Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Mercado
January 15, 2014 Gr. No. 156407
FACTS:
Emigdio and Teresita were married before 1988 and so, their property regime is governed
by the conjugal partnership of gains. During the lifetime of Emigdio, he inherited and acquired
real properties from her deceased mother. He owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty
Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He
assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real
property in Badian, Cebu to Mervir Realty and such deed of assignments were executed days
before he died.
Thelma then petitioned the RTC in Cebu City for the appointment of Teresita as
administrator of Emigdios estate. Following an order from the court, Teresita filed an inventory
of the properties left by the deceased but excluded therefrom the properties mentioned to have
been already assigned to Mervir Realty. Thelma moved that the list of inventory be amended to
include all the properties of the deceased even if already assigned. The trial court issued an order
that mandates Teresita to re-do the inventory made. Teresita appealed to the CA to which the CA
ruled in her favour.
ISSUE: Whether the properties that had already been assigned to Mervir Realty should be
included in the inventory of the administrator of the estate considering the fact that the same
were conjugal properties of the deceased and his surviving spouse.
DECISION:
Yes, the properties, even though assigned to Mervir Realty should be included in the
inventory for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
xxx with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
in August 3, 1988, their property regime was the conjugal partnership of gains. For purposes of
the settlement of Emigdios estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in the
conjugal partnership of gains. The party asserting that specific property acquired during that
property regime did not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden of proof,
and that party must prove the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and
convincing evidence. In the absence of or pending the presentation of such proof, the conjugal
partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be provisionally liquidated to establish who the real
owners of the affected properties were, and which of the properties should form part of the estate
of Emigdio. The portions that pertained to the estate of Emigdio must be included in the
inventory.
Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the name of Mervir
Realty, the RTC made findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB12692, a
dispute that had involved the ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of
Emigdio, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in Emigdios
name. Indeed, the RTC noted in the order of March 14, 2001, or ten years after his death, that Lot
3353 had remained registered in the name of Emigdio.
doubted that Sps. Sarili were actually aware of a flaw or defect in their title or mode of
acquisition and have consequently built the house on the subject property in bad faith under legal
contemplation.
Valino vs. Adriano, et.al.
April 22, 2014 G.R. No. 182894
FACTS:
Atty. Adriano married respondent Rosario Adriano in 1955. The couple had 5 children
and 1 adopted child. The marriage did turn sour and the couple separated in fact, though Adriano
continued to support his wife and children.
Atty. Adriano then started living with Valino, whom he courted. Atty. Adriano died and since his
immediate family, including respondent were in the United States, Valino took it upon herself to
bury Atty. Adriano at her family's mausoleum. In the meantime, Respondents heard about the
death and requested Valino to delay the burial so they can pay their final respects, but Valino still
buried the body.
Respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral
and exemplary damages and attorneys fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed
and transferred to the family plot.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
DECISION:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the duty and the right to make funeral arrangements
are confined within the family of the deceased particularly the spouse of the deceased to the
exclusion of a common law spouse. Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now
Article 1996 of the Family Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall
be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants
of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants,
the paternal shall have a better right.
Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the
consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305.
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Rana v. Wong
June 30, 2014 G.R. No. 192861
FACTS:
Teresita and the spouses Shirley and Ruben (Spouses Wong) are co-owners of a property
located in Peace Valley Subdivision, near a 10-meter subdivision road. On the opposite side of
the road are the lots of the other protagonists, Wilson and Rosario (Spouses Uy) and Reynaldo
and Linda (Spouses Rana. The lot of the Rana spouses stand about two meters higher than the lot
of of the spouses Uy, while that of the spouses Wong are level with the road. To level the portion
of the road with their gate, the Rana spouses elevated and cemented a portion of the road
sometime in 1997, and backfilled a portion of the perimeter fence they share with the spouses Uy
but without erecting a retaining wall. When the matter was referred to the barangay authorities
and nothing happened, the spouses Uy and Ong as well as Teresita filed a complaint for
abatement of nuisance (Civil Case No. CEB-20893) to declare the improvements introduced by
the spouses Rana as a nuisance which affected their engross and egress, since they now have to
practically jump over the elevated portion to come in and out of their properties, while the
backfilling constitutes a danger to the spouses Uys family because seeping rainwater from the
Rana property might cause its sudden collapse.
ISSUE: Whether or not nuisance should be abated.
DECISION:
No. It is a standing jurisprudential rule that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may
not be summarily abated. Aside from the remedy of summary abatement which should be taken
under the parameters stated in Articles 704 (for public nuisances) and 706 (for private nuisances)
of the Civil Code, a private person whose property right was invaded or unreasonably interfered
with by the act, omission, establishment, business or condition of the property of another may
file a civil action to recover personal damages. Abatement may be judicially sought through a
civil action therefor if the pertinent requirements under the Civil Code for summary abatement,
or the requisite that the nuisance is a nuisance per se, do not concur. To note, the remedies of
abatement and damages are cumulative; hence, both may be demanded.
With respect to the elevated and cemented subject portion, the Court finds that the same is not a
nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was
built primarily to facilitate the ingress and egress of Sps. Rana from their house which was
admittedly located on a higher elevation than the subject road and the adjoining Uy, and WongOng properties. Since the subject portion is not a nuisance per se, it cannot be summarily abated.
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Further, in the Deed of Absolute Sale, no sale was perfected as the parties failed to agree
on the purchase price. Thus, defendants claim of possession had no sufficient basis and it cannot
overthrow the attribute of possession attached to the respondents certificate of title.
Penta Pacific Realty Corporation vs. Ley Construction And Development Corporation
November 24, 2014 G.R. No. 161589
FACTS:
Penta Pacific leased its properties to Ley Construction. Both parties then entered into a
contract to sell. Ley Construction failed to pay its amortizations prompting Penta Pacific to file
an action for ejectment. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the MeTC had no
jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint was for unlawful detainer, or accion publiciana, or accion
reivindicatoria.
DECISION:
In resolving, the Supreme Court ruled that, a defendant's claim of possession de Jure or
his averment of ownership does not render the ejectment suit either accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. The suit remains an accion interdictal, a summary proceeding that can proceed
independently of any claim of ownership. Even when the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership is to be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
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their allegation that the disposition in favor of Lapinid before partition was a concrete or definite
portion, the validity of sale still prevails.
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In their complaint for quieting of title, petitioners specifically pray for the declaration of
nullity and/or cancellation of respondents TCT Nos. 265778 and 285313 over the subject land.
The relief sought by petitioners is certainly feasible since the objective of an action to quiet title,
as provided under Article 476 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, is precisely to quiet, remove,
invalidate, annul, and/or nullify a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein by reason
of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title.
In their complaint for quieting of title, petitioners specifically pray for the declaration of
nullity and/or cancellation of respondents TCT Nos. 265778 and 285313 over the subject land.
The relief sought by petitioners is certainly feasible since the objective of an action to quiet title,
as provided under Article 476 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, is precisely to quiet, remove,
invalidate, annul, and/or nullify a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein by reason
of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title.
It is an established doctrine in land ownership disputes that the filing of an action to quiet
title is imprescriptible if the disputed real property is in the possession of the plaintiff. One who
is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason
for the rule being that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a
court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its
effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
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ISSUE: Whether or not foreign laws will apply rather than Phiilippine laws are regards contracts
entered into.
DECISION:
Philippine law is definite as to what governs the formal or extrinsic validity of contracts.
The first paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he forms and solemnities of
contracts . . . shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed".
In contrast, there is no statutorily established mode of settling conflict of laws situations on
matters pertaining to substantive content of contracts. It has been noted that three (3) modes have
emerged: (1) lex loci contractus or the law of the place of the making; (2) lex loci solutionis or
the law of the place of performance; and (3) lex loci intentionis or the law intended by the
parties.
Given Saudia's assertions, of particular relevance to resolving the present dispute is lex loci
intentionis.
An author observed that Spanish jurists and commentators "favor lex loci intentionis." These
jurists and commentators proceed from the Civil Code of Spain, which, like our Civil Code, is
silent on what governs the intrinsic validity of contracts, and the same civil law traditions from
which we draw ours.
Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest Philippine
tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law.
Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate the stipulations of the Cabin
Attendant contracts that require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia.
Forum non conveniens relates to forum, not to the choice of governing law. Thai forum
non conveniens may ultimately result in the application of foreign law is merely an incident of its
application. In this strict sense, forum non conveniens is not applicable. It is not the primarily
pivotal consideration in this case.
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As mentioned, the right of way constituting the easement in this case consists of existing
and developed network of roads. This means that in their construction, the needs of the dominant
estate were not taken into consideration precisely because they were constructed prior to the
grant of the right of way. During the remand proceedings, it was established that the width of the
affected roads is 10 meters. Multiplied by the distance of 2,350 meters, the total area to be
indemnified is 23,500 square meters and at a price of P1,620.00 per square meter, petitioners
must pay respondent the whopping amount of P38,070,000.00 for the value of the land. Under
the circumstances, the Court finds it rather iniquitous to compute the proper indemnity based on
the 10-meter width of the existing roads. To stress, it is the needs of the dominant estate which
determines the width of the passage. And per their complaint, petitioners were simply asking for
adequate vehicular and other similar access to the highway. To the Court's mind, the 10-meter
width of the affected road lots is unnecessary and inordinate for the intended use of the easement.
At most, a 3-meter wide right of way can already sufficiently meet petitioners' need for vehicular
access. It would thus be unfair to assess indemnity based on the 10-meter road width when a
three-meter width can already sufficiently answer the needs of the dominant estate. Therefore
bearing in mind Article 651, the Court finds proper a road width of 3 meters in computing the
proper indemnity. Thus, multiplying the road length of 2,350 meters by a road width of 3 meters,
the total area to be indemnified is 7,050 square meters. At a value of P1,620.00 per square meter,
the total value of the land to form part of the indemnity amounts to P11,421,000.00. It must be
made clear, however, that despite their payment of the value of the land on the basis of a threemeter road width or basically for a one-way traffic road only, petitioners must be allowed to use
the roads within respondent's subdivision based on the existing traffic patterns so as not to
disrupt the traffic flow therein.
In addition, petitioners must bear as part of damages the costs for the removal of the fence in
Road Lot 15. Also, the Court takes judicial notice that subdivision residents are paying monthly
dues for purposes of road maintenance, security, garbage collection, use and maintenance of
other subdivision facilities, etc. In view of the fact that the road lots affected would be used by
the dominant estate in common with the subdivision residents, the Court deems reasonable to
require petitioners to pay the homeowner's association in respondent's subdivision, by way of
monthly dues, an amount equivalent to half of the rate of the monthly dues that the subdivision
residents are being assessed. This shall serve as petitioners' share in the maintenance of the
affected road lots.
In easement of right of way, there is no alienation of the land occupied.
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ISSUE: Whether or not sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTCs declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Mary Grace.
DECISION:
The instant petition lacks merit. The lack of personal examination or assessment of the
respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage. "If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.
The testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag, and Rodelito, and the documentary evidence do not
suffice to prove the cause, gravity, and incurability of the respondent's condition. The evidence
merely shows the respondents outgoing, strong-willed, and no inclination to household chores.
Likewise, the respondents act of living with another man within four years into the marriage
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific
evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In
fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and faithful when they were going
steady and for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in later.
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less seven
years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows that living together as spouses
under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Graces departure from their home in 2006 indicates
either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live
with her husband.
A careful reading of Dr. Tayags testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact that
at the time the parties were married, respondent was already suffering from a psychological
defect that deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of
marriage. Neither did she adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that respondents
condition was grave and incurable.
The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of
witnesses who can attest to the antecedence of a persons psychological incapacity, but such
difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what the law requires. While the
Court also commiserates with Glenns marital woes, the totality of the evidence presented
provides inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her obligations as Glenns spouse.
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statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim
for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of
a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial
action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the childs
acknowledgment.
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the records
covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed,
which necessitated the introduction of other documentary evidence particularly Alfredo
Aguilars SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit G) to prove filiation. It was erroneous for the CA to treat
said document as mere proof of open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation
under the first paragraph thereof, the same being an express recognition in a public instrument.
To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, liation may be proved by an admission of legitimate
liation in a public document or a private hand written instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
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Based on these provisions, the following requisites need to be established before a person
becomes entitled to demand the compulsory easement of right of way:
1.
An immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons, and is
without adequate outlet to a public highway;
2.
Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounded immovable;
3.
The isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner's acts; and
4.
The proposed easement of right of way is established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance of the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest.
An easement of right of way is a real right. When an easement of right of way is granted
to another person, the rights of the property's owner are limited. An owner may not exercise
some of his or her property rights for the benefit of the person who was granted the easement of
right of way. Hence, the burden of proof to show the existence of the above conditions is
imposed on the person who seeks the easement of right of way.
The court agree with the Regional Trial Court's and the Court of Appeals' findings that petitioner
failed to establish that there was no adequate outlet to the public highway and that the proposed
easement was the least prejudicial to respondents' estate and that there is an adequate exit to a
public highway.
The convenience of the dominant estate's owner is not the basis for granting an easement
of right of way, especially if the owner's needs may be satisfied without imposing the easement.
Thus, mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of
setting up a compulsory easement. Furthermore, based on the Ocular Inspection Report,
petitioner's property had another outlet to the highway. Access to the public highway can be
satisfied without imposing an easement on the spouses' property.
Mallilin vs. Jamesolamin
February 18, 2015 GR No. 192718
FACTS:
Robert and Luz were married in 1972. They begot three children. On 16 March 1994,
Robert filed a case for annulment of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Roberts petition was tried by the family court (RTC) of
CDO. Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering from
psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to
comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. He alleged that such incapacity became
even more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity,
irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and inability to cope with the
heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent. (In the meantime, Roberts petition with
Metropolitan Tribunal and the National Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church was
granted and their marriage declared void) After the hearing, the family court granted the petition
but the Court of Appeals reversed family court and declared that there is no psychological
incapacity.
ISSUE: Whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
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DECISION:
The Court is of the considered view that Roberts evidence failed to establish the
psychological incapacity of Luz.
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage. Other than his self-serving testimony, no other evidence was adduced to show the
alleged incapacity of Luz. He presented no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on her
behavior. Thus, his testimony was self-serving and had no serious value as evidence.
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically or
clinically identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial. Based on the records, Robert failed
to prove that her disposition of not cleaning the room, preparing their meal, washing the clothes,
and propensity for dating and receiving different male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and
incurable within the parameters of jurisprudence on psychological incapacity.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligation of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family
Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together; observe love, respect and
fidelity; and render help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
only emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved.
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lot by the mere expedient of filing a writ of possession, but must resort to judicial remedy which
is ejectment or accion reivindicatoria since it it is only the Bank who was the buyer during the
foreclosure sale who is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are entitled, as a matter of right, to the issuance of a writ
of possession when they merely bought the subject property through private transaction and not
through land registration proceedings, judicial foreclosure and extrajudicial foreclosure.
DECISION:
Petitioner is correct in saying that respondents must resort to judicial process in order
for them to obtain possession of the disputed lot. However, petitioner is wrong in positing that
the only appropriate judicial actions or proceedings that should have been taken by respondents
are either ejectment or a reivindicatory suit. On the other hand, respondents were correct in
asking the court to issue a writ of possession.
If the purchaser is a third party who acquired the property after the redemption period, a
hearing must be conducted to determine whether possession over the subject property is still with
the mortgagor or is already in the possession of a third party holding the same adversely to the
defaulting debtor or mortgagor. In the instant case, while respondents' petition for the issuance of
a writ of possession was filed ex-parte, a hearing was, nonetheless, conducted when the RTC
gave petitioner her day in court by giving her the opportunity to file various pleadings to oppose
respondent's petition. Moreover, there is no dispute that petitioner remained in possession of the
subject property prior to the issuance of the questioned writ of possession. It is, thus, clear that
respondents' resort, as a subsequent or third-party purchaser, the petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession is proper.
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