EMMANUEL B. MORAN, JR. v.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

The executive power of control over the acts of department secretaries has been defined as the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Such executive control is not absolute. The definition of the structure of the executive branch of
government, and the corresponding degrees of administrative control and supervision is not the
exclusive preserve of the executive. It may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by
judicial decisions. All the more in the matter of appellate procedure as in the instant case.
Appeals are remedial in nature; hence, constitutionally subject to this Courts rule-making power.
In the instant case, the enabling law of respondent BOI, E.O. No. 226, explicitly allows for
immediate judicial relief from the decision of respondent BOI involving petitioners application
for an ITH. E.O. No. 226 is a law of special nature and should prevail over A.O. No. 18.

Maria Carolina P. Araullo v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III

The Court DECLARES the following acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration
Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL
for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of
separation of powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of
the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the
fiscal year without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General
Appropriations Acts; and
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other
offices outside the Executive.

Province of North Cotabato -vs- Ermita Exec.Sec.

Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which is scheduled to be signed by
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF
Well settled is the rule that the President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. The
power of the President to conduct peace negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but
is rather implied from her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief Executive, the
President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has
the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.

The principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of conducting peace negotiations - may
validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may
not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent
of that body were assumed as a certainty. The Presidents power is limited only to the preservation and
defense of the Constitution but not changing the same but simply recommending proposed amendments
or revisions.

MalariaEmployeesandWorkersAssociationv.HonorableExecutiveSecretary
SubjectisthevalidityofExecutiveOrder(E.O.)No.102,1thelawRedirectingtheFunctionsand
OperationsoftheDepartmentofHealth.
Asfarasbureaus,agencies,orofficesintheexecutivedepartmentareconcerned,thePresident'spower
ofcontrolmayjustifyhimtoinactivatethefunctionsofaparticularoffice,orcertainlawsmaygrant
himthebroadauthoritytocarryoutreorganizationmeasures.
TheonlylimitsetbytheCourttothePresident'sbroadauthoritytoreorganizeisthetestofgoodfaith.
ThePresidentmustexercisegoodfaithincarryingoutthereorganizationofanybranchoragency
oftheexecutivedepartment.Reorganizationiseffectedingoodfaithifitisforthepurposeof
economyortomakebureaucracymoreefficient.R.A.No.6656providesforthecircumstanceswhich
maybeconsideredasevidenceofbadfaithintheremovalofcivilserviceemployeesmadeasaresult
ofreorganization,towit:(a)wherethereisasignificantincreaseinthenumberofpositionsinthenew
staffingpatternofthedepartmentoragencyconcerned;(b)whereanofficeisabolishedandanother
performingsubstantiallythesamefunctionsiscreated;(c)whereincumbentsarereplacedbythoseless
qualifiedintermsofstatusofappointment,performanceandmerit;(d)wherethereisaclassificationof
officesinthedepartmentoragencyconcernedandthereclassifiedofficesperformsubstantiallythe
samefunctionsastheoriginaloffices;and(e)wheretheremovalviolatestheorderofseparation.

LEAGUEOFPROVINCESOFTHEPHILIPPINESv.DENRandSecretary
Subject is the petition to prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control over provinces
anddeclare as illegal the DENR Secretarys nullification, voiding and cancellation of the SmallScale Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.
Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his/her duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
the latter. Supervision is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform
their function in accordance with law.
The DENR is in charge of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural resources. The
enforcement of the small-scale mining law by the provincial government is subject to the
supervision, control and review of the DENR.

Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary

After Congress adjourned President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to secretaries

of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.

The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stopgap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter
ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must
necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the
guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her
alter ego should be.

DENNIS A. B. FUNA - versus - THE CHAIRMAN,

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR
A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for
an appointment to the position of Chair for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chair.
Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of
the length of service as commissioners and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will
not exceed seven years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Char resulted from
death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment; and that any member of the Commission
cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
While the case has been deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Tan and resignation of
Villar, the Court considered the instant case as falling within one of the requirements for review of a
moot and academic case since the case is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has farreaching implications, and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the
public in future analogous cases.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION -versus- PILILLA

WATER DISTRICT
A permanent appointment is issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which
he is being appointed/promoted, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the
provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof, while a temporary
appointment may be extended to a person who possesses all the requirements for the position except
the appropriate civil service eligibility and for a limited period not exceeding twelve months or until a
qualified civil service eligible becomes available.
An appointment may also be co-terminous which shall be issued to a person whose entrance and
continuity in the service is based on the trust and confidence of the appointing authority or that which is
subject to his pleasure, or co-existent with his tenure, or limited by the duration of project or
subject to the availability of funds

SAMUEL B. ONG - versus - OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

The Court is categorical in the Amores case that an appointee without the requisite CES eligibility
cannot hold the position in a permanent capacity. Temporary appointments are made if only to prevent
hiatus in the government's rendition of public service. However, a temporary appointee can be removed
even without cause and at a moment's notice.
This Court recognizes Ong's lengthy service rendered to the government and deeply commisserates
with his earlier plight. However, we cannot grant Ong the reliefs he sought as law and jurisprudence
clearly dictate that being a temporary and co-terminous appointee, he had no vested rights over the
position of Director III.

Marcos vs. Manglapus

The executive power of the President under the Constitution is more than the sum of
specific powers enumerated under the Constitution. In balancing the general welfare and
the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals, the power involved is
the Presidents residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. Presidential
power is a wide discretion, within the bounds of laws and extraordinary in times of
emergency.
The ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of Marcos will only exacerbate the
situation in the country.

THE VETERANS FEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

Hon. ANGELO T. REYES
This Court has defined the power of control as "the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate has done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former to that of the latter." The power of
supervision, on the other hand, means "overseeing, or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.
The provisions of the assailed in Department Circular No. 04 did not supplant nor
modify the provisions of Republic Act No. 2640, thus not violating the settled rule that
"all such (administrative) issuances must not override, but must remain consistent and
in harmony with the law they seek to apply or implement. Administrative rules and
regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law.

BIRAOGOVSPTC
ThePresidentspowertoconductinvestigationstoaidhiminensuringthefaithfulexecutionof
lawsinthiscase,fundamentallawsonpublicaccountabilityandtransparencyisinherentinthe

Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct
investigationsandtocreatebodiestoexecutethispowerisnotexplicitlymentionedinthe
Constitutionorinstatutesdoesnotmeanthatheisbereftofsuchauthority.
Itshouldbestressedthatthepurposeofallowingadhocinvestigatingbodiestoexististoallow
aninquiryintomatterswhichthePresidentisentitledtoknowsothathecanbeproperly
advisedandguidedintheperformanceofhisdutiesrelativetotheexecutionandenforcement
ofthelawsoftheland.

BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB vs. HON. EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY RONALDO B. ZAMORA
The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature.
This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public
office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the
office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it
into existence.
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are
concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular
office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.
Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416 expressly grant the
President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government,
which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize
salaries and materials.

ALEXIS C. CANONIZADO vs. HON. ALEXANDER P. AGUIRRE

An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection.
Therefore, the unavoidable consequence of the Courts declaration that section 8 of RA 8551 violates
the fundamental law is that all acts done pursuant to such provision shall be null and void, including the
removal of petitioners and Adiong from their positions in the NAPOLCOM and the appointment of
new commissioners in their stead.
When a regular government employee is illegally dismissed, his position does not become vacant and
the new appointment made in order to replace him is null and void ab initio. Rudimentary is the precept
that there can be no valid appointment to a non-vacant position.

SANLAKAS V. Executive Secretary Angelo Reyes

The Constitution does not require the President to declare a state of rebellion to
exercise her calling out power grants. Section 18, Article VII grants the President,
as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated power[s].
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a
declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it only gives
notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be
called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotional
effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. But
the Courts mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the
declaration. The Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal
significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.

Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo

Puno, et al.
The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such
places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not
need a congressional authority to exercise the same. But, apart from the fact that
there was no such take over to begin with, the SC held the imminence of violence
and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to
ignore and as a result, the President had to act to prevent further bloodshed and
hostilities in the places mentioned.
Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to
take preventive action. She called out the armed forces tocontrol the proliferation
of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened
the peace and security in the affected places.

PANFILO LACSON vs. SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides that [t]he President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
ThePresidentasCommanderinChiefhasavastintelligencenetworktogatherinformation,someof
whichmaybeclassifiedashighlyconfidentialoraffectingthesecurityofthestate.Intheexerciseof
thepowertocall,onthespotdecisionsmaybeimperativelynecessaryinemergencysituationstoavert
greatlossofhumanlivesandmassdestructionofproperty.

IBPvs.Zamora
PresidentasstatedinSection18,ArticleVIIoftheConstitution,specifically,thepowertocalloutthe
armedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion.Callingthearmedforcesis
notproperforjudicialscrutinysinceitinvolvesapoliticalquestionandtheresolutionoffactualissues

whicharebeyondthereviewpowersofthisCourt.
Bygraveabuseofdiscretionismeantsimplycapriciousorwhimsicalexerciseofjudgmentthatis
patentandgrossastoamounttoanevasionofpositivedutyoravirtualrefusaltoperformaduty
enjoinedbylaw,ortoactatallincontemplationoflaw,aswherethepowerisexercisedinanarbitrary
anddespoticmannerbyreasonofpassionorhostility.WhenthePresidentcallsthearmedforcesto
preventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion,henecessarilyexercisesadiscretionary
powersolelyvestedinhiswisdom.

Echegaray v Secretary of Justice

The SC does not lose its jurisdiction over a case with a final judgment rendered upon it. What it
cannot do is modify or amend the final decision. The court held that by finality of judgment, the court
loses its jurisdiction to amend the decision but retains its power to execute or enforce it. There is a
difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend,
modify or alter a decision. The former continues for the purpose of enforcing the judgment while the
latter terminates after the final judgment is rendered for after the judgment becomes final, facts and
circumstances may transpire which may render the execution unjust or impossible.

RANDOLF DAVID, et al. v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in a move to suppress alleged plans to overthrow the
government, issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of
national emergency. Exactly one week from the declaration of a state of national
emergency and after all the present petitions had been filed, President Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 1021 (PP 1021), declaring that the state of national
emergency has ceased to exist and lifting PP 1017
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: (1)there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2)the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3)the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and (4)the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.
There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public interest, involving as
they do the peoples basic rights to the freedoms of expression, of assembly and of the
press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the
bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent
of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. Lastly, the contested actions are
capable of repetition. Certainly, the present petitions are subject to judicial review.

IBP v. Zamora

Pres. Estrada ordered the deployment of the Phil. Marines to join in visibility patrols around the
metropolis. The Pres. invoked his Comm.-in-Chief powers under Sec 18, Art VII of the Constitution.
Locus standi has been defined as personal & substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as result of the challenged act. In this case, IBP primarily
anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the constitution. The mere invocation by
the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law & nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient
to clothed it w/ standing. That is too general, an interests that is shared by other groups & the whole
citizenry. IBPs fundamental purpose that is to elevate the standards of the law profession & improve
the administration of justice, cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines.

BAYAN V. ZAMORA
Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as
a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA
involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing
that a taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.

GONZALESVS.NARVASA
Locus standi in assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR).
A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the
Constitution.

Republicvs.Garcia,G.R.No.167741,July12,2007
TheCourtmaylookintoandresolvequestionsofwhetherornotsuchjudgmenthasbeenmadewithgrave
abuseofdiscretion,whentheactofthelegislativeorexecutivedepartmentiscontrarytotheConstitution,the
laworjurisprudence,orwhenexecutedwhimsically,capriciouslyorarbitrarilyoutofmalice,illwillor
personalbias.

Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines vs. Commission on

Elections
Glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been conducted in
the modernization program for the 2004 elections. Petitioners suing in their capacities
as taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens respond that the issues central
to this case are "of transcendental importance and of national interest." Allegedly,
Comelec's flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified

entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process. Thus,
any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the people would
inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of government. Petitioners further
argue that the award of any contract for automation involves disbursement of public
funds in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws governing
the transaction must be followed strictly.
Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of
"illegal disbursement of public funds," or if public money is being "deflected to any
improper purpose"; or when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from "wasting public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law."

House of Sara Lee vs. Rey

As a general rule, the factual findings of administrative agencies are not subject to review by this
Court, it is equally established that we will not uphold erroneous conclusions which are contrary to the
evidence, because the agency a quo, for that reason, would be guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. Nor
is this Court bound by conclusions which are not supported by substantial evidence. The substantial
evidence rule does not authorize any finding just as long as there is any evidence to support it. It does
not excuse administrative agencies from considering contrary evidence which fairly detracts from the
evidence supporting a finding.

The Secretary of Justice, et al. vs. Christopher Koruga

It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear
cases against an alleged alien, and that the BOC has jurisdiction over deportation
proceedings. Nonetheless, Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution has vested power of
judicial review in the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA, as established
by law. Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from that
of Congress or of the President, the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether
or not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the
legislative or executive department is contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill
will or personal bias.

Senate vs. Ermita

This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with
the China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of
the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.
Requisites for transcendental importance: Establish (1) the character of the funds (that it
is public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and
specific interest in raising the questions being raised.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives

The courts power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to
several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a
proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the
line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the
filing of a complaint does.

Alvarez v. PICOP resources

The SC in its July 5, 2009 decision declared RA 95 creating the PNRC unconstitutional.
PNRC intervened and filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that in the original
case, the issue of unconstitutionality of RA 95 was not raised, hence, the SC should not
have ruled on it.
The Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is
a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and
decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the
parties and that when it is raise, if the record also presents some other ground upon
which the court rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional
question will be left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable.

Macalintal vs PET, GR 191618, June 7, 2011

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO versus SPEAKER PROSPERO C.

NOGRALES
The case-or-controversy requirement bans this court from deciding abstract,
hypothetical or contingent questions, lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice
concerning legislative or executive action
The fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. In the
first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from
the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that
the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing
amendments or revisions to the Constitution. This involves a quintessential example of
an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may

not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an
intervention from this Court.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are
instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayers suit
requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public
funds derived from taxation. It is undisputed that there has been no allocation or
disbursement of public funds in this case as of yet.

LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), et al. v THE

SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
In consideration is the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the
General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the
implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The
petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this
is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial
controversy before the Court.
Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds
have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue. Lastly, the Court is of the view that
the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification
of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of
the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition
Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.
The SC found that the previous case of Francisco v. House of Representatives was
applicable to this case. There the SC held that the term initiate means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it. It refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action
taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on
Justice.
In the matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence Against the
Abolition of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Autonomy
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman must have the independence
and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions
and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the
funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of

the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system
is based.

Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr.

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law)
The Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken
effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that
the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. the case is so because medical practitioners or
medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations
thereof.
The petitioners invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi, considering that it is the right to life of the mother
and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before
taking action.

Monteclaro vs. Comelec [GR L-35941]

Constitution expressly provides for the authority of the Supreme Court to review cases
involving validity of Presidential Decree which have the force and effect of a legislation.