INDIAN SCHOOL OF PETROLEUM & ENERGY

PG Diploma in HSE
EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
(EQUIP)

FOR

Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.

(Assignment - Semester Three)

Subject:

Fire Hazards & Control

Code:

_____ _______ ____________

Date:

_______05/08 /2013_________

Enrollment No.:

_____R102120001_______

Name:

__A. ALLWYN ROZZER_

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FIRE HAZARDS & CONTROL

Assignment 1
Section A (10 marks)
1. Discuss the concepts of FIRE RESISTANCE and PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION.
Answer:
Passive fire protection (PFP) is an integral component of the three components of structural fire protection and
fire safety in a building. PFP attempts to contain fires or slow the spread, through use of fire-resistant walls,
floors, and doors.
There are four main areas of passive fire protection:
i.

Structural fire protection: Structural fire protection guards essential structural components (such as
structural steel and joint systems) from the effects of fire. This is accomplished with a fireproofing
material (spray-on thin-film intumescents, endothermic materials like gypsum-based plasters and
cementitious products, mineral wool wraps and insulation, and fireproofing cladding) or building the
structure out of concrete products. When structural fire protection is designed and applied properly, the
building's structural integrity should be maintained when it's exposed to fire.

ii.

Compartmentation: Fire barriers, firewalls, fire partitions, and smoke barriers are all included in
compartmentation. Fire barriers include fire-rated walls, floors, and ceilings (often made of concrete,
combination wood, gypsum, or masonry). These barriers are used to limit the spread of fire in a building
and allow safe egress. Walls extend from a fire-rated floor to the fire-rated ceiling above, and continue
into concealed spaces for full protection. Fire rated walls and floors protect evacuation routes from fire
and smoke migration, and the window of evacuation time is maximized when the barriers effectively
contain the fire.

iii.

Opening protection: Fire doors and windows are installed in an opening of a fire barrier to maintain its
fire resistance. Doors, builders' hardware, and frames work together to form an effective smoke and fire
barrier. Additionally, fire and smoke dampers (often used in duct systems) are considered "opening
protection" and complete the fire barrier where air ducts penetrate fire-rated and/or smoke-resistant
assemblies.

iv.

Firestopping materials: These materials are used to limit fire spread through penetrations in a fire
barrier.

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2. What are the various WATER-BASED Fixed Fire Protection systems for POL storage tanks and the
components thereof?
Answer:
Water based Fire protection systems utilize the inexpensive and readily available medium of water to discharge
onto flames through a normally fixed piping system.
i)

Water Spray Systems

Water Spray System is a special fixed pipe system connected to a reliable source of pressurised water supply
and equipped with water spray nozzles for application on area / equipment to be protected. The system can be
operated automatically by connection to an automatic detection and alarm system or manually, or both.
These systems can be used for any one or more of the under mentioned purposes:

Extinguishment of fire
Control of fire
Exposure protection (cooling)
Prevention of fire (cooling)

The type of water spray required will depend on the nature of the hazard and protection required.
Types of water spray systems:
There are two basic types of water spray systems installed as fixed systems. One of these is used to extinguish
oil fires and usually referred to as .Water Spray Projector System.; the other is mainly used to provide protection
to plant, processes, equipment, and to prevent explosions, and is generally known as a Water Spray Protector
System
Medium Velocity Water Spray System
This system applies water in finely divided droplets at medium velocity. This is mainly used for fire protection
of areas with fire risks from low FP flammable liquids (FP below 65oC) and also for fire extinguishment of
water miscible liquids (polar solvents, alcohols etc.). It gives protection to tanks, structures, equipments etc. by
cooling, by controlled burning of flammable liquids and also by dilution of explosive gases.
High velocity water Spray system
This is generally used for extinction of fires in flammable medium and heavy oils or similar flammable liquids
having a flashpoint above 65oC. The system projects water in the form of a conical spray, with the droplets of
water travelling at high velocity. Extinguishment is achieved by the three principles of emulsification, cooling
and smothering.

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ii)

Deluge Systems

Deluge systems are used where there are typically fast growing and/or high risk hazards. These types of
environments are best suited for the use of a deluge type sprinkler system or spray system. A deluge system
consists of a fixed piping system, a automatic sprinkler control valve (deluge valve) and open-head sprinklers
(sprinklers without a heat-sensing device like the aforementioned systems). When the detection system is
activated, typically by heat detectors (due to the type of environment), the automatic sprinkler control valve
(deluge valve) will open and introduce pressurized water into the piping and all nozzles will discharge onto the
hazard.

iii)

Fixed Or Semi-Fixed Foam Fire Protection Systems

One practical method to protect flammable liquid storage tanks from fire is with a fixed or a semifixed foam fire
protection system. The foam system can be used for fire prevention, control or direct extinguishment of any
flammable or combustible liquid fire within the tank.
A Fixed System is a complete installation piped from a central foam station, discharging through fixed
discharge devices on the hazard being protected. Foam proportioning components are permanently installed.
A Semi Fixed System is an installation where the hazard is equipped with fixed discharge device(s) which
connect to piping that terminates a safe distance from the hazard. (Normally outside the dike wall.) Foam
producing materials are transported to the scene after the fire starts and are connected to the piping.

iv)

Firefighting Monitors

A Fire monitor is an aimable controllable high-capacity water jet used for manual firefighting. Fire monitors are
often designed to accommodate foam which has been injected in the upstream piping. Fire monitors can be
directed by a single firefighter and can discharge up to, and sometimes over, 2000 gallons per minute (126 litres
per second).
Monitors spend most of their lives static and lifeless. But when a fire is detected they can often be the only
practical way of applying foam or water to the fire.

Section A (20 marks)

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With reference to the fire tetrahedron, discuss in detail ONE of the following (1000 words):
1. HEAT face
2. FUEL face.
Answer :
The fire tetrahedron is a four-sided geometric representation of the four factors necessary for fire:
Fuel (any substance that can undergo combustion)
Heat (heat energy sufficient to release vapor from the fuel and cause ignition)
Oxidizing agent (air containing oxygen), and
Uninhibited chemical chain reaction (sufficient exothermic reaction energy to
produce ignition)
The fuel/air ratio must within flammable limits, which describes the amount of
vapor in air necessary to propagate flame. Removing any of these four factors will
prevent, suppress, or control the fire.

Heat
Without sufficient heat, a fire cannot begin, and it cannot continue. Heat can be removed by the application of a
substance which reduces the amount of heat available to the fire reaction. This is often water, which requires
heat for phase change from water to steam. Introducing sufficient quantities and types of powder or gas in the
flame reduces the amount of heat available for the fire reaction in the same manner. Scraping embers from a
burning structure also removes the heat source. Turning off the electricity in an electrical fire removes the
ignition source.
For many reasons, Heat is needed to initiate the fire and to sustain the same.
Fuel in Solid or liquid phase cannot burn as such, it needed to be in gaseous state. In a process called
Pyrolysis, heat breaks long cellulose molecules down into shorter molecules, which are released as vapours or
volatile gases that can react with oxygen. Heat is required to initiate pyrolysis in fuel before the fuel will burn.
Smaller pieces of tinder or kindling will heat more easily than larger pieces.
Once the fuel is in vapour/gaseous state and in right mix (Explosive range) with air (oxygen), again heat is
required to initiate the fire (source of ignition). Technically, it isn't "heat" that makes a chemical reaction
happen. "Heat" is merely a form of Energy. It is the energy itself that causes a reaction to occur. As an increase
in temperature occurs, there is an increase in the energy in a group of molecules by making them mover around
faster and bump into each other more. The reactants (fuel & oxygen), poses their own energy and they should
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reach the Threshold energy to start the reaction. The reactants absorb certain amount of heat energy and reach
the threshold energy. This energy is called "Activation energy", and is defined as the amount of energy
required to make the reaction (fire) start and carry on spontaneously.
Once the Fire is started, to sustain the Fire also heat is required. As it is clear that each molecule need to absorb
the activation energy and reach the threshold energy to react, there should be energy (heat) available for the
reactants. Hence without the Heat, the Fire cannot sustain. Combustion is generally exothermic reaction, which
gives out energy in the form of Heat and Light, when the molecules react. This energy is sufficient for the other
molecules to reach their threshold energy, thus sustaining the fire.
Hence, it is clear that the heat is very much necessary for the initiation and sustenance of fire and by removing
the Heat the fire can be extinguished.
Fire extinguishing by cooling is more effective when Solids like wood, paper, etc are on fire (Class-A fire).
Water is the more preferred medium for cooling. This is because water is inexpensive, readily available
medium, non-hazardous, easy to handle, above all the ability of water to absorb massive amount of heat by
converting into water vapour. Water also cools the smoke, air, walls, objects in the vicinity, like the tank or
room and thus prevents the fire jumping or reigniting.
Water shall be sprayed as small droplets, so that the surface area of the water is increased, which increases the
rate of heat absorption, hence extinguishing the fire soon. In case of oil fires (class B) fires also the water can
be used as a medium for Fire extinguishing. The water shall be sprayed as very small droplets into the fire,
preferably through a diffuser. These water droplets absorbs the heat and gets converted into steam, thus cooling
the reactants. When there is no sufficient heat for the reactants to reach the threshold energy the fire is inhibited
and extinguished. (Here the water vapour acts as an smothering agent as well).

Section C (20 marks)

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Compare and contrast the two major fire incidents at IOC Jaipur terminal and Buncefield depot with specific
reference to CAUSES and EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT.
Answer:
Jaipur Fire Incident
In the evening shift of October 29, 2009, the Indian Oil Corporations POL (Petroleum Oil Lubricants) Terminal
at Sanganer in Jaipur was preparing to transfer Kerosene (SKO) and Motor Spirit (MS) to the neighbouring
BPCL Terminal, a routine operation for these Installations. A crew of four (one shift officer and three operators)
were manning the IOC Installation. Kerosene was lined up (pipeline made through) first and thereafter the
operating crew proceeded to prepare the MS tank (tank 401-A) for pumping to BPCL installation. In the process
of lining up the MS tank, at about 6.10 PM, a huge leak of the product took place as a jet of liquid from the
Hammer Blind Valve on the delivery line of the tank leading to the MS pump. This liquid MS which rapidly
generated vapours, soon overwhelmed and incapacitated the operator carrying out the line up operation. The
shift officer, who was nearby, tried to help the operator, but he too was affected by the vapours and liquid, and
had to be removed to hospital in a semi-conscious state. The 2nd operator, who was incidentally in the canteen
at the time, also rushed to the spot, but he was also completely overpowered by the strong MS vapours and
liquid and could not be rescued. The 3rd operator on the shift, who was supposed to be on site, had earlier left
for home on some personal work and was thus not available to initiate any rescue or mitigating steps. With none
of the operating crew being available any more for initiating any control actions, the leak continued unabated,
and by the time the senior staff and civil authorities could reach the site, had already engulfed almost the entire
installation, making their entry not only difficult but also dangerous.
After about an hour and 15 minutes of the leak having started, there was a massive explosion followed by a
huge fireball covering the entire installation. It is estimated that in this one hour and 15 or 20 minutes of
uncontrolled leak, about 1000 tons of MS could have escaped out, which would have generated enough vapour
to cause anexplosion with the equivalence of 20 tons of TNT. The source of ignition, which triggered the
explosion and fire could have been from one of the non flame proof electrical equipment in the Administrative
Block, or from a vehicle being started in the installation. The fire which followed the explosion soon spread to
all other tanks and continued to rage for about 11 days. The management of IOCL had taken a considered
decision to allow the petroleum products to burn out to avoid further possibilities of accident in the installation
in the interest of public safety. Ultimately the entire, about 60,000 KL of petroleum products stored in the
Terminal (equivalent of about 1000-1200 retail outlets) at the time of the accident was consumed in the fire, and
the installation was totally destroyed. Buildings in the immediate neighbourhood were heavily damaged with
minor damages and window panes breakages occurring up to around 2 Km from the site.
The total loss estimated on account of the fire and explosion as reported by IOC in the Press, which includes the
loss for finished products, stores, fixed assets and compensation for third party losses, amount to approx., Rs.
280 crores. Eleven people lost their lives in the accident six from IOC and five outsiders, and several others
were injured.

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Immediate Causes
The immediate cause of the accident was the non-observance of normal safe procedure involving sequence of
valve operation in the line up activity and an engineering design which permitted use of a Hammer Blind
Valve, a device which is used for positively isolating a pipeline. The design of the Hammer Blind valve allows
a large area at the top of the valve (at the valve bonnet) to be completely open every time the valve position
needed to be changed. It was through this open area that the liquid MS had gushed out, when the tank was being
lined up (made ready for pumping to BPCL) because another valve connecting to the tank was also open when
the Hammer Blind was in the changeover position
Root Cause
The basic or root causes were an absence of site specific written operating procedures, absence of leak stopping
devices from a remote location (the facility for remote closing of the Motor Operated Valve connecting to the
tank side, which could have stopped the leak) and insufficient understanding of hazards and risks and
consequences.
Critical Factors
The critical factors which resulted in the Catastrophic Accident are:
Loss of primary containment of Motor Spirit (Petrol)
The Hammer Blind valve allows a large area at the top of the valve (at the valve bonnet) to be
completely open every time the valve position needed to be changed, making it unsuitable for Oil Industry
applications. The use of improper Equipment (Hammer Blind valve), wrong operation of valves by operator,
absence of Second Operator and lack of supervision had resulted in uncontrolled Loss of Primary Containment
in the form of a jet of gasoline
Loss of secondary containment
Once the Primary containment has failed it has to be relied on the secondary containment to contain the
fuel within the dyke. The open dyke Valve in Tank 401A dyke resulted in failure of the Secondary containment
as well, enabling the spilled Motor spirit to flow to other area of the Terminal and generation of more Vapour
cloud.
Incapacitated Operating Personnel
All operating crew were overcome by leaking gasoline liquid and vapour. Second operator attempting
rescue also entered the affected area and was overcome. Lack of operational skill and poor mental alertness,
Lack of training in emergency management, Nonavailability/ lack of awareness on PPE use, and non usage of
PPE, resulted in incapcitated operating personnel.
Inadequate mitigation measures
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The facility to close MOV from the control room was available but the same was made defunct. No self
controlled breathing apparatus (SCBA), Emergency plan for the scenario or Emergency responder were
available for mitigating the situation.
Nevertheless, fundamentally these immediate failures are caused by root causes based in broader management
failures:
Absence of written Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), no review of operating practices even after CBI
investigation in August 2009, Safety rules not enforced, Operating discipline very poor, PLTs carried on after
dark, never with manager or senior manager present, shows inadequate leadership at Terminal in-charge and
state level management.
Inadequate Safety Priorities in the management had given way for the Vital safety devices made non functional
since long, Safety Management System not properly implemented, no adequate safety check list and anagement
of change, safety training ensuring competency of people not adequately done.
Response
Information about the leak and the hazard was conveyed by the Security staff on site to the Terminal senior
management staff and others. The state and local civil authorities were alerted by IOC state level officers and
within about 30-45 minutes almost all personnel and agencies in the city and around had come to the site.
However, the sheer enormity of the unconfined vapour cloud which had by then spread till the gate of the
installation, made the affected area unapproachable. Non-availability of a Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
(SCBA) and Fire Suit immediately, left the entire response team as mere helpless spectators in preventing the
incident.
However, the civic authorities took commendable steps in evacuating the injured and ensuring immediate
medical attention and in redirecting and controlling traffic and cordoning off areas thereby minimizing damages
outside the Installation.

Buncefield Incident
On the night of Saturday 10 December 2005, Tank 912 at the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited (HOSL) part of
the Buncefield oil storage depot was filling with petrol. The tank had two forms of level control: a gauge that
enabled the employees to monitor the filling operation; and an independent high-level switch (IHLS) which was
meant to close down operations automatically if the tank was overfilled. The first gauge stuck and the IHLS was
inoperable there was therefore no means to alert the control room staff that the tank was filling to dangerous
levels. Eventually large quantities of petrol overflowed from the top of the tank. A vapour cloud formed which
ignited causing a massive explosion and a fire that lasted five days.
Causes

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The immediate cause of the incident was the failure of both the ATG and the IHLS to operate as the fuel level in
Tank 912 increased. The Auto Tank Gauge had stuck intermittently after the tank had been serviced in August
2005. However, neither site management nor the contractors who maintained the systems responded effectively
to its obvious unreliability. The IHLS needed a padlock to retain its check lever in a working position. However,
the switch supplier did not communicate this critical point to the installer and maintenance contractor or the site
operator. Because of this lack of understanding, the padlock was not fitted. This was a loss of primary
containment.
Having failed to contain the petrol, there was reliance on a bund retaining wall around the tank (secondary
containment) and a system of drains and catchment areas (tertiary containment) to ensure that liquids could not
be released to the environment. Both forms of containment failed. Pollutants from fuel and firefighting liquids
leaked from the bund, flowed off site and entered the groundwater. These containment systems were
inadequately designed and maintained.
Failures of design and maintenance in both overfill protection systems and liquid containment systems were the
technical causes of the initial explosion and the seepage of pollutants to the environment in its aftermath.
However, underlying these immediate failings lay root causes based in broader management failings:

Management systems in place at HOSL relating to tank filling were both deficient and not properly
followed, despite the fact that the systems were independently audited.
Pressures on staff had been increasing before the incident. The site was fed by three pipelines, two of
which control room staff had little control over in terms of flow rates and timing of receipt. This meant
that staff did not have sufficient information easily available to them to manage precisely the storage of
incoming fuel.
Throughput had increased at the site. This put more pressure on site management and staff and further
degraded their ability to monitor the receipt and storage of fuel. The pressure on staff was made worse
by a lack of engineering support from Head Office.

Cumulatively, these pressures created a culture where keeping the process operating was the primary focus and
process safety did not get the attention, resources or priority that it required.
Response
The Buncefield fire In would go down in the history of the UK Fire and Rescue Service. It was one of the
largest of its kind in peacetime Europe. It represented a significant challenge for everyone involved. The first
blast occurred at 0601 hours.
Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service arrived within minutes and the officer in charge had declared a major
incident by 0610 hours. The first firefighters to arrive were met by a scene of utter devastation spread over and
immense area. The explosion wrecked homes and businesses in the local area, with damage reported up to 18.6
km away. Officers from Devon and Somerset joined colleagues from some 31 Fire & Rescue Services that all
sent assistance to the incident. Their role was to operate the High Volume Pump units that had been mobilised to

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the fire. These units are supplied as part of the New Dimension Project, and this was the first nationally
coordinated response of these New Dimension assets.
Having a capability to pump up to 7000l/min over a distance of 3km, they proved pivotal to supply and
maintain the sustained foam attack required to deal with the incident. At the height of the incident 15 High
Volume Pump units were used, 6 of these were used to deliver water through 12 lines of hose over a distance of
1.8km. These alone were supplying around 25,000l/min at pressures of up to 14 bars.
Buncefield: Facts

22 Tanks & 7 bunds involved in fire

221 x 999 calls to 7 different Fire & Rescue Services
31 Fire & Rescue Services supported Hertfordshire
4 industry fire brigades supported Hertfordshire
15 High Volume Pumps used
Approximately 36 million litres of fuel saved
786,000 litres of foam concentrate used
53 million litres of 'clean water' applied to fire
15 million litres of water recycled and reapplied to fire
10 million litres of water moved on site to protect the environment
38km of hose used
Incident covered area approx 1.5km by 1km
51 buildings searched
1/2 mile radius evacuated (0.8km)
Window breakage at 2km with further minor damage as far away as 18.6km
First national mobilisation of Fire & Rescue Services by National Coordination Centre

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