People V.

Dionisio
22 SCRA 1299
FACTS: On or about the 19th day of August, 1962, in Manila City, Rosauro Dionisio, a person
who is not duly authorized in any capacity by the Games and Amusement Board to conduct a
horse race, did then and there willfully and unlawfully offer, arranhge and collect bets for the
Special Daily Double Race being then conducted at the Sta. Ana Racing Club at Makati and for
that purpose has in possession the cash amount of P8.50, one Nueva Era Racing Program,
dated August 19, 1962, one list of bets, one ballpen and one booklet of Daily Double receipt. He
was thereby charged in violation of Republic Act No. 3063.
ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty applied to his offense infringes the Constitutional provision
that Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. (Art III
Sec. 1 clause 19, of the Constitution of the Phils)
RULING: Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves cruel and unusual
punishment, for the Constitutional structure has been interpreted as referring to penalties that
are inhumane and barbarous, or shocking to the conscience and fines or imprisonment are
definitely not in this category. Nor does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
SERAFIN VS. LINDAYAG [67 SCRA 166; ADM. MATTER. NO. 297-MJ; 30 SEPT 1975]
Facts: Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito Mendoza, then
municipal secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza and therefore an estafa case was filed
against

her.

Complainant

admitted

complaint.

Now

complainant

filed

case

against respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and issuing a warrant of arrest as it falls
on the category of a simple indebtedness, since elements of estafa are not present. Further she
contended that no person should be imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of a sum of money.
Two months after respondentdismissed plaintiffs case. (Judge here committed gross ignorance
of

law.

Even

if

complainant

desisted

case

was

pursued.)

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the
imprisonment

of plaintiff for

non-payment

of

debt?

Held: Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as, his debt is considered a simple loan
granted by her friends to her. There is no collateral or security because complainant was an old

friend of the spouses who lent the money and that when they wrote her a letter of demand she
promised to pay them and said that if she failed to keep her promise, they could get her
valuable things at her home. Under the Constitution she is protected. Judge therefore in
admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the
complaint and the "evidence" presented, and issuing on the same day the warrant of arrestupon
his

utterly

baseless

finding

crime charged," respondent grossly

"that
failed

the

accused
to

perform

is

probably
his

guilty

duties

of the
properly.

DEL ROSARIO VS BENGZON

Facts: On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act 6675 was published in two newspapers
of general circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on 30 March 1989, 15 days after its
publication, as provided in Section 15 thereof. Section 7, Phase 3 of Administrative Order 62
was amended by Administrative Order 76 dated 28 August 1989 by postponing to 1 January
1990 the effectivity of the sanctions and penalties for violations of the law, provided in Sections
6 and 12 of the Generics Act and Sections 4 and 7 of the Administrative Order. Officers of the
Philippine Medical Association, the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines,
on behalf of their professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, filed a class suit
requesting the Court to declare some provisions (specifically penal) of the Generics Act of 1988
and the implementing Administrative Order 62 issued pursuant thereto as unconstitutional,
hence, null and void. The petition was captioned as an action for declaratory relief, over which
the Court does not exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of the public interest involved, the
Court decided to treat it as a petition for prohibition instead.
Issue: Whether the prohibition against the use by doctors of no substitution and/or words of
similar import in their prescription in the Generics Act is a lawful regulation.
Held: Yes. There is no constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act; rather, it implements the
constitutional mandate for the State to protect and promote the right to health of the people
and to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). The prohibition
against the use by doctors of no substitution and/or words of similar import in their
prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent the circumvention of the law. It secures to the
patient the right to choose between the brand name and its generic equivalent since his doctor
is allowed to write both the generic and the brand name in his prescription form. If a doctor is
allowed to prescribe a brand-name drug with no substitution, the patients option to buy a
lower-priced, but equally effective, generic equivalent would thereby be curtailed. The law aims
to benefit the impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the population in a still developing
country like ours, not the affluent and generally healthy minority

PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN [17 SCRA 1119; G.R. NO. L-26376; 31 AUG 1966]
Sunday,
February
15,
2009
Posted
by Coffeeholic
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Writes

Facts: Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being
arraigned, he entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted y counsel. At his counsel
de officio, he was allowed to present evidence and consequently testified that he stabbed the
deceased in self-defense. In addition, he stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the
police authorities. On the basis of the testimony of the accused, he was acquitted. Thus,
the prosecution appealed.
Issue: Whether

or

Not

the

appeal

placed

the

accused

in double

jeopardy.

Held: The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is an essential
requisite to double jeopardy. The accused had first entered a plea of guilty but however testified
that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of
guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new charge, or at least direct that
a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. Therefore, there has been no
standing of plea during the judgment of acquittal, so there can be no double jeopardy with
respect to the appeal herein.

PAULIN VS. GIMENEZ [217 SCRA 386; G.R. NO. 103323; 21 JAN 1993]
Sunday,
February
15,
2009
Posted
by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were smothered with dust when
they were overtaken by the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, Mabuyo
followed the vehicle until the latter entered the gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby
security guard for the identity of the owner of the vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his
duties, petitioners allegedly pointed their guns at him. Thus, he immediately ordered
his subordinate to call the police and block road to prevent the petitioners escape. Upon the
arrival of the police, petitioners put their guns down and were immediately apprehended.

A complaint grave threats was filed against the petitioners (Criminal Case No. 5204). It was
dismissed by the court acting on the motion of the petitioners. Mabuyo filed a MOR thus the
dismissal was reversed. Thereafter, petitioners filed for certiorari, prohibition, damages, with
relief of preliminary injunction and the issuance of a TRO (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed for
lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading and ordered to proceed with the trial of the
case.

Hence,

this

instant petition.

Issues:
(1)

Whether

or

Not

the

dismissal

of

5204

was

a judgment of

acquittal.

(2) Whether or Not the judge ignored petitioners right against double jeopardy by dismissing
CEB-9207.

Held: For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express
consent of the accused. Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express
assent of the accused, he has deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy.
In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of the petitioners. Double jeopardy
thus

did

not

attach.

Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The latter is always based on
merit that shows that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not guilty. While the former, in
the case at bar, terminated the proceedings because no finding was made as to the guilt or
innocence

of

the

petitioners.

The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the order of dismissal for
the reception of further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it
prematurely terminated and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right to
complete thepresentation of its evidence. The rule on summary procedure was correctlyapplied.

People vs. Judge Villarama

People vs. Judge Villarama, 210 SCRA 246 (1992)

FACTS: Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.
During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. After the
prosecution rested its case, counsel for private respondent verbally manifested in open court that
private respondent was willing to change his former plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the lesser
offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425.
Respondent Judge issued an order directing private respondent to secure the consent of the
prosecutor to the change of plea.
The prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense.
Accused filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense,
alleging that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an accused
is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Respondent judge granted accuseds motion and
convicted him guilty beyond reasonable-doubt of the crime of violation of Section 17, Republic Act
No. 6425 thus this instant petition for review.
Counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondents change of plea and his
conviction to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer
open to review otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated.
ISSUE: W/N accused can invoke double jeopardy?
HELD: NO. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to
the private respondents change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private
respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable provision is that
found in Section 7, Rule 117 which states:

Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.

xxx xxx xxx

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense
which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of
the following instances:

(a) . . . ;

(b) . . . ;

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of the
offended party;

xxx xxx xxx

Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation
of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also
represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial courts approval of his change
of plea was irregular and improper.

PEOPLE VS. RELOVA [149 SCRA 292; G.R. NO.L45129; 6 MAR 1987]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

FACTS:

In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the

Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova
quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of
double jeopardy and denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.. On
Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of BatangasElectric
Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of
Batangas to search and examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice
Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric wiring devices
have

been installed without

authority

from

the

citygovernment and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building.

Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings ofelectric
current consumption in the plants electric meter. The case was dismissed on
the ground of prescription for the complaint was filed nine months prior to
discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act being a
light felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another
case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for
a

violation

of

Batangas

Ordinance

regarding

unauthorized

electrical

installations with resulting damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in the

amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash
on the ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscals claim is that it is not
double jeopardy because the first offense charged against the accused was
unauthorized installation of

electrical

devices

without

the

approval

and

necessary authority from the City Government which was punishable by an

ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the second offense
which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code
making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint against
Mr.Opulencia.

Issue:

Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double

jeopardy as defense to the second offense charged against him by the assistant
fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of electricity punishable by a statute

against

Held: Yes,

the

Revised

Penal

Code.

Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the

second offense because as tediously explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero,

the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of double jeopardy. The first would
be that No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense and the second sentence states that If an act is punishable by a law or
an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the
same act. In the case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against
Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein it
contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. It further
explains that even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing that the first
charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge was a
violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two charges sprung
from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the
ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making it against the
logic of double jeopardy. The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first
offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the same
identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.
Bayot Vs. Sandiganbayan
128 SCRA 383
No.L-61776 To No.L-61861
March 23, 1984
Facts: Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa thru
falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his
alleged involvement as a government auditor of the commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of
education and culture, with some other employees from the said ministry. The bureau of treasury
and the teachers camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks
for the nom-existent obligations of the teachers camp resulting in damage to the government of
several millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of
Amadeo Cavite and was elected on January 1980. but on May 1980 Sandiganbayan promulgated a
decision convicting the accused together with his other co-accused in all but one of the thirty two
cases filed against them.
On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019.

Issue: Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an ex post facto
law.
Held: The court finds no merit in the petitioners contention that RA 3019 as amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the crime of estafa through falsification of Public Documents as
among crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from public office
pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the
enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment and public office
during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a result of a
judicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to
reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. And does
not violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto law.
The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying a
position diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly
states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under RA 3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or
property or whatever stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended from office.
The use of the word office applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding and not
only the particular office under which he was charged.