the doctrine of estoppel against a
municipality in such case would be to enable it to do indirectly what it cannot do

directly. Also, where a contract is violative of public policy, the municipality

executing it cannot be estopped to assert the invalidity on this ground; nor can it
be estopped to assert the invalidity of a contract which has ceded away,
controlled, or embarrassed its legislative or government powers.
Fernando v CA
Facts: November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public
Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's
Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao wherein Bascon won. On
November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito
Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead
inside the septic tank.The bodies were removed by a fireman.The body of
Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the
Regional Hospital but he expired there.
The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they entered the
septic tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the
market master. Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they were
presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City
Health Office found them to have died from "asphyxia" - diminution of oxygen
supply in the body and intake of toxic gas. November 26, 1975: Bascon signed
the purchase order
RTC: Dismissed the case
CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the
ignorant and the indigent
ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause
therefore can be liable for damages
HELD: NO. CA affirmed. The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent
act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater
familias of the Roman law
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently
probable warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience
and in view of the facts involved in the particular case
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of
this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist
Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury
Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining
factors, he can not recover
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury,
he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should

pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence
Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the
New Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the
public
While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with
safety and sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one of
those requirements
accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen
unless one removes its covers
Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which
has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly
be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr.
Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the
hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take
precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.
proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own
negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from the
public respondent.
City of Manila v. Teotico
Facts: In January 1958, at about 8pm, Teotico was about to board a jeepney in P.
Burgos, Manila when he fell into an uncovered manhole, resulting injuries upon
him . Thereafter he sued for damages under Art.2189 of the Civil Code the City of
Manila, the mayor, the city engineer, the city health officer, the city treasurer, and
the chief of police. The CFI Manila ruled against Teotico. Upon appeal, the CA
reversed the CFI ruling and held that the City of Manila should pay damages to
Teotico. The City of Manila assailed the decision of the CA on the ground that the

charter of Manila states that it shall not be liable for damages caused by the
negligence of the city officers in enforcing the charter; that the charter is a special
law and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that the
accident happened in national highway.
Issue: Whether the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave
making it responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico.
Held: Yes. It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a general
law; that the charter of Manila is a special law and that the Civil Code is a general
law. However, looking at the particular provisions of each law concerned, the
provision of the Manila Charter exempting it from liability caused by the
negligence of its officers is a general law in the sense that it exempts the city from
negligence of its officers in general. There is no particular exemption but merely a
general exemption. On the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code provides a
particular prescription to the effect that it makes provinces, cities, and
municipalities liable for the damages caused to a certain person by reason of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public
works under their control or supervision.
The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only raised
for the first time in the Citys motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals,
hence it cannot be given due weight. At any rate, even though it is a national
highway, the law contemplates that regardless if whether or not the road is
national, provincial, city, or municipal, so long as it is under the Citys control and
supervision, it shall be responsible for damages by reason of the defective
conditions thereof. In the case at bar, the City admitted they have control and
supervision over the road where Teotico fell when the City alleged that it has been
doing constant and regular inspection of the citys roads, P. Burgos included.