Democratic Kampuchea:

THE FIRST SESSION

IN THE FIRST LEGISLATURE OF KAMPUCHEAN
PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY
April 11-13, 1976
Unofficial Translation By Bun Sou Sour
Documentation Center of Cambodia
Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly's
Plan on Decisions To Be Taken in its First Session, First Legislature
April 13, 1976
Respected and Beloved Kampuchean People's Representatives!
From April 11 to April 13 1976, we have opened meeting both in forms of committe
e meeting and plenary meeting for discussion, review on all aspects and all qual
ifications of the agenda of Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly's first
session in the first legislature.
Having gone through debates for three consecutive days, the assembly's floor is
in unanimous agreement with the basic essence listed on the agenda towards a fin
al decision.
Based on the unanimity provided by our session, the Chairmen of the meeting have
prepared a draft of decision to be taken by the People's Representative Assembl
y's meeting in its first session, first legislature.
We, on behalf of the Chairmen, would like to read out the draft of decision to t
he floor for final approval and adoption.
Here we go.
After the successful election to choose the members of Kampuchean People?s Repre
sentative Assembly on March 20, 1976, the Kampuchean People?s Representative Ass
embly has conducted its first plenary meeting for the first period.
The first plenary meeting in the first period of People?s Representative Assembl
y was carried out for three days from the morning of April 11 until April 13, 19
76 in the capital city of Phnom Penh in a great and warm solidarity atmosphere.
The meeting focused on all important issues, which have been declared in the age
ndas. The issues are thoroughly discussed in accordance with Constitution of Dem
ocratic Kampuchea and with great spiritual responsibility for revolution, nation
, workers, peasants, laborers, male and female youths, and cadres of Kampuchean
Revolutionary Army.
After thorough and full examination of all issues, which are listed in the agend
as, finally the assembly has formally adopted the followings:
1. About the Evaluation of the Outcome of the General Election Held on March 20,
1976
The assembly's unanimous adoption: The general election held on March 20, 1976
under careful supervision and monitoring of the election committee and committee
of ministry of interior has been conducted meticulously according to the princi
ples of the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea. Workers, peasants, laborers, m
ale and female youths, and cadres of Kampuchean Revolutionary Army have actively

participated in the election in a super solidarity atmosphere and with strong b

elief in the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea, in their relative-representat
ives, and in the anticipation of a brighter future of Democratic Kampuchea of th
eir home country.
2. About the Management of Work Procedures of Kampuchean People?s Representative
Assembly and the Organization of Standing Committee of the Assembly and Various
Committees of the Assembly itself
Kampuchean People?s Representative Assembly was founded by the fresh blood of la
borers and peasants, which had been flowing like rivers in the struggle and in t
he fight thousand years ago.
All members of the Assembly are the flesh and blood of workers, peasants, labore
rs, and Kampuchean Revolutionary Army, who used to join in the revolutionary str
uggles, underwent hardship and misery together in the fight against imperialism,
old and new types of colonialism and its lackeys, experienced happiness and des
pair together for years, and still, we can now live together in the class of lab
orers working in factories, railroads, harbors, rubber plantations, salt fields,
dike systems in rice fields, and water channels in syndicates, in cooperatives,
and in various departments of Kampuchean Revolutionary Army fighting relentless
ly to build up our nation and to defense our country.
This is the true background of our representatives; there would be no qualificat
ion in term of representativeness and democratic nature better than the above-me
ntioned points. So far, until these days and from now on our Assembly shall main
tain the nature as laborers, peasants, and our revolutionary army?s representati
ves into the future.
With this viewpoint, the Assembly has unanimously adopted the basic principle of
work procedures as follows:
1. Each member of Kampuchean People?s Representative Assembly must continue to b
e representative for their previous local bases, sharing misery and happiness wi
th people, trying to understand the feeling of the people, and make sure to be i
nformed about people?s requests, especially staying closely with syndicates and
factories, cooperatives, dike and irrigation systems, work sites, their own unit
s, participate in building up and defense the country with workers and peasants
people, laborers, male and female youths and cadres of Kampuchean Revolutionary
Army in order to suit their ranks of real representatives of workers and peasant
s people, laborers, and Kampuchean Revolutionary Army.
2. Kampuchean People?s Representative Assembly shall conduct a plenary meeting o
nce a year, in order to promote annually the political line inside and outside o
f the country and to observe the activities of the state presidium, government,
and judicial committee. They shall also observe good and bad points and rectify
annual work targets of the three state organs.
3. During the period between each plenary meeting of Kampuchean People?s Represe
ntative Assembly, there shall be a permanent organization of Kampuchean People?s
Representative Assembly which is responsible for practicing and observing the p
ractice and decisions of the plenary meetings of the Assembly. This organization
is called Standing Committee of Kampuchean People?s Representative Assembly.
At the same time, the Assembly has also selected members of the Standing Committ
ee of Kampuchean People?s Representative Assembly and has also chosen members of
other commissions of the Assembly.
The Standing Committee of Kampuchean People?s Representative Assembly is compose
d as follows:

1.
Comrade Nuon Chea, President
2.
Comrade Nguon Kang, First Vice-president
3.
Comrade Peou Sou, Second Vice-president
4.
Female Comrade Ruos Nim, Member
5.
Comrade Sar San, Member
6.
Comrade My Chham, Member
7.
Comrade Kheng Sokh, Member
8.
Comrade Matt Ly, Member
9.
Comrade Thang Sy, Member
10. Comrade Ruos Preap, Member
3. About the Examination, Judgement and Decision on the Request for Retirement b
y King Norodom Sihanouk by virtue of the his statement dated April 2, 1976 and t
he Government Statement dated April 4, 1976 on the Request for Retirement of the
King dispatched to the assembly
Having thoroughly examined and discussed the two statements, the People's Repres
entative Assembly unanimously does hereby agree with the request for retirement
of King Norodom Sihanouk.
By virtue of the great achievement of King Norodom Sihanouk, a patriotic monarch
who has paid interest-bearing contribution to the nation and the people of Kamp
uchea for national liberation against heinous and barbarous aggressive war of Am
erican imperialism and its reactionary clique of traitors, including Lon Noll, S
irik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, Cheng Heng, In Tam, Long Boret, Sosten, the National
Assembly does hereby agree with the government's requests in the following:
1.
Entitle King Sihanouk "The Hero with the Highest Patriotism".
2.
Build a memorial for inscribing his aforementioned achievement.
3.
Guarantee King Sihanouk's and his family's living standard as high as h
is honor and his status as Head of State and President of National Liberation Fr
ont of Kampuchea with a yearly pension amounted to US$8.000.
4. About the Examination, Judgement and Decision on the Request for Retirement o
f the Former Government
The People's Representative Assembly notes that the Government of Democratic Kam
puchea, previously known as Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia [RGNU
C] and established on May 5, 1970, has, in co-operation with the people of Kampu
chea as a whole and the revolutionary army of Kampuchea, made great efforts to f
ulfill its task of waging People's War for the liberation of nation and the peop
le against American imperialism and its reactionary clique consisting of Lon Nol
, Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, Cheng Heng, In Tam, Long Boret, Sosten until the
day of victory?April 17, 1975.
Given the whole country was liberated, and in accordance with the decision taken
by the special national congress along with the decision made by the Third Nati
onal Congress, the government jointly arranged for an establishment of the Const
itution of Democratic Kampuchea, its promulgation and for the election of Repres
entative Assembly of Kampuchea. The government, having accomplished major achiev
ements, asks for resignation on April 6, 1976.
The People's Representative Assembly unanimously agrees with the former governme
nt's resignation.
5.

Election of the State Presidium of Democratic Kampuchea

Having painstakingly discussed the qualifications of all aspects, the People's R

epresentative Assembly elects and appoints the State Presidium of Democratic Kam
puchea, which is composed of:
1.
Comrade Khieu Samphan, President

2.
3.

Comrade Sao Phim, First Vice-president

Comrade Ruos Nhim, Second Vice-president

6. Election of the New Government of Democratic Kampuchea

Having painstakingly discussed the qualifications of all aspects, the People's R
epresentative Assembly chooses the new government of Democratic Kampuchea, which
is composed of:
1.
Comrade Pol Pot, Prime Minister
2.
Comrade Ieng Sary, Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs
3.
Comrade Vorn Vet, Deputy Prime Minister for Economics
4.
Comrade Son Sen, Deputy Prime Minister for Defense
5.
Comrade Hou Nim, Minister of Propaganda and Information
6.
Comrade Chuon Choeun, Minister of Health
7.
Female Comrade Ieng Thirith, Minister of Social Affairs
8.
Comrade Tauch Toeun, Minister of Public Affairs
9.
Female Comrade Yon Yat, Minister of Culture and Education
The committees within the government framework and put in charge of economics ar
e in the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Committee
Committee
Committee
Committee
Committee
Committee

of
of
of
of
of
of

Agriculture
Industry
Commerce
Communication
Power
Rubber Plantation

The Chief of each committee is equivalent in rank to Minister of the government

of Democratic Kampuchea.
7.

Election of Judicial Committee

Having thoroughly discussed, the People's Representative Assembly elects and app
oints a judicial committee chaired by Kang Chap.
8. People's Representative Assembly's Guidelines On Domestic and Foreign Policie
s of the State Presidium and the New Government of Democratic Kampuchea
The following are unanimously adopted domestic and foreign policies to be implem
ented by the new government of Democratic Kampuchea:
1)All articles and chapters of the constitution of the Democratic Kampuchea shal
l be correctly, completely, and cohesively implemented. The constitution of the
Democratic Kampuchea is the soul of Democratic Kampuchea and the basis for domes
tic and foreign policies on various fields ranging from political economy, socia
l affairs, culture, which stems from the fresh blood of millions of children of
Kampuchea of several generations. Therefore, there shall be respect, observation
and implementation at full strength.
2)Strengthen and extend the force of great national solidarity with higher revol
utionary vigilance for defense of the country, territory, independence, sovereig
nty, territorial integrity within the existing boundaries and with high responsi
bility for the revolution, nation and our people of Kampuchea.
3)Strengthen and extend the force of great national solidarity for shock assault
s in terms of production of all fields, especially agricultural field to the poi
nt that a maximum yield of rice shall be reached for upgrading the living standa
rd of our people and building our country with the speed of great leap forwards.
4)Continue to implement political line of independence, peace, neutrality, and n
on-alignment of Democratic Kampuchea by virtue of article 21 of the constitution
of Democratic Kampuchea.

There shall be strengthening and extension of the solidarity and fraternity with
all revolutionary movements in various countries in the world, near and far, an
d with figures and youth in the five continents, who love peace and justice, inc
luding the ones in the United States of America, in order to struggle against im
perialism, old and new colonies and reactionary forces for the sake of the revol
ution, independence, peace, democracy, fraternity and social development in the
international arena.
The firs session in the first legislature of the People's Representative Assembl
y concluded on the evening of April 13, 1976 with great success, revolutionary o
ptimism, and strong belief in a glorious future of the nation and people of Kamp
uchea.

Statement of the Communist Party of Kampuchea [CPK]

to the Communist Workers' Party of Denmark, July 1978
by
Nuon Chea
Deputy Secretary, CPK
On behalf of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, I wish to express our deep thanks
for your visit to Kampuchea. It is a great honour and a source of encouragement
for us to have you here...
I. On Party-building 1960-67
From the beginning we believed it was necessary to have a party led by the worki
ng class and to base ourselves upon the contradictions in Kampuchean society. In
that period, that is, in 1960, Kampuchean society was neo-colonial and semi-feu
dal. The contradiction between the Kampuchean nation and US imperialism was very
sharp. That was the external contradiction. As for the internal contradiction,
it was between, on the one hand the working class and the capitalists and on the
other the poor peasants and the feudal class. At that time, capitalists and rea
ctionaries together oppressed our people.
On the basis of these contradictions, the party determined its revolutionary tas
ks: to make the national democratic revolution; to fight US imperialism and the
feudal class; to liberate the Kampuchean nation and the poor peasant class. It l
aid down this strategic line for the national democratic revolution:
(1) The party leading the revolution had to be a party of the working class. I
t had to lead the revolution directly and not allow other classes to lead the re
volution or the party. The party had to define the forces of the revolution; fir
stly, the strategic forces in the revolution and secondly, the tactical forces i
n the revolution.
(2) Strategic forces are the workers, peasants and some of the petty bourgeois
ie. Of these, we see the working class, as basic class while the petty bourgeois
ie was something like allied force. National capitalists were supplementary forc
es. Moreover, we regarded some high-ranking personalities within the ruling Clas
s-some big capitalists and officials in the civil service and government, and so
me Buddhist monks -as supplementary forces. Those people had to have a patriotic
, progressive and national outlook, that is, progressive in relation to the reac
tionaries.
Based on this classification of forces, we tried to construct a national democra

tic front for the purpose of struggling against US imperialism and its lackey. W
e wish to stress to you that all of these forces depended upon the leadership of
the working class and the party.
(3) Our party chose two forms of struggle: political struggle and armed strugg
le. These are interrelated. The political struggle was promoted through legal st
ruggle and illegal struggle, with the illegal being the basic from of struggle.
Now we struggle openly and in secret with secret struggle as the basis of our st
ruggle. We define the forms of struggle in this way as a result of our own exper
ience. Defending, expanding and building our forces required working in this way
.
(4) We took up the struggle in the city as well as in the countryside.
(5) The struggle in the countryside was the basic one, especially the struggle
in the most backward and remote areas. Those were base areas.
(6) We recognized that we had to conduct people's war, to overcome all obstacl
es, make any sacrifice, so as resolutely and finally to win victory and to launc
h a final offensive. We resolved never to put ourselves on the defensive but alw
ays to take the offensive.
(7) Our strategic line took as its premises: independence; sovereignty; self-r
eliance. It was based upon the right to choose our own destiny with dignity.
(8) Our struggle was based on international solidarity with all brotherly part
ies in the world and with all peoples and countries in the world who oppose revi
sionism, imperialism, neo-colonialism and colonialism of any kind.
These principles and practices are not new. They have been recognized around the
world, but we review them with you because they reflect our own experiences. We
have followed these principles in our struggle and we have learned from them. T
his line was adopted by the first congress of our party on 30 September 1960.
I would like to stress that putting this line into practice was not easy. Especi
ally before 1970. In 1960, we were badly affected by the twentieth party congres
s in the Soviet Union. Vietnam also opposed our party line especially the armed
struggle, as well as our line of independence, sovereignty and self-re1iance. Th
e Vietnamese said we had to make the national democratic revolution on the basis
of the documents of the twentieth congress in the Soviet Union. They said it wa
s not clear how the classes in Kampuchea had to be divided. They believed the fe
udal class had a progressive function in Kampuchea and that it would be able to
make the revolution with us. Moreover, they thought the revolution could be achi
eved through the parliament and on the basis of co-operation among different cla
sses. Then and now, they saw and still see our line as putchist and too much to
the left. But we defended our party line. Having correctly defined our party lin
e and our party activities, we sent most of our cadres to work in the countrysid
e. We kept only a few in the cities.
Our army was built from scratch, from a small army to a big army. In the beginni
ng, we created some secret self-defence corps. We selected the best youth. Almos
t all cadres had to do illegal work at that time. Only a few worked legally; som
e in the parliament, some in the administration, some in the press. The legal wo
rk was for the purpose of mobilizing popular forces but the basic work was the w
ork done in the countryside and among the workers; it had to be done illegally a
nd secretly. This meant that our enemies-the US imperialists, their lackey and t
he reactionary classes - could not find out who was leading our revolution. They
knew the names of a few comrades such as Khieu Samphan.1 They thought those com
rades were the real leaders of the revolution. But they did not know the real le
aders. And as they could take action against known people only, most of our lead
ers were able to work safely.
During 1960-67, we organized and consolidated many bases in the countryside. The
movement in favour of production and against land- owners was very strong. Peas
ants pitted their strength against the ruling class. They had nothing but used e

verything: stones, knives, sticks, axes. Some of the wives of poor peasants part
icipated by taking their children to demonstrate in front of the National Assemb
ly. Revolutionary forces in the rural areas were very strong then. We let our pa
rty members from the working class go there to work among the poor and middle pe
asants.
In the cities, there was a related movement among workers and students. They dem
anded that the government cut off US aid and kick out the US ambassador. Demonst
rators burnt the US flag and the embassy.2
- In the countryside, the movement of the people ignited. Those who were hungry
rose up against traitors, reactionaries and agents of the administration. The sl
ogan was 'Make the National Democratic Revolution', that is, fight US imperialis
m. The spirit of patriotism was very high. Everybody felt they had to fight US i
mperialism. But we divided the struggle into two parts: the national struggle an
d the democratic struggle. In the latter, we raised slogans demanding rights for
students, workers and peasants; higher wages; land to the peasants; better pric
es for rice, bean curd and meat and better living conditions for the people. The
struggle embraced big issues and small and involved all regions and means. The
enemy tried to suppress us but failed because we fought legally and secretly, bi
g and little battles at the same time. In this way, we were able to defend and s
trengthen revolutionary forces step-by-step.
-Through struggle, we built up the leadership of the party, recruiting good cadr
es from among the workers, peasants, civil servants in the administration, Buddh
ist monks and women. In struggle we were able to temper cadres from all strata.
Thus the contradictions in our society deepened, the contradictions between work
ers and capitalists, between the peasants and landlords, between workers and gov
ernment officials. The enemy tried harder to suppress our movement. In this situ
ation, confronting these acute contradictions, we had a Central Committee meetin
g. We decided we could no longer continue the legal struggle. And that we had to
start the uprising. This was in January 1968.
The Soviet ambassador in Phnom Penh opposed us. The Soviets said our party was o
ut of its mind to launch armed struggle. They began to build a new party aimed a
gainst us, gathering people who had surrendered to the enemy and who were traito
rs, opportunists and vagabonds. Vietnam also opposed our armed struggle. Vietnam
ese cadres took action against us, by sneaking around giving our cadres pamphlet
s such as Lenin's Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder. They said we were
too left.
We tell you this in order to point out that Vietnam did not help us! A lot of pe
ople misunderstand this. It was at tcl1at moment that our party consolidated its
position as independent and sovereign. We realized our case was different. We h
ad to take account of the concrete situation in order to resolve our social cont
radictions. Perhaps it is different in other places, but this is what it was lik
e here. We had to determine our line on the basis of our own contradictions. The
situation was favourable for armed struggle. Because our party was united on th
is principle and this line and our people supported the revolution wholeheartedl
y, the uprising against the ruling classes began in 17 out of 19 provinces. We h
ad no weapons to speak of and no aid from outside. We had only a few carbines ca
ptured from the enemy. Sometimes we had weapons but no ammunition. Sometimes eve
n if we had no ammunition we carried rifles so as to frighten the enemy. Step-by
-step we were able to expand our forces because we followed the party line of pe
ople's war.
II. The Armed Struggle, 1968-75
The people gave us support by hiding food and by hiding our guerrilla forces and
cadres. This taught our cadres to be vigilant in following the party line of co

mbining with the masses and relying upon the masses. Our army was not very big t
hen. It fought with bows and arrows, especially in the northeast base areas. We
gained the confidence of the people by showing them that traditional weapons cou
ld kill the enemy. The people then believed in the party line and in the revolut
ion. The enemy used all kinds of weapons especially in the north-east where our
Central Committee had its base. But this region was very strong; the enemy could
not do a thing to us. However, the Vietnamese revolution was in trouble then be
cause the enemy had built strategic villages in South Vietnam. Having no land to
escape to, the Vietnamese asked us for refuge and got it. This led to the 18 Ma
rch 1970 coup d'tat of the US.
The US sought to destroy our revolution, but as we were strong, we began establi
shing our own state power in the liberated areas. We were successful immediately
in 70 per cent of the rural areas; if the US had not invaded, we could have lib
erated the whole country by June 1970. In 1967-68 many people said we were ultra
-leftist; in 1970, everyone agreed we had the correct position. Everyone followe
d us. Socialist countries and other countries around the world supported us, ena
bling us to continue our economic, military and international work better than b
efore. But I would like to stress that even with favourable conditions we kept t
he existence of our party secret and we continued to build upon the secret strug
gle as a fundamental tactic. We became masters of the situation because we had o
ur bases in the rural areas, and because we had the forces of the united front.3
At first, we did not notice our contradictions with Vietnam. To be frank, we tho
ught the Vietnamese were our friends. But instead of helping us Vietnam came to
seize forces, to build up its own forces and to grasp our party as a whole. Ther
e were lots of difficulties. We had to fight the US-Thieu forces sent to help Lo
n Nol, while at the same time they tried to stab us in the back. Our party, of c
ourse, decided to resolve the principal contradiction first that is, to win vict
ory over Lon Nol.
The contradiction between us and Vietnam deepened towards 1973 when Vietnam unit
ed with the US at the negotiating table. The US immediately imposed conditions,
obliging Vietnam to pressure Kampuchea to come to the negotiating table. They tr
ied but we refused. The Vietnamese then made every effort to undermine our revol
ution. Meanwhile, as Vietnam and Laos laid down their arms, the US mobilized all
its forces to bomb Kampuchea ? all its forces in South-East Asia! ? for 200 day
s and 200 nights, to force us to the negotiating table. Our party was resolutely
opposed to kneeling to the US. Had we done so the Lon Nol traitors in Phnom Pen
h would have gained time to build up their forces. We decided to struggle to the
end. We were in any case able to resist the US air war, and by defeating the US
air war confidence grew in our party line. More and more people were convinced
that our line was correct I must make clear that awareness of the party line did
not come overnight or through theoretical studies. It grew as a result of the c
oncrete experiences and suffering of the people and as a result of class hatred.
It was only through practice that understanding of the party line deepened.
In 1974, the year after the air war, our party decided to launch the final big o
ffensive, to liberate Phnom Penh and the whole country in the dry season of 1975
. Vietnam was naturally informed. The Vietnamese believed the US would not allow
us to win. Moreover they were not prepared to allow us to have victory in advan
ce of their victory. Consequently, they refused to transport ammunition being se
nt from China and other countries, but especially from China. We had to use ammu
nition captured from the enemy; we received nothing from Vietnam. The Vietnamese
opposed our winning because they wanted to liberate Saigon and then send their
forces to liberate Phnom Penh, to build up a political apparatus here and to cre
ate a new party, thereby eliminating the Communist Party of Kampuchea and establ
ishing an Indochinese Federation.
In spite of these difficult conditions, our party did its best and liberated Phn

om Penh on 17 April 1975, two weeks in advance of the liberation of Saigon. Once
we had liberated the whole country and secured our independence and sovereignty
, that is in June 1975, the Vietnamese sent their troops to occupy our island, K
oh Way. We defended it and forced Vietnam to withdraw. What we want to make clea
r to you is that, throughout the period of national democratic revolution, there
was a hard, complicated struggle involving difficulties with the Soviet Union a
nd Vietnam but we overcame these and won victory.
Question:
At the time of the founding of the Communist Party, was there a
ny discussion of the political line for the period leading to communism?
It is written in our party programme that we shall continue our socialist revolu
tion and advance towards communism after the national democratic revolution, but
we did not go into details. We worked out our present tasks of socialist constr
uction after liberation.4
Our main tasks are to defend our state power and to continue the socialist revol
ution and socialist construction. We have defended our territory and sovereignty
since liberation in a fierce, complicated struggle, especially against Vietnam.
We think this struggle will last a long time since Vietnam has enormous ambitio
ns. It wants to force Kampuchea into an Indochinese Federation and will pursue e
xpansionist aims in all of South-east Asia.
As for living conditions, we have basically solved our problems by means of irri
gation projects. We are accumulating capital for the development of our country
on the basis of independence and self-reliance.
III. On Building the Party Ideologically
Having the right political line was not enough to ensure victory .Our party had
to have, in addition, a firm revolutionary standpoint. This is partly because So
much of our struggle was illegal. Thus, sometimes, if our cadres were not ideol
ogically committed, they would surrender to the enemy or, once captured, they wo
uld tell secrets. To avoid this, we stressed ideological education.
During the struggle, we encountered many difficulties. For example, cadres separ
ated from their families and not ideologically firm would sometimes decide to ru
n back to their families and away from the revolution. And sometimes cadres were
working underground within the enemy administration and receiving very high wag
es. Lacking a firm revolutionary standpoint, they would be bought. Thus our part
y could see that ideology was the key factor in implementing the political line
as well as the organizational line. Ideological party building was done in two w
ays: by destroying incorrect ideological standpoints and by building up the corr
ect ideological standpoints of the party. For example, we had to:
(1) build up the ideological standpoint of the basic class in the party, the w
orking class consciousness. To do this we had to define the different classes in
our society and the contradictions between them. From this base, we armed our c
adres ideologically with the viewpoints of the working class. This was done by e
xplaining the spirit of sacrifice for the good of all and the need to abandon pr
ivate ownership in favour of collective ownership; and by teaching them party di
scipline, love of party work, methods of self-criticism and ways to unite closel
y with the masses;
(2) build up the ideological standpoint of revolutionary patriotism and revolu
tionary internationalism, the first being the fundamental standpoint. By this we
mean striving energetically to make our own revolution, struggling successfully
against imperialism and revisionism in our own country. This advances and suppo
rts the international struggle. To speak only of internationalism while failing
to carry out the revolution in one's own country is meaningless. We have to be c
oncrete in this. We try to teach our people the principle of self-reliance in or

der to avoid making ourselves a burden for friendly countries. While they might
like to help us, they must make their own revolutions and improve the living sta
ndard of their own people. Thus, we try as much as possible to avoid outside aid
, to overcome all forms of suffering without seeking aid unless it is absolutely
necessary .On the one hand, we try to avoid being too nationalistic, and on the
other, to avoid being too internationalist;
(3) build up the ideological standpoint of constantly maintaining revolutionar
y ardour, especially the desire to be like ordinary people, especially the poor
peasants. This is why our party cadres and our men and women in the army do not
receive wages; they are told to serve the party and to receive only from the par
ty. In this way, we avoid creating a new ruling class separated from the people;
(4) build up the concept of the mass outlook and of the mass line, that is, to
have full confidence in the masses and to live among the masses, especially the
poor peasants. Only by doing this can the revolution win victory and build its
forces. We stress this to cadres because there are some who have petty bourgeois
class backgrounds, specifically intellectuals who lack real confidence in the m
asses, especially in the poor peasants. We try to make them understand that thes
e poor people can do everything. They conquered the enemy, do productive work an
d everything. Because they do everything, we must serve them;
(5) Cadres are also instructed in revolutionary vigilance, that is, taking car
e to be on guard against the enemy;
(6) We arm them with an understanding of dialectical materialism to enable the
m to analyse things and to understand the ideological standpoints of the party.
All of these ideological standpoints have been propagated in the branches and ce
lls of the party. This was done not by the reading out of documents but by analy
sing daily activities, determining what was done wrongly and correcting shortcom
ings.
As for our books, they are only a few pages in length, as brief documents are mo
re suitable for poor peasants. We also have some courses, mostly short ones for
small groups -in underground work for two to three people-once or twice a month.
There are also other courses held about twice a year in which party members are
introduced to revolutionary concepts and educated in our political, ideological
and organizational line.
Even now, after liberation, we believe the ideological factor is the determining
factor. In cadre education, we place stress on destroying old society ideologic
al standpoints which remain powerful. Among leading cadres, we also stress the d
efending and building up of working class consciousness. This is to avoid revisi
onism. When a party becomes revisionist, it is not because the ordinary member b
ecomes revisionist but because the leadership leads the party towards revisionis
m. Although we say very little about revisionism outside the party, inside the p
arty we have fought a lot against revisionism. It is partly for this reason that
we avoid using the documents of others. We rely mostly on our own assessments o
f class struggle. This is more concrete. Some of our cadres who have lived overs
eas, and who worked with foreign communist panics, regularly request foreign doc
uments, claiming we neglect the study of Marxism-Leninism. But we tell them that
Marxism-Leninism develops by means of the struggle of the people; our experienc
es are genuine Marxist-Leninist documents.
IV. The Organizational Line of the Party
We build the party ideologically and organizationally by relying on our class an
alysis, taking the poor peasant and worker classes as the basic classes. Those w
ho joined from the petty bourgeoisie or other classes tried to promote the stand
points of those classes, but they had to renounce their old standpoints and deve
lop working class consciousness. Cadres are evaluated on the basis of their conc
rete activities. Their spirit has to be clean uncorrupted and without entangling
contacts with the enemy. We investigate life histories and class background bot

h before and after they join the revolution. We do this to prevent infiltration
by, for example, CIA, KGB or Vietnamese agents. By adopting these organizational
principles, we have unity in the party and can cleanse our party of bad element
s.5 We have not been 100 per cent successful. The enemy is still attempting to u
ndermine the party. Consequently, we are striving to strengthen political and id
eological education and to clean the party.
In summation, we can say that our party is integrated and united through this po
litical, ideological, and organizational work. It has become stronger and strong
er. We have learned that, as soon as you have a strong and clean party, you will
have a strong revolutionary movement. We still have some distance to travel on
this path, and the enemy, both the imperialists and the revisionists as well as
the Vietnamese, continue to fight us. Thus, the building of the party continues
from one generation to the next. We hope to avoid the possibility of the next ge
neration becoming revisionist. If we can guard safely the interests of our count
ry, we will also contribute to the struggle in the whole world. We know about th
e emergence of revisionism in the Soviet Union and we are saddened by this. And
about the destruction of the Indonesian party by the enemy. We have learned from
these experiences, and the experiences of other parties. We have tried not to f
all by the wayside.
Question:
Is there a danger ? from outside the country or inside the part
y ? a danger of a new class being created?
To clarify the nature of the struggle inside the party, yes, there are both dang
ers. Inside the party, there is a contradiction between the standpoints of priva
te ownership and collective ownership. If we do not take care, it may become ant
agonistic. The other contradiction is external. Vietnam, in particular, is tryin
g to undermine our party by military, political, economic and ideological means.
The Vietnamese also try to infiltrate our party. We are not worried about the e
xternal, military aggression. We worry most of all about the enemy inside.
Question:

Why is illegal work still the fundamental or basic work?

In this period, after liberation, it is secret work that is fundamental. We no l

onger use the terms 'legal' and 'illegal'; we use the terms 'secret' and 'open'.
Secret work is fundamental in all that we do. For example, the elections of com
rades to leading work are secret. The places where our leaders live are secret.
We keep meeting times and places secret, and so on. On the one hand, this is a m
atter of general principle, and on the other, it is a way to defend ourselves fr
om the danger of enemy infiltration. As long as there is class struggle or imper
ialism, secret work will remain fundamental. Only through secrecy can we be mast
ers of the situation and win victory over the enemy who cannot find out who is w
ho.
This also applies to foreign affairs. For example, the Soviet Union asked to com
e to Phnom Penh at liberation. They were preparing to send men to the Embassy. W
e said we could not possibly receive them and they were furious. We base everyth
ing on secrecy. This is in the interests of the working classes.
Question:

Why do you not mention the Soviets externally?

Inside the party we struggle resolutely against the Soviet Union, but we have ma
ny enemies now ? US imperialism, Thailand, Vietnam ? and for tactical reasons we
must limit our enemies as much as possible. It should be clear that we oppose t
he Soviet Union and revisionism, but our line has to be different from the line
taken in China because we are a small country.
Take another example: our attitude towards 'the three worlds'. We have the same

standpoint, exactly the same, but as for what we do, we have to bear in mind the
concrete interests of our country.
Question:

Do you have a party programme?

Yes we have one but only in Kampuchean. We still have many tasks; we have not do
ne enough propaganda work internationally. The Vietnamese enemy has been able to
make so much international propaganda against us because of shortcomings in our
propaganda work in the international arena.
V. On Concrete Work Before and After Liberation
Before liberation, legal activities concerned work undertaken by different organ
izations such as the students' union, workers' associations, women's association
and other organizations. We did everything we were allowed to do under the enem
y's laws. There are also sub-categories of non-legal or non-open activities: sem
i-open and semi-secret forms or semi-legal and semi-illegal forms. Celebrating M
ay 1st, for example, was both legal and illegal. Even though the ruling class mi
ght have caught us, we celebrated May 1st We maintained the tradition once it wa
s established. Perhaps it is different in your place.
The Communist Party of Kampuchea has never before been legal. This is also true
of other progressive organizations we created. We developed the tactic of secrec
y, firstly, to defend ourselves, secondly, to mobilize more forces, and finally
to serve our struggle, for example, in mobilizing intellectuals. We found they w
ould not join us if we used semi-illegal forms, but with legal forms such as cel
ebrations and visiting temples, they joined in. Thus, we made them join us stepby-step. Many semi-secret and semi-illegal and secret activities were organized
so as to protect the wholly illegal and secret activities of the party centre. T
hus, when the enemy attacked from outside, he struck semi-illegal and semi-secre
t activities only and we were able to defend our party and its leadership. In th
e neo-colonial, semi-feudal society, we had to work in complete secrecy, both in
side the party and inside other organizations. This also applied to party member
s working among the masses. Since liberation, we continue secret work because we
consider the strategic line to be more important than tactics. We have publishe
d the names of only a few of our cadres and members. Not many need to be public.
During the war, all of them were secret in this area, we learned from the blood
stained experience of the Communist party of Indonesia.6
Operating secretly, our organization has the following rules. Three members are
required to form a cell, for example in a factory. If there are more than three
members, a cell secretary must direct party work. If there are up to six people,
we form two separate cells having no contact with each other. Even with five pe
ople we organize two separate party cells, which work secretly and separately. I
f the enemy discovers one cell, the other can continue its work. There are no di
rect contacts among cells. In each factory, there is one leading cadre. Only he
knows this. He can go directly to the leadership. These procedures also apply to
other sectors such as students. We form cells having no knowledge of each other
and which are unable to contact each other. The same applies to contacts betwee
n the designated leading cadre and the leadership. Contacts are arranged through
a third person. If the enemy captures the leading cadre, he will not be able to
identify the leadership, only the go-between. This is our secret organization.
From our experience, secrecy is only one aspect of building up the organization.
Of greater importance is the ideological level of the designated leading cadres
. They must display great discipline. We had to be especially careful when work
had to be done in the cities. Cadres can be forced to leave in a hurry. They sho
uld not live with their families. When they do, things get complicated. It takes
them longer to escape. We have had some bitter experience with these things. Af
terwards, we decided to observe party discipline more strictly. Permit me to say

that we are speaking of concrete experiences and conditions in our country. It

is up to you to decide what you can learn from these experiences. We offer these
examples out of friendly revolutionary feelings.
Secrecy meant avoiding the law. For example, we had to make our own identity car
ds so that our names would not appear in the register. If the enemy captured gen
uine identity cards, photos and work permits, it would have been easier to find
us. Also, if revolutionaries did not have any work, the enemy might have noticed
us. We opened a bookshop for ourselves, but to avoid letting out any of our nam
es, we took shelter behind a third person and his name. During the war many cadr
es had to leave their jobs periodically, and we had to protect them. Contacts an
d meetings were at night; so were political training classes. We locked ourselve
s up in a room for two or three days until we were finished. Contacts between pu
blicly well-known leaders, such as those who worked in parliament, and secret le
aders were arranged through two or three other persons. We employed various tact
ics to overcome the oppression of the enemy. For meetings in a house, for exampl
e, we used signals, such as a scarf in front of the house. If the scarf was in p
lace, it was safe to enter it; if it was not, the enemy was there. In the beginn
ing we lost many people because the enemy knew the secret signals. From this we
learned not to go directly into the house but to walk around the neighbourhood,
maybe go into a shop, drink something and ask about what was happening in the ho
use. Sometimes good people would tell us in confidence about the enemy. Sometime
s the neighbours were not revolutionaries, but they would warn us if spies and a
gents were there.
We also used couriers for messages, letters, carrying ammunition, etc. Couriers
were not allowed to know our real places of residence. Other- wise, captured cou
riers could be forced to reveal them. We had to use a bridge of two or three oth
er persons. If a messenger failed to show up, we did nothing for two to three da
ys. But after this, we had to move elsewhere. When the enemy learned this, they
tortured captured couriers right away so as to catch us. From bitter experience,
we learned to abandon a safe house at once if a messenger was two to three hour
s late. The enemy came immediately a few times and we had to use arms in order t
o allow leading cadres to escape. This should give you an idea of our experience
s. The tactics and techniques are of secondary importance only; most important i
s the class standpoint of cadres.
Since liberation, our experience relates to anti-party activities organized insi
de our party. They usually involve CIA, Vietnamese and KGB agents. Our experienc
es in this area are very recent, but it appears from what we have been able to l
earn that CIA, Vietnamese and KGB agents have been working inside the party for
a long time. When we observed that something was wrong, we thought it was an int
ernal contradiction and attempted to resolve it by means of persuasion, self-cri
ticism and so on. For example, the party had to give directives to a branch conc
erning the living conditions of the people. When nothing changed, we realized so
mething was wrong. Where there were deviations to the left or to the right, we l
ooked carefully into the backgrounds of the cadres. We also sought the opinion o
f the masses. We have thus been able to uncover enemy agents step-by-step. Gener
ally, we discovered they had been engaged in enemy activities for a very long ti
me. Sometimes good comrades had been imprisoned and tortured and afterwards they
surrendered to the enemy. Upon release, they served as agents. We welcomed them
back, accepted them, without looking at what had happened in prison. We now rea
lize they had become agents of the enemy.
It is more widely known that the USA planned to seize power from us six months a
fter liberation. The plan involved joint action on the part of the USA, the KGB
and Vietnam. There was to be combined struggle from inside and outside. But we s
mashed the plan. Immediately after liberation, we evacuated the cities. The CIA,
KGB and Vietnamese agents there left for the countryside and were unable to imp
lement the plan. People who had infiltrated the party could not react immediatel

y, but we discovered them later when they planned coups d'tat. Their activities w
ere coordinated with aggression from outside. These were not powerful people; th
eir intention was to exploit the opportunity provided by Vietnam's attacks to as
sassinate our leaders and then announce it to the world. However, when the Vietn
amese attacked, our army defeated them and we caught the traitors inside the par
ty.
Although we say plans have been crushed, we do not mean the enemy has given up.
We have to continue to build and to defend our party, and our leadership, and to
apprehend the people who have infiltrated our party. We know the current plan i
nvolves not only Vietnamese agents, but has something to do with US imperialism
and the KGB. All of them! A similar thing has occurred in Yemen, both North and
South. And in Afghanistan. But as these things happen, the face of the Soviets b
ecomes more and more clear.
Question:
Is it co-operation between the CIA and KGB or is it rivalry for
control of Kampuchea?
Both. On the one hand they co-operate; on the other, they are rivals. For exampl
e, Vietnam attacked us last October to December while the US conducted operation
s near our coastal islands and along the border with Thailand with its CIA agent
s. They compete for control at the same time. This is an open form of co-operati
on. As for the secret one, some CIA agents joined up with the Vietnamese in orde
r to come to Kampuchea. Because the US was unable to come into Kampuchea, it had
to rely upon Vietnam. The Vietnamese do not discriminate in choosing agents. Th
ey accept anybody who fights the Communist party of Kampuchea. Even CIA agents!
The leadership apparatus must be defended at any price. If we lose members but r
etain the leadership, we can continue to win victories. Defending the leadership
of the party is strategic. As long as the leader- ship is there, the party will
not die. There can be no comparison between losing two to three leading cadres
and 200-300 members. Rather the latter than the former. Otherwise the party has
no head and cannot lead the struggle. This has been demonstrated by the experien
ce of the Communist Party of Indonesia. Its leadership was 90 per cent destroyed
. It has taken them a very long time to re-establish themselves. Thirteen years
have passed since 1965 and the party is not yet rebuilt. We do not know how long
it will take for them to regain the offensive strength, which they had before.
To build a good leadership is strategic. It takes 10-20 years to build up a good
leading communist. If you lose one, you lose a lot. And party secrecy can be lo
st.
VI. Building and Leading the Revolutionary Movement
As we have said, from 1960 we regarded the workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoi
sie and progressive patriotic personalities as strategic forces. The working cla
ss is the progressive class while the largest class is the peasantry. The others
are secondary, allied forces. The national progressive capitalists were seconda
ry, tactical forces mobilized in particular instances. The next step was setting
the strategic line. The rural struggle was the fundamental struggle. We divided
our cadres between the towns and the countryside, according to their abilities.
Before 1960 there was some confusion about this. We did not have a clear party
line. We had developed bases in the countryside but the enemy had destroyed up t
o 90 per cent of them. Moreover, we were not strong in the cities. We realized i
n 1959 that we lacked the strategic forces necessary for advancing the revolutio
n!
It was only after 1960 that we could allocate our forces correctly. Most of them
went to work among the peasants; slightly fewer worked among the petty Bourgeoi
sie, the students and intellectuals; a very few worked among national capitalist
s and with high-ranking personalities in the administration. Once we had this li

ne we could very quickly build our forces. In particular, we built up rural base
areas. As the mass movement became stronger and stronger, we were able to build
up legal and illegal work. We could even mount mass demonstrations. From 1962 t
o 1963, in particular, our forces grew stronger and stronger.8
The best of our cadres worked among poor peasants building base areas in the mos
t remote regions. They had to transform themselves so as to work among peasants.
Initially, there were a lot of problems. Meanwhile in the cities, cadres had to
become workers. The conditions in the cities and the countryside were quite dif
ferent in rural areas, living conditions were very bad but there were few enemie
s. In the cities, living conditions were better but there were many enemies. Bot
h places had advantages and disadvantages. Cadres had to be selected accordingly
. There was a lot of malaria in the countryside. Some cadres refused to work the
re, but we had work to do and we had to strengthen their ideological standpoint.
When we look back upon this period, we realize we would not have obtained such a
big victory without first overcoming such obstacles. We see two main turning po
ints: if we had not reorganized in 1960, we could not have launched the armed st
ruggle in 1968; if we had not launched the armed struggle in 1968, we would not
have been masters of the situation at the time of the 1970 coup d'tat. The enemy
might otherwise have destroyed our forces. To be master of the situation, to rel
y upon your own forces, to be sovereign ? these words have meaning only if we ha
ve the forces of the people in our hands. If we do not, they will fall into the
hands of the enemy. The most important thing was to grasp the national forces in
our country. This was for us a major lesson.
We seek to stress the right thing in gathering forces. This is important in all
periods of the revolution. Today, in the period of socialist revolution, our str
ength is greater than it was during the national democratic revolution. Take, fo
r example, the petty capitalists who were evacuated from the cities. Initially t
hey had difficulties living in the countryside, but gradually they have become p
roud of the revolution. They see the prospects for their children, that our revo
lution is clean and that we are independent and sovereign. They know we can defe
nd ourselves from Vietnam, and they have confidence in us. As for the intellectu
als who have remained abroad, some support us. In France, an association has exp
ressed solidarity with us against Vietnam. We are stronger now than in the first
revolution: 85 per cent of the population belongs to the revolution, as workers
and peasants, and 80-90 per cent of the intellectuals belong to it. Only ten pe
r cent are different. We try to educate these people so that they will see that
the revolution is good for them and their children. Thus we grow stronger and st
ronger.
We have gathered forces from different strata in different periods because every
one recognizes the patriotic spirit of the communists. The feudalists said bad t
hings about Vietnam and the USA without doing anything. They were corrupt and le
t Vietnam come ? 100 kilometres, 200 kilometres, half a kilometre ? across the b
order by corrupting the police.
The Vietnamese thus crawled into our country by what they tern 'legal' means, es
pecially in Takeo and Svay Rieng. But when power came into the hands of the part
y, everyone saw that we could hold aloft the banner of independence. They realiz
ed communists were clean, that we live as ordinary people live, while in the old
days, when people lived in a capitalist way, the society disintegrated. As soon
as people understood, they followed the communist way and we could easily mobil
ize forces.
VII. Forming the National United Front
How did we make Sihanouk join us? We were able to mobilize forces after the coup
d'tat because we had made preparations for a long time. We were masters of the s

ituation. We had an army; we had some weapons. Thus, we were able to form a unit
ed front. We even allowed King Sihanouk to become chairman of the front. It mean
t nothing because we were the masters of the situation. Following the coup, Siha
nouk was reduced from everything to nothing while for us it was the opposite ? i
n the cities as well as in the countryside. Forces from the basic levels of soci
ety were essential for getting top levels to join us. That is the first lesson.
The second lesson and experience concerns front activities. We did not have an e
asy time of it. The enemy tried to corrupt Sihanouk ? the USA, the French, the S
oviet revisionists ? and to split him away from the front. Sihanouk did not leav
e because we won victory after victory at the basic level. Sihanouk would have l
eft us had we not done so, especially in 1973 when Vietnam sat at the negotiatin
g table with the USA. Sihanouk was scared to be alone; he kept asking if we were
able to continue the struggle. He wanted to negotiate but we told him we would
continue the struggle to the end.
Thirdly, we found we had to struggle inside the front with Sihanouk at the same
time that we united with him externally. Sihanouk asked for things; we let him h
ave them as long as this did not contradict our strategic policy. We had to be v
ery flexible towards him. The party slogan was 'Don't push anybody over to the e
nemy'.
VIII. The Urban Struggle, 1960-73
Our struggle in the cities had two components: the legal struggle and the secret
struggle. The urban struggle was not as important as the struggle in the countr
yside but its impact was felt all over the country and on an international level
. Moreover, the struggle had an important effect on the middle level of the ruli
ng class, in spite of the fact that the city was the headquarters of the ruling
class and its apparatus of oppression.
Some of the legal work was undertaken in the National Assembly. We did not attem
pt to obtain seats; we used patriotic personalities for making propaganda. These
dignitaries did not act in the name of the party, but the party was in essence
behind the propaganda. The work was limited. We just let our people use strategi
c slogans to arouse the people. At the same time, we used newspapers, promoted r
umours and asked people to follow the deputies whom we had managed to get into t
he Assembly. In this way, we worked at the top, making people follow us while at
the same time we worked at basic levels.
Although we were able to work legally in the National Assembly, our deputies wer
e sometimes subject to repression. We would then try to sneak our ideas into oth
er deputies by telling them, 'If you say this and this, people will follow you a
nd elect you again'. And sometimes they tried it. When our slogans were used bef
ore the people, the people applauded. The deputies were pleased. Later they woul
d ask us what to say and we would then sneak more of our slogans into them. Some
of our comrades could not understand this and thought that by doing this we mig
ht strengthen the influence of the ruling class. But we did not think it did any
harm. If we could get some of the essence of our ideas to the people, then we c
ould get some of these people with us. There were difficulties in the struggle w
ith our newspapers.
When the ruling class realized a particular newspaper had been secretly establis
hed by the party, it would be closed in less than three months. We would then le
t comrades write anonymously for newspapers of a more neutral nature. Sometimes
the paper would cut out half the words. We did it nonetheless; to get some ideas
out. We also let our people respond to reactionary newspaper articles, by writi
ng letters to the editor asking the paper to stop printing reactionary views. In
the case of the most reactionary papers, those that could not be restrained in
any other way, we called for mass demonstrations at their offices. In the case o

f Phnom Penh Presse, a CIA newspaper and the most reactionary of them all, we le
t the people sack the place.9 Among our other activities in the cities, we promo
ted artistic performances among the people and arranged travel to rural areas fo
r festivals, ceremonies, and so on. We were thus able to make our forces stronge
r and stronger at all levels of the society.
Choosing the right slogan, the slogan that suited the situation ? asking not too
much, not too little in the situation ? was crucial to our work in the cities.
We did not use words like 'revolutionary', 'communist', or 'red', for example. I
nstead we used words everyone would accept such as 'Fight US Imperialism', 'Figh
t for Sovereignty', etc. People were especially scared of words such as 'communi
st' and 'revolutionary'. But we made them adopt our party line, in its essence,
by putting out the party line. If in this way we could make people adopt the lin
e ? people who were otherwise afraid of 'revolution' and 'communism' ? then thos
e people, in spite of their fears, were able to hold aloft our party flag.
We even worked within the movement of Buddhist monks, making them follow us by s
aying we would defend the country and religion. If the country were to become do
minated by foreigners, there would no longer be any religion. So monks, too, hel
d aloft our banner even if they did not like communism. We worked not only among
the rank-and-file monks ? they were not so reactionary, in any case ? but also
among high-ranking monks who controlled large parts of the country. We used slog
ans opposing foreign suppression of the culture of Kampuchea. Monks then became
patriotic, supporting us without being aware of it.
We also worked with high personalities such as Penn Nouth.10 Here, we had to be
careful. We had to solicit his ideas, not make propositions, not propagate. The
high-ranking patriotic personalities were not an important force but we were try
ing to gather all forces in support of the struggle, especially in the cities. W
e asked, for example, 'What would your Excellency think if the USA attacked the
country?' He would then think about it and we would sneak in ideas about what ha
d to be done. The dignitaries then listened to us and spoke to others under thei
r influence. Thus Penn Nouth did not know that he propagated for the communists.
These were the different forms of legal struggle in the cities. However, we put
most stress upon the secret struggle. Without the secret struggle, the legal str
uggle would not have succeeded. These two forms of struggle interacted and compl
emented each other, but the secret work was the most important.
We had to educate our cadres all the time about secret as well as legal work. Wh
en the situation was easy, cadres wanted to work legally so as to have the chanc
e to gain a title, money, etc. And when the situation was difficult, they prefer
red instead to work secretly. Consequently they had to be educated continuously,
so as to be able to remain firm at their posts even at the risk of their lives.
They could not assume new duties on their own, before the party gave authorizat
ion. This was ideological work.
Anticipating difficulties, we took precautions. We set up bases in the countrysi
de that would receive people engaged in secret work in the cities. Once secrecy
was broken, however, those comrades were not allowed into secret work in the cou
ntryside. Once out in the open ? always open work. We had to be careful about wh
ere people went so that no one knew in advance. If they did, the enemy could fin
d out.
When cadres had trouble, they often asked to be sent to the countryside even whe
n secrecy remained unbroken. Because of this we had to work step-by-step with th
eir ideological standpoint, and we had to keep an eye on those working in the ci
ties ? either secretly or legally ? observing especially their living conditions
and personal circumstances. Those working secretly could not hold jobs as ordin
ary people did, so we had to assist them in finding jobs to some extent.

In accordance with the party's correct line, we were able to build and to defend
our forces. Some were destroyed by the enemy, but for the most part we were abl
e to protect them; especially after the coup in 1970 when we had large liberated
areas. The locations of our most important bases were a secret. Even US electro
nics could not discover them. Although US bombings destroyed a lot, they were no
t very effective because we stuck to our secret line of struggle. Vietnamese for
ces in Vietnam were less well-hidden and less secret than we were and because of
that more of them were destroyed. Even the Vietnamese here were hit more often
than we were.
Our people and soldiers called the B-52s 'the blind ones'. When they came, they
dropped bombs without looking. They did not care whether they hit anything or no
t. Our people were not too afraid of the B-52s.
We learned that as long as we preserved our secrecy, our struggle could continue
as long as necessary. Even US-made artillery was ineffective when it was not kn
own who or where we were. Within limits. Some of us were hit But we told our cad
res not to be afraid, to keep themselves well hidden and then we would all be ab
le to throw out the US imperialists.
[Nuon Chea concluded his statement at this point as the time allocated for the m
eeting had elapsed.]

Leader Hou Youn on the commercial system

We cam compare the establishment of commercial organization in the colonial peri
od to a large spider's web covering all of Kampuchea. If we consider the peasant
s and the consumers as flies or mosquitoes which get trapped in the web, we can
see that the peasats and the consumers are prey to the merchants, and the spider
which spins the web. The commercial system, the selling and exchanging of agric
ultural production in our country, suppresses production and squeezes the rural
areas dry and tasteless, permanently maintaining them in their poverty. What we
habitually call "cities" or "market towns" are pumps which drain away the vitali
ty of the rural areas. Any type of goods that the cities and the market towns pr
ovide for the rural areas are just bait. The large rural areas feed the cities a
nd the market towns. The cities--the market towns with their fresh and up-to-dat
e appearance--live at the expense of the rural areas--they ride on their shoulde
rs.
Those who work the land, ploughing, harvesting, enduring the entire burden of na
ture, under the sun and in the rain, getting gnarled fingers and cracked skin on
their hands and feet, receive only 26 percent as their share . . . whereas the
others, who work in the shade, using nothing but their money, receive a share of
up to 74 per cent . . . The rural areas are poor, skinny and miserable because
of the commercial system which oppresses them. The tree grows in the rural areas
, but the fruit goes to the towns.
Hou Youn, "La Paysannerie du Cambodge" ("The Cambodian Peasantry"). Paris: The S
orbonne, 1955.

Leader Khieu Samphan on International Integration, and the need for an autonomou
s economic development

To accept international integration is to accept a mechanism by which the struct

ural imbalance will be aggravated, an aggravation which could end in a violent e
xplosion, seeing that it cannot fail to become insupportable for an ever greater
part of the population. Indeed, the latter is already aware of the contradictio
ns which lock up the integration of the economy within the international market
of goods and capital.
A conscious and autonomous development is thus objectively necessary.
Khieu Samphan, "L'Economie du Cambodge et les Problmes de l'Industrialisation" ("
Cambodia's Economy and Problems of Industrialisation"), p. 100. Paris: The Sorbo
nne, 1959.

Pol Pot on victory over U.S. Imperialism

We have won a total, definitive and clear victory, meaning that we have won it w
ithout any foreign connection or involvement.
We dared to wage a struggle on a stand completely different from that of world r
evolution. The world revolution carried out the struggle with all kinds of massi
ve support, material, economic and financial, from outside world forces. As for
us, we have waged our revolutionary struggle basically on the principles of inde
pendence, sovereignty and self-reliance. . . . In the entire world, ever since t
he advent of revolutionary war and the birth of U.S. imperialism, no country, no
people and no army has been able to drive the imperialists out to the last man
and score total victory over them in the way we have.
Quoted in: Kiernan, Ben, and Boua, Chanthou, Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea,
1942-79. London: Zed Press, in press.

On Vietnam's use of the banner of revolution to take possession of territories

From 1946 to 1954, under the cover of "revolutionary solidarity" against French
colonialism, the Vietnamese sought for taking possession of Kampuchea's territor
y. Under the banner of revolution, the Vietnamese came into Kampuchea and settle
d up cells of the Indochinese Communist Party in order to grasp Kampuchea's peop
le. They organized a party, an army and a State power. They used this expedient
in order to try to take possession of Kampuchea. . . .
At that time, the Khmers who waged the struggle in Kampuchea had not an independ
ent position. They were totally relying on the Vietnamese. They did not well und
erstand for whom and for what they were making revolution. That is why the Vietn
amese could easily enter into Kampuchea. They divided Kampuchea into zones: Easy
zone, Southwest zone and Northwest zone. They could install there whoever they
wanted to. They did everything at their place and acted at their will.
Kampuchea's people, being victims of the acts of aggression and annexation of th
e Vietnamese and having successively lost an important part of their Kampuchea K
rom's territory, foster a deep national hatred against the Vietnamese aggressors
, annexationists and swallowers of Kampuchea's territory. The Kampuchea's people
are perfectly aware of the Vietnamese treacherous acts, subterfuges and hypocri
sy. They have always seethed with a deep rancour.
Black Paper: Facts & Evidences of the Acts of Aggression and Annexation of Vietn

am Against Kampuchea. Phnom Penh: Department of Press and Information of the Min
istry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea, September 1978.

Excerpts from the Black Paper

As Kampuchea's delegation always kept silence about the Paris negotiations, afte
r two or three meetings the Vietnamese asked for its opinion. The Communist Part
y of Kampuchea's delegation put back the question in return: "Whom to negotiate
with? Would we have to negotiate with the Lon Nol clique?" But the latter was al
ready dying. . . . "Would we have to negotiate with the US?" Kampuchea's revolut
ion had not to negotiate with the aggressors of Kampuchea. . . . Besides, the Co
mmunist Party of Kampuchea had nobody to carry out negotiations.
The Vietnamese replied: In our opinion Kampuchea's comrades must negotiate. If K
ampuchea's comrades have no cadred to carry out negotiations with the US, we can
do it in their place.
The Vietnamese impudence is boundless!
In October 1972, Vietnamese pressures became more imperious.
In fact, the US and Vietnamese had already put the broad outline of the draft of
Paris Agreements into shape. Pham Hung and Hay So asked to meet once again with
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. The talks lasted fou
r days instead of the initially scheduled two days. During the talks the Vietnam
ese have shown their rare insolence and were in a towering rage. Both sides expr
essed once again their points of views and each side kept abaiding by its positi
on. The Communist Party of Kampuchea yielded nothing under the vietnamese pressu
res. [1]
. . .
At the moment when he was about to go home, Pham Hung said he had been entrusted
by the Vietnamese party to inform the Communist Party of Kampuchea that on the
day of their meeting to finish off the text of the Agreements, Kissinger asked L
e Duc Tho to inform the Kampuchea's side that if Kampuchea did not cease fire, t
he US strategic and tactical planes would destroy Kampuchea within 72 hours. Thi
s was an open threat uttered to the Communist Party of Kampuchea. . . .
When Comrade Secretary Pol Pot came back home, he received a letter from the Vie
tnamese party to South Vietnam. . . [which] only confirmed Kissinger's threats u
nderlining that if Kampuchea did not cease fire, he would totally destroy Kampuc
hea's revolution within 72 hours. The Vietnamese asked the Communist Party of Ka
mpuchea to more carefully consider the problem. Did Kissinger really talk like t
hat? Probably. But anyway, the Vietnamese were involved in this affair. . . .
As it has been mentioned above, the Communist Party of Kampuchea did not know wi
th whom to negotiate, for Lon Nol was already dying. As for the US, they were th
e aggressors. They had to stop the aggression? . . . Besides, a cease-fire would
spread confusion in the determination of the people and the Revolutionary Army
of Kampuchea in waging their struggle.
On the other hand, at the end of 1972, the political situation of the whole of S
outheast Asia showed that it was in Kampuchea where the revolutionary situation
was best. South vietnam was under the Thieu clique's control. It was the same in
Laos which, except some regions, was controlled by the administration of the Vi
entaine. As for Kampuchea', the Kampuchea's revolution, on the whole, grasped th

e situation well in hands and controlled the country. If the map was coloured, b
lack colour would be in every place, except in Kampuchea were red colour would d
ominate. The objective of the US imperialists was to take this red place and tur
n it into black colour. . . . If Kampuchea's revolution failed, Vietnam's revolu
tion would also fail. It would be the same for the other revolutions in South Ea
st Asian countries. . . .
So, when the Vietnamese informed the US that they had failed in forcing Kampuche
a to negotiate and cease-fire, the US were very mad and decided to send their B52 to bomb Hanoi in December 1972, until the Vietnamese implored them to stop bo
mbing and resume negotiations. [2]
. . .
Kampuchea has been totally and definitely liberated on April 17, 1975. South Vie
tnam has been liberated on April 30, 1975. The Vietnamese had to leave Kampuchea
and go back home. The Communist Party of Kampuchea requested the Vietnamese to
withdraw before the end of May 1975, and at the lastest, at the end of June, 197
5. But in fact, only one party of Vietnamese withdraw from Kampuchea. . . .
It was in Ratanakiri province where they were most numerous to remain in Kampuch
ea's territory. There were more than 1,000 scattered here and there in many plac
es by groups of ten to one hundred. . . . Kampuchea's regional forces requested
them to withdraw. The Vietnamese replied that the territories located North of A
ndaung Meas and Voeunsay were Vietnamese territories. . . . In Mondulkiri provin
ce, the Vietnamese troops also refused to withdraw. They finally withdrew only u
nder the threat of the regional Secretary to drive them out by force.
At Snuol (Kratie province) the Vietnamese accepted to withdraw for they were awa
re of the measures taken in Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri provinces. [3]
**************************
1. Black Paper: Facts & Evidences of the Acts of Aggression and Annexation of Vi
etnam Against Kampuchea, pp. 72-74. Phnom Penh: Department of Press and Informat
ion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea, September 1978 (
English as in original).
2. Ibid., pp. 74-46.
3. Ibid., pp. 78.

MANIFESTO OF THE PERIODICAL

REVOLUTIONARY YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN
(From Yuvachun Nung Yuvaneari Padevat,
No.1 August 1973,
pp. 1-7.)
In our revolutionary movement today a great mean young men and women have active
ly sought to join together in both the Alliance of Yuv.K.K. [Communist Youth of
Kampuchea] and in patriotic organizations. And these numbers are continually gro
wing in an orderly way. Today, all over the country, the membership of he Allian
ce of Yuv.K.K. counts by tens of thousands of people. In the offices and departm
ents there are tens of thousands of young men and women. In the armed forces of
all three categories (village militia, regional forces, regular forces) there ar
e also a great many young men and women. Therefore, if we add them together all

over the country, the number of young men and women in our revolutionary ranks a
dds to hundreds of thousands of people, whether Yuv.K.K troops, in offices and d
epartments both at the front lines and the rear ranks.
In sum, all young men and women in our revolutionary ranks have all received con
tinuous constructive education from the party. Therefore, so far, the movement o
f young men and women has progressed forward both in building each individual an
d in building a movement of revolutionary struggle. Our many young men and women
have joined in revolutionary activities on all battlefields both at the front l
ines and in rear areas in overflowing numbers.
In order to explode and push the movement of young men and women toward greater
strength in accordance with the actual situation, in accordance with our revolut
ionary movement which is bounding ahead, our Communist Party of Kampuchea, even
though pressed by other matters, nevertheless definitely needs to build an organ
to educate-construct-nurture the principle of revolutionary political conscious
ness in our young men and women following the direction and the policy approach
of the party in order that [this principle] becomes more clearly defined. That o
rgan is this periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women which appears monthly.
This periodical is an organ of revolutionary youth and is under the aegis of th
e party.
The intentions of this periodical aim to serve revolutionary young men and women
, taken together, but also to serve all progressive young men and women in the r
anks, too. This periodical has a direction toward building our young men's and w
omen's political consciousness and their implementation of assignments which wil
l serve the movement to fight and strive in the front lines and the rear areas a
s well as in the offices and departments.
Therefore, this periodical is a periodical to lead, explode and push the movemen
t of young men and women to do the concrete work of building-nurturing the princ
iple of political consciousness of the party into the revolutionary youth organi
zation and to acquire [ for the youth movement] and spread experiences both in t
he matter of political consciousness and regarding the job of implementing vario
us assignments of the revolutionary youth organization. That is to say [this per
iodical]:
Politically, aims to disseminate, educate, nurture, orient political principles,
strategic and tactical; the approach to people?s war of the party; the party?s
economic approach; the party?s socio-cultural approach and the party?s foreign p
olicy goals through concrete execution and with experience of building the force
of revolutionary young men and women. Mentally, aims to disseminate, construct,
nurture a revolutionary consciousness such as:
-- class consciousness, class struggle, division into classes so that our youth
have a proper class philosophy;
-- righteous revolutionary principles;
-- national pride, a proper patriotic spirit. Proletarian nationalism and intern
ationalism of our revolutionary movement in order to explode the national princi
ples of the working class, of the party;
-- precepts of unremitting struggle both with the enemy and with nature and in b
uilding oneself in order to fulfill duties, large and small, which the party ass
igns in order to have maximum victory;
-- a spirit of serving the nation and people, especially the people of the bas a
reas;

-- revolutionary heroism in the task of fighting the enemy at the front lines, i
ncreasing production in the rear area, in fulfilling duties well in offices, etc
.
-- high spirit of collectivity, ridding oneself of individual interests in favor
of the whole, etc
3. In implementing assignments, aims to:
At the front lines explode and push young men and women who are combatants, who
are messengers, who are medics, who carry ammunition, food, the wounded, etc., t
o overcome to fight, rushing to fulfill their individual duties to the maximum;
to fight and strive as strongly as possible and always firmly.
In the rear areas explode and push the movement to increase production; the prob
lem of solidarity with the people in general; the problem of doing a job with th
e people of the bases:
-- increasing pride in the work of manual activities to become closer to the peo
ple of the bases;
-- exploding the spirit of the collectivity; spirit of economizing of collective
goods and of time in the officers and departments and worksites and individual
jobs.
In all, that is, the aim is of building reflexes of our youth toward the overall
good and increasing their understanding and desire for manual activities; that
is to say, changing their old worldview progressively and causing the adoption o
f a new, revolutionary worldview as a replacement.
To summarize, the periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women has a direction t
oward building a stand of the political consciousness and implementation of assi
gnments of the party and exploding the movement of young men and women so that i
t becomes increasingly vigorous and strong in the interest of serving the moveme
nt to fight and strive onward both at the front lines and in the rear areas. It
also builds reserve strength for perpetuating the leadership of the revolutionar
y movement generally in the future by taking the revolutionary movement concrete
ly, both at the front lines and in the rear areas and offices, and building it b
y means of the aspects of political consciousness and the task of implementing v
arious assignment. Therefore, the periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women w
ishes success to the brave young men and women of Kampuchea wishes good health a
nd strength and a quick intelligence as well as a strong principle of revolution
ary consciousness in order to raise the battle standard to fight and strive agai
nst the enemy on all front to be as strong as possible and continually gain new
great victories.
Long Live the brave young men and women of Kampuchea!
Long Live the periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women!
Printed in Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussi
on Compiled and Edited with an introduction by Timothy Michael Carney
Data Paper: Number 106 Southeast Asia Program Department of Asian Studies Progra
m
Cornell University Ithaca, New York Janurary 1977

Straight Talk on the Trial of Pol Pot

by Mike Ely
Revolutionary Worker #918, Aug. 10, 1997
In the end of July, ABC News broadcast parts of a videotape showing a trial of P
ol Pot in territory controlled by Khmer Rouge forces in western Cambodia.
Pol Pot has been the long-time leader of the Khmer Rouge (which means "Red Cambo
dians"). The Khmer Rouge armed forces seized power in Cambodia in 1975 after man
y years of guerrilla warfare. They led the country for three years. Then they we
re driven out of power and back into the countryside by a 1979 Vietnamese invasi
on.
With news that Pol Pot had been arrested and put on trial, the U.S. media reissu
ed their familiar charges about "killing fields" during the years 1975-79 when P
ol Pot's Khmer Rouge controlled Cambodia. They insisted that Pol Pot be handed o
ver to an international tribunal to be tried for genocide.
Nowhere is it mentioned that for years the U.S. bombed and invaded Cambodia in a
n attempt to defeat the anti-imperialist forces, totally wreck the country's eco
nomy and punish the people of Cambodia. Given this bloody history, the U.S. impe
rialists have no right to speak on what is good for Cambodia--and no right to ju
dge those who fought them.
In the hands of the western media, the story of Cambodia has become a crude anti
-communist morality tale. New York Times reporter Elizabeth Becker appeared on T
V again recently as an official "expert" to hammer home the message: Cambodia, s
he said, shows that attempts to carry out "wonderful-sounding ideals" about equa
lity using "social engineering" produces a disaster for people.
To make the facts fit this message, official discussion rips the Cambodian event
s out of any recognizable context. Cambodia is portrayed as a gentle, peasant la
nd destroyed by communist revolution. In fact, any serious approach to the event
s in Cambodia has to start with the imperialist invasion of Indochina launched b
y the U.S. in 1965 and the class nature of Cambodian society.
U.S. Destruction and the Challenges of the Year Zero
"Traditional" Cambodia was a brutal feudal society that needed a revolution. Abo
ut 80 percent of the people were peasants, most of them extremely poor and explo
ited by a class of government officials based in urban strongholds. Cambodia's a
bsolute monarchy rested on a military that repeatedly suppressed peasant uprisin
gs. The country was colonized by France in the late 1800s. In one famous inciden
t, 900 workers died constructing a colonial resort at Bokor during nine months o
f forced corve labor.
As the French imperialists were defeated in Indochina, the U.S. moved in to asse
rt influence and control. In Cambodia the U.S. maneuvered for influence through
aid and arms to the government of Prince Sihanouk, while backing reactionary arm
ed forces in opposition to Sihanouk.
In the 1960s the Khmer Rouge, led by Angkar (which means "the Organization" in t
he Khmer language), launched a just revolutionary armed struggle by establishing
rural base areas among the peasants. (Angkar later publicly named itself the Co
mmunist Party of Kampuchea--CPK.) Their goals were to overthrow feudalism, devel
op an independent new economy, and drive any foreign dominating forces out of Ca
mbodia.

As revolutionary forces made progress in Indochina, U.S. forces invaded in 1965.

Within a few years, the U.S. had 500,000 troops in Vietnam.
Unknown to most of the world, the U.S. also launched a "secret war" of massive b
ombardment of the neighboring countries Cambodia and Laos--targeting the rural b
ase areas of the guerrilla forces. The U.S. expanded its aggression against Camb
odia. In 1969 a U.S.-instigated coup overthrew Sihanouk and brought the right-wi
ng general Lon Nol to power. Then, in 1970, President Nixon ordered a land invas
ion of eastern Cambodia to attack Vietnamese liberation forces based there. It w
as a defeat for the U.S.--their armies had to withdraw. And the Khmer Rouge made
major advances.
The U.S. responded with one of the most intense and protracted air wars in histo
ry. They dropped over 500,000 tons of bombs on Cambodia between 1970 and 1973--t
hree times what the U.S. dropped on Japan during World War 2. In 160 days of "ca
rpet bombings" in 1973, U.S. planes dropped over 240,000 tons, concentrated on t
he main farming areas along the Mekong River.
This was the real genocidal episode in Cambodia and it marked everything that fo
llowed.
In April 1975, when the Khmer Rouge troops took the capital Phnom Penh, Angkar a
nd the masses of people faced extremely difficult conditions. Unable to win the
war, the U.S. had set out to wreck and punish the country. Agriculture was in ru
ins. At least 500,000 people had died during the war--many because of the U.S. b
ombing. About two million people--a third of the country's population--had fled
the countryside into Phnom Penh, where they faced starvation.
At the beginning of what Angkar called "Year Zero," the challenges were huge: a
new state system, agriculture, and industry had to be rebuilt, virtually from sc
ratch, in one of the poorest countries of the world--under constant threat of ne
w invasion.
In May 1975, U.S. President Gerald Ford staged the so-called Mayaguez incident,
launched new air raids and destroyed Cambodia's only oil refinery.
Under these conditions, any government leading Cambodia would have had to take e
mergency measures to ensure survival for the masses of people. In the process, t
he Khmer Rouge attempted to replace the old semifeudal, semicolonial society wit
h their vision of a new independent Democratic Kampuchea.
Any serious analysis of the Khmer Rouge has to start with understanding these co
nditions--which is precisely what the standard tales about "Khmer Rouge genocide
" try to hide.
Dishonest Distortions
The western press repeats a standard formula: "at least a million people died un
der Pol Pot." When people hear this, they are supposed to believe that one milli
on people were killed by Pol Pot.
In fact, these numbers include everyone who died from starvation, disease and po
litical execution in the 1975-79 period between wars--and assigns blame for each
of those deaths to the new government of the Khmer Rouge-led Democratic Kampuch
ea.
Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman devote a useful chapter in their book After th
e Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina & the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology to docu
menting how the official myth of "Khmer Rouge genocide" was systematically creat
ed using false information and distortions.

In Cambodia, after 10 years of war, revolution, invasion, bombardment, famine an

d dislocation, the country was dotted with mass graves. Many people, certainly h
undreds of thousands, died during the years that the Khmer Rouge ruled Cambodia.
Their skulls and bones are offered as proof of "Khmer Rouge atrocities." In fac
t, the overwhelming majority of those who died during the 1970s died of war, bom
bardment, starvation and disease.
Michael Vickery, in his book Cambodia 1975-82, shows why no one knows how many C
ambodians died during the wars and upheavals of the 1970s. There were no reliabl
e population figures before the fighting. Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman (The Na
tion, June 25, 1977) point out that John Barron and Anthony Paul, who wrote the
first widely publicized book accusing the Khmer Rouge of genocide, estimated tha
t only about 10 percent of those who died in that hard first year of 1976 were f
rom political executions. Vickery's account covering the larger period from 1975
-79 suggests a higher range estimate for the number who died from execution, but
he emphasizes the lack of precision inherent in all the data and estimates conc
erning this period.
A former U.S. Foreign Service officer in Phnom Penh, David Chandler, reported th
at the U.S. government itself estimated that a million Cambodians were going to
die of starvation in the years after the U.S. bombardment. Then--when hundreds o
f thousands did die of starvation--the U.S. media machine claims all this was "a
uto-genocide" by those who opposed the U.S. aggression.
Any serious international tribunal on genocide in Cambodia would have to indict
the U.S. war-makers Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, General Westmoreland, Defens
e Secretary Melvin Laird, Gerald Ford and all the rest.
A Standard for a Serious Analysis
The defenders of capitalist/imperialist society examine the experience of Cambod
ia from their perspective--from the perspective of defending and justifying capi
talist society. In these accounts, the disruption of the old society is itself c
onsidered a crime. The fact that the upper class elite had to do manual labor un
der the Khmer Rouge, or that young people and women should be encouraged to brea
k from the traditional family control, or that officials of the old society were
deposed and often punished--these things are portrayed as atrocities.
Clearly, analyses that start from that bourgeois class stand cannot serve our st
ruggle for liberation. For oppressed people, a serious analysis has to approach
these experiences from a completely different point of view, using a completely
different standard--seeking to make radical ruptures in traditional ideas and tr
aditional property relations.
In a discussion of Cambodia, Chairman Avakian asked (Revolution/Fall 1990): "How
do you break with these very oppressive and exploitative relations and traditio
ns, customs, and cultures in a way that... fundamentally relies on the masses an
d acts on the understanding that they are the ones that have to carry out these
social transformations. Not that this will just happen spontaneously--it require
s that the masses have the leadership of a vanguard party, but a vanguard party
that precisely relies fundamentally on the masses to carry this out and doesn't
try to impose it from the top down."
Evaluating the experience of the Khmer Rouge is a very complex and difficult pro
blem. Reliable information and analysis is hard to come by and fragmentary. But
some initial investigation points to several important questions that would have
to be looked at in the course of any serious evaluation of the experience of Ca
mbodia and the approach of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

The Relocation of People

and the Reconstruction of Agriculture
The bourgeois press often accuses the Khmer Rouge of atrocities because they imm
ediately evacuated Phnom Penh after taking it in April 1975. This evacuation is
portrayed as an irrational and cruel "death march."
In fact, the Khmer Rouge had real reasons to fear that the U.S. might launch bom
bing raids to attack Phnom Penh and the people there. The U.S. had done this dur
ing the 1968 Tet offensive when Vietnamese fighters seized parts of Hue and Chol
on.
In addition, the huge refugee encampments around Phnom Penh had only days worth
of food stocks. Eight thousand people there had already starved to death in the
month before liberation. Hospitals were terribly overcrowded, and over half the
country's doctors had left for exile. This objective situation has to be taken i
nto account in evaluating the decision to evacuate Phnom Penh.
At the same time, the lines and policies that were then carried out need to be e
valuated. The new government of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) put the whole country
on an emergency footing--and moved the relocated people into peasant villages or
uninhabited forest areas to plant rice, create new irrigation systems, restore
agriculture, and rebuild roads. Vickery estimates that after overthrowing Lon No
l, the Khmer Rouge quickly relocated over 2.5 million people to the countryside.
This was undoubtedly a wrenching process.
r roots and edible plants until the first
ften few tools, and many of the relocated
he new areas. There were many deaths from

In many areas people had to scratch fo

crops could be harvested. There were o
people knew little about how to farm t
starvation and disease.

But it was also wrenching in a political sense--strangers were moved in large nu

mbers into isolated and insulated villages, resources were strained--and there w
ere inevitably sharp conflicts over who would rule, who would control the land,
and how food, tools and seed grain would be distributed.
Vickery reports a new political arrangement was envisioned where the population
was divided into three categories: Full rights, Candidate, and Depositee. "The F
ull rights people were poor peasants, the lower middle strata of the middle peas
ants, and workers. Candidates were upper middle peasants, wealthy peasants and p
etty bourgeoisie; while the Depositees were capitalist and foreign minorities."
People with links to Lon Nol's officers and police were reportedly made Deposite
es.
Vickery writes that these divisions often were applied, in practice, so that the
"really operative division was between `new' people (evacuees) and `old' or `ba
se' people...who had lived in the revolutionary areas since before April 1975. T
his division is all the more meaningful in that even peasants from non-revolutio
nary areas were classed as Depositees, and in some cases there was a distinction
between base area Depositees (former capitalists or non-Khmer) and `new' Deposi
tees from the city." Some sources report that peasant refugees who had fled to t
he cities were sometimes accused of having "defected" to the Lon Nol side and we
re therefore treated as politically suspect. These reports require more investig
ation.
It would be important to understand better the line and policies of the Khmer Ro
uge in constructing the new revolutionary power. Were they constructing a revolu
tionary dictatorship of workers and peasants, and what classes did they see as a
llies? What were their policies on "land to the tiller" and on land collectiviza
tion? Did they envision a united front led by the proletariat?

Vickery and other sources point out that the line and policies that guided recon
struction varied tremendously from region to region, and even between neighborin
g towns. It would also be important to understand better the causes for the diff
erences in line.
In many cases, these new arrangements had to be set up almost overnight--with li
ttle or no participation of trained political cadre. How much of the practical p
olicies flowed from the spontaneous actions and outlooks of the "base" peasants?
Cambodian villagers had long-standing hostilities toward towns and townspeople.
Some may have resisted uniting with large numbers of strangers entering their v
illages.
To what degree did organizational and political weaknesses in the Angkar contrib
ute to incorrect and uneven policies? Vickery and other sources report that the
centralized connections between Khmer Rouge of various regions were extremely lo
ose--and that widely different polices were carried out in the country's seven m
ain Khmer Rouge regions. This suggests that lack of strong party organization ma
y have been a serious problem in this movement.
To understand what happened in Cambodia it would be important to evaluate the li
ne associated with Pol Pot that eventually emerged out of intense internal strug
gles within the Angkar/CPK after the seizure of power. As a unified command was
consolidated, the Angkar/CPK attempted to quickly abolish all money, wages syste
ms, marketplaces, religion, and private ownership of land and productive forces.
These policies are often called "ultra-Maoist" in the western press. But in real
ity, they are quite different from the policies of New Democratic Revolution car
ried out by Mao in the liberation of China. And Mao developed a whole theory whi
ch saw the socialist transition to communism as a protracted and wave-like proce
ss of struggling to overcome class society through relying on the masses of peop
le.
Vickery suggests that the implementation of these new consolidated policies coin
cided with a change in the use of political execution. Before 1977, he writes, e
xtreme punishment was mainly used against officers and officials associated with
the crimes of the old regime. After 1977, he believes the numbers of executions
rose and involved more punishment of both "new" people and "base" people who ra
n afoul of the new campaigns and the new authorities. Again, more investigation
would be needed to evaluate the truth of such reports, and to understand the ext
ent to which incorrect methods were used to enforce the policies of the new powe
r.
The Problem of Nationalism
It is clear that Khmer Rouge politics were heavily colored by an intense Khmer n
ationalism. There were apparently attempts to forcibly suppress the language, re
ligion and culture of minority nationalities--such as the Moslem Cham people. Vi
etnamese people living in Cambodia were reportedly treated very harshly. Vickery
's report that national minorities as a whole were categorized as "depositees" s
uggests that such policies were not just local errors.
Such narrow nationalism may also have played a role in the alliance between the
Khmer Rouge and capitalist roaders in China. The Khmer Rouge movement had develo
ped close ties to Maoist China during their years of guerrilla warfare. But in S
eptember 1976, a year after the CPK came to power, Mao Tsetung died and his clos
e allies were arrested in a counterrevolutionary coup. Pol Pot traveled to China
in September 1977 in his first public appearance and, on behalf of the DK gover
nment and the CPK, embraced the new reactionary leaders of China.
The bourgeois press often connects Pol Pot with the Great Proletarian Cultural R

evolution that Mao led in China--but in practice, Pol Pot associated himself wit
h forces like Deng Xiaoping who overthrew the Maoist forces and reversed the Cul
tural Revolution.
*****
Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge movement only held overall power in Cambodia for thr
ee short years. The internal struggles between Pol Pot and the CPK forces of Cam
bodia's eastern region erupted into open military fighting--which Vietnam used a
s a pretext to invade Cambodia and set up a new government allied to them. The K
hmer Rouge was driven back into rural base areas in western Cambodia--where they
still exist as an armed force. At the time, a section of the population clearly
fought to defend the Democratic Kampuchean government--and for years a sizable
section of the population supported Pol Pot for his incorruptible reputation, hi
s identification with the peasants and his relentless fight against foreign domi
nation.
Any revolutionary critique of Pol Pot requires much deeper investigation into th
e events and policies of this complex experience. But meanwhile, Pol Pot's recen
t trial in the jungle appears to be an attempt by forces within the Khmer Rouge
to make themselves acceptable to factions within the Cambodian government and to
the world's imperialist powers.
Pol Pot kicked the U.S. imperialists out of Cambodia. And that's why they hate h
im. By vilifying Pol Pot, the U.S. is pressing ahead with their attempts to slam
the door on all dreams of social change--to declare that communist revolution a
nd even national independence for oppressed countries must be rejected and denou
nced. They cannot be allowed to get away with this.

Propaganda about Pol Pot

It is time to put the record straight and to expose this tiresome propaganda on
Pol Pot.
The Khmer Rouge, Communist guerrilla movement in Cambodia, was founded in 1963 b
y Pol Pot. The organization engaged in guerrilla warfare against the government
of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and later the CIA installed Lon Nol government. It al
so fought United States and South Vietnamese forces that invaded Cambodia in 197
0. Lon Nol led the coup against the Cambodian constitutional monarchy led by Pri
nce Norodom Sihanouk in 1970. Lon Nol declared Cambodia a republic but began to
rule as a dictator. He suffered a stroke in 1971 and gave up many duties. But in
1972, Lon Nol set up a new government with himself as president.
The New York Times reported at Lon Nol's death that when he was forced out in 19
75, he left behind a legacy of corruption and military defeat. As the anti-commu
nist Cambodian army under Lon Nol grew in size with U.S. aid, corruption also gr
ew, the New York Times said.
But hardly a word was said about 1970-75, the period when the CIA ruled Cambodia
through its agent Lon Nol. This was the defining period in modern Cambodian his
tory during the Cold War. It shaped all the forces still in struggle there. Befo
re Lon Nol's coup in March 1970, Cambodian leader King Sihanouk had remained neu
tral in the Cold War and kept his country out of the war raging in Vietnam. That
did not satisfy Washington.
The United States wanted to use Cambodia as a base from which to attack Vietname
se liberation forces, who were gaining ground despite the all-out war the Pentag
on waged against them. So the CIA conspired with Lon Nol, Cambodian army chief o

f staff, to take over.

According to U.S. Green Beret Capt. Robert F. Marasco, quoted in the Internation
al Herald Tribune of June 3, 1970, Cambodian mercenaries under his command were
operating in Phnom Penh during the coup. The coup sparked mass demonstrations in
17 of Cambodia's 19 provinces throughout the month of March. But Lon Nol's mili
tary, with U.S. might behind it, responded with brutal repression - executing th
ousands of Cambodian progressives by beheading.
While this was happening, Lon Nol was hailed in the Western media as a friend of
the "free world."
On April 24 and 25, representatives from the South Vietnamese National Liberatio
n Front, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Pathet Lao and the Cambodian li
beration forces met in an historic Summit Conference of the Indochinese People.
They announced their unity in the face of imperialist aggression.
The coup leaders put in place by the CIA then welcomed in the United States, whi
ch launched a massive invasion of Cambodia on April 30, 1970. That invasion touc
hed off worldwide reaction. In the United States, National Guard troops shot and
killed protesting students at state universities in Kent, Ohio, and Jackson, Mi
ss.
For the next five years, the Cambodian people organized resistance to the U.S. o
ccupation. Meanwhile the officer elite and a section of the merchants grew wealt
hy off war and corruption.
On March 16, 1975, New York Times described Phnom Penh: "Cabinet ministers ride
to and from their air-conditioned villas in chauffeured Mercedes ... [while] ref
ugees, crushed by food prices which have risen more than 1,000 percent ... stir
the garbage in the gutter in search of something salvageable."
While starvation and war spread in the countryside, the war profiteers met with
their U.S. and French contacts-- France had earlier colonized all of Indochine around swimming pools in Phnom Penh's five star hotels.
Before the coup, there was only a relatively small left movement in Cambodia. Bu
t the coup and U.S. invasion thrust a war upon those who survived the executions
. And by the end of that war, the resistance - known as the Khmer Rouge - found
itself in power with the task of trying to put Cambodia back together again.
During the five years of war, at least a million Cambodians - out of a populatio
n of only 7 million - were killed and injured. More starved in the final months
of the war.
Whenever it seemed clear that the Khmer Rouge was about to win, the United State
s would pour in hundreds of millions of dollars more worth of war materiel and m
oney to prop up the Lon Nol regime.
Carpet bombings of the countryside by B-52s and Phantom jets became routine. So
did the dropping of napalm and defoliation agents that eventually was to kill th
e son of the US Admiral who ordered the defoliation (agent orange) attacks. It w
as U.S. policy to leave Cambodia in as devastated a condition as possible.
The Lon Nol regime crumbled in the middle of April 1975. As the Khmer Rouge ente
red Phnom Penh, the streets were lined with thousands of people who greeted them
as liberators. But in less than a month, the United States attacked again.
A U.S. warship, the Mayaguez, penetrated Cambodia's territorial waters and was d
etained by Cambodian authorities. The U.S. then launched a massive attack.

A-7 fighter bombers launched from the aircraft carrier Coral Sea bombed Cambodia
n cities and sunk ships in the Gulf of Thailand. Marines accompanied by a flotil
la of 12 naval craft invaded Koh Tang Island.
It was after this incident that seemed to threaten a resumption of the war that
the Khmer Rouge began to evacuate major cities in the area--a decision that ende
d in a bloody purge.
The U.S. media have devoted enormous attention to this last period, which they h
ave dubbed the "killing fields." Yet they breeze over the years of pain and suff
ering that brought the Cambodian struggle to that point. Most of all, they have
tried to erase from the consciousness of people in the US and the world the Pent
agon's horrendous war against the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. That wa
r's effects persist today in all areas of life.
Po Pot 's real name was Soloth Sar. He remained mostly behind the scenes in the
years 1975-1979 when he and his Khmer Rouge tried to remake Cambodia according t
o agrarian socialist principles. They move people to move from cities to the cou
ntryside to avoid US bombing and to solve urban shortages of food and supplies.
The bourgeois classes opposed the relocation program and had to be dealt with ha
rshly. In 1979 the Vietnamese invaded and overthrew Pol Pot, who fled into jungl
es near Thailand and led a Khmer Rouge guerrilla war from there. Born Saloth Sar
- Pol Pot was a nom de guerre - the revolutionary leader grew up in a relativel
y prosperous farming family in Kompong Thong province, the heartland of the then
French protectorate.
One of his brothers, Saloth Neap, once described Pol Pot as a gentle and kind ch
ild. He added he had no idea what his sibling had become until he saw a poster o
f "Brother Number One" - Pol Pot's title as leader of the Khmer Rouge - hung up
at a work collective.
Having studied at a Buddhist monastery and a Roman Catholic school, Pol Pot won
a scholarship in 1949 to study radio electronics in Paris. There, the young acti
vist devoted his time to radical student politics and Marxism - charming convert
s at cell meetings in his Latin Quarter apartment in Paris. He eventually return
ed to Phnom Penh in 1953.
Pol Pot then joined the ranks of the underground Cambodian Communist Party and b
ecame secretary-general in 1962.
In 1963, fearing persecution from Prince Norodom Sihanouk's secret police, Pol P
ot and several of his trusted right-hand men fled deep into the countryside.
Based in remote northeastern Cambodia, he became influenced by the surrounding h
ill-tribes. These "original Khmers" were self-sufficient in their communal livin
g, had no use for money and were untainted" by Buddhism. From this base he waged
war against the US-backed Cambodian government.
When the Khmer Rouge came to power in 1975, as a countermeasure to US led aggres
sion and embargo, they quickly set about transforming the country into his visio
n of an agrarian utopia by emptying the cities, abolishing money, private proper
ty and religion and setting up rural collectives.
The Khmer Rouge's radical social experiment was based on the only culture the mo
vement had known. Naturally it was opposed by many intellectuals and professiona
ls. A hostility toward these types mutated into an issue of revolutionary ideolo
gy in the atmosphere of extreme hardship cause of relentless
American aggression. Revolutionary excesses grew out of control. The Khmer Rouge

government fell in 1979 when Vietnam invaded Cambodia after a series of violent
border confrontations. Southeast Asia has always been the Balkan of Asia. With
the end of the Cold War, and the demise of Western political imperialism, local
ethnic nationalism resurfaced.
Pol Pot and his forces once again fled to the northern jungle. The errors of rev
olutionary excesses they committed during the years of struggle for survival wer
e repackaged as evidence of their atrocities and was broadcast around the world
as part of a new American strategy to demonize the Khmer Rouge leader so that th
e movement itself can be incorporated in a new American brokered coalition for C
ambodia.
Socialism as an emerging social force is to link itself to revolution as a vehic
le to power. Yet the ideology of socialism is independent of the metabolism of r
evolution. Revolutions of different ideologies go through similar stages, often
including reigns of terror. As Mao said: revolution is not a dinner party.
Socialism in Asia allied itself with nationalism's struggle against Western impe
rialism, which Lenin had identified as a new stage of industrial capitalism.
For Asians, to be anti-imperialism is to be anti-capitalism.
Similarly, Martin Luther (1483-1546), in placing theological protest under the p
rotection of secular power politics, would exploit the political aspirations of
budding German principalities in the sixteenth century. In return, he would conv
eniently provide the German princes with a theological basis for political seces
sion from the theocratic Holy Roman Empire. In like manner, Buddhism in China pr
ovided the petty kingdoms that had sprung up during the dissolution of the Han e
mpire since the year 220, with a convenient theology for transition from ancient
feudalism under a centralized authority to a fragmented political order of inde
pendent regional sovereign states. Analogous to the rise of European nationalism
which would be a facilitating vehicle for the religious movement known as the R
eformation which in turn would give birth to Protestant national states as polit
ical by-products, the fall of the Han dynasty (B.C. 206-220 A.D.) had not been i
ndependent of the growth of Buddhism in China. In fact, recurring official perse
cution of Buddhism in China throughout history has been motivated by the religio
n's persistent involvement in secular dissident politics. The corrupt impact of
Buddhist politics on the ruling authority was deemed bu historians as being resp
onsible for the tragic fate of the disintegrated Han dynasty. Luther would explo
it the political aspirations of German princes to be independent of the Holy Rom
an Emperor to bolster his theological revolt from the Roman Catholic Church. But
he would come to denounce peasant rebellions when the peasants would rebel agai
nst the same Protestant German princes. He would do so even though such peasant
uprisings against the German princes would claim inspiration from the same theol
ogical ideas of the Reformation that had motivated the revolt against the Holy R
oman Emperor by the same German princes for independence, even though such radic
al ideas had been advocated by Luther. However, even Luther's professed personal
sympathy for peasant demands for improved treatment from their oppressive princ
es would not persuade him to endorse peasant uprisings. In fact, Luther could be
considered a Stalinist. Or more accurately, Stalin would in fact fit the defini
tion of a Lutheran diehard, at least in revolutionary strategy if not in ideolog
ical essence. Like Luther, Stalin would suppress populist radicalism to preserve
institutional revolution, and would glorify the state as the sole legitimate ex
pediter of revolutionary ideology. Early Protestantism, like Stalinism, would be
come more oppressive and intolerant than the system it would replace. Ironically
, puritanical Protestant ethics celebrating the virtues of thrift, industry, sob
riety and responsibility, would be identified by many sociologists as the drivin
g force centuries later behind the success of modern capitalism and industrializ
ed economy. Particularly, ethics as espoused by Calvinism which in its extreme w
ould advocate subordination of the state to the Church, diverging from Luther's

view of the state to which the Church is subordinate, would be ironically credit
ed as the spirit behind the emergence of the modern Western industrial state. Ea
rly Buddhism, after its initial grass-root political successes in Tang China in
the seventh century, would adopt similar Stalinist postures against further soci
al revolution in following centuries, and it would always stop pragmatically sho
rt of demanding subordination of the state to religion. In the French Revolution
, Robespeierre and the Committee of Public Safety, with a democratic program of
its own to concentrate on the revolution, suppressed the "enrages", extreme revo
lutionism of Herbertism as well as Dantonist revisionism.
That strategy led to the Reign of Terror and eventually to Robespierres own down
fall.
After U.S. and Vietnamese forces withdrew from Cambodia in 1973, the Khmer Rouge
in 1975 toppled the Lon Nol government. The Democratic Kampuchea (DK) was estab
lished as the new government in 1976 with Pol Pot as prime minister. The governm
ent abolished money and property and collectivized Cambodian agriculture, moving
citizens into the countryside to overcome urban shortages left by years of US b
ombing and embargo. Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978 and installed a ne
w government but could not eliminate the Khmer Rouge as a political or military
force. The Vietnamese withdrew in 1989, and in 1991 the Khmer Rouge agreed to a
United Nations (UN) cease-fire and peace accords. The UN agreed to monitor gener
al elections in 1993, but the Khmer Rouge refused to participate. The Khmer Roug
e continued fighting the elected government, retaining control over parts of Cam
bodia.
Even though international audiences were horrified by the Hollywood propaganda m
ovie about Pol Pot's rule, (The Killing Fields), the Khmer Rouge was offered sup
port from the United States because of its opposition to America's main enemy: V
ietnam. That support required the demonization of Pol Pot.
Pol Pot officially retired as leader of the Khmer Rouge at the end of the 1980s.
Following a complex internecine power struggle inside the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot w
as arrested by his former colleagues last July who were eager to make a deal wit
h the US. Pol Pot was charged with treason before a "people's tribunal" which se
ntenced him to life under house arrest. He gave an interview shortly before his
death in which he declared: "My conscience is clear".
Pol Pot dilemma was not unique for revolutionaries. The same dilemma was faced b
y Robespierre, Stalin, Mao, Castro and will be by other revolutionary leaders in
the future.
But to blame the death and destruction caused by foreign invasion and embargo du
ring 1975-79 on Pol Pot's controversial revolutionary policies is merely reactio
nary propaganda.
Henry C.K. Liu