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UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE
LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
IN THE
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.
C A T T A N I, Judge:
1
This is an appeal from a juvenile courts order granting the
States motion to terminate parental rights. For reasons that follow, we
affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
2
L.B. was born in July 2010; his parents are Lloyd B.
(Father) and Tina M. (Mother). 1
In June 2012, the Arizona
Department of Economic Security (ADES) received a report alleging
that (1) Father was increasingly violent towards Mother in L.B.s presence;
(2) Father and Mothers residence had dog feces on the floor and was so
cluttered that only a small path permitted movement through the home;
(3) L.B. was left in his high chair or playpen for hours at a time because he
could not be safely placed on the ground; (4) Father and Mother allowed
L.B. to remain in his own feces for extended periods of time, resulting in a
rash; (5) Father refused to give L.B. food or water for hours at a time; (6)
both parents were unemployed; and (7) Father and Mother had not
obtained services to address L.B.s special needs due to his premature
birth.
3
After an investigation, ADES offered the parents in-home
family preservation services. ADES authorized childcare for L.B. and
urged Father and Mother to remedy the homes condition. Nevertheless,
Father and Mother did not consistently take L.B. to daycare, made only
minimal improvements to the homes condition, and failed to participate
in the offered family preservation program.
25
The juvenile court may terminate the parentchild
relationship only if clear and convincing evidence establishes at least one
statutory ground for severance. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284,
22, 110 P.3d 1013, 1018 (2005); see also A.R.S. 8-533(B). The court must
also find that a preponderance of the evidence establishes that severance
is in the childs best interests. Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 284, 22, 110 P.3d at
1018; see also A.R.S. 8-533(B). We review the juvenile courts severance
order for an abuse of discretion, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to sustaining the courts findings and accepting the courts
factual findings unless clearly erroneous. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dept of
Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, 8, 83 P.3d 43, 47 (App. 2004); Manuel M. v.
Ariz. Dept of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 207, 2, 181 P.3d 1126, 1128 (App.
2008). We similarly defer to the juvenile courts credibility assessments.
27
Father argues the juvenile court erred by finding that he
would not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and
control in the near future due to substance abuse. But a parents failure to
remedy his or her substance abuse, knowing that the loss of his or her
child is imminent, is evidence that the parent has not overcome
dependency on drugs and alcohol. Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 379, 29, 231
P.3d at 383. In considering whether a parents substance abuse will
continue for a prolonged indeterminate period, courts consider the
parents treatment history to gauge the likelihood the parent will be in a
position to parent the child in the foreseeable future. Id. at 378, 25, 231
P.3d at 382 (citation omitted). If the parent has been unable to sustain
sobriety in a noncustodial setting, there is little hope of success in
parenting. Id. (citation omitted).
28
Here, Father refused to participate in required urinalysis
testing through TASC following L.B.s removal. Father alleged that a
medical condition affected his ability to comply with urinalysis testing,
but he did not provide any evidence documenting his alleged medical
condition. Moreover, he acknowledged that he was able to provide a
urine sample for a new employer a week prior to the severance hearing.
39
Father argues that the juvenile courts best interests finding
is not supported by the evidence. He alleges that L.B. is unhappy at his
foster placement, the foster parents are spanking and abusing L.B., and
L.B.s needs are not being met. Father also argues that he has learned
appropriate parenting skills and should be given more time to obtain
necessary treatment, and that he has a close bond with L.B.
40
To determine whether severance is in the best interests of a
child, the court balances the parents rights against the childs rights. Kent
K., 210 Ariz. at 287, 37, 110 P.3d at 1021. Termination of the parentchild
relationship is in the childs best interests if the child would be harmed if
the relationship continues or would benefit from termination. Mary Lou
C., 207 Ariz. at 50, 19, 83 P.3d at 50. Factors to consider include (1)
whether an adoptive placement is immediately available, Audra T. v. Ariz.
Dept of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, 5, 982 P.2d 1290, 1291 (App. 1998),
(2) whether the current placement is meeting the childs needs, id., and (3)
whether the child is adoptable. See Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 352, 884 P.2d 234, 238 (App. 1994).
41
The juvenile court found that L.B.s placement with a
relative was meeting L.B.s special needs, and that L.B. is happy and has
bonded with the relative, who is willing to adopt him. The juvenile court
further found that L.B. needs to be in a safe, stable, and loving
environment and that [n]either parent can provide same at this time, or
in the foreseeable future.
42
The evidence supports the juvenile courts finding that
termination of Fathers parental rights is in L.B.s best interests. The ADES
case manager testified that L.B.s placement with relatives provided a
loving and caring environment, and that L.B. appeared to be happy and to
have bonded with his foster parents. The current placement is also
meeting L.B.s special needs as he is receiving occupational/speech
therapy and attending a developmental preschool. L.B. is adoptable, and
L.B.s foster parents are willing to adopt him, which demonstrates an
affirmative benefit to L.B. from severance of Fathers parental rights. See
Ariz. Dept of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, 6, 100 P.3d 943, 945
(App. 2004).
43
Although Father argues that termination of his parental
rights is premature, we conclude otherwise. See Maricopa County Juv.
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