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TO

PULL
TO PULL:
WHAT
ISOR
THENOT
QUESTION?

Wallace J. Hoppand Mark L. Spearman

Department of Industrial Engineering and Management Sciences


Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois 60208
hopp@northwestern.edu
Factory Physics, Inc.
5107 Laurel Valley Court, Suite 200
College Station, Texas 77845
www.factoryphysics.com

August 15, 2002


Revised July 23, 2003

c Hopp and Spearman, 20022003

Abstract
The terms
pull and lean
production
become
cornerstones
of modern
manufacturing
practice.
But,
they
widelyhave
used,
they
less widely
understood.
Inofthis
paper,
we concepts,
argue although
thatthe
while
the are
academic
literature
hasare
steadily
revealed
the
richness
the
pull/lean
practitioner
literature
has
progressively
simpli

ed
these
termswe
toothe
point
where
serious
misunderstandings
now
exist.
In
hopes
of
reducing
confusion,
er
general
but
precise
de

nitions
of
pull
and
lean.
Speci

call
y,
we
argue
that
pull
is
essentially
a
mechanism
for limiting WIP and lean is fundamentally about minimizing the cost of
bu
ering variability.

1 Introduction
We
haveatbeen
teaching
executive
courses
on and
manufacturing
regularly the
since
the mid-1980s.
Starting
the height
of reengineering,
the
just-in-time
craze
continuing
through
time-based
manufacturing,
business
process
enterprise
resource
management
and
lean
manufacturing
movements,
we
have
been
doing
our
best
to
explain
pull
production
to
people
who
really
want
to
use
it. Wepull
evenhaswrote
a book
on the
subject [18].
With all
our experience
and all
of the
attention
received
in the
practitioner
literature,
you ofwould
think our task
would
be
getting easier.
But its
not.
Inpull
recent
both
of us havewillingness
been nding
increasing
confusion
our
students
about
how
is deyears,
ned
and
decreasing
to accept
our
dereceived
nition. among
The
main
controversy
has
usually
stemmed
from
some
participants
(who
have
almost
always
some
sort
of
lean as
training
priorto tomaking
attending
oneto ofstock
our classes)
insisting
pull meansthis
making
to
order,
opposed
them
or forecast.
Interestingly,
is a products
fairly
recent
phenomenon.
Ten
years
ago,
our
students
equated
pull
with
kanban,
a
make-to-stock
system,
but
not
with
make-to-order.
Nevertheless,
it
has
been
a
disturbing
experience
for
us,
since
we
do
not
feel that pull is properly dened as either kanban or make-to-order.
Had we
been
wrong all along?
The sheer
number fundamental
of confrontations
in our
classes
forced us
to
consider
that
possibility.
To decide,
wesystem?,
revisited
wewhat
thought
resolved,
such
as
what In
constitutes
awepull
what makes
pullissues
work?,and
is leanwere
andlong
how
does
it
relate
to
pull?
addition,
reviewed
carefully
the
practitioner
academic
literatures
related to pull. This paper is the result of our soul-searching process. In it, we:
1. Provide
a history
of pull,between
from itspush
antecedents
history when trends have
caused the
distinction
and pulluptothrough
becomerecent
confused.
2. Describe the essence of pull and how strategic pull diers from tactical pull.
3. Investigate
the relationship of pull and push to the concepts of make-to-order and make- tostock.
Although
wepaper
cite aissigni
intended
cant amount
of literature that
is important
toliterature.
understanding
pull and its
history,
this
notreviews
a comprehensive
review
of and
the pull
For that,
the reader
to excellent
by as
Uzsoy
and Martin-Vega
[51]
Huang
and Kusiak
[23]. we refer

2 A Brief History of Pull


2.1 First There Was MRP
To
understand
why and
how pull
about,
it isPrior
necessary
rst appreciate
environment
that preceeded
it, namely
the came
worldusing
of MRP.
to theto
dominance
of(ROP/ROQ)
the the
computer
in
manufacturing,
inventory
was Joseph
controlled
reorder-point/reorder-quantity
type
methods.
During
the
1960s,
Orlicky,
Oliver
Wight,
and
George
Plossl
along
with
others
developed
a
new
system,
which
they
termed
Material
Requirements
Planning
(MRP)
.
Orlicky
obviously
believed
they wereand
on to
something
big; he subtitled
book
on the
sub-MRP
ject The
New
Way steam
of Lifeduring
inthat
Production
Inventory
Management
[37]. his
After
a slow
start,
began
to
gather
the
1970s
fueled
by
the
MRP
Crusade
of
the
American
Production
and Inventory Control Society (APICS). Orlicky reported 150 implementations in
1971
[37].
By 1981,
the
numberin had
to around
8,000 [56]. As itResources
grew in popularity,
grew
incombined
scope,
andMRP
evolved
the grown
1980s
into Manufacturing
Planning MRP
(MRPalso
II),
which
with
Master
Scheduling,
Rough-Cut
Capacity
Planning,
Capacity
Requirements
Planning,
Input/Output
Control
and
other
modules.
In
1984
alone,
16
companies
sold
$400constituting
million in just
MRP
II software
Byentire
1989,software
over $1.2
billion [24].
was sold to American
industry,
under
one-third[60].
of the
industry
While
MRP
was
steadily
dominating
the
American
production
control
history comwas
taking
a dierent
course
in Japan.
There,
perhaps inbecause
it lacked
a strongscene,
indigenous
puter
industry,
the
computer
was
far
less
pervasive
production
and
inventory
control.
Instead,
several
Japanese
companies,
most notably
Toyota,
developed
the older
ROP/ROQ
methods
to a
high
level.
Starting
in theAmerican
1940s,
Taiichi
Ohno
began
evolving
a system
that
would
enable
Toyota
toproduction
compete
with
automaker
but
would
not depend
on e
ciencies
resulting
from
long
runs
that
Toyota
did
not
have
the
volumes
to
support.
This
approach,
known
Toyota ow
Production
System, was designed to make goods, as muchnow
as
possible,asinthe
a continuous
[36].
According to Ohno, the Toyota Production System rests on two pillars:
1. Autonomation
2. Just-in-time production
Autonomation,
or automation
athen
human
touch,
is the
practice
of determining
the
optimal
way to perform
a given fool
taskwith
and
making
this
the
best
practice
standard
method.
Autonomation
also
involved
proo

ng
or

p
o
ke
yoke
,
which
involved
using
devices
to
quickly
check
dimensions
and were
otherfound,
qualitytheattributes
to line
allowstopped
workersuntil
to be
for
their
own
quality.
If problems
production
theresponsible
problems
were
corrected.
This
eliminated
the
need
for
rework
lines
and,
eventually,
eliminated
most
scrap.
The
Toyotaare
Production System also promoted 5S, Seiri, Seiton, Seiso, Seiketsu, and Shitsuke
Visualwhich
Control.organization and housekeeping techniques aimed at achieving Autonomation and
Just-in-time
production
according
to Ohno
involved
components:
kanbanProduction
and level
production.
or
pull
production
became
thetwo
hallmark
the Toyota
System
(which Kanban
was But
also kanban
frequently
to as Just-In-Time)
to
thefamously
pointofwhere
many his
thought they
were synonymous.
wasreferred
just a means
to an end. Ohno
described

inspiration
for kanban
as comingsupermarkets
from a visitthan
to the
U.S.American
during the
1950s in which
he was
more
with American
with
manufacturing.
havingimpressed
all goods available
at all times was, to Ohno,
novel
and revolutionary.
He said: The idea of

Fromline
the as
supermarket
we
got the
idea
ofprocess
viewing (customer)
the earlier goes
process
in eaarlier
production
a kind
of
store.
The
later
to the
process
(supermarket)
to
aquire
the
needed
parts
(commodities)
at
the
time
and
in
the
quantity
The earlier
process immediately produces the quantity just taken (restocking needed.
the shelves).
[36, p. 26]
To doonly
this,
Ohno
had
to make
major
system
changes.
Ifbethe
supermarket
was To
to
replenish
what
wasneeded,
just taken
in and
a some
timely
manner,
lot sizes
had to
drastically
reduced.
achieve
the e
ciencies
Ohno
his
Toyota
colleagues
found
many
creative ways
toreally
reduce
change-over
times.
Although
change
did
not
happen
overnight
(the
JIT
revolution
was
an
evolution),
the results
were
substantial.
In 1945
setups
on large
presses
took
2-3 hours.
By such
1962short
they
had
been
reduced
to
15
minutes
and
by
1971
some
were
down
to
3
minutes
[36].
With
change-overs, Ohno could achieve one piece ow and just-in-time production.
Bybehind
the early
1980s, American
manufacturers
had
become acutely
aware(especially
that theyinhad
fallen
in manufacturing
innovation
and
even in
manufacturing
e
ciency
the
automotive
sector).
Even
while
MRP
sales
continued
to
climb,
many
were
thinking
that MRP
had
been
a
mistake.
A
1980
survey
showed
that
less
than
10%
of
the

rms
interviewed
had
recouped their investment within two years [19]. JIT began being hailed as the next great thing.
American
became
enamored
with
everything
Japanese.
American
profeswent
to
Japanmanagers
toinlearn
quickly
rst-hand
whatDriving
was
going
on,
and
of course
they wrote
books. and
The
rstsors
JIT
book,
published
1981,
was
Halls
the
Productivity
Machine:
Production
Control
in
J
ap
an
[15].
This
was
followed
by
Schonbergers,
Japanese
Manufacturing
T
e
c
hniques:
Nine
L
essons in Simplicity
in
1982 [38].
By 1983System
Yasuhiro
Monden,
a Japanese
professor,
got on the
bandwagon
with
Toyota
Production
[35].SMED
ShigeoSystem
Shingo,
whoOhnos
worked with
published
bookThe
on
reduction
in 1985, The
[39].
book Ohno,
nally
appeared ina English
in setup
1988 [36].
Despite
the
frenzy
of
interest
in
JIT
throughout
American
industry
during
the
1980s,
results
were mixed.
Firms
implementing
JIT were
faced
withdiscussion
a deceptively
simple
philosophy and
a
complicated
array
of techniques
(seepragmatic
[61]
for an
elegant
of the
romantic
JIT (philosophy)
JIT (techniques)).
So, disconnect
managers between
had
to
contribute considerable
site-speciand
c innovation
to produce
workable systems.
Depending
on how
1
creative and insightful they were, JIT sometimes worked and sometimes did not.
By the Planning
end of the
1980s,
being eclipsed
by
the next great
thingtechnology
Enterprise
Resources
(ERP)
. WithJIT
thebegan
development
of ofthe
client/server
information
architecture,
it became
feasible
integrate
a corporations
applications
with a common
data base.
ERP otoered
both virtually
near-totalall
integration
and bestbusiness
of breed
software
1

The early confusion about JIT had many philosophical, cultural and technical explanations. But it may also
have been partly intentional. In a 1990 interview, Ohno claimed that Toyota considered the system so powerful
that they deliberately coined misleading terms and words to describe it. If in the beginning the U.S. had
understood what Toyota was doing, it would have been no good for us. Eventually, however, Toyota
became very open and invited the whole world to see their factories in the 1980s and 1990s. [34].

in
the speci
applications.
Of
course, imaginable,
ERP was much
more
complexand
thannancial
MRP II, functions
containing
modules
forcevery
business
function
from
accounting
to
human
resources.
And
it was
correspondingly
more
expensive,
withtag
implementation
costs
at some
companies
soaring
as
high
as
$250
million
[9].
In
spite
of
the
price
and
the
growing
number
ofa
implementation
horror
stories,
ERP
continued
to
grow
in
popularity.
As
the
1990s
drew
to
close and fear of the Millennium Bug intensied, ERP was being installed at a feverish rate.
As ERP
begantoitsrank
rise,atitthe
appeared
thatautomotive
the JIT movement
had run itsand
course.
Even metrics,
though
Toyota
continued
topSystem
of the
industry
eciency
interest
in the
Toyota
Production
was
on theThat
wane.
Butininquality
1990,
a landmark
case study
conducted
by
MIT
was
published
in
The
Machine
Changed
the
World
by
Womack,
Jones
and
Roos [57].
This
study compared
American,
European,
and Japanese
automobile
manufacturing
techniques
andvastly
concluded
in noInuncertain
terms
that the freshened
Japanese
methods,
particularly
those
of
Toyota,
were
superior.
addition,
the
authors
JIT
by
recasting
it
as
Lean
Manufacturing.
newbecame
name and
a topic
new set
of world
storiesoftomanufacturing.
rekindle interest, the system
created by Taiichi With
Ohno aagain
a hot
in the
The JIT movement
also spawned (TQM).
a separate
movement
thatasultimately
became
larger than
JIT
itselfTotal
Quality
Management
Originally
cast
a means
for facilitating
smooth
production
ow,
TQM
grew
into
a popular
management
doctrine
institutionalized
inestablish
the
ISO
9000
Certi

cation
process.
The
focus
on
TQM
in
the
1980s
also
spurred
Motorola
to
an
ambitious
quality
goal and
to develop
set of statistical
for measuring
and achieving
it.
This
approach
became
known
asElectric.
SixaSigma
andentered
was techniques
eventually
adopted
by companies
such
as
Allied
Signal
and
then
General
Six
Sigma
the
mainstream
management
lexicon
when
Jack
Welch,
the
charismatic
CEO
of
GE,
declared
that
it
played
a
major
role
in
his
companys
nancial
on the legacyof
JIT. success. Today, Six Sigma carries on the legacy of TQM just like lean carries
Despite traveling separate paths since emerging from JIT, it now appears that the Lean
Manufacturing and Six Sigma movements are about to merge, as suggested by the recent best
selling management book, Lean Six Sigma [20]. At the same time, the computer approach characterized by MRP/ERP is also undergoing consolidation. After Y2K proved to be a non-event,
ERP became passe as a term but was quickly replaced by SCM (Supply Chain Management).
Remarkably, SAP, the worlds largest provider of ERP software, changed its entire product line
in a matter of months (or so it would appear when a search of their web-site revealed that
all references to ERP were gone and had been replaced with the new SCM acronym). Since
both ERP and SCM trace their roots back to quantitative production and inventory control,
it is perhaps not surprising that they would wind up embodied in the same software products.
However, all this leads one to wonder when the Lean Six Sigma Supply Chain Management
movement will begin.

3 Pull Research
While
corporate
America
tried the
to navigate
this
sea of of
buzz
words
comprehend
thebusy
Toyota
Production
System
along
with
mysterious
concept
pull,
thoseand
in to
thequick
academy
were
as
well.
As
with
any
new
management
trend,
academic
researchers
were
to
get
on
the
JIT
bandwagon. Hall and Schonberger were both academics who went to Japan to study just-

in-time
rst-hand.
Monden,
of describing
the University
of was
Tsukuba,
did by
not
have toresearchers
travel as in
far. It
appears the
rst academic
paper
kanban
published
Japanese
1977.
The
title
of
the
paper
by
Sugimori,
et
al.
[47]
is
telling:
Toyota
Production
System
and
Kanban
System:
Materialization
of Just-In-Time
and Respect-For-Human
System.
Like
Orlickys
New
WayThe
of Life,
thethis
Toyota
System
is something
big that
goes mistaken
beyond
production
control.
title of
rstProduction
paper
mayand
alsokanban.
have
contributed
to the
equivalence
between
the
Toyota
Production
System
It
was
followed
four
years
later
bydescribed
another paper
by two other
Japanese
Kimurafor
and
[30]. BothAs
of these
papers
the for
mechanics
of kanban
andresearchers,
the requirements
itsTerada
implementation.
such,
they
set the
themechanics
stage
thekanban
books
of Schonberger,
Hall and Monden.
Hence,
by the
early
1980s
of
had
been
widely
described.
Because
it
represented
the
rst
system
to
be
termed
a
pull
system,
and
is
hence
central
to
the
subject
of
this
paper,
we
brie
y
describe these mechanics below.

3.1 Kanban Mechanics


The
classic
version ofinkanban
by begins
Toyotawhen
is called
a twohandler
card kanban
system,
as
shown
schematically
Figure as
1. pioneered
Production
a material
withThe
a move
card
removes
a that
standard
container
of parts
from
the outbound
stock
point.
move
card
authorizes
handler
to
take
these
parts
and
tells
him
where
the
parts
are
needed.
Before
the
container is removed, the production
card is removed from the standard container and placed
2
on
the production
card board.
Production
begin
without a production
card,are
a
container
of
the
appropriate
incoming
parts,
andcannot
an
idle
work
When stock
all three
available,
themove
worker
removes
a standard
container
ofin parts
from station.
the
inbound
point,
removes
the
card
from
the
container,
places
it
the
hopper
for
move
cards
at
the
work
station
and begins
to process
parts. them
Periodically,
a material
the move
card(s),
the needed
parts,the
transports
to the work
station, handler
and the collects
process repeats
at
the nextlocates
work station
upstream.
It
is
easy
to
see
that
the
two
card
kanban
system
is
the
result
of
an
arti

cial
distinction
between
parts
processing
movement.
If we include
material
movement
as a separate
process,
we see
the twoand
cardmaterial
kanban
becomes
a one
card
system
becoming
for thesystem
This
is illustrated
in with
Figurethe
2, move
which card
also
shows thataaproduction
kanban system iscard
essentially
amove
serialprocess.
production
system
with blocking.

3.2 What Is So Special About Pull?


But
ifSystems
kanbanwith
is nothing
more
than
a serial
production
system
with where
blocking,
then why
the
fuss?
occur
naturally
(e.g.,
incongestion
automotive
systems
limitations
onall
space
and
the
number
ofblocking
pallets
can
cause
downstream
to
shut Researchers
down upstream
production).
Why
would
Toyota
deliberately
constrain
the
ow
in
their
system?
and
practitioners
have had to address this fundamental question since the beginnings of JIT.
The rst, and easiest, step in understanding kanban in specic, and pull in general, is to
characterize its benets. These have been widely cited as (see, e.g., [17, 11]):
2

Some authors indicate that the term kanban refers to the card while others indicate that it is the
board holding the cards.

Figure 1: A two card kanban system.

Figure 2: Equivalence of the one and two card kanban systems.

1. Reduced
WIP
and in
Cycle
Time:
By limiting
releases
the system,
kanban
regulates WIP
and
hence
results
acycle
lower
average
WIP level.
By into
Littles
Law, this
also translates
into
shorter
manufacturing
times.
2. steadier,
Smoothermore
Prodpredictable
uction Flooutput
w: By dampening
uctuations in WIP level, kanban achieves a
stream.
3. rework
Improved
Quality:these
A system
with short
cannot
high levels
yield loss
and
will quickly
shut queues
down
line.tolerate
Additionally,
shortofqueues
reduce
the
timebecause
between
creation
andprovides
detection
of athe
defect.
a result,
kanban
pressure
for
better quality
and
an environment
inAs
which
to achieve
it. both applies
4. Reduced
Cost: By
the control
from release
rate Each
to WIP
level (card
count),
kanban
provides
an switching
explicit
means
to
stress
the have
system.
reduction
inbreaks
WIP
will
cause
problems
(e.g.,
a setup
is too
long,
assemblies
t starving
problems,
worker
are
uncoordinated,
etc.)
to
show
up
in
the
form
of
blocking
and
in
the
line.
Only
by
solving
these
can
the
progression
toward
leaner
(lower
inventory)
production
proceed.
This
process
was
widely
described
via
the
analogy
of
lowering
the
water
(inventory)
in
a
river
to nd the rocks (problems). The end result is a more ecient system with lower costs.
The
subtler, ifproblem
identify what
is about
kanban that
yieldsed
these
bene
ts. second,
This
isand
important
we
are is
to tounderstand
how itmuch
kanban
be simpli
generalized
and still
be eective.
In essence,
this is the question
of what
reallycan
constitutes
pull. or
The water-and-rocks
analogy
suggests
that the beneresearch
ts of kanban
stem from this
environmental
improvements
rocks
or aproblems).
supported
view. For
instance,
Huang(removing
et
al.
[22]
performed
simulation Some
of
kanban
andhas
concluded
that without
signi

ca
nt
changes
in
the
manufacturing
environment,
kanban
would
not
be
successful
in the that
U.S.
Krajewski
et
al.
[31]
performed
an
even
more
comprehensive
simulation
study
and
concluded
the
bene

t
of
kanban
is
due
more
to
an
improved
environment
than
to
any
fundamental
change
in logistics.
But
ascribing
bene
ts to environmental
improvements
does not
explain
exactly
what
about
kanbankanbans
leads
to the
improvements.
most
researchers
were
notts.
willing
to
credit
environmental
improvements
as JIT
the and
soleFurthermore,
explanation
of had
all
of
JITs
bene
Ohno
clearly
regarded
kanban
as
essential
to
many
companies
used
versions
of
it
to
great
success.
Moreover,
if
the
ow
control
method
didnt
matter,
then
successful
JIT
companies
could
have reverted to MRP after improving their environments. But this did not happen.
Hence,
models.to understand more fully what makes kanban work, researchers turned to mathematical
Karmarkar
appears and
to have
been papers
rst to note
the The
similarities
of
to isearlier
base stock
systems
in two
insightful
27].
system
he kanban
discusses
very
similar
a
traditional
basesimple
stock
system
as described
byD.[26,
Simpson
(1958).
Simpson
attributes
this
systemtoto
George
Kimball
in
an
unpublished
Arthur
Little
report,
which
Karmarkar
had
published
in
1988 [29].
Simpson describes the base stock system as follows:

When
an orderis is
placed,
it is
fromininventory
if the
is not
zero.an
If
the
inventory
the order
islled
placed
aorder
backorder
le,inventory
to be placed
lled
when
item
arrives.
In zero,
any event,
a manufacturing
is immediately
with
the
preceding
manufacturing
operation
to
produce
an
item
to
replace
the
item
that
has
been
The materials
manufacturing
in turn,inventory,
immediately
anasorder
for
theconsumed.
raw
againstoperator,
the
preceding
and places
as soon
order
is required
lled
[i.e.,
heitem.
has In
thethis
needed
inventory],
proceeds
toinventory
operate
on
itthis
to
produce
the
required
way
an
order
against
the
last
for
a
nished
item
is
immediately
transmitted
all
the
way
back
along
the
line
to
all
the
manufacturing operations, each of which is galvanized into production.
But, while
kanban and
the base [45]
stock
systems are similar, they are not identical. The
dierence
was described
by Spearman
as follows:
Kanban
would
not place
an
order
more
parts
if a demandstock
(in thepoint.
form ofInstead,
a move there
card)
had
arrived
when
there
was
no for
stock
in
the outbound
would
be
one
or
more
production
cards
already
in
process
and
whenever
one
of
these
was
completed,
the waiting
move
card
be immediately
attached
to the
recently
completed
container
of parts
and
thewould
production
card would
be sent
back
into
production.
In this
kanban
system
the system while
the way
baseastock
system
doesbounds
not. the amount of WIP there can be in
Spearman are
et al.
[42] and
Spearman
andsetup
Zazanis
[46] found
that while specic environmental
improvements
certainly
inthe
uential
(e.g.,
reduction,
production
primary logistical
reasons
for
improved
performance
of pull
systems: smoothing), there are three
1. Lone
ess shows
Congestion:
Comparison
of a open
queueing
with anthan
equivalent
closed
that throughput.
the
average WIP
in
the network
closed
network
openfact
network
given
the
same
The isein
lower
ect
isopen
relatively
minor
andnegatively
is duethe
tocorrelated
the
that
queue
lengths
have
no
correlation
an
system
but
are
in
a
closed queueing network, an observation made earlier by Whitt [54].
2. Easier Control: This is a fundamental benet, which results from several observations:
a. WIP is easier to control than throughput since it can be observed directly.
b. Throughput
is typically
controlledbe
with respect by
to ca
pacity. Because
it cannot
be
observed
directly,
capacity
considering
process
time,
random
workermust
eciencestimated
y, rework and
other factors
thattime,
aectsetup
the
potential
rate ofoutages,
production.
c. capacity
Throughput
is controlled
specifyingisan
input
rate.
If the
input
rate is less
than the
of
the
linebuilds
then by
throughput
equal
input.
If not,
throughput
is equal
to
capacity
and
WIP
without
bound.
Byto
incorrectly
estimating
capacity,
input
can
easily
exceed
the
true
capacity.
This
is
particularly
true
when
seeking
high
utilization
rates.
As
a
result,
systems
that
control
WIP
are
substantially
more
robust
control
errors illustration
than are systems
controlethroughput
(see Chapter 10 of [18] for to
a
mathematical
of this that
robustness
ect).

3. WIP
Cap:
The bene
ts of a pull everywhere.
environment This
owe more
to the fact
WIP isthat
bounded
than
to
the
practice
of the
pulling
was argued
by that
observing
a simple
overall
bound
on
WIP
(i.e.,
as
in a
closed
queueing
network
without
blocking)
will
promote
the
same
bene

ts
as
those
cited
for
kanban
and
by
showing
that
the
throughput
of
a
closed
queueing
network
without
blocking is greater than that of a closed queueing network
with blocking
(i.e.,
a kanban
system).
Based on
these
ndings,the
Spearman
hybrid
push/pull
system
known
as
CONWIP
that
possesses
benetsand
of Zazanis
kanban proposed
but canabe
applied
to more
general
man3
ufacturing
settings.
A number
of which
properties
of
CONWIP
systems
were demonstrated
using
simulation
in
Spearman,
et
al.
[42],
also
described
several
practical
implementation
considerations.
The
book Factory
Physics [18]
also
discussed several
ways in[18].
which
CONWIP work
can by
be
implemented,
including
using
CONWIP
inthe
make-to-order
environments
Independent
Veatch
and
Wein
[52]
also
concluded
that
WIP
constraint
is
a
major
source
of
the
bene

t
of
kanban.

3.3 Comparisons and Generalizations


During
the
late 1980s
and early
1990s
a number
of of
researchers
dican
erent
of
kanban,
CONWIP
and other
systems.
A good
overview
the work compared
before 1996
beversions
found in
[23].
As more
variants
kanban Buzacott
and relateddescribed
systems were
proposed, researchers
began toin
seek
to
unify
them.
For of
example,
a generalized
kanban
policy
[7] ways
and
introduced
the
concept
of
production
authorization
cards.
This
concept
was
developed
further
in
[8]
where
it
was
shown
to
represent
MRP,
kanban,
CONWIP,
as
well
as
many
hybrid
systems.
Using is
thistheframework
and sample
path arguments,
Buzacott
Shanthikumar
showed
that
CONWIP
optimalthe
structure
throughput
for and
any viewing
WIP
limiting
system.
Tayur
[49] also
considered
questionfordepending
ofmaximizing
the optimal
pull they
structure,
systems
as
a
continuum
from
kanban
to
CONWIP
on
how
are
partitioned
into
WIP
controlled
and considered how to optimize the allocation of cards in such systems so
as
to maximizesegments
throughput.
In another stock
unication
paper,
and
Rosling
[2] showed
that
is amultiple
special type
of
installation
policy
(i.e.,Axsater
one
which
the reorder
is kanban
an integer
of also
the
reorder
quantity
and where
backlogs
arein
not
subtracted
frompoint
theposition
inventory
position).
They
de

ned
an
echelon
stock
policy
in
which
the
inventory
is
the
sum
of
the
installation
inventory
positions
for policies
the installation
and all downstream
installations.
Theyand
then
demonstrated
echelon
stock
will always
installation
stock
policies
kanban
will
beathat
dominated
by
a echelon
stock
policy. dominate
In later
work,with
Axsater
and
Rosling
[3, so
4]
showed
that
kanban
system
can
be
reproduced
within
MRP
a
suitable
selection
of
parameters
(i.e.,
zero
lead
time,
and
the
safety
stock
less
one
is
a
multiple
of
the
order
quantity).
The
result
is
completely
general
except
that
MRP
is
a
periodic
review
system
while
the
kanban
system is a continuous review system (although there is no reason why the review in
3

They termed this a hybrid system because the first station in the line requires a pull signal (kanban card)
but the other stations in the line do not. So, all operators except the one at the first station behave the same as
they would in a conventional push system; they just process jobs when they have them.

MRP
coulddominated
not be done
This
matters
since ifwill
kanban
is a subset
of MRP,
then it
is
clearly
by continuously).
MRP.
this
dominance
be limited
to the
experimental
conditions
Axsater
andHowever,
Rosling
model
does
robustness
issues,
such as
those arisingsince
from the
mistakenly
releasing
too much
work
intonot
the consider
line.
Other
generalizations
of kanbana block-and-hold-k
include those of Glasserman
Yao [21]how
andmuch
Yaowork
and
Cheng
[12]. should
These be
papers
introduce
cardcation
thatand
determines
in
process
keptmove
before
moving.
However,
because
justi
of this the
approach
relies
on
the
existence
of
separate
cards,
the
bene

ts
disap
pear
when
we
consider
equivalent
onecard kanban system.
Suri [48] introduced a generalization of kanban called Paired-cell Overlapping Loops of
Cards with Authorization or POLCA. POLCA is dierent from kanban in that cards are
assigned to pairs of cells rather than particular parts within a cell. The result is a more general
construct than kanban that can be applied to make-to-order situations. Because the initial
authorization is from an MRP system, but cards are used to limit WIP within pairs of cells,
POLCA possesses both push and pull characteristics. One drawback, however, is that one must
set a card count for every set of consecutive cells. Nonetheless, Suri describes several examples
where POLCA has been used to greatly reduce overall cycle times and WIP.
More recently, Liberopoulos and Dallery [33] (building on [13, 10]) developed another generalized pull system in the form of a make-to-stock system with separate limits on nished goods
(S) and WIP (K ) that we will refer to as a (K, S) system. This model incorporates classical
base stock (K = , S < ), CONWIP (K = S), single-stage reserved-stock kanban as in [7]
(K < S), single-stage backordered kanban policy as in [7] and [13] (K > S) and several other
formulations. They dene a critical WIP, Kc , as a minimum WIP level that supplies enough
throughput from the production system so that for any K Kc , the optimal base stock level is
equal to the base stock level that would occur with K = , noted as S . They then conjecture
that the policy parameters that minimize total WIP and nished goods (with identical carrying
costs) are Kc and S . If this conjecture is true, then one can easily improve on a CONWIP
make-to-stock policy by providing separate limits on WIP and nished goods. A trivial case is
that of a single server production-inventory system, where the optimal values are clearly Kc = 1
and S set to whatever value is required to maintain the ll rate.

4 Meanwhile, In the Real World . . .


The
research
literature
gave
a clear
de
nition ofin
kanban
a detailed
summary
of itsHowever,
benets.all
It
also
showed
that
kanban
could
be that
generalized
a wideand
variety
practical
these
variantsis
ofit?kanban
suggested
pull was certainly
a more of
general
idea ways.
than kanban.
So,
what exactly
did not
have
a clear pull
answer.
forhigh-level
this was terms.
that Ohno and the other
earlyIndustry
practitioners
of JIT
discussed
only One
in veryreason
general,

Manufacturers
workplaces
can
no onto
longerthe
base
production
desktop
alone
and
then
disand
tribut
or push,
them
market.
has on
become
a mplanning
attinerthe
of
course
forof
customers,
ore, users,
each
with
a di
erent
valueIt they
system,
toinstand
front
line
the
marketplace
and,
so
to
speak,
pull
the
goods
need,
the amount
and at the time they need them. (Ohno, 1988, p. xiv)

In
words,toone
shouldofnot
a large
amount
and then try to go and sell
it. other
One needs
be aware
the simply
marketmake
and pay
attention
to of
thestock
customer.
While
this
might
sound
like
common
sense
today,
it
was
revolutionary
for the mid
20th
Century.
But
it only needed
described
the
strategy
of work,
pull, not
the (1)
tactics
of pull.
Although
Ohno
did
outline
the
elements
to
make
pull
to
namely
standard
work
methods
(autonomation) and (2) level production, his writings fell short of providing a working description of pull.
Because
of
the
lack
of
a
more
precise
de

nition
of
pull
at
the
shop
oor
level,
pull
quickly
became
equatedMRP
with (see,
its e.g.,
rst manifestation,
kanban. articles
Symmetrically,
push became
nearly synonymous
[16]).such
Most
magazine
andoftrade
vague andwith
self referential
denitions,
as pull
is the opposite
pushpress
(see books
below).provided
A rare
was
theof1993
book Just-in-Time
Manufacturing:
An Introduction
which
stated,
.to
.exception
. the
pull
mode
manufacturing
only allows
parts to
to process.
be moved
from
the42].
previous
operation
the
next
when
the
subsequent
operation
is
ready
[11,
p.
They
identied one of the advantages of pull as follows:
Pull
systems
far outreach
the and
responsiveness
of a push
system.
Theprocesses
responsiveness
ofdownstream
thebysystem
to changes
problems
which
arise in
upstream
allows
the
processes
to
be
shut
down.
This
prevents
the
accumulation
of
inventory on the plant oor. [11, p. 43]
In short, a WIP cap prevents a WIP explosion. Sadly, this book was not typical.
In the mid-1990s pull shifted in popular usage from being synonymous with kanban to
shorthand for make-to-order. A key catalyst for this change was the 1996 book by Womack
and Jones, Lean Thinking, which was a follow-on to their highly successful The Machine That
Changed the World. Unfortunately, while this book was widely read and provided many details
and case histories related to lean techniques, including pull, it did not provide clean denitions
of basic concepts. (In a sense, this book was the opposite of Ohnos, which was short on details,
but clear on basic philosophy.) For instance, in the chapter titled, Pull Womack and Jones
begin,
Pull in simplest
terms downstream
means that asks
no one
upstream
shouldfollowing
produce this
a good
service
customer
for it,
but actually
rule or
in
practiceuntil
is a bthe
it more
complicated.
While
this at
may
like a level
reformulation
Ohnos
description
of pull,
it is not. and
Whiledemand,
Ohno
was
speaking
thelook
strategic
about the
theoftactics
basic
connection
between
production
Womack
and
Jones
were
talking
about
of implementing
lean.
At
the
tactical
level,
waiting
for
customers
to
ask
for
goods
or
services
does
indeed
cause
things
to
get
a
bit
more
complicated.
For instance,
Ohnos
supermarket
example. The grocer would have
to
wait for the customer
to ask forconsider
his groceries
before
stocking them!
Lean Thinking was just one of many books and articles that confused the concept of pull
with the simpler idea of make-to-order. But because of its popularity, it has served to muddle
the understanding of pull signicantly. It has become common for managers to state that pull
is make-to-order while push is make-to-stock. For example, when Alcoa announced its heavily

publicized
of theofbasic
tenantscontrol
was: Produce
for use, not for
inventoryAlcoa
[1] evenProduction
though its System,
principleone
method
production
was kanban.
Unfortunately,
such
lean
thinking
has
become
pervasive
in
industry.
Boeing,
now
a champion
of their
lean web
and site:
a provider of lean training to its suppliers, gives the following de
nition
for
pull on
Pull
Production
is the opposite
of push.
It means
products
the customer
has requested
or pulled
it, and
not before.
[5] are made only when
Using
this de
nition,
a make-to-order
contradicts
the
historical
intent of pull.MRP system would be an ideal pull system, which clearly
Despite
the
confusion
over tactical
pull,
companies implementing
lean
appreciate
Ohnos
insight
that
leveling
production
was key
to strategic
pull For
andexample,
that
thedid
way
to accomplish
this
was
to
use
a
takt
time
or
takt-paced
production.
Boeing
de

ned
taktpaced production as [6]:
Takt-Paced
rate things
of assembly
a factory.
Lean does not
mean
doing Production
things
faster;describes
itestablishes
meansthedoing
attakt
thein
right
pace.
Essentially,
the
customers
rate
of
demand
the
pace,
or
time.
So,
rather
thanthat
simply
maximizing
the
rate
of
work,
lean
sets
the
pace
in
the
factory,
ensuring
the
customers needs are met on time.
Taken
at face
value, demands
it would would
appear be
thathugely
demand
must
be extremely
regular
because
otherwise
following
customer
ine
cient.
In reality,
however,
setting
a pace
(instead
of
chasing
demand)
is
exactly
what
Boeing
(and
Toyota)
do
to
smooth
the
demand
that
is
seen
by
the
plant.
This
means
that
they
set
the
takt
time
based
on
a
current
backlog
of
orders
and
then
adjust
it
from
time
to
time.
Since
most
releases
can
be
connected
to
a
customer
order,
these
systems are, in an overall sense, make-to-order.
In an analytical
sense,
production
smoothing
is really
a simple
mattera of
bubacklog
ering the
production
line
from temporarily
demand
variability.
This
buare
ering
is done
with
either
time
or
inventory.
If
demand
increases,
orders
backlogged.
If
orders
are
needed
later,
the
line
will
build
up
some
inventory.
Furthermore,
while
the
takt
time
drives

nal
assembly,
component
parts must
be available
in order
for them to with
be pulled
from
internal
fabrication
centers
outside
Clearly,
any component
amust
leadbe
time
longer
than
the time
betweenor
start
of the suppliers.
nal assembly
and when
the unit is needed
made-to-stock.
If
actual
demand
varies
enough
(e.g.,
due
to
seasonality
or
random
surges)
the
order
backlog
occasionally
run customer
dry. Whenorders.
this occurs
theitis
rmpossible
must adjust
takt
time
and/or
release
some may
jobs
without
explicit
Hence,
for athe
takt
time
based
system
to pre-release
jobs in make-to-forecast
mode.
The bottomthis
lineonly
is that
although
practitioner
literature
has commonly
desystems
ned pull
to be
make-to-order,
applies
at thethe
strategic
level.make-to-forecast.
At the tactical
level, this,
the
used
to implement
pull have
can
be
make-to-stock,
or even
is no actually
wonder
that many
practitioners
found
the literature
on lean
confusing and Given
dicult
toitimplement.

5 The Essence of Pull


To
remove
we need
a denition
of pull that
captures
what isitessential
for obtaining
its
ts,this
butconfusion,
does not overly
restrict
implementation
(e.g.,
by equating
with a speci
c system
suchbene
as kanban).
As we noted above, the term pull can be applied at the both strategic and the tactical
levels. Establishing a takt time to set the output of the plant to be equal to demand is a
way to establish strategic (or market) pull. This was an important part of Ohnos original
vision (around 1950) and was adopted (or, more likely, independently discovered) by those who
developed computer based push systems. For instance, in 1970 Wight described very similar
logic (i.e., Input/Output Control) to be used with MRP [55]. Hence, strategic pull can be
implemented even in, what have been traditionally called, push systems.
Therefore, the key question we must answer to fully dene pull is what constitutes tactical
pull, as characterized by kanban. To be meaningful, we must dene pull so that it includes
those systems that people tend to think of as pull (e.g., kanban) but not those that have been
considered as push (e.g., MRP). Moreover, if pull is somehow intrinsically better, our denition
should provide a means to determine if a system belongs to a class of systems that dominate in
performance. Finally, although admittedly less important, such a denition should settle long
standing debates among academics as to whether various systems (e.g., basestock models and
other make-to-stock variations) are fundamentally pull or push systems.

5.1 The Fundamental Dierence Between Push and Pull


Given
commonTousage,
we(tactical)
begin with
thewe
assumption
that kanban what
is a pull
system, while MRP
isnt
a
push
dene
pull,
need to characterize
is fundamentally
diere
about system.
these systems.
Axsater
andany
Rosling
[3] show can
that
is more
general
than
an installation
stock
(Q,
r)policy
so
that
(Q,ar)-policy
beMRP
replaced
by
an
MRP
system.
This
implies
that
MRP
should
also
dominate
kanban
policy
since
it
is
simply
an
installation
stock
policy
with
an
additional
limit
onkey
thetonumber
of outstanding
[2]. However,
the that
additional
constraint
appears
to
be the
the system
eecti
veness
ofa certain
theorders
pullpoint
system.
fact
kanban
not
continue
adding
orders
to the
beyond
puts The
a cannot
natural
limit
on WIP.does
Thus,
no
matter
how
wrong
the
forecast
or
how
great
the
demand,
the
system
be
overwhelmed
beyond
its
capacity.
Since
the
output
of
a
production
line
is
an
increasing
but
bounded
function
of
WIP
(bounded
by
the
bottleneck
rate),
while
ow
time
begins
to
grow
almost
linearly
beyond
a
certain
point,
itand
is pointless
to
add
more
to a system that is already saturated [44]. Findings by
Veatch
[52]Physics
also
point
to work
the bene
at length
in Wein
Factory
(Chapter
10). cial eects of having a WIP limit and we discuss these
Based on this observation we propose the following denition:
Denition
andthat
Push):
A pull
production
system
is one
thatimplies
explicitly
thepramount
of
work
in(Pull
process
can be
in the
system. By
default,
this
that limits
a push
oduc- tion
system
system. is one that has no explicit limit on the amount of work in process that can be in the
If we are model
interested
in the
essence
of purely
push pull
or pull,
is quitea easy
construct a
mathematical
that only
is either
purely
push or
. Foritinstance,
closedtoqueueing

Push
Pull

Make-to-Forecast
MRP
with
forecast

Make-to-Order
MRP
orderswith rm

Make-to-Stock
(Q,
with pull
fromr)FGI

kanban with takt


time & forecast

kanban with takt


time & orders

kanban with pull


from FGI

Table 1: Examples of Push and Pull.

network,
with a rigidly
limit on the number of entities, is a pure pull system, while an open
queueing
(e.g.,does
a set
GI/G/1
WIP whilesystem
the latter
not. queue) is an pure push system. The former has a clear limit on
But
in
the
real
world
there
are
noonpure
push
or production
pure pull systems.
Forare
example,
a
kanban
system establishes
a clear
limit
WIPbe
viaoverridden
the
cards,
there
almost while
always
circumstances
under
which
this
limit
will
(e.g.,
a
downstream
non-bottleneck
machine
goes down).
while
MRPmanagement
does not establish
a limit
on WIP,order
therereleases
is almost
certainly
level
ofConversely,
WIP that
will cause
to further
ignore
the
planned
revise
thesome
master
production
schedule
in order
to (e.g.,
prevent
WIP
growth. toIndeed,
there or
is
presumably
some
limit
on
WIP
for
every
system
an
amount
equivalent
1000
years
of
demand).
The
distinction,
however,
is
that
the
WIP
limit
in
practical
pull
systems
is
explicitly
stated
and
is
generally
small.
Any
WIP
limit
in
a
practical
push
system
is
implicit,
large
and
usually comes into play too late (i.e., after WIP is out of control).
Hence,
our de
nition
gives a black
and
white the
distinction
push and
pull among
mathematical
But
the real
generally
case,
is of
a matter
shades
of gray.
The
extent
tomodels.
which
a system
will world,
obtain astheis bene
ts of pull
depends
on howofsharply
the
up-front
WIP limit
is imposed.

5.2 Make-to-Stock and Make-to-Order


Note
that
our or
demake-to-forecast
nition of pull does
not involve
of make-to-order
make- tostock
(MTS)
Indeed,the
as concepts
we
illustrate
in Table
1,(MTO),
the
push/pull
distinction
is are
orthogonal
to
the (MTF).
MTO/MTS/MTF
decision.
These
examples
show
that all
combinations
possible.
Hence,
while
MTO
may
indeed
be
superior
in
many
environments
to
MTS
or production
MTF, thise
distinction
doesend,
notit capture
the essence
ofWIP
why that
tactical
pull
systems
improve
cienc
y.
In
the
is
the
explicit
limit
on
de

nes
a
tactical
pull system and makes it work.

5.3 Push or Pull


The
good
news inherent
our
denition
of pull
is thatWIP.
it implies
that are
pullothers.
can beTo
implemented
in a
variety
of ways.
Kanban in
ismost
certainly
one way
to limit
But there
illustrate
this
we
consider
common
systems
found in industry
and the
literature
and classify
them
as eithersome
pushoforthe
pull.
1. MRP
is without
a push regard
systemtobecause
are made
to limit
a master
production
schedule
system releases
status. Hence,
no aaccording
priori WIP
exists.

2. Classic
kanban is a pull system. The number of kanban cards establishes a xed limit on
WIP.
3. Classic
Base
Stock System
is,
pushissystem
because
there iscan
no
limit
on beyond
the amount
of work level.
in somewhat
process insurprisingly,
the system.a This
because
backorders
increase
the basestock
4. because
Installation
(Q,a r)
is on
alsotheanumber
push system
neitherstock
imposes
limit
of ordersasinare
theechelon
system.stock (Q, r) systems
5. important
CONWIPdiiserence
a pull
system
because
it implementation
limits WIP viastandpoint
cards similar
to the
kanban.
An
from
kanban
from an
is that
cards are
line
specicards
c rather
speci
as
c. kanban
However,
from a push/pull
perspective,
CONWIP
limitthan
WIP part
in thenumber
same manner
cards.
6. (K,
systems
(proposed by Liberopoulos and Dallery) are pull systems if K < and are
pushS)
systems
otherwise.
7. WIP
POLKA
systems
proposed by Suri is a pull system because, like kanban and CONWIP,
is limited
by cards.
8. number
PAC systems
byserve
Buzacott
Shanthikumar
of processproposed
tags (which
to limitand
WIP)
is less than inisniaty.pull system when the
9. MRP with a WIP constraint (as suggested by Axsater and Rosling ) is a pull system.

6 Other Issues
The confusion surrounding pull has led to confusion around other issues. These include the
push/pull interface and the essence of what denes lean production.

6.1 The Inventory/Order Interface


If
we
accept
the above [32]
denition
push andinpull
systems,
the push/pull
interface
by
Lee
andwere
Billington
and was
byofourselves
[18]virtually
is actually
misnomer. systems
What
we
anddescribed
Leemakeand
Billington
pointing out
the fact
that
all aproduction
include
to-stock
and
make-to-order
segments.
For
instance,
consider
the
stylized
McDonalds
system
shown
in
Figure
3.
During
rush
hour,
when
there
are
speci

ed
targets
for
the
warming
table,
production
up istomake-to-order.
the warming table is make-to-stock; production beyond this point (i.e., bagging
and checkout)
Because the warming table generally establishes a WIP cap on the front end of the line but
there is no rm limit on WIP in the back end of the line, we dened these segments as pull and
push and called the interface (warming table) the push/pull interface. But, since theoretically
one could envision systems like this with no WIP limit on the front end and/or a nite limit
on WIP in the back end, this is not a proper denition. A more accurate term would be the
inventory/order (I/O) interface, since it represents the point in the production process where
the stimulus for work movement shifts from make-to-stock to make-to-order.

Figure 3: The inventory/order interface.


This
correction
inmaking,
terminology
notthese
change
the fundamental
that we
and Lee
and
Billington
were
which does
is that
interfaces
existinventory/order
in allpoint
production
systems
and
that
positioning
them
is
a
management
decision.
Locating
the
interface
at
raw
materials
produces
a
conventional
make-to-order
system,
while
locating
it
at

nished
goods
produces
a
classic
make-to-stock
system.
Locating
it
at
an
intermediate
point
(e.g.,
by
stocking
components
or subassemblies) leads to an assemble-to-order system, which can be used if the

rm wants
cycle
time.to be able to quote customer lead times that are shorter than the overall manufacturing

6.2 Lean Production


Just
as kanban
wasjust
partasofthere
the larger
construct of
JIT, pull about
is partpull,
of the
larger
construct of
lean
production.
And
isessence
considerable
there
is confusion
about
lean.
Most
sources
describe
thebooks
ofarticles
leanconfusion
production
asspeaking
waste reduction.
But
since
this
doesnt
sound
very
deep,
lean
and
are
fond
of
in
terms
of
elimination
muda
. Butiswhether
one
speaks
in English
or Fredrick
Japanese,Taylor
the idea
of Henry
reducing
waste
in aggressive
search of
of
echampions
ciency
hardly
new.
Andrew
Carnegie,
and
Ford
were
elimination
a hundred
years
ago.
So,waste
eitherreduction.
lean production is simply a new
name for anofoldwaste
concept
or it means
something
more
than
Our opinion isframework
that whilefor
lean
is certainly
concerned
with
outofwaste,
it represents
a
more
enhancing
ecienc
y. Using
thedriving
language
factory
physics we
can defundamental
ne lean as:
Denition
(Lean):
buering
costs. Production of goods or services is lean if it is accomplished with minimal
The
rst excessive
source of excess
buering
is obvious
waste.that
Such
waste
includes
operations
that
are
not
needed,
setup
unreliable
machines
can
be made
more
reliable,
rework
that
can be waste
eliminated,
etc. times,
Indeed,
to the for
dismay
of some
lean
practitioners,
Shingo
once
said,
Eliminate
is a non-sensical
slogan
this very
reason.
We
take it as a given

that
the elimination
obvious waste
obvious.
Unfortunately,
this tends
be the focus
and limit
of most leanofimplementations
thatisnever
get to
the real meat
of theto
problem.
The
less
obvious
source
of
bu

ering
costs
is
variability.
This
can
take
on
many
forms,
including
variability
in process
times,
delivery times,
yieldand
rates,
stang levels,
demand
rates,
etc.
Anything
in
the
system
that
is
not
absolutely
regular
predictable
exhibits
variability.
The
causes
of variability
can be
classied
into internal
factors, such rates,
as setups,
downtime
(scheduled and
unscheduled),
operator
induced
uctuations
in
production
yield
loss,
rework,
engineering
change
orders
and
many
others,
and
external
factors,
including
irregular
demand,
product
variety
(to
market
needs),strategy,
customersuch
change
etc.
variability
isvaoften
the to
consequence
of
ameet
rms
business
as orders,
oering
highExternal
levels of
product
riety
achieve
a
competitive
advantage.
In such
instances,
a certain
amount
of
variability
is simply
a costFor
of
doing
business.
But
external
variability
is
not
always
justi

ed
by
strategic
considerations.
example,
o

ering
discounts,
pushing
to
make
end-of-quarter
sales
targets,
interrupting
operations
to
satisfy a specic customer, and so on, may not generate sucient revenue to justify their
cost.
Regardless
of its source,
allis variability
inare
a production
will be buebu
red.eA
fundamental
principle
of
physics
that
therestocks
three
typessystem
of variability
r:variability
inventory,
capacity
andfactory
time.
For example,
safety
represent
inventory
buers(i.e.,
against
in
demand
and/or
production.
Excess
capacity
can
also
provide
protection
a
capacity
bu
er)
against

uctuations
in
demand
and/or
production.
Finally,
safety
lead
times
provide
a time
bu

er
against
production
variability.
While
the
exact
mix
of
bu

ers
is
a
management
decision,
the
decision of whether or not to buer variability is not. If variability exists, it will be buered
somehow.
This framework suggests a few simple steps for lean implementation:
1. mistakes
EliminatethatObvious
Waste:
Unnecessary
moves (e.g.,
into
andthat
outleads
of a towarehouse),
require
an
operation
be repeated,
poor
layout
excessive
material
handling,
andMost
thousands
of toother
examples
of
poor
manufacturing
practice
represent
obvious
waste.
lean
sources
focus
on
these
and
they
are
clearly
important.
But,
the
goal
of
eliminating
direct
waste
is
as
old
as
the
factory
system
itself.
While
this
needs
to
be
done
more
thoroughly
than
ever
to
be
competitive
in
a
global
economy,
the
principle
is
the same as it has always been.
2. Swap
Bu
ers:theInventory
bubu
ers
are
evil
because increasing
they hide another
problems.
if we
simply
reduce
inventory
erorders
without
deliberately
buHowever,
er, thecapacity
default
bu

er
will
be

rst,
time
(i.e.,
late
will
cause
poor
customer
service),
and
then
(i.e.,
customers
cancel
orders
which reduces
equipment
utilization).
bothcapacity,
of these not
are
bad,
it may
make
sense
to deliberately
the capacity
bu
eroverlooked,
(bySince
adding
reducing
demand).
Indeed,
one
ofinventory
theincrease
mostburevolutionary,
and
steps
taken
by
Toyota
was
a
conscious
shift
from

ering
to
capacity
bu

ering.
At
a
time
when
automotive
plants
generallyby
rantwo-hour
three shifts
a day, Toyota
went to(PM)
a twoperiods.
shift schedule,
with
ten
hour
shifts
separated
preventive
maintenance
These
PM
periods
served as capacity
buers
to allow
make up
any could
shortfalls
ontotheir
production
Withtothese
capacity
bushifts
ers astobackup,
Toyota
aord
run
much
leaner quotas.
with
respect
Furthermore,
has been
much made
of the
use
of problem
solvers
on theinventory.
line at Toyota
[41] that there
are available

whenever
an
problem.
additional
staIncreasing
representscapacity
an evenrst
larger
capacity
bu
eroperator
that washas
nota available
in This
theallows
original
system.
and
then
reducing
inventory
using
a pull
system
one
to reduce
cycle
times without
losing
throughput
or
hurting
customer
service.
Because
cycle
times
are
reduced,
we
can
more
easily
determine
the
root
cause
of
variability
problems.
At
this
point
we
can
begin
making
real improvements by reducing variability.
3. Reduce
Variability:
Because
variability
buering
itoverlooked.
is a fundamental
source
of
waste.
But
it isofanthe
indirect
source
ofassociated
wastenecessitates
and with
is therefore
often
may
be
very
aware
obvious
waste
machine
failures
(i.e.,these
theManagers
lost capacity),
but
they
may
not
appreciate
the
extent
to
which
the
variability
caused
by
failures
results
in
lost throughput
or long
times (i.e.,
increased
inventory,
capacity
time
bu
high
ers). WIP,
Because
of
this, weon
feel
thatcycle
variability
reduction
is close
to the
coresetup
oforlean.
Indeed,
with
itspreventive
emphasis
production
smoothing,
quality
improvement,
time
reduction,
total
maintenance
and
many
other
practices,
it
is
clear
that
Toyota
appreciated
key
role of variability
reduction
in JITand
right
from theisstart.
As Because
Inman [25]
elegantly
putthe
it,
inventory
is theSixower
ofhas
allaevil
variability
its root.
it
is
a
variability
reduction
method,
Sigma
natural
connection
to
lean
in
the
same way
TQM
had a central
role innot
JIT.a However,
it shouldforbeimprovement
clear that Six(e.g.,
Sigma
is Sigma
a methodology
for
variability
reduction,
general
strategy
Six
does
not
address
obvious
So once
in WIP
by using
pull system
has reduced
cycle times,
the waste).
plant can
beginthe
toreduction
identify and
eliminate
manythe
sources
of variability.
4. Continual
Improvement:
variability
is reduced,
we
reduce
the
capacitycapacity
buer
and
keep
the
buerAslow.
Toyota
didtothis,
theycan
were
able
to reduce
bu
ers
to low.
the inventory
point
of running
theirAs
plants
close
capacity
while
keeping
cycle
time and
inventory
The
result
was
improved
productivity
that
could
be
sustained.
Nonetheless,
regardless
of how
diligently systems.
management
pursued
variability
reduction,
variability
always
be
part
of production
So, the
decision
of products
how to bu
erintroduced,
the variability will
will
require
continual
attention.
As
the
system
changes
(new
are
processes
are
updated,
etc.)
variability
will in
increase.
If approached
passively,
buinventory
ers will simply
arise.
For
instance,
process
variability
a
production
system
will
cause
to
increase,
throughput
to fall,bu
customer
service
to decline, or a combination of these and other
consequences.
ering
need
choose the mix But
of buers
it wishes
to not
use. be done passively; management can, and should,
There
are otherwith
paths
to becoming
lean other
the one
Toyota
took.
Forapproach
instance, was
one quite
of us
has
been
working
Moog,
Inc., a producer
of than
precision
servo
valves.
Their
di

ere
nt
from
Toyotas
but
consistent
with
the
basic
principles
outlined
above.
Moogs
basic
problem
wasdown.
that lead
timeswas
were
too long
for the
changing
market, costs
were up,these
and issues
customer
service
was
There
a real
danger
of losing
customers.
To address
we
developed
and implemented
the following
strategy:
1. Eliminate obvious waste. Using lean methods such as Value Stream Mapping and 5S
look for and eliminate easy problems. We save the hard problems for later.

2. Increase
the inventory
busub-assembly
er to insulate
problems
in fabrication.
Essentially
we
isolated
fabrication
the
nal
assembly
areas by
establishing
kanban
stores
for
most
offrom
the
components.
Toand
set
these
inventory
levels
we
used
more
sophisticated
inventory
models
than
those
proposed
by
lean
texts.
In
this
way,
the
lead
time to the customer was cut from 16-20 weeks to less than 4 weeks.
3. lining
Reduce
in sub-assembly
and nalLead
assembly. This was done by streamthe variability
ow
andwent
establishing
CONWIP
days while
service
from lessathan
50% tosystem.
over 95%. time came down from 23 days to 6
4. Reduce inventory buers. Because of the smoother ow, inventory could be reduced.
5. Address
that customer
service has
been
restored,
the
focus
has problems
shifted to in
thefabrication.
more dicultNow
problems
in fabrication.
Issues
such
as setup
reduction
output. and machine maintenance are now being addressed with no disruption of plant
The result
has been
much
greater
responsiveness
to the customer
improved
service. The
improved
ow also
resulted
in an
unexpected
(for management)
benewith
ta greater
than
5% improvement in productivity.
In this section we have dened lean in terms of the cost of buering. This is critical, since
the fundamental objective is not to reduce inventory, increase utilization, shorten lead time,
or even the perfect value stream [59]. The objective is to make money. Since the cost of
the various options for reducing or buering variability will vary between environments, no one
solution is right for all systems. The real challenge of lean is to nd the mix of policies that is
best for each particular environment.

7 Conclusions
Pull
systems
havehave
beenincrementally
a part of the described
manufacturing
lexicon for of
a quarter
of a century.
Duringtheir
this
time,
academics
thevariants
mechanics
pull
systems,
characterized
bene

ts,
extended
kanban
into
an
array
of
and
o

ered
unifying
frameworks
for
integrating
and of
comparing
thewhy
rangepull
of possible
pull
systems.
This work has
steadily
enhanced
our
understanding
how and
works.
Industry
practitioners,
in in
spite
ofsimpler
their many
successes
at
implementing
pull,
seem
to
have
focused
on
describing
pull
ever
terms.
Starting
withpopular
a tendency
to confuse
the general
concept
of view
pull of
with
c practice
of
kanban,
the
literature
has evolved
into athis
simplistic
pullthe
as speci
nothing
more than
making
to customer
orders.
Wesystems
think
is aenvironments.
serious
mistake
that
compromises
the
ability ofproducts
rms to construct
eecti
ve pull
for their
The
ofpull
the of
maintenance
of a WIP
pull
systems can
take
on many
forms
tomagic
suit
di
ereto
ntisinternal
sets
circumstances,
ofcap.
themWhile
have
in common
thatfrom
releases
are
regulated
according
system
status
inall
a manner
that
prevents
inventory
growing
beyond
a
speci

ed
limit.
Because
this
is
fundamental
to
achieving
the
bene

ts
of
pull,
it is
essential
that
pull
be
de

ned
in
terms
of
the
WIP
cap.
Decisions
of
whether
to
make-to-order
or make-to-stock and how to rely on forecasting are certainly important, but are

orthogonal
the pushofversus
pull decision.
WIP issues.
cap denition of pull given in this paper
will preventto
confusion
these important,
but The
separate,
The
sin
of
oversimpli

cation
has
been
carried
over
from
pull
to the
lean.
Practitioner
literature
that
describes
lean production
only insources
terms of of
reducing
waste
does
profession
a disservice
by
overlooking
important
but
indirect
waste.
Moreover,
there
are
many
of
variablity
that result in
a buer that
are notiswaste.
For instance,
adding
variety
to acauses
product
mix
to
accommodate
customers
demands
hardly
considered
waste
but
it
will
reduce
e

ciency
and
increase
bu

ers.
Lean
is
better
de

ned
as
best
bu

er
production
than
low
waste
or
even
low
buencourages
er production.
Thinking in terms
of the more
concepts ofalternatives.
variability and
buering
more comprehensive
consideration
of efundamental
ciency improvement
While
there
have
been
plenty
of
cases
where
academics
have
confused
or
missed
the
pointis of
a
practical
(seecommunity
e.g., [14] forhas
a criticism
of scheduling
research),
we feel for
the us
pull
arena
one
where
theproblem
academic
been a voice
of reason.
The question
now:
is anyone
listening?

8 Acknowledgments
We
would
to thank
Lee Schwarz
for
encouraging
us to write
this paper.
We would
also like
to
thank
the like
truly
wonderful
referees,
Dr.
Robert
Inman,
Dr. guidance
William
Jordan,
Professor
Uday
Karmarkar,
and
Professor
John
Buzacott,
who
provided
much
in
the
preparation
of
the
manuscript.
All
of
their
input
was
extremely
valuable
in
sharpening
our
thinking
and
clearing
up
misunderstandings.
Finally, in
we our
would
like to thank
Professor
Scott Factory
Moses who
pointed
out
an our
important
logical inconsistency
exposition
on pull
in our book,
Physics
.

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