50 F.

2d 382 (1931)
HEINE
v.
NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.
No. 6405.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
May 25, 1931.
*383 *384 *385 C. T. Haas and E. B. Seabrook, both of Portland, Or., for appellant.
Huntington, Wilson & Huntington and Clark & Clark, all of Portland, Or., for appellee.
Before WILBUR and SAWTELLE, Circuit Judges, and NETERER, District Judge.
NETERER, District Judge (after stating the facts).
The agency in Germany was established as a distinct entity, a German creation under
German law. A reserve fund was made and all premiums received were placed in that
fund and invested in Germany under German official approval. Upon creation of
"Kronos," all funds and property of appellee in Germany were delivered to and
supervision and execution of power assumed by the German Federal Insurance Board,
and additional deposits made by the appellee, as required by the German valorization
laws, in accordance with the decisions of the German Federal Insurance Board. The
laws in relation thereto have been interpreted to apply to like policies, and many similar
cases are now pending before the German courts, they being open, able, competent,
and efficient, and the German Federal Insurance Board being active and fully
functioning.
It is obvious that this litigation is not the normal outgrowth of usual business activity and
relation, but that it is the creation of activity to secure representation of some 28,000
insurance policies executed in Germany by American companies, written in the German
language, in the relation of collection agent or agencies, and file actions thereon in the
state and federal courts of the United States, an indirect appeal from the German
judiciary and the German Federal Insurance Board.

Incidentally, it may be said that the courts of the United States have uniformly applied
the law of the place to insurance contracts. Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S.
557, 19 S. Ct. 281, 43 L. Ed. 552; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Cohen, 179 U.S. 262,
21 S. Ct. 106, 45 L. Ed. 181; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U.S. 551, 24 S. Ct. 538, 48
L. Ed. 788; Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U.S. 234, 32 S. Ct. 220, 56 L.
Ed. 419, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 57. *386 And, when suit was entertained, the cause of which
arose in a foreign country, the courts granted relief according to the laws of the country
where the action arose. Slater v. Mexican Nat. Ry. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 24 S. Ct. 581, 48
L. Ed. 900. It has been held that discharge under a foreign obligation in accordance with
the foreign law is a complete defense. Zimmerman v. Sutherland, 274 U.S. 253, 47 S.
Ct. 625, 71 L. Ed. 1034. It has also been held that the courts of the United States will
not inquire into the validity, wisdom or justice of the laws of a foreign country, or the
administration of foreign agencies. League v. De Young, 52 U. S. (11 How.) 185, 13 L.
Ed. 657; Canada Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 3 S. Ct. 363, 27 L. Ed.
1020; Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 18 S. Ct. 83, 42 L. Ed. 456; Hewitt v.
Speyer (C. C. A.) 250 F. 367.
Nor does it appear that enlarged rights may be obtained over the German law should a
suit by a policyholder be entertained by the courts of the United States. Sutherland v.
Mayer, 271 U.S. 272, 46 S. Ct. 538, 70 L. Ed. 943; Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey, 272
U.S. 517, 47 S. Ct. 166, 71 L. Ed. 383; see, also, Zimmerman v. Sutherland, supra.
Such holding is in harmony with other courts. See, Chesterman's Trust, (1923) 2
Chancery 466, where the court had before it a debt payable in German marks which
had greatly depreciated, and it was held that it might be paid in the depreciated marks or
in their exchange value converted into British currency. The same rule was applied in
British Bank v. Russian Bank, (1921) 38 Times Law Reports 65, in which Mr. Justice
Russell said that he "had great sympathy with the defendants, but it must be
remembered that the same causes that caused the fall in the value of roubles had
produced great depreciation in the plaintiff's securities." This was approved in Anderson
v. Equitable Assurance Society, (1926) 134 Law Times 557.
It is asserted by appellant that, jurisdiction being apparent on the face of the record, it
may not be challenged by motion but must be by plea, and that when, as here,
jurisdiction is challenged by plea, by the answer, and put in issue by the reply, issue
must be submitted to the jury for decision on the merits, and that there is no precedent
for the order of the trial court.

As to the last objection, to have a precedent there must be an antecedent case; but the
lack thereof does not defeat a right or privilege. No fault can be found with the cases
cited by the appellant, the following of which are the more prominent: Farmington v.
Pillsbury, 114 U.S. 138, 5 S. Ct. 807, 29 L. Ed. 114; Hartog v. Memory, 116 U.S. 588, 6
S. Ct. 521, 29 L. Ed. 725; Mexican Central Railway Co. v. Pinkney, 149 U.S. 194, 13 S.
Ct. 859, 37 L. Ed. 699; City Railway Co. v. Citizen's Street Railroad Co., 166 U.S. 557,
17 S. Ct. 653, 41 L. Ed. 1114; Union Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Kirchoff, 169 U.S. 103,
18 S. Ct. 260, 42 L. Ed. 677; York County Sav. Bank v. Abbot (C. C.) 131 F. 980. These
cases do not point the way. One sustains dismissal when the fact appears to a legal
certainty; another, where a party is collusively added; another holds that the evidence
considered must be pertinent to the issue, or to the inquiry by the court; another holds
that where there is reasonable plausibility of bona fide claim, jurisdiction will be passed
to trial on the merits, and another is one where the court holds that claim rightly viewed
unfounded must be denied.
Every requirement appears to be met substantially by the record. Process in this case
was served upon the statutory agent of the appellee in Oregon, appointed as a condition
to do business in that state and for the convenience and protection of residents to whom
policies may be issued and afford them access to the courts of the state or district.
The appellant contends that, notwithstanding the agreement that the German courts
shall have exclusive jurisdiction, such agreement is not binding on the federal courts,
vested with their jurisdiction by the United States Constitution, of which they cannot be
deprived by foreign laws or agreement. The appellant also contends that these are not
actions upon the policies. But, whatever the designation may be, the basis is the
policies.
No alien has a constitutional right to sue in the United States courts. Kline v. Burke
Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 43 S. Ct. 79, 67 L. Ed. 226, 24 A. L. R. 1077. The
United States District Courts have such jurisdiction as the Congress confers. 28 USCA
41, grants jurisdiction as follows:
"First. Of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity * * * between citizens of a
State and foreign States, citizens, or subjects. * * *
"Third. Of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all
cases the right of a common-law remedy. * * *"

*387 Civil cases and actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction have equal status,
and the courts have uniformly, where the question has arisen, declined to entertain
jurisdiction in admiralty suits by nonresidents when in the discretion of the court it would
be inconvenient and inexpedient to do so. And no distinction has been made to civil
cases.
Nor is the right to challenge the jurisdiction or to invite the discretion of the court waived
or forfeited by removal from the state to the federal court, or the right of the court, after
issue joined, to make investigation on notice and, in its discretion, decline jurisdiction
after such inquiry. 28 USCA, 81, provides that in all suits removed the court shall
proceed as if the suit had been originally commenced in the district court and the same
proceedings had been taken in such suit in said district court as shall have been had
therein in said state court prior to its removal.
Upon the face of the record the district court had jurisdiction when the case came to it
from the state court. When the issue first came to its attention, and upon inquiry and
examination, the court became cognizant of the status and relation and no doubt had
inherent power to protect itself from a deluge of litigation by nonresidents, inspired by
contingent retainers to avoid or overcome foreign laws and interpretation and application
thereof by foreign courts of the country of the situs of the contract; and it had the power
to prefer resident litigants of the district in access to overcrowded calendars, for, as
Justice Holmes said in Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387, 49
S. Ct. 355, 356, 73 L. Ed. 747: "There are manifest reasons for preferring residents in
access to often overcrowded Courts, both in convenience and in the fact that broadly
speaking it is they who pay for maintaining the Courts concerned"; and it had the power
to prevent imposition upon its jurisdiction and use of the court as a "cover for injustice to
the defendants" (Cuba R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 479, 32 S. Ct. 132, 133, 56 L.
Ed. 274, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 40) by reason of the enormous expense involved in bringing
across the continent witnesses from Germany and New York and the records of
appellee which plaintiff demands as necessary in another case and, if so, must also be
necessary in this case, the removal of which would destroy the ability of the appellee,
representing more than 2,500,000 policyholders, to function.
Comity between the United States and Germany should also have consideration.
With the foregoing, nothing can be added to the opinion of Judge Robert S. Bean, who
at the time of his recent demise was the dean of the American bench, and whose death

terminated a creditable judicial career of more than forty-eight years on the state and
federal bench. His opinion is reported in (D. C.) 45 F.(2d) 426, and is adopted as a part
of the opinion of the court.
Affirmed.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32636

March 17, 1930

In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.

A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.
C.A. Sobral for appellant.
Harvey & O' Brien and Gibbs & McDonough for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals from a decision of Judge of
First Instance Tuason denying the probate of the document alleged to by the last will and testament
of the deceased. Appellee is not authorized to carry on this appeal. We think, however, that the
appellant, who appears to have been the moving party in these proceedings, was a "person
interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First Instance," and so should be
permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of the will (Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva vs. De Leon [1925], 42 Phil., 780).
It is theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November
3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Verginia Code,
Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and as certified to by the Director of the
National Library. But this was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do
not prove themselves in our courts. the courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take
American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.)
Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no was printed or published under the
authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor
was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original,
under the sale of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was
in force at the time the alleged will was executed.
In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point is to be
found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will

was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, of that these
witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West
Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the
Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means
(Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633.)
It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia
and not establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony of the
petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings orginally in the Philippine Islands, the
petitioner violated his own theory by attempting to have the principal administration in the Philippine
Islands.
While the appeal pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant presented an
unverified petition asking the court to accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to the
petition. One of these documents discloses that a paper writing purporting to be the was presented
for probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of Randolph Country, State of West Virginia, in vacation,
and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana Wamsley and Joseph L. MAdden, the subscribing
witnesses thereto , and ordered to be recorded and filed. It was shown by another document that, in
vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph Country, West Virginia, appointed Claude
W. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix,
deceased. In this connection, it is to be noted that the application for the probate of the will in the
Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have
been initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the
Philippines the principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration. However this
may be, no attempt has been made to comply with Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of
the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested.
There is no showing that the deceased left any property at any place other than the Philippine
Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia.
Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have been awarded Edward
Randolph Hix from Annie Cousins Hix on October 8, 1925, in the State of West specific
pronouncements on the validity or validity of this alleged divorce.
For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant.
Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12105

January 30, 1960

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor-appellee,

vs.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN, oppositorsappellants.

Jose D. Cortes for appellants.

Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Ramon San Jose, presiding,
dismissing the objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward Bohanan to
the project of partition submitted by the executor and approving the said project.
On April 24, 195 0, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding, admitted to
probate a last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23, 1944 in Manila. In
the said order, the court made the following findings:
According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born in Nebraska and therefore
a citizen of that state, or at least a citizen of California where some of his properties are
located. This contention in untenable. Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent in
the Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary, and he continued and remained to be a
citizen of the United States and of the state of his pertinent residence to spend the rest of his
days in that state. His permanent residence or domicile in the United States depended upon
his personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the
time of his death, he was a citizen of that state. Nobody can choose his domicile or
permanent residence for him. That is his exclusive personal right.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a
citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and
testament, Exhibit A, is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits
the same to probate. Accordingly, the Philippine Trust Company, named as the executor of
the will, is hereby appointed to such executor and upon the filing of a bond in the sum of
P10,000.00, let letters testamentary be issued and after taking the prescribed oath, it may
enter upon the execution and performance of its trust. (pp. 26-27, R.O.A.).
It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever questions on appeal. The executor filed
a project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with the provisions of the will,
the following adjudications: (1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants
National Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator's grandson
Edward George Bohanan, which consists of several mining companies; (2) the other half of the
residuary estate to the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share
and share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash and of shares of mining stock similar to
those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert
Bohana, and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments; (4) legacies
to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and
Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;
It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of
P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock
of several mining companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave
a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.
The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the testamentary
provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been
deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them.

The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be
entitled to received. The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the testator. It is argued
that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from
his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in this
jurisdiction, citing the case of Querubin vs.Querubin, 87 Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz., (Sup, 12) 315,
Cousins Hiz vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 852, Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 and Gorayeb vs. Hashim, 50
Phil., 22. The court below refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of
Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without
requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws
of 1925 provides:
Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all
his or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the
testator's debts.
Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, to a share in the
testator's estafa had already been passed upon adversely against her in an order dated June 19,
1955, (pp. 155-159, Vol II Records, Court of First Instance), which had become final, as Magdalena
C. Bohanan does not appear to have appealed therefrom to question its validity. On December 16,
1953, the said former wife filed a motion to withdraw the sum of P20,000 from the funds of the
estate, chargeable against her share in the conjugal property, (See pp. 294-297, Vol. I, Record,
Court of First Instance), and the court in its said error found that there exists no community property
owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time the decree of divorce was issued. As already
and Magdalena C. Bohanan may no longer question the fact contained therein, i.e. that there was no
community property acquired by the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan during their converture.
Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on
January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in 1925,
Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death
of the testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State
of Nevada and since the court below had already found that there was no conjugal property between
the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of
the estate left by the testator.
The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia, who had
received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their
shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of the
estate left by the testator. Is the failure old the testator to give his children two-thirds of the estate left
by him at the time of his death, in accordance with the laws of the forum valid?
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly
provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the
person whose succession is in question. Says the law on this point:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as
well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property and the country in which it is found. (par. 2, Art.
10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the testator
was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his

permanent residence. (See Decision dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the question at issue is
whether the estementary dispositions, especially hose for the children which are short of the legitime
given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada
allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied Nevada Laws of
1925, supra). It does not appear that at time of the hearing of the project of partition, the abovequoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the executor's duly to do. The law of Nevada,
being a foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our
Rules, which are as follows:
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
tested by the officer having the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer
has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that
during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of
P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. was
introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein) counsel as Exhibits "2" (See pp. 77-79, VOL. II, and
t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said laws presented by the counsel for the
executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23,
1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (se Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision
of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold
that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925,
can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of
the project of partition.
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to
be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that
the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows
a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the
court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must
be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., concurs in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35694

December 23, 1933

ALLISON G. GIBBS, petitioner-appelle,

vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, oppositor-appellant.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellants.

Allison D. Gibbs in his own behalf.

BUTTE, J.:
This is an appeal from a final order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, requiring the register of
deeds of the City of Manila to cancel certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, covering
lands located in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, and issue in lieu thereof new certificates of
transfer of title in favor of Allison D. Gibbs without requiring him to present any document showing
that the succession tax due under Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code has been paid.
The said order of the court of March 10, 1931, recites that the parcels of land covered by said
certificates of title formerly belonged to the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson
Gibbs; that the latter died intestate in Palo Alto, California, on November 28, 1929; that at the time of
her death she and her husband were citizens of the State of California and domiciled therein.
It appears further from said order that Allison D. Gibbs was appointed administrator of the state of
his said deceased wife in case No. 36795 in the same court, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of Eva Johnson Gibbs, Deceased"; that in said intestate proceedings, the said Allison D.
Gibbs, on September 22,1930, filed an ex parte petition in which he alleged "that the parcels of land
hereunder described belong to the conjugal partnership of your petitioner and his wife, Eva Johnson
Gibbs", describing in detail the three facts here involved; and further alleging that his said wife, a
citizen and resident of California, died on November 28,1929; that in accordance with the law of
California, the community property of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the
wife previous to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without
administration; that the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs, deceased,
has no obligations or debts and no one will be prejudiced by adjucating said parcels of land (and
seventeen others not here involved) to be the absolute property of the said Allison D. Gibbs as sole
owner. The court granted said petition and on September 22, 1930, entered a decree adjucating the
said Allison D. Gibbs to be the sole and absolute owner of said lands, applying section 1401 of the
Civil Code of California. Gibbs presented this decree to the register of deeds of Manila and
demanded that the latter issue to him a "transfer certificate of title".
Section 1547 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code provides in part that:
Registers of deeds shall not register in the registry of property any document transferring
real property or real rights therein or any chattel mortgage, by way of gifts mortis causa,
legacy or inheritance, unless the payment of the tax fixed in this article and actually due
thereon shall be shown. And they shall immediately notify the Collector of Internal Revenue
or the corresponding provincial treasurer of the non payment of the tax discovered by them. .
..
Acting upon the authority of said section, the register of deeds of the City of Manila, declined to
accept as binding said decree of court of September 22,1930, and refused to register the transfer of
title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that the corresponding
inheritance tax had not been paid. Thereupon, under date of December 26, 1930, Allison D. Gibbs
filed in the said court a petition for an order requiring the said register of deeds "to issue the
corresponding titles" to the petitioner without requiring previous payment of any inheritance tax. After
due hearing of the parties, the court reaffirmed said order of September 22, 1930, and entered the
order of March 10, 1931, which is under review on this appeal.

On January 3, 1933, this court remanded the case to the court of origin for new trial upon additional
evidence in regard to the pertinent law of California in force at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs,
also authorizing the introduction of evidence with reference to the dates of the acquisition of the
property involved in this suit and with reference to the California law in force at the time of such
acquisition. The case is now before us with the supplementary evidence.
For the purposes of this case, we shall consider the following facts as established by the evidence or
the admissions of the parties: Allison D. Gibbs has been continuously, since the year 1902, a citizen
of the State of California and domiciled therein; that he and Eva Johnson Gibbs were married at
Columbus, Ohio, in July 1906; that there was no antenuptial marriage contract between the parties;
that during the existence of said marriage the spouses acquired the following lands, among others,
in the Philippine Islands, as conjugal property:
lawphil.net

1. A parcel of land in the City of Manila represented by transfer certificate of title No. 20880, dated
March 16, 1920, and registered in the name of "Allison D. Gibbs casado con Eva Johnson Gibbs".
2. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer certificate of title No. 28336, dated
May 14, 1927, in which it is certified "that spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs are the
owners in fee simple" of the land therein described.
3. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer certificate of title No. 28331, dated
April 6, 1927, which it states "that Allison D. Gibbs married to Eva Johnson Gibbs" is the owner of
the land described therein; that said Eva Johnson Gibbs died intestate on November 28, 1929, living
surviving her her husband, the appellee, and two sons, Allison J. Gibbs , now age 25 and Finley J.
Gibbs, now aged 22, as her sole heirs of law.
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code entitled "Tax on inheritances, legacies and other
acquisitionsmortis causa" provides in section 1536 that "Every transmission by virtue of
inheritance ... of real property ... shall be subject to the following tax." It results that the question for
determination in this case is as follows: Was Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death the owner
of a descendible interest in the Philippine lands above-mentioned?
The appellee contends that the law of California should determine the nature and extent of the title, if
any, that vested in Eva Johnson Gibbs under the three certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and
28331 above referred to, citing article 9 of the Civil Code. But that, even if the nature and extent of
her title under said certificates be governed by the law of the Philippine Islands, the laws of
California govern the succession to such title, citing the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil
Code.
Article 9 of the Civil Code is as follows:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of
persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country." It is
argued that the conjugal right of the California wife in community real estate in the Philippine
Islands is a personal right and must, therefore, be settled by the law governing her personal
status, that is, the law of California. But our attention has not been called to any law of
California that incapacitates a married woman from acquiring or holding land in a foreign
jurisdiction in accordance with the lex rei sitae. There is not the slightest doubt that a
California married woman can acquire title to land in a common law jurisdiction like the State
of Illinois or the District of Columbia, subject to the common-law estate by the courtesy which
would vest in her husband. Nor is there any doubt that if a California husband acquired land
in such a jurisdiction his wife would be vested with the common law right of dower, the

prerequisite conditions obtaining. Article 9 of the Civil Code treats of purely personal
relations and status and capacity for juristic acts, the rules relating to property, both personal
and real, being governed by article 10 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, article 9, by its very
terms, is applicable only to "Spaniards" (now, by construction, to citizens of the Philippine
Islands).
The Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Act of Congress, August 29, 1916, known as the
"Jones Law") as regards the determination of private rights, grants practical autonomy to the
Government of the Philippine Islands. This Government, therefore, may apply the principles
and rules of private international law (conflicts of laws) on the same footing as an organized
territory or state of the United States. We should, therefore, resort to the law of California, the
nationality and domicile of Mrs. Gibbs, to ascertain the norm which would be applied here as
law were there any question as to her status.
But the appellant's chief argument and the sole basis of the lower court's decision rests upon the
second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code which is as follows:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as
well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.
In construing the above language we are met at the outset with some difficulty by the expression
"the national law of the person whose succession is in question", by reason of the rather anomalous
political status of the Philippine Islands. (Cf. Manresa, vol. 1, Codigo Civil, pp. 103, 104.) We
encountered no difficulty in applying article 10 in the case of a citizen of Turkey. (Miciano vs. Brimo,
50 Phil., 867.) Having regard to the practical autonomy of the Philippine Islands, as above stated, we
have concluded that if article 10 is applicable and the estate in question is that of a deceased
American citizen, the succession shall be regulated in accordance with the norms of the State of his
domicile in the United States. (Cf. Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil., 130, 137; In
re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156, 166.)
The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death of the wife, the entire
community property without administration belongs to the surviving husband; that he is the absolute
owner of all the community property from the moment of the death of his wife, not by virtue of
succession or by virtue of her death, but by virtue of the fact that when the death of the wife
precedes that of the husband he acquires the community property, not as an heir or as the
beneficiary of his deceased wife, but because she never had more than an inchoate interest or
expentancy which is extinguished upon her death. Quoting the case of Estate of Klumpke (167 Cal.,
415, 419), the court said: "The decisions under this section (1401 Civil Code of California) are
uniform to the effect that the husband does not take the community property upon the death of the
wife by succession, but that he holds it all from the moment of her death as though required by
himself. ... It never belonged to the estate of the deceased wife."
The argument of the appellee apparently leads to this dilemma: If he takes nothing by succession
from his deceased wife, how can the second paragraph of article 10 be invoked? Can the appellee
be heard to say that there is a legal succession under the law of the Philippine Islands and no legal
succession under the law of California? It seems clear that the second paragraph of article 10
applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has taken place in the Philippines and in
accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard to
the order of succession or the extent of the successional rights; in other words, the second

paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was vested with a descendible
interest in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke (178 U. S., 186, 191; 44 Law ed., 1028, 1031), the court said:
It is principle firmly established that to the law of the state in which the land is situated we
must look for the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect
and construction of wills and other conveyances. (United States vs. Crosby, 7 Cranch, 115; 3
L. ed., 287; Clark vs. Graham, 6 Wheat., 577; 5 L. ed., 334; McGoon vs. Scales, 9 Wall., 23;
19 L. ed., 545; Brine vs. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 96 U. S., 627; 24 L. ed., 858.)" (See also Estate
of Lloyd, 175 Cal., 704, 705.) This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of
article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the nation
of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is situated.
It is stated in 5 Cal. Jur., 478:
In accord with the rule that real property is subject to the lex rei sitae, the respective rights of
husband and wife in such property, in the absence of an antenuptial contract, are determined
by the law of the place where the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the
parties or to the place where the marriage was celebrated. (See also Saul vs. His Creditors,
5 Martin [N. S.], 569; 16 Am. Dec., 212 [La.]; Heidenheimer vs. Loring, 26 S. W., 99 [Texas].)
Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of
the acquisition of the community lands here in question must be determined in accordance with
the lex rei sitae.
It is admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were acquired as community property of the
conjugal partnership of the appellee and his wife. Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she was
vested of a title equal to that of her husband. Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides:
All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of proof
that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Article 1395 provides:
"The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules of law applicable to the contract of
partnership in all matters in which such rules do not conflict with the express provisions of this
chapter." Article 1414 provides that "the husband may dispose by will of his half only of the property
of the conjugal partnership." Article 1426 provides that upon dissolution of the conjugal partnership
and after inventory and liquidation, "the net remainder of the partnership property shall be divided
share and share alike between the husband and wife, or their respective heirs." Under the provisions
of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife, upon the acquisition of any conjugal
property, becomes immediately vested with an interest and title therein equal to that of her husband,
subject to the power of management and disposition which the law vests in the husband.
Immediately upon her death, if there are no obligations of the decedent, as is true in the present
case, her share in the conjugal property is transmitted to her heirs by succession. (Articles 657, 659,
661, Civil Code; cf. alsoCoronel vs. Ona, 33 Phil., 456, 469.)
It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a
descendible interest, equal to that of her husband, in the Philippine lands covered by certificates of
title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date of their acquisition to the date of her death. That
appellee himself believed that his wife was vested of such a title and interest in manifest from the
second of said certificates, No. 28336, dated May 14, 1927, introduced by him in evidence, in which

it is certified that "the spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs are the owners in fee simple
of the conjugal lands therein described."
The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs
by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the language of section 1536 of
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances. (Cf. Re Estate
of Majot, 199 N. Y., 29; 92 N. E., 402; 29 L. R. A. [N. S.], 780.) It is unnecessary in this proceeding to
determine the "order of succession" or the "extent of the successional rights" (article 10, Civil
Code, supra) which would be regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which was in
effect at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.
The record does not show what the proper amount of the inheritance tax in this case would be nor
that the appellee (petitioner below) in any way challenged the power of the Government to levy an
inheritance tax or the validity of the statute under which the register of deeds refused to issue a
certificate of transfer reciting that the appellee is the exclusive owner of the Philippine lands included
in the three certificates of title here involved.
The judgment of the court below of March 10, 1931, is reversed with directions to dismiss the
petition, without special pronouncement as to the costs.
Avancea, C. J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur.
Street, J., dissents.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-104776 December 5, 1994

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, and the rest of
1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL
MUNDO, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION'S ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA
INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 104911-14 December 5, 1994
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC.
and/or ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 105029-32 December 5, 1994

ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDER CORPORATION and BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL,

INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M.
AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, ROMEO PATAG, RIZALINO REYES, IGNACIO DE VERA,
SOLOMON B. REYES, JOSE M. ABAN, EMIGDIO N. ABARQUEZ, ANTONIO ACUPAN, ROMEO
ACUPAN, BENJAMIN ALEJANDRE, WILFREDO D. ALIGADO, MARTIN AMISTAD, JR.,
ROLANDO B. AMUL, AMORSOLO ANADING, ANTONIO T. ANGLO, VICENTE ARLITA,
HERBERT AYO, SILVERIO BALATAZO, ALFREDO BALOBO, FALCONERO BANAAG, RAMON
BARBOSA, FELIX BARCENA, FERNANDO BAS, MARIO BATACLAN, ROBERTO S. BATICA,
ENRICO BELEN, ARISTEO BICOL, LARRY C. BICOL, PETRONILLO BISCOCHO, FELIX M.
BOBIER, DIONISIO BOBONGO, BAYANI S. BRACAMANTE, PABLITO BUSTILLO, GUILLERMO
CABEZAS, BIENVENIDO CADALIN, RODOLFO CAGATAN, AMANTE CAILAO, IRENEO
CANDOR, JOSE CASTILLO, MANUEL CASTILLO, REMAR CASTROJERES, REYNALDO
CAYAS, ROMEO CECILIO, TEODULO CREUS, BAYANI DAYRIT, RICARDO DAYRIT, ERNESTO
T. DELA CRUZ, FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, ONOFRE DE RAMA, IGNACIO DE VERA, MODESTO
DIZON, REYNALDO DIZON, ANTONIO S. DOMINGUEZ, GILBERT EBRADA, RICARDO
EBRADA, ANTONIO EJERCITO, JR., EDUARTE ERIDAO, ELADIO ESCOTOTO, JOHN
ESGUERRA, EDUARDO ESPIRITU, ERNESTO ESPIRITU, RODOLFO ESPIRITU, NESTOR M.
ESTEVA, BENJAMIN ESTRADA, VALERIO EVANGELISTA, OLIGARIO FRANCISCO, JESUS
GABAWAN, ROLANDO GARCIA, ANGEL GUDA, PACITO HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO HILARIO,
HENRY L. JACOB, HONESTO JARDINIANO, ANTONIO JOCSON, GERARDO LACSAMANA,
EFREN U. LIRIO LORETO LONTOC, ISRAEL LORENZO, ALEJANDRO LORINO, JOSE
MABALAY, HERMIE MARANAN, LEOVIGILDO MARCIAL, NOEL MARTINEZ, DANTE MATREO,
LUCIANO MELENDEZ, RENATO MELO, FRANCIS MEDIODIA, JOSE C. MILANES, RAYMUNDO
C. MILAY, CRESENCIANO MIRANDA, ILDEFONSO C. MOLINA, ARMANDO B. MONDEJAR
RESURRECCION D. NAZARENO, JUAN OLINDO, FRANCISCO R. OLIVARES, PEDRO
ORBISTA, JR., RICARDO ORDONEZ, ERNIE PANCHO, JOSE PANCHO, GORGONIO P.
PARALA, MODESTO PINPIN, JUANITO PAREA, ROMEO I. PATAG, FRANCISCO PINPIN,
LEONARDO POBLETE, JAIME POLLOS, DOMINGO PONDALIS, EUGENIO RAMIREZ, LUCIEN
M. RESPALL, GAUDENCIO RETANAN, JR., TOMAS B. RETENER, ALVIN C. REYES, RIZALINO
REYES, SOLOMON B. REYES, VIRGILIO G. RICAZA, RODELIO RIETA, JR., BENITO RIVERA,
JR., BERNARDO J. ROBILLOS, PABLO A. ROBLES, JOSE ROBLEZA, QUIRINO RONQUILLO,
AVELINO M. ROQUE, MENANDRO L. SABINO, PEDRO SALGATAR, EDGARDO SALONGA,
NUMERIANO SAN MATEO, FELIZARDO DE LOS SANTOS, JR., GABRIEL SANTOS, JUANITO
SANTOS, PAQUITO SOLANTE, CONRADO A. SOLIS, JR., RODOLFO SULTAN, ISAIAS
TALACTAC, WILLIAM TARUC, MENANDRO TEMPROSA, BIENVENIDO S. TOLENTINO,
BENEDICTO TORRES, MAXIMIANO TORRES, FRANCISCO G. TRIAS, SERGIO A. URSOLINO,
ROGELIO VALDEZ, LEGORIO E. VERGARA, DELFIN VICTORIA, GILBERT VICTORIA,
HERNANE VICTORIANO, FRANCISCO VILLAFLORES, DOMINGO VILLAHERMOSA, ROLANDO
VILLALOBOS, ANTONIO VILLAUZ, DANILO VILLANUEVA, ROGELIO VILLANUEVA, ANGEL
VILLARBA, JUANITO VILLARINO, FRANCISCO ZARA, ROGELIO AALAGOS, NICANOR B.
ABAD, ANDRES ABANES, REYNALDO ABANES, EDUARDO ABANTE, JOSE ABARRO,
JOSEFINO ABARRO, CELSO S. ABELANIO, HERMINIO ABELLA, MIGUEL ABESTANO,
RODRIGO G. ABUBO, JOSE B. ABUSTAN, DANTE ACERES, REYNALDO S. ACOJIDO,
LEOWILIN ACTA, EUGENIO C. ACUEZA, EDUARDO ACUPAN, REYNALDO ACUPAN, SOLANO
ACUPAN, MANUEL P. ADANA, FLORENTINO R. AGNE, QUITERIO R. AGUDO, MANUEL P.
AGUINALDO, DANTE AGUIRRE, HERMINIO AGUIRRE, GONZALO ALBERTO, JR., CONRADO
ALCANTARA, LAMBERTO Q. ALCANTARA, MARIANITO J. ALCANTARA, BENCIO ALDOVER,
EULALIO V. ALEJANDRO, BENJAMIN ALEJANDRO, EDUARDO L. ALEJANDRO, MAXIMINO
ALEJANDRO, ALBERTO ALMENAR, ARNALDO ALONZO, AMADO ALORIA, CAMILO
ALVAREZ, MANUEL C. ALVAREZ, BENJAMIN R. AMBROCIO, CARLOS AMORES, BERNARD P.
ANCHETA, TIMOTEO O. ANCHETA, JEOFREY ANI, ELINO P. ANTILLON, ARMANDRO B.

ANTIPONO, LARRY T. ANTONIO, ANTONIO APILADO, ARTURO P. APILADO, FRANCISCO

APOLINARIO, BARTOLOME M. AQUINO, ISIDRO AQUINO, PASTOR AQUINO, ROSENDO M.
AQUINO, ROBERTO ARANGORIN, BENJAMIN O. ARATEA, ARTURO V. ARAULLO,
PRUDENCIO ARAULLO, ALEXANDER ARCAIRA, FRANCISCO ARCIAGA, JOSE AREVALO,
JUANTO AREVALO, RAMON AREVALO, RODOLFO AREVALO, EULALIO ARGUELLES,
WILFREDO P. ARICA, JOSE M. ADESILLO, ANTONIO ASUNCION, ARTEMIO M. ASUNCION,
EDGARDO ASUNCION, REXY M. ASUNCION, VICENTE AURELIO, ANGEL AUSTRIA, RICARDO
P. AVERILLA, JR., VIRGILIO AVILA, BARTOLOME AXALAN, ALFREDO BABILONIA, FELIMON
BACAL, JOSE L. BACANI, ROMULO R. BALBIERAN, VICENTE BALBIERAN, RODOLFO
BALITBIT, TEODORO Y. BALOBO, DANILO O. BARBA, BERNARDO BARRO, JUAN A.
BASILAN, CEFERINO BATITIS, VIVENCIO C. BAUAN, GAUDENCIO S. BAUTISTA, LEONARDO
BAUTISTA, JOSE D. BAUTISTA, ROSTICO BAUTISTA, RUPERTO B. BAUTISTA, TEODORO S.
BAUTISTA, VIRGILIO BAUTISTA, JESUS R. BAYA, WINIEFREDO BAYACAL, WINIEFREDO
BEBIT, BEN G. BELIR, ERIC B. BELTRAN, EMELIANO BENALES, JR., RAUL BENITEZ,
PERFECTO BENSAN, IRENEO BERGONIO, ISABELO BERMUDEZ, ROLANDO I. BERMUDEZ,
DANILO BERON, BENJAMIN BERSAMIN, ANGELITO BICOL, ANSELMO BICOL, CELESTINO
BICOL, JR., FRANCISCO BICOL, ROGELIO BICOL, ROMULO L. BICOL, ROGELIO BILLIONES,
TEOFILO N. BITO, FERNANDO BLANCO, AUGUSTO BONDOC, DOMINGO BONDOC, PEPE S.
BOOC, JAMES R. BORJA, WILFREDO BRACEROS, ANGELES C. BRECINO, EURECLYDON G.
BRIONES, AMADO BRUGE, PABLITO BUDILLO, ARCHIMEDES BUENAVENTURA, BASILIO
BUENAVENTURA, GUILLERMO BUENCONSEJO, ALEXANDER BUSTAMANTE, VIRGILIO
BUTIONG, JR., HONESTO P. CABALLA, DELFIN CABALLERO, BENEDICTO CABANIGAN,
MOISES CABATAY, HERMANELI CABRERA, PEDRO CAGATAN, JOVEN C. CAGAYAT,
ROGELIO L. CALAGOS, REYNALDO V. CALDEJON, OSCAR C. CALDERON, NESTOR D.
CALLEJA, RENATO R. CALMA, NELSON T. CAMACHO, SANTOS T. CAMACHO, ROBERTO
CAMANA, FLORANTE C. CAMANAG EDGARDO M. CANDA, SEVERINO CANTOS, EPIFANIO A.
CAPONPON, ELIAS D. CARILLO, JR., ARMANDO CARREON, MENANDRO M. CASTAEDA,
BENIGNO A. CASTILLO, CORNELIO L. CASTILLO, JOSEPH B. CASTILLO, ANSELMO
CASTILLO, JOAQUIN CASTILLO, PABLO L. CASTILLO, ROMEO P. CASTILLO, SESINANDO
CATIBOG, DANILO CASTRO, PRUDENCIO A. CASTRO, RAMO CASTRO, JR., ROMEO A. DE
CASTRO, JAIME B. CATLI, DURANA D. CEFERINO, RODOLFO B. CELIS, HERMINIGILDO
CEREZO, VICTORIANO CELESTINO, BENJAMIN CHAN, ANTONIO C. CHUA, VIVENCIO B.
CIABAL, RODRIGO CLARETE, AUGUSTO COLOMA, TURIANO CONCEPCION, TERESITO
CONSTANTINO, ARMANDO CORALES, RENATO C. CORCUERA, APOLINAR CORONADO,
ABELARDO CORONEL, FELIX CORONEL, JR., LEONARDO CORPUZ, JESUS M. CORRALES,
CESAR CORTEMPRATO, FRANCISCO O. CORVERA, FRANCISCO COSTALES, SR.,
CELEDONIO CREDITO, ALBERTO A. CREUS, ANACLETO V. CRUZ, DOMINGO DELA CRUZ,
AMELIANO DELA CRUZ, JR., PANCHITO CRUZ, REYNALDO B. DELA CRUZ, ROBERTO P.
CRUZ, TEODORO S. CRUZ, ZOSIMO DELA CRUZ, DIONISIO A. CUARESMA, FELIMON
CUIZON, FERMIN DAGONDON, RICHARD DAGUINSIN, CRISANTO A. DATAY, NICASIO
DANTINGUINOO, JOSE DATOON, EDUARDO DAVID, ENRICO T. DAVID, FAVIO DAVID,
VICTORIANO S. DAVID, EDGARDO N. DAYACAP, JOSELITO T. DELOSO, CELERINO DE
GUZMAN, ROMULO DE GUZMAN, LIBERATO DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE LEON, JOSELITO L. DE
LUMBAN, NAPOLEON S. DE LUNA, RICARDO DE RAMA, GENEROSO DEL ROSARIO,
ALBERTO DELA CRUZ, JOSE DELA CRUZ, LEONARDO DELOS REYES, ERNESTO F. DIATA,
EDUARDO A. DIAZ, FELIX DIAZ, MELCHOR DIAZ, NICANOR S. DIAZ, GERARDO C. DIGA,
CLEMENTE DIMATULAC, ROLANDO DIONISIO, PHILIPP G. DISMAYA, BENJAMIN
DOCTOLERO, ALBERTO STO. DOMINGO, BENJAMIN E. DOZA, BENJAMIN DUPA, DANILO C.
DURAN, GREGORIO D. DURAN, RENATO A. EDUARTE, GODOFREDO E. EISMA, ARDON B.
ELLO, UBED B. ELLO, JOSEFINO ENANO, REYNALDO ENCARNACION, EDGARDO
ENGUANCIO, ELIAS EQUIPANO, FELIZARDO ESCARMOSA, MIGUEL ESCARMOSA,
ARMANDO ESCOBAR, ROMEO T. ESCUYOS, ANGELITO ESPIRITU, EDUARDO S. ESPIRITU,
REYNALDO ESPIRITU, ROLANDO ESPIRITU, JULIAN ESPREGANTE, IGMIDIO ESTANISLAO,

ERNESTO M. ESTEBAN, MELANIO R. ESTRO, ERNESTO M. ESTEVA, CONRADO ESTUAR,

CLYDE ESTUYE, ELISEO FAJARDO, PORFIRIO FALQUEZA, WILFREDO P. FAUSTINO, EMILIO
E. FERNANDEZ, ARTEMIO FERRER, MISAEL M. FIGURACION, ARMANDO F. FLORES,
BENJAMIN FLORES, EDGARDO C. FLORES, BUENAVENTURA FRANCISCO, MANUEL S.
FRANCISCO, ROLANDO FRANCISCO, VALERIANO FRANCISCO, RODOLFO GABAWAN,
ESMERALDO GAHUTAN, CESAR C. GALANG, SANTIAGO N. GALOSO, GABRIEL GAMBOA,
BERNARDO GANDAMON, JUAN GANZON, ANDRES GARCIA, JR., ARMANDO M. GARCIA,
EUGENIO GARCIA, MARCELO L. GARCIA, PATRICIO L. GARCIA, JR., PONCIANO G. GARCIA,
PONCIANO G. GARCIA, JR., RAFAEL P. GARCIA, ROBERTO S. GARCIA, OSIAS G. GAROFIL,
RAYMUNDO C. GARON, ROLANDO G. GATELA, AVELINO GAYETA, RAYMUNDO GERON,
PLACIDO GONZALES, RUPERTO H. GONZALES, ROGELIO D. GUANIO, MARTIN V.
GUERRERO, JR., ALEXIS GUNO, RICARDO L. GUNO, FRANCISCO GUPIT, DENNIS J.
GUTIERREZ, IGNACIO B. GUTIERREZ, ANGELITO DE GUZMAN, JR., CESAR H. HABANA,
RAUL G. HERNANDEZ, REYNALDO HERNANDEZ, JOVENIANO D. HILADO, JUSTO HILAPO,
ROSTITO HINAHON, FELICISIMO HINGADA, EDUARDO HIPOLITO, RAUL L. IGNACIO,
MANUEL L. ILAGAN, RENATO L. ILAGAN, CONRADO A. INSIONG, GRACIANO G. ISLA,
ARNEL L. JACOB, OSCAR J. JAPITENGA, CIRILO HICBAN, MAXIMIANO HONRADES,
GENEROSO IGNACIO, FELIPE ILAGAN, EXPEDITO N. JACOB, MARIO JASMIN, BIENVENIDO
JAVIER, ROMEO M. JAVIER, PRIMO DE JESUS, REYNALDO DE JESUS, CARLOS A. JIMENEZ,
DANILO E. JIMENEZ, PEDRO C. JOAQUIN, FELIPE W. JOCSON, FELINO M. JOCSON, PEDRO
N. JOCSON, VALENTINO S. JOCSON, PEDRO B. JOLOYA, ESTEBAN P. JOSE, JR., RAUL
JOSE, RICARDO SAN JOSE, GERTRUDO KABIGTING, EDUARDO S. KOLIMLIM, SR., LAURO
J. LABAY, EMMANUEL C. LABELLA, EDGARDO B. LACERONA, JOSE B. LACSON, MARIO J.
LADINES, RUFINO LAGAC, RODRIGO LAGANAPAN, EFREN M. LAMADRID, GUADENCIO
LATANAN, VIRGILIO LATAYAN, EMILIANO LATOJA, WENCESLAO LAUREL, ALFREDO
LAXAMANA, DANIEL R. LAZARO, ANTONIO C. LEANO, ARTURO S. LEGASPI, BENITO DE
LEMOS, JR., PEDRO G. DE LEON, MANOLITO C. LILOC, GERARDO LIMUACO, ERNESTO S.
LISING, RENATO LISING, WILFREDO S. LISING, CRISPULO LONTOC, PEDRO M. LOPERA,
ROGELIO LOPERA, CARLITO M. LOPEZ, CLODY LOPEZ, GARLITO LOPEZ, GEORGE F.
LOPEZ, VIRGILIO M. LOPEZ, BERNARDITO G. LOREJA, DOMINGO B. LORICO, DOMINGO
LOYOLA, DANTE LUAGE, ANTONIO M. LUALHATI, EMMANUEL LUALHATI, JR., LEONIDEZ C.
LUALHATI, SEBASTIAN LUALHATI, FRANCISCO LUBAT, ARMANDO LUCERO, JOSELITO L.
DE LUMBAN, THOMAS VICENTE O. LUNA, NOLI MACALADLAD, ALFREDO MACALINO,
RICARDO MACALINO, ARTURO V. MACARAIG, ERNESTO V. MACARAIG, RODOLFO V.
MACARAIG, BENJAMIN MACATANGAY, HERMOGENES MACATANGAY, RODEL
MACATANGAY, ROMULO MACATANGAY, OSIAS Q. MADLANGBAYAN, NICOLAS P. MADRID,
EDELBERTO G. MAGAT, EFREN C. MAGBANUA, BENJAMIN MAGBUHAT, ALFREDO C.
MAGCALENG, ANTONIO MAGNAYE, ALFONSO MAGPANTAY, RICARDO C. MAGPANTAY,
SIMEON M. MAGPANTAY, ARMANDO M. MAGSINO, MACARIO S. MAGSINO, ANTONIO
MAGTIBAY, VICTOR V. MAGTIBAY, GERONIMO MAHILUM, MANUEL MALONZO, RICARDO
MAMADIS, RODOLFO MANA, BERNARDO A. MANALILI, MANUEL MANALILI, ANGELO
MANALO, AGUILES L. MANALO, LEOPOLDO MANGAHAS, BAYANI MANIGBAS, ROLANDO C.
MANIMTIM, DANIEL MANONSON, ERNESTO F. MANUEL, EDUARDO MANZANO, RICARDO N.
MAPA, RAMON MAPILE, ROBERTO C. MARANA, NEMESIO MARASIGAN, WENCESLAO
MARASIGAN, LEONARDO MARCELO, HENRY F. MARIANO, JOEL MARIDABLE, SANTOS E.
MARINO, NARCISO A. MARQUEZ, RICARDO MARTINEZ, DIEGO MASICAMPO, AURELIO
MATABERDE, RENATO MATILLA, VICTORIANO MATILLA, VIRGILIO MEDEL, LOLITO M.
MELECIO, BENIGNO MELENDEZ, RENER J. MEMIJE, REYNALDO F. MEMIJE, RODEL
MEMIJE, AVELINO MENDOZA, JR., CLARO MENDOZA, TIMOTEO MENDOZA, GREGORIO
MERCADO, ERNANI DELA MERCED, RICARDO MERCENA, NEMESIO METRELLO, RODEL
MEMIJE, GASPAR MINIMO, BENJAMIN MIRANDA, FELIXBERTO D. MISA, CLAUDIO A.
MODESTO, JR., OSCAR MONDEDO, GENEROSO MONTON, RENATO MORADA, RICARDO
MORADA, RODOLFO MORADA, ROLANDO M. MORALES, FEDERICO M. MORENO,

VICTORINO A. MORTEL, JR., ESPIRITU A. MUNOZ, IGNACIO MUNOZ, ILDEFONSO MUNOZ,

ROGELIO MUNOZ, ERNESTO NAPALAN, MARCELO A. NARCIZO, REYNALDO NATALIA,
FERNANDO C. NAVARETTE, PACIFICO D. NAVARRO, FLORANTE NAZARENO, RIZAL B.
NAZARIO, JOSUE NEGRITE, ALFREDO NEPUMUCENO, HERBERT G. NG, FLORENCIO
NICOLAS, ERNESTO C. NINON, AVELINO NUQUI, NEMESIO D. OBA, DANILO OCAMPO,
EDGARDO OCAMPO, RODRIGO E. OCAMPO, ANTONIO B. OCCIANO, REYNALDO P. OCSON,
BENJAMIN ODESA, ANGEL OLASO, FRANCISCO OLIGARIO, ZOSIMO OLIMBO, BENJAMIN V.
ORALLO, ROMEO S. ORIGINES, DANILO R. ORTANEZ, WILFREDO OSIAS, VIRGILIO PA-A,
DAVID PAALAN, JESUS N. PACHECO, ALFONSO L. PADILLA, DANILO PAGSANJAN,
NUMERIANO PAGSISIHAN, RICARDO T. PAGUIO, EMILIO PAKINGAN, LEANDRO PALABRICA,
QUINCIANO PALO, JOSE PAMATIAN, GONZALO PAN, PORFIRIO PAN, BIENVENIDO PANGAN,
ERNESTO PANGAN, FRANCISCO V. PASIA, EDILBERTO PASIMIO, JR., JOSE V. PASION,
ANGELITO M. PENA, DIONISIO PENDRAS, HERMINIO PERALTA, REYNALDO M. PERALTA,
ANTONIO PEREZ, ANTOLIANO E. PEREZ, JUAN PEREZ, LEON PEREZ, ROMEO E. PEREZ,
ROMULO PEREZ, WILLIAM PEREZ, FERNANDO G. PERINO, FLORENTINO DEL PILAR,
DELMAR F. PINEDA, SALVADOR PINEDA, ELIZALDE PINPIN, WILFREDO PINPIN, ARTURO
POBLETE, DOMINADOR R. PRIELA, BUENAVENTURA PRUDENTE, CARMELITO PRUDENTE,
DANTE PUEYO, REYNALDO Q. PUEYO, RODOLFO O. PULIDO, ALEJANDRO PUNIO,
FEDERICO QUIMAN, ALFREDO L. QUINTO, ROMEO QUINTOS, EDUARDO W. RACABO,
RICARDO C. DE RAMA, RICARDO L. DE RAMA, ROLANDO DE RAMA, FERNANDO A.
RAMIREZ, LITO S. RAMIREZ, RICARDO G. RAMIREZ, RODOLFO V. RAMIREZ, ALBERTO
RAMOS, ANSELMO C. RAMOS, TOBIAS RAMOS, WILLARFREDO RAYMUNDO, REYNALDO
RAQUEDAN, MANUEL F. RAVELAS, WILFREDO D. RAYMUNDO, ERNESTO E. RECOLASO,
ALBERTO REDAZA, ARTHUR REJUSO, TORIBIO M. RELLAMA, JAIME RELLOSA, EUGENIO
A. REMOQUILLO, GERARDO RENTOZA, REDENTOR C. REY, ALFREDO S. REYES, AMABLE
S. REYES, BENEDICTO R. REYES, GREGORIO B. REYES, JOSE A. REYES, JOSE C. REYES,
ROMULO M. REYES, SERGIO REYES, ERNESTO F. RICO, FERNANDO M. RICO, EMMANUEL
RIETA, RICARDO RIETA, LEO B. ROBLES, RUBEN ROBLES, RODOLFO ROBLEZA, RODRIGO
ROBLEZA, EDUARDO ROCABO, ANTONIO R. RODRIGUEZ, BERNARDO RODRIGUEZ, ELIGIO
RODRIGUEZ, ALMONTE ROMEO, ELIAS RONQUILLO, ELISE RONQUILLO, LUIS VAL B.
RONQUILLO, REYNOSO P. RONQUILLO, RODOLFO RONQUILLO, ANGEL ROSALES, RAMON
ROSALES, ALBERTO DEL ROSARIO, GENEROSO DEL ROSARIO, TEODORICO DEL
ROSARIO, VIRGILIO L. ROSARIO, CARLITO SALVADOR, JOSE SAMPARADA, ERNESTO SAN
PEDRO, ADRIANO V. SANCHA, GERONIMO M. SANCHA, ARTEMIO B. SANCHEZ, NICASIO
SANCHEZ, APOLONIO P. SANTIAGO, JOSELITO S. SANTIAGO, SERGIO SANTIAGO,
EDILBERTO C. SANTOS, EFREN S. SANTOS, RENATO D. SANTOS, MIGUEL SAPUYOT, ALEX
S. SERQUINA, DOMINADOR P. SERRA, ROMEO SIDRO, AMADO M. SILANG, FAUSTINO D.
SILANG, RODOLFO B. DE SILOS, ANICETO G. SILVA, EDGARDO M. SILVA, ROLANDO C.
SILVERTO, ARTHUR B. SIMBAHON, DOMINGO SOLANO, JOSELITO C. SOLANTE, CARLITO
SOLIS, CONRADO SOLIS, III, EDGARDO SOLIS, ERNESTO SOLIS, ISAGANI M. SOLIS,
EDUARDO L. SOTTO, ERNESTO G. STA. MARIA, VICENTE G. STELLA, FELIMON SUPANG,
PETER TANGUINOO, MAXIMINO TALIBSAO, FELICISMO P. TALUSIK, FERMIN TARUC, JR.,
LEVY S. TEMPLO, RODOLFO S. TIAMSON, LEONILO TIPOSO, ARNEL TOLENTINO, MARIO M.
TOLENTINO, FELIPE TORRALBA, JOVITO V. TORRES, LEONARDO DE TORRES, GAVINO U.
TUAZON, AUGUSTO B. TUNGUIA, FRANCISCO UMALI, SIMPLICIO UNIDA, WILFREDO V.
UNTALAN, ANTONIO VALDERAMA, RAMON VALDERAMA, NILO VALENCIANO, EDGARDO C.
VASQUEZ, ELPIDIO VELASQUEZ, NESTOR DE VERA, WILFREDO D. VERA, BIENVENIDO
VERGARA, ALFREDO VERGARA, RAMON R. VERZOSA, FELICITO P. VICMUNDO, ALFREDO
VICTORIANO, TEOFILO P. VIDALLO, SABINO N. VIERNEZ, JESUS J. VILLA, JOVEN
VILLABLANCO, EDGARDO G. VILLAFLORES, CEFERINO VILLAGERA, ALEX
VILLAHERMOZA, DANILO A. VILLANUEVA, ELITO VILLANUEVA, LEONARDO M.
VILLANUEVA, MANUEL R. VILLANUEVA, NEPTHALI VILLAR, JOSE V. VILLAREAL,

FELICISIMO VILLARINO, RAFAEL VILLAROMAN, CARLOS VILLENA, FERDINAND VIVO,

ROBERTO YABUT, VICENTE YNGENTE, AND ORO C. ZUNIGA,respondents.
Gerardo A. Del Mundo and Associates for petitioners.
Romulo, Mabanta, Sayoc, Buenaventura, De los Angeles Law Offices for BRII/AIBC.
Florante M. De Castro for private respondents in 105029-32.

QUIASON, J.:
The petition in G.R. No. 104776, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al. v. Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration's Administrator, et. al.," was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court:
(1) to modify the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in POEA Cases Nos.
L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and L-86-05-460; (2) to render a new
decision: (i) declaring private respondents as in default; (ii) declaring the said labor
cases as a class suit; (iii) ordering Asia International Builders Corporation (AIBC) and
Brown and Root International Inc. (BRII) to pay the claims of the 1,767 claimants in
said labor cases; (iv) declaring Atty. Florante M. de Castro guilty of forum-shopping;
and (v) dismissing POEA Case No. L-86-05-460; and
(3) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC, denying the motion for
reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-288).
The petition in G.R. Nos. 104911-14, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al., v. Hon. National Labor
Relations Commission, et. al.," was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases
Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-799 and
L-86-05-460 insofar as it: (i) applied the three-year prescriptive period under the
Labor Code of the Philippines instead of the ten-year prescriptive period under the
Civil Code of the Philippines; and (ii) denied the
"three-hour daily average" formula in the computation of petitioners' overtime pay;
and
(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC, denying the motion for
reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-25; 26-220).
The petition in G.R. Nos. 105029-32, entitled "Asia International Builders Corporation, et. al., v.
National Labor Relations Commission, et. al." was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases
Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and
L-86-05-460, insofar as it granted the claims of 149 claimants; and

(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 21, 1992 of NLRC insofar as it denied the
motions for reconsideration of AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 2-59; 61-230).
The Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC, which modified the decision of POEA in four
labor cases: (1) awarded monetary benefits only to 149 claimants and (2) directed Labor Arbiter
Fatima J. Franco to conduct hearings and to receive evidence on the claims dismissed by the POEA
for lack of substantial evidence or proof of employment.
Consolidation of Cases
G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32 were originally raffled to the Third Division while G.R. Nos.
104911-14 were raffled to the Second Division. In the Resolution dated July 26, 1993, the Second
Division referred G.R. Nos. 104911-14 to the Third Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 895).
In the Resolution dated September 29, 1993, the Third Division granted the motion filed in G.R. Nos.
104911-14 for the consolidation of said cases with G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32, which were
assigned to the First Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 986-1,107; G.R. Nos. 10502930, Rollo, pp. 369-377, 426-432). In the Resolution dated October 27, 1993, the First Division
granted the motion to consolidate G.R. Nos. 104911-14 with G.R. No. 104776 (G.R. Nos. 10491114, Rollo, p. 1109; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, p. 1562).
I
On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M.. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista, in their own
behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing
an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for
money claims arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII (POEA Case No. L84-06-555). The claimants were represented by Atty. Gerardo del Mundo.
BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction;
while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy
Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment
contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the
earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary
differential pay; fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of
withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the
suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 13-14).
At the hearing on June 25, 1984, AIBC was furnished a copy of the complaint and was given,
together with BRII, up to July 5, 1984 to file its answer.
On July 3, 1984, POEA Administrator, upon motion of AIBC and BRII, ordered the claimants to file a
bill of particulars within ten days from receipt of the order and the movants to file their answers within
ten days from receipt of the bill of particulars. The POEA Administrator also scheduled a pre-trial
conference on July 25, 1984.
On July 13, 1984, the claimants submitted their "Compliance and Manifestation." On July 23, 1984,
AIBC filed a "Motion to Strike Out of the Records", the "Complaint" and the "Compliance and
Manifestation." On July 25, 1984, the claimants filed their "Rejoinder and Comments," averring,

among other matters, the failure of AIBC and BRII to file their answers and to attend the pre-trial
conference on July 25, 1984. The claimants alleged that AIBC and BRII had waived their right to
present evidence and had defaulted by failing to file their answers and to attend the pre-trial
conference.
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the "Motion to Strike Out of the Records" filed
by AIBC but required the claimants to correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out in the
order.
On October 10, 1984, claimants asked for time within which to comply with the Order of October 2,
1984 and filed an "Urgent Manifestation," praying that the POEA Administrator direct the parties to
submit simultaneously their position papers, after which the case should be deemed submitted for
decision. On the same day, Atty. Florante de Castro filed another complaint for the same money
claims and benefits in behalf of several claimants, some of whom were also claimants in POEA Case
No. L-84-06-555 (POEA Case No. 85-10-779).
On October 19, 1984, claimants filed their "Compliance" with the Order dated October 2, 1984 and
an "Urgent Manifestation," praying that the POEA direct the parties to submit simultaneously their
position papers after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. On the same day,
AIBC asked for time to file its comment on the "Compliance" and "Urgent Manifestation" of
claimants. On November 6, 1984, it filed a second motion for extension of time to file the comment.
On November 8, 1984, the POEA Administrator informed AIBC that its motion for extension of time
was granted.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for extension of time and asked
that AIBC and BRII be declared in default for failure to file their answers.
On November 20, 1984, AIBC and BRII filed a "Comment" praying, among other reliefs, that
claimants should be ordered to amend their complaint.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their
answers within ten days from receipt of the order.
On February 27, 1985, AIBC and BRII appealed to NLRC seeking the reversal of the said order of
the POEA Administrator. Claimants opposed the appeal, claiming that it was dilatory and praying that
AIBC and BRII be declared in default.
On April 2, 1985, the original claimants filed an "Amended Complaint and/or Position Paper" dated
March 24, 1985, adding new demands: namely, the payment of overtime pay, extra night work pay,
annual leave differential pay, leave indemnity pay, retirement and savings benefits and their share of
forfeitures (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 14-16). On April 15, 1985, the POEA Administrator directed
AIBC to file its answer to the amended complaint (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 20).
On May 28, 1985, claimants filed an "Urgent Motion for Summary Judgment." On the same day, the
POEA issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers to the "Amended Complaint,"
otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present evidence and the case would
be resolved on the basis of complainant's evidence.
On June 5, 1985, AIBC countered with a "Motion to Dismiss as Improper Class Suit and Motion for
Bill of Particulars Re: Amended Complaint dated March 24, 1985." Claimants opposed the motions.

On September 4, 1985, the POEA Administrator reiterated his directive to AIBC and BRII to file their
answers in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.
On September 18, 1985, AIBC filed its second appeal to the NLRC, together with a petition for the
issuance of a writ of injunction. On September 19, 1985, NLRC enjoined the POEA Administrator
from hearing the labor cases and suspended the period for the filing of the answers of AIBC and
BRII.
On September 19, 1985, claimants asked the POEA Administrator to include additional claimants in
the case and to investigate alleged wrongdoings of BRII, AIBC and their respective lawyers.
On October 10, 1985, Romeo Patag and two co-claimants filed a complaint (POEA Case No. L-8510-777) against AIBC and BRII with the POEA, demanding monetary claims similar to those subject
of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In the same month, Solomon Reyes also filed his own complaint
(POEA Case No. L-85-10-779) against AIBC and BRII.
On October 17, 1985, the law firm of Florante M. de Castro & Associates asked for the substitution
of the original counsel of record and the cancellation of the special powers of attorney given the
original counsel.
On December 12, 1985, Atty. Del Mundo filed in NLRC a notice of the claim to enforce attorney's
lien.
On May 29, 1986, Atty. De Castro filed a complaint for money claims (POEA Case No. 86-05-460) in
behalf of 11 claimants including Bienvenido Cadalin, a claimant in POEA Case No. 84-06-555.
On December 12, 1986, the NLRC dismissed the two appeals filed on February 27, 1985 and
September 18, 1985 by AIBC and BRII.
In narrating the proceedings of the labor cases before the POEA Administrator, it is not amiss to
mention that two cases were filed in the Supreme Court by the claimants, namely G.R. No. 72132
on September 26, 1985 and Administrative Case No. 2858 on March 18, 1986. On May 13, 1987,
the Supreme Court issued a resolution in Administrative Case No. 2858 directing the POEA
Administrator to resolve the issues raised in the motions and oppositions filed in POEA Cases Nos.
L-84-06-555 and L-86-05-460 and to decide the labor cases with deliberate dispatch.
AIBC also filed a petition in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 78489), questioning the Order dated
September 4, 1985 of the POEA Administrator. Said order required BRII and AIBC to answer the
amended complaint in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In a resolution dated November 9, 1987, we
dismissed the petition by informing AIBC that all its technical objections may properly be resolved in
the hearings before the POEA.
Complaints were also filed before the Ombudsman. The first was filed on September 22, 1988 by
claimant Hermie Arguelles and 18 co-claimants against the POEA Administrator and several NLRC
Commissioners. The Ombudsman merely referred the complaint to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment with a request for the early disposition of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. The second
was filed on April 28, 1989 by claimants Emigdio P. Bautista and Rolando R. Lobeta charging AIBC
and BRII for violation of labor and social legislations. The third was filed by Jose R. Santos,
Maximino N. Talibsao and Amado B. Bruce denouncing AIBC and BRII of violations of labor laws.

On January 13, 1987, AIBC filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Resolution dated
December 12, 1986.
On January 14, 1987, AIBC reiterated before the POEA Administrator its motion for suspension of
the period for filing an answer or motion for extension of time to file the same until the resolution of
its motion for reconsideration of the order of the NLRC dismissing the two appeals. On April 28,
1987, NLRC en banc denied the motion for reconsideration.
At the hearing on June 19, 1987, AIBC submitted its answer to the complaint. At the same hearing,
the parties were given a period of 15 days from said date within which to submit their respective
position papers. On June 24, 1987 claimants filed their "Urgent Motion to Strike Out Answer,"
alleging that the answer was filed out of time. On June 29, 1987, claimants filed their "Supplement to
Urgent Manifestational Motion" to comply with the POEA Order of June 19, 1987. On February 24,
1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their position paper. On March 4, 1988, claimants filed their "ExParte Motion to Expunge from the Records" the position paper of AIBC and BRII, claiming that it was
filed out of time.
On September 1, 1988, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro filed their memorandum in
POEA Case No. L-86-05-460. On September 6, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their Supplemental
Memorandum. On September 12, 1988, BRII filed its "Reply to Complainant's Memorandum." On
October 26, 1988, claimants submitted their "Ex-Parte Manifestational Motion and CounterSupplemental Motion," together with 446 individual contracts of employments and service records.
On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a "Consolidated Reply."
On January 30, 1989, the POEA Administrator rendered his decision in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555
and the other consolidated cases, which awarded the amount of $824,652.44 in favor of only 324
complainants.
On February 10, 1989, claimants submitted their "Appeal Memorandum For Partial Appeal" from the
decision of the POEA. On the same day, AIBC also filed its motion for reconsideration and/or appeal
in addition to the "Notice of Appeal" filed earlier on February 6, 1989 by another counsel for AIBC.
On February 17, 1989, claimants filed their "Answer to Appeal," praying for the dismissal of the
appeal of AIBC and BRII.
On March 15, 1989, claimants filed their "Supplement to Complainants' Appeal Memorandum,"
together with their "newly discovered evidence" consisting of payroll records.
On April 5, 1989, AIBC and BRII submitted to NLRC their "Manifestation," stating among other
matters that there were only 728 named claimants. On April 20, 1989, the claimants filed their
"Counter-Manifestation," alleging that there were 1,767 of them.
On July 27, 1989, claimants filed their "Urgent Motion for Execution" of the Decision dated January
30, 1989 on the grounds that BRII had failed to appeal on time and AIBC had not posted the
supersedeas bond in the amount of $824,652.44.
On December 23, 1989, claimants filed another motion to resolve the labor cases.
On August 21, 1990, claimants filed their "Manifestational Motion," praying that all the 1,767
claimants be awarded their monetary claims for failure of private respondents to file their answers
within the reglamentary period required by law.

On September 2, 1991, NLRC promulgated its Resolution, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the POEA in these
consolidated cases is modified to the extent and in accordance with the following
dispositions:
1. The claims of the 94 complainants identified and listed in Annex
"A" hereof are dismissed for having prescribed;
2. Respondents AIBC and Brown & Root are hereby ordered, jointly
and severally, to pay the 149 complainants, identified and listed in
Annex "B" hereof, the peso equivalent, at the time of payment, of the
total amount in US dollars indicated opposite their respective names;
3. The awards given by the POEA to the 19 complainants classified
and listed in Annex "C" hereof, who appear to have worked
elsewhere than in Bahrain are hereby set aside.
4. All claims other than those indicated in Annex "B", including those
for overtime work and favorably granted by the POEA, are hereby
dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in support thereof or are
beyond the competence of this Commission to pass upon.
In addition, this Commission, in the exercise of its powers and authority under Article
218(c) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, hereby directs Labor Arbiter
Fatima J. Franco of this Commission to summon parties, conduct hearings and
receive evidence, as expeditiously as possible, and thereafter submit a written report
to this Commission (First Division) of the proceedings taken, regarding the claims of
the following:
(a) complainants identified and listed in Annex "D" attached and
made an integral part of this Resolution, whose claims were
dismissed by the POEA for lack of proof of employment in Bahrain
(these complainants numbering 683, are listed in pages 13 to 23 of
the decision of POEA, subject of the appeals) and,
(b) complainants identified and listed in Annex "E" attached and made
an integral part of this Resolution, whose awards decreed by the
POEA, to Our mind, are not supported by substantial evidence" (G.R.
No. 104776; Rollo, pp. 113-115; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp. 85-87;
G.R. Nos. 105029-31, pp. 120-122).
On November 27, 1991, claimant Amado S. Tolentino and 12
co-claimants, who were former clients of Atty. Del Mundo, filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 120741-44). The petition was dismissed in a resolution dated January 27,
1992.
Three motions for reconsideration of the September 2, 1991 Resolution of the NLRC were filed. The
first, by the claimants represented by Atty. Del Mundo; the second, by the claimants represented by
Atty. De Castro; and the third, by AIBC and BRII.

In its Resolution dated March 24, 1992, NLRC denied all the motions for reconsideration.
Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants represented by Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No. 104776), the
claimants represented by Atty. De Castro (G.R. Nos. 104911-14) and by AIBC and BRII (G.R. Nos.
105029-32).
II
Compromise Agreements
Before this Court, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro and AIBC and BRII have submitted,
from time to time, compromise agreements for our approval and jointly moved for the dismissal of
their respective petitions insofar as the claimants-parties to the compromise agreements were
concerned (See Annex A for list of claimants who signed quitclaims).
Thus the following manifestations that the parties had arrived at a compromise agreement and the
corresponding motions for the approval of the agreements were filed by the parties and approved by
the Court:
1) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Emigdio Abarquez and 47 coclaimants dated September 2, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 263-406; G.R.
Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp.
470-615);
2) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Bienvenido Cadalin and 82 copetitioners dated September 3, 1992 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 364-507);
3) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Jose
M. Aban and 36 co-claimants dated September 17, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 10502932, Rollo, pp. 613-722; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 518-626; G.R. Nos. 10491114, Rollo, pp. 407-516);
4) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Antonio T. Anglo and 17 coclaimants dated October 14, 1992 (G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 778-843; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 650-713; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 530-590);
5) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dionisio Bobongo and 6 coclaimants dated January 15, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 813-836; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 629-652);
6) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Valerio A. Evangelista and 4 coclaimants dated March 10, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 731-746; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);
7) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimants Palconeri Banaag and 5 coclaimants dated March 17, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1657-1703; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 655-675);

8) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Benjamin Ambrosio and 15 other
co-claimants dated May 4, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 906-956; G.R.
Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 679-729; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1773-1814);
9) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Valerio Evangelista and 3 co-claimants
dated May 10, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);
10) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Quiterio R. Agudo and 36 coclaimants dated June 14, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 974-1190; G.R.
Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 748-864; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1066-1183);
11) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Arnaldo J. Alonzo and 19 coclaimants dated July 22, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1173-1235; G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1193-1256; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 896-959);
12) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Ricardo C. Dayrit and 2 coclaimants dated September 7, 1993 (G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1266-1278; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1243-1254; G.R. Nos.
104911-14,Rollo, pp. 972-984);
13) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dante C. Aceres and 37 coclaimants dated September 8, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1257-1375; G.R.
Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 987-1105; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1280-1397);
14) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Vivencio V. Abella and 27 co-claimants
dated January 10, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, Vol. II);
15) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Domingo B. Solano and six co-claimants
dated August 25, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32; G.R. No. 104776; G.R. Nos. 10491114).
III
The facts as found by the NLRC are as follows:
We have taken painstaking efforts to sift over the more than fifty volumes now
comprising the records of these cases. From the records, it appears that the
complainants-appellants allege that they were recruited by respondent-appellant
AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from 1975
to 1983. They were all deployed at various projects undertaken by Brown & Root in
several countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, United Arab
Emirates and Bahrain, as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
Having been officially processed as overseas contract workers by the Philippine
Government, all the individual complainants signed standard overseas employment
contracts (Records, Vols. 25-32. Hereafter, reference to the records would be
sparingly made, considering their chaotic arrangement) with AIBC before their
departure from the Philippines. These overseas employment contracts invariably
contained the following relevant terms and conditions.
PART B

(1) Employment Position Classification :

(Code) :
(2) Company Employment Status :
(3) Date of Employment to Commence on :
(4) Basic Working Hours Per Week :
(5) Basic Working Hours Per Month :
(6) Basic Hourly Rate :
(7) Overtime Rate Per Hour :
(8) Projected Period of Service
(Subject to C(1) of this [sic]) :
Months and/or
Job Completion
xxx xxx xxx
3. HOURS OF WORK AND COMPENSATION
a) The Employee is employed at the hourly rate and overtime rate as set out in Part
B of this Document.
b) The hours of work shall be those set forth by the Employer, and Employer may, at
his sole option, change or adjust such hours as maybe deemed necessary from time
to time.
4. TERMINATION
a) Notwithstanding any other terms and conditions of this agreement, the Employer
may, at his sole discretion, terminate employee's service with cause, under this
agreement at any time. If the Employer terminates the services of the Employee
under this Agreement because of the completion or termination, or suspension of the
work on which the Employee's services were being utilized, or because of a
reduction in force due to a decrease in scope of such work, or by change in the type
of construction of such work. The Employer will be responsible for his return
transportation to his country of origin. Normally on the most expeditious air route,
economy class accommodation.
xxx xxx xxx
10. VACATION/SICK LEAVE BENEFITS
a) After one (1) year of continuous service and/or satisfactory completion of contract,
employee shall be entitled to 12-days vacation leave with pay. This shall be
computed at the basic wage rate. Fractions of a year's service will be computed on
a pro-rata basis.
b) Sick leave of 15-days shall be granted to the employee for every year of service
for non-work connected injuries or illness. If the employee failed to avail of such
leave benefits, the same shall be forfeited at the end of the year in which said sick
leave is granted.

11. BONUS
A bonus of 20% (for offshore work) of gross income will be accrued and payable only
upon satisfactory completion of this contract.
12. OFFDAY PAY
The seventh day of the week shall be observed as a day of rest with 8 hours regular
pay. If work is performed on this day, all hours work shall be paid at the premium
rate. However, this offday pay provision is applicable only when the laws of the Host
Country require payments for rest day.
In the State of Bahrain, where some of the individual complainants were deployed,
His Majesty Isa Bin Salman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23
on June 16, 1976, otherwise known as the Labour Law for the Private Sector
(Records, Vol. 18). This decree took effect on August 16, 1976. Some of the
provisions of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the complainantsappellants are as follows (italics supplied only for emphasis):
Art. 79: . . . A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour
equivalent to his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twentyfive per centum thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a
minimum of fifty per centum thereof for hours worked during the
night which shall be deemed to being from seven o'clock in the
evening until seven o'clock in the morning. . . .
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
. . . an employer may require a worker, with his consent, to work on
his weekly day of rest if circumstances so require and in respect of
which an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage shall
be paid to him. . . .
Art. 81: . . . When conditions of work require the worker to work on
any official holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to
150% of his normal wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year's continuous
service with his employer shall be entitled to leave on full pay for a
period of not less than 21 days for each year increased to a period
not less than 28 days after five continuous years of service.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in
respect of the proportion of his service in that year.
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite
duration may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the
other party thirty days' prior notice before such termination, in writing,
in respect of monthly paid workers and fifteen days' notice in respect
of other workers. The party terminating a contract without giving the
required notice shall pay to the other party compensation equivalent

to the amount of wages payable to the worker for the period of such
notice or the unexpired portion thereof.
Art. 111: . . . the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon
termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his
employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days' wages for each
year of the first three years of service and of one month's wages for
each year of service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to
payment of leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to
the period of his service completed within a year.
All the individual complainants-appellants have already been
repatriated to the Philippines at the time of the filing of these cases
(R.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 59-65).
IV
The issues raised before and resolved by the NLRC were:
First: Whether or not complainants are entitled to the benefits provided by Amiri
Decree No. 23 of Bahrain;
(a) Whether or not the complainants who have worked in Bahrain are
entitled to the above-mentioned benefits.
(b) Whether or not Art. 44 of the same Decree (allegedly prescribing a
more favorable treatment of alien employees) bars complainants from
enjoying its benefits.
Second: Assuming that Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain is applicable in these
cases, whether or not complainants' claim for the benefits provided therein have
prescribed.
Third: Whether or not the instant cases qualify as a class suit.
Fourth: Whether or not the proceedings conducted by the POEA, as well as the
decision that is the subject of these appeals, conformed with the requirements of due
process;
(a) Whether or not the respondent-appellant was denied its right to
due process;
(b) Whether or not the admission of evidence by the POEA after
these cases were submitted for decision was valid;
(c) Whether or not the POEA acquired jurisdiction over Brown & Root
International, Inc.;
(d) Whether or not the judgment awards are supported by substantial
evidence;

(e) Whether or not the awards based on the averages and formula
presented by the complainants-appellants are supported by
substantial evidence;
(f) Whether or not the POEA awarded sums beyond what the
complainants-appellants prayed for; and, if so, whether or not these
awards are valid.
Fifth: Whether or not the POEA erred in holding respondents AIBC and Brown &
Root jointly are severally liable for the judgment awards despite the alleged finding
that the former was the employer of the complainants;
(a) Whether or not the POEA has acquired jurisdiction over Brown &
Root;
(b) Whether or not the undisputed fact that AIBC was a licensed
construction contractor precludes a finding that Brown & Root is liable
for complainants claims.
Sixth: Whether or not the POEA Administrator's failure to hold respondents in
default constitutes a reversible error.
Seventh: Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in dismissing the following
claims:
a. Unexpired portion of contract;
b. Interest earnings of Travel and Reserve Fund;
c. Retirement and Savings Plan benefits;
d. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay;
e. Area Differential Pay;
f. Accrued interests on all the unpaid benefits;
g. Salary differential pay;
h. Wage differential pay;
i. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to SSS;
j. Refund of withholding tax not remitted to BIR;
k. Fringe benefits under B & R's "A Summary of Employee Benefits"
(Annex "Q" of Amended Complaint);
l. Moral and exemplary damages;

m. Attorney's fees of at least ten percent of the judgment award;

n. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license to
recruit of AIBC and the accreditation of B & R issued by POEA;
o. Penalty for violations of Article 34 (prohibited practices), not
excluding reportorial requirements thereof.
Eighth: Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in not dismissing POEA
Case No. (L) 86-65-460 on the ground of multiplicity of suits (G.R. Nos. 10491114, Rollo, pp. 25-29, 51-55).
Anent the first issue, NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence
governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in evidence a simple copy of the
Bahrain's Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector). NLRC invoked Article
221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, vesting on the Commission ample discretion to use every
and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case without regard to the technicalities of
law or procedure. NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that the Amiri Decree No. 23, being
more favorable and beneficial to the workers, should form part of the overseas employment contract
of the complainants.
NLRC, however, held that the Amiri Decree No. 23 applied only to the claimants, who worked in
Bahrain, and set aside awards of the POEA Administrator in favor of the claimants, who worked
elsewhere.
On the second issue, NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the
complainants was three years, as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and
not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year as
provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
On the third issue, NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that the labor cases cannot be treated
as a class suit for the simple reason that not all the complainants worked in Bahrain and therefore,
the subject matter of the action, the claims arising from the Bahrain law, is not of common or general
interest to all the complainants.
On the fourth issue, NLRC found at least three infractions of the cardinal rules of administrative due
process: namely, (1) the failure of the POEA Administrator to consider the evidence presented by
AIBC and BRII; (2) some findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) some
of the evidence upon which the decision was based were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII during the
hearing.
On the fifth issue, NLRC sustained the ruling of the POEA Administrator that BRII and AIBC are
solidarily liable for the claims of the complainants and held that BRII was the actual employer of the
complainants, or at the very least, the indirect employer, with AIBC as the labor contractor.
NLRC also held that jurisdiction over BRII was acquired by the POEA Administrator through the
summons served on AIBC, its local agent.
On the sixth issue, NLRC held that the POEA Administrator was correct in denying the Motion to
Declare AIBC in default.

On the seventh issue, which involved other money claims not based on the Amiri Decree No. 23,
NLRC ruled:
(1) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the claims for refund of the
SSS premiums and refund of withholding taxes and the claimants should file their
claims for said refund with the appropriate government agencies;
(2) the claimants failed to establish that they are entitled to the claims which are not
based on the overseas employment contracts nor the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976;
(3) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over claims for moral and
exemplary damages and nonetheless, the basis for granting said damages was not
established;
(4) that the claims for salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their contract
may be allowed if filed within the three-year prescriptive period;
(5) that the allegation that complainants were prematurely repatriated prior to the
expiration of their overseas contract was not established; and
(6) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the complaint for the
suspension or cancellation of the AIBC's recruitment license and the cancellation of
the accreditation of BRII.
NLRC passed sub silencio the last issue, the claim that POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460 should have
been dismissed on the ground that the claimants in said case were also claimants in POEA Case
No. (L) 84-06-555. Instead of dismissing POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460, the POEA just resolved the
corresponding claims in POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-555. In other words, the POEA did not pass upon
the same claims twice.
V
G.R. No. 104776
Claimants in G.R. No. 104776 based their petition for certiorari on the following grounds:
(1) that they were deprived by NLRC and the POEA of their right to a speedy
disposition of their cases as guaranteed by Section 16, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The POEA Administrator allowed private respondents to file their
answers in two years (on June 19, 1987) after the filing of the original complaint (on
April 2, 1985) and NLRC, in total disregard of its own rules, affirmed the action of the
POEA Administrator;
(2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have declared AIBC and BRII in
default and should have rendered summary judgment on the basis of the pleadings
and evidence submitted by claimants;
(3) the NLRC and POEA Administrator erred in not holding that the labor cases filed
by AIBC and BRII cannot be considered a class suit;
(4) that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims is ten years; and

(5) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have dismissed POEA Case No.
L-86-05-460, the case filed by Atty. Florante de Castro (Rollo, pp. 31-40).
AIBC and BRII, commenting on the petition in G.R. No. 104776, argued:
(1) that they were not responsible for the delay in the disposition of the labor cases,
considering the great difficulty of getting all the records of the more than 1,500
claimants, the piece-meal filing of the complaints and the addition of hundreds of new
claimants by petitioners;
(2) that considering the number of complaints and claimants, it was impossible to
prepare the answers within the ten-day period provided in the NLRC Rules, that
when the motion to declare AIBC in default was filed on July 19, 1987, said party had
already filed its answer, and that considering the staggering amount of the claims
(more than US$50,000,000.00) and the complicated issues raised by the parties, the
ten-day rule to answer was not fair and reasonable;
(3) that the claimants failed to refute NLRC's finding that
there was no common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy
which was the applicability of the Amiri Decree No. 23. Likewise, the nature of the
claims varied, some being based on salaries pertaining to the unexpired portion of
the contracts while others being for pure money claims. Each claimant demanded
separate claims peculiar only to himself and depending upon the particular
circumstances obtaining in his case;
(4) that the prescriptive period for filing the claims is that prescribed by Article 291 of
the Labor Code of the Philippines (three years) and not the one prescribed by Article
1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (ten years); and
(5) that they are not concerned with the issue of whether POEA Case No. L-86-05460 should be dismissed, this being a private quarrel between the two labor lawyers
(Rollo, pp. 292-305).
Attorney's Lien
On November 12, 1992, Atty. Gerardo A. del Mundo moved to strike out the joint manifestations and
motions of AIBC and BRII dated September 2 and 11, 1992, claiming that all the claimants who
entered into the compromise agreements subject of said manifestations and motions were his clients
and that Atty. Florante M. de Castro had no right to represent them in said agreements. He also
claimed that the claimants were paid less than the award given them by NLRC; that Atty. De Castro
collected additional attorney's fees on top of the 25% which he was entitled to receive; and that the
consent of the claimants to the compromise agreements and quitclaims were procured by fraud
(G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 838-810). In the Resolution dated November 23, 1992, the Court
denied the motion to strike out the Joint Manifestations and Motions dated September 2 and 11,
1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 608-609).
On December 14, 1992, Atty. Del Mundo filed a "Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorney's Lien,"
alleging that the claimants who entered into compromise agreements with AIBC and BRII with the
assistance of Atty. De Castro, had all signed a retainer agreement with his law firm (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 623-624; 838-1535).

Contempt of Court
On February 18, 1993, an omnibus motion was filed by Atty. Del Mundo to cite Atty. De Castro and
Atty. Katz Tierra for contempt of court and for violation of Canons 1, 15 and 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The said lawyers allegedly misled this Court, by making it appear that
the claimants who entered into the compromise agreements were represented by Atty. De Castro,
when in fact they were represented by Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1560-1614).
On September 23, 1994, Atty. Del Mundo reiterated his charges against Atty. De Castro for unethical
practices and moved for the voiding of the quitclaims submitted by some of the claimants.
G.R. Nos. 104911-14
The claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 based their petition for certiorari on the grounds that NLRC
gravely abused its discretion when it: (1) applied the three-year prescriptive period under the Labor
Code of the Philippines; and (2) it denied the claimant's formula based on an average overtime pay
of three hours a day (Rollo, pp. 18-22).
The claimants argue that said method was proposed by BRII itself during the negotiation for an
amicable settlement of their money claims in Bahrain as shown in the Memorandum dated April 16,
1983 of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain (Rollo, pp. 21-22).
BRII and AIBC, in their Comment, reiterated their contention in G.R. No. 104776 that the prescriptive
period in the Labor Code of the Philippines, a special law, prevails over that provided in the Civil
Code of the Philippines, a general law.
As to the memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain on the method of computing the overtime
pay, BRII and AIBC claimed that they were not bound by what appeared therein, because such
memorandum was proposed by a subordinate Bahrain official and there was no showing that it was
approved by the Bahrain Minister of Labor. Likewise, they claimed that the averaging method was
discussed in the course of the negotiation for the amicable settlement of the dispute and any offer
made by a party therein could not be used as an admission by him (Rollo, pp. 228-236).
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
In G.R. Nos. 105029-32, BRII and AIBC claim that NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it: (1)
enforced the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and not the terms of the employment
contracts; (2) granted claims for holiday, overtime and leave indemnity pay and other benefits, on
evidence admitted in contravention of petitioner's constitutional right to due process; and (3) ordered
the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings for the 683 claimants whose claims had been
dismissed for lack of proof by the POEA Administrator or NLRC itself. Lastly, they allege that
assuming that the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 was applicable, NLRC erred when it did not apply the
one-year prescription provided in said law (Rollo, pp. 29-30).
VI
G.R. No. 104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14; G.R. Nos. 105029-32
All the petitions raise the common issue of prescription although they disagreed as to the time that
should be embraced within the prescriptive period.

To the POEA Administrator, the prescriptive period was ten years, applying Article 1144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. NLRC believed otherwise, fixing the prescriptive period at three years as
provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 and G.R. Nos. 104911-14, invoking different grounds, insisted that
NLRC erred in ruling that the prescriptive period applicable to the claims was three years, instead of
ten years, as found by the POEA Administrator.
The Solicitor General expressed his personal view that the prescriptive period was one year as
prescribed by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 but he deferred to the ruling of NLRC that Article 291
of the Labor Code of the Philippines was the operative law.
The POEA Administrator held the view that:
These money claims (under Article 291 of the Labor Code) refer to those arising from
the employer's violation of the employee's right as provided by the Labor Code.
In the instant case, what the respondents violated are not the rights of the workers as
provided by the Labor Code, but the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 issued in
Bahrain, which ipso factoamended the worker's contracts of employment.
Respondents consciously failed to conform to these provisions which specifically
provide for the increase of the worker's rate. It was only after June 30, 1983, four
months after the brown builders brought a suit against B & R in Bahrain for this same
claim, when respondent AIBC's contracts have undergone amendments in Bahrain
for the new hires/renewals (Respondent's Exhibit 7).
Hence, premises considered, the applicable law of prescription to this instant case is
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
Art. 1144. The following actions may be brought within ten years from
the time the cause of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
Thus, herein money claims of the complainants against the respondents shall
prescribe in ten years from August 16, 1976. Inasmuch as all claims were filed within
the ten-year prescriptive period, no claim suffered the infirmity of being prescribed
(G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, 89-90).
In overruling the POEA Administrator, and holding that the prescriptive period is three years as
provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the NLRC argued as follows:
The Labor Code provides that "all money claims arising from employer-employee
relations . . . shall be filed within three years from the time the cause of action
accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred" (Art. 291, Labor Code, as
amended). This three-year prescriptive period shall be the one applied here and
which should be reckoned from the date of repatriation of each individual
complainant, considering the fact that the case is having (sic) filed in this country. We
do not agree with the POEA Administrator that this three-year prescriptive period

applies only to money claims specifically recoverable under the Philippine Labor
Code. Article 291 gives no such indication. Likewise, We can not consider
complainants' cause/s of action to have accrued from a violation of their employment
contracts. There was no violation; the claims arise from the benefits of the law of the
country where they worked. (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
90-91).
Anent the applicability of the one-year prescriptive period as provided by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976, NLRC opined that the applicability of said law was one of characterization, i.e., whether to
characterize the foreign law on prescription or statute of limitation as "substantive" or "procedural."
NLRC cited the decision in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955],
where the issue was the applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the State of New
York for claims arising from said Code. In said case, the claims would have prescribed under the
Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as it was not "specifically intended to be
substantive," hence, the prescriptive period provided in the law of the forum should apply. The Court
observed:
. . . And where, as here, we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a foreign
country, and it is not clear on the face of the statute that its purpose was to limit the
enforceability, outside as well as within the foreign country concerned, of the
substantive rights to which the statute pertains, we think that as a yardstick for
determining whether that was the purpose this test is the most satisfactory one. It
does not lead American courts into the necessity of examining into the unfamiliar
peculiarities and refinements of different foreign legal systems. . .
The court further noted:
xxx xxx xxx
Applying that test here it appears to us that the libelant is entitled to succeed, for the
respondents have failed to satisfy us that the Panamanian period of limitation in
question was specifically aimed against the particular rights which the libelant seeks
to enforce. The Panama Labor Code is a statute having broad objectives, viz: "The
present Code regulates the relations between capital and labor, placing them on a
basis of social justice, so that, without injuring any of the parties, there may be
guaranteed for labor the necessary conditions for a normal life and to capital an
equitable return to its investment." In pursuance of these objectives the Code gives
laborers various rights against their employers. Article 623 establishes the period of
limitation for all such rights, except certain ones which are enumerated in Article 621.
And there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Panamanian legislature gave
special consideration to the impact of Article 623 upon the particular rights sought to
be enforced here, as distinguished from the other rights to which that Article is also
applicable. Were we confronted with the question of whether the limitation period of
Article 621 (which carves out particular rights to be governed by a shorter limitation
period) is to be regarded as "substantive" or "procedural" under the rule of "specifity"
we might have a different case; but here on the surface of things we appear to be
dealing with a "broad," and not a "specific," statute of limitations (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp.
92-94).

Claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 are of the view that Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, which was applied by NLRC, refers only to claims "arising from the employer's violation
of the employee's right as provided by the Labor Code." They assert that their claims are based on
the violation of their employment contracts, as amended by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and
therefore the claims may be brought within ten years as provided by Article 1144 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines (Rollo, G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp.
18-21). To bolster their contention, they cite PALEA v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976).
AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have prescribed under the Amiri Decree No.
23 of 1976, argue that there is in force in the Philippines a "borrowing law," which is Section 48 of
the Code of Civil Procedure and that where such kind of law exists, it takes precedence over the
common-law conflicts rule (G.R. No. 104776,Rollo, pp. 45-46).
First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse
of one year from the date of the expiry of the contract. (G.R. Nos. 105029-31, Rollo,
p. 226).
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such
as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed
by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law
(Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International Law, 131 [1979]).
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed
either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.
Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the American court applied the statute of
limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no showing that
the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a
procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum on prescription of actions.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant
when the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the practical effect of
treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 152-153
[1938]). A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations
to the pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are several
kinds of "borrowing statutes," one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where
it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it
(Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure
is of this kind. Said Section provides:
If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is
barred, it is also barred in the Philippines Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2270 of
said Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedures as to which were
inconsistent with it. There is no provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent

with or contradictory to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws
104 [7th ed.]).
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio
vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No.
23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public policy
(Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To
enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in
question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized that:
The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. (Sec.
10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights
of workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).
In article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized
and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
Having determined that the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law, the next question is
whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the claims is three years, as provided by the
Labor Code or ten years, as provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The claimants are of the view that the applicable provision is Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which provides:
The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of
action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable provision is Article 291 of the Labor Code of
the Philippines, which in pertinent part provides:
Money claims-all money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing
during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time
the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred.
xxx xxx xxx

The case of Philippine Air Lines Employees Association v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244
(1976) invoked by the claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 is inapplicable to the cases at bench (Rollo,
p. 21). The said case involved the correct computation of overtime pay as provided in the collective
bargaining agreements and not the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
As noted by the Court: "That is precisely why petitioners did not make any reference as to the
computation for overtime work under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Secs. 3 and 4, CA No. 494) and
instead insisted that work computation provided in the collective bargaining agreements between the
parties be observed. Since the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written
contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(1) of the New
Civil Code should govern."
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended by R.A. No. 19933) provides:
Any action to enforce any cause of action under this Act shall be commenced within
three years after the cause of action accrued otherwise such action shall be forever
barred, . . . .
The court further explained:
The three-year prescriptive period fixed in the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as
amended) will apply, if the claim for differentials for overtime work is solely based on
said law, and not on a collective bargaining agreement or any other contract. In the
instant case, the claim for overtime compensation is not so much because of
Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended but because the claim is demandable right
of the employees, by reason of the above-mentioned collective bargaining
agreement.
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive period for filing "actions to enforce
any cause of action under said law." On the other hand, Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines provides the prescriptive period for filing "money claims arising from employer-employee
relations." The claims in the cases at bench all arose from the employer-employee relations, which is
broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law or from the collective bargaining agreement.
The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of
the Labor Code of the Philippines applies only to money claims specifically recoverable under said
Code, does not find support in the plain language of the provision. Neither is the contention of the
claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims "arising from the employer's
violation of the employee's right," as provided by the Labor Code supported by the facial reading of
the provision.
VII
G.R. No. 104776
A. As to the first two grounds for the petition in G.R. No. 104776, claimants aver: (1) that while their
complaints were filed on June 6, 1984 with POEA, the case was decided only on January 30, 1989,
a clear denial of their right to a speedy disposition of the case; and (2) that NLRC and the POEA
Administrator should have declared AIBC and BRII in default (Rollo, pp.
31-35).

Claimants invoke a new provision incorporated in the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
It is true that the constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases,
and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution,
any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.
However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987), "speedy disposition of cases" is
a relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial" accorded to the accused in all
criminal proceedings, "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays
and depends upon the circumstances of each case. What the Constitution prohibits are
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
Caballero laid down the factors that may be taken into consideration in determining whether or not
the right to a "speedy disposition of cases" has been violated, thus:
In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has been violated,
certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other. These are
length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and
prejudice caused by the delay. The same factors may also be considered in
answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially charged with the
administration of justice has violated the speedy disposition of cases.
Likewise, in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298, (1991), we held:
It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the
right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justified motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Since July 25, 1984 or a month after AIBC and BRII were served with a copy of the amended
complaint, claimants had been asking that AIBC and BRII be declared in default for failure to file their
answers within the ten-day period provided in Section 1, Rule III of Book VI of the Rules and
Regulations of the POEA. At that time, there was a pending motion of AIBC and BRII to strike out of
the records the amended complaint and the "Compliance" of claimants to the order of the POEA,
requiring them to submit a bill of particulars.
The cases at bench are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, such that their final disposition in the
administrative level after seven years from their inception, cannot be said to be attended by
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays as to violate the constitutional rights to a speedy
disposition of the cases of complainants.
The amended complaint filed on June 6, 1984 involved a total of 1,767 claimants. Said complaint
had undergone several amendments, the first being on April 3, 1985.

The claimants were hired on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were deployed in different
areas, one group in and the other groups outside of, Bahrain. The monetary claims totalling more
than US$65 million according to Atty. Del Mundo, included:
1. Unexpired portion of contract;
2. Interest earnings of Travel and Fund;
3. Retirement and Savings Plan benefit;
4. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay;
5. Area Differential pay;
6. Accrued Interest of all the unpaid benefits;
7. Salary differential pay;
8. Wage Differential pay;
9. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to Social Security System;
10. Refund of Withholding Tax not remitted to Bureau of Internal Revenue (B.I.R.);
11. Fringe Benefits under Brown & Root's "A Summary of Employees Benefits
consisting of 43 pages (Annex "Q" of Amended Complaint);
12. Moral and Exemplary Damages;
13. Attorney's fees of at least ten percent of amounts;
14. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license to recruit of AIBC and
issued by the POEA; and
15. Penalty for violation of Article 34 (Prohibited practices) not excluding reportorial
requirements thereof (NLRC Resolution, September 2, 1991, pp. 18-19; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 73-74).
Inasmuch as the complaint did not allege with sufficient definiteness and clarity of some facts, the
claimants were ordered to comply with the motion of AIBC for a bill of particulars. When claimants
filed their "Compliance and Manifestation," AIBC moved to strike out the complaint from the records
for failure of claimants to submit a proper bill of particulars. While the POEA Administrator denied the
motion to strike out the complaint, he ordered the claimants "to correct the deficiencies" pointed out
by AIBC.
Before an intelligent answer could be filed in response to the complaint, the records of employment
of the more than 1,700 claimants had to be retrieved from various countries in the Middle East.
Some of the records dated as far back as 1975.

The hearings on the merits of the claims before the POEA Administrator were interrupted several
times by the various appeals, first to NLRC and then to the Supreme Court.
Aside from the inclusion of additional claimants, two new cases were filed against AIBC and BRII on
October 10, 1985 (POEA Cases Nos.
L-85-10-777 and L-85-10-779). Another complaint was filed on May 29, 1986 (POEA Case No. L-8605-460). NLRC, in exasperation, noted that the exact number of claimants had never been
completely established (Resolution, Sept. 2, 1991, G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 57). All the three new
cases were consolidated with POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.
NLRC blamed the parties and their lawyers for the delay in terminating the proceedings, thus:
These cases could have been spared the long and arduous route towards resolution
had the parties and their counsel been more interested in pursuing the truth and the
merits of the claims rather than exhibiting a fanatical reliance on technicalities.
Parties and counsel have made these cases a litigation of emotion. The
intransigence of parties and counsel is remarkable. As late as last month, this
Commission made a last and final attempt to bring the counsel of all the parties (this
Commission issued a special order directing respondent Brown & Root's resident
agent/s to appear) to come to a more conciliatory stance. Even this failed (Rollo,
p. 58).
The squabble between the lawyers of claimants added to the delay in the disposition of the cases, to
the lament of NLRC, which complained:
It is very evident from the records that the protagonists in these consolidated cases
appear to be not only the individual complainants, on the one hand, and AIBC and
Brown & Root, on the other hand. The two lawyers for the complainants, Atty.
Gerardo Del Mundo and Atty. Florante De Castro, have yet to settle the right of
representation, each one persistently claiming to appear in behalf of most of the
complainants. As a result, there are two appeals by the complainants. Attempts by
this Commission to resolve counsels' conflicting claims of their respective authority to
represent the complainants prove futile. The bickerings by these two counsels are
reflected in their pleadings. In the charges and countercharges of falsification of
documents and signatures, and in the disbarment proceedings by one against the
other. All these have, to a large extent, abetted in confounding the issues raised in
these cases, jumble the presentation of evidence, and even derailed the prospects of
an amicable settlement. It would not be far-fetched to imagine that both counsel,
unwittingly, perhaps, painted a rainbow for the complainants, with the proverbial pot
of gold at its end containing more than US$100 million, the aggregate of the claims in
these cases. It is, likewise, not improbable that their misplaced zeal and exuberance
caused them to throw all caution to the wind in the matter of elementary rules of
procedure and evidence (Rollo, pp. 58-59).
Adding to the confusion in the proceedings before NLRC, is the listing of some of the complainants
in both petitions filed by the two lawyers. As noted by NLRC, "the problem created by this situation is
that if one of the two petitions is dismissed, then the parties and the public respondents would not
know which claim of which petitioner was dismissed and which was not."
B. Claimants insist that all their claims could properly be consolidated in a "class suit" because "all
the named complainants have similar money claims and similar rights sought irrespective of whether

they worked in Bahrain, United Arab Emirates or in Abu Dhabi, Libya or in any part of the Middle
East" (Rollo, pp. 35-38).
A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
court (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 12).
While all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain Law, many of the claimants worked
outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia and Malaysia under different
terms and conditions of employment.
NLRC and the POEA Administrator are correct in their stance that inasmuch as the first requirement
of a class suit is not present (common or general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State of
Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to file their claims in
a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of the claims is the same (for
employee's benefits), there is no common question of law or fact. While some claims are based on
the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked in that country, but were deployed
elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is interested only in his own demand and not in the claims of the
other employees of defendants. The named claimants have a special or particular interest in specific
benefits completely different from the benefits in which the other named claimants and those
included as members of a "class" are claiming (Berses v. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473 [1913]). It appears
that each claimant is only interested in collecting his own claims. A claimants has no concern in
protecting the interests of the other claimants as shown by the fact, that hundreds of them have
abandoned their co-claimants and have entered into separate compromise settlements of their
respective claims. A principle basic to the concept of "class suit" is that plaintiffs brought on the
record must fairly represent and protect the interests of the others (Dimayuga v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 101 Phil. 590 [1957]). For this matter, the claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be
allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial proceeding. The most that can be accorded to them under
the Rules of Court is to be allowed to join as plaintiffs in one complaint (Revised Rules of Court, Rule
3, Sec. 6).
The Court is extra-cautious in allowing class suits because they are the exceptions to the
condition sine qua non, requiring the joinder of all indispensable parties.
In an improperly instituted class suit, there would be no problem if the decision secured is favorable
to the plaintiffs. The problem arises when the decision is adverse to them, in which case the others
who were impleaded by their self-appointed representatives, would surely claim denial of due
process.
C. The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 also urged that the POEA Administrator and NLRC should
have declared Atty. Florante De Castro guilty of "forum shopping, ambulance chasing activities,
falsification, duplicity and other unprofessional activities" and his appearances as counsel for some
of the claimants as illegal (Rollo, pp. 38-40).
The Anti-Forum Shopping Rule (Revised Circular No. 28-91) is intended to put a stop to the practice
of some parties of filing multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues, with the result
that the courts or agencies have to resolve the same issues. Said Rule, however, applies only to
petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. It is entitled "Additional
Requirements For Petitions Filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals To Prevent
Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of Petitioners and Complainants." The first sentence of the circular

expressly states that said circular applies to an governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals.
While Administrative Circular No. 04-94 extended the application of the anti-forum shopping rule to
the lower courts and administrative agencies, said circular took effect only on April 1, 1994.
POEA and NLRC could not have entertained the complaint for unethical conduct against Atty. De
Castro because NLRC and POEA have no jurisdiction to investigate charges of unethical conduct of
lawyers.
Attorney's Lien
The "Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorney's Lien" dated December 14, 1992 was filed by Atty.
Gerardo A. Del Mundo to protect his claim for attorney's fees for legal services rendered in favor of
the claimants (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 841-844).
A statement of a claim for a charging lien shall be filed with the court or administrative agency which
renders and executes the money judgment secured by the lawyer for his clients. The lawyer shall
cause written notice thereof to be delivered to his clients and to the adverse party (Revised Rules of
Court, Rule 138, Sec. 37). The statement of the claim for the charging lien of Atty. Del Mundo should
have been filed with the administrative agency that rendered and executed the judgment.
Contempt of Court
The complaint of Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to cite Atty. Florante De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be filed in a separate and appropriate
proceeding.
G.R. No. 104911-14
Claimants charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in not accepting their formula of "Three
Hours Average Daily Overtime" in computing the overtime payments. They claim that it was BRII
itself which proposed the formula during the negotiations for the settlement of their claims in Bahrain
and therefore it is in estoppel to disclaim said offer (Rollo, pp. 21-22).
Claimants presented a Memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain dated April 16, 1983, which
in pertinent part states:
After the perusal of the memorandum of the Vice President and the Area Manager,
Middle East, of Brown & Root Co. and the Summary of the compensation offered by
the Company to the employees in respect of the difference of pay of the wages of the
overtime and the difference of vacation leave and the perusal of the documents
attached thereto i.e., minutes of the meetings between the Representative of the
employees and the management of the Company, the complaint filed by the
employees on 14/2/83 where they have claimed as hereinabove stated, sample of
the Service Contract executed between one of the employees and the company
through its agent in (sic)Philippines, Asia International Builders Corporation where it
has been provided for 48 hours of work per week and an annual leave of 12 days
and an overtime wage of 1 & 1/4 of the normal hourly wage.
xxx xxx xxx

The Company in its computation reached the following averages:

A. 1. The average duration of the actual service of the employee is 35 months for the
Philippino (sic) employees . . . .
2. The average wage per hour for the Philippino (sic) employee is US$2.69 . . . .
3. The average hours for the overtime is 3 hours plus in all public holidays and
weekends.
4. Payment of US$8.72 per months (sic) of service as compensation for the
difference of the wages of the overtime done for each Philippino (sic) employee . . .
(Rollo, p.22).
BRII and AIBC countered: (1) that the Memorandum was not prepared by them but by a subordinate
official in the Bahrain Department of Labor; (2) that there was no showing that the Bahrain Minister
of Labor had approved said memorandum; and (3) that the offer was made in the course of the
negotiation for an amicable settlement of the claims and therefore it was not admissible in evidence
to prove that anything is due to the claimants.
While said document was presented to the POEA without observing the rule on presenting official
documents of a foreign government as provided in Section 24, Rule 132 of the 1989 Revised Rules
on Evidence, it can be admitted in evidence in proceedings before an administrative body. The
opposing parties have a copy of the said memorandum, and they could easily verify its authenticity
and accuracy.
The admissibility of the offer of compromise made by BRII as contained in the memorandum is
another matter. Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, an offer to
settle a claim is not an admission that anything is due.
Said Rule provides:
Offer of compromise not admissible. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not
an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
This Rule is not only a rule of procedure to avoid the cluttering of the record with unwanted evidence
but a statement of public policy. There is great public interest in having the protagonists settle their
differences amicable before these ripen into litigation. Every effort must be taken to encourage them
to arrive at a settlement. The submission of offers and counter-offers in the negotiation table is a
step in the right direction. But to bind a party to his offers, as what claimants would make this Court
do, would defeat the salutary purpose of the Rule.
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
A. NLRC applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than those
stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that "where the
laws of the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host
country shall form part of the overseas employment contract." It quoted with approval the
observation of the POEA Administrator that ". . . in labor proceedings, all doubts in the
implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations shall be
resolved in favor of labor" (Rollo, pp. 90-94).

AIBC and BRII claim that NLRC acted capriciously and whimsically when it refused to enforce the
overseas-employment contracts, which became the law of the parties. They contend that the
principle that a law is deemed to be a part of a contract applies only to provisions of Philippine law in
relation to contracts executed in the Philippines.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided
that the laws of the host country became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and
conditions more favorable that those stipulated therein. It was stipulated in said contracts that:
The Employee agrees that while in the employ of the Employer, he will not engage in
any other business or occupation, nor seek employment with anyone other than the
Employer; that he shall devote his entire time and attention and his best energies,
and abilities to the performance of such duties as may be assigned to him by the
Employer; that he shall at all times be subject to the direction and control of the
Employer; and that the benefits provided to Employee hereunder are substituted for
and in lieu of all other benefits provided by any applicable law, provided of course,
that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host country
regulation or custom, it being understood that should applicable laws establish that
fringe benefits, or other such benefits additional to the compensation herein agreed
cannot be waived, Employee agrees that such compensation will be adjusted
downward so that the total compensation hereunder, plus the non-waivable benefits
shall be equivalent to the compensation herein agreed (Rollo, pp. 352-353).
The overseas-employment contracts could have been drafted more felicitously. While a part thereof
provides that the compensation to the employee may be "adjusted downward so that the total
computation (thereunder) plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation"
therein agreed, another part of the same provision categorically states "that total remuneration and
benefits do not fall below that of the host country regulation and custom."
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII,
the parties that drafted it (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Margarine-Verkaufs-Union, 93 SCRA 257
[1979]).
Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the
party who caused the obscurity.
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared
form containing the stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely "take it or
leave it." The presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against the other and that the
employees signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power (Fieldmen's
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Songco, 25 SCRA 70 [1968]).
Applying the said legal precepts, we read the overseas-employment contracts in question as
adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof.
The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed (Cheshire, Private
International Law, 187 [7th ed.]). In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a "system" to regulate
the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the
formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth (16 Am Jur 2d,
150-161).

Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific
provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their contract "as a set of terms."
By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign
contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of
contractual terms deemed written in the contract (Anton, Private International Law, 197 [1967]; Dicey
and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 702-703, [8th ed.]).
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties (Reese, Choice of Law in Torts
and Contracts, 16 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1, 21 [1977]). Such party expectation is
protected by giving effect to the parties' own choice of the applicable law (Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co.,
Inc., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 [1957]). The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship to the
parties or their transaction (Scoles and Hayes, Conflict of Law 644-647 [1982]). There is no question
that the contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law
because the services were rendered in that country.
In Norse Management Co. (PTE) v. National Seamen Board, 117 SCRA 486 (1982), the
"Employment Agreement," between Norse Management Co. and the late husband of the private
respondent, expressly provided that in the event of illness or injury to the employee arising out of
and in the course of his employment and not due to his own misconduct, "compensation shall be
paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitation of the Workmen's Compensation
Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Worker's Insurance Act of registry of the vessel,
whichever is greater." Since the laws of Singapore, the place of registry of the vessel in which the
late husband of private respondent served at the time of his death, granted a better compensation
package, we applied said foreign law in preference to the terms of the contract.
The case of Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 135
SCRA 278 (1985), relied upon by AIBC and BRII is inapposite to the facts of the cases at bench. The
issue in that case was whether the amount of the death compensation of a Filipino seaman should
be determined under the shipboard employment contract executed in the Philippines or the
Hongkong law. Holding that the shipboard employment contract was controlling, the court
differentiated said case from Norse Management Co. in that in the latter case there was an express
stipulation in the employment contract that the foreign law would be applicable if it afforded greater
compensation.
B. AIBC and BRII claim that they were denied by NLRC of their right to due process when said
administrative agency granted Friday-pay differential, holiday-pay differential, annual-leave
differential and leave indemnity pay to the claimants listed in Annex B of the Resolution. At first,
NLRC reversed the resolution of the POEA Administrator granting these benefits on a finding that the
POEA Administrator failed to consider the evidence presented by AIBC and BRII, that some findings
of fact of the POEA Administrator were not supported by the evidence, and that some of the
evidence were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 35-36; 106-107). But instead of remanding
the case to the POEA Administrator for a new hearing, which means further delay in the termination
of the case, NLRC decided to pass upon the validity of the claims itself. It is this procedure that AIBC
and BRII complain of as being irregular and a "reversible error."
They pointed out that NLRC took into consideration evidence submitted on appeal, the same
evidence which NLRC found to have been "unilaterally submitted by the claimants and not disclosed
to the adverse parties" (Rollo, pp. 37-39).
NLRC noted that so many pieces of evidentiary matters were submitted to the POEA administrator
by the claimants after the cases were deemed submitted for resolution and which were taken
cognizance of by the POEA Administrator in resolving the cases. While AIBC and BRII had no

opportunity to refute said evidence of the claimants before the POEA Administrator, they had all the
opportunity to rebut said evidence and to present their
counter-evidence before NLRC. As a matter of fact, AIBC and BRII themselves were able to present
before NLRC additional evidence which they failed to present before the POEA Administrator.
Under Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, NLRC is enjoined to "use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process."
In deciding to resolve the validity of certain claims on the basis of the evidence of both parties
submitted before the POEA Administrator and NLRC, the latter considered that it was not expedient
to remand the cases to the POEA Administrator for that would only prolong the already protracted
legal controversies.
Even the Supreme Court has decided appealed cases on the merits instead of remanding them to
the trial court for the reception of evidence, where the same can be readily determined from the
uncontroverted facts on record (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 190 SCRA 653 [1990]; Pagdonsalan v. National Labor Relations Commission, 127 SCRA 463
[1984]).
C. AIBC and BRII charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the POEA
Administrator to hold new hearings for 683 claimants listed in Annex D of the Resolution dated
September 2, 1991 whose claims had been denied by the POEA Administrator "for lack of proof" and
for 69 claimants listed in Annex E of the same Resolution, whose claims had been found by NLRC
itself as not "supported by evidence" (Rollo, pp. 41-45).
NLRC based its ruling on Article 218(c) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which empowers it "[to]
conduct investigation for the determination of a question, matter or controversy, within its jurisdiction,
. . . ."
It is the posture of AIBC and BRII that NLRC has no authority under Article 218(c) to remand a case
involving claims which had already been dismissed because such provision contemplates only
situations where there is still a question or controversy to be resolved (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
A principle well embedded in Administrative Law is that the technical rules of procedure and
evidence do not apply to the proceedings conducted by administrative agencies (First Asian
Transport & Shipping Agency, Inc. v. Ople, 142 SCRA 542 [1986]; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc.
v. Ople, 152 SCRA 219 [1987]). This principle is enshrined in Article 221 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines and is now the bedrock of proceedings before NLRC.
Notwithstanding the non-applicability of technical rules of procedure and evidence in administrative
proceedings, there are cardinal rules which must be observed by the hearing officers in order to
comply with the due process requirements of the Constitution. These cardinal rules are collated
in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
VIII
The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on the grounds that
NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
questioned orders. We find no such abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, all the three petitions are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
ANNEX A
LIST OF CLAIMANTS WHO SIGNED QUITCLAIMS
Bienvenido Cadalin Ardon Ello
Antonio Acupan Josefino R. Enano
Benjamin Alejandre Rolando E. Espiritu
Wilfredo Aligada Patricio L. Garcia Jr.
Robert Batica Felino M. Jocson
Enrico Belen Eduardo S. Kolimlim
Guillermo Cabeza Emmanuel C. Labella
Rodolfo Cagatan Ernesto S. Lising
Francisco De Guzman Edilberto G. Magat
Ignacio De Vera Victoriano L. Matilla
Ernesto De la Cruz Renato V. Morada
Reynaldo Dizon Ildefonso C. Muoz
Ricardo Ebrada Herbert G. Ng
Antonio Ejercito Reynado Oczon
Eduardo Espiritu Romeo Orial
Ernesto Espiritu Ricardo Paguio
Rodolfo Espiritu Emilio Pakingan
Oligario Francisco Ernesto S. Pangan
Antonio Jocson Albert L. Quinto
Alejandro Olorino Romulo M. Reyes
Efren Lirio Leonilo Tiposo
Noel Martinez Manual P. Villanueva
Francis Mediodia Arnaldo J. Alonzo
Luciano Melendez Pastor M. Aquino
Reymundo Milay Ramon Castro
Jose Pancho Graciano Isla
Modesto Pin Pin Renato Matilla
Gaudencio Retana Ricardo B. Morada
Rodelio Rieta, Jr. Pacifico D. Navarro
Jose Robleza Eugenio A. Remonquillo
Nemeriano San Mateo Felix Barcena
Juanito Santos Eliseo Fajardo
Paquito Solanto Sergio S. Santiago
Conrado Solis, Jr. Antonio R. Rodriquez
Menandro Temprosa Luis Val B. Ronquillo
Maximiano Torres Teodorico C. Del Rosario
Francisco Trias Joselito C. Solante
Delfin Victoria Ricardo C. Dayrit
Gilbert Victoria Antonio P. Hilario
Domingo Villahermosa Edgardo O. Salonga
Rogelio Villanueva Dante C. Aceres
Jose M. Aban Reynaldo S. Acojido

Amorsolo S. Anading Esidro M. Aquino

Alfredo S. Balogo Rosendo M. Aquino
Ramon T. Barboza Rodolfo D. Arevalo
Felix M. Bobier Rexy De Leon Ascuncion
Jose H. Castillo Basilio Buenaventura
Emmanuel H. Castillo Alexander Bustamante
Remar R. Castrojerez Virgilio V. Butiong, Jr.
Romeo O. Cecilio Delfin Caballero
Bayani M. Dayrit Danilo M. Castro
Felizardo S. Delos Santos Franscisco O. Corvera
Nestor N. Estava Edgardo N. Dayacap
Rolando M. Garcia Napoleon S. De Luna
Angel D. Guda Benjamin E. Doza
Henry L. Jacob Renato A. Eduarte
Dante A. Matreo Clyde C. Estuye
Renato S. Melo Buenaventura M. Francisco
Resurrecion D. Nazareno Rogelio D. Guanio
Jaime C. Pollos Arnel L. Jacob
Domingo Pondales Renato S. Lising
Eugenio Ramirez Wilfredo S. Lising
Lucien M. Respall Rogelio S. Lopena
Alvin C. Reyes Bernardito G. Loreja
Rizalina R. Reyes Ignacio E. Muoz
Quirino Ronquillo Romeo C. Quintos
Avelino M. Roque Willafredo Dayrit Raymundo
Pedro L. Salgatar Virgilio L. Rosario
Rodolfo T. Sultan Joselito Santiago
Benedicto E. Torres Ernesto G. Sta. Maria
Sergio A. Ursolino Gavino U. Tuazon
Rogelio R. Valdez Elito S. Villanueva
Dionisio Bobongo Lamberto Q. Alcantara
Crisenciano Miranda Arturo P. Apilado
Ildefonso C. Molina Turiano V. Concepcion
Gorgonio C. Parala Domingo V. Dela Cruz
Virgilio Ricaza Eduardo R. Enguancho
Palconeri D. Banaag Melanio R. Esteron
Bayani S. Bracamante Santiago N. Galoso
Onofre De Rama Joveniano Hilado
Jose C. Melanes Eduardo Hipolito
Romeo I. Patag Romero M. Javier
Valerio A. Evangelista Valentino S. Jocson
Gilbert E. Ebrada Jose B. Lacson
Juanito P. Villarino Armando M. Magsino
Aristeo M. Bicol Avelino O. Nuqui
Quiterio R. Agudo Delmar F. Pineda
Marianito J. Alcantara Federico T. Quiman
Jose Arevalo Alberto M. Redaza
Ramon A. Arevalo Renosa Ronquillo
Jesus Baya Rodolfo Ronquillo
Guillermo Buenconsejo Antonio T. Valderama
Teresito A. Constantino Ramon Valderama
Eduardo A. Diaz Benigno N. Melendez
Emigdio Abarquez Claudio A. Modesto

Herbert Ayo Solomon Reyes

Mario Bataclan Isaias Talactac
Ricardo Ordonez William G. Taruc
Bernardino Robillos Oscar C. Calderon
Francisco Villaflores Pacifico P. Campano
Angel Villarba Eulalio G. Arguelles
Honesto Jardiniano Ben G. Belir
Juan Y. Olindo Cornelio L. Castillo
Hernani T. Victoriano Valeriano B. Francisco
Ubed B. Ello, Sr. Jaime L. Relosa
Ernesto V. Macaraig Alex Q. Villahermosa
Espiritu A. Munoz, Sr. Vivencio V. Abello, Jr.
Rodrigo E. Ocampo Renato C. Corcuera
Rodolfo V. Ramirez Emiliano B. Dela Cruz, Jr.
Ceferino Batitis Esteban B. Jose, Jr.
Augusto R. Bondoc Ricardo B. Martinez
Jaime C. Catli Bienvenido Vergara
Gerardo B. Limuaco, Jr. Pedro G. Cagatan
Macario S. Magsino Francisco Apolinario
Domingo B. Solano Miguel Abestano
Ricardo De Rama Prudencio Araullo
Arturo V. Araullo
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16749

January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr.,
presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among
things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen
the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria
Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case
of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in

accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was
executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is
now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my
above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
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7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to
Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was
baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted
by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines,
the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency
the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao
Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
(P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest
which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
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12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665
Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project
of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the
residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar
as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been
declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the
laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to
Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the
estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire
law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and
even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires
that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria
Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is
deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator

has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion
over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d
952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor
Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were
denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE
INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL
OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State
of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he
was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in
appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the
deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y.,
U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1,
1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of
San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.

In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the
following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in
1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the
following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country,
and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1wph1.t

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in
the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United
States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6",
CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l",
"MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the
making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his
lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of
Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded
by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and
since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits
(perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or
properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and
make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary
presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something
more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines,
for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to
have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951
he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the
following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning.
Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a
place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his
time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would
require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have
sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he
treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his
former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice

requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires
bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term
used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most
permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one.
(Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force
only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can
not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than
the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?
The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he
desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant
invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have
checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case
cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is
argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of
California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in
force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand,
insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine
of therenvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred
back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:

The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers
a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law
of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that
is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law.
But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is
difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws.
This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been
criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the
internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than to
the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but
those who have accepted the renvoitheory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at
the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of
reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater
uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact
that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the
two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether
the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the
litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan
court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been
brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the
woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to
which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in
question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the
Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case,
is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a
person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every
divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property
in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be
distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict
of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the
deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing
for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or
whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on
the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a)
either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French
court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is

what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter
course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the
forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back
again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this
judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a
particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws
contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has
been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation
of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main
controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the
doctrine of renvoiis that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must
take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of
laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction
prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of therenvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a
country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp.
529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or
country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
country' means the whole of its law.
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xxx

xxx

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at
Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals
abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall
be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the
act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one
of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a
question to the same system of law.

xxx

xxx

xxx

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an
Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile,
he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon
death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make
the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality that is the English law he must
accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied
in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of
California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle
cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such
of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of
resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most
matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing
the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the
time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as
completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical
that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate
succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the
borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the
Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case
of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has
said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the
domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in
that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of
boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national
law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed
two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its
citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we
must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of
our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate
thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-oflaws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where
the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16
that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As
explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in

California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled
in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile
can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable
of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two
states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code
of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105;
Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs.
Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the
case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen
of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each
case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with
Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil
Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower
court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23678

June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in
Civil Case No. 37089 therein.
1wph1.t

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his
first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children:
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children:
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after
all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;
(b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis,
and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.
1wph1.t

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His
will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various
amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed
the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of
their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock
amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition,
the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament divided
the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate
children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions
to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on
April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account,
report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied
the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply
Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied
by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually
pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present
case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the
time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference
back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts
rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where
the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the
Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their
case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article
16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent,
in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b)
the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congressdeleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16

a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees
that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For
it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes
He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in this case as one of the
oppositors-appellants; to file or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the project of partition;
to submit his brief after paying his proportionate share in the expenses incurred in the
printing of the record on appeal; or to allow him to adopt the briefs filed by his sisters but
this Court resolved to deny the motion.
1

San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.

Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12767

November 16, 1918

In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG JOHNSON, applicantappellant,
Hartigan & Welch for applicant and appellant.
Hartford Beaumont for Victor Johnson and others as appellees.
Chas. E. Tenney for Alejandra Ibaez de Johnson, personally and as guardian,
and for Simeona Ibaez, appellees.

STREET, J.:
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United
States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a will, dated September 9, 1915, by which he disposed of
an estate, the value of which, as estimated by him, was P231,800. This document is an holographic
instrument, being written in the testator's own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two
witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to
wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not have been proved under section
618.
On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen
of the State of Illinois, United States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with
the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. This section reads as follows:
Will made here by alien. A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of
another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country
of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his
own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and
shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands.
The hearing on said application was set for March 6, 1916, and three weeks publication of notice
was ordered in the "Manila Daily Bulletin." Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the
court. On March 6, 1916, witnesses were examined relative to the execution of the will; and upon
March 16th thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate. At the
same time an order was made nominating Victor Johnson and John T. Pickett as administrators of
the estate, with the sill annexed. Shortly thereafter Pickett signified his desire not to serve, and Victor
Johnson was appointed sole administrator.
By the will in question the testator gives to his brother Victor one hundred shares of the corporate
stock in the Johnson-Pickett Rope Company; to his father and mother in Sweden, the sum of
P20,000; to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra Ibaez, the sum
of P75 per month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibaez, spinster, P65 per month, if she remains
single. The rest of the property is left to the testator's five children Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor,
Eleonor and Alberto.
The biographical facts relative to the deceased necessary to an understanding of the case are these:
Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden, May 25, 1877, from which country he emigrated to the United
States and lived in Chicago, Illinois, from 1893 to 1898. On May 9, 1898, at Chicago, he was married
to Rosalie Ackeson, and immediately thereafter embarked for the Philippine Islands as a soldier in

the Army of the United States. As a result of relations between Johnson and Rosalie Ackeson a
daughter, named Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few months after their marriage. This child was
christened in Chicago by a pastor of the Swedish Lutheran Church upon October 16, 1898.
After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the United States he continued to live
in the Philippine Islands, and on November 20, 1902, the wife, Rosalie Johnson, was granted a
decree of divorce from him in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on the ground of desertion. A
little later Johnson appeared in the United States on a visit and on January 10, 1903, procured a
certificate of naturalization at Chicago. From Chicago he appears to have gone to Sweden, where a
photograph, exhibited in evidence in this case, was taken in which he appeared in a group with his
father, mother, and the little daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, who was then living with her grandparents in
Sweden. When this visit was concluded, the deceased returned to Manila, where he prospered in
business and continued to live until his death.
In this city he appears to have entered into marital relations with Alejandra Ibaez, by whom he had
three children, to wit, Mercedes, baptized May 31, 1903; Encarnacion, baptized April 29, 1906; and
Victor, baptized December 9, 1907. The other two children mentioned in the will were borne to the
deceased by Simeona Ibaez.
On June 12, 1916, or about three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba
Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in her behalf and noted an exception to the other
admitting the will to probate. On October 31, 1916, the same attorneys moved the court to vacate
the order of March 16 and also various other orders in the case. On February 20, 1917, this motion
was denied, and from this action of the trial court the present appeal has been perfected.
As will be discerned, the purpose of the proceeding on behalf of the petitioner is to annul the decree
of probate and put the estate into intestate administration, thus preparing the way for the
establishment of the claim of the petitioner as the sole legitimate heir of her father.
The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to avoid the probate are four in number and may be
stated, in the same sequence in which they are set forth in the petition, as follows:
(1) Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila and not a resident of the State of Illinois at
the time the will in question was executed;
(2) The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the State of Illinois;
(3) The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to the petitioner; and
(4) The order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
It cannot of course be maintained that a court of first instance lacks essential jurisdiction over the
probate of wills. The fourth proposition above stated must, accordingly, be interpreted in relation with
the third and must be considered as a corollary deduced from the latter. Moreover, both the third and
fourth grounds stated take precedence, by reason of their more fundamental implications, over the
first two; and a logical exposition of the contentions of the petitioner is expressed in the two following
propositions:
(I) The order admitting the will to probate was beyond the jurisdiction of the court and void
because made without notice to the petitioner;

(II) The judgment from which the petitioner seeks relief should be set aside because the
testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and the will was not in conformity with the
laws of that State.
In the discussion which is to follow we shall consider the problems arising in this cae in the order last
above indicated. Upon the question, then, of the jurisdiction of the court, it is apparent from an
inspection of the record of the proceedings in the court below that all the steps prescribed by law as
prerequisites to the probate of a will were complied with in every respect and that the probate was
effected in external conformity with all legal requirements. This much is unquestioned. It is, however,
pointed out in the argument submitted in behalf of the petitioner, that, at the time the court made the
order of publication, it was apprised of the fact that the petitioner lived in the United States and that
as daughter and heir she was necessarily interested in the probate of the will. It is, therefore, insisted
that the court should have appointed a date for the probate of the will sufficiently far in the future to
permit the petitioner to be present either in person or by representation; and it is said that the failure
of the court thus to postpone the probate of the will constitutes an infringement of that provision of
the Philippine Bill which declared that property shall not be taken without due process of law.
On this point we are of the opinion that the proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and
that the publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to
allow the will to be probated.
As was said in the case of In re Davis (136 Cal., 590, 596), "the proceeding as to the probate of a
will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a wide latitude in
determining the character of the constructive notice to be given to the world in a proceeding where it
has absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where a court would declare a
statute void, as depriving a party of his property without due process of law, the proceeding being
strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground that the constructive notice prescribed
by the statute was unreasonably short."
In that case the petitioner had been domiciled in the Hawaiian Islands at the time of the testator's
death; and it was impossible, in view of the distance and means of communication then existing, for
the petitioner to appear and oppose the probate on the day set for the hearing in California. It was
nevertheless held that publication in the manner prescribed by statute constituted due process of
law. (See Estate of Davis, 151 Cal., 318; Tracy vs.Muir, 151 Cal., 363.)
In the Davis case (136 Cal., 590) the court commented upon the fact that, under the laws of
California, the petitioner had a full year within which she might have instituted a proceeding to
contest the will; and this was stated as one of the reasons for holding that publication in the manner
provided by statute was sufficient. The same circumstance was commented upon in
O'Callaghan vs. O'Brien (199 U. S., 89), decided in the Supreme Court of the United States. This
case arose under the laws of the State of Washington, and it was alleged that a will had been there
probated without the notice of application for probate having been given as required by law. It was
insisted that this was an infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. This contention was, however, rejected and it was held that the statutory right to contest the
will within a year was a complete refutation of the argument founded on the idea of a violation of the
due process provision.
The laws of these Islands, in contrast with the laws in force in perhaps all of the States of the
American Union, contain no special provision, other than that allowing an appeal in the probate
proceedings, under which relief of any sort can be obtained from an order of a court of first instance
improperly allowing or disallowing a will. We do, however, have a provision of a general nature
authorizing a court under certain circumstances to set aside any judgment, order, or other

proceeding whatever. This provision is found in section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
reads as follows:
Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative
from a judgment, order or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; Provided, That application therefor be made
within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or
proceeding was taken.
The use of the word "judgment, order or other proceeding" in this section indicates an intention on
the part of the Legislature to give a wide latitude to the remedy here provided, and in our opinion its
operation is not to be restricted to judgments or orders entered in ordinary contentious litigation
where a plaintiff impleads a defendant and brings him into court by personal service of process. In
other words the utility of the provision is not limited to actions proper but extends to all sorts of
judicial proceedings.
In the second section of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that the provisions of this Code
shall be liberally construed to promote its object and to assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice.
We think that the intention thus exhibited should be applied in the interpretation of section 113; and
we hold that the word "party," used in this section, means any person having an interest in the
subject matter of the proceeding who is in a position to be concluded by the judgment, order, to other
proceeding taken.
The petitioner, therefore, in this case could have applied, under the section cited, at any time within
six months for March 16, 1916, and upon showing that she had been precluded from appearing in
the probate proceedings by conditions over which she had no control and that the order admitting
the will to probate had been erroneously entered upon insufficient proof or upon a supposed state of
facts contrary to the truth, the court would have been authorized to set the probate aside and grant a
rehearing. It is no doubt true that six months was, under the circumstances, a very short period of
time within which to expect the petitioner to appear and be prepared to contest the probate with the
proof which she might have desired to collect from remote countries. Nevertheless, although the
time allowed for the making of such application was inconveniently short, the remedy existed; and
the possibility of its use is proved in this case by the circumstance that on June 12, 1916, she in fact
here appeared in court by her attorneys and excepted to the order admitting the will to probate.
It results that, in conformity with the doctrine announced in the Davis case, above cited, the
proceedings in the court below were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law.
The law supplied a remedy by which the petitioner might have gotten a hearing and have obtained
relief from the order by which she is supposed to have been injured; and though the period within
which the application should have been made was short, the remedy was both possible and
practicable.
From what has been said it follows that the order of March 16, 1916, admitting the will of Emil H.
Johnson to probate cannot be declared null and void merely because the petitioner was unavoidably
prevented from appearing at the original hearing upon the matter of the probate of the will in
question. Whether the result would have been the same if our system of procedure had contained no
such provision as that expressed in section 113 is a matter which we need not here consider.
Intimately connected with the question of the jurisdiction of the court, is another matter which may be
properly discussed at this juncture. This relates to the interpretation to be placed upon section 636 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. The position is taken by the appellant that this section is applicable only
to wills of liens; and in this connection attention is directed to the fact that the epigraph of this section

speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to the further fact that the word "state" in the body
of the section is not capitalized. From this it is argued that section 636 is not applicable to the will of
a citizen of the United States residing in these Islands.
lawphil.net

We consider these suggestions of little weight and are of the opinion that, by the most reasonable
interpretation of the language used in the statute, the words "another state or country" include the
United States and the States of the American Union, and that the operation of the statute is not
limited to wills of aliens. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of
low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the intelligible
meaning of the written words. Furthermore, the epigraph, or heading,, of a section, being nothing
more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision, cannot have the effect of limiting the
operative words contained in the body of the text. It results that if Emil H. Johnson was at the time of
his death a citizen of the United States and of the State of Illinois, his will was provable under this
section in the courts of the Philippine Islands, provided the instrument was so executed as to be
admissible to probate under the laws of the State of Illinois.
We are thus brought to consider the second principal proposition stated at the outset of this
discussion, which raises the question whether the order f probate can be set aside in this proceeding
on the other ground stated in the petition, namely, that the testator was not a resident of the State of
Illinois and that the will was not made in conformity with the laws of that State.
The order of the Court of First Instance admitting the will to probate recites, among other things:
That upon the date when the will in question was executed Emil H. Johnson was a citizen of
the United States, naturalized in the State of Illinois, County of Cook, and that the will in
question was executed in conformity with the dispositions of the law f the State of Illinois.
We consider this equivalent to a finding that upon the date of the execution of the will the testator
was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of that
State. Upon the last point the finding is express; and in our opinion the statement that the testator
was a citizen of the United States, naturalized in the State of Illinois, should be taken to imply that he
was a citizen of the State of Illinois, as well as of the United States.
The naturalization laws of the United States require, as a condition precedent to the granting of the
certificate of naturalization, that the applicant should have resided at least five years in the United
States and for one year within the State or territory where the court granting the naturalization
papers is held; and in the absence of clear proof to the contrary it should be presumed that a person
naturalized in a court of a certain State thereby becomes a citizen of that State as well as of the
United States.
In this connection it should be remembered that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States declares, in its opening words, that all persons naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.
It is noteworthy that the petition by which it is sought to annul the probate of this will does not assert
that the testator was not a citizen of Illinois at the date when the will was executed. The most that is
said on this point is he was "never a resident of the State of Illinois after the year 1898, but became
and was a resident of the city of Manila," etc. But residence in the Philippine Islands is compatible
with citizenship in Illinois; and it must be considered that the allegations of the petition on this point
are, considered in their bearing as an attempt to refute citizenship in Illinois, wholly insufficient.

As the Court of First Instance found that the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that the
will was executed in conformity with the laws of that State, the will was necessarily and properly
admitted to probate. And how is it possible to evade the effect of these findings?
In Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that "the allowance by the court of a will
of real or personal property shall be conclusive as to its due execution."
The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number of matters, such as the age and
mental capacity of the testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by someone in his
behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of the required number of
witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act. The proof of all these requisites is
involved in the probate; and as to each and all of them the probate is conclusive.
(Castaeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil. Rep., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., 436; Chiong JocSoy vs. Vao, 8 Phil. Rep., 119; Sanchez vs. Pascual, 11 Phil. Rep., 395; Montaano vs.Suesa, 14
Phil. Rep., 676.)
Our reported cases do not contain the slightest intimation that a will which has been probated
according to law, and without fraud, can be annulled, in any other proceeding whatever, on account
of any supposed irregularity or defect in the execution of the will or on account of any error in the
action of the court upon the proof adduced before it. This court has never been called upon to decide
whether, in case the probate of a will should be procured by fraud, relief could be granted in some
other proceeding; and no such question is now presented. But it is readily seen that if fraud were
alleged, this would introduce an entirely different factor in the cae. In Austruavs. Ventenilla (21 Phil.
Rep., 180, 184), it was suggested but not decided that relief might be granted in case the probate of
a will were procured by fraud.
The circumstance that the judgment of the trial court recites that the will was executed in conformity
with the law of Illinois and also, in effect, that the testator was a citizen of that State places the
judgment upon an unassailable basis so far as any supposed error apparent upon the fact of the
judgment is concerned. It is, however, probable that even if the judgment had not contained these
recitals, there would have been a presumption from the admission of the will to probate as the will of
a citizen of Illinois that the facts were as recited in the order of probate.
As was said by this court in the case of Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca (37 Phil. Rep., 921),
"There is no principle of law better settled than that after jurisdiction has once been acquired, every
act of a court of general jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied
to every judgment or decree rendered in the various stages of the proceedings from their initiation to
their completion (Voorhees vs. United States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and if the record is
silent with respect to any fact which must have established before the court could have rightly acted,
it will be presumed that such fact was properly brought to its knowledge."
The Court of First Instance is a court of original and general jurisdiction; and there is no difference in
its faculties in this respect whether exercised in matters of probate or exerted in ordinary contentious
litigation. The trial court therefore necessarily had the power to determine the facts upon which the
propriety of admitting the will to probate depended; and the recital of those facts in the judgment was
probably not essential to its validity. No express ruling is, however, necessary on this point.
What has been said effectually disposes of the petition considered in its aspect as an attack upon
the order of probate for error apparent on the face of the record. But the petitioner seeks to have the
judgment reviewed, it being asserted that the findings of the trial court especially on the question
of the citizenship of the testator are not supported by the evidence. It needs but a moment's
reflection, however, to show that in such a proceeding as this it is not possible to reverse the original

order on the ground that the findings of the trial court are unsupported by the proof adduced before
that court. The only proceeding in which a review of the evidence can be secured is by appeal, and
the case is not before us upon appeal from the original order admitting the will to probate. The
present proceedings by petition to set aside the order of probate, and the appeal herein is from the
order denying this relief. It is obvious that on appeal from an order refusing to vacate a judgment it is
not possible to review the evidence upon which the original judgment was based. To permit this
would operate unduly to protract the right of appeal.
However, for the purpose of arriving at a just conception of the case from the point of view of the
petitioner, we propose to examine the evidence submitted upon the original hearing, in connection
with the allegations of the petition, in order to see, first, whether the evidence submitted to the trial
court was sufficient to justify its findings, and, secondly, whether the petition contains any matter
which would justify the court in setting the judgment, aside. In this connection we shall for a moment
ignore the circumstance that the petition was filed after the expiration of the six months allowed by
section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The principal controversy is over the citizenship of the testator. The evidence adduced upon this
point in the trial court consists of the certificate of naturalization granted upon January 10, 1903, in
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, in connection with certain biographical facts contained in
the oral evidence. The certificate of naturalization supplies incontrovertible proof that upon the date
stated the testator became a citizen of the United States, and inferentially also a citizen of said
State. In the testimony submitted to the trial court it appears that, when Johnson first came to the
United States as a boy, he took up his abode in the State of Illinois and there remained until he came
as a soldier in the United States Army to the Philippine Islands. Although he remained in these
Islands for sometime after receiving his discharge, no evidence was adduced showing that at the
time he returned to the United States, in the autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as the
State of his permanent domicile, and on the contrary the certificate of naturalization itself recites that
at that time he claimed to be a resident of Illinois.
Now, if upon January 10, 1903, the testator became a citizen of the United States and of the State of
Illinois, how has he lost the character of citizen with respect to either of these jurisdictions? There is
no law in force by virtue of which any person of foreign nativity can become a naturalized citizen of
the Philippine Islands; and it was, therefore, impossible for the testator, even if he had so desired, to
expatriate himself from the United States and change his political status from a citizen of the United
States to a citizen of these Islands. This being true, it is to be presumed that he retained his
citizenship in the State of Illinois along with his status as a citizen of the United States. It would be
novel doctrine to Americans living in the Philippine Islands to be told that by living here they lose
their citizenship in the State of their naturalization or nativity.
We are not unmindful of the fact that when a citizen of one State leaves it and takes up his abode in
another State with no intention of returning, he immediately acquires citizenship in the State of his
new domicile. This is in accordance with that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States which says that every citizen of the United States is a citizen of the
State where in he resides. The effect of this provision necessarily is that a person transferring his
domicile from one State to another loses his citizenship in the State of his original above upon
acquiring citizenship in the State of his new abode. The acquisition of the new State citizenship
extinguishes the old. That situation, in our opinion, has no analogy to that which arises when a
citizen of an American State comes to reside in the Philippine Islands. Here he cannot acquire a new
citizenship; nor by the mere change of domicile does he lose that which he brought with him.
The proof adduced before the trial court must therefore be taken as showing that, at the time the will
was executed, the testator was, as stated in the order of probate, a citizen of the State of Illinois.

This, in connection with the circumstance that the petition does not even so much as deny such
citizenship but only asserts that the testator was a resident of the Philippine Islands, demonstrates
the impossibility of setting the probate aside for lack of the necessary citizenship on the part of the
testator. As already observed, the allegation of the petition on this point is wholly insufficient to justify
any relief whatever.
Upon the other point as to whether the will was executed in conformity with the statutes of the
State of Illinois we note that it does not affirmatively appear from the transaction of the testimony
adduced in the trial court that any witness was examined with reference to the law of Illinois on the
subject of the execution of will. The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that the will was properly
executed by examining section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, as exhibited in volume 3 of
Starr & Curtis's Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he may have assumed that he could
take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he
was in our opinion mistaken. that section authorizes the courts here to take judicial notice, among
other things, of the acts of the legislative department of the United States. These words clearly have
reference to Acts of the Congress of the United States; and we would hesitate to hold that our courts
can, under this provision, take judicial notice of the multifarious laws of the various American States.
Nor do we think that any such authority can be derived from the broader language, used in the same
action, where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge
"similar" to those therein enumerated. The proper rule we think is to require proof of the statutes of
the States of the American Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in any
action litigated in the Philippine courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking judicial notice of the law
of Illinois on the point in question, such error is not now available to the petitioner, first, because the
petition does not state any fact from which it would appear that the law of Illinois is different from
what the court found, and, secondly, because the assignment of error and argument for the appellant
in this court raises no question based on such supposed error. Though the trial court may have
acted upon pure conjecture as to the law prevailing in the State of Illinois, its judgment could not be
set aside, even upon application made within six months under section 113 of the Code of Civil
procedure, unless it should be made to appear affirmatively that the conjecture was wrong. The
petitioner, it is true, states in general terms that the will in question is invalid and inadequate to pass
real and personal property in the State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits
by which the petition is accompanied contain no reference to the subject, and we are cited to no
authority in the appellant's brief which might tent to raise a doubt as to the correctness of the
conclusion of the trial court. It is very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be urged as of serious
moment.
But it is insisted in the brief for the appellant that the will in question was not properly admissible to
probate because it contains provisions which cannot be given effect consistently with the laws of the
Philippine Islands; and it is suggested that as the petitioner is a legitimate heir of the testator she
cannot be deprived of the legitime to which she is entitled under the law governing testamentary
successions in these Islands. Upon this point it is sufficient to say that the probate of the will does
not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as
regards the due execution of the will. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 625, 614; Sahagun vs. De
Gorostiza, 7 Phil. Rep., 347, 349; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vao, 8 Phil. Rep., 119, 121;
Limjuco vs.Ganara, 11 Phil. Rep., 393, 395.)
If, therefore, upon the distribution of this estate, it should appear that any legacy given by the will or
other disposition made therein is contrary to the law applicable in such case, the will must
necessarily yield upon that point and the law must prevail. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten
that the intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined by the law of Illinois and not,

as the appellant apparently assumes, by the general provisions here applicable in such matters; for
in the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and testamentary
successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount of the successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the laws of the nation of
the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the
country where it may be situate."
From what has been said, it is, we think, manifest that the petition submitted to the court below on
October 31, 1916, was entirely insufficient to warrant the setting aside of the other probating the will
in question, whether said petition be considered as an attack on the validity of the decree for error
apparent, or whether it be considered as an application for a rehearing based upon the new
evidence submitted in the affidavits which accompany the petition. And in this latter aspect the
petition is subject to the further fatal defect that it was not presented within the time allowed by law.
It follows that the trial court committed no error in denying the relief sought. The order appealed from
is accordingly affirmed with costs. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Malcolm, Avancea and Fisher, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate of
Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1307). TESTATE
ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, administrator-appellant,
vs.
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN,
BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO
LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES,
ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA
PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as Administratrix in
Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin for Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.

Manglapus Law Office, Antonio Law Office and Rizal R. Quimpo for private respondents and
appellees Avelina A. Magno, etc., et al.

BARREDO, J.:p
Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction; certiorari to "declare all acts of the respondent
court in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307 of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo) subsequent to the order of December 14, 1957 as null and void for having been issued
without jurisdiction"; prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from allowing, tolerating, sanctioning,
or abetting private respondent Avelina A. Magno to perform or do any acts of administration, such as
those enumerated in the petition, and from exercising any authority or power as Regular
Administratrix of above-named Testate Estate, by entertaining manifestations, motion and pleadings
filed by her and acting on them, and also to enjoin said court from allowing said private respondent
to interfere, meddle or take part in any manner in the administration of the Testate Estate of Charles
Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the same court and branch); with prayer for preliminary
injunction, which was issued by this Court on August 8, 1967 upon a bond of P5,000; the petition
being particularly directed against the orders of the respondent court of October 12, 1966 denying
petitioner's motion of April 22, 1966 and its order of July 18, 1967 denying the motion for
reconsideration of said order.
Related to and involving basically the same main issue as the foregoing petition, thirty-three (33)
appeals from different orders of the same respondent court approving or otherwise sanctioning the
acts of administration of the respondent Magno on behalf of the testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges.
THE FACTS
On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will executed on November 22,
1952 pertinently providing as follows:
FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and funeral expenses be first paid out of my
estate.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my beloved
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband,
during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall
have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and
he is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of said
estate, by sale or any part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any
other or additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or
without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or
time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real
property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass
the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he may
elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him,
and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may
need or desire. It is provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise
dispose of any of the improved property now owned by us located at, in or near the

City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy
the same during his lifetime, above provided. He shall have the right to subdivide any
farm land and sell lots therein. and may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise
and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and
sisters, share and share alike, namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Saddie Rascoe, Era
Roman and Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters named in item
Fourth, above, prior to the death of my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, then it is
my will and bequest that the heirs of such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly
the share which would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived.
SIXTH: I nominate and appoint my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to be
executor of this, my last will and testament, and direct that no bond or other security
be required of him as such executor.
SEVENTH: It is my will and bequest that no action be had in the probate court, in the
administration of my estate, other than that necessary to prove and record this will
and to return an inventory and appraisement of my estate and list of claims. (Pp. 2-4,
Petition.)
This will was subsequently probated in aforementioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 of respondent
court on June 28, 1957, with the widower Charles Newton Hodges being appointed as Executor,
pursuant to the provisions thereof.
Previously, on May 27, 1957, the said widower (hereafter to be referred to as Hodges) had been
appointed Special Administrator, in which capacity he filed a motion on the same date as follows:
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION TO ALLOW OR AUTHORIZE PETITIONER TO
CONTINUE THE BUSINESS IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND TO PERFORM
ACTS WHICH HE HAD BEEN DOING WHILE DECEASED WAS LIVING
Come petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedings, thru his undersigned attorneys, to the
Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
1. That Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving her last will and testament, a copy of
which is attached to the petition for probate of the same.
2. That in said last will and testament herein petitioner Charles Newton Hodges is
directed to have the right to manage, control use and enjoy the estate of deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges, in the same way, a provision was placed in paragraph two, the
following: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and (to) hold unto
him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime."

3. That during the lifetime of Linnie Jane Hodges, herein petitioner was engaged
in the business of buying and selling personal and real properties, and do such acts
which petitioner may think best.
4. That deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants or
ascendants, except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as executor surviving
spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent.
5. That the present motion is submitted in order not to paralyze the business of
petitioner and the deceased, especially in the purchase and sale of properties. That
proper accounting will be had also in all these transactions.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, petitioner C. N. Hodges (Charles
Newton Hodges) be allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was
engaged and to perform acts which he had been doing while deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges was living.
City of Iloilo, May 27, 1957. (Annex "D", Petition.)
which the respondent court immediately granted in the following order:
It appearing in the urgent ex-parte motion filed by petitioner C. N. Hodges, that the
business in which said petitioner and the deceased were engaged will be paralyzed,
unless and until the Executor is named and appointed by the Court, the said
petitioner is allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged
and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo May 27, 1957. (Annex "E", Petition.)
Under date of December 11, 1957, Hodges filed as such Executor another motion thus:
MOTION TO APPROVE ALL SALES, CONVEYANCES, LEASES, MORTGAGES
THAT THE EXECUTOR HAD MADE FURTHER AND SUBSEQUENT
TRANSACTIONS WHICH THE EXECUTOR MAY DO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
LAST WISH OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES.
Comes the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, thru his undersigned
attorney, to the Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
1. That according to the last will and testament of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges, the executor as the surviving spouse and legatee named in the will of the
deceased; has the right to dispose of all the properties left by the deceased, portion
of which is quoted as follows:
Second: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my beloved
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband,
during his natural lifetime.

Third: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall
have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and
he is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of said
estate, by sale or any part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any
other or additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or
without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or
time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real
property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass
the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he may
elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him,
and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may
need or desire. ...
2. That herein Executor, is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal,
but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
That during the lifetime of herein Executor, as Legatee has the right to sell, convey,
lease or dispose of the properties in the Philippines. That inasmuch as C.N. Hodges
was and is engaged in the buy and sell of real and personal properties, even before
the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, a motion to authorize said C.N. Hodges was filed in
Court, to allow him to continue in the business of buy and sell, which motion was
favorably granted by the Honorable Court.
3. That since the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. C.N. Hodges had been buying
and selling real and personal properties, in accordance with the wishes of the late
Linnie Jane Hodges.
4. That the Register of Deeds for Iloilo, had required of late the herein Executor to
have all the sales, leases, conveyances or mortgages made by him, approved by the
Hon. Court.
5. That it is respectfully requested, all the sales, conveyances leases and
mortgages executed by the Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court. and
subsequent sales conveyances, leases and mortgages in compliances with the
wishes of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, and within the scope of the terms of the last
will and testament, also be approved;
6. That the Executor is under obligation to submit his yearly accounts, and the
properties conveyed can also be accounted for, especially the amounts received.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, all the sales, conveyances, leases,
and mortgages executed by the Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court, and also
the subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages in consonance with the
wishes of the deceased contained in her last will and testament, be with authorization
and approval of the Hon. Court.
City of Iloilo, December 11, 1967.
(Annex "G", Petition.)
which again was promptly granted by the respondent court on December 14, 1957 as follows:

ORDER
As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor for the reasons stated in
his motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken all the
sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges are hereby
APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes conveyed in the last will and
testament of the latter.
So ordered.
Iloilo City. December 14, 1957.
(Annex "H", Petition.)
On April 14, 1959, in submitting his first statement of account as Executor for approval, Hodges
alleged:
Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, herein executor of the deceased,
renders the following account of his administration covering the period from January
1, 1958 to December 31, 1958, which account may be found in detail in the individual
income tax return filed for the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, to wit:
That a certified public accountant has examined the statement of net worth of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, as well as the income and
expenses, copy of which is hereto attached and made integral part of this statement
of account as Annex "A".
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully prayed that, the statement of
net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, income and
expenses as shown in the individual income tax return for the estate of the deceased
and marked as Annex "A", be approved by the Honorable Court, as substantial
compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court.
That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the
herein accounts be given notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of
the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the
Honorable court.
City of Iloilo April 14, 1959.
(Annex "I", Petition.)
The respondent court approved this statement of account on April 21, 1959 in its order worded thus:
Upon petition of Atty. Gellada, in representation of the Executor, the statement of net
worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, assets and liabilities, income and
expenses as shown in the individual income tax return for the estate of the deceased
and marked as Annex "A" is approved.

SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo April 21, 1959.
(Annex "J", Petition.)
His accounts for the periods January 1, 1959 to December 31, 1959 and January 1, 1960 to
December 31, 1960 were submitted likewise accompanied by allegations identical mutatis
mutandis to those of April 14, 1959, quoted above; and the respective orders approving the same,
dated July 30, 1960 and May 2, 1961, were substantially identical to the above-quoted order of April
21, 1959. In connection with the statements of account just mentioned, the following assertions
related thereto made by respondent-appellee Magno in her brief do not appear from all indications
discernible in the record to be disputable:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C.N. Hodges filed his first "Account by the Executor" of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges
and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto,
C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of
P328,402.62, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1958 on
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having
earned income of P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined
personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's
Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Under date of July 21, 1960, C.N. Hodges filed his second "Annual Statement of
Account by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of
Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December
31, 1959 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate
earned a net income of P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for
calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the
said estate as having earned income of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net
income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (pp. 91-92. Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Under date of April 20, 1961, C.N. Hodges filed his third "Annual Statement of
Account by the Executor for the Year 1960" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In
the "Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges" as of December 31, 1960 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the
combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P314,857.94, divided evenly
between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
"individual income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of
P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and
that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (Pp. 92-93, Appellee's Brief.)
Likewise the following:

In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven brothers and
sisters of Linnie Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the court
admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see
p. 14, Green ROA). Immediately, C.N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy
Higdon's name included as an heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the records
"in order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were
omitted, and that they were really and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges. .
As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was administering
under American law. He did file such as estate tax return on August 8, 1958. In
Schedule "M" of such return, he answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he
was contemplating "renouncing the will". On the question as to what property
interests passed to him as the surviving spouse, he answered:
"None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts,
taxes and other legal charges. It is the intention of the surviving
husband of deceased to distribute the remaining property and
interests of the deceased in their Community estate to the devisees
and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and
expenses of administration are finally determined and paid."
Again, on August 9, 1962, barely four months before his death, he executed an
"affidavit" wherein he ratified and confirmed all that he stated in Schedule "M" of his
estate tax returns as to his having renounced what was given him by his wife's will. 1
As appointed executor, C.N. Hodges filed an "Inventory" dated May 12, 1958. He listed
all the assets of his conjugal partnership with Linnie Jane Hodges on a separate balance
sheet and then stated expressly that her estate which has come into his possession as
executor was "one-half of all the items" listed in said balance sheet. (Pp. 89-90,
Appellee's Brief.)

Parenthetically, it may be stated, at this juncture, that We are taking pains to quote wholly or at least,
extensively from some of the pleadings and orders whenever We feel that it is necessary to do so for
a more comprehensive and clearer view of the important and decisive issues raised by the parties
and a more accurate appraisal of their respective positions in regard thereto.
The records of these cases do not show that anything else was done in the above-mentioned
Special Proceedings No. 1307 until December 26, 1962, when on account of the death of Hodges
the day before, the same lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who had been previously acting as counsel
for Hodges in his capacity as Executor of his wife's estate, and as such had filed the aforequoted
motions and manifestations, filed the following:
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX
COMES the undersigned attorney for the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings,
to the Honorable Court, most respectfully states:
1. That in accordance with the Last Will and Testament of Linnie Jane Hodges
(deceased), her husband, Charles Newton Hodges was to act as Executor, and in

fact, in an order issued by this Hon. Court dated June 28, 1957, the said Charles
Newton Hodges was appointed Executor and had performed the duties as such.
2. That last December 22, 1962, the said Charles Newton Hodges was stricken ill,
and brought to the Iloilo Mission Hospital for treatment, but unfortunately, he died on
December 25, 1962, as shown by a copy of the death certificate hereto attached and
marked as Annex "A".
3. That in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of Linnie Jane
Hodges, whatever real and personal properties that may remain at the death of her
husband Charles Newton Hodges, the said properties shall be equally divided among
their heirs. That there are real and personal properties left by Charles Newton
Hodges, which need to be administered and taken care of.
4. That the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as that of Charles
Newton Hodges, have not as yet been determined or ascertained, and there is
necessity for the appointment of a general administrator to liquidate and distribute
the residue of the estate to the heirs and legatees of both spouses. That in
accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 75 of the Rules of Court, the
conjugal partnership of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges shall be
liquidated in the testate proceedings of the wife.
5. That the undersigned counsel, has perfect personal knowledge of the existence of
the last will and testament of Charles Newton Hodges, with similar provisions as that
contained in the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges. However, said last
will and testament of Charles Newton Hodges is kept inside the vault or iron safe in
his office, and will be presented in due time before this honorable Court.
6. That in the meantime, it is imperative and indispensable that, an Administratrix be
appointed for the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and a Special Administratrix for the
estate of Charles Newton Hodges, to perform the duties required by law, to
administer, collect, and take charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate
of both spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, as provided for
in Section 1 and 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
7. That there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration, because
the last will and testament of deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, is still kept in his
safe or vault, and in the meantime, unless an administratrix (and,) at the same time,
a Special Administratrix is appointed, the estate of both spouses are in danger of
being lost, damaged or go to waste.
8. That the most trusted employee of both spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C.N.
Hodges, who had been employed for around thirty (30) years, in the person of Miss
Avelina Magno, (should) be appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and at the same time Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton
Hodges. That the said Miss Avelina Magno is of legal age, a resident of the
Philippines, the most fit, competent, trustworthy and well-qualified person to serve
the duties of Administratrix and Special Administratrix and is willing to act as such.
9. That Miss Avelina Magno is also willing to file bond in such sum which the Hon.
Court believes reasonable.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed that, Miss
AVELINA A. MAGNO be immediately appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges,
with powers and duties provided for by law. That the Honorable Court fix the
reasonable bond of P1,000.00 to be filed by Avelina A. Magno.
(Annex "O", Petition.)
which respondent court readily acted on in its order of even date thus: .
For the reasons alleged in the Urgent Ex-parte Motion filed by counsel for the
Executor dated December 25, 1962, which the Court finds meritorious, Miss
AVELINA A. MAGNO, is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the
latter case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his
vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both spouses may be
lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special Administratrix is appointed.
Miss Avelina A. Magno is required to file bond in the sum of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00), and after having done so, let letters of Administration be issued
to her." (Annex "P", Petition.)
On December 29, 1962, however, upon urgent ex-parte petition of respondent
Magno herself, thru Atty. Gellada, Harold, R. Davies, "a representative of the heirs of
deceased Charles Newton Hodges (who had) arrived from the United States of
America to help in the administration of the estate of said deceased" was appointed
as Co-Special Administrator of the estate of Hodges, (pp. 29-33, Yellow - Record on
Appeal) only to be replaced as such co-special administrator on January 22, 1963 by
Joe Hodges, who, according to the motion of the same attorney, is "the nephew of
the deceased (who had) arrived from the United States with instructions from the
other heirs of the deceased to administer the properties or estate of Charles Newton
Hodges in the Philippines, (Pp. 47-50, id.)
Meanwhile, under date of January 9, 1963, the same Atty. Gellada filed in Special Proceedings 1672
a petition for the probate of the will of Hodges, 2 with a prayer for the issuance of letters of
administration to the same Joe Hodges, albeit the motion was followed on February 22, 1963 by a
separate one asking that Atty. Fernando Mirasol be appointed as his co-administrator. On the same date
this latter motion was filed, the court issued the corresponding order of probate and letters of
administration to Joe Hodges and Atty. Mirasol, as prayed for.
At this juncture, again, it may also be explained that just as, in her will, Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her
whole estate to her husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural
lifetime", she, at the same time or in like manner, provided that "at the death of my said husband I
give devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share
alike ". Accordingly, it became incumbent upon Hodges, as executor of his wife's will, to duly
liquidate the conjugal partnership, half of which constituted her estate, in order that upon the
eventuality of his death, "the rest, residue and remainder" thereof could be determined and
correspondingly distributed or divided among her brothers and sisters. And it was precisely because
no such liquidation was done, furthermore, there is the issue of whether the distribution of her estate
should be governed by the laws of the Philippines or those of Texas, of which State she was a
national, and, what is more, as already stated, Hodges made official and sworn statements or

manifestations indicating that as far as he was concerned no "property interests passed to him as
surviving spouse "except for purposes of administering the estate, paying debts, taxes and other
legal charges" and it was the intention of the surviving husband of the deceased to distribute the
remaining property and interests of the deceased in their Community Estate to the devisees and
legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally
determined and paid", that the incidents and controversies now before Us for resolution arose. As
may be observed, the situation that ensued upon the death of Hodges became rather unusual and
so, quite understandably, the lower court's actuations presently under review are apparently wanting
in consistency and seemingly lack proper orientation.
Thus, We cannot discern clearly from the record before Us the precise perspective from which the
trial court proceeded in issuing its questioned orders. And, regretably, none of the lengthy briefs
submitted by the parties is of valuable assistance in clearing up the matter.
To begin with, We gather from the two records on appeal filed by petitioner, as appellant in the
appealed cases, one with green cover and the other with a yellow cover, that at the outset, a sort of
modus operandi had been agreed upon by the parties under which the respective administrators of
the two estates were supposed to act conjointly, but since no copy of the said agreement can be
found in the record before Us, We have no way of knowing when exactly such agreement was
entered into and under what specific terms. And while reference is made to said modus operandi in
the order of September 11, 1964, on pages 205-206 of the Green Record on Appeal, reading thus:
The present incident is to hear the side of administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, in
answer to the charges contained in the motion filed by Atty. Cesar Tirol on
September 3, 1964. In answer to the said charges, Miss Avelina A. Magno, through
her counsel, Atty. Rizal Quimpo, filed a written manifestation.
After reading the manifestation here of Atty. Quimpo, for and in behalf of the
administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, the Court finds that everything that happened
before September 3, 1964, which was resolved on September 8, 1964, to the
satisfaction of parties, was simply due to a misunderstanding between the
representative of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank and Miss Magno
and in order to restore the harmonious relations between the parties, the Court
ordered the parties to remain in status quo as to their modus operandi before
September 1, 1964, until after the Court can have a meeting with all the parties and
their counsels on October 3, as formerly agreed upon between counsels, Attys.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta, Attys. Tirol and Tirol and Atty. Rizal Quimpo.
In the meantime, the prayers of Atty. Quimpo as stated in his manifestation shall not
be resolved by this Court until October 3, 1964.
SO ORDERED.
there is nothing in the record indicating whatever happened to it afterwards, except that again,
reference thereto was made in the appealed order of October 27, 1965, on pages 292-295 of the
Green Record on Appeal, as follows:
On record is an urgent motion to allow PCIB to open all doors and locks in the
Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City, to take immediate and exclusive
possession thereof and to place its own locks and keys for security purposes of the
PCIB dated October 27, 1965 thru Atty. Cesar Tirol. It is alleged in said urgent motion
that Administratrix Magno of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges refused to

open the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City where PCIB holds
office and therefore PCIB is suffering great moral damage and prejudice as a result
of said act. It is prayed that an order be issued authorizing it (PCIB) to open all doors
and locks in the said office, to take immediate and exclusive possession thereof and
place thereon its own locks and keys for security purposes; instructing the clerk of
court or any available deputy to witness and supervise the opening of all doors and
locks and taking possession of the PCIB.
A written opposition has been filed by Administratrix Magno of even date (Oct. 27)
thru counsel Rizal Quimpo stating therein that she was compelled to close the office
for the reason that the PCIB failed to comply with the order of this Court signed by
Judge Anacleto I. Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964 to the effect that both estates
should remain in status quo to their modus operandi as of September 1, 1964.
To arrive at a happy solution of the dispute and in order not to interrupt the operation
of the office of both estates, the Court aside from the reasons stated in the urgent
motion and opposition heard the verbal arguments of Atty. Cesar Tirol for the PCIB
and Atty. Rizal Quimpo for Administratix Magno.
After due consideration, the Court hereby orders Magno to open all doors and locks
in the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City in the presence of the
PCIB or its duly authorized representative and deputy clerk of court Albis of this
branch not later than 7:30 tomorrow morning October 28, 1965 in order that the office
of said estates could operate for business.
Pursuant to the order of this Court thru Judge Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964, it
is hereby ordered:
(a) That all cash collections should be deposited in the joint account of the estates of
Linnie Jane Hodges and estates of C.N. Hodges;
(b) That whatever cash collections that had been deposited in the account of either of
the estates should be withdrawn and since then deposited in the joint account of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the estate of C.N. Hodges;
(c) That the PCIB should countersign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of
Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as administratrix of the Linnie
Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only;
(d) That Administratrix Magno is hereby directed to allow the PCIB to inspect
whatever records, documents and papers she may have in her possession in the
same manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow Administratrix Magno
to inspect whatever records, documents and papers it may have in its possession;
(e) That the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all
records of the transactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges; and in like manner the accountant or any authorized representative of
the estate of C.N. Hodges shall have access to the records of transactions of the
Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection of the estate of C.N. Hodges.

Once the estates' office shall have been opened by Administratrix Magno in the
presence of the PCIB or its duly authorized representative and deputy clerk Albis or
his duly authorized representative, both estates or any of the estates should not
close it without previous consent and authority from this court.
SO ORDERED.
As may be noted, in this order, the respondent court required that all collections from the properties
in the name of Hodges should be deposited in a joint account of the two estates, which indicates that
seemingly the so-calledmodus operandi was no longer operative, but again there is nothing to show
when this situation started.
Likewise, in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's motion of September 14, 1964, on pages 188-201 of the
Green Record on Appeal, (also found on pp. 83-91 of the Yellow Record on Appeal) it is alleged that:
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C.N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and
Fernando P. Mirasol acting as the two co-administrators of the estate of C.N.
Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and Messrs. William Brown and Ardell Young acting for all of the Higdon
family who claim to be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
various legal counsel representing the aforementioned parties entered into an
amicable agreement, which was approved by this Honorable Court, wherein the
parties thereto agreed that certain sums of money were to be paid in settlement of
different claims against the two estates and that the assets (to the extent they
existed) of both estates would be administered jointly by the PCIB as administrator of
the estate of C.N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid October 5, 1963 Motion,
namely, the PCIB's claim to exclusive possession and ownership of one hundred
percent (100%) (or, in the alternative, seventy-five percent (75%) of all assets owned
by C.N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. On February 1,
1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court amended its order
of January 24, 1964 but in no way changed its recognition of the afore-described
basic demand by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges to one
hundred percent (100%) of the assets claimed by both estates.
but no copy of the mentioned agreement of joint administration of the two estates exists in the
record, and so, We are not informed as to what exactly are the terms of the same which could be
relevant in the resolution of the issues herein.
On the other hand, the appealed order of November 3, 1965, on pages 313-320 of the Green
Record on Appeal, authorized payment by respondent Magno of, inter alia, her own fees as
administratrix, the attorney's fees of her lawyers, etc., as follows:
Administratrix Magno thru Attys. Raul S. Manglapus and Rizal. R. Quimpo filed a
Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated June 10, 1964 asking for the approval of the
Agreement dated June 6, 1964 which Agreement is for the purpose of retaining their
services to protect and defend the interest of the said Administratrix in these
proceedings and the same has been signed by and bears the express conformity of
the attorney-in-fact of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. James L. Sullivan. It is further
prayed that the Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be
directed to pay the retailers fee of said lawyers, said fees made chargeable as

expenses for the administration of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1641-1642,
Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
An opposition has been filed by the Administrator PCIB thru Atty. Herminio Ozaeta
dated July 11, 1964, on the ground that payment of the retainers fee of Attys.
Manglapus and Quimpo as prayed for in said Manifestation and Urgent Motion is
prejudicial to the 100% claim of the estate of C. N. Hodges; employment of Attys.
Manglapus and Quimpo is premature and/or unnecessary; Attys. Quimpo and
Manglapus are representing conflicting interests and the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges should be closed and terminated (pp. 1679-1684, Vol, V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Leon P. Gellada filed a memorandum dated July 28, 1964 asking that the
Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied
because no evidence has been presented in support thereof. Atty. Manglapus filed a
reply to the opposition of counsel for the Administrator of the C. N. Hodges estate
wherein it is claimed that expenses of administration include reasonable counsel or
attorney's fees for services to the executor or administrator. As a matter of fact the
fee agreement dated February 27, 1964 between the PCIB and the law firm of
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta as its counsel (Pp. 1280-1284, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which
stipulates the fees for said law firm has been approved by the Court in its order dated
March 31, 1964. If payment of the fees of the lawyers for the administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges will cause prejudice to the estate of C. N. Hodges, in
like manner the very agreement which provides for the payment of attorney's fees to
the counsel for the PCIB will also be prejudicial to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
(pp. 1801-1814, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a rejoinder dated August 10, 1964 to the reply to the
opposition to the Manifestation and Urgent Motion alleging principally that the estates
of Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges are not similarly situated for the reason that
C. N. Hodges is an heir of Linnie Jane Hodges whereas the latter is not an heir of the
former for the reason that Linnie Jane Hodges predeceased C. N. Hodges (pp. 18391848, Vol. V, Sp. 1307); that Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo formally entered their
appearance in behalf of Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on June
10, 1964 (pp. 1639-1640, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Manglapus filed a manifestation dated December 18, 1964 stating therein that
Judge Bellosillo issued an order requiring the parties to submit memorandum in
support of their respective contentions. It is prayed in this manifestation that the
Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated June 10, 1964 be resolved (pp. 6435-6439,
Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a counter- manifestation dated January
5, 1965 asking that after the consideration by the court of all allegations and
arguments and pleadings of the PCIB in connection therewith (1) said manifestation
and urgent motion of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied (pp. 6442-6453, Vol.
VII, Sp. 1307). Judge Querubin issued an order dated January 4, 1965 approving the
motion dated June 10, 1964 of the attorneys for the administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and agreement annexed to said motion. The said order further
states: "The Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is authorized to issue
or sign whatever check or checks may be necessary for the above purpose and the
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is ordered to countersign the same. (pp.
6518-6523, Vol VII, Sp. 1307).

Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a manifestation and motion dated
January 13, 1965 asking that the order of January 4, 1965 which was issued by
Judge Querubin be declared null and void and to enjoin the clerk of court and the
administratrix and administrator in these special proceedings from all proceedings
and action to enforce or comply with the provision of the aforesaid order of January
4, 1965. In support of said manifestation and motion it is alleged that the order of
January 4, 1965 is null and void because the said order was never delivered to the
deputy clerk Albis of Branch V (the sala of Judge Querubin) and the alleged order
was found in the drawer of the late Judge Querubin in his office when said drawer
was opened on January 13, 1965 after the death of Judge Querubin by Perfecto
Querubin, Jr., the son of the judge and in the presence of Executive Judge Rovira
and deputy clerk Albis (Sec. 1, Rule 36, New Civil Code) (Pp. 6600-6606, Vol. VIII,
Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a motion for reconsideration dated
February 23, 1965 asking that the order dated January 4, 1964 be reversed on the
ground that:
1. Attorneys retained must render services to the estate not to the personal heir;
2. If services are rendered to both, fees should be pro-rated between them;
3. Attorneys retained should not represent conflicting interests; to the prejudice of the
other heirs not represented by said attorneys;
4. Fees must be commensurate to the actual services rendered to the estate;
5. There must be assets in the estate to pay for said fees (Pp. 6625-6636, Vol. VIII,
Sp. 1307).
Atty. Quimpo for Administratrix Magno of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges filed a
motion to submit dated July 15, 1965 asking that the manifestation and urgent motion
dated June 10, 1964 filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo and other incidents
directly appertaining thereto be considered submitted for consideration and approval
(pp. 6759-6765, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Considering the arguments and reasons in support to the pleadings of both the
Administratrix and the PCIB, and of Atty. Gellada, hereinbefore mentioned, the Court
believes that the order of January 4, 1965 is null and void for the reason that the said
order has not been filed with deputy clerk Albis of this court (Branch V) during the
lifetime of Judge Querubin who signed the said order. However, the said
manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 is being treated and
considered in this instant order. It is worthy to note that in the motion dated January
24, 1964 (Pp. 1149- 1163, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which has been filed by Atty. Gellada and
his associates and Atty. Gibbs and other lawyers in addition to the stipulated fees for
actual services rendered. However, the fee agreement dated February 27, 1964,
between the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and Atty. Gibbs which
provides for retainer fee of P4,000 monthly in addition to specific fees for actual
appearances, reimbursement for expenditures and contingent fees has also been
approved by the Court and said lawyers have already been paid. (pp. 1273-1279,
Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307 pp. 1372-1373, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307).

WHEREFORE, the order dated January 4, 1965 is hereby declared null and void.
The manifestation and motion dated June 10, 1964 which was filed by the attorneys
for the administratrix of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is granted and the
agreement annexed thereto is hereby approved.
The administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is hereby directed to be
needed to implement the approval of the agreement annexed to the motion and the
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is directed to countersign the said check
or checks as the case may be.
SO ORDERED.
thereby implying somehow that the court assumed the existence of independent but simultaneous
administrations.
Be that as it may, again, it appears that on August 6, 1965, the court, acting on a motion of petitioner
for the approval of deeds of sale executed by it as administrator of the estate of Hodges, issued the
following order, also on appeal herein:
Acting upon the motion for approval of deeds of sale for registered land of the PCIB,
Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges in Sp. Proc. 1672 (Vol. VII, pp.
2244-2245), dated July 16, 1965, filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol in representation of the
law firms of Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta and Tirol and Tirol and the opposition thereto
of Atty. Rizal R. Quimpo (Vol. VIII, pp. 6811-6813) dated July 22, 1965 and
considering the allegations and reasons therein stated, the court believes that the
deeds of sale should be signed jointly by the PCIB, Administrator of the Testate
Estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno, Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and to this effect the PCIB should take the necessary steps so
that Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of sale.
SO ORDERED. (p. 248, Green Record on Appeal.)
Notably this order required that even the deeds executed by petitioner, as administrator of the Estate
of Hodges, involving properties registered in his name, should be co-signed by respondent
Magno. 3 And this was not an isolated instance.
In her brief as appellee, respondent Magno states:
After the lower court had authorized appellee Avelina A. Magno to execute final
deeds of sale pursuant to contracts to sell executed by C. N. Hodges on February
20, 1963 (pp. 45-46, Green ROA), motions for the approval of final deeds of sale
(signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and the administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, first Joe Hodges, then Atty. Fernando Mirasol and later the appellant) were
approved by the lower court upon petition of appellee Magno's counsel, Atty. Leon P.
Gellada, on the basis of section 8 of Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Subsequently, the appellant, after it had taken over the bulk of the assets of the two
estates, started presenting these motions itself. The first such attempt was a "Motion
for Approval of Deeds of Sale for Registered Land and Cancellations of Mortgages"
dated July 21, 1964 filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, counsel for the appellant, thereto
annexing two (2) final deeds of sale and two (2) cancellations of mortgages signed

by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino, Assistant Vice-President and

Manager of the appellant (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. V, pp. 1694-1701).
This motion was approved by the lower court on July 27, 1964. It was followed by
another motion dated August 4, 1964 for the approval of one final deed of sale again
signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No.
1307. Vol. V, pp. 1825-1828), which was again approved by the lower court on
August 7, 1964. The gates having been opened, a flood ensued: the appellant
subsequently filed similar motions for the approval of a multitude of deeds of sales
and cancellations of mortgages signed by both the appellee Avelina A. Magno and
the appellant.
A random check of the records of Special Proceeding No. 1307 alone will show Atty.
Cesar T. Tirol as having presented for court approval deeds of sale of real properties
signed by both appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino in the following
numbers: (a) motion dated September 21, 1964 6 deeds of sale; (b) motion dated
November 4, 1964 1 deed of sale; (c) motion dated December 1, 1964 4 deeds
of sale; (d) motion dated February 3, 1965 8 deeds of sale; (f) motion dated May
7, 1965 9 deeds of sale. In view of the very extensive landholdings of the Hodges
spouses and the many motions filed concerning deeds of sale of real properties
executed by C. N. Hodges the lower court has had to constitute special separate
expedientes in Special Proceedings Nos. 1307 and 1672 to include mere motions for
the approval of deeds of sale of the conjugal properties of the Hodges spouses.
As an example, from among the very many, under date of February 3, 1965, Atty.
Cesar T. Tirol, as counsel for the appellant, filed "Motion for Approval of Deeds of
Sale for Registered Land and Cancellations of Mortgages" (CFI Record, Sp. Proc.
No. 1307, Vol. VIII, pp. 6570-6596) the allegations of which read:
"1. In his lifetime, the late C. N. Hodges executed "Contracts to Sell" real property,
and the prospective buyers under said contracts have already paid the price and
complied with the terms and conditions thereof;
"2. In the course of administration of both estates, mortgage debtors have already
paid their debts secured by chattel mortgages in favor of the late C. N. Hodges, and
are now entitled to release therefrom;
"3. There are attached hereto documents executed jointly by the Administratrix in Sp.
Proc. No. 1307 and the Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 1672, consisting of deeds of
sale in favor
Fernando Cano, Bacolod City, Occ. Negros
Fe Magbanua, Iloilo City
Policarpio M. Pareno, La Paz, Iloilo City
Rosario T. Libre, Jaro, Iloilo City
Federico B. Torres, Iloilo City
Reynaldo T. Lataquin, La Paz, Iloilo City
Anatolio T. Viray, Iloilo City
Benjamin Rolando, Jaro, Iloilo City
and cancellations of mortgages in favor of

Pablo Manzano, Oton, Iloilo

Ricardo M. Diana, Dao, San Jose, Antique
Simplicio Tingson, Iloilo City
Amado Magbanua, Pototan, Iloilo
Roselia M. Baes, Bolo, Roxas City
William Bayani, Rizal Estanzuela, Iloilo City
Elpidio Villarete, Molo, Iloilo City
Norma T. Ruiz, Jaro, Iloilo City
"4. That the approval of the aforesaid documents will not reduce the
assets of the estates so as to prevent any creditor from receiving his
full debt or diminish his dividend."
And the prayer of this motion is indeed very revealing:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, under Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules
of Court, this honorable court approve the aforesaid deeds of sale and cancellations
of mortgages." (Pp. 113-117, Appellee's Brief.)
None of these assertions is denied in Petitioner's reply brief.
Further indicating lack of concrete perspective or orientation on the part of the respondent court and
its hesitancy to clear up matters promptly, in its other appealed order of November 23, 1965, on
pages 334-335 of the Green Record on Appeal, said respondent court allowed the movant Ricardo
Salas, President of appellee Western Institute of Technology (successor of Panay Educational
Institutions, Inc.), one of the parties with whom Hodges had contracts that are in question in the
appeals herein, to pay petitioner, as Administrator of the estate of Hodges and/or respondent Magno,
as Administrator of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, thus:
Considering that in both cases there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor
distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto, the Court believes that
payment to both the administrator of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges and the
administratrix of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or to either one of the two
estates is proper and legal.
WHEREFORE, movant Ricardo T. Salas can pay to both estates or either of them.
SO ORDERED.
(Pp. 334-335, Green Record on Appeal.)
On the other hand, as stated earlier, there were instances when respondent Magno was given
authority to act alone. For instance, in the other appealed order of December 19, 1964, on page 221
of the Green Record on Appeal, the respondent court approved payments made by her of overtime
pay to some employees of the court who had helped in gathering and preparing copies of parts of
the records in both estates as follows:
Considering that the expenses subject of the motion to approve payment of overtime
pay dated December 10, 1964, are reasonable and are believed by this Court to be a
proper charge of administration chargeable to the testate estate of the late Linnie
Jane Hodges, the said expenses are hereby APPROVED and to be charged against

the testate estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges. The administrator of the testate
estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges is hereby ordered to countersign the check
or checks necessary to pay the said overtime pay as shown by the bills marked
Annex "A", "B" and "C" of the motion.
SO ORDERED.
(Pp. 221-222, Green Record on Appeal.)
Likewise, the respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno alone, as
Administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, covering properties in the name of Hodges, pursuant to
"contracts to sell" executed by Hodges, irrespective of whether they were executed by him before or
after the death of his wife. The orders of this nature which are also on appeal herein are the
following:
1. Order of March 30, 1966, on p. 137 of the Green Record on Appeal, approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Lorenzo Carles on February 24, 1966, pursuant
to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on June 17, 1958, after the death of his wife, which contract
petitioner claims was cancelled by it for failure of Carles to pay the installments due on January 7,
1965.
2. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 139-140, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent
Magno in favor of appellee Salvador Guzman on February 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell"
signed by Hodges on September 13, 1960, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner
claims it cancelled on March 3, 1965 in view of failure of said appellee to pay the installments on
time.
3. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 167-168, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent
Magno in favor of appellee Purificacion Coronado on March 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell"
signed by Hodges on August 14, 1961, after the death of his wife.
4. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 168-169, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent
Magno in favor of appellee Florenia Barrido on March 28, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell"
signed by Hodges on February 21, 1958, after the death of his wife.
5. Order of June 7, 1966, on pp. 184-185, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent
Magno in favor of appellee Belcezar Causing on May 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed
by Hodges on February 10, 1959, after the death of his wife.
6. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 211-212, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent
Magno in favor of appellee Artheo Thomas Jamir on June 3, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell"
signed by Hodges on May 26, 1961, after the death of his wife.
7. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 212-213, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent
Magno in favor of appellees Graciano Lucero and Melquiades Batisanan on June 6 and June 3,
1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on June 9, 1959 and November
27, 1961, respectively, after the death of his wife.
8. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., approving the deed of sale executed by
respondent Magno in favor of appellees Espiridion Partisala, Winifredo Espada and Rosario
Alingasa on September 6, 1966, August 17, 1966 and August 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to

"contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on April 20, 1960, April 18, 1960 and August 25, 1958,
respectively, that is, after the death of his wife.
9. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 137-138, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent
Magno in favor of appellee Alfredo Catedral on March 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed
by Hodges on May 29, 1954, before the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it had
cancelled on February 16, 1966 for failure of appellee Catedral to pay the installments due on time.
10. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 138-139, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent
Magno in favor of appellee Jose Pablico on March 7, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by
Hodges on March 7, 1950, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it had
cancelled on June 29, 1960, for failure of appellee Pablico to pay the installments due on time.
11. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., insofar as it approved the deed of sale executed
by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Pepito Iyulores on September 6, 1966, pursuant to a
"contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 5, 1951, before the death of his wife.
12. Order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, id., approving three deeds of sale executed by
respondent Magno, one in favor of appellees Santiago Pacaonsis and two in favor of appellee Adelfa
Premaylon on December 5, 1966 and November 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to separate
"promises to sell" signed respectively by Hodges on May 26, 1955 and January 30, 1954, before the
death of his wife, and October 31, 1959, after her death.
In like manner, there were also instances when respondent court approved deeds of sale executed
by petitioner alone and without the concurrence of respondent Magno, and such approvals have not
been the subject of any appeal. No less than petitioner points this out on pages 149-150 of its brief
as appellant thus:
The points of fact and law pertaining to the two abovecited assignments of error have
already been discussed previously. In the first abovecited error, the order alluded to
was general, and as already explained before, it was, as admitted by the lower court
itself, superseded by the particular orders approving specific final deeds of sale
executed by the appellee, Avelina A. Magno, which are subject of this appeal, as well
as the particular orders approving specific final deeds of sale executed by the
appellant, Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, which were never appealed by
the appellee, Avelina A. Magno, nor by any party for that matter, and which are now
therefore final.
Now, simultaneously with the foregoing incidents, others of more fundamental and all embracing
significance developed. On October 5, 1963, over the signature of Atty. Allison J. Gibbs in
representation of the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta, as counsel for the co-administrators Joe
Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the following self-explanatory motion was filed:
URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL OF
THE ASSETS OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE
DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES AND C N. HODGES EXISTING
AS OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS ALL THE RENTS, EMOLUMENTS AND
INCOME THEREFROM.

COMES NOW the co-administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges,

through his undersigned attorneys in the above-entitled proceedings, and to this
Honorable Court respectfully alleges:
(1) On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City.
(2) On June 28, 1957 this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last Will and
Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed November 22, 1952 and
appointed C. N. Hodges as Executor of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 24-25,
Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
(3) On July 1, 1957 this Honorable Court issued Letters Testamentary to C. N.
Hodges in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
(4) On December 14, 1957 this Honorable Court, on the basis of the following
allegations in a Motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as
attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:
"That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as
conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges."
(p. 44, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
issued the following order:
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executory, for the
reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957 which the
court considers well taken, all the sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
are hereby APPROVED. The said executor is further authorized to
execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of
the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in
consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and testament
of the latter."
(p. 46, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
(5) On April 21, 1959 this Honorable Court approved the inventory and accounting
submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959
wherein he alleged among other things
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be given notice, as herein executor is
the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the
last will and testament already probated by the Honorable Court."
(pp. 77-78, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.).

(6) On July 30, 1960 this Honorable Court approved the "Annual Statement of
Account" submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21,
1960 wherein he alleged among other things:
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be given notice as herein executor is
the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in
accordance with the last will and testament of the deceased, already
probated by this Honorable Court."
(pp. 81-82. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
(7) On May 2, 1961 this Honorable court approved the "Annual Statement of Account
By The Executor for the Year 1960" submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April 20,
1961 wherein he alleged:
That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, of the
time and place of examining the herein account, as herein Executor
is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges,
in accordance with the last will and testament of the deceased,
already probated by this Honorable Court.
(pp. 90-91. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
(8) On December 25, 1962, C.N. Hodges died.
(9) On December 25, 1962, on the Urgent Ex-parte Motion of Leon P. Gellada filed
only in Special Proceeding No. 1307, this Honorable Court appointed Avelina A.
Magno
"Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of
the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter case, because the last will of said
Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and
personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a
Special Administratrix is appointed."
(p. 100. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(10) On December 26, 1962 Letters of Administration were issued to Avelina Magno
pursuant to this Honorable Court's aforesaid Order of December 25, 1962
"With full authority to take possession of all the property of said
deceased in any province or provinces in which it may be situated
and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said
property, said Administratrix and/or Special Administratrix having filed
a bond satisfactory to the Court."
(p. 102, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(11) On January 22, 1963 this Honorable Court on petition of Leon P. Gellada of
January 21, 1963 issued Letters of Administration to:

(a) Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;

(b) Avelina A. Magno as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges; and
(c) Joe Hodges as Co-Special Administrator of the Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges.
(p. 43, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(12) On February 20, 1963 this Honorable Court on the basis of a motion filed by
Leon P. Gellada as legal counsel on February 16, 1963 for Avelina A. Magno acting
as Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (pp. 114-116, Sp. Proc.
1307) issued the following order:
"... se autoriza a aquella (Avelina A. Magno) a firmar escrituras de
venta definitiva de propiedades cubiertas por contratos para vender,
firmados, en vida, por el finado Charles Newton Hodges, cada vez
que el precio estipulado en cada contrato este totalmente pagado. Se
autoriza igualmente a la misma a firmar escrituras de cancelacion de
hipoteca tanto de bienes reales como personales cada vez que la
consideracion de cada hipoteca este totalmente pagada.
"Cada una de dichas escrituras que se otorguen debe ser sometida
para la aprobacion de este Juzgado."
(p. 117, Sp. Proc. 1307).
[Par 1 (c), Reply to Motion For Removal of Joe Hodges]
(13) On September l6, 1963 Leon P. Gellada, acting as attorney for Avelina A. Magno
as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, alleges:
3. That since January, 1963, both estates of Linnie Jane Hodges
and Charles Newton Hodges have been receiving in full, payments
for those "contracts to sell" entered into by C. N. Hodges during his
lifetime, and the purchasers have been demanding the execution of
definite deeds of sale in their favor.
4. That hereto attached are thirteen (13) copies deeds of sale
executed by the Administratrix and by the co-administrator (Fernando
P. Mirasol) of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton
Hodges respectively, in compliance with the terms and conditions of
the respective "contracts to sell" executed by the parties thereto."
(14) The properties involved in the aforesaid motion of September 16, 1963 are all
registered in the name of the deceased C. N. Hodges.
(15) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has been advertising in
the newspaper in Iloilo thusly:

For Sale
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges.
All Real Estate or Personal Property will be sold on First Come First Served Basis.
Avelina
A.
Magno
Admini
stratrix
(16) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has paid and still is
paying sums of money to sundry persons.
(17) Joe Hodges through the undersigned attorneys manifested during the hearings
before this Honorable Court on September 5 and 6, 1963 that the estate of C. N.
Hodges was claiming all of the assets belonging to the deceased spouses Linnie
Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges situated in Philippines because of the aforesaid
election by C. N. Hodges wherein he claimed and took possession as sole owner of
all of said assets during the administration of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on the
ground that he was the sole devisee and legatee under her Last Will and Testament.
(18) Avelina A. Magno has submitted no inventory and accounting of her
administration as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Special
Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges. However, from manifestations made by
Avelina A. Magno and her legal counsel, Leon P. Gellada, there is no question she
will claim that at least fifty per cent (50%) of the conjugal assets of the deceased
spouses and the rents, emoluments and income therefrom belong to the Higdon
family who are named in paragraphs Fourth and Fifth of the Will of Linnie Jane
Hodges (p. 5, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, movant respectfully prays that this Honorable
Court, after due hearing, order:
(1) Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting of all of the funds,
properties and assets of any character belonging to the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into her possession, with full details of
what she has done with them;
(2) Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the Administrator of the estate of C.
N. Hodges all of the funds, properties and assets of any character remaining in her
possession;
(3) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid issues, Avelina A.
Magno to stop, unless she first secures the conformity of Joe Hodges (or his duly
authorized representative, such as the undersigned attorneys) as the Coadministrator and attorney-in-fact of a majority of the beneficiaries of the estate of C.
N. Hodges:
(a) Advertising the sale and the sale of the properties of the estates:

(b) Employing personnel and paying them any compensation.

(4) Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the
premises. (Annex "T", Petition.)
Almost a year thereafter, or on September 14, 1964, after the co-administrators Joe Hodges and
Fernando P. Mirasol were replaced by herein petitioner Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
as sole administrator, pursuant to an agreement of all the heirs of Hodges approved by the court,
and because the above motion of October 5, 1963 had not yet been heard due to the absence from
the country of Atty. Gibbs, petitioner filed the following:
MANIFESTATION AND MOTION, INCLUDING MOTION TO SET
FOR HEARING AND RESOLVE "URGENT MOTION FOR AN
ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO ADMINISTRATORS OF THE
ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL THE ASSETS OF THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE
HODGES AND C. N. HODGES EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957
PLUS ALL OF THE RENTS, EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME
THEREFROM OF OCTOBER 5, 1963.
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as
PCIB), the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased, in Special
Proceedings No. 1672, through its undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court
respectfully alleges that:
1. On October 5, 1963, Joe Hodges acting as the co-administrator of the estate of C.
N. Hodges filed, through the undersigned attorneys, an "Urgent Motion For An
Accounting and Delivery To Administrator of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all Of The
Assets Of The Conjugal Partnership of The Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
Hodges Existing as Of May, 23, 1957 Plus All Of The Rents, Emoluments and
Income Therefrom" (pp. 536-542, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672).
2. On January 24, 1964 this Honorable Court, on the basis of an amicable agreement
entered into on January 23, 1964 by the two co-administrators of the estate of C. N.
Hodges and virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges (p. 912, CFI Rec., S. P. No.
1672), resolved the dispute over who should act as administrator of the estate of C.
N. Hodges by appointing the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges
(pp. 905-906, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672) and issuing letters of administration to the
PCIB.
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and
Fernando P. Mirasol acting as the two co-administrators of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, and Messrs. William Brown and Ardel Young Acting for all of the Higdon
family who claim to be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
various legal counsel representing the aforenamed parties entered into an amicable
agreement, which was approved by this Honorable Court, wherein the parties thereto
agreed that certain sums of money were to be paid in settlement of different claims
against the two estates andthat the assets (to the extent they existed)of both estates
would be administrated jointly by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
subject, however, to the aforesaid October 5, 1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim

to exclusive possession and ownership of one-hundred percent (10017,) (or, in the

alternative, seventy-five percent [75%] of all assets owned by C. N. Hodges or Linnie
Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI
Rec., S. P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court amended its order of January 24, 1964
but in no way changes its recognition of the aforedescribed basic demand by the
PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges to one hundred percent (100%)
of the assets claimed by both estates.
4. On February 15, 1964 the PCIB filed a "Motion to Resolve" the aforesaid Motion of
October 5, 1963. This Honorable Court set for hearing on June 11, 1964 the Motion
of October 5, 1963.
5. On June 11, 1964, because the undersigned Allison J. Gibbs was absent in the
United States, this Honorable Court ordered the indefinite postponement of the
hearing of the Motion of October 5, 1963.
6. Since its appointment as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges the PCIB has
not been able to properly carry out its duties and obligations as administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges because of the following acts, among others, of Avelina A.
Magno and those who claim to act for her as administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges:
(a) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as if she is in exclusive control of
all of the assets in the Philippines of both estates including those
claimed by the estate of C. N. Hodges as evidenced in part by her
locking the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City on August
31, 1964 and refusing to reopen same until ordered to do so by this
Honorable Court on September 7, 1964.
(b) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as though she alone may decide
how the assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges should be administered,
who the PCIB shall employ and how much they may be paid as
evidenced in party by her refusal to sign checks issued by the PCIB
payable to the undersigned counsel pursuant to their fee agreement
approved by this Honorable Court in its order dated March 31, 1964.
(c) Avelina A. Magno illegally gives access to and turns over
possession of the records and assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges to
the attorney-in-fact of the Higdon Family, Mr. James L. Sullivan, as
evidenced in part by the cashing of his personal checks.
(d) Avelina A. Magno illegally refuses to execute checks prepared by
the PCIB drawn to pay expenses of the estate of C. N. Hodges as
evidenced in part by the check drawn to reimburse the PCIB's
advance of P48,445.50 to pay the 1964 income taxes reported due
and payable by the estate of C.N. Hodges.
7. Under and pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court, particularly those of
January 24 and February 1, 1964, and the mandate contained in its Letters of
Administration issued on January 24, 1964 to the PCIB, it has

"full authority to take possession of all the property of

the deceased C. N. Hodges
"and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said
property." (p. 914, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672.)
8. As administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB claims the right to the
immediate exclusive possession and control of all of the properties, accounts
receivables, court cases, bank accounts and other assets, including the documentary
records evidencing same, which existed in the Philippines on the date of C. N.
Hodges' death, December 25, 1962, and were in his possession and registered in his
name alone. The PCIB knows of no assets in the Philippines registered in the name
of Linnie Jane Hodges, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, or, C. N. Hodges, Executor
of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on December 25, 1962. All of the assets of
which the PCIB has knowledge are either registered in the name of C. N. Hodges,
alone or were derived therefrom since his death on December 25, 1962.
9. The PCIB as the current administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased,
succeeded to all of the rights of the previously duly appointed administrators of the
estate of C. N. Hodges, to wit:
(a) On December 25, 1962, date of C. N. Hodges' death, this
Honorable Court appointed Miss Avelina A. Magno simultaneously as:
(i) Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 102, CFI
Rec., S.P. No. 1307) to replace the deceased C. N. Hodges who on
May 28, 1957 was appointed Special Administrator (p. 13. CFI Rec.
S.P. No. 1307) and on July 1, 1957 Executor of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges (p. 30, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307).
(ii) Special Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges (p. 102, CFI
Rec., S.P. No. 1307).
(b) On December 29, 1962 this Honorable Court appointed Harold K.
Davies as co-special administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges along
with Avelina A. Magno (pp. 108-111, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307).
(c) On January 22, 1963, with the conformity of Avelina A. Magno,
Harold K. Davies resigned in favor of Joe Hodges (pp. 35-36, CFI
Rec., S.P. No. 1672) who thereupon was appointed on January 22,
1963 by this Honorable Court as special co-administrator of the
estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 38-40 & 43, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672)
along with Miss Magno who at that time was still acting as special coadministratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
(d) On February 22, 1963, without objection on the part of Avelina A.
Magno, this Honorable Court appointed Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol as co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 76-78,
81 & 85, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672).

10. Miss Avelina A. Magno, pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court of
December 25, 1962, took possession of all Philippine Assets now claimed by the two
estates. Legally, Miss Magno could take possession of the assets registered in the
name of C. N. Hodges alone only in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the
Estate of C.N. Hodges. With the appointment by this Honorable Court on February
22, 1963 of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as the co-administrators of the
estate of C.N. Hodges, they legally were entitled to take over from Miss Magno the
full and exclusive possession of all of the assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges. With
the appointment on January 24, 1964 of the PCIB as the sole administrator of the
estate of C.N. Hodges in substitution of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the
PCIB legally became the only party entitled to the sole and exclusive possession of
all of the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
11. The PCIB's predecessors submitted their accounting and this Honorable Court
approved same, to wit:
(a) The accounting of Harold K. Davies dated January 18, 1963 (pp.
16-33, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672); which shows or its face the:
(i) Conformity of Avelina A. Magno acting as "Administratrix of the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Special Administratrix of the Estate
of C. N. Hodges";
(ii) Conformity of Leslie Echols, a Texas lawyer acting for the heirs of
C.N. Hodges; and
(iii) Conformity of William Brown, a Texas lawyer acting for the Higdon
family who claim to be the only heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 18,
25-33, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on January 22, 1963
(p. 34, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
(b) The accounting of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as of
January 23, 1964, filed February 24, 1964 (pp. 990-1000, CFI Rec.
S.P. No. 1672 and pp. 1806-1848, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1307).
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on March 3, 1964.
(c) The PCIB and its undersigned lawyers are aware of no report or
accounting submitted by Avelina A. Magno of her acts as
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or special
administratrix of the estate of C.N. Hodges, unless it is the accounting
of Harold K. Davies as special co-administrator of the estate of C.N.
Hodges dated January 18, 1963 to which Miss Magno manifested her
conformity (supra).
12. In the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964, Miss Avelina A. Magno agreed to receive
P10,000.00

"for her services as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane

Hodges"
and in addition she agreed to be employed, starting February 1, 1964, at
"a monthly salary of P500.00 for her services as an employee of both
estates."
24 ems.
13. Under the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964 and the orders of this
Honorable Court of same date, the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges is entitled to the exclusive possession of all records, properties and assets in
the name of C. N. Hodges as of the date of his death on December 25, 1962 which
were in the possession of the deceased C. N. Hodges on that date and which then
passed to the possession of Miss Magno in her capacity as Special Co-Administratrix
of the estate of C. N. Hodges or the possession of Joe Hodges or Fernando P.
Mirasol as co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
14. Because of Miss Magno's refusal to comply with the reasonable request of PCIB
concerning the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB dismissed Miss
Magno as an employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges effective August 31, 1964. On
September 1, 1964 Miss Magno locked the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and
denied the PCIB access thereto. Upon the Urgent Motion of the PCIB dated
September 3, 1964, this Honorable Court on September 7, 1964 ordered Miss
Magno to reopen the aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and permit the
PCIB access thereto no later than September 8, 1964.
15. The PCIB pursuant to the aforesaid orders of this Honorable Court is again in
physical possession of all of the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges. However, the
PCIB is not in exclusive control of the aforesaid records, properties and assets
because Miss Magno continues to assert the claims hereinabove outlined in
paragraph 6, continues to use her own locks to the doors of the aforesaid premises
at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City and continues to deny the PCIB its right to know
the combinations to the doors of the vault and safes situated within the premises at
206-208 Guanco Street despite the fact that said combinations were known to only
C. N. Hodges during his lifetime.
16. The Philippine estate and inheritance taxes assessed the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges were assessed and paid on the basis that C. N. Hodges is the sole
beneficiary of the assets of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the
Philippines. Avelina A. Magno and her legal counsel at no time have questioned the
validity of the aforesaid assessment and the payment of the corresponding Philippine
death taxes.
17. Nothing further remains to be done in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges except to
resolve the aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963 and grant the PCIB the exclusive
possession and control of all of the records, properties and assets of the estate of C.
N. Hodges.
18. Such assets as may have existed of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were
ordered by this Honorable Court in special Proceedings No. 1307 to be turned over

and delivered to C. N. Hodges alone. He in fact took possession of them before his
death and asserted and exercised the right of exclusive ownership over the said
assets as the sole beneficiary of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PCIB respectfully petitions that this
Honorable court:
(1) Set the Motion of October 5, 1963 for hearing at the earliest possible date with
notice to all interested parties;
(2) Order Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting as Administratrix
of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Co-Administratrix of the Estate of C. N.
Hodges of all of the funds, properties and assets of any character belonging to the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into her
possession, with full details of what she has done with them;
(3) Order Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the PCIB as administrator of
the estate of C. N. Hodges all of the funds, properties and assets of any character
remaining in her possession;
(4) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid issues, order Avelina
A. Magno and her representatives to stop interferring with the administration of the
estate of C. N. Hodges by the PCIB and its duly authorized representatives;
(5) Enjoin Avelina A. Magno from working in the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street,
Iloilo City as an employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges and approve her dismissal
as such by the PCIB effective August 31, 1964;
(6) Enjoin James L. Sullivan, Attorneys Manglapus and Quimpo and others allegedly
representing Miss Magno from entering the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street,
Iloilo City or any other properties of C. N. Hodges without the express permission of
the PCIB;
(7) Order such other relief as this Honorable Court finds just and equitable in the
premises. (Annex "U" Petition.)
On January 8, 1965, petitioner also filed a motion for "Official Declaration of Heirs of Linnie Jane
Hodges Estate" alleging:
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as PCIB), as
administrator of the estate of the late C. N. Hodges, through the undersigned counsel, and to this
Honorable Court respectfully alleges that:
1. During their marriage, spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges,
American citizens originally from the State of Texas, U.S.A., acquired and
accumulated considerable assets and properties in the Philippines and in the States
of Texas and Oklahoma, United States of America. All said properties constituted
their conjugal estate.
2. Although Texas was the domicile of origin of the Hodges spouses, this Honorable
Court, in its orders dated March 31 and December 12, 1964 (CFI Record, Sp. Proc.

No. 1307, pp. ----; Sp. Proc. No. 1672, p. ----), conclusively found and categorically
ruled that said spouses had lived and worked for more than 50 years in Iloilo City and
had, therefore, acquired a domicile of choice in said city, which they retained until the
time of their respective deaths.
3. On November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo her Last
Will and Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A". The bequests
in said will pertinent to the present issue are the second, third, and fourth provisions,
which we quote in full hereunder.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or
located, to my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold
unto him, my said husband during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said
estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make
any changes in the physical properties of said estate by sale of any
part thereof which he think best, and the purchase of any other or
additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances
with or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or
for any other term or time, any property which he may deem proper to
dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other
minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee
simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he may
elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall
belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided
herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of
the improved property now owned by us located at, in or near the City
of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease, manage
and enjoy the same during his lifetime, as above provided. He shall
have the right to sub-divide any farmland and sell lots therein, and
may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges,
I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of
my estate both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be
equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share
alike, namely:
"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie
Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimray Higdon."
4. On November 14, 1953, C. N. Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo his Last Will
and Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B ". In said Will, C. N.
Hodges designated his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, as his beneficiary using the
identical language she used in the second and third provisos of her Will, supra.
5. On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City, predeceasing her
husband by more than five (5) years. At the time of her death, she had no forced or

compulsory heir, except her husband, C. N. Hodges. She was survived also by
various brothers and sisters mentioned in her Will (supra), which, for convenience,
we shall refer to as the HIGDONS.
6. On June 28, 1957, this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last Will and
Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), and appointed C. N.
Hodges as executor of her estate without bond. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp.
24-25). On July 1, 1957, this Honorable Court issued letters testamentary to C. N.
Hodges in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p.
30.)
7. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respect to the order of succession, the
amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic of its testamentary provisions, should
be governed by Philippine laws because:
(a) The testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, intended Philippine laws to
govern her Will;
(b) Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found", shall prevail. However, the Conflict of Law of
Texas, which is the "national law" of the testatrix, Linnie Jane
Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law see
paragraph 2, supra) should govern the testamentary dispositions and
successional rights over movables (personal properties), and the law
of the situs of the property (also Philippine law as to properties
located in the Philippines) with regards immovable (real properties).
Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and applied by our
Supreme Court in the case of "In The Matter Of The Testate Estate of
Eduard E. Christensen", G.R. No.
L-16749, promulgated January 31, 1963, Philippine law should apply
to the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges and to the successional rights to
her estate insofar as her movable andimmovable assets in the
Philippines are concerned. We shall not, at this stage, discuss what
law should govern the assets of Linnie Jane Hodges located in
Oklahoma and Texas, because the only assets in issue in this motion
are those within the jurisdiction of this motion Court in the two abovecaptioned Special Proceedings.
8. Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate of spouses
shall, upon dissolution, be divided equally between them. Thus, upon the death of
Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, one-half (1/2) of the entirety of the assets of
the Hodges spouses constituting their conjugal estate pertained automatically to
Charles Newton Hodges, not by way of inheritance, but in his own right as partner in
the conjugal partnership. The other one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal estate
constituted the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. This is the only portion of the conjugal
estate capable of inheritance by her heirs.
9. This one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal assets pertaining to Linnie Jane Hodges
cannot, under a clear and specific provision of her Will, be enhanced or increased by
income, earnings, rents, or emoluments accruing after her death on May 23, 1957.

Linnie Jane Hodges' Will provides that "all rents, emoluments and income from said
estate shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further authorized to use any
part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire." (Paragraph 3, Annex
"A".) Thus, by specific provision of Linnie Jane Hodges' Will, "all rents, emoluments
and income" must be credited to the one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal estate
pertaining to C. N. Hodges. Clearly, therefore, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
capable of inheritance by her heirs, consisted exclusively of no more than one-half
(1/2) of the conjugal estate, computed as of the time of her death on May 23, 1957.
10. Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code provide that the surviving
spouse of a deceased leaving no ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a matter
of right and by way of irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half (1/2) of the estate of
the deceased, and no testamentary disposition by the deceased can legally and
validly affect this right of the surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is entitled to said
one-half (1/2) portion of her estate by way of legitime. (Article 886, Civil Code.)
Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges
was the owner of at least three-fourths (3/4) or seventy-five (75%) percent of all of
the conjugal assets of the spouses, (1/2 or 50% by way of conjugal partnership share
and 1/4 or 25% by way of inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents, emoluments and
income" accruing to said conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie Jane Hodges'
death (see paragraph 9, supra).
11. The late Linnie Jane Hodges designated her husband C.N. Hodges as her sole
and exclusive heir with full authority to do what he pleased, as exclusive heir and
owner of all the assets constituting her estate, except only with regards certain
properties "owned by us, located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas". Thus,
even without relying on our laws of succession and legitime, which we have cited
above, C. N. Hodges, by specific testamentary designation of his wife, was entitled
to the entirely to his wife's estate in the Philippines.
12. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "the rights of the successor are
transmitted from the death of the decedent". Thus, title to the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges was transmitted to C. N. Hodges immediately upon her death on May 23,
1957. For the convenience of this Honorable Court, we attached hereto as Annex "C"
a graph of how the conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges should be divided in
accordance with Philippine law and the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges.
13. In his capacity as sole heir and successor to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges as
above-stated, C. N. Hodges, shortly after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges,
appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate. He operated all the assets,
engaged in business and performed all acts in connection with the entirety of the
conjugal estate, in his own name alone, just as he had been operating, engaging and
doing while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on December
25, 1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole possession and control,
and registered in his name alone, not as executor, but as exclusive owner of all said
assets.
14. All these acts of C. N. Hodges were authorized and sanctioned expressly and
impliedly by various orders of this Honorable Court, as follows:
(a) In an Order dated May 27, 1957, this Honorable Court ruled that C. N. Hodges "is
allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged, and to

perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living." (CFI Record,
Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 11.)
(b) On December 14, 1957, this Honorable Court, on the basis of the following fact,
alleged in the verified Motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as
attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:
That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but
also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.'
(CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 44; emphasis supplied.)
issued the following order:
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor, for the reasons stated
in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, all the
sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby
APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and
testament of the latter." (CFI Record. Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 46; emphasis supplied.)
24 ems
(c) On April 21, 1959, this Honorable Court approved the verified inventory and
accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April
14, 1959 wherein he alleged among other things,
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be given notice, as herein executor is
the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the
last will and testament already probated by the Honorable Court."
(CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 77-78; emphasis supplied.)
(d) On July 20, 1960, this Honorable Court approved the verified "Annual Statement
of Account" submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July
21, 1960 wherein he alleged, among other things.
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be given notice as herein executor is
the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in
accordance with the last will and testament ofthe deceased, already
probated by this Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307,
pp. 81-82; emphasis supplied.)
(e) On May 2, 1961, this Honorable Court approved the verified "Annual Statement of
Account By The Executor For the Year 1960" submitted through Leon P. Gellada on
April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged:
"That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, ofthe time and place of
examining the herein account, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of

the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and testament
ofthe deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc.
No. 1307, pp. 90-91; emphasis supplied.)
15. Since C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of Linnie Jane Hodges, not
only by law, but in accordance with the dispositions of her will, there was, in fact, no
need to liquidate the conjugal estate of the spouses. The entirely of said conjugal
estate pertained to him exclusively, therefore this Honorable Court sanctioned and
authorized, as above-stated, C. N. Hodges to manage, operate and control all the
conjugal assets as owner.
16. By expressly authorizing C. N. Hodges to act as he did in connection with the
estate of his wife, this Honorable Court has (1) declared C. N. Hodges as the sole
heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and (2) delivered and distributed her estate
to C. N. Hodges as sole heir in accordance with the terms and conditions of her Will.
Thus, although the "estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" still exists as a legal and juridical
personality, it had no assets or properties located in the Philippines registered in its
name whatsoever at the time of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.
17. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), fourth paragraph, provides as
follows:
"At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give,
devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be
equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share
alike, namely:
"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy
Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimray
Higdon."
Because of the facts hereinabove set out there is no "rest, residue and remainder", at
least to the extent of the Philippine assets, which remains to vest in the HIGDONS,
assuming this proviso in Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is valid and binding against the
estate of C. N. Hodges.
18. Any claims by the HIGDONS under the above-quoted provision of Linnie Jane
Hodges' Will is without merit because said provision is void and invalid at least as to
the Philippine assets. It should not, in anyway, affect the rights of the estate of C. N.
Hodges or his heirs to the properties, which C. N. Hodges acquired by way of
inheritance from his wife Linnie Jane Hodges upon her death.
(a) In spite of the above-mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie
Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges acquired, not merely a usufructuary
right, but absolute title and ownership to her estate. In a recent case
involving a very similar testamentary provision, the Supreme Court
held that the heir first designated acquired full ownership of the
property bequeathed by the will, not mere usufructuary rights.
(Consolacion Florentino de Crisologo, et al., vs. Manuel Singson, G.
R. No. L-13876, February 28, 1962.)

(b) Article 864, 872 and 886 of the New Civil Code clearly provide
that no charge, condition or substitution whatsoever upon the legitime
can be imposed by a testator. Thus, under the provisions of Articles
900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code, the legitime of a surviving
spouse is 1/2 of the estate of the deceased spouse. Consequently,
the above-mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is
clearly invalid insofar as the legitime of C. N. Hodges was concerned,
which consisted of 1/2 of the 1/2 portion of the conjugal estate, or 1/4
of the entire conjugal estate of the deceased.
(c) There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for and
authorized by our Civil Code (Articles 857-870), namely, (1) simple or
common substitution, sometimes referred to as vulgar substitution
(Article 859), and (2) fideicommissary substitution (Article 863). All
other substitutions are merely variations of these. The substitution
provided for by paragraph four of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is
not fideicommissary substitution, because there is clearly no
obligation on the part of C. N. Hodges as the first heir designated, to
preserve the properties for the substitute heirs. (Consolacion
Florentino de Crisologo et al. vs. Manuel Singson, G. R. No.
L-13876.) At most, it is a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in
order that a vulgar orsimple substitution can be valid, three alternative
conditions must be present, namely, that the first designated heir (1)
should die before the testator; or (2) should not wish to accept the
inheritance; or (3) should be incapacitated to do so. None of these
conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and, therefore, the substitution
provided for by the above-quoted provision of the Will is not
authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is void. Manresa,
commenting on these kisses of substitution, meaningfully stated that:
"... cuando el testador instituyeun primer heredero, y por fallecimiento
de este nombra otro u otros, ha de entenderse que estas segundas
designaciones solo han de llegar a tener efectividad en el caso de
que el primer instituido muera antes que el testador, fuera o no esta
su verdadera intencion. ...". (6 Manresa, 7 a ed., pag. 175.) In other
words, when another heir is designated to inherit upon the death of a
first heir, the second designation can have effect only in case the first
instituted heir dies before the testator, whether or not that was the
true intention of said testator. Since C. N. Hodges did not die before
Linnie Jane Hodges, the provision for substitution contained in Linnie
Jane Hodges' Willis void.
(d) In view of the invalidity of the provision for substitution in the Will,
C. N. Hodges' inheritance to the entirety of the Linnie Jane Hodges
estate is irrevocable and final.
19. Be that as it may, at the time of C. N. Hodges' death, the entirety of the conjugal
estate appeared and was registered in him exclusively as owner. Thus, the
presumption is that all said assets constituted his estate. Therefore
(a) If the HIGDONS wish to enforce their dubious rights as substituted heirs to 1/4 of
the conjugal estate (the other 1/4 is covered by the legitime of C. N. Hodges which
can not be affected by any testamentary disposition), their remedy, if any, is to file

their claim against the estate of C. N. Hodges, which should be entitled at the
present time to full custody and control of all the conjugal estate of the spouses.
(b) The present proceedings, in which two estates exist under separate
administration, where the administratrix of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate exercises
an officious right to object and intervene in matters affecting exclusively the C. N.
Hodges estate, is anomalous.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after trial and reception of
evidence, this Honorable Court declare:
1. That the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was and is composed exclusively of onehalf (1/2) share in the conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges, computed as of the
date of her death on May 23, 1957;
2. That the other half of the conjugal estate pertained exclusively to C. N. Hodges as
his share as partner in the conjugal partnership;
3. That all "rents, emoluments and income" of the conjugal estate accruing after
Linnie Jane Hodges' death pertains to C. N. Hodges;
4. That C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges;
5. That, therefore, the entire conjugal estate of the spouses located in the
Philippines, plus all the "rents, emoluments and income" above-mentioned, now
constitutes the estate of C. N. Hodges, capable of distribution to his heirs upon
termination of Special Proceedings No. 1672;
6. That PCIB, as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, is entitled to full and
exclusive custody, control and management of all said properties; and
7. That Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, as
well as the HIGDONS, has no right to intervene or participate in the administration of
the C. N. Hodges estate.
PCIB further prays for such and other relief as may be deemed just and equitable in
the premises."
(Record, pp. 265-277)
Before all of these motions of petitioner could be resolved, however, on December 21, 1965, private
respondent Magno filed her own "Motion for the Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges" as follows:
COMES NOW the Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and, through
undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court most respectfully states and
manifests:

1. That the spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were
American citizens who died at the City of Iloilo after having amassed and
accumulated extensive properties in the Philippines;
2. That on November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed a last will and
testament (the original of this will now forms part of the records of these proceedings
as Exhibit "C" and appears as Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 17-18);
3. That on May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died at the City of Iloilo at the time
survived by her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and several relatives named in
her last will and testament;
4. That on June 28, 1957, a petition therefor having been priorly filed and duly heard,
this Honorable Court issued an order admitting to probate the last will and testament
of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 24-25, 26-28);
5. That the required notice to creditors and to all others who may have any claims
against the decedent, Linnie Jane Hodges has already been printed, published and
posted (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I. pp. 34-40) and the reglamentary period for filing
such claims has long ago lapsed and expired without any claims having been
asserted against the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, approved by the
Administrator/Administratrix of the said estate, nor ratified by this Honorable Court;
6. That the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges already admitted to probate
contains an institution of heirs in the following words:
"SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated or
located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges to have
and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said
estate during his lifetime, and, he is hereby given the right to make
any changes in the physical properties of said estate, by sale of any
part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other
or additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances
with or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or
for any other term or time, any property which he may deem proper to
dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other
minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee
simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he elect to
sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong
to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of
said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided herein, however,
that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved
property now owned by us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock
Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the
same during his lifetime, above provided. He shall have the right to
subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein, and may sell
unimproved town lots.

FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges,

I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of
my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be
equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share
alike, namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie
Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters
named in item Fourth, above, prior to the death of my husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and bequest that the heirs
of such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which
would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived."
7. That under the provisions of the last will and testament already above-quoted,
Linnie Jane Hodges gave a life-estate or a usufruct over all her estate to her
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and a vested remainder-estate or the naked title
over the same estate to her relatives named therein;
8. That after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges and after the admission to probate of
her last will and testament, but during the lifetime of Charles Newton Hodges, the
said Charles Newton Hodges with full and complete knowledge of the life-estate or
usufruct conferred upon him by the will since he was then acting as Administrator of
the estate and later as Executor of the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, unequivocably and
clearly through oral and written declarations and sworn public statements,
renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges;
9. That, accordingly, the only heirs left to receive the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
pursuant to her last will and testament, are her named brothers and sisters, or their
heirs, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon and David
Higdon, the latter two being the wife and son respectively of the deceased Roy
Higdon, Sadie Rascoe Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, all of legal ages, American
citizens, with residence at the State of Texas, United States of America;
10. That at the time of the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, she was
the co-owner (together with her husband Charles Newton Hodges) of an undivided
one-half interest in their conjugal properties existing as of that date, May 23, 1957,
which properties are now being administered sometimes jointly and sometimes
separately by the Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and/or the
Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges but all of which are under the control and
supervision of this Honorable Court;
11. That because there was no separation or segregation of the interests of husband
and wife in the combined conjugal estate, as there has been no such separation or
segregation up to the present, both interests have continually earned exactly the
same amount of "rents, emoluments and income", the entire estate having been
continually devoted to the business of the spouses as if they were alive;
12. That the one-half interest of Linnie Jane Hodges in the combined conjugal estate
was earning "rents, emoluments and income" until her death on May 23, 1957, when

it ceased to be saddled with any more charges or expenditures which are purely
personal to her in nature, and her estate kept on earning such "rents, emoluments
and income" by virtue of their having been expressly renounced, disclaimed and
repudiated by Charles Newton Hodges to whom they were bequeathed for life under
the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges;
13. That, on the other hand, the one-half interest of Charles Newton Hodges in the
combined conjugal estate existing as of May 23, 1957, while it may have earned
exactly the same amount of "rents, emoluments and income" as that of the share
pertaining to Linnie Jane Hodges, continued to be burdened by charges,
expenditures, and other dispositions which are purely personal to him in nature, until
the death of Charles Newton Hodges himself on December 25, 1962;
14. That of all the assets of the combined conjugal estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
Charles Newton Hodges as they exist today, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is
clearly entitled to a portion more than fifty percent (50%) as compared to the portion
to which the estate of Charles Newton Hodges may be entitled, which portions can
be exactly determined by the following manner:
a. An inventory must be made of the assets of the combined conjugal
estate as they existed on the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May
23, 1957 one-half of these assets belong to the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges;
b. An accounting must be made of the "rents, emoluments and
income" of all these assets again one-half of these belong to the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
c. Adjustments must be made, after making a deduction of charges,
disbursements and other dispositions made by Charles Newton
Hodges personally and for his own personal account from May 23,
1957 up to December 25, 1962, as well as other charges,
disbursements and other dispositions made for him and in his behalf
since December 25, 1962 up to the present;
15. That there remains no other matter for disposition now insofar as the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges is concerned but to complete the liquidation of her estate,
segregate them from the conjugal estate, and distribute them to her heirs pursuant to
her last will and testament.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully moved and prayed that
this Honorable Court, after a hearing on the factual matters raised by this motion,
issue an order:
a. Declaring the following persons, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard
Higdon, Aline Higdon, David Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon,
as the sole heirs under the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges and as the
only persons entitled to her estate;
b. Determining the exact value of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in accordance
with the system enunciated in paragraph 14 of this motion;

c. After such determination ordering its segregation from the combined conjugal
estate and its delivery to the Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for
distribution to the heirs to whom they properly belong and appertain.
(Green Record on Appeal, pp. 382-391)
whereupon, instead of further pressing on its motion of January 8, 1965 aforequoted, as it had been
doing before, petitioner withdrew the said motion and in addition to opposing the above motion of
respondent Magno, filed a motion on April 22, 1966 alleging in part that:
1. That it has received from the counsel for the administratrix of the supposed estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges a notice to set her "Motion for Official Declaration of Heirs of
the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges";
2. That before the aforesaid motion could be heard, there are matters pending before
this Honorable Court, such as:
a. The examination already ordered by this Honorable Court of
documents relating to the allegation of Avelina Magno that Charles
Newton Hodges "through ... written declarations and sworn public
statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated life-estate and
usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges';
b. That "Urgent Motion for An Accounting and Delivery to the Estate
of C. N. Hodges of All the Assets of the Conjugal Partnership of the
Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges Existing as of May
23, 1957 Plus All the Rents, Emoluments and Income Therefrom";
c. Various motions to resolve the aforesaid motion;
d. Manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing acts of interference
of Avelina Magno under color of title as administratrix of the Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges;
which are all prejudicial, and which involve no issues of fact, all facts involved therein
being matters of record, and therefore require only the resolution of questions of law;
3. That whatever claims any alleged heirs or other persons may have could be very
easily threshed out in the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges;
4. That the maintenance of two separate estate proceedings and two administrators
only results in confusion and is unduly burdensome upon the Testate Estate of
Charles Newton Hodges, particularly because the bond filed by Avelina Magno is
grossly insufficient to answer for the funds and property which she has inofficiously
collected and held, as well as those which she continues to inofficiously collect
and hold;
5. That it is a matter of record that such state of affairs affects and inconveniences
not only the estate but also third-parties dealing with it;" (Annex "V", Petition.)

and then, after further reminding the court, by quoting them, of the relevant allegations of its earlier
motion of September 14, 1964, Annex U, prayed that:
1. Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to the administrator of
the Estate of C. N. Hodges all the assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents, emoluments and income
therefrom;
2. Pending the consideration of this motion, immediately order Avelina Magno to turn
over all her collections to the administrator Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank;
3. Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed;
4. Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in the
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters hereinabove set forth are
resolved.
(Prayer, Annex "V" of Petition.)
On October 12, 1966, as already indicated at the outset of this opinion, the respondent court denied
the foregoing motion, holding thus:
ORDER
On record is a motion (Vol. X, Sp. 1672, pp. 4379-4390) dated April 22, 1966 of
administrator PCIB praying that (1) Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for
and deliver to the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all assets of the
conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all
the rents, emoluments and income therefrom; (2) Pending the consideration of this
motion, immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over all her collections to the
administrator PCIB; (3) Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc.
No. 1307) closed; and (4) Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion for
declaration of heirs in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters
hereinabove set forth are resolved.
This motion is predicated on the fact that there are matters pending before this court
such as (a) the examination already ordered by this Honorable Court of documents
relating to the allegation of Avelina Magno that Charles Newton Hodges thru written
declaration and sworn public statements renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his
life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (b) the urgent motion
for accounting and delivery to the estate of C. N. Hodges of all the assets of the
conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges existing
as of May 23, 1957 plus all the rents, emoluments and income therefrom; (c) various
motions to resolve the aforesaid motion; and (d) manifestation of September 14,
1964, detailing acts of interference of Avelina Magno under color of title as
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
These matters, according to the instant motion, are all pre-judicial involving no issues
of facts and only require the resolution of question of law; that in the motion of
October 5, 1963 it is alleged that in a motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Atty.
Leon Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges, the said executor C. N.
Hodges is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal but also the
successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.

Said motion of December 11, 1957 was approved by the Court in consonance with
the wishes contained in the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges.
That on April 21, 1959 this Court approved the inventory and accounting submitted
by C. N. Hodges thru counsel Atty. Leon Gellada in a motion filed on April 14, 1959
stating therein that executor C. N. Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of Linnie
Jane Hodges in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the
Court.
That on July 13, 1960 the Court approved the annual statement of accounts
submitted by the executor C. N. Hodges thru his counsel Atty. Gellada on July 21,
1960 wherein it is stated that the executor, C. N. Hodges is the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges; that on May 2, 1961 the Court
approved the annual statement of accounts submitted by executor, C. N. Hodges for
the year 1960 which was submitted by Atty. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein it is
stated that executor Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges;
That during the hearing on September 5 and 6, 1963 the estate of C. N. Hodges
claimed all the assets belonging to the deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and
C. N. Hodges situated in the Philippines; that administratrix Magno has executed
illegal acts to the prejudice of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges.
An opposition (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4415-4421) dated April 27, 1966 of administratrix
Magno has been filed asking that the motion be denied for lack of merit and that the
motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be set
for presentation and reception of evidence.
It is alleged in the aforesaid opposition that the examination of documents which are
in the possession of administratrix Magno can be made prior to the hearing of the
motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, during
said hearing.
That the matters raised in the PCIB's motion of October 5, 1963 (as well as the other
motion) dated September 14, 1964 have been consolidated for the purpose of
presentation and reception of evidence with the hearing on the determination of the
heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. It is further alleged in the opposition that
the motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is
the one that constitutes a prejudicial question to the motions dated October 5 and
September 14, 1964 because if said motion is found meritorious and granted by the
Court, the PCIB's motions of October 5, 1963 and September 14, 1964 will become
moot and academic since they are premised on the assumption and claim that the
only heir of Linnie Jane Hodges was C. N. Hodges.
That the PCIB and counsel are estopped from further questioning the determination
of heirs in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges at this stage since it was PCIB as early
as January 8, 1965 which filed a motion for official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane
Hodges that the claim of any heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges can be determined only in
the administration proceedings over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and not that of
C. N. Hodges, since the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges are claiming her estate and not
the estate of C. N. Hodges.

A reply (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4436-4444) dated May 11, 1966 of the PCIB has been
filed alleging that the motion dated April 22, 1966 of the PCIB is not to seek
deferment of the hearing and consideration of the motion for official declaration of
heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges but to declare the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
closed and for administratrix Magno to account for and deliver to the PCIB all assets
of the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses which has come to her
possession plus all rents and income.
A rejoinder (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4458-4462) of administratrix Magno dated May 19,
1966 has been filed alleging that the motion dated December 11, 1957 only sought
the approval of all conveyances made by C. N. Hodges and requested the Court
authority for all subsequent conveyances that will be executed by C. N. Hodges; that
the order dated December 14, 1957 only approved the conveyances made by C. N.
Hodges; that C. N. Hodges represented by counsel never made any claim in the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and never filed a motion to declare himself as the heir
of the said Linnie Jane Hodges despite the lapse of more than five (5) years after the
death of Linnie Jane Hodges; that it is further alleged in the rejoinder that there can
be no order of adjudication of the estate unless there has been a prior express
declaration of heirs and so far no declaration of heirs in the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges (Sp. 1307) has been made.
Considering the allegations and arguments in the motion and of the PCIB as well as
those in the opposition and rejoinder of administratrix Magno, the Court finds the
opposition and rejoinder to be well taken for the reason that so far there has been no
official declaration of heirs in the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and therefore
no disposition of her estate.
WHEREFORE, the motion of the PCIB dated April 22, 1966 is hereby DENIED.
(Annex "W", Petition)
In its motion dated November 24, 1966 for the reconsideration of this order, petitioner alleged inter
alia that:
It cannot be over-stressed that the motion of December 11, 1957 was based on the
fact that:
a. Under the last will and testament of the deceased, Linnie Jane
Hodges, the late Charles Newton Hodges was the sole heir instituted
insofar as her properties in the Philippines are concerned;
b. Said last will and testament vested upon the said late Charles
Newton Hodges rights over said properties which, in sum, spell
ownership, absolute and in fee simple;
c. Said late Charles Newton Hodges was, therefore, "not only part
owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all
the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
Likewise, it cannot be over-stressed that the aforesaid motion was granted by this
Honorable Court "for the reasons stated" therein.

Again, the motion of December 11, 1957 prayed that not only "all the sales,
conveyances, leases, and mortgages executed by" the late Charles Newton Hodges,
but also all "the subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages ..." be
approved and authorized. This Honorable Court, in its order of December 14, 1957,
"for the reasons stated" in the aforesaid motion, granted the same, and not only
approved all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the late Charles Newton Hodges, but
also authorized "all subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the
properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. (Annex "X", Petition)
and reiterated its fundamental pose that the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges had already been
factually, although not legally, closed with the virtual declaration of Hodges and adjudication to him,
as sole universal heir of all the properties of the estate of his wife, in the order of December 14,
1957, Annex G. Still unpersuaded, on July 18, 1967, respondent court denied said motion for
reconsideration and held that "the court believes that there is no justification why the order of
October 12, 1966 should be considered or modified", and, on July 19, 1967, the motion of
respondent Magno "for official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", already
referred to above, was set for hearing.
In consequence of all these developments, the present petition was filed on August 1, 1967 (albeit
petitioner had to pay another docketing fee on August 9, 1967, since the orders in question were
issued in two separate testate estate proceedings, Nos. 1307 and 1672, in the court below).
Together with such petition, there are now pending before Us for resolution herein, appeals from the
following:
1. The order of December 19, 1964 authorizing payment by respondent Magno of
overtime pay, (pp. 221, Green Record on Appeal) together with the subsequent
orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232, id.) October 27, 1965, (pp. 227, id.) and
February 15, 1966 (pp. 455-456, id.) repeatedly denying motions for reconsideration
thereof.
2. The order of August 6, 1965 (pp. 248, id.) requiring that deeds executed by
petitioner to be co-signed by respondent Magno, as well as the order of October 27,
1965 (pp. 276-277) denying reconsideration.
3. The order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 292-295, id.) enjoining the deposit of all
collections in a joint account and the same order of February 15, 1966 mentioned in
No. 1 above which included the denial of the reconsideration of this order of October
27, 1965.
4. The order of November 3, 1965 (pp. 313-320, id.) directing the payment of
attorney's fees, fees of the respondent administratrix, etc. and the order of February
16, 1966 denying reconsideration thereof.
5. The order of November 23, 1965 (pp. 334-335, id.) allowing appellee Western
Institute of Technology to make payments to either one or both of the administrators
of the two estates as well as the order of March 7, 1966 (p. 462, id.) denying
reconsideration.
6. The various orders hereinabove earlier enumerated approving deeds of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Carles, Catedral, Pablito,

Guzman, Coronado, Barrido, Causing, Javier, Lucero and Batisanan, (see pp. 35 to
37 of this opinion), together with the two separate orders both dated December 2,
1966 (pp. 306-308, and pp. 308-309, Yellow Record on Appeal) denying
reconsideration of said approval.
7. The order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, Yellow Record on Appeal,
approving similar deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno, as those in No. 6, in
favor of appellees Pacaonsis and Premaylon, as to which no motion for
reconsideration was filed.
8. Lastly, the order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 305-306, Yellow Record on Appeal,
directing petitioner to surrender to appellees Lucero, Batisanan, Javier, Pablito,
Barrido, Catedral, Causing, Guzman, and Coronado, the certificates of title covering
the lands involved in the approved sales, as to which no motion for reconsideration
was filed either.
Strictly speaking, and considering that the above orders deal with different matters, just as they
affect distinctly different individuals or persons, as outlined by petitioner in its brief as appellant on
pp. 12-20 thereof, there are, therefore, thirty-three (33) appeals before Us, for which reason,
petitioner has to pay also thirty-one (31) more docket fees.
It is as well perhaps to state here as elsewhere in this opinion that in connection with these appeals,
petitioner has assigned a total of seventy-eight (LXXVIII) alleged errors, the respective discussions
and arguments under all of them covering also the fundamental issues raised in respect to the
petition for certiorari and prohibition, thus making it feasible and more practical for the Court to
dispose of all these cases together. 4
The assignments of error read thus:
I to IV
THE ORDER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA,
WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO
SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
V to VIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR
OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA,
WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, COVERING PARCELS OF
LAND FOR WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.
IX to XII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP
OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES,

ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA,

WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
XIII to XV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO
PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104), EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO
SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XVI to XVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR
OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO
PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) COVERING PARCELS
OF LAND FOR WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.
XIX to XXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP
OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO.
102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) WHILE
ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
XXII to XXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO
CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XXVI to XXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE
EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, LORENZO CARLES, JOSE
PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN PURSUANT TO
CONTRACTS TO SPELL WHICH WERE CANCELLED AND RESCINDED.
XXX to XXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP
OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO
CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE
COURT.
XXXV to XXXVI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN

FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION
CORONADO, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING
PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE
EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XXXVII to XXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR
OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO,
ALTHOUGH THEY WERE IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN
THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH THEY EXECUTED WITH THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF P10,680.00 and
P4,428.90, RESPECTIVELY.
XXXIX to XL
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, OF THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH
HIS ADMINISTRATOR, THE INSTANT APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE
CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND
PURIFICACION CORONADO.
XLI to XLIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR
AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING
WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XLIV to XLVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR
AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL
EXECUTED BY THEM WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER COMPLIED
WITH.
XLVII to XLIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, OF HIS RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH HIS
ADMINISTRATION, THE INSTANT APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS
TO SELL OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR
AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN, AND IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE
SAID APPELLEES OVER REAL PROPERTY WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE
COURT.

L
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO
SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
LI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR
OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH HE WAS IN ARREARS IN
THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH
HE EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE
AMOUNT OF P2,337.50.
LII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH THE SAME WAS NOT
EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF COURT.
LIII to LXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK TO SURRENDER THE OWNER'S
DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OVER THE RESPECTIVE LOTS COVERED
BY THE DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
IN FAVOR OF THE OTHER APPELLEES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL,
SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, FLRENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO,
BELCESAR CAUSING, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MAXIMA BATISANAN AND
GRACIANO L. LUCERO.
LXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965,
WITHOUT ANY COPY THEREOF HAVING BEEN SERVED UPON THE
APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK.
LXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HEARING AND CONSIDERING THE MOTION OF
THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER
3rd, 1965, ON NOVEMBER 23, 1965, WHEN THE NOTICE FOR THE HEARING
THEREOF WAS FOR NOVEMBER 20, 1965.
LXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEE, WESTERN
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY A RELIEF OTHER THAN THAT PRAYED FOR IN

ITS MOTION, DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965, IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRAYER FOR

GENERAL RELIEF CONTAINED THEREIN.
LXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE APPELLEE, WESTERN
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, TO CONTINUE PAYMENTS UPON A CONTRACT
TO SELL THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF WHICH IT HAS FAILED TO FULFILL.
LXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE
APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY OVER THE REAL
PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTRACT TO SELL IT EXECUTED
WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHILE ACTING AS A
PROBATE COURT.
LXVII
LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE CONTINUATION OF PAYMENTS BY
THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, UPON A CONTRACT
TO SELL EXECUTED BY IT AND THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, TO A PERSON OTHER THAN HIS LAWFULLY APPOINTED
ADMINISTRATOR.
LXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S
FEES FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE
HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S
FEES OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPLEMENTING THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE HEIRS OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED,
LINNIE JANE HODGES, AND THEIR LAWYERS.
LXXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION
OF ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY
WAY OF RETAINER'S FEES.
LXXII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT ALL FINAL DEEDS OF SALE
EXECUTED PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL ENTERED INTO BY THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, DURING HIS LIFETIME, BE SIGNED
JOINTLY BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, AND THE APPELLANT,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND NOT BY THE LATTER
ONLY AS THE LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF HIS ESTATE.
LXXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL
EXPENSES FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE
HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL
EXPENSES OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF
THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION
OF ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY
WAY OF LEGAL EXPENSES.
LXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION
TO THE PURPORTED ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, THE INSTANT APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXVII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE FUNDS OF THE
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, BE
PLACED IN A JOINT ACCOUNT OF THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHO IS A
COMPLETE STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE.
LXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, BE GIVEN EQUAL ACCESS TO THE RECORDS OF THE TESTATE
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHEN SHE IS A
COMPLETE STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE. (Pp. 73-83, Appellant's
Brief.)
To complete this rather elaborate, and unavoidably extended narration of the factual setting of these
cases, it may also be mentioned that an attempt was made by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges to have
respondent Magno removed as administratrix, with the proposed appointment of Benito J. Lopez in

her place, and that respondent court did actually order such proposed replacement, but the Court
declared the said order of respondent court violative of its injunction of August 8, 1967, hence
without force and effect (see Resolution of September 8, 1972 and February 1, 1973). Subsequently,
Atty. Efrain B. Trenas, one of the lawyers of said heirs, appeared no longer for the proposed
administrator Lopez but for the heirs themselves, and in a motion dated October 26, 1972 informed
the Court that a motion had been filed with respondent court for the removal of petitioner PCIB as
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, which removal motion
alleged that 22.968149% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already been acquired by the heirs of
Mrs. Hodges from certain heirs of her husband. Further, in this connection, in the answer of PCIB to
the motion of respondent Magno to have it declared in contempt for disregarding the Court's
resolution of September 8, 1972 modifying the injunction of August 8, 1967, said petitioner annexed
thereto a joint manifestation and motion, appearing to have been filed with respondent court,
informing said court that in addition to the fact that 22% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already
been bought by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as already stated, certain other heirs of Hodges
representing 17.343750% of his estate were joining cause with the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as against
PCIB, thereby making somewhat precarious, if not possibly untenable, petitioners' continuation as
administrator of the Hodges estate.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN THE CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION CASES
I
As to the Alleged Tardiness
of the Present Appeals
The priority question raised by respondent Magno relates to the alleged tardiness of all the
aforementioned thirty-three appeals of PCIB. Considering, however, that these appeals revolve
around practically the same main issues and that it is admitted that some of them have been timely
taken, and, moreover, their final results hereinbelow to be stated and explained make it of no
consequence whether or not the orders concerned have become final by the lapsing of the
respective periods to appeal them, We do not deem it necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any
of said appeals.
II
The Propriety Here of Certiorari and
Prohibition instead of Appeal
The other preliminary point of the same respondent is alleged impropriety of the special civil action
of certiorariand prohibition in view of the existence of the remedy of appeal which it claims is proven
by the very appeals now before Us. Such contention fails to take into account that there is a
common thread among the basic issues involved in all these thirty-three appeals which, unless
resolved in one single proceeding, will inevitably cause the proliferation of more or less similar or
closely related incidents and consequent eventual appeals. If for this consideration alone, and
without taking account anymore of the unnecessary additional effort, expense and time which would
be involved in as many individual appeals as the number of such incidents, it is logical and proper to
hold, as We do hold, that the remedy of appeal is not adequate in the present cases. In determining
whether or not a special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may be resorted to in lieu of appeal, in
instances wherein lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is alleged, it is not
enough that the remedy of appeal exists or is possible. It is indispensable that taking all the relevant
circumstances of the given case, appeal would better serve the interests of justice. Obviously, the

longer delay, augmented expense and trouble and unnecessary repetition of the same work
attendant to the present multiple appeals, which, after all, deal with practically the same basic issues
that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action, make the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition, pursued by petitioner, preferable, for purposes of resolving the
common basic issues raised in all of them, despite the conceded availability of appeal. Besides, the
settling of such common fundamental issues would naturally minimize the areas of conflict between
the parties and render more simple the determination of the secondary issues in each of them.
Accordingly, respondent Magno's objection to the present remedy of certiorari and prohibition must
be overruled.
We come now to the errors assigned by petitioner-appellant, Philippine Commercial & Industrial
Bank, (PCIB, for short) in the petition as well as in its main brief as appellant.
III
On Whether or Not There is Still Any Part of the Testate
Estate Mrs. Hodges that may be Adjudicated to her brothers
and sisters as her estate, of which respondent Magno is the
unquestioned Administratrix in special Proceedings 1307.
In the petition, it is the position of PCIB that the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely
abused its discretion in further recognizing after December 14, 1957 the existence of the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and in sanctioning purported acts of administration therein of
respondent Magno. Main ground for such posture is that by the aforequoted order of respondent
court of said date, Hodges was already allowed to assert and exercise all his rights as universal heir
of his wife pursuant to the provisions of her will, quoted earlier, hence, nothing else remains to be
done in Special Proceedings 1307 except to formally close it. In other words, the contention of PCIB
is that in view of said order, nothing more than a formal declaration of Hodges as sole and exclusive
heir of his wife and the consequent formal unqualified adjudication to him of all her estate remain to
be done to completely close Special Proceedings 1307, hence respondent Magno should be
considered as having ceased to be Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges since then.
After carefully going over the record, We feel constrained to hold that such pose is patently
untenable from whatever angle it is examined.
To start with, We cannot find anywhere in respondent Order of December 14, 1957 the sense being
read into it by PCIB. The tenor of said order bears no suggestion at all to such effect. The
declaration of heirs and distribution by the probate court of the estate of a decedent is its most
important function, and this Court is not disposed to encourage judges of probate proceedings to be
less than definite, plain and specific in making orders in such regard, if for no other reason than that
all parties concerned, like the heirs, the creditors, and most of all the government, the devisees and
legatees, should know with certainty what are and when their respective rights and obligations
ensuing from the inheritance or in relation thereto would begin or cease, as the case may be,
thereby avoiding precisely the legal complications and consequent litigations similar to those that
have developed unnecessarily in the present cases. While it is true that in instances wherein all the
parties interested in the estate of a deceased person have already actually distributed among
themselves their respective shares therein to the satisfaction of everyone concerned and no rights of
creditors or third parties are adversely affected, it would naturally be almost ministerial for the court
to issue the final order of declaration and distribution, still it is inconceivable that the special
proceeding instituted for the purpose may be considered terminated, the respective rights of all the
parties concerned be deemed definitely settled, and the executor or administrator thereof be

regarded as automatically discharged and relieved already of all functions and responsibilities
without the corresponding definite orders of the probate court to such effect.
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal. Section 1 of Rule 90 provides:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow and inheritance
tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law have been paid, the court,
on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the
estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which
each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares
from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his
possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned
has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them give a bond,
in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs.
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of a deceased may be deemed ready for final closure, (1) there should have been
issued already an order of distribution or assignment of the estate of the decedent among or to those
entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such order shall not be issued until after it is shown that the
"debts, funeral expenses, expenses of administration, allowances, taxes, etc. chargeable to the
estate" have been paid, which is but logical and proper. (3) Besides, such an order is usually issued
upon proper and specific application for the purpose of the interested party or parties, and not of the
court.
... it is only after, and not before, the payment of all debts, funeral charges, expenses
of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax shall have been
effected that the court should make a declaration of heirs or of such persons as are
entitled by law to the residue. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd ed., Vol.
II, p. 397, citing Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 49 Phil., 726; Lopez vs. Lopez, 37 Off.
Gaz., 3091.) (JIMOGA-ON v. BELMONTE, 84 Phil. 545, 548) (p. 86, Appellee's Brief)
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (corresponding to Section 1, Rule
90) what brings an intestate (or testate) proceeding to a close is the order of
distribution directing delivery of the residue to the persons entitled thereto after
paying the indebtedness, if any, left by the deceased. (Santiesteban vs.
Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, 370.)
In the cases at bar, We cannot discern from the voluminous and varied facts, pleadings and orders
before Us that the above indispensable prerequisites for the declaration of heirs and the adjudication
of the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been complied with when the order of December 14, 1957
was issued. As already stated, We are not persuaded that the proceedings leading to the issuance
of said order, constituting barely of the motion of May 27, 1957, Annex D of the petition, the order of
even date, Annex E, and the motion of December 11, 1957, Annex H, all aforequoted, are what the

law contemplates. We cannot see in the order of December 14, 1957, so much relied upon by the
petitioner, anything more than an explicit approval of "all the sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor
Charles N. Hodges" (after the death of his wife and prior to the date of the motion), plus a general
advance authorization to enable said "Executor to execute subsequent sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of the properties left the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance
with wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter", which, certainly, cannot amount to
the order of adjudication of the estate of the decedent to Hodges contemplated in the law. In fact, the
motion of December 11, 1957 on which the court predicated the order in question did not pray for
any such adjudication at all. What is more, although said motion did allege that "herein Executor
(Hodges) is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", it significantly added that "herein Executor, as
Legatee (sic), has the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the properties in the Philippines
during his lifetime", thereby indicating that what said motion contemplated was nothing more than
either the enjoyment by Hodges of his rights under the particular portion of the dispositions of his
wife's will which were to be operative only during his lifetime or the use of his own share of the
conjugal estate, pending the termination of the proceedings. In other words, the authority referred to
in said motions and orders is in the nature of that contemplated either in Section 2 of Rule 109 which
permits, in appropriate cases, advance or partial implementation of the terms of a duly probated will
before final adjudication or distribution when the rights of third parties would not be adversely
affected thereby or in the established practice of allowing the surviving spouse to dispose of his own
share of he conjugal estate, pending its final liquidation, when it appears that no creditors of the
conjugal partnership would be prejudiced thereby, (see the Revised Rules of Court by Francisco,
Vol. V-B, 1970 ed. p. 887) albeit, from the tenor of said motions, We are more inclined to believe that
Hodges meant to refer to the former. In any event, We are fully persuaded that the quoted
allegations of said motions read together cannot be construed as a repudiation of the rights
unequivocally established in the will in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters to whatever have
not been disposed of by him up to his death.
Indeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the trial court subsequently acted upon the
premise suggested by petitioner. On the contrary, on November 23, 1965, when the court resolved
the motion of appellee Western Institute of Technology by its order We have quoted earlier, it
categorically held that as of said date, November 23, 1965, "in both cases (Special Proceedings
1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to
whomsoever are entitled thereto." In this connection, it may be stated further against petitioner, by
way of some kind of estoppel, that in its own motion of January 8, 1965, already quoted in full on
pages 54-67 of this decision, it prayed inter alia that the court declare that "C. N. Hodges was the
sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", which it would not have done if it were
really convinced that the order of December 14, 1957 was already the order of adjudication and
distribution of her estate. That said motion was later withdrawn when Magno filed her own motion for
determination and adjudication of what should correspond to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges
does not alter the indubitable implication of the prayer of the withdrawn motion.
It must be borne in mind that while it is true that Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to her
husband and gave him what amounts to full powers of dominion over the same during his lifetime,
she imposed at the same time the condition that whatever should remain thereof upon his death
should go to her brothers and sisters. In effect, therefore, what was absolutely given to Hodges was
only so much of his wife's estate as he might possibly dispose of during his lifetime; hence, even
assuming that by the allegations in his motion, he did intend to adjudicate the whole estate to
himself, as suggested by petitioner, such unilateral act could not have affected or diminished in any
degree or manner the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law over what would remain thereof upon
his death, for surely, no one can rightly contend that the testamentary provision in question allowed
him to so adjudicate any part of the estate to himself as to prejudice them. In other words,

irrespective of whatever might have been Hodges' intention in his motions, as Executor, of May 27,
1957 and December 11, 1957, the trial court's orders granting said motions, even in the terms in
which they have been worded, could not have had the effect of an absolute and unconditional
adjudication unto Hodges of the whole estate of his wife. None of them could have deprived his
brothers and sisters-in-law of their rights under said will. And it may be added here that the fact that
no one appeared to oppose the motions in question may only be attributed, firstly, to the failure of
Hodges to send notices to any of them, as admitted in the motion itself, and, secondly, to the fact
that even if they had been notified, they could not have taken said motions to be for the final
distribution and adjudication of the estate, but merely for him to be able, pending such final
distribution and adjudication, to either exercise during his lifetime rights of dominion over his wife's
estate in accordance with the bequest in his favor, which, as already observed, may be allowed
under the broad terms of Section 2 of Rule 109, or make use of his own share of the conjugal estate.
In any event, We do not believe that the trial court could have acted in the sense pretended by
petitioner, not only because of the clear language of the will but also because none of the interested
parties had been duly notified of the motion and hearing thereof. Stated differently, if the orders of
May 27, 1957 and December 4, 1957 were really intended to be read in the sense contended by
petitioner, We would have no hesitancy in declaring them null and void.
Petitioner cites the case of Austria vs. Ventenilla, G. R. No. L-10018, September 19, 1956,
(unreported but a partial digest thereof appears in 99 Phil. 1069) in support of its insistence that with
the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957, the closure of Mrs. Hodges' estate has become a
mere formality, inasmuch as said orders amounted to the order of adjudication and distribution
ordained by Section 1 of Rule 90. But the parallel attempted to be drawn between that case and the
present one does not hold. There the trial court had in fact issued a clear, distinct and express order
of adjudication and distribution more than twenty years before the other heirs of the deceased filed
their motion asking that the administratrix be removed, etc. As quoted in that decision, the order of
the lower court in that respect read as follows:
En orden a la mocion de la administradora, el juzgado la encuentra procedente bajo
la condicion de que no se hara entrega ni adjudicacion de los bienes a los herederos
antes de que estos presten la fianza correspondiente y de acuerdo con lo prescrito
en el Art. 754 del Codigo de Procedimientos: pues, en autos no aparece que hayan
sido nombrados comisionados de avaluo y reclamaciones. Dicha fianza podra ser
por un valor igual al de los bienes que correspondan a cada heredero segun el
testamento. Creo que no es obice para la terminacion del expediente el hecho de
que la administradora no ha presentado hasta ahora el inventario de los bienes;
pues, segun la ley, estan exentos de esta formalidad os administradores que son
legatarios del residuo o remanente de los bienes y hayan prestado fianza para
responder de las gestiones de su cargo, y aparece en el testamento que la
administradora Alejandra Austria reune dicha condicion.
POR TODO LO EXPUESTO, el juzgado declara, 1.o: no haber lugar a la mocion de
Ramon Ventenilla y otros; 2.o, declara asimismo que los unicos herederos del finado
Antonio Ventenilla son su esposa Alejandra Austria, Maria Ventenilla, hermana del
testador, y Ramon Ventenilla, Maria Ventenilla, Ramon Soriano, Eulalio Soriano,
Jose Soriano, Gabriela Ventenilla, Lorenzo Ventenilla, Felicitas Ventenilla, Eugenio
Ventenilla y Alejandra Ventenilla, en representacion de los difuntos Juan, Tomas,
Catalino y Froilan, hermanos del testador, declarando, ademas que la heredera
Alejandra Austria tiene derecho al remanente de todos los bienes dejados por el
finado, despues de deducir de ellos la porcion que corresponde a cada uno de sus
coherederos, conforme esta mandado en las clausulas 8.a, 9.a, 10.a, 11.a, 12.a y
13.a del testamento; 3.o, se aprueba el pago hecho por la administradora de los
gastos de la ultima enfermedad y funerales del testador, de la donacion hecha por el

testador a favor de la Escuela a Publica del Municipio de Mangatarem, y de las

misas en sufragio del alma del finado; 4.o, que una vez prestada la fianza
mencionada al principio de este auto, se haga la entrega y adjudicacion de los
bienes, conforme se dispone en el testamento y se acaba de declarar en este auto;
5.o, y, finalmente, que verificada la adjudicacion, se dara por terminada la
administracion, revelandole toda responsabilidad a la administradora, y cancelando
su fianza.
ASI SE ORDENA.
Undoubtedly, after the issuance of an order of such tenor, the closure of any proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person cannot be but perfunctory.
In the case at bar, as already pointed out above, the two orders relied upon by petitioner do not
appear ex-facieto be of the same tenor and nature as the order just quoted, and, what is more, the
circumstances attendant to its issuance do not suggest that such was the intention of the court, for
nothing could have been more violative of the will of Mrs. Hodges.
Indeed, to infer from Hodges' said motions and from his statements of accounts for the years 1958,
1959 and 1960, A Annexes I, K and M, respectively, wherein he repeatedly claimed that "herein
executor (being) the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and
testament already probated," there is "no (other) person interested in the Philippines of the time and
place of examining herein account to be given notice", an intent to adjudicate unto himself the whole
of his wife's estate in an absolute manner and without regard to the contingent interests of her
brothers and sisters, is to impute bad faith to him, an imputation which is not legally permissible,
much less warranted by the facts of record herein. Hodges knew or ought to have known that, legally
speaking, the terms of his wife's will did not give him such a right. Factually, there are enough
circumstances extant in the records of these cases indicating that he had no such intention to ignore
the rights of his co-heirs. In his very motions in question, Hodges alleged, thru counsel, that the
"deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants and ascendants, except brothers and
sisters and herein petitioner, as surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent", and even
promised that "proper accounting will be had in all these transactions" which he had submitted for
approval and authorization by the court, thereby implying that he was aware of his responsibilities
vis-a-vis his co-heirs. As alleged by respondent Magno in her brief as appellee:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C. N. Hodges filed his first "Account by the Executor" of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges
and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C.
N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of
P328,402.62, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1958 on
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having
earned income of P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined
personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's
Brief.)
Under date of July 21, 1960, C. N. Hodges filed his second "Annual Statement of
Account by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of
Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December
31, 1959 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate
earned a net income of P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for

calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the
said estate as having earned income of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net
income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (pp. 91-92, id.)
Under date of April 20, 1961, C. N. Hodges filed his third "Annual Statement of
Account by the Executor for the year 1960" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In
the "Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges" as of December 31, 1960 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the
combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P314,857.94, divided of Linnie
Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual evenly between him and the
estate income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of P157,428.97,
exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 92-93,id.)
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven brothers and
sisters of Linnie Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the court
admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see
p. 14, Green ROA). Immediately, C. N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy
Higdon's name included as an heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the records
"in order (that) the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were
omitted, and that they were really and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges".
Thus, he recognized, if in his own way, the separate identity of his wife's estate from his own share
of the conjugal partnership up to the time of his death, more than five years after that of his wife. He
never considered the whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself. The only
conclusion one can gather from this is that he could have been preparing the basis for the eventual
transmission of his wife's estate, or, at least, so much thereof as he would not have been able to
dispose of during his lifetime, to her brothers and sisters in accordance with her expressed desire,
as intimated in his tax return in the United States to be more extensively referred to anon. And
assuming that he did pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the
basis of his being sole heir, such payment is not necessarily inconsistent with his recognition of the
rights of his co-heirs. Without purporting to rule definitely on the matter in these proceedings, We
might say here that We are inclined to the view that under the peculiar provisions of his wife's will,
and for purposes of the applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered as her sole
heir, pending the actual transmission of the remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon
the eventuality of his death, and whatever adjustment might be warranted should there be any such
remainder then is a matter that could well be taken care of by the internal revenue authorities in due
time.
It is to be noted that the lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who signed the motions of May 27, 1957 and
December 11, 1957 and the aforementioned statements of account was the very same one who also
subsequently signed and filed the motion of December 26, 1962 for the appointment of respondent
Magno as "Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Linnie Jane Hodges" wherein it was alleged that "in
accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real
properties that may remain at the death of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, the said
properties shall be equally divided among their heirs." And it appearing that said attorney was
Hodges' lawyer as Executor of the estate of his wife, it stands to reason that his understanding of the
situation, implicit in his allegations just quoted, could somehow be reflective of Hodges' own
understanding thereof.

As a matter of fact, the allegations in the motion of the same Atty. Gellada dated July 1, 1957, a
"Request for Inclusion of the Name of Roy Higdon in the Order of the Court dated July 19, 1957,
etc.", reference to which is made in the above quotation from respondent Magno's brief, are over the
oath of Hodges himself, who verified the motion. Said allegations read:
1. That the Hon. Court issued orders dated June 29, 1957, ordering the probate of
the will.
2. That in said order of the Hon. Court, the relatives of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges were enumerated. However, in the petition as well as in the testimony of
Executor during the hearing, the name Roy Higdon was mentioned, but deceased. It
was unintentionally omitted the heirs of said Roy Higdon who are his wife Aline
Higdon and son David Higdon, all of age, and residents of Quinlan, Texas, U.S.A.
3. That to straighten the records, and in order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon
may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are
interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, it is requested of the Hon.
Court to insert the names of Aline Higdon and David Higdon, wife and son of
deceased Roy Higdon in the said order of the Hon. Court dated June 29, 1957. (pars.
1 to 3, Annex 2 of Magno's Answer Record, p. 260)
As can be seen, these italicized allegations indicate, more or less, the real attitude of Hodges in
regard to the testamentary dispositions of his wife.
In connection with this point of Hodges' intent, We note that there are documents, copies of which
are annexed to respondent Magno's answer, which purportedly contain Hodges' own solemn
declarations recognizing the right of his co-heirs, such as the alleged tax return he filed with the
United States Taxation authorities, identified as Schedule M, (Annex 4 of her answer) and his
supposed affidavit of renunciation, Annex 5. In said Schedule M, Hodges appears to have answered
the pertinent question thus:
2a. Had the surviving spouse the right to declare an election between (1) the
provisions made in his or her favor by the will and (11) dower, curtesy or a statutory
interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
2d. Does the surviving spouse contemplate renouncing the will and electing to take
dower, curtesy, or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
3. According to the information and belief of the person or persons filing the return, is
any action described under question 1 designed or contemplated? ( ) Yes (X) No
(Annex 4, Answer Record, p. 263)
and to have further stated under the item, "Description of property interests passing to surviving
spouse" the following:
None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and other
legal charges.It is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased to distribute the
remaining property and interests of the deceased in their Community Estate to the
devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and
expenses of administration are finally determined and paid. (Annex 4, Answer
Record, p. 263)

In addition, in the supposed affidavit of Hodges, Annex 5, it is stated:

I, C. N. Hodges, being duly sworn, on oath affirm that at the time the United States
Estate Tax Return was filed in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on August 8, 1958, I
renounced and disclaimed any and all right to receive the rents, emoluments and
income from said estate, as shown by the statement contained in Schedule M at
page 29 of said return, a copy of which schedule is attached to this affidavit and
made a part hereof.
The purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do hereby ratify and
confirm, the declaration made in Schedule M of said return and hereby formally
disclaim and renounce any right on my part to receive any of the said rents,
emoluments and income from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges.
This affidavit is made to absolve me or my estate from any liability for the payment of
income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957. (Annex 5, Answer
Record, p. 264)
Although it appears that said documents were not duly presented as evidence in the court below,
and We cannot, therefore, rely on them for the purpose of the present proceedings, still, We cannot
close our eyes to their existence in the record nor fail to note that their tenor jibes with Our
conclusion discussed above from the circumstances related to the orders of May 27 and December
14, 1957. 5 Somehow, these documents, considering they are supposed to be copies of their
originals found in the official files of the governments of the United States and of the Philippines,
serve to lessen any possible apprehension that Our conclusion from the other evidence of Hodges'
manifest intent vis-a-vis the rights of his co-heirs is without basis in fact.
Verily, with such eloquent manifestations of his good intentions towards the other heirs of his wife,
We find it very hard to believe that Hodges did ask the court and that the latter agreed that he be
declared her sole heir and that her whole estate be adjudicated to him without so much as just
annotating the contingent interest of her brothers and sisters in what would remain thereof upon his
demise. On the contrary, it seems to us more factual and fairer to assume that Hodges was well
aware of his position as executor of the will of his wife and, as such, had in mind the following
admonition made by the Court in Pamittan vs. Lasam, et al., 60 Phil., 908, at pp. 913-914:
Upon the death of Bernarda in September, 1908, said lands continued to be conjugal
property in the hands of the defendant Lasam. It is provided in article 1418 of the
Civil Code that upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, an inventory shall
immediately be made and this court in construing this provision in connection with
section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure (prior to its amendment by Act No. 3176
of November 24, 1924) has repeatedly held that in the event of the death of the wife,
the law imposes upon the husband the duty of liquidating the affairs of the
partnership without delay (desde luego) (Alfonso vs. Natividad, 6 Phil., 240; Prado
vs. Lagera, 7 Phil., 395; De la Rama vs. De la Rama, 7 Phil., 745; Enriquez vs.
Victoria, 10 Phil., 10; Amancio vs. Pardo, 13 Phil., 297; Rojas vs. Singson Tongson,
17 Phil., 476; Sochayseng vs. Trujillo, 31 Phil., 153; Molera vs. Molera, 40 Phil., 566;
Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil., 713.)
In the last mentioned case this court quoted with approval the case of Leatherwood
vs. Arnold (66 Texas, 414, 416, 417), in which that court discussed the powers of the
surviving spouse in the administration of the community property. Attention was
called to the fact that the surviving husband, in the management of the conjugal

property after the death of the wife, was a trustee of unique character who is liable
for any fraud committed by him with relation to the property while he is charged with
its administration. In the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, he had wide powers
(as the law stood prior to Act No. 3176) and the high degree of trust reposed in him
stands out more clearly in view of the fact that he was the owner of a half interest in
his own right of the conjugal estate which he was charged to administer. He could
therefore no more acquire a title by prescription against those for whom he was
administering the conjugal estate than could a guardian against his ward or a judicial
administrator against the heirs of estate. Section 38 of Chapter III of the Code of Civil
Procedure, with relation to prescription, provides that "this chapter shall not apply ...
in the case of a continuing and subsisting trust." The surviving husband in the
administration and liquidation of the conjugal estate occupies the position of a trustee
of the highest order and is not permitted by the law to hold that estate or any portion
thereof adversely to those for whose benefit the law imposes upon him the duty of
administration and liquidation. No liquidation was ever made by Lasam hence, the
conjugal property which came into his possession on the death of his wife in
September, 1908, still remains conjugal property, a continuing and subsisting trust.
He should have made a liquidation immediately (desde luego). He cannot now be
permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. One of the conditions of title by
prescription (section 41, Code of Civil Procedure) is possession "under a claim of title
exclusive of any other right". For a trustee to make such a claim would be a manifest
fraud.
And knowing thus his responsibilities in the premises, We are not convinced that Hodges arrogated
everything unto himself leaving nothing at all to be inherited by his wife's brothers and sisters.
PCIB insists, however, that to read the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957, not as
adjudicatory, but merely as approving past and authorizing future dispositions made by Hodges in a
wholesale and general manner, would necessarily render the said orders void for being violative of
the provisions of Rule 89 governing the manner in which such dispositions may be made and how
the authority therefor and approval thereof by the probate court may be secured. If We sustained
such a view, the result would only be that the said orders should be declared ineffective either way
they are understood, considering We have already seen it is legally impossible to consider them as
adjudicatory. As a matter of fact, however, what surges immediately to the surface, relative to PCIB's
observations based on Rule 89, is that from such point of view, the supposed irregularity would
involve no more than some non-jurisdictional technicalities of procedure, which have for their evident
fundamental purpose the protection of parties interested in the estate, such as the heirs, its
creditors, particularly the government on account of the taxes due it; and since it is apparent here
that none of such parties are objecting to said orders or would be prejudiced by the unobservance by
the trial court of the procedure pointed out by PCIB, We find no legal inconvenience in nor
impediment to Our giving sanction to the blanket approval and authority contained in said orders.
This solution is definitely preferable in law and in equity, for to view said orders in the sense
suggested by PCIB would result in the deprivation of substantive rights to the brothers and sisters of
Mrs. Hodges, whereas reading them the other way will not cause any prejudice to anyone, and,
withal, will give peace of mind and stability of rights to the innocent parties who relied on them in
good faith, in the light of the peculiar pertinent provisions of the will of said decedent.
Now, the inventory submitted by Hodges on May 12, 1958 referred to the estate of his wife as
consisting of "One-half of all the items designated in the balance sheet, copy of which is hereto
attached and marked as "Annex A"." Although, regrettably, no copy of said Annex A appears in the
records before Us, We take judicial notice, on the basis of the undisputed facts in these cases, that
the same consists of considerable real and other personal kinds of properties. And since, according
to her will, her husband was to be the sole owner thereof during his lifetime, with full power and

authority to dispose of any of them, provided that should there be any remainder upon his death,
such remainder would go to her brothers and sisters, and furthermore, there is no pretension, much
less any proof that Hodges had in fact disposed of all of them, and, on the contrary, the indications
are rather to the effect that he had kept them more or less intact, it cannot truthfully be said that,
upon the death of Hodges, there was no more estate of Mrs. Hodges to speak of. It is Our
conclusion, therefore, that properties do exist which constitute such estate, hence Special
Proceedings 1307 should not yet be closed.
Neither is there basis for holding that respondent Magno has ceased to be the Administratrix in said
proceeding. There is no showing that she has ever been legally removed as such, the attempt to
replace her with Mr. Benito Lopez without authority from the Court having been expressly held
ineffective by Our resolution of September 8, 1972. Parenthetically, on this last point, PCIB itself is
very emphatic in stressing that it is not questioning said respondent's status as such administratrix.
Indeed, it is not clear that PCIB has any standing to raise any objection thereto, considering it is a
complete stranger insofar as the estate of Mrs. Hodges is concerned.
It is the contention of PCIB, however, that as things actually stood at the time of Hodges' death, their
conjugal partnership had not yet been liquidated and, inasmuch as the properties composing the
same were thus commingled pro indiviso and, consequently, the properties pertaining to the estate
of each of the spouses are not yet identifiable, it is PCIB alone, as administrator of the estate of
Hodges, who should administer everything, and all that respondent Magno can do for the time being
is to wait until the properties constituting the remaining estate of Mrs. Hodges have been duly
segregated and delivered to her for her own administration. Seemingly, PCIB would liken the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges to a party having a claim of ownership to some properties included in
the inventory of an administrator of the estate of a decedent, (here that of Hodges) and who normally
has no right to take part in the proceedings pending the establishment of his right or title; for which
as a rule it is required that an ordinary action should be filed, since the probate court is without
jurisdiction to pass with finality on questions of title between the estate of the deceased, on the one
hand, and a third party or even an heir claiming adversely against the estate, on the other.
We do not find such contention sufficiently persuasive. As We see it, the situation obtaining herein
cannot be compared with the claim of a third party the basis of which is alien to the pending probate
proceedings. In the present cases what gave rise to the claim of PCIB of exclusive ownership by the
estate of Hodges over all the properties of the Hodges spouses, including the share of Mrs. Hodges
in the community properties, were the orders of the trial court issued in the course of the very
settlement proceedings themselves, more specifically, the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957
so often mentioned above. In other words, the root of the issue of title between the parties is
something that the court itself has done in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction. And since in the
ultimate analysis, the question of whether or not all the properties herein involved pertain exclusively
to the estate of Hodges depends on the legal meaning and effect of said orders, the claim that
respondent court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the said issue is incorrect. If it
was within the competence of the court to issue the root orders, why should it not be within its
authority to declare their true significance and intent, to the end that the parties may know whether
or not the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been adjudicated by the court, upon the initiative of
Hodges, in his favor, to the exclusion of the other heirs of his wife instituted in her will?
At this point, it bears emphasis again that the main cause of all the present problems confronting the
courts and the parties in these cases was the failure of Hodges to secure, as executor of his wife's
estate, from May, 1957 up to the time of his death in December, 1962, a period of more than five
years, the final adjudication of her estate and the closure of the proceedings. The record is bare of
any showing that he ever exerted any effort towards the early settlement of said estate. While, on the
one hand, there are enough indications, as already discuss that he had intentions of leaving intact

her share of the conjugal properties so that it may pass wholly to his co-heirs upon his death,
pursuant to her will, on the other hand, by not terminating the proceedings, his interests in his own
half of the conjugal properties remained commingled pro-indiviso with those of his co-heirs in the
other half. Obviously, such a situation could not be conducive to ready ascertainment of the portion
of the inheritance that should appertain to his co-heirs upon his death. Having these considerations
in mind, it would be giving a premium for such procrastination and rather unfair to his co-heirs, if the
administrator of his estate were to be given exclusive administration of all the properties in question,
which would necessarily include the function of promptly liquidating the conjugal partnership, thereby
identifying and segregating without unnecessary loss of time which properties should be considered
as constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges, the remainder of which her brothers and sisters are
supposed to inherit equally among themselves.
To be sure, an administrator is not supposed to represent the interests of any particular party and his
acts are deemed to be objectively for the protection of the rights of everybody concerned with the
estate of the decedent, and from this point of view, it maybe said that even if PCIB were to act alone,
there should be no fear of undue disadvantage to anyone. On the other hand, however, it is evidently
implicit in section 6 of Rule 78 fixing the priority among those to whom letters of administration
should be granted that the criterion in the selection of the administrator is not his impartiality alone
but, more importantly, the extent of his interest in the estate, so much so that the one assumed to
have greater interest is preferred to another who has less. Taking both of these considerations into
account, inasmuch as, according to Hodges' own inventory submitted by him as Executor of the
estate of his wife, practically all their properties were conjugal which means that the spouses have
equal shares therein, it is but logical that both estates should be administered jointly by
representatives of both, pending their segregation from each other. Particularly is such an
arrangement warranted because the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit
groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance. Besides, to allow
PCIB, the administrator of his estate, to perform now what Hodges was duty bound to do as
executor is to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of Section 2 of Rule 78 which expressly provides that
"The executor of an executor shall not, as such, administer the estate of the first testator." It goes
without saying that this provision refers also to the administrator of an executor like PCIB here.
We are not unmindful of the fact that under Section 2 of Rule 73, "When the marriage is dissolved by
the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either." Indeed, it is true that the last sentence of this provision allows or
permits the conjugal partnership of spouses who are both deceased to be settled or liquidated in the
testate or intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because said sentence allows or permits that
the liquidation be made in either proceeding, it is a matter of sound judicial discretion in which one it
should be made. After all, the former rule referring to the administrator of the husband's estate in
respect to such liquidation was done away with by Act 3176, the pertinent provisions of which are
now embodied in the rule just cited.
Thus, it can be seen that at the time of the death of Hodges, there was already the pending judicial
settlement proceeding of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and, more importantly, that the former was the
executor of the latter's will who had, as such, failed for more than five years to see to it that the same
was terminated earliest, which was not difficult to do, since from ought that appears in the record,
there were no serious obstacles on the way, the estate not being indebted and there being no
immediate heirs other than Hodges himself. Such dilatory or indifferent attitude could only spell
possible prejudice of his co-heirs, whose rights to inheritance depend entirely on the existence of
any remainder of Mrs. Hodges' share in the community properties, and who are now faced with the
pose of PCIB that there is no such remainder. Had Hodges secured as early as possible the
settlement of his wife's estate, this problem would not arisen. All things considered, We are fully

convinced that the interests of justice will be better served by not permitting or allowing PCIB or any
administrator of the estate of Hodges exclusive administration of all the properties in question. We
are of the considered opinion and so hold that what would be just and proper is for both
administrators of the two estates to act conjointly until after said estates have been segregated from
each other.
At this juncture, it may be stated that we are not overlooking the fact that it is PCIB's contention that,
viewed as a substitution, the testamentary disposition in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters
may not be given effect. To a certain extent, this contention is correct. Indeed, legally speaking, Mrs.
Hodges' will provides neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code
nor for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution
therein because there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir
or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by Article 859; and
neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is imposed thereby
upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. But from these premises, it
is not correct to jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary dispositions in question
are therefore inoperative and invalid.
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition exclusively in the
light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV,
Book III) when it is obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will "so
that he may enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857, id.) and, in
the present case, no such possible default is contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges
are not substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what Hodges cannot,
would not or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore,
they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions,
partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with
reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges
the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute
dominion over them 6 only during his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely
dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis
causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of
that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although
vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the
occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.
Contrary to the view of respondent Magno, however, it was not the usufruct alone of her estate, as
contemplated in Article 869 of the Civil Code, that she bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but
the full ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there
was no restriction whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof to
anybody other than himself. The Court sees no legal impediment to this kind of institution, in this
jurisdiction or under Philippine law, except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Hodges as the
surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Mrs. Hodges had no surviving
ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904, New Civil Code.)
But relative precisely to the question of how much of Mrs. Hodges' share of the conjugal partnership
properties may be considered as her estate, the parties are in disagreement as to how Article 16 of
the Civil Code 7 should be applied. On the one hand, petitioner claims that inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges was
a resident of the Philippines at the time of her death, under said Article 16, construed in relation to the
pertinent laws of Texas and the principle of renvoi, what should be applied here should be the rules of
succession under the Civil Code of the Philippines, and, therefore, her estate could consist of no more
than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other fourth being, as already explained, the legitime
of her husband (Art. 900, Civil Code) which she could not have disposed of nor burdened with any

condition (Art. 872, Civil Code). On the other hand, respondent Magno denies that Mrs. Hodges died a
resident of the Philippines, since allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her original
residence of birth in Texas, United States of America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of the
question of her residence, she being indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil
Code, the distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State which, according to her, do not
provide for any legitime, hence, the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled to the remainder of
the whole of her share of the conjugal partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof. Respondent
Magno further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had renounced his rights under the will in favor of his
co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents touching on the point already mentioned earlier, the
genuineness and legal significance of which petitioner seemingly questions. Besides, the parties are
disagreed as to what the pertinent laws of Texas provide. In the interest of settling the estates herein
involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the parties were determined in
these proceedings. The Court regrets, however, that it cannot do so, for the simple reason that neither the
evidence submitted by the parties in the court below nor their discussion, in their respective briefs and
memoranda before Us, of their respective contentions on the pertinent legal issues, of grave importance
as they are, appear to Us to be adequate enough to enable Us to render an intelligent comprehensive
and just resolution. For one thing, there is no clear and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly
applicable laws of Texas are. 7* Then also, the genuineness of documents relied upon by respondent
Magno is disputed. And there are a number of still other conceivable related issues which the parties may
wish to raise but which it is not proper to mention here. In Justice, therefore, to all the parties concerned,
these and all other relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings
hereafter to be held therein for the purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating and/or distributing the estate
of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will.

To be more explicit, all that We can and do decide in connection with the petition for certiorari and
prohibition are: (1) that regardless of which corresponding laws are applied, whether of the
Philippines or of Texas, and taking for granted either of the respective contentions of the parties as to
provisions of the latter, 8 and regardless also of whether or not it can be proven by competent evidence
that Hodges renounced his inheritance in any degree, it is easily and definitely discernible from the
inventory submitted by Hodges himself, as Executor of his wife's estate, that there are properties which
should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges and ought to be disposed of or distributed among her heirs
pursuant to her will in said Special Proceedings 1307; (2) that, more specifically, inasmuch as the
question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas applicable to the situation herein is basically one of fact,
and, considering that the sole difference in the positions of the parties as to the effect of said laws has
reference to the supposed legitime of Hodges it being the stand of PCIB that Hodges had such a
legitime whereas Magno claims the negative - it is now beyond controversy for all future purposes of
these proceedings that whatever be the provisions actually of the laws of Texas applicable hereto, the
estate of Mrs. Hodges is at least, one-fourth of the conjugal estate of the spouses; the existence and
effects of foreign laws being questions of fact, and it being the position now of PCIB that the estate of
Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the laws of Texas, should only be one-fourth of the conjugal estate, such
contention constitutes an admission of fact, and consequently, it would be in estoppel in any further
proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate could be less, irrespective of what might be proven
later to be actually the provisions of the applicable laws of Texas; (3) that Special Proceedings 1307 for
the settlement of the testate estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed at this stage and should proceed to
its logical conclusion, there having been no proper and legal adjudication or distribution yet of the estate
therein involved; and (4) that respondent Magno remains and continues to be the Administratrix therein.
Hence, nothing in the foregoing opinion is intended to resolve the issues which, as already stated, are not
properly before the Court now, namely, (1) whether or not Hodges had in fact and in law waived or
renounced his inheritance from Mrs. Hodges, in whole or in part, and (2) assuming there had been no
such waiver, whether or not, by the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code, and in the light of what
might be the applicable laws of Texas on the matter, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than the onefourth declared above. As a matter of fact, even our finding above about the existence of properties
constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges rests largely on a general appraisal of the size and extent of the
conjugal partnership gathered from reference made thereto by both parties in their briefs as well as in
their pleadings included in the records on appeal, and it should accordingly yield, as to which exactly

those properties are, to the more concrete and specific evidence which the parties are supposed to
present in support of their respective positions in regard to the foregoing main legal and factual issues. In
the interest of justice, the parties should be allowed to present such further evidence in relation to all
these issues in a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein involved. After all, the court a
quo has not yet passed squarely on these issues, and it is best for all concerned that it should do so in
the first instance.

Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than the remainder of
one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, it may be mentioned here that during the
deliberations, the point was raised as to whether or not said holding might be inconsistent with Our
other ruling here also that, since there is no reliable evidence as to what are the applicable laws of
Texas, U.S.A. "with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights" that
may be willed by a testator which, under Article 16 of the Civil Code, are controlling in the instant
cases, in view of the undisputed Texan nationality of the deceased Mrs. Hodges, these cases should
be returned to the court a quo, so that the parties may prove what said law provides, it is premature
for Us to make any specific ruling now on either the validity of the testamentary dispositions herein
involved or the amount of inheritance to which the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled.
After nature reflection, We are of the considered view that, at this stage and in the state of the
records before Us, the feared inconsistency is more apparent than real. Withal, it no longer lies in
the lips of petitioner PCIB to make any claim that under the laws of Texas, the estate of Mrs. Hodges
could in any event be less than that We have fixed above.
It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of what are the laws of Texas
governing the matters herein issue is, in the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the
rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in
dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare exception in instances when the said
laws are already within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and generally
known or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties
concerned do not claim otherwise. (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 41, 1970 ed.)
In Fluemer vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610, it was held:
It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins West Virginia, on
November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West
Virginia govern. To this end, there was submitted a copy of section 3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84 as found
in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1960, and as certified to by
the Director of the National Library. But this was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a
foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws
must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of
the law were not met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was
printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer
having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301
of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of
West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed."
No evidence of the nature thus suggested by the Court may be found in the records of the cases at
bar. Quite to the contrary, the parties herein have presented opposing versions in their respective
pleadings and memoranda regarding the matter. And even if We took into account that in Aznar vs.
Garcia, the Court did make reference to certain provisions regarding succession in the laws of
Texas, the disparity in the material dates of that case and the present ones would not permit Us to
indulge in the hazardous conjecture that said provisions have not been amended or changed in the
meantime.

On the other hand, in In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, We held:

Upon the other point as to whether the will was executed in conformity with the
statutes of the State of Illinois we note that it does not affirmatively appear from
the transcription of the testimony adduced in the trial court that any witness was
examined with reference to the law of Illinois on the subject of the execution of will.
The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that the will was properly executed by
examining section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, as exhibited in volume 3 of
Starr & Curtis's Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he may have
assumed that he could take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under section 275 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion mistaken. That section
authorizes the courts here to take judicial notice, among other things, of the acts of
the legislative department of the United States. These words clearly have reference
to Acts of the Congress of the United States; and we would hesitate to hold that our
courts can, under this provision, take judicial notice of the multifarious laws of the
various American States. Nor do we think that any such authority can be derived
from the broader language, used in the same section, where it is said that our courts
may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge "similar" to those therein
enumerated. The proper rule we think is to require proof of the statutes of the States
of the American Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in
any action litigated in the Philippine courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking judicial
notice of the law of Illinois on the point in question, such error is not now available to
the petitioner, first, because the petition does not state any fact from which it would
appear that the law of Illinois is different from what the court found, and, secondly,
because the assignment of error and argument for the appellant in this court raises
no question based on such supposed error. Though the trial court may have acted
upon pure conjecture as to the law prevailing in the State of Illinois, its judgment
could not be set aside, even upon application made within six months under section
113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless it should be made to appear affirmatively
that the conjecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is true, states in general terms that
the will in question is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the
State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits by which the
petition is accompanied contain no reference to the subject, and we are cited to no
authority in the appellant's brief which might tend to raise a doubt as to the
correctness of the conclusion of the trial court. It is very clear, therefore, that this
point cannot be urged as of serious moment.
It is implicit in the above ruling that when, with respect to certain aspects of the foreign laws
concerned, the parties in a given case do not have any controversy or are more or less in
agreement, the Court may take it for granted for the purposes of the particular case before it that the
said laws are as such virtual agreement indicates, without the need of requiring the presentation of
what otherwise would be the competent evidence on the point. Thus, in the instant cases wherein it
results from the respective contentions of both parties that even if the pertinent laws of Texas were
known and to be applied, the amount of the inheritance pertaining to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges is as
We have fixed above, the absence of evidence to the effect that, actually and in fact, under said
laws, it could be otherwise is of no longer of any consequence, unless the purpose is to show that it
could be more. In other words, since PCIB, the petitioner-appellant, concedes that upon application
of Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, the amount of the estate in
controversy is just as We have determined it to be, and respondent-appellee is only claiming, on her
part, that it could be more, PCIB may not now or later pretend differently.

To be more concrete, on pages 20-21 of its petition herein, dated July 31, 1967, PCIB states
categorically:
Inasmuch as Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "intestate and testamentary
successions both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found", while the law of Texas (the Hodges spouses being
nationals of U.S.A., State of Texas), in its conflicts of law rules, provides that the
domiciliary law (in this case Philippine law) governs the testamentary dispositions
and successional rights over movables or personal properties, while the law of the
situs (in this case also Philippine law with respect to all Hodges properties located in
the Philippines), governs with respect to immovable properties, and applying
therefore the 'renvoi doctrine' as enunciated and applied by this Honorable Court in
the case of In re Estate of Christensen (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can
be no question that Philippine law governs the testamentary dispositions contained in
the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the
successional rights to her estate, both with respect to movables, as well as to
immovables situated in the Philippines.
In its main brief dated February 26, 1968, PCIB asserts:
The law governing successional rights.
As recited above, there is no question that the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, was
an American citizen. There is also no question that she was a national of the State of
Texas, U.S.A. Again, there is likewise no question that she had her domicile of choice
in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, as this has already been pronounced by the abovecited orders of the lower court, pronouncements which are by now res
adjudicata (par. [a], See. 49, Rule 39, Rules of Court; In re Estate of Johnson, 39
Phil. 156).
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides:
"Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where
it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."
Thus the aforecited provision of the Civil Code points towards the national law of the
deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, which is the law of Texas, as governing succession
"both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions ...". But the law of Texas,
in its conflicts of law rules, provides that the domiciliary law governs the testamentary
dispositions and successional rights over movables or personal property, while the
law of the situs governs with respect to immovable property. Such that with respect to

both movable property, as well as immovable property situated in the Philippines, the
law of Texas points to the law of the Philippines.
Applying, therefore, the so-called "renvoi doctrine", as enunciated and applied by this
Honorable Court in the case of "In re Christensen" (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31,
1963), there can be no question that Philippine law governs the testamentary
provisions in the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as
well as the successional rights to her estate, both with respect to movables, as well
as immovables situated in the Philippines.
The subject of successional rights.
Under Philippine law, as it is under the law of Texas, the conjugal or community
property of the spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, upon the
death of the latter, is to be divided into two, one-half pertaining to each of the
spouses, as his or her own property. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges,
one-half of the conjugal partnership property immediately pertained to Charles
Newton Hodges as his own share, and not by virtue of any successional rights.
There can be no question about this.
Again, Philippine law, or more specifically, Article 900 of the Civil Code provides:
If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled
to one-half of the hereditary estate of the deceased spouse, and the
testator may freely dispose of the other half.
If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the testator was
solemnized in articulo mortis, and the testator died within three
months from the time of the marriage, the legitime of the surviving
spouse as the sole heir shall be one-third of the hereditary estate,
except when they have been living as husband and wife for more
than five years. In the latter case, the legitime of the surviving spouse
shall be that specified in the preceding paragraph.
This legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be burdened by a fideicommisary
substitution (Art. 864, Civil code), nor by any charge, condition, or substitution (Art,
872, Civil code). It is clear, therefore, that in addition to one-half of the conjugal
partnership property as his own conjugal share, Charles Newton Hodges was also
immediately entitled to one-half of the half conjugal share of the deceased, Linnie
Jane Hodges, or one-fourth of the entire conjugal property, as his legitime.
One-fourth of the conjugal property therefore remains at issue.
In the summary of its arguments in its memorandum dated April 30, 1968, the following appears:
Briefly, the position advanced by the petitioner is:
a. That the Hodges spouses were domiciled legally in the Philippines (pp. 19-20,
petition). This is now a matter of res adjudicata (p. 20, petition).

b. That under Philippine law, Texas law, and the renvoi doctrine, Philippine law
governs the successional rights over the properties left by the deceased, Linnie Jane
Hodges (pp. 20-21, petition).
c. That under Philippine as well as Texas law, one-half of the Hodges properties
pertains to the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges (p. 21, petition). This is not
questioned by the respondents.
d. That under Philippine law, the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, automatically
inherited one-half of the remaining one-half of the Hodges properties as his legitime
(p. 21, petition).
e. That the remaining 25% of the Hodges properties was inherited by the deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, under the will of his deceased spouse (pp. 22-23, petition).
Upon the death of Charles Newton Hodges, the substitution 'provision of the will of
the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, did not operate because the same is void (pp.
23-25, petition).
f. That the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, asserted his sole ownership of the
Hodges properties and the probate court sanctioned such assertion (pp. 25-29,
petition). He in fact assumed such ownership and such was the status of the
properties as of the time of his death (pp. 29-34, petition).
Of similar tenor are the allegations of PCIB in some of its pleadings quoted in the earlier part of this
option.
On her part, it is respondent-appellee Magno's posture that under the laws of Texas, there is no
system of legitime, hence the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be one-half of all the conjugal
properties.
It is thus unquestionable that as far as PCIB is concerned, the application to these cases of Article
16 of the Civil Code in relation to the corresponding laws of Texas would result in that the Philippine
laws on succession should control. On that basis, as We have already explained above, the estate of
Mrs. Hodges is the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, considering that
We have found that there is no legal impediment to the kind of disposition ordered by Mrs. Hodges in
her will in favor of her brothers and sisters and, further, that the contention of PCIB that the same
constitutes an inoperative testamentary substitution is untenable. As will be recalled, PCIB's position
that there is no such estate of Mrs. Hodges is predicated exclusively on two propositions, namely:
(1) that the provision in question in Mrs. Hodges' testament violates the rules on substitution of heirs
under the Civil Code and (2) that, in any event, by the orders of the trial court of May 27, and
December 14, 1957, the trial court had already finally and irrevocably adjudicated to her husband the
whole free portion of her estate to the exclusion of her brothers and sisters, both of which poses, We
have overruled. Nowhere in its pleadings, briefs and memoranda does PCIB maintain that the
application of the laws of Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything
under her will. And since PCIB's representations in regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute
admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB
is "not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contradictory to or inconsistent
with them." (5 Moran, id, p. 65, citing Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat, L23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018).
Accordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the further proceedings hereby ordered to
be held in the court below is how much more than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and

this would depend on (1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more,
such as, when there is no legitime provided therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges has validly
waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.
In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the Court that to avoid or,
at least, minimize further protracted legal controversies between the respective heirs of the Hodges
spouses, it is imperative to elucidate on the possible consequences of dispositions made by Hodges
after the death of his wife from the mass of the unpartitioned estates without any express indication
in the pertinent documents as to whether his intention is to dispose of part of his inheritance from his
wife or part of his own share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made by PCIB after the death
of Hodges. After a long discussion, the consensus arrived at was as follows: (1) any such
dispositions made gratuitously in favor of third parties, whether these be individuals, corporations or
foundations, shall be considered as intended to be of properties constituting part of Hodges'
inheritance from his wife, it appearing from the tenor of his motions of May 27 and December 11,
1957 that in asking for general authority to make sales or other disposals of properties under the
jurisdiction of the court, which include his own share of the conjugal estate, he was not invoking
particularly his right over his own share, but rather his right to dispose of any part of his inheritance
pursuant to the will of his wife; (2) as regards sales, exchanges or other remunerative transfers, the
proceeds of such sales or the properties taken in by virtue of such exchanges, shall be considered
as merely the products of "physical changes" of the properties of her estate which the will expressly
authorizes Hodges to make, provided that whatever of said products should remain with the estate
at the time of the death of Hodges should go to her brothers and sisters; (3) the dispositions made
by PCIB after the death of Hodges must naturally be deemed as covering only the properties
belonging to his estate considering that being only the administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB
could not have disposed of properties belonging to the estate of his wife. Neither could such
dispositions be considered as involving conjugal properties, for the simple reason that the conjugal
partnership automatically ceased when Mrs. Hodges died, and by the peculiar provision of her will,
under discussion, the remainder of her share descended also automatically upon the death of
Hodges to her brothers and sisters, thus outside of the scope of PCIB's administration. Accordingly,
these construction of the will of Mrs. Hodges should be adhered to by the trial court in its final order
of adjudication and distribution and/or partition of the two estates in question.
THE APPEALS
A cursory examination of the seventy-eight assignments of error in appellant PCIB's brief would
readily reveal that all of them are predicated mainly on the contention that inasmuch as Hodges had
already adjudicated unto himself all the properties constituting his wife's share of the conjugal
partnership, allegedly with the sanction of the trial court per its order of December 14, 1957, there
has been, since said date, no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of which appellee Magno could be
administratrix, hence the various assailed orders sanctioning her actuations as such are not in
accordance with law. Such being the case, with the foregoing resolution holding such posture to be
untenable in fact and in law and that it is in the best interest of justice that for the time being the two
estates should be administered conjointly by the respective administrators of the two estates, it
should follow that said assignments of error have lost their fundamental reasons for being. There are
certain matters, however, relating peculiarly to the respective orders in question, if commonly among
some of them, which need further clarification. For instance, some of them authorized respondent
Magno to act alone or without concurrence of PCIB. And with respect to many of said orders, PCIB
further claims that either the matters involved were not properly within the probate jurisdiction of the
trial court or that the procedure followed was not in accordance with the rules. Hence, the necessity
of dealing separately with the merits of each of the appeals.

Indeed, inasmuch as the said two estates have until now remained commingled pro-indiviso, due to
the failure of Hodges and the lower court to liquidate the conjugal partnership, to recognize appellee
Magno as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges which is still unsegregated from that of
Hodges is not to say, without any qualification, that she was therefore authorized to do and perform
all her acts complained of in these appeals, sanctioned though they might have been by the trial
court. As a matter of fact, it is such commingling pro-indivisoof the two estates that should deprive
appellee of freedom to act independently from PCIB, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, just
as, for the same reason, the latter should not have authority to act independently from her. And
considering that the lower court failed to adhere consistently to this basic point of view, by allowing
the two administrators to act independently of each other, in the various instances already noted in
the narration of facts above, the Court has to look into the attendant circumstances of each of the
appealed orders to be able to determine whether any of them has to be set aside or they may all be
legally maintained notwithstanding the failure of the court a quo to observe the pertinent procedural
technicalities, to the end only that graver injury to the substantive rights of the parties concerned and
unnecessary and undesirable proliferation of incidents in the subject proceedings may be forestalled.
In other words, We have to determine, whether or not, in the light of the unusual circumstances
extant in the record, there is need to be more pragmatic and to adopt a rather unorthodox approach,
so as to cause the least disturbance in rights already being exercised by numerous innocent third
parties, even if to do so may not appear to be strictly in accordance with the letter of the applicable
purely adjective rules.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned, at this point, that it was principally on account of the confusion that
might result later from PCIB's continuing to administer all the community properties, notwithstanding
the certainty of the existence of the separate estate of Mrs. Hodges, and to enable both estates to
function in the meantime with a relative degree of regularity, that the Court ordered in the resolution
of September 8, 1972 the modification of the injunction issued pursuant to the resolutions of August
8, October 4 and December 6, 1967, by virtue of which respondent Magno was completely barred
from any participation in the administration of the properties herein involved. In the September 8
resolution, We ordered that, pending this decision, Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 should
proceed jointly and that the respective administrators therein "act conjointly none of them to act
singly and independently of each other for any purpose." Upon mature deliberation, We felt that to
allow PCIB to continue managing or administering all the said properties to the exclusion of the
administratrix of Mrs. Hodges' estate might place the heirs of Hodges at an unduly advantageous
position which could result in considerable, if not irreparable, damage or injury to the other parties
concerned. It is indeed to be regretted that apparently, up to this date, more than a year after said
resolution, the same has not been given due regard, as may be gleaned from the fact that recently,
respondent Magno has filed in these proceedings a motion to declare PCIB in contempt for alleged
failure to abide therewith, notwithstanding that its repeated motions for reconsideration thereof have
all been denied soon after they were filed. 9
Going back to the appeals, it is perhaps best to begin first with what appears to Our mind to be the
simplest, and then proceed to the more complicated ones in that order, without regard to the
numerical sequence of the assignments of error in appellant's brief or to the order of the discussion
thereof by counsel.
Assignments of error numbers
LXXII, LXXVII and LXXVIII.
These assignments of error relate to (1) the order of the trial court of August 6, 1965 providing that
"the deeds of sale (therein referred to involving properties in the name of Hodges) should be signed
jointly by the PCIB, as Administrator of Testate Estate of C.N. Hodges, and Avelina A. Magno, as
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and to this effect, the PCIB should take

the necessary steps so that Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of sale," (p. 248,
Green Rec. on Appeal) (2) the order of October 27, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration of
the foregoing order, (pp. 276-277, id.) (3) the other order also dated October 27, 1965 enjoining inter
alia, that "(a) all cash collections should be deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and estate of C. N. Hodges, (b) that whatever cash collections (that) had been deposited in
the account of either of the estates should be withdrawn and since then (sic) deposited in the joint
account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the estate of C. N. Hodges; ... (d) (that)
Administratrix Magno allow the PCIB to inspect whatever records, documents and papers she
may have in her possession, in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow
Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever records, documents and papers it may have in its
possession" and "(e) that the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all
records of the transactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
and in like manner, the accountant or any authorized representative of the estate of C. N. Hodges
shall have access to the records of transactions of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection
of the estate of C. N. Hodges", (pp. 292-295, id.) and (4) the order of February 15, 1966, denying,
among others, the motion for reconsideration of the order of October 27, 1965 last referred to. (pp.
455-456, id.)
As may be readily seen, the thrust of all these four impugned orders is in line with the Court's abovementioned resolution of September 8, 1972 modifying the injunction previously issued on August 8,
1967, and, more importantly, with what We have said the trial court should have always done
pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the Hodges spouses. In fact, as already stated,
that is the arrangement We are ordering, by this decision, to be followed. Stated differently, since the
questioned orders provide for joint action by the two administrators, and that is precisely what We
are holding out to have been done and should be done until the two estates are separated from each
other, the said orders must be affirmed. Accordingly the foregoing assignments of error must be, as
they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error Numbers LXVIII
to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI.
The orders complained of under these assignments of error commonly deal with expenditures made
by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges, in connection with her
administration thereof, albeit additionally, assignments of error Numbers LXIX to LXXI put into
question the payment of attorneys fees provided for in the contract for the purpose, as constituting,
in effect, premature advances to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges.
More specifically, assignment Number LXXIII refers to reimbursement of overtime pay paid to six
employees of the court and three other persons for services in copying the court records to enable
the lawyers of the administration to be fully informed of all the incidents in the proceedings. The
reimbursement was approved as proper legal expenses of administration per the order of December
19, 1964, (pp. 221-222, id.) and repeated motions for reconsideration thereof were denied by the
orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232, id.) October 27, 1965, (p. 277, id.) and February 15, 1966.
(pp. 455-456, id.) On the other hand, Assignments Numbers LXVIII to LXXI, LXXIV and LXXV
question the trial court's order of November 3, 1965 approving the agreement of June 6, 1964
between Administratrix Magno and James L. Sullivan, attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Mrs. Hodges,
as Parties of the First Part, and Attorneys Raul Manglapus and Rizal R. Quimpo, as Parties of the
Second Part, regarding attorneys fees for said counsel who had agreed "to prosecute and defend
their interests (of the Parties of the First Part) in certain cases now pending litigation in the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo , more specifically in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 " (pp. 126129, id.) and directing Administratrix Magno "to issue and sign whatever check or checks maybe
needed to implement the approval of the agreement annexed to the motion" as well as the

"administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges to countersign the said check or checks as the case
maybe." (pp. 313-320, id.), reconsideration of which order of approval was denied in the order of
February 16, 1966, (p. 456, id.) Assignment Number LXXVI imputes error to the lower court's order
of October 27, 1965, already referred to above, insofar as it orders that "PCIB should counter sign
the check in the amount of P250 in favor of Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as
administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
only." (p. 294, id.)
Main contention again of appellant PCIB in regard to these eight assigned errors is that there is no
such estate as the estate of Mrs. Hodges for which the questioned expenditures were made, hence
what were authorized were in effect expenditures from the estate of Hodges. As We have already
demonstrated in Our resolution above of the petition for certiorari and prohibition, this posture is
incorrect. Indeed, in whichever way the remaining issues between the parties in these cases are
ultimately resolved, 10 the final result will surely be that there are properties constituting the estate of Mrs.
Hodges of which Magno is the current administratrix. It follows, therefore, that said appellee had the right,
as such administratrix, to hire the persons whom she paid overtime pay and to be paid for her own
services as administratrix. That she has not yet collected and is not collecting amounts as substantial as
that paid to or due appellant PCIB is to her credit.
Of course, she is also entitled to the services of counsel and to that end had the authority to enter
into contracts for attorney's fees in the manner she had done in the agreement of June 6, 1964. And
as regards to the reasonableness of the amount therein stipulated, We see no reason to disturb the
discretion exercised by the probate court in determining the same. We have gone over the
agreement, and considering the obvious size of the estate in question and the nature of the issues
between the parties as well as the professional standing of counsel, We cannot say that the fees
agreed upon require the exercise by the Court of its inherent power to reduce it.
PCIB insists, however, that said agreement of June 6, 1964 is not for legal services to the estate but
to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, or, at most, to both of them, and such being the case, any payment
under it, insofar as counsels' services would redound to the benefit of the heirs, would be in the
nature of advances to such heirs and a premature distribution of the estate. Again, We hold that
such posture cannot prevail.
Upon the premise We have found plausible that there is an existing estate of Mrs. Hodges, it results
that juridically and factually the interests involved in her estate are distinct and different from those
involved in her estate of Hodges and vice versa. Insofar as the matters related exclusively to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, is a complete stranger and it
is without personality to question the actuations of the administratrix thereof regarding matters not
affecting the estate of Hodges. Actually, considering the obviously considerable size of the estate of
Mrs. Hodges, We see no possible cause for apprehension that when the two estates are segregated
from each other, the amount of attorney's fees stipulated in the agreement in question will prejudice
any portion that would correspond to Hodges' estate.
And as regards the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges who ought to be the ones who should have a say on
the attorney's fees and other expenses of administration assailed by PCIB, suffice it to say that they
appear to have been duly represented in the agreement itself by their attorney-in-fact, James L.
Sullivan and have not otherwise interposed any objection to any of the expenses incurred by Magno
questioned by PCIB in these appeals. As a matter of fact, as ordered by the trial court, all the
expenses in question, including the attorney's fees, may be paid without awaiting the determination
and segregation of the estate of Mrs. Hodges.

Withal, the weightiest consideration in connection with the point under discussion is that at this stage
of the controversy among the parties herein, the vital issue refers to the existence or non-existence
of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. In this respect, the interest of respondent Magno, as the appointed
administratrix of the said estate, is to maintain that it exists, which is naturally common and identical
with and inseparable from the interest of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges. Thus, it should not
be wondered why both Magno and these heirs have seemingly agreed to retain but one counsel. In
fact, such an arrangement should be more convenient and economical to both. The possibility of
conflict of interest between Magno and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges would be, at this stage, quite
remote and, in any event, rather insubstantial. Besides, should any substantial conflict of interest
between them arise in the future, the same would be a matter that the probate court can very well
take care of in the course of the independent proceedings in Case No. 1307 after the corresponding
segregation of the two subject estates. We cannot perceive any cogent reason why, at this stage, the
estate and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges cannot be represented by a common counsel.
Now, as to whether or not the portion of the fees in question that should correspond to the heirs
constitutes premature partial distribution of the estate of Mrs. Hodges is also a matter in which
neither PCIB nor the heirs of Hodges have any interest. In any event, since, as far as the records
show, the estate has no creditors and the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes, except those
of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, have already been paid, 11 no prejudice can caused to
anyone by the comparatively small amount of attorney's fees in question. And in this connection, it may
be added that, although strictly speaking, the attorney's fees of the counsel of an administrator is in the
first instance his personal responsibility, reimbursable later on by the estate, in the final analysis, when, as
in the situation on hand, the attorney-in-fact of the heirs has given his conformity thereto, it would be idle
effort to inquire whether or not the sanction given to said fees by the probate court is proper.
For the foregoing reasons, Assignments of Error LXVIII to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI should be as
they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error I to IV,
XIII to XV, XXII to XXV, XXXV
to XXX VI, XLI to XLIII and L.
These assignments of error deal with the approval by the trial court of various deeds of sale of real
properties registered in the name of Hodges but executed by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of
the Estate of Mrs. Hodges, purportedly in implementation of corresponding supposed written
"Contracts to Sell" previously executed by Hodges during the interim between May 23, 1957, when
his wife died, and December 25, 1962, the day he died. As stated on pp. 118-120 of appellant's main
brief, "These are: the, contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the
appellee, Pepito G. Iyulores executed on February 5, 1961; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellant Esperidion Partisala, executed on April 20,
1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
Winifredo C. Espada, executed on April 18, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Rosario Alingasa, executed on August 25, 1958; the
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Lorenzo Carles,
executed on June 17, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges,
and the appellee, Salvador S. Guzman, executed on September 13, 1960; the contract to sell
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Florenia Barrido, executed on
February 21, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the
appellee, Purificacion Coronado, executed on August 14, 1961; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Graciano Lucero, executed on November 27,
1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Ariteo
Thomas Jamir, executed on May 26, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Melquiades Batisanan, executed on June 9, 1959; the contract to

sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Belcezar Causing, executed
on February 10, 1959 and the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and
the appellee, Adelfa Premaylon, executed on October 31, 1959, re Title No. 13815."
Relative to these sales, it is the position of appellant PCIB that, inasmuch as pursuant to the will of
Mrs. Hodges, her husband was to have dominion over all her estate during his lifetime, it was as
absolute owner of the properties respectively covered by said sales that he executed the
aforementioned contracts to sell, and consequently, upon his death, the implementation of said
contracts may be undertaken only by the administrator of his estate and not by the administratrix of
the estate of Mrs. Hodges. Basically, the same theory is invoked with particular reference to five
other sales, in which the respective "contracts to sell" in favor of these appellees were executed by
Hodges before the death of his wife, namely, those in favor of appellee Santiago Pacaonsis, Alfredo
Catedral, Jose Pablico, Western Institute of Technology and Adelfa Premaylon.
Anent those deeds of sale based on promises or contracts to sell executed by Hodges after the
death of his wife, those enumerated in the quotation in the immediately preceding paragraph, it is
quite obvious that PCIB's contention cannot be sustained. As already explained earlier, 1 1* all
proceeds of remunerative transfers or dispositions made by Hodges after the death of his wife should be
deemed as continuing to be parts of her estate and, therefore, subject to the terms of her will in favor of
her brothers and sisters, in the sense that should there be no showing that such proceeds, whether in
cash or property have been subsequently conveyed or assigned subsequently by Hodges to any third
party by acts inter vivos with the result that they could not thereby belong to him anymore at the time of
his death, they automatically became part of the inheritance of said brothers and sisters. The deeds here
in question involve transactions which are exactly of this nature. Consequently, the payments made by
the appellees should be considered as payments to the estate of Mrs. Hodges which is to be distributed
and partitioned among her heirs specified in the will.
The five deeds of sale predicated on contracts to sell executed Hodges during the lifetime of his
wife, present a different situation. At first blush, it would appear that as to them, PCIB's position has
some degree of plausibility. Considering, however, that the adoption of PCIB's theory would
necessarily have tremendous repercussions and would bring about considerable disturbance of
property rights that have somehow accrued already in favor of innocent third parties, the five
purchasers aforenamed, the Court is inclined to take a pragmatic and practical view of the legal
situation involving them by overlooking the possible technicalities in the way, the non-observance of
which would not, after all, detract materially from what should substantially correspond to each and
all of the parties concerned.
To start with, these contracts can hardly be ignored. Bona fide third parties are involved; as much as
possible, they should not be made to suffer any prejudice on account of judicial controversies not of
their own making. What is more, the transactions they rely on were submitted by them to the probate
court for approval, and from already known and recorded actuations of said court then, they had
reason to believe that it had authority to act on their motions, since appellee Magno had, from time
to time prior to their transactions with her, been allowed to act in her capacity as administratrix of one
of the subject estates either alone or conjointly with PCIB. All the sales in question were executed by
Magno in 1966 already, but before that, the court had previously authorized or otherwise sanctioned
expressly many of her act as administratrix involving expenditures from the estate made by her
either conjointly with or independently from PCIB, as Administrator of the Estate of Hodges. Thus, it
may be said that said buyers-appellees merely followed precedents in previous orders of the court.
Accordingly, unless the impugned orders approving those sales indubitably suffer from some clearly
fatal infirmity the Court would rather affirm them.
It is quite apparent from the record that the properties covered by said sales are equivalent only to a
fraction of what should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, even if it is assumed that the same

would finally be held to be only one-fourth of the conjugal properties of the spouses as of the time of
her death or, to be more exact, one-half of her estate as per the inventory submitted by Hodges as
executor, on May 12, 1958. In none of its numerous, varied and voluminous pleadings, motions and
manifestations has PCIB claimed any possibility otherwise. Such being the case, to avoid any
conflict with the heirs of Hodges, the said properties covered by the questioned deeds of sale
executed by appellee Magno may be treated as among those corresponding to the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, which would have been actually under her control and administration had Hodges complied
with his duty to liquidate the conjugal partnership. Viewing the situation in that manner, the only ones
who could stand to be prejudiced by the appealed orders referred to in the assignment of errors
under discussion and who could, therefore, have the requisite interest to question them would be
only the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, definitely not PCIB.
It is of no moment in what capacity Hodges made the "contracts to sell' after the death of his wife.
Even if he had acted as executor of the will of his wife, he did not have to submit those contracts to
the court nor follow the provisions of the rules, (Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 of Rule 89 quoted by
appellant on pp. 125 to 127 of its brief) for the simple reason that by the very orders, much relied
upon by appellant for other purposes, of May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957, Hodges was
"allowed or authorized" by the trial court "to continue the business in which he was engaged and to
perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living", (Order of May 27) which
according to the motion on which the court acted was "of buying and selling personal and real
properties", and "to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the
properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes conveyed in
the last will and testament of the latter." (Order of December 14) In other words, if Hodges acted
then as executor, it can be said that he had authority to do so by virtue of these blanket orders, and
PCIB does not question the legality of such grant of authority; on the contrary, it is relying on the
terms of the order itself for its main contention in these cases. On the other hand, if, as PCIB
contends, he acted as heir-adjudicatee, the authority given to him by the aforementioned orders
would still suffice.
As can be seen, therefore, it is of no moment whether the "contracts to sell" upon which the deeds in
question were based were executed by Hodges before or after the death of his wife. In a word, We
hold, for the reasons already stated, that the properties covered by the deeds being assailed pertain
or should be deemed as pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges; hence, any supposed irregularity
attending the actuations of the trial court may be invoked only by her heirs, not by PCIB, and since
the said heirs are not objecting, and the defects pointed out not being strictly jurisdictional in nature,
all things considered, particularly the unnecessary disturbance of rights already created in favor of
innocent third parties, it is best that the impugned orders are not disturbed.
In view of these considerations, We do not find sufficient merit in the assignments of error under
discussion.
Assignments of error V to VIII,
XVI to XVIII, XXVI to XXIX, XXXVII
to XXXVIII, XLIV to XLVI and LI.
All these assignments of error commonly deal with alleged non-fulfillment by the respective vendees,
appellees herein, of the terms and conditions embodied in the deeds of sale referred to in the
assignments of error just discussed. It is claimed that some of them never made full payments in
accordance with the respective contracts to sell, while in the cases of the others, like Lorenzo
Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo Catedral and Salvador S. Guzman, the contracts with them had
already been unilaterally cancelled by PCIB pursuant to automatic rescission clauses contained in
them, in view of the failure of said buyers to pay arrearages long overdue. But PCIB's posture is

again premised on its assumption that the properties covered by the deeds in question could not
pertain to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. We have already held above that, it being evident that a
considerable portion of the conjugal properties, much more than the properties covered by said
deeds, would inevitably constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, to avoid unnecessary legal
complications, it can be assumed that said properties form part of such estate. From this point of
view, it is apparent again that the questions, whether or not it was proper for appellee Magno to have
disregarded the cancellations made by PCIB, thereby reviving the rights of the respective buyersappellees, and, whether or not the rules governing new dispositions of properties of the estate were
strictly followed, may not be raised by PCIB but only by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as the persons
designated to inherit the same, or perhaps the government because of the still unpaid inheritance
taxes. But, again, since there is no pretense that any objections were raised by said parties or that
they would necessarily be prejudiced, the contentions of PCIB under the instant assignments of error
hardly merit any consideration.
Assignments of error IX to XII, XIX
to XXI, XXX to XXIV, XXXIX to XL,
XLVII to XLIX, LII and LIII to LXI.
PCIB raises under these assignments of error two issues which according to it are fundamental,
namely: (1) that in approving the deeds executed by Magno pursuant to contracts to sell already
cancelled by it in the performance of its functions as administrator of the estate of Hodges, the trial
court deprived the said estate of the right to invoke such cancellations it (PCIB) had made and (2)
that in so acting, the court "arrogated unto itself, while acting as a probate court, the power to
determine the contending claims of third parties against the estate of Hodges over real property,"
since it has in effect determined whether or not all the terms and conditions of the respective
contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of the buyers-appellees concerned were complied with
by the latter. What is worse, in the view of PCIB, is that the court has taken the word of the appellee
Magno, "a total stranger to his estate as determinative of the issue".
Actually, contrary to the stand of PCIB, it is this last point regarding appellee Magno's having agreed
to ignore the cancellations made by PCIB and allowed the buyers-appellees to consummate the
sales in their favor that is decisive. Since We have already held that the properties covered by the
contracts in question should be deemed to be portions of the estate of Mrs. Hodges and not that of
Hodges, it is PCIB that is a complete stranger in these incidents. Considering, therefore, that the
estate of Mrs. Hodges and her heirs who are the real parties in interest having the right to oppose
the consummation of the impugned sales are not objecting, and that they are the ones who are
precisely urging that said sales be sanctioned, the assignments of error under discussion have no
basis and must accordingly be as they are hereby overruled.
With particular reference to assignments LIII to LXI, assailing the orders of the trial court requiring
PCIB to surrender the respective owner's duplicate certificates of title over the properties covered by
the sales in question and otherwise directing the Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel said certificates
and to issue new transfer certificates of title in favor of the buyers-appellees, suffice it to say that in
the light of the above discussion, the trial court was within its rights to so require and direct, PCIB
having refused to give way, by withholding said owners' duplicate certificates, of the corresponding
registration of the transfers duly and legally approved by the court.
Assignments of error LXII to LXVII
All these assignments of error commonly deal with the appeal against orders favoring appellee
Western Institute of Technology. As will be recalled, said institute is one of the buyers of real property
covered by a contract to sell executed by Hodges prior to the death of his wife. As of October, 1965,

it was in arrears in the total amount of P92,691.00 in the payment of its installments on account of its
purchase, hence it received under date of October 4, 1965 and October 20, 1965, letters of
collection, separately and respectively, from PCIB and appellee Magno, in their respective capacities
as administrators of the distinct estates of the Hodges spouses, albeit, while in the case of PCIB it
made known that "no other arrangement can be accepted except by paying all your past due
account", on the other hand, Magno merely said she would "appreciate very much if you can make
some remittance to bring this account up-to-date and to reduce the amount of the obligation." (See
pp. 295-311, Green R. on A.) On November 3, 1965, the Institute filed a motion which, after alleging
that it was ready and willing to pay P20,000 on account of its overdue installments but uncertain
whether it should pay PCIB or Magno, it prayed that it be "allowed to deposit the aforesaid amount
with the court pending resolution of the conflicting claims of the administrators." Acting on this
motion, on November 23, 1965, the trial court issued an order, already quoted in the narration of
facts in this opinion, holding that payment to both or either of the two administrators is "proper and
legal", and so "movant can pay to both estates or either of them", considering that "in both cases
(Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution
of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto."
The arguments under the instant assignments of error revolve around said order. From the
procedural standpoint, it is claimed that PCIB was not served with a copy of the Institute's motion,
that said motion was heard, considered and resolved on November 23, 1965, whereas the date set
for its hearing was November 20, 1965, and that what the order grants is different from what is
prayed for in the motion. As to the substantive aspect, it is contended that the matter treated in the
motion is beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court and that the order authorized payment to a
person other than the administrator of the estate of Hodges with whom the Institute had contracted.
The procedural points urged by appellant deserve scant consideration. We must assume, absent
any clear proof to the contrary, that the lower court had acted regularly by seeing to it that appellant
was duly notified. On the other hand, there is nothing irregular in the court's having resolved the
motion three days after the date set for hearing the same. Moreover, the record reveals that
appellants' motion for reconsideration wherein it raised the same points was denied by the trial court
on March 7, 1966 (p. 462, Green R. on A.) Withal, We are not convinced that the relief granted is not
within the general intent of the Institute's motion.
Insofar as the substantive issues are concerned, all that need be said at this point is that they are
mere reiterations of contentions We have already resolved above adversely to appellants' position.
Incidentally, We may add, perhaps, to erase all doubts as to the propriety of not disturbing the lower
court's orders sanctioning the sales questioned in all these appeal s by PCIB, that it is only when
one of the parties to a contract to convey property executed by a deceased person raises substantial
objections to its being implemented by the executor or administrator of the decedent's estate that
Section 8 of Rule 89 may not apply and, consequently, the matter has, to be taken up in a separate
action outside of the probate court; but where, as in the cases of the sales herein involved, the
interested parties are in agreement that the conveyance be made, it is properly within the jurisdiction
of the probate court to give its sanction thereto pursuant to the provisions of the rule just mentioned.
And with respect to the supposed automatic rescission clauses contained in the contracts to sell
executed by Hodges in favor of herein appellees, the effect of said clauses depend on the true
nature of the said contracts, despite the nomenclature appearing therein, which is not controlling, for
if they amount to actual contracts of sale instead of being mere unilateral accepted "promises to
sell", (Art. 1479, Civil Code of the Philippines, 2nd paragraph) thepactum commissorium or the
automatic rescission provision would not operate, as a matter of public policy, unless there has been
a previous notarial or judicial demand by the seller (10 Manresa 263, 2nd ed.) neither of which have
been shown to have been made in connection with the transactions herein involved.

Consequently, We find no merit in the assignments of error

Number LXII to LXVII.
SUM MARY
Considering the fact that this decision is unusually extensive and that the issues herein taken up and
resolved are rather numerous and varied, what with appellant making seventy-eight assignments of
error affecting no less than thirty separate orders of the court a quo, if only to facilitate proper
understanding of the import and extent of our rulings herein contained, it is perhaps desirable that a
brief restatement of the whole situation be made together with our conclusions in regard to its
various factual and legal aspects. .
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges as well as that of his
wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, who predeceased him by about five years and a half. In their respective
wills which were executed on different occasions, each one of them provided mutually as follows: "I
give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder (after funeral and administration
expenses, taxes and debts) of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to
my beloved (spouse) to have and to hold unto (him/her) during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject
to the condition that upon the death of whoever of them survived the other, the remainder of what he
or she would inherit from the other is "give(n), devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and
sisters of the latter.
Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27, Hodges was appointed special
administrator of her estate, and in a separate order of the same date, he was "allowed or authorized
to continue the business in which he was engaged, (buying and selling personal and real properties)
and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living." Subsequently, on
December 14, 1957, after Mrs. Hodges' will had been probated and Hodges had been appointed and
had qualified as Executor thereof, upon his motion in which he asserted that he was "not only part
owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", the trial court ordered that "for the reasons stated in his motion
dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, ... all the sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the
Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized
to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and
testament of the latter."
Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the corresponding statements of account of his
administration, with the particularity that in all his motions, he always made it point to urge the that
"no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein accounts be
given notice as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased in accordance with
the last will and testament already probated by the Honorable Court." All said accounts approved as
prayed for.
Nothing else appears to have been done either by the court a quo or Hodges until December 25,
1962. Importantly to be the provision in the will of Mrs. Hodges that her share of the conjugal
partnership was to be inherited by her husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said husband,
during his natural lifetime" and that "at the death of my said husband, I give, devise and bequeath all
the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located,
to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike", which provision
naturally made it imperative that the conjugal partnership be promptly liquidated, in order that the
"rest, residue and remainder" of his wife's share thereof, as of the time of Hodges' own death, may

be readily known and identified, no such liquidation was ever undertaken. The record gives no
indication of the reason for such omission, although relatedly, it appears therein:
1. That in his annual statement submitted to the court of the net worth of C. N.
Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, Hodges repeatedly and consistently
reported the combined income of the conjugal partnership and then merely divided
the same equally between himself and the estate of the deceased wife, and, more
importantly, he also, as consistently, filed corresponding separate income tax returns
for each calendar year for each resulting half of such combined income, thus
reporting that the estate of Mrs. Hodges had its own income distinct from his own.
2. That when the court a quo happened to inadvertently omit in its order probating
the will of Mrs. Hodges, the name of one of her brothers, Roy Higdon then already
deceased, Hodges lost no time in asking for the proper correction "in order that the
heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that
they were really interested in the estate of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges".
3. That in his aforementioned motion of December 11, 1957, he expressly stated that
"deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants or ascendants except
brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as the surviving spouse, to inherit the
properties of the decedent", thereby indicating that he was not excluding his wife's
brothers and sisters from the inheritance.
4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and manifestations to the United States
inheritance tax authorities indicating that he had renounced his inheritance from his
wife in favor of her other heirs, which attitude he is supposed to have reiterated or
ratified in an alleged affidavit subscribed and sworn to here in the Philippines and in
which he even purportedly stated that his reason for so disclaiming and renouncing
his rights under his wife's will was to "absolve (him) or (his) estate from any liability
for the payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges", his wife, since her death.
On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day, upon motion of herein
respondent and appellee, Avelina A. Magno, she was appointed by the trial court as Administratrix of
the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings No. 1307 and as Special
Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, "in the latter case, because the last will of
said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal
properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless Special Administratrix is
appointed," (Order of December 26, 1962, p. 27, Yellow R. on A.) although, soon enough, on
December 29, 1962, a certain Harold K. Davies was appointed as her Co-Special Administrator, and
when Special Proceedings No. 1672, Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, was opened, Joe
Hodges, as next of kin of the deceased, was in due time appointed as Co-Administrator of said
estate together with Atty. Fernando P. Mirasol, to replace Magno and Davies, only to be in turn
replaced eventually by petitioner PCIB alone.
At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been proceeding jointly, with each
administrator acting together with the other, under a sort of modus operandi. PCIB used to secure at
the beginning the conformity to and signature of Magno in transactions it wanted to enter into and
submitted the same to the court for approval as their joint acts. So did Magno do likewise. Somehow,
however, differences seem to have arisen, for which reason, each of them began acting later on
separately and independently of each other, with apparent sanction of the trial court. Thus, PCIB had
its own lawyers whom it contracted and paid handsomely, conducted the business of the estate

independently of Magno and otherwise acted as if all the properties appearing in the name of
Charles Newton Hodges belonged solely and only to his estate, to the exclusion of the brothers and
sisters of Mrs. Hodges, without considering whether or not in fact any of said properties
corresponded to the portion of the conjugal partnership pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. On
the other hand, Magno made her own expenditures, hired her own lawyers, on the premise that
there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and dealth with some of the properties, appearing in the
name of Hodges, on the assumption that they actually correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. All
of these independent and separate actuations of the two administrators were invariably approved by
the trial court upon submission. Eventually, the differences reached a point wherein Magno, who was
more cognizant than anyone else about the ins and outs of the businesses and properties of the
deceased spouses because of her long and intimate association with them, made it difficult for PCIB
to perform normally its functions as administrator separately from her. Thus, legal complications
arose and the present judicial controversies came about.
Predicating its position on the tenor of the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 as well as the
approval by the court a quo of the annual statements of account of Hodges, PCIB holds to the view
that the estate of Mrs. Hodges has already been in effect closed with the virtual adjudication in the
mentioned orders of her whole estate to Hodges, and that, therefore, Magno had already ceased
since then to have any estate to administer and the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges have no
interests whatsoever in the estate left by Hodges. Mainly upon such theory, PCIB has come to this
Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the lower court's orders allowing
respondent Magno to continue acting as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges in Special
Proceedings 1307 in the manner she has been doing, as detailed earlier above, be set aside.
Additionally, PCIB maintains that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will instituting her brothers and sisters
in the manner therein specified is in the nature of a testamentary substitution, but inasmuch as the
purported substitution is not, in its view, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code,
it is ineffective and may not be enforced. It is further contended that, in any event, inasmuch as the
Hodges spouses were both residents of the Philippines, following the decision of this Court in Aznar
vs. Garcia, or the case of Christensen, 7 SCRA 95, the estate left by Mrs. Hodges could not be more
than one-half of her share of the conjugal partnership, notwithstanding the fact that she was citizen
of Texas, U.S.A., in accordance with Article 16 in relation to Articles 900 and 872 of the Civil Code.
Initially, We issued a preliminary injunction against Magno and allowed PCIB to act alone.
At the same time PCIB has appealed several separate orders of the trial court approving individual
acts of appellee Magno in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, such as, hiring
of lawyers for specified fees and incurring expenses of administration for different purposes and
executing deeds of sale in favor of her co-appellees covering properties which are still registered in
the name of Hodges, purportedly pursuant to corresponding "contracts to sell" executed by Hodges.
The said orders are being questioned on jurisdictional and procedural grounds directly or indirectly
predicated on the principal theory of appellant that all the properties of the two estates belong
already to the estate of Hodges exclusively.
On the other hand, respondent-appellee Magno denies that the trial court's orders of May 27 and
December 14, 1957 were meant to be finally adjudicatory of the hereditary rights of Hodges and
contends that they were no more than the court's general sanction of past and future acts of Hodges
as executor of the will of his wife in due course of administration. As to the point regarding
substitution, her position is that what was given by Mrs. Hodges to her husband under the provision
in question was a lifetime usufruct of her share of the conjugal partnership, with the naked ownership
passing directly to her brothers and sisters. Anent the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code, she
claims that the applicable law to the will of Mrs. Hodges is that of Texas under which, she alleges,
there is no system of legitime, hence, the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than her share or
one-half of the conjugal partnership properties. She further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had

as a matter of fact and of law renounced his inheritance from his wife and, therefore, her whole
estate passed directly to her brothers and sisters effective at the latest upon the death of Hodges.
In this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the issues just summarized, We overrule
PCIB's contention that the orders of May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957 amount to an
adjudication to Hodges of the estate of his wife, and We recognize the present existence of the
estate of Mrs. Hodges, as consisting of properties, which, while registered in that name of Hodges,
do actually correspond to the remainder of the share of Mrs. Hodges in the conjugal partnership, it
appearing that pursuant to the pertinent provisions of her will, any portion of said share still existing
and undisposed of by her husband at the time of his death should go to her brothers and sisters
share and share alike. Factually, We find that the proven circumstances relevant to the said orders
do not warrant the conclusion that the court intended to make thereby such alleged final
adjudication. Legally, We hold that the tenor of said orders furnish no basis for such a conclusion,
and what is more, at the time said orders were issued, the proceedings had not yet reached the
point when a final distribution and adjudication could be made. Moreover, the interested parties were
not duly notified that such disposition of the estate would be done. At best, therefore, said orders
merely allowed Hodges to dispose of portions of his inheritance in advance of final adjudication,
which is implicitly permitted under Section 2 of Rule 109, there being no possible prejudice to third
parties, inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges had no creditors and all pertinent taxes have been paid.
More specifically, We hold that, on the basis of circumstances presently extant in the record, and on
the assumption that Hodges' purported renunciation should not be upheld, the estate of Mrs. Hodges
inherited by her brothers and sisters consists of one-fourth of the community estate of the spouses
at the time of her death, minus whatever Hodges had gratuitously disposed of therefrom during the
period from, May 23, 1957, when she died, to December 25, 1962, when he died provided, that with
regard to remunerative dispositions made by him during the same period, the proceeds thereof,
whether in cash or property, should be deemed as continuing to be part of his wife's estate, unless it
can be shown that he had subsequently disposed of them gratuitously.
At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas and
what would be the estate of Mrs. Hodges under them is basically one of fact, and considering the
respective positions of the parties in regard to said factual issue, it can already be deemed as settled
for the purposes of these cases that, indeed, the free portion of said estate that could possibly
descend to her brothers and sisters by virtue of her will may not be less than one-fourth of the
conjugal estate, it appearing that the difference in the stands of the parties has reference solely to
the legitime of Hodges, PCIB being of the view that under the laws of Texas, there is such a legitime
of one-fourth of said conjugal estate and Magno contending, on the other hand, that there is none. In
other words, hereafter, whatever might ultimately appear, at the subsequent proceedings, to be
actually the laws of Texas on the matter would no longer be of any consequence, since PCIB would
anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less than as
contended by it now, for admissions by a party related to the effects of foreign laws, which have to
be proven in our courts like any other controverted fact, create estoppel.
In the process, We overrule PCIB's contention that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will in favor of her
brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. But neither are We sustaining, on
the other hand, Magno's pose that it gave Hodges only a lifetime usufruct. We hold that by said
provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her
husband, with the condition, however, that the latter would have complete rights of dominion over the
whole estate during his lifetime and what would go to the former would be only the remainder thereof
at the time of Hodges' death. In other words, whereas they are not to inherit only in case of default of
Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for them. Clearly then, the
essential elements of testamentary substitution are absent; the provision in question is a simple case

of conditional simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby the institution of Hodges is subject to a

partial resolutory condition the operative contingency of which is coincidental with that of the
suspensive condition of the institution of his brothers and sisters-in-law, which manner of institution
is not prohibited by law.
We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters could be
more than just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the
principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will
appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held
that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the
circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the Court
is not in a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and
We, therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the
court a quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such further
proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that
since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not have anyway legally
adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugal partnership,
albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs.
Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the
conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained earlier, have
beengratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons since then, for even if it
were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and
applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share
would be her free disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband under
Article 900 of the Civil Code.
The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no alternative than to conclude that in predicating
its orders on the assumption, albeit unexpressed therein, that there is an estate of Mrs. Hodges to
be distributed among her brothers and sisters and that respondent Magno is the legal administratrix
thereof, the trial court acted correctly and within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition
for certiorari and prohibition has to be denied. The Court feels however, that pending the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership and the determination of the specific properties constituting her estate,
the two administrators should act conjointly as ordered in the Court's resolution of September 8,
1972 and as further clarified in the dispositive portion of its decision.
Anent the appeals from the orders of the lower court sanctioning payment by appellee Magno, as
administratrix, of expenses of administration and attorney's fees, it is obvious that, with Our holding
that there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and for the reasons stated in the body of this opinion,
the said orders should be affirmed. This We do on the assumption We find justified by the evidence
of record, and seemingly agreed to by appellant PCIB, that the size and value of the properties that
should correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges far exceed the total of the attorney's fees and
administration expenses in question.
With respect to the appeals from the orders approving transactions made by appellee Magno, as
administratrix, covering properties registered in the name of Hodges, the details of which are related
earlier above, a distinction must be made between those predicated on contracts to sell executed by
Hodges before the death of his wife, on the one hand, and those premised on contracts to sell
entered into by him after her death. As regards the latter, We hold that inasmuch as the payments
made by appellees constitute proceeds of sales of properties belonging to the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, as may be implied from the tenor of the motions of May 27 and December 14, 1957, said
payments continue to pertain to said estate, pursuant to her intent obviously reflected in the relevant
provisions of her will, on the assumption that the size and value of the properties to correspond to

the estate of Mrs. Hodges would exceed the total value of all the properties covered by the
impugned deeds of sale, for which reason, said properties may be deemed as pertaining to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges. And there being no showing that thus viewing the situation, there would be
prejudice to anyone, including the government, the Court also holds that, disregarding procedural
technicalities in favor of a pragmatic and practical approach as discussed above, the assailed orders
should be affirmed. Being a stranger to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB has no personality to raise
the procedural and jurisdictional issues raised by it. And inasmuch as it does not appear that any of
the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges or the government has objected to any of the orders under appeal,
even as to these parties, there exists no reason for said orders to be set aside.
DISPOSITIVE PART
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the
petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the
other thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered to be added after payment of the corresponding docket
fees, all the orders of the trial court under appeal enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to
82 of this decision; the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respondentappellee Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix thereof is recognized, and it is declared that, until final
judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines to the situation obtaining in these cases and (2) the factual and legal issue of whether
or not Charles Newton Hodges had effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under the will of
Linnie Jane Hodges, the said estate consists of one-fourth of the community properties of the said
spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had
already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death, provided,
first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of
the wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and
second, that should the purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no deductions
whatsoever are to be made from said estate; in consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8,
1967, as amended on October 4 and December 6, 1967, is lifted, and the resolution of September 8,
1972, directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles
Newton Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1672, and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1307, should act
thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from each other, as such administrators, is
reiterated, and the same is made part of this judgment and shall continue in force, pending the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses and the determination and
segregation from each other of their respective estates, provided, that upon the finality of this
judgment, the trial court should immediately proceed to the partition of the presently combined
estates of the spouses, to the end that the one-half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly
and clearly identified; thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of the onefourth herein adjudged to be her estate and cause the same to be turned over or delivered to
respondent for her exclusive administration in Special Proceedings 1307, while the other one-fourth
shall remain under the joint administration of said respondent and petitioner under a joint
proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to
Hodges shall be administered by petitioner exclusively in Special Proceedings 1672, without
prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of the pending motions for its removal as administrator 12;
and this arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the two issues of renvoi and
renunciation hereby reserved for further hearing and determination, and the corresponding complete
segregation and partition of the two estates in the proportions that may result from the said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to adhere
henceforth, in all their actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the views passed and
ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing opinion.

Appellant PCIB is ordered to pay, within five (5) days from notice hereof, thirty-one additional appeal
docket fees, but this decision shall nevertheless become final as to each of the parties herein after
fifteen (15) days from the respective notices to them hereof in accordance with the rules.
Costs against petitioner-appellant PCIB.
Zaldivar, Castro, Esguerra and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

I concur on the basis of the procedural pronouncements in the opinion.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the result of dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L27896 and with the affirmance of the appealed orders of the probate court in Cases L-27936-37.
I also concur with the portion of the dispositive part of the judgment penned by Mr. Justice Barredo
decreeing thelifting of the Court's writ of preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967 as amended on
October 4, and December 6, 1967 1 and ordering in lieu thereof that the Court's resolution of September
8, 1972 2 which directed that petitioner-appellantPCIB as administrator of C. N. (Charles Newton) Hodges'
estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of Linnie Jane
Hodges' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) should act always conjointly never independently from each other, as
such administrators, is reiterated and shall continue in force and made part of the judgment.
It is manifest from the record that petitioner-appellant PCIB's primal contention in the cases at bar
belatedly filedby it with this Court on August 1, 1967 (over ten (10) years after Linnie Jane Hodges'
death on May 23, 1957 and (over five (5) years after her husband C.N. Hodges' death on December
25, 1962 during which time both estates have been pending settlement and distribution to the
decedents' respective rightful heirs all this time up to now) that the probate court per its order of
December 14, 1957 (supplementing an earlier order of May 25, 1957) 3 in granting C. N. Hodges'
motion as Executor of his wife Linnie's estate to continue their "business of buying and selling personal
and real properties" and approving "all sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages" made and to be made
by him as such executor under his obligation to submit his yearly accounts in effect declared him as sole
heir of his wife's estate and nothing remains to be done except to formally close her estate (Sp. Proc. No.
1307) as her estate was thereby merged with his own so that nothing remains of it that may be
adjudicated to her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs after him, 4 is wholly untenable and
deserves scant consideration.

Aside from having been put forth as an obvious afterthought much too late in the day, this contention
of PCIB that there no longer exists any separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges after the probate
court's order of December 14, 1957 goes against the very acts and judicial admissions of C.N.
Hodges as her executor whereby he consistently recognized the separate existence and identity of
his wife's estate apart from his own separate estate and from his own share of their conjugal
partnership and estate and "never considered the whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively
to himself" during the entire period that he survived her for over five (5) years up to the time of his
own death on December 25, 1962 5 and against the identical acts and judicial admissions of PCIB as
administrator of C.N. Hodges' estate until PCIB sought in 1966 to take over both estates as pertaining to
its sole administration.
PCIB is now barred and estopped from contradicting or taking a belated position contradictory to or
inconsistent with its previous admissions 6 (as well as those of C.N. Hodges himself in his lifetime
and of whose estate PCIB is merely an administrator) recognizing the existence and identity of
Linnie Jane Hodges' separate estate and the legal rights and interests therein of her brothers and
sisters as her designated heirs in her will.
PCIB's petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare all acts of the probate court in Linnie Jane
Hodges' estate subsequent to its order of December 14, 1957 as "null and void for having been
issued without jurisdiction" must therefore be dismissed with the rejection of its belated and
untenable contention that there is no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of which respondent Avelina
Magno is the duly appointed and acting administratrix.
PCIB's appeal 7 from the probate court's various orders recognizing respondent Magno as administratrix
of Linnie's estate (Sp. Proc No. 1307) and sanctioning her acts of administration of said estate and
approving the sales contracts executed by her with the various individual appellees, which involve
basically the same primal issue raised in the petition as to whether there still exists a separate estate of
Linnie of which respondent-appellee Magno may continue to be the administratrix, must necessarily fail
a result of the Court's main opinion at bar that there does exist such an estate and that the twoestates
(husband's and wife's) must be administered cojointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and
Magno).
The dispositive portion of the main opinion
The main opinion disposes that:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G.
R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered to be added
after payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders of the trial court under
appeal enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision:
The existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee
Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix thereof is recognized, and
It is declared that, until final judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner
of applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation obtaining in
these cases and (2) the factual and legal issues of whether or not Charles Newton
Hodges has effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under the will of Linnie
Jane Hodges, the said estate consists of one-fourthof the community properties of
the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on May 23,
1957, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of

third persons from said date until his death, provided, first, that with respect
to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of
the wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed ofgratuitously to third parties by the
husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared legally
effective, no deduction whatsoever are to be made from said estate;
In consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended on
October 4 and December 6, 1967, is lifted and the resolution of September 8, 1972,
directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of
Charles Newton Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, and respondent-appellee
Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in
Special Proceedings 1307, should act thenceforth always conjointly, never
independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated, and the same
is made part of this judgment and shall continue in force, pending the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses and
the determination and segregation from each other of their respective estates;
provided, that upon the finality of this judgment, the trial court should immediately
proceed to the partition of the presently combined estates of the spouses, to the end
that the one-half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and clearly identified;
Thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of the onefourth herein adjudged to be her estate and cause the same to be turned over or
delivered to respondent for her exclusive administration in Special Proceedings
1307, while the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint administrative of said
respondent and petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307
and 1672, whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall
be administered bypetitioner exclusively in Special Proceedings 1672, without
prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of the pending motions for its removal as
administrator;
And this arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the two issues
of renvoi andrenunciation hereby reserved for further hearing and determination, and
the corresponding completesegregation and partition of the two estates in the
proportions that may result from the said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to
adhere henceforth, in all their actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to
the views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing opinion. 8
Minimum estimate of Mrs. Hodges' estate:
One-fourth of conjugal properties.
The main opinion in declaring the existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges which shall
pass to her brothers and sisters with right of representation (by their heirs) as her duly designated
heirs declares that her estate consists as a minimum (i.e. assuming (1) that under Article 16 of the
Philippine Civil Code C. N. Hodges as surviving husband was entitled to one-half of her estate
as legitime and (2) that he had not effectively and legallyrenounced his inheritance under her will) of
"one-fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife
on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third
persons from said date until his death," with the proviso that proceeds of remunerativedispositions or
sales for valuable consideration made by C. N. Hodges after his wife Linnie's death shall continue to
be part of her estate unless subsequently disposed of by him gratuitously to third parties subject to

the condition, however, that if he is held to have validly and effectively renounced his inheritance
under his wife's will,no deductions of any dispositions made by Hodges even if gratuitously are to be
made from his wife Linnie's estate which shall pass intact to her brothers and sisters as her
designated heirs called in her will to succeed to her estate upon the death of her husband C. N.
Hodges.
Differences with the main opinion
I do not share the main opinion's view that Linnie Jane Hodges instituted her husband as her heir
under her will "to have dominion over all her estate during his lifetime ... as absolute owner of the
properties ..." 9 and that she bequeathed "the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as
universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that while
he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than
himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his death
would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and
sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would
automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual
existence of any remainder of her estate then." 10
As will be amplified hereinafter, I do not subscribe to such a view that Linnie Jane Hodges willed "full
and absolute ownership" and "absolute dominion" over her estate to her husband, but rather that she
named her husband C. N. Hodges and her brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a term under
Article 885 of our Civil Code, to wit, Hodges as instituted heir with a resolutory term whereunder his
right to the succession ceased in diem upon arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December
25, 1962 and her brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a suspensive term whereunder their
right to the succession commenced ex die upon arrival of the suspensive term of the death of C. N.
Hodges on December 25, 1962.
Hence, while agreeing with the main opinion that the proceeds of all remunerative dispositions made
by C. N. Hodges after his wife's death remain an integral part of his wife's estate which she willed to
her brothers and sisters, I submit that C. N. Hodges could not validly make gratuitous dispositions of
any part or all of his wife's estate "completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter
vivos to anyone other than himself" in the language of the main opinion, supra and thereby render
ineffectual and nugatory her institution of her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs to
succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her) husband." If according to the main opinion,
Hodges could not make such gratuitous "complete and absolute dispositions" of his wife Linnie's
estate "mortis causa," it would seem that by the same token and rationale he was likewise
proscribed by the will from making such dispositions of Linnie's estate inter vivos.
I believe that the two questions of renvoi and renunciation should be
resolved preferentially and expeditiously by the probate court ahead of the partition and segregation
of the minimum one-fourth of the conjugal or community properties constituting Linnie Jane
Hodges' separate estate, which task considering that it is now seventeen (17) years since Linnie
Jane Hodges' death and her conjugal estate with C. N. Hodges has remained unliquidated up to now
might take a similar number of years to unravel with the numerous items, transactions and details of
the sizable estates involved.
Such partition of the minimum one-fourth would not be final, since if the two prejudicial questions
of renvoi andrenunciation were resolved favorably to Linnie's estate meaning to say that if it should
be held that C. N. Hodges is not entitled to any legitime of her estate and at any rate he had totally
renounced his inheritance under the will), then Linnie's estate would consist not only of the minimum
one-fourth but one-half of the conjugal or community properties of the Hodges spouses, which would

require again the partition and segregation of still another one-fourth of said. properties
to complete Linnie's separate estate.
My differences with the main opinion involve further the legal concepts, effects and consequences of
the testamentary dispositions of Linnie Jane Hodges in her will and the question of the best to reach
a solution of the pressing question of expediting the closing of the estates which after all do not
appear to involve any outstanding debts nor any dispute between the heirs and should therefore be
promptly settled now after all these years without any further undue complications and delays and
distributed to the heirs for their full enjoyment and benefit. As no consensus appears to have been
reached thereon by a majority of the Court, I propose to state views as concisely as possible with the
sole end in view that they may be of some assistance to the probate court and the parties in
reaching an expeditious closing and settlement of the estates of the Hodges spouses.
Two Assumptions
As indicated above, the declaration of the minimum of Mrs. Hodges' estate as one-fourth of the
conjugal properties is based on two assumptions most favorable to C. N. Hodges' estate and his
heirs, namely (1) that the probate court must accept the renvoi or "reference back" 11 allegedly
provided by the laws of the State of Texas (of which state the Hodges spouses were citizens) whereby the
civil laws of the Philippines as the domicile of the Hodges spouses would govern their
succession notwithstanding the provisions of Article 16 of our Civil Code (which provides that the national
law of the decedents, in this case, of Texas, shall govern their succession) with the result that her estate
would consist of no more than one-fourth of the conjugal properties since the legitime of her husband (the
other one-fourth of said conjugal properties or one-half of her estate, under Article 900 of our Civil Code)
could not then be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by her and (2) that C.N. Hodges
had not effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under his wife's will.
These two assumptions are of course flatly disputed by respondent-appellee Magno as Mrs. Hodges'
administratrix, who avers that the law of the State of Texas governs her succession and
does not provide for and legitime, hence, her brothers and sisters are entitled to succeed to the
whole of her share of the conjugal properties which is one-half thereof and that in any event, Hodges
had totally renounced all his rights under the will.
The main opinion concedes that "(I)n the interest of settling the estates herein involved soonest, it
would be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the parties were determined in these
proceedings." It observes however that this cannot be done due to the inadequacy of the evidence
submitted by the parties in the probate court and of the parties' discussion, viz, "there is no clear and
reliable proof of what the possibly applicable laws of Texas are. Then also, the genuineness of the
documents relied upon by respondent Magno [re Hodges' renunciation] is disputed." 12
Hence, the main opinion expressly reserves resolution and determination on these two conflicting
claims and issues which it deems "are not properly before the Court
now," 13 and specifically holds that "(A)ccordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the
further proceedings hereby ordered to be held in the court below is how much more than as fixed above is
the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend on (1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do
provide in effect for more, such as, when there is nolegitime provided therein, and (2) whether or not
Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges." 14
Suggested guidelines
Considering that the only unresolved issue has thus been narrowed down and in consonance with
the ruling spirit of our probate law calling for the prompt settlement of the estates of deceased

persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance
considering that the estates have been long pending settlement since 1957 and 1962, respectively
it was felt that the Court should lay down specific guidelines for the guidance of the probate court
towards the end that it may expedite the closing of the protracted estates proceedings below to the
mutual satisfaction of the heirs and without need of a dissatisfied party elevating its resolution of
this only remaining issue once more to this Court and dragging out indefinitely the proceedings.
After all, the only question that remains depends for its determination on the resolution of the two
questions ofrenvoi and renunciation, i.e. as to whether C. N. Hodges can claim
a legitime and whether he had renounced the inheritance. But as already indicated above, the Court
without reaching a consensus which would finally resolve the conflicting claims here and now in this
case opted that "these and other relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in
the proceedings hereinafter to be held for the purpose of ascertaining and/or distributing the estate
of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will." 15
The writer thus feels that laying down the premises and principles governing the nature, effects and
consequences of Linnie Jane Hodges' testamentary dispositions in relation to her conjugal
partnership and co-ownership of properties with her husband C. N. Hodges and "thinking out" the
end results, depending on whether the evidence directed to be formally received by the probate
court would bear out that under renvoi C. N. Hodges was or was not entitled to claim a legitime of
one-half of his wife Linnie's estate and/or that he had or had not effectively and validly renounced his
inheritance should help clear the decks, as it were, and assist the probate court in resolving
the only remaining question of how much more than the minimum one-fourth of the community
properties of the Hodges spouses herein finally determined should be awarded as the separate
estate of Linnie, particularly since the views expressed in the main opinion have not gained a
consensus of the Court. Hence, the following suggested guidelines, which needless to state,
represent the personal opinion and views of the writer:
1. To begin with, as pointed out in the main opinion, "according to Hodges' own inventory submitted
by him as executor of the estate of his wife, practically all their properties were conjugal which
means that the spouses haveequal shares therein." 16
2. Upon the death of Mrs. Hodges on May 23, 1957, and the dissolution thereby of the marriage, the
law imposed upon Hodges as surviving husband the duty of inventorying, administering and
liquidating the conjugal or community property. 17 Hodges failed to discharge this duty of liquidating the
conjugal partnership and estate. On the contrary, he sought and obtained authorization from the probate
court to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying and selling real and personal properties.
In his annual accounts submitted to the probate court as executor of Mrs. Hodges' estate, Hodges
thusconsistently reported the considerable combined income (in six figures) of the conjugal
partnership or coownership and then divided the same equally between himself and Mrs. Hodges'
estate and as consistently filed separate income tax returns and paid the income taxes
for each resulting half of such combined income corresponding to his own and to Mrs. Hodges'
estate. 18 (Parenthetically, he could not in law do this, had he adjudicated Linnie's entire estate to
himself, thus supporting the view advanced even in the main opinion that "Hodges waived not only
his rights to the fruits but to the properties themselves." 19
By operation of the law of trust 20 as well as by his own acknowledgment and acts, therefore, all
transactions made by Hodges after his wife's death were deemed for and on behalf of their unliquidated
conjugal partnership and community estate and were so reported and treated by him.

3. With this premise established that all transactions of Hodges after his wife's death were for and on
behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate, share and share alike, it
should be clear that nogratuitous dispositions, if any, made by C. N. Hodges from his wife Linnie's
estate should be deducted from herseparate estate as held in the main opinion. On the contrary, any
such gratuitous dispositions should be charged to his own share of the conjugal estate since he had
no authority or right to make any gratuitous dispositions of Linnie's properties to the prejudice of her
brothers and sisters whom she called to her succession upon his death, not to mention that the very
authority obtained by him from the probate court per its orders of May 25, and December 14, 1957
was to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying and selling real properties for the
account of their unliquidated conjugal estate and co-ownership, share and share alike and not to
make anyfree dispositions of Linnie's estate.
4. All transactions as well after the death on December 25, 1962 of Hodges himself appear perforce
and necessarily to have been conducted, on the same premise, for and on behalf of
their unliquidated conjugal partnership and/or co-ownership, share and share alike since the
conjugal partnership remained unliquidated which is another way of saying that such transactions,
purchases and sales, mostly the latter, must be deemed in effect to have been made for the
respective estates of C. N. Hodges and of his wife Linnie Jane Hodges, as both estates continued to
have an equal stake and share in the conjugal partnership which was not only leftunliquidated but
continued as a co-ownership or joint business with the probate court's approval by Hodges during
the five-year period that he survived his wife.
This explains the probate court's action of requiring that deeds of sale executed by PCIB as Hodges'
estate's administrator be "signed jointly" by respondent Magno as Mrs. Hodges' estate's
administratrix, as well as its order authorizing payment by lot purchasers from the Hodges
to either estate, since "there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to
whomsoever are entitled thereto." 22
And this equally furnishes the rationale of the main opinion for continued conjoint administration by
the administrators of the two estates of the deceased spouses, "pending the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership,"23 since "it is but logical that both estates should be administered jointly by the
representatives of both, pending their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because the actuations
so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges
from their inheritance." 24 5. Antly by the representatives of both, pending their segregation from each
other. Particularly ... because the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent
to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance." 24
5. As stressed in the main opinion, the determination of the only unresolved issue of how much more
than the minimum of one-fourth of the community or conjugal properties of the Hodges spouses
pertains to Mrs. Hodges' estate depends on the twin questions of renunciation and renvoi. It directed
consequently that "a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein involved" be held by the
probate court for the reception of "further evidence" in order to finally resolved these twin
questions. 25
(a) On the question of renunciation, it is believed that all that the probate court has to do is to receive
formally in evidence the various documents annexed to respondent Magno's answer at
bar, 26 namely: Copy of the U.S. Estate Tax Return filed on August 8, 1958 by C. N. Hodges for his wife
Linnie's estate wherein he purportedly declared that he wasrenouncing his inheritance under his wife's will
in favor of her brothers and sisters as co-heirs designated with him and that it was his "intention (as)
surviving husband of the deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in
their community estate to the devisee and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and
expenses of administration are finally determined and paid;" 27 and

The affidavit of ratification of such renunciation (which places him in estoppel) allegedly executed on
August 9, 1962 by C. N. Hodges in Iloilo City wherein he reaffirmed that "... on August 8, 1958,
I renounced and disclaimed any and all right to receive the rents, emoluments and income from said
estate" and further declared that "(T)he purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do
hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration made in schedule M of said return and hereby
formally disclaim and renounce any right on my part to receive any of the said rents, emoluments
and income from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit is made
to absolve me or my estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income which has
accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May
23, 1957." 28
(b) On the question of renvoi, all that remains for the probate court to do is to formally receive in
evidence duly authenticated copies of the laws of the State of Texas governing the succession of
Linnie Jane Hodges and her husband C. N. Hodges as citizens of said State at the time of their
respective deaths on May 23, 1957 andDecember 25, 1962. 29
6. The text and tenor of the declarations by C. N. Hodges of renunciation of his inheritance from his
wife in favor of her other named heirs in her will (her brothers and sisters and their respective heirs)
as ratified and reiteratedexpressly in his affidavit of renunciation executed four years later for the
avowed purpose of not being held liable for payment of income taxes on income which has accrued
to his wife's estate since her death indicate a valid and effective renunciation.
Once the evidence has been formally admitted and its genuineness and legal effectivity established
by the probate court, the renunciation by C. N. Hodges must be given due effect with the result that
C. N. Hodges therefore acquired no part of his wife's one-half share of the community properties
since he removed himself as an heir by virtue of his renunciation. By simple substitution then under
Articles 857 and 859 of our Civil Code 30and by virtue of the will's institution of heirs, since "the heir
originally instituted C. N. Hodges) does not become an heir" 31by force of his renunciation, Mrs. Hodges'
brothers and sisters whom she designated as her heirs upon her husband's death are called immediately
to her succession.
Consequently, the said community and conjugal properties would then pertain pro indiviso share and
share alike to their respective estates, with each estate, however, shouldering its own expenses of
administration, estate and inheritance taxes, if any remain unpaid, attorneys' fees and other like
expenses and the net remainder to be adjudicated directly to the decedents' respective brothers and
sisters (and their heirs) as the heirs duly designated in their respective wills. The question
of renvoi becomes immaterial since most laws and our lawspermit such renunciation of inheritance.
7. If there were no renunciation (or the same may somehow be declared to have not been valid and
effective) by C. N. Hodges of his inheritance from his wife, however, what would be the
consequence?
(a) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do provide for renvoi or "reference back" to
Philippine law as the domiciliary law of the Hodges' spouses governing their succession, then
petitioners' view that Mrs. Hodges' estate would consist only of the minimum of "one-fourth of the
community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of (her) death on May 23, 1957" would
have to be sustained and C. N. Hodges' estate would consist ofthree-fourths of the community
properties, comprising his own one-half (or two-fourths) share and the other fourth of Mrs. Hodges'
estate as the legitime granted him as surviving spouse by Philippine law (Article 900 of the Civil
Code) which could not be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by Mrs. Hodges as testatrix.

(b) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do not provide for such renvoi and respondent
Magno's assertion is correct that the Texas law which would then prevail, provides for no legitime for
C. N. Hodges as the surviving spouse, then respondent Magno's assertion that Mrs. Hodges' estate
would consist of one-half of the community properties (with the other half pertaining to C. N. Hodges)
would have to be sustained. The community and conjugal properties would then pertain share and
share alike to their respective estates, with each estate shouldering its own expenses of
administration in the same manner stated in the last paragraph of paragraph 6 hereof. .
8. As to the nature of the institution of heirs made by Mrs. Hodges in her will, the main opinion holds
that "(T)he brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges; rather, they are also
heirs institutedsimultaneously with Hodges," but goes further and holds that "it was not the usufruct
alone of her estate ... that she bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full
ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no
restriction against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof anybody other than
himself" and describes Hodges "as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over Mrs. Hodges'
estate (except over their Lubbock, Texas property ), 32 adding that "Hodges was not obliged to preserve
anything for them" (referring to Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters as instituted co-heirs). 33
Contrary to this view of the main opinion, the writer submits that the provisions of Mrs. Hodges' will
did not grant to C.N. Hodges "full ownership" nor "absolute dominion" over her estate, such that he
could as "universal and sole heir" by the mere expedient of gratuitously disposing to third persons
her whole estate during his lifetime nullifyher institution of her brothers and sisters as his co-heirs to
succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her) husband," deprive them of any inheritance and
make his own brothers and sisters in effect sole heirs not only of his own estate but of
his wife's estate as well.
Thus, while Linnie Jane Hodges did not expressly name her brothers and sisters as substitutes for
Hodges because she willed that they would enter into the succession upon his death, still it cannot
be gainsaid, as the main opinion concedes, "that they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with
Hodges, subject however to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned
and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law." 34
Hence, if Hodges is found to have validly renounced his inheritance, there would be a substitution of
heirs in fact and in law since Linnie's brothers and sisters as the heirs "simultaneously instituted"
with a suspensive term would be called immediately to her succession instead of waiting for the
arrival of suspensive term of Hodges' death, since as the heir originally instituted he does not
become an heir by force of his renunciation and therefore they would "enter into the inheritance in
default of the heir originally instituted" (Hodges) under the provisions of Article 857 and 859 of our
Civil Code, supra, 35 thus accelerating their succession to her estate as a consequence of Hodges'
renunciation.
Consequently, Linnie Jane Hodges willed that her husband C.N. Hodges would "during his natural
lifetime ...manage, control, use and enjoy said estate" and that only "all rents,
emoluments and income" alone shall belong to him. She further willed that while he
could sell and purchase properties of her estate, and "use any part of the principal estate," such
principal notwithstanding "any changes in the physical properties of said estate"(i.e. new properties
acquired or exchanged) would still pertain to her estate, which at the time of his death would pass
infull dominion to her brothers and sisters as the ultimate sole and universal heirs of her estate. 36
The testatrix Linnie Jane Hodges in her will thus principally provided that "I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real ... to my
beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold with him ... during his natural

lifetime;" 37 that "(he) shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime,
... to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate, bysale ... and the purchase of any other
or additional property as he may think best ... . All rents, emoluments and incomefrom said estate
shall belong to him and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may
need or desire, ... he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned by us,
located at ... City of Lubbock, Texas ... . He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots
therein, and may sell unimproved town lots;" 38 that "(A)t the death of my said husband, Charles Newton, I
give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real, ...
to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely: Esta Higdon, Emma
Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy Higdon;" 39 and that "(I)n
case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters ... prior to the death of my husband ... the heirs of
such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which would have gone to such brother or
sister had she or he survived." 40
Such provisions are wholly consistent with the view already fully expounded above that all
transactions and sales made by Hodges after his wife Linnie's death were by operation of the law
of trust as well as by his ownacknowledgment and acts deemed for and on behalf of
their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate, share and share alike, with the
express authorization of the probate court per its orders of May 25, and December 14, 1957 granting
Hodges' motion to continue the conjugal partnership business of buying and selling real estate even
after her death. By the same token, Hodges could not conceivably be deemed to have had any
authority or right to dispose gratuitously of any portion of her estate to whose succession she had
called her brothers and sisters upon his death.
9. Such institutions of heirs with a term are expressly recognized and permitted under Book III,
Chapter 2, section 4 of our Civil Code dealing with "conditional testamentary dispositions and
testamentary dispositions with a term."41
Thus, Article 885 of our Civil Code expressly provides that:
ART 885. The designation of the day or time when the effects of the institution of an
heir shallcommence or cease shall be valid.
In both cases, the legal heir shall be considered as called to the succession until the
arrival of the period or its expiration. But in the first case he shall not enter into
possession of the property until after having given sufficient security, with the
intervention of the instituted heir.
Accordingly, under the terms of Mrs. Hodges' will, her husband's right to the succession as the
instituted heir ceased in diem, i.e. upon the arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December
25, 1962, while her brothers' and sisters' right to the succession also as instituted heirs
commenced ex die, i.e. upon the expiration of the suspensive term (as far as they were concerned)
of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962 . 42
As stated in Padilla's treatise on the Civil Code, "A term is a period whose arrival is certain although
the exact date thereof may be uncertain. A term may have either a suspensive or a resolutory effect.
The designation of the day when the legacy "shall commence" is ex die, or a term with a suspensive
effect, from a certain day. The designation of the day when the legacy "shall cease" is in diem or a
term with a resolutory effect, until a certain day." He adds that "A legacy based upon a certain age or
upon the death of a person is not a condition but aterm. If the arrival of the term would commence
the right of the heir, it is suspensive. If the arrival of the term would terminate his right, it is
resolutory" and that "upon the arrival of the period, in case of a suspensive term, the instituted heir is
entitled to the succession, and in case of a resolutory term, his right terminates." 43

10. The sizable estates herein involved have now been pending settlement for a considerably
protracted period (of seventeen years counted from Linnie's death in 1957), and all that is left to be
done is to resolve the onlyremaining issue (involving the two questions of renunciation and renvoi)
hereinabove discussed in order to close up the estates and finally effect distribution to the deceased
spouses' respective brothers and sisters and their heirs as the heirs duly instituted in their wills long
admitted to probate. Hence, it is advisable for said instituted heirs and their heirs in turn 44 to come to
terms for the adjudication and distribution to them pro-indiviso of the up to now unliquidated community
properties of the estates of the Hodges spouses (derived from their unliquidated conjugal partnership)
rather than to get bogged down with the formidable task of physically segregating and partitioning the two
estates with the numerous transactions, items and details and physical changes of properties involved.
The estates proceedings would thus be closed and they could then name their respective attorneys-infact to work out the details of segregating, dividing or partitioning the unliquidated community properties
or liquidating them which can be done then on their own without further need of intervention on the part
of the probate court as well as allow them meanwhile to enjoy and make use of the income and cash and
liquid assets of the estates in such manner as may be agreed upon between them.
Such a settlement or modus vivendi between the heirs of the unliquidated two estates for the mutual
benefit of all of them should not prove difficult, considering that it appears as stated in the main
opinion that 22.968149% of the share or undivided estate of C. N. Hodges have already been
acquired by the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges from certain heirs of her husband, while certain other
heirs representing 17.34375% of Hodges' estate were joining cause with Linnie's heirs in their
pending and unresolved motion for the removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of Hodges'
estate, 45 apparently impatient with the situation which has apparently degenerated into a running battle
between the administrators of the two estates to the common prejudice of all the heirs.
11. As earlier stated, the writer has taken the pain of suggesting these guidelines which may serve to
guide the probate court as well as the parties towards expediting the winding up and closing of the
estates and the distribution of the net estates to the instituted heirs and their successors duly entitled
thereto. The probate court should exert all effort towards this desired objective pursuant to the
mandate of our probate law, bearing in mind the Court's admonition in previous cases that "courts of
first instance should exert themselves to close up estate within twelve months from the time they are
presented, and they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors and administrators who do
not actively labor to that end, and they may even adopt harsher measures."46
Timeliness of appeals and imposition of
thirty-one (31) additional docket fees
Two appeals were docketed with this Court, as per the two records on appeal submitted (one with a
green cover and the other with a yellow cover). As stated at the outset, these appeals involve
basically the same primal issue raised in the petition for certiorari as to whether there still exists a
separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges which has to continue to be administered by respondent
Magno. Considering the main opinion's ruling in the affirmative and that her estate and that of her
husband (since they jointly comprise unliquidated community properties) must be
administered conjointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and Magno), the said appeals
(involving thirty-three different orders of the probate court approving sales contracts and other acts
of administration executed and performed by respondent Magno on behalf of Linnie's estate) have
been necessarily overruled by the Court's decision at bar.
(a) The "priority question" raised by respondent Magno as to the patent failure of the two records on
appeal to show on their face and state the material data that the appeals were timely taken within
the 30-day reglamentary period as required by Rule 41, section 6 of the Rules of Court, has been
brushed aside by the main opinion with the statement that it is "not necessary to pass upon the
timeliness of any of said appeals" since they "revolve around practically the same main issues

and ... it is admitted that some of them have been timely taken." 47 The main opinion thus proceeded
with the determination of the thirty-three appealed orders despite the grave defect of the appellant PCIB's
records on appeal and their failure to state the required material data showing the timeliness of the
appeals.
Such disposition of the question of timeliness deemed as "mandatory and jurisdictional" in a number
of cases merits the writer's concurrence in that the question raised has been subordinated to the
paramount considerations of substantial justice and a "liberal interpretation of the rules" applied so
as not to derogate and detract from the primary intent and purpose of the rules, viz "the proper and
just determination of a litigation" 48 which calls for "adherence to a liberal construction of the
procedural rules in order to attain their objective of substantial justice and of avoiding denials of
substantial justice due to procedural technicalities." 49
Thus, the main opinion in consonance with the same paramount considerations of substantial justice
has likewise overruled respondents' objection to petitioner's taking the recourse of "the present
remedy of certiorari and prohibition" "despite the conceded availability of appeal" on the
ground that "there is a common thread among the basic issues involved in all these thirty-three
appeals (which) deal with practically the same basic issues that can be more expeditiously
resolved or determined in a single special civil action . . . " 50
(b) Since the basic issues have been in effect resolved in the special civil action at bar (as above
stated) with the dismissal of the petition by virtue of the Court's judgment as to the continued
existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the affirmance as a necessary
consequence of the appealed orders approving and sanctioning respondent Magno's sales contracts
and acts of administration, some doubt would arise as to the propriety of the main opinion requiring
the payment by PCIB of thirty-one (31) additional appeal docket fees. This doubt is further enhanced
by the question of whether it would make the cost of appeal unduly expensive or prohibitive by
requiring the payment of a separate appeal docket fee for each incidental order questioned when the
resolution of all such incidental questioned orders involve basically one and the same main issue (in
this case, the existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges) and can be more expeditiously
resolved or determined in a single special civil action" (for which a single docket fee is required) as
stated in the main opinion. 51Considering the importance of the basic issues and the magnitude of the
estates involved, however, the writer has pro hac vice given his concurrence to the assessment of the
said thirty-one (31) additional appeal docket fees.
MAKALINTAL, C.J., concurring:
I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Teehankee, which in turn agrees with the dispositive
portion of the main opinion of Justice Barredo insofar as it dismisses the petition for certiorari and
prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L-27896 and affirms the appealed orders of the probate court in
cases L-27936-37.
However, I wish to make one brief observation for the sake of accuracy. Regardless of whether or
not C. N. Hodges was entitled to a legitime in his deceased wife's estate which question, still to be
decided by the said probate court, may depend upon what is the law of Texas and upon its
applicability in the present case the said estate consists of one-half, not one-fourth, of the
conjugal properties. There is neither a minimum of one-fourth nor a maximum beyond that. It is
important to bear this in mind because the estate of Linnie Hodges consists of her share in the
conjugal properties, is still under administration and until now has not been distributed by order of
the court.

The reference in both the main and separate opinions to a one-fourth portion of the conjugal
properties as Linnie Hodges' minimum share is a misnomer and is evidently meant only to indicate
that if her husband should eventually be declared entitled to a legitime, then the disposition made by
Linnie Hodges in favor of her collateral relatives would be valid only as to one-half of her share, or
one-fourth of the conjugal properties, since the remainder, which constitutes such legitime, would
necessarily go to her husband in absolute ownership, unburdened by any substitution, term or
condition, resolutory or otherwise. And until the estate is finally settled and adjudicated to the heirs
who may be found entitled to it, the administration must continue to cover Linnie's entire conjugal
share.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
I concur on the basis of the procedural pronouncements in the opinion.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the result of dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L27896 and with the affirmance of the appealed orders of the probate court in Cases L-27936-37.
I also concur with the portion of the dispositive part of the judgment penned by Mr. Justice Barredo
decreeing thelifting of the Court's writ of preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967 as amended on
October 4, and December 6, 1967 1 and ordering in lieu thereof that the Court's resolution of September
8, 1972 2 which directed that petitioner-appellantPCIB as administrator of C. N. (Charles Newton) Hodges'
estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of Linnie Jane
Hodges' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) should act always conjointly never independently from each other, as
such administrators, is reiterated and shall continue in force and made part of the judgment.
It is manifest from the record that petitioner-appellant PCIB's primal contention in the cases at bar
belatedly filedby it with this Court on August 1, 1967 (over ten (10) years after Linnie Jane Hodges'
death on May 23, 1957 and (over five (5) years after her husband C.N. Hodges' death on December
25, 1962 during which time both estates have been pending settlement and distribution to the
decedents' respective rightful heirs all this time up to now) that the probate court per its order of
December 14, 1957 (supplementing an earlier order of May 25, 1957) 3 in granting C. N. Hodges'
motion as Executor of his wife Linnie's estate to continue their "business of buying and selling personal
and real properties" and approving "all sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages" made and to be made
by him as such executor under his obligation to submit his yearly accounts in effect declared him as sole
heir of his wife's estate and nothing remains to be done except to formally close her estate (Sp. Proc. No.
1307) as her estate was thereby merged with his own so that nothing remains of it that may be
adjudicated to her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs after him, 4 is wholly untenable and
deserves scant consideration.
Aside from having been put forth as an obvious afterthought much too late in the day, this contention
of PCIB that there no longer exists any separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges after the probate
court's order of December 14, 1957 goes against the very acts and judicial admissions of C.N.
Hodges as her executor whereby he consistently recognized the separate existence and identity of
his wife's estate apart from his own separate estate and from his own share of their conjugal

partnership and estate and "never considered the whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively
to himself" during the entire period that he survived her for over five (5) years up to the time of his
own death on December 25, 1962 5 and against the identical acts and judicial admissions of PCIB as
administrator of C.N. Hodges' estate until PCIB sought in 1966 to take over both estates as pertaining to
its sole administration.
PCIB is now barred and estopped from contradicting or taking a belated position contradictory to or
inconsistent with its previous admissions 6 (as well as those of C.N. Hodges himself in his lifetime
and of whose estate PCIB is merely an administrator) recognizing the existence and identity of
Linnie Jane Hodges' separate estate and the legal rights and interests therein of her brothers and
sisters as her designated heirs in her will.
PCIB's petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare all acts of the probate court in Linnie Jane
Hodges' estate subsequent to its order of December 14, 1957 as "null and void for having been
issued without jurisdiction" must therefore be dismissed with the rejection of its belated and
untenable contention that there is no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of which respondent Avelina
Magno is the duly appointed and acting administratrix.
PCIB's appeal 7 from the probate court's various orders recognizing respondent Magno as administratrix
of Linnie's estate (Sp. Proc No. 1307) and sanctioning her acts of administration of said estate and
approving the sales contracts executed by her with the various individual appellees, which involve
basically the same primal issue raised in the petition as to whether there still exists a separate estate of
Linnie of which respondent-appellee Magno may continue to be the administratrix, must necessarily fail
a result of the Court's main opinion at bar that there does exist such an estate and that the twoestates
(husband's and wife's) must be administered cojointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and
Magno).
The dispositive portion of the main opinion
The main opinion disposes that:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G.
R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered to be added
after payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders of the trial court under
appeal enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision:
The existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee
Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix thereof is recognized, and
It is declared that, until final judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner
of applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation obtaining in
these cases and (2) the factual and legal issues of whether or not Charles Newton
Hodges has effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under the will of Linnie
Jane Hodges, the said estate consists of one-fourthof the community properties of
the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on May 23,
1957, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of
third persons from said date until his death, provided, first, that with respect
to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of
the wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed ofgratuitously to third parties by the
husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared legally
effective, no deduction whatsoever are to be made from said estate;

In consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended on

October 4 and December 6, 1967, is lifted and the resolution of September 8, 1972,
directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of
Charles Newton Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, and respondent-appellee
Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in
Special Proceedings 1307, should act thenceforth always conjointly, never
independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated, and the same
is made part of this judgment and shall continue in force, pending the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses and
the determination and segregation from each other of their respective estates;
provided, that upon the finality of this judgment, the trial court should immediately
proceed to the partition of the presently combined estates of the spouses, to the end
that the one-half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and clearly identified;
Thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of the onefourth herein adjudged to be her estate and cause the same to be turned over or
delivered to respondent for her exclusive administration in Special Proceedings
1307, while the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint administrative of said
respondent and petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307
and 1672, whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall
be administered bypetitioner exclusively in Special Proceedings 1672, without
prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of the pending motions for its removal as
administrator;
And this arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the two issues
of renvoi andrenunciation hereby reserved for further hearing and determination, and
the corresponding completesegregation and partition of the two estates in the
proportions that may result from the said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to
adhere henceforth, in all their actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to
the views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing opinion. 8
Minimum estimate of Mrs. Hodges' estate:
One-fourth of conjugal properties.
The main opinion in declaring the existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges which shall
pass to her brothers and sisters with right of representation (by their heirs) as her duly designated
heirs declares that her estate consists as a minimum (i.e. assuming (1) that under Article 16 of the
Philippine Civil Code C. N. Hodges as surviving husband was entitled to one-half of her estate
as legitime and (2) that he had not effectively and legallyrenounced his inheritance under her will) of
"one-fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife
on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third
persons from said date until his death," with the proviso that proceeds of remunerativedispositions or
sales for valuable consideration made by C. N. Hodges after his wife Linnie's death shall continue to
be part of her estate unless subsequently disposed of by him gratuitously to third parties subject to
the condition, however, that if he is held to have validly and effectively renounced his inheritance
under his wife's will,no deductions of any dispositions made by Hodges even if gratuitously are to be
made from his wife Linnie's estate which shall pass intact to her brothers and sisters as her
designated heirs called in her will to succeed to her estate upon the death of her husband C. N.
Hodges.

Differences with the main opinion

I do not share the main opinion's view that Linnie Jane Hodges instituted her husband as her heir
under her will "to have dominion over all her estate during his lifetime ... as absolute owner of the
properties ..." 9 and that she bequeathed "the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as
universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that while
he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than
himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his death
would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and
sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would
automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual
existence of any remainder of her estate then." 10
As will be amplified hereinafter, I do not subscribe to such a view that Linnie Jane Hodges willed "full
and absolute ownership" and "absolute dominion" over her estate to her husband, but rather that she
named her husband C. N. Hodges and her brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a term under
Article 885 of our Civil Code, to wit, Hodges as instituted heir with a resolutory term whereunder his
right to the succession ceased in diem upon arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December
25, 1962 and her brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a suspensive term whereunder their
right to the succession commenced ex die upon arrival of the suspensive term of the death of C. N.
Hodges on December 25, 1962.
Hence, while agreeing with the main opinion that the proceeds of all remunerative dispositions made
by C. N. Hodges after his wife's death remain an integral part of his wife's estate which she willed to
her brothers and sisters, I submit that C. N. Hodges could not validly make gratuitous dispositions of
any part or all of his wife's estate "completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter
vivos to anyone other than himself" in the language of the main opinion, supra and thereby render
ineffectual and nugatory her institution of her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs to
succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her) husband." If according to the main opinion,
Hodges could not make such gratuitous "complete and absolute dispositions" of his wife Linnie's
estate "mortis causa," it would seem that by the same token and rationale he was likewise
proscribed by the will from making such dispositions of Linnie's estate inter vivos.
I believe that the two questions of renvoi and renunciation should be
resolved preferentially and expeditiously by the probate court ahead of the partition and segregation
of the minimum one-fourth of the conjugal or community properties constituting Linnie Jane
Hodges' separate estate, which task considering that it is now seventeen (17) years since Linnie
Jane Hodges' death and her conjugal estate with C. N. Hodges has remained unliquidated up to now
might take a similar number of years to unravel with the numerous items, transactions and details of
the sizable estates involved.
Such partition of the minimum one-fourth would not be final, since if the two prejudicial questions
of renvoi andrenunciation were resolved favorably to Linnie's estate meaning to say that if it should
be held that C. N. Hodges is not entitled to any legitime of her estate and at any rate he had totally
renounced his inheritance under the will), then Linnie's estate would consist not only of the minimum
one-fourth but one-half of the conjugal or community properties of the Hodges spouses, which would
require again the partition and segregation of still another one-fourth of said. properties
to complete Linnie's separate estate.
My differences with the main opinion involve further the legal concepts, effects and consequences of
the testamentary dispositions of Linnie Jane Hodges in her will and the question of the best to reach
a solution of the pressing question of expediting the closing of the estates which after all do not

appear to involve any outstanding debts nor any dispute between the heirs and should therefore be
promptly settled now after all these years without any further undue complications and delays and
distributed to the heirs for their full enjoyment and benefit. As no consensus appears to have been
reached thereon by a majority of the Court, I propose to state views as concisely as possible with the
sole end in view that they may be of some assistance to the probate court and the parties in
reaching an expeditious closing and settlement of the estates of the Hodges spouses.
Two Assumptions
As indicated above, the declaration of the minimum of Mrs. Hodges' estate as one-fourth of the
conjugal properties is based on two assumptions most favorable to C. N. Hodges' estate and his
heirs, namely (1) that the probate court must accept the renvoi or "reference back" 11 allegedly
provided by the laws of the State of Texas (of which state the Hodges spouses were citizens) whereby the
civil laws of the Philippines as the domicile of the Hodges spouses would govern their
succession notwithstanding the provisions of Article 16 of our Civil Code (which provides that the national
law of the decedents, in this case, of Texas, shall govern their succession) with the result that her estate
would consist of no more than one-fourth of the conjugal properties since the legitime of her husband (the
other one-fourth of said conjugal properties or one-half of her estate, under Article 900 of our Civil Code)
could not then be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by her and (2) that C.N. Hodges
had not effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under his wife's will.
These two assumptions are of course flatly disputed by respondent-appellee Magno as Mrs. Hodges'
administratrix, who avers that the law of the State of Texas governs her succession and
does not provide for and legitime, hence, her brothers and sisters are entitled to succeed to the
whole of her share of the conjugal properties which is one-half thereof and that in any event, Hodges
had totally renounced all his rights under the will.
The main opinion concedes that "(I)n the interest of settling the estates herein involved soonest, it
would be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the parties were determined in these
proceedings." It observes however that this cannot be done due to the inadequacy of the evidence
submitted by the parties in the probate court and of the parties' discussion, viz, "there is no clear and
reliable proof of what the possibly applicable laws of Texas are. Then also, the genuineness of the
documents relied upon by respondent Magno [re Hodges' renunciation] is disputed." 12
Hence, the main opinion expressly reserves resolution and determination on these two conflicting
claims and issues which it deems "are not properly before the Court
now," 13 and specifically holds that "(A)ccordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the
further proceedings hereby ordered to be held in the court below is how much more than as fixed above is
the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend on (1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do
provide in effect for more, such as, when there is nolegitime provided therein, and (2) whether or not
Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges." 14
Suggested guidelines
Considering that the only unresolved issue has thus been narrowed down and in consonance with
the ruling spirit of our probate law calling for the prompt settlement of the estates of deceased
persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance
considering that the estates have been long pending settlement since 1957 and 1962, respectively
it was felt that the Court should lay down specific guidelines for the guidance of the probate court
towards the end that it may expedite the closing of the protracted estates proceedings below to the
mutual satisfaction of the heirs and without need of a dissatisfied party elevating its resolution of
this only remaining issue once more to this Court and dragging out indefinitely the proceedings.

After all, the only question that remains depends for its determination on the resolution of the two
questions ofrenvoi and renunciation, i.e. as to whether C. N. Hodges can claim
a legitime and whether he had renounced the inheritance. But as already indicated above, the Court
without reaching a consensus which would finally resolve the conflicting claims here and now in this
case opted that "these and other relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in
the proceedings hereinafter to be held for the purpose of ascertaining and/or distributing the estate
of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will." 15
The writer thus feels that laying down the premises and principles governing the nature, effects and
consequences of Linnie Jane Hodges' testamentary dispositions in relation to her conjugal
partnership and co-ownership of properties with her husband C. N. Hodges and "thinking out" the
end results, depending on whether the evidence directed to be formally received by the probate
court would bear out that under renvoi C. N. Hodges was or was not entitled to claim a legitime of
one-half of his wife Linnie's estate and/or that he had or had not effectively and validly renounced his
inheritance should help clear the decks, as it were, and assist the probate court in resolving
the only remaining question of how much more than the minimum one-fourth of the community
properties of the Hodges spouses herein finally determined should be awarded as the separate
estate of Linnie, particularly since the views expressed in the main opinion have not gained a
consensus of the Court. Hence, the following suggested guidelines, which needless to state,
represent the personal opinion and views of the writer:
1. To begin with, as pointed out in the main opinion, "according to Hodges' own inventory submitted
by him as executor of the estate of his wife, practically all their properties were conjugal which
means that the spouses haveequal shares therein." 16
2. Upon the death of Mrs. Hodges on May 23, 1957, and the dissolution thereby of the marriage, the
law imposed upon Hodges as surviving husband the duty of inventorying, administering and
liquidating the conjugal or community property. 17 Hodges failed to discharge this duty of liquidating the
conjugal partnership and estate. On the contrary, he sought and obtained authorization from the probate
court to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying and selling real and personal properties.
In his annual accounts submitted to the probate court as executor of Mrs. Hodges' estate, Hodges
thusconsistently reported the considerable combined income (in six figures) of the conjugal
partnership or coownership and then divided the same equally between himself and Mrs. Hodges'
estate and as consistently filed separate income tax returns and paid the income taxes
for each resulting half of such combined income corresponding to his own and to Mrs. Hodges'
estate. 18 (Parenthetically, he could not in law do this, had he adjudicated Linnie's entire estate to
himself, thus supporting the view advanced even in the main opinion that "Hodges waived not only
his rights to the fruits but to the properties themselves." 19
By operation of the law of trust 20 as well as by his own acknowledgment and acts, therefore, all
transactions made by Hodges after his wife's death were deemed for and on behalf of their unliquidated
conjugal partnership and community estate and were so reported and treated by him.
3. With this premise established that all transactions of Hodges after his wife's death were for and on
behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate, share and share alike, it
should be clear that nogratuitous dispositions, if any, made by C. N. Hodges from his wife Linnie's
estate should be deducted from herseparate estate as held in the main opinion. On the contrary, any
such gratuitous dispositions should be charged to his own share of the conjugal estate since he had
no authority or right to make any gratuitous dispositions of Linnie's properties to the prejudice of her
brothers and sisters whom she called to her succession upon his death, not to mention that the very
authority obtained by him from the probate court per its orders of May 25, and December 14, 1957

was to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying and selling real properties for the
account of their unliquidated conjugal estate and co-ownership, share and share alike and not to
make anyfree dispositions of Linnie's estate.
4. All transactions as well after the death on December 25, 1962 of Hodges himself appear perforce
and necessarily to have been conducted, on the same premise, for and on behalf of
their unliquidated conjugal partnership and/or co-ownership, share and share alike since the
conjugal partnership remained unliquidated which is another way of saying that such transactions,
purchases and sales, mostly the latter, must be deemed in effect to have been made for the
respective estates of C. N. Hodges and of his wife Linnie Jane Hodges, as both estates continued to
have an equal stake and share in the conjugal partnership which was not only leftunliquidated but
continued as a co-ownership or joint business with the probate court's approval by Hodges during
the five-year period that he survived his wife.
This explains the probate court's action of requiring that deeds of sale executed by PCIB as Hodges'
estate's administrator be "signed jointly" by respondent Magno as Mrs. Hodges' estate's
administratrix, as well as its order authorizing payment by lot purchasers from the Hodges
to either estate, since "there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to
whomsoever are entitled thereto." 22
And this equally furnishes the rationale of the main opinion for continued conjoint administration by
the administrators of the two estates of the deceased spouses, "pending the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership,"23 since "it is but logical that both estates should be administered jointly by the
representatives of both, pending their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because the actuations
so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges
from their inheritance." 24 5. Antly by the representatives of both, pending their segregation from each
other. Particularly ... because the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent
to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance." 24
5. As stressed in the main opinion, the determination of the only unresolved issue of how much more
than the minimum of one-fourth of the community or conjugal properties of the Hodges spouses
pertains to Mrs. Hodges' estate depends on the twin questions of renunciation and renvoi. It directed
consequently that "a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein involved" be held by the
probate court for the reception of "further evidence" in order to finally resolved these twin
questions. 25
(a) On the question of renunciation, it is believed that all that the probate court has to do is to receive
formally in evidence the various documents annexed to respondent Magno's answer at
bar, 26 namely: Copy of the U.S. Estate Tax Return filed on August 8, 1958 by C. N. Hodges for his wife
Linnie's estate wherein he purportedly declared that he wasrenouncing his inheritance under his wife's will
in favor of her brothers and sisters as co-heirs designated with him and that it was his "intention (as)
surviving husband of the deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in
their community estate to the devisee and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and
expenses of administration are finally determined and paid;" 27 and
The affidavit of ratification of such renunciation (which places him in estoppel) allegedly executed on
August 9, 1962 by C. N. Hodges in Iloilo City wherein he reaffirmed that "... on August 8, 1958,
I renounced and disclaimed any and all right to receive the rents, emoluments and income from said
estate" and further declared that "(T)he purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do
hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration made in schedule M of said return and hereby
formally disclaim and renounce any right on my part to receive any of the said rents, emoluments
and income from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit is made
to absolve me or my estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income which has

accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May
23, 1957." 28
(b) On the question of renvoi, all that remains for the probate court to do is to formally receive in
evidence duly authenticated copies of the laws of the State of Texas governing the succession of
Linnie Jane Hodges and her husband C. N. Hodges as citizens of said State at the time of their
respective deaths on May 23, 1957 andDecember 25, 1962. 29
6. The text and tenor of the declarations by C. N. Hodges of renunciation of his inheritance from his
wife in favor of her other named heirs in her will (her brothers and sisters and their respective heirs)
as ratified and reiteratedexpressly in his affidavit of renunciation executed four years later for the
avowed purpose of not being held liable for payment of income taxes on income which has accrued
to his wife's estate since her death indicate a valid and effective renunciation.
Once the evidence has been formally admitted and its genuineness and legal effectivity established
by the probate court, the renunciation by C. N. Hodges must be given due effect with the result that
C. N. Hodges therefore acquired no part of his wife's one-half share of the community properties
since he removed himself as an heir by virtue of his renunciation. By simple substitution then under
Articles 857 and 859 of our Civil Code 30and by virtue of the will's institution of heirs, since "the heir
originally instituted C. N. Hodges) does not become an heir" 31by force of his renunciation, Mrs. Hodges'
brothers and sisters whom she designated as her heirs upon her husband's death are called immediately
to her succession.
Consequently, the said community and conjugal properties would then pertain pro indiviso share and
share alike to their respective estates, with each estate, however, shouldering its own expenses of
administration, estate and inheritance taxes, if any remain unpaid, attorneys' fees and other like
expenses and the net remainder to be adjudicated directly to the decedents' respective brothers and
sisters (and their heirs) as the heirs duly designated in their respective wills. The question
of renvoi becomes immaterial since most laws and our lawspermit such renunciation of inheritance.
7. If there were no renunciation (or the same may somehow be declared to have not been valid and
effective) by C. N. Hodges of his inheritance from his wife, however, what would be the
consequence?
(a) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do provide for renvoi or "reference back" to
Philippine law as the domiciliary law of the Hodges' spouses governing their succession, then
petitioners' view that Mrs. Hodges' estate would consist only of the minimum of "one-fourth of the
community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of (her) death on May 23, 1957" would
have to be sustained and C. N. Hodges' estate would consist ofthree-fourths of the community
properties, comprising his own one-half (or two-fourths) share and the other fourth of Mrs. Hodges'
estate as the legitime granted him as surviving spouse by Philippine law (Article 900 of the Civil
Code) which could not be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by Mrs. Hodges as testatrix.
(b) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do not provide for such renvoi and respondent
Magno's assertion is correct that the Texas law which would then prevail, provides for no legitime for
C. N. Hodges as the surviving spouse, then respondent Magno's assertion that Mrs. Hodges' estate
would consist of one-half of the community properties (with the other half pertaining to C. N. Hodges)
would have to be sustained. The community and conjugal properties would then pertain share and
share alike to their respective estates, with each estate shouldering its own expenses of
administration in the same manner stated in the last paragraph of paragraph 6 hereof. .

8. As to the nature of the institution of heirs made by Mrs. Hodges in her will, the main opinion holds
that "(T)he brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges; rather, they are also
heirs institutedsimultaneously with Hodges," but goes further and holds that "it was not the usufruct
alone of her estate ... that she bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full
ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no
restriction against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof anybody other than
himself" and describes Hodges "as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over Mrs. Hodges'
estate (except over their Lubbock, Texas property ), 32 adding that "Hodges was not obliged to preserve
anything for them" (referring to Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters as instituted co-heirs). 33
Contrary to this view of the main opinion, the writer submits that the provisions of Mrs. Hodges' will
did not grant to C.N. Hodges "full ownership" nor "absolute dominion" over her estate, such that he
could as "universal and sole heir" by the mere expedient of gratuitously disposing to third persons
her whole estate during his lifetime nullifyher institution of her brothers and sisters as his co-heirs to
succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her) husband," deprive them of any inheritance and
make his own brothers and sisters in effect sole heirs not only of his own estate but of
his wife's estate as well.
Thus, while Linnie Jane Hodges did not expressly name her brothers and sisters as substitutes for
Hodges because she willed that they would enter into the succession upon his death, still it cannot
be gainsaid, as the main opinion concedes, "that they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with
Hodges, subject however to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned
and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law." 34
Hence, if Hodges is found to have validly renounced his inheritance, there would be a substitution of
heirs in fact and in law since Linnie's brothers and sisters as the heirs "simultaneously instituted"
with a suspensive term would be called immediately to her succession instead of waiting for the
arrival of suspensive term of Hodges' death, since as the heir originally instituted he does not
become an heir by force of his renunciation and therefore they would "enter into the inheritance in
default of the heir originally instituted" (Hodges) under the provisions of Article 857 and 859 of our
Civil Code, supra, 35 thus accelerating their succession to her estate as a consequence of Hodges'
renunciation.
Consequently, Linnie Jane Hodges willed that her husband C.N. Hodges would "during his natural
lifetime ...manage, control, use and enjoy said estate" and that only "all rents,
emoluments and income" alone shall belong to him. She further willed that while he
could sell and purchase properties of her estate, and "use any part of the principal estate," such
principal notwithstanding "any changes in the physical properties of said estate"(i.e. new properties
acquired or exchanged) would still pertain to her estate, which at the time of his death would pass
infull dominion to her brothers and sisters as the ultimate sole and universal heirs of her estate. 36
The testatrix Linnie Jane Hodges in her will thus principally provided that "I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real ... to my
beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold with him ... during his natural
lifetime;" 37 that "(he) shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime,
... to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate, bysale ... and the purchase of any other
or additional property as he may think best ... . All rents, emoluments and incomefrom said estate
shall belong to him and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may
need or desire, ... he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned by us,
located at ... City of Lubbock, Texas ... . He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots
therein, and may sell unimproved town lots;" 38 that "(A)t the death of my said husband, Charles Newton, I
give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real, ...
to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely: Esta Higdon, Emma

Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy Higdon;" 39 and that "(I)n
case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters ... prior to the death of my husband ... the heirs of
such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which would have gone to such brother or
sister had she or he survived." 40

Such provisions are wholly consistent with the view already fully expounded above that all
transactions and sales made by Hodges after his wife Linnie's death were by operation of the law
of trust as well as by his ownacknowledgment and acts deemed for and on behalf of
their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate, share and share alike, with the
express authorization of the probate court per its orders of May 25, and December 14, 1957 granting
Hodges' motion to continue the conjugal partnership business of buying and selling real estate even
after her death. By the same token, Hodges could not conceivably be deemed to have had any
authority or right to dispose gratuitously of any portion of her estate to whose succession she had
called her brothers and sisters upon his death.
9. Such institutions of heirs with a term are expressly recognized and permitted under Book III,
Chapter 2, section 4 of our Civil Code dealing with "conditional testamentary dispositions and
testamentary dispositions with a term."41
Thus, Article 885 of our Civil Code expressly provides that:
ART 885. The designation of the day or time when the effects of the institution of an
heir shallcommence or cease shall be valid.
In both cases, the legal heir shall be considered as called to the succession until the
arrival of the period or its expiration. But in the first case he shall not enter into
possession of the property until after having given sufficient security, with the
intervention of the instituted heir.
Accordingly, under the terms of Mrs. Hodges' will, her husband's right to the succession as the
instituted heir ceased in diem, i.e. upon the arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December
25, 1962, while her brothers' and sisters' right to the succession also as instituted heirs
commenced ex die, i.e. upon the expiration of the suspensive term (as far as they were concerned)
of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962 . 42
As stated in Padilla's treatise on the Civil Code, "A term is a period whose arrival is certain although
the exact date thereof may be uncertain. A term may have either a suspensive or a resolutory effect.
The designation of the day when the legacy "shall commence" is ex die, or a term with a suspensive
effect, from a certain day. The designation of the day when the legacy "shall cease" is in diem or a
term with a resolutory effect, until a certain day." He adds that "A legacy based upon a certain age or
upon the death of a person is not a condition but aterm. If the arrival of the term would commence
the right of the heir, it is suspensive. If the arrival of the term would terminate his right, it is
resolutory" and that "upon the arrival of the period, in case of a suspensive term, the instituted heir is
entitled to the succession, and in case of a resolutory term, his right terminates." 43
10. The sizable estates herein involved have now been pending settlement for a considerably
protracted period (of seventeen years counted from Linnie's death in 1957), and all that is left to be
done is to resolve the onlyremaining issue (involving the two questions of renunciation and renvoi)
hereinabove discussed in order to close up the estates and finally effect distribution to the deceased
spouses' respective brothers and sisters and their heirs as the heirs duly instituted in their wills long
admitted to probate. Hence, it is advisable for said instituted heirs and their heirs in turn 44 to come to
terms for the adjudication and distribution to them pro-indiviso of the up to now unliquidated community

properties of the estates of the Hodges spouses (derived from their unliquidated conjugal partnership)
rather than to get bogged down with the formidable task of physically segregating and partitioning the two
estates with the numerous transactions, items and details and physical changes of properties involved.
The estates proceedings would thus be closed and they could then name their respective attorneys-infact to work out the details of segregating, dividing or partitioning the unliquidated community properties
or liquidating them which can be done then on their own without further need of intervention on the part
of the probate court as well as allow them meanwhile to enjoy and make use of the income and cash and
liquid assets of the estates in such manner as may be agreed upon between them.

Such a settlement or modus vivendi between the heirs of the unliquidated two estates for the mutual
benefit of all of them should not prove difficult, considering that it appears as stated in the main
opinion that 22.968149% of the share or undivided estate of C. N. Hodges have already been
acquired by the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges from certain heirs of her husband, while certain other
heirs representing 17.34375% of Hodges' estate were joining cause with Linnie's heirs in their
pending and unresolved motion for the removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of Hodges'
estate, 45 apparently impatient with the situation which has apparently degenerated into a running battle
between the administrators of the two estates to the common prejudice of all the heirs.
11. As earlier stated, the writer has taken the pain of suggesting these guidelines which may serve to
guide the probate court as well as the parties towards expediting the winding up and closing of the
estates and the distribution of the net estates to the instituted heirs and their successors duly entitled
thereto. The probate court should exert all effort towards this desired objective pursuant to the
mandate of our probate law, bearing in mind the Court's admonition in previous cases that "courts of
first instance should exert themselves to close up estate within twelve months from the time they are
presented, and they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors and administrators who do
not actively labor to that end, and they may even adopt harsher measures."46
Timeliness of appeals and imposition of
thirty-one (31) additional docket fees
Two appeals were docketed with this Court, as per the two records on appeal submitted (one with a
green cover and the other with a yellow cover). As stated at the outset, these appeals involve
basically the same primal issue raised in the petition for certiorari as to whether there still exists a
separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges which has to continue to be administered by respondent
Magno. Considering the main opinion's ruling in the affirmative and that her estate and that of her
husband (since they jointly comprise unliquidated community properties) must be
administered conjointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and Magno), the said appeals
(involving thirty-three different orders of the probate court approving sales contracts and other acts
of administration executed and performed by respondent Magno on behalf of Linnie's estate) have
been necessarily overruled by the Court's decision at bar.
(a) The "priority question" raised by respondent Magno as to the patent failure of the two records on
appeal to show on their face and state the material data that the appeals were timely taken within
the 30-day reglamentary period as required by Rule 41, section 6 of the Rules of Court, has been
brushed aside by the main opinion with the statement that it is "not necessary to pass upon the
timeliness of any of said appeals" since they "revolve around practically the same main issues
and ... it is admitted that some of them have been timely taken." 47 The main opinion thus proceeded
with the determination of the thirty-three appealed orders despite the grave defect of the appellant PCIB's
records on appeal and their failure to state the required material data showing the timeliness of the
appeals.
Such disposition of the question of timeliness deemed as "mandatory and jurisdictional" in a number
of cases merits the writer's concurrence in that the question raised has been subordinated to the

paramount considerations of substantial justice and a "liberal interpretation of the rules" applied so
as not to derogate and detract from the primary intent and purpose of the rules, viz "the proper and
just determination of a litigation" 48 which calls for "adherence to a liberal construction of the
procedural rules in order to attain their objective of substantial justice and of avoiding denials of
substantial justice due to procedural technicalities." 49
Thus, the main opinion in consonance with the same paramount considerations of substantial justice
has likewise overruled respondents' objection to petitioner's taking the recourse of "the present
remedy of certiorari and prohibition" "despite the conceded availability of appeal" on the
ground that "there is a common thread among the basic issues involved in all these thirty-three
appeals (which) deal with practically the same basic issues that can be more expeditiously
resolved or determined in a single special civil action . . . " 50
(b) Since the basic issues have been in effect resolved in the special civil action at bar (as above
stated) with the dismissal of the petition by virtue of the Court's judgment as to the continued
existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the affirmance as a necessary
consequence of the appealed orders approving and sanctioning respondent Magno's sales contracts
and acts of administration, some doubt would arise as to the propriety of the main opinion requiring
the payment by PCIB of thirty-one (31) additional appeal docket fees. This doubt is further enhanced
by the question of whether it would make the cost of appeal unduly expensive or prohibitive by
requiring the payment of a separate appeal docket fee for each incidental order questioned when the
resolution of all such incidental questioned orders involve basically one and the same main issue (in
this case, the existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges) and can be more expeditiously
resolved or determined in a single special civil action" (for which a single docket fee is required) as
stated in the main opinion. 51Considering the importance of the basic issues and the magnitude of the
estates involved, however, the writer has pro hac vice given his concurrence to the assessment of the
said thirty-one (31) additional appeal docket fees.
MAKALINTAL, C.J., concurring:
I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Teehankee, which in turn agrees with the dispositive
portion of the main opinion of Justice Barredo insofar as it dismisses the petition for certiorari and
prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L-27896 and affirms the appealed orders of the probate court in
cases L-27936-37.
However, I wish to make one brief observation for the sake of accuracy. Regardless of whether or
not C. N. Hodges was entitled to a legitime in his deceased wife's estate which question, still to be
decided by the said probate court, may depend upon what is the law of Texas and upon its
applicability in the present case the said estate consists of one-half, not one-fourth, of the
conjugal properties. There is neither a minimum of one-fourth nor a maximum beyond that. It is
important to bear this in mind because the estate of Linnie Hodges consists of her share in the
conjugal properties, is still under administration and until now has not been distributed by order of
the court.
The reference in both the main and separate opinions to a one-fourth portion of the conjugal
properties as Linnie Hodges' minimum share is a misnomer and is evidently meant only to indicate
that if her husband should eventually be declared entitled to a legitime, then the disposition made by
Linnie Hodges in favor of her collateral relatives would be valid only as to one-half of her share, or
one-fourth of the conjugal properties, since the remainder, which constitutes such legitime, would
necessarily go to her husband in absolute ownership, unburdened by any substitution, term or
condition, resolutory or otherwise. And until the estate is finally settled and adjudicated to the heirs

who may be found entitled to it, the administration must continue to cover Linnie's entire conjugal
share.
Footnotes
1 Actually, the affidavit reads as follows:
"I, C. N. Hodges, being duly sworn, on oath affirm that at the time the United States
Estate Tax Return was filed in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on August 8, 1958, I
renounced and disclaimed any and all right to receive the rents, emoluments and
income from said estate, as shown by the statement contained in schedule M at
page 29 of said return, a copy of which schedule is attached to this affidavit and
made a part hereof.
"The purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do hereby ratify and
confirm, the declaration made in schedule M of said return and hereby formally
disclaim and renounce any right on my part to receive any of the said rents,
emoluments and income from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges.
This affidavit is made to absolve me or my estate from any liability for the payment of
income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957." ( annex 5, Answer
of respondent Avelina Magno, p. 264, L-27860 Rollo.)
2 The will of Hodges executed on November 14, 1953 contained mutually similar
dispositions as those of his wife as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and funeral expenses be first paid out of my
estate.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my beloved wife,
Linnie Jane Hodges, to have and to hold unto her, my said wife, during her natural
lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, shall have the
right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during her lifetime, and she is
hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate,
by sale or any part thereof which she may think best; to execute conveyances with or
without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or
time, any property which she may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real
property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass
the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as she may
elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to her,
and she is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as she
may need or desire. It is provided herein, however, that she shall not sell or
otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned by us located at, in or
near the City of Lubbock, Texas, but she shall have the full right to lease, manage
and enjoy the same during her lifetime, as above provided. She shall have the right
to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein, and may sell unimproved town lots.

xxx xxx xxx

FIFTH: At the death of my beloved wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, I give, devise and
bequeath to the heirs of my half brother, Robert Hodges, who is now deceased, a
half brother's share of my estate.
SIXTH: At the death of my said wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, I give, devise and
bequeath to the heirs of my deceased full sister, Mattie Hodges Simpkins, a full
sister's share of my estate.
SEVENTH: At the death of my said wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, I give, devise and
bequeath to the heirs of my deceased half sister, Barbara O'dell, a half sister's share
of my estate.
EIGHT: At the death of my said wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, I give, devise and
bequeath to the heirs of my full brother, Joe Hodges, deceased, a full brother's share
of my estate. .
NINTH: At the death of my said wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, I give, devise and
bequeath to the heirs of my half brother, Willie Carver, deceased, a half brother's
share of my estate.
TENTH: At the death of my said wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my other full brothers and
full sisters, share and share alike, namely: J. A. Hodges, B. F. Hodges, Laura Holland
and Addie Elliot.
ELEVENTH: In case of the death of any of my full brothers and/or full sisters named
in Item Tenth above, prior to the death of my wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, then it is my
will and bequest that the heirs of such deceased full brother or full sister shall take
jointly the share which would have gone to such full brother or full sister had he or
she survived.
xxx xxx xxx
All erasures and interlineations made before signing."
3 None of the two records on appeal contains any copy of the motion and the
opposition upon which the court acted.
4 More specific factual details related to these appeals will be stated later in the
course of the distribution of the assignments of error.
5 It should be noted that in his affidavit, Hodges ratified and confirmed the
"declaration made in Schedule M (of the inheritance tax return he filed in the U.S.)"
wherein he declared that no property interests passed to him as the surviving
spouse, except for purposes of administration and distribution to the devisees and
legatees named in the will of his wife, and further disclaimed and renounced any right
on his part to receive rents, emoluments and income therefrom because he wanted
to be "absolved ... from liability for the payment of income taxes on income that has

accrued to the estate of" his wife. While We cannot make any definite ruling on the
point now, We might at least express the impression that reading all these
statements together, one can hardly escape the conclusion that in the literal sense
the idea conveyed by them is that Hodges waived not only his rights to the fruits but
to the properties themselves.
6 With the exception of the limitations referring to the Texas properties.
7 "Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." (Article 16, Civil
Code.)
7* The question of what is the law of a foreign country is one of fact subject to proof
like any other factual issue. (Sy Joc Lien vs. Sy Quia, 16 Phil. 137; Ching Huat vs.
Co Heong 77 Phil. 988.)
8 PCIB claims that pursuant to the laws of Texas, Mrs. Hodges' estate is only onefourth of the conjugal estate, while, on the other hand, Magno contends that under
said laws, it is one-half of said estate since there is no legitime for the surviving
spouse provided in said laws.
9 The motion for contempt will be separately taken up in due time.
10 The issues We have expressly reserved for later resolution. (See pp. 111-114 of
this opinion.)
11 If it should be found by the court later that Hodges did renounce his inheritance
from Mrs. Hodges, as seems to be indicated in the documents mentioned in the
opinion, Schedule M of the Inheritance Tax Return filed by Hodges in the United
States, Annex 4 of the Answer in G. R. Nos. L- 27860 & L-27896, and the affidavit of
Hodges, Annex 5 also of the same answer, it is likely that Hodges did not have to pay
any inheritance tax, and it would only be after these proceedings are finally
terminated with a judgment favorable to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges that
taxes could be assessed against them according to their respective individual
shares.
11* See page 114-I ante.
12 See page 89-A of this decision.
TEEHANKEE J., CONCURRING:
1 This writ enjoined respondent court from acting in Sp. Proc. No. 1307 (Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges) and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno from
interfering and intervening therein,pending determination of the main issue raised by

petitioner-appellant PCIB as to whether or not Mrs. Hodges' estate continued to exist

as such so as to require the services of said Avelina A. Magno as administratrix
thereof in view of PCIB's contention that her (Mrs. Hodges') entire estate had been
adjudicated in 1957 by the probate court to her surviving husband C. N. Hodges as
"the only devisee or legatee" under her will, which contention
has now been rejected in the Court's decision at bar.
2 This resolution was based on "the inherent fairness of allowing the administratrix of
the estate of Mrs. Hodges [Avelina A. Magno] to jointly administer the properties,
rights and interests comprising both estates [Linnie Jane Hodges' and that of her
husband C. N. Hodges] until they are separated from each other" in order to give
adequate protection to the rights and interests of their respective brothers and sisters
as their designated heirs rather than "if the whole [both] proceedings were to be
under the administration of the estate of Mr. Hodges [PCIB] to the exclusion of any
representative of the heirs of Mrs. Hodges."
3 See page 5 et seq of main opinion.
4 See page 91 et seq of main opinion.
5 See page 100 of main opinion.
6 "Sec. 2. Judicial Admissions. Admissions made by the parties in the pleadings,
or in the course of the trial or other proceedings do not require proof and can not be
contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake."
(Rule 129). See also 5 Moran's 1970 Ed. 65 and cases cited.
7 See p. 114-1 et seq. of main opinion.
8 At pp., 136-137 of main opinion; paragraphing and emphasis supplied.
9 At page 121 of main opinion.
10 At pages 110-11 of main opinion.
11 See In re: Testate Estate of Edward E. Christiansen, deceased, Aznar vs. Garcia,
7 SCRA 95, 103, 107 (1963).
12 At p. 112, main opinion. See also p. 103, where the main opinion refers to still
other documentsevidencing Hodges' renunciation and observes that "we cannot
close our eyes to their existence in the record." (emphasis supplied).
13 At p. 113, main opinion.
14 At p. 114-I, main opinion, emphasis supplied.
15 At page 112, main opinion.
16 At page 109, main opinion; emphasis supplied.

17 "SEC 2. Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. When the marriage
is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the
conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of
either." (Rule 73) 18 At pp. 129-130, main opinion.
19 At page 103, main opinion, fn. 5.
20 Pamittan vs. Lasam, 60 Phil. 908 (1934), where the Court stressed the "high
degree of trust" reposed in the surviving husband as "owner of a half interest in his
own right of the conjugal estate which he was charged to administer" and that the
conjugal property which thus comes into his possession upon his wife's death
"remains conjugal property, a continuing and subsisting trust" for as long as it
remains unliquidated.
21 Order of August 6, 1965, p. 248 Green Record on Appeal; see p. 30, main
opinion.
22 Appealed order of November 23, 1965 against Western Institute of Technology,
Inc. as purchaser-appellee, pp. 334-335, Green Rec. on App. see pp. 33-34, main
opinion.
23 At p. 137, main opinion.
24 At pp. 108-109, main opinion.
25 At p. 114, main opinion, which notes that "the question of what are the laws of
Texas governing the matter here in issue is . . . one of fact, not of law."
26 See p. 102 et seq. main opinion; Annexes 4 and 5 Answer, pp. 163-264 of Rollo.
27 Annex 4, Answer, p. 263 of Rollo; emphasis supplied. 28 Annex 5, Answer, see p.
103, main opinion; emphasis supplied. 29 See pp. 114 et seq. main opinion.
30 "ART. 857. Substitution is the appointment of another heir so that he may enter
into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted." (Civil Code)
"ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or
heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish,
or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
"A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall
comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has
otherwise provided." (Civil Code, emphasis supplied)
31 6 Manresa 116, cited in III Padilla's Civil Code 1973 Ed., p. 241.
32 At pp. 110-112, main opinion; emphasis supplied.
33 At p. 134, main opinion.

34 At page 110, main opinion.

35 Text reproduced in fn. 30 hereof.
36 C.N. Hodges' own will contained identical provisions in favor of his wife, Linnie
Jane Hodges to "manage, control, use and enjoy (his)estate during her lifetime" and
making specific bequests of his whole estate to his full and half-brothers and sisters
in clauses Fifth to Tenth thereof all "at the death of my said wife, Linnie Jane Hodges.
"At p. 18 et seq. main opinion.
37 Second of seven clauses of will, emphasis supplied.
38 Third clause of will, idem.
39 Fourth clause of will, idem.
40 Fifth clause of will, idem.
41 Art. 871, Civil Code provides that "(T)he institution of an heir may he made
conditionally, or for a certain purpose or cause."
42 An analogous case is found in Crisologo vs. Singson, 4 SCRA 491 (1962) where
the testatrix provided that the property willed by her to a grandniece was to pass to
her brothers "to be effective or to take place upon the death of the (grandniece)"
whether this happens before or after the testatrix's own death.
43 Padilla's Civil Code, 1973 Ed. p. 284. The main opinion at pp. 110-111 also
concedes the suspensive and resolutory effects of Mrs. Hodges' institution of heirs.
44 Linnie Jane Hodges' brothers and sisters at her death on May 23, 1957 had ages
ranging from 62 to 74 yrs. (except for Nimroy Higdon who was then 50 yrs. old) and
most likely have all passed away or are already too old to enjoy their inheritance.
Green Rec. on Appeal, p. 2.
45 At page 89-a, main opinion.
46 Medina et al. vs. C. A., L-34760, September 28, 1973, citing Lizarraga Hnos. vs.
Abada, 40 Phil. 124 and other cases.
47 At p. 90, main opinion.
48 Ronquillo vs. Marasigan, 5 SCRA 304, cited in Berkenkotter vs. C.A., L-36629,
September 28, 1973, per Esguerra, J.
49 See the writer's concurring op. in Sison vs. Gatchalian, L-34709, June 15, 1973
and dissenting op. in Velasco vs. C.A., L-31018, June 29, 1973.
50 At pp. 90-91, main opinion.
51 At p. 91, main opinion.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11759

March 16, 1917

CAYETANO LIM and MARCIANO LIM, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondent-appellee.
Williams, Ferrier and SyCip for appellants.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The real question raised on this appeal is whether the Insular Collector of Customs may lawfully
deny entry into the Philippine Islands to two children aged 8 and 14 years, respectively, under and
by authority of the Chinese Immigration, Laws, it appearing that the children arrived at the Port of
Manila accompanied by and in the custody of their mother, a Filipino woman; that they were born in
China, out of lawful wedlock; and that their father was a Chinese person.
It is contended, on behalf of the Insular Collector of Customs, that these children being Chinese
persons are denied the right of entrance into the Philippine Islands under the express terms of the
Chinese immigration laws. On the other hand, it is urged on behalf of the children that they are
entitled to enter, regardless of the provisions of the Chinese immigration laws, since the admitted
facts, as it is said, disclose that they are citizens of the Philippine Islands; and for the further reason,
that their mother, who is entitled to their custody and charged with their maintenance and education,
is clearly entitled to take up her residence in the Philippine Islands and should not be required, to
that end, to abandon her minor children.
Without discussing or deciding any of the contentions of the parties as to the rights of citizenship of
these children, actual or inchoate, we are of opinion that by analogous reasoning to that upon which
the Supreme Court of the United States held that the wives and minor children of Chinese
merchants domiciled in the United States may enter that country without certificates, these children
must be held to be entitled to enter the Philippine Islands with their mother, for the purpose of taking
up their residence here with her, it appearing that she is natural guardian, entitled to their custody
and charged with their maintenance and education. (U. S. vs. Gue Lim, 176 U. S. 459.)
In the case just cited the court said:
While the literal construction of the section would require a certificate, as therein stated, from
every Chinese person, other than a laborer, who should come into the country, yet such a
construction leads to what we think an absurd result, for it requires a certificate for a wife of a
merchant, among others, in regard to whom its would be impossible to give the particulars
which the statute requires shall be stated in such certificate.

"Nothing is better settled," says the present Chief Justice, in Lau Ow Bew vs. United States
(144 U. S., 59) "than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will
effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid and unjust or an absurd
conclusion.
The purposes of the sixth section, requiring the certificate, was not to prevent the persons
named in the second article of the treaty from coming into the country, but to prevent
Chinese laborers from entering under the guise of being one of the classes permitted by the
treaty. It is the coming of Chinese laborers that the act is aimed against.
It was said in the opinion in the Lau Ow Bew case, in speaking of the provisions that the sole
evidence permissible should be the certificate: "This rule of evidence was evidently
prescribed by the amendment as a means of effectually preventing the violation or evasion of
the prohibition against the coming of Chinese laborers. It was designed as a safeguard to
prevent the unlawful entry of such laborers, under the pretense that they belong to the
merchant class or to some other of the admitted classes."
It was also held in that case that although the literal wording of the statute of 1884, section
six, would require a certificate in the case of a merchant already domiciled in the United
States and who had left the country for temporary purposes, animo revertendi, yet its true
and proper construction did not include his case, and the general terms used in the act were
limited to those persons to whom Congress manifestly intended to apply them, which would
be those who were about to come to the United States for the first time, and not to those
Chinese merchants already domiciled in the United States who had gone to China for
temporary purposes only, with the intention of returning. The case of Wan Shing vs. United
States (140 U. S., 24), was referred to, and attention called to the fact that the appellant
therein was not a merchant but a laborer, who had acquired no commercial domicile in this
county, and was clearly within the exception requiring him to procure and produce the
certificate specified in the act. The rule was approved, and the differences in the two cases
pointed out by the Chief Justice.
To hold that a certificate is required in this case is to decide that the woman cannot come
into this country at all, for it is not possible for her to comply with the act, because she cannot
in any event procure the certificate even by returning to China. She must come in as the wife
of her domiciled husband or not at all. The act was never meant to accomplish the result of
permanently excluding the wife under the circumstances of this case, and we think that,
properly and reasonably construed, it does not do so. If we hold that she is entitled to come
in as the wife, because the true construction of the treaty and the act permits it, there is no
provision which makes the certificate the only proof of the fact that she is such wife.
In the case of the minor children, the same result must follow as in that of the wife. All the
reasons which favor the construction of the statute as exempting the wife from the necessity
of procuring a certificate apply with equal force to the case of minor children of a member or
members of the admitted classes. They come in by reason of their relationship to the father,
and whether they accompany or follow him, a certificate is not necessary in either case.
When the fact is established to the satisfaction of the authorities that the person claiming to
enter, either as wife or minor child, is in fact the wife or minor child of one of the members of
the class mentioned in the treaty as entitled to enter, them that person in entitled to
admission without the certificate.
We are not advised of any provision of Chinese law which differentiates the status of infant children,
born out of lawful wedlock, from that of similar children under the laws in force in the Philippine

Islands. We assume, therefore, that in China as well as in the Philippine Islands such children have
the right to look to their mother for their maintenance and education, and that she is entitled to their
custody and control in fulfilling the obligations towards them which are imposed upon her, not only by
the natural impulses of love and affection, but also by the express mandate of the law. And it having
been held on the highest authority that the general terms of the Act were limited to those to whom
Congress manifestly intended to apply them as set forth in the foregoing opinion, and that "nothing is
better settled than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the
legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion," we are of
opinion that the Chinese Immigration Laws should not be construed so as to exclude infant children
of a Filipino mother, born out of lawful wedlock, seeking entrance to the Philippine Islands for the
purpose of taking up their residence with her in her native land.
It has been suggested that such a ruling opens the door to fraud and evasion, but we are not much
impressed with the force of this suggestion, knowing as we do that the immigration authorities have
been furnished by the law with peculiarly effective machinery for its enforcement, well calculated to
defeat any attempt to make an unauthorized or improper use of so manifestly reasonable an
exception from the literal construction and application of its general provisions.
Some confusion seems to have arisen in the court below as to the precise nature and effect of the
somewhat inartificial pleadings upon which these proceedings were submitted. The case appears to
have been submitted upon an answer to an order to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should
not issue upon the petition filed on behalf of the infant children. In the form in which the answer is
couched, there is much in the contention of the appellee that the trial court should have treated the
answer as in substance and effect a demurrer to the petition, admitting the truth of the facts alleged
therein, but praying judgment as to whether it sets forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
and to justify the issuance of the writ. We are inclined to think, however, that the understanding of
the parties and of the court below was that the answer should be treated rather as in the nature of a
return to a writ of habeas corpus, accepting as true the allegations of the petition but maintaining the
legality of the detention upon the facts thus submitted. Without considering at this time whether in
habeas corpus proceedings the respondent may, without consent of court, demur to, instead of
answering an order to show cause why the writ should not issue, and without considering or deciding
the course which should be pursued where a respondent attempts to file a demurrer to a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in lieu of the return prescribed by the statute to the writ when actually issued;
we treat the answer to the order to show cause in the case at bar as we think the parties and the
court below understood it should be treated, that is to say, as in substance and effect the return
which the Insular Collector desired to make to the writ of habeas corpus issued or assumed to have
been issued in response to the petition on behalf of the children held in custody by him.
We conclude, therefore, that, it appearing that the respondent Collector of Customs is detaining the
petitioners under an erroneous construction of the immigration laws, and it appearing from the facts
disclosed by the administrative proceedings that these children are entitled to admission into the
Philippine Islands, the order entered in the court below should be reversed, and in lieu thereof an
order should be entered directing the discharge of these children from the custody of the Insular
Collector of Customs, with the costs in both instances,de officio. So ordered.
Torres, Moreland, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 48122

October 29, 1948

A. W. BEAM, A. W. BEAM, Jr., and EUGENIA BEAM, the latter two assisted by their
guardian ad litem,
John W. Haussermann, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
A. L. YATCO, Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippines, defendant-appellee.
Ross, Selph, Carrascoso and Janda for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo for
appellee.

PERFECTO, J.:
On July 17, 1937, plaintiffs filed a complaint praying that the amount of P343,298.72, paid by them
as inheritance tax, be refunded to them as follows: P40,480 to A. W. Beam, P151,409.36 to A. W.
Beam, Jr. and P151,409.36 to Eugenia Beam.
In March, 1938, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts from which the following can be
gathered:
That on or before April 26, 1937, the Collector of Internal Revenue declared and assessed the
following items of property of A. W. Beam and Lydia McKee Beam at the time of the death of the
latter on October 18, 1934, at P8,100,544.91:
15,000 shares of stock of Beam Investment Company, evidenced by Certificates Nos. 2, 15 and 25
issued to and in the name of Lydia McKee Beam;
88,163 shares of stock of Beam Investment Company, evidenced by Certificates Nos. 11, 23 and 24
issued to and in the name of A. W. Beam;
500 shares of stock of Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, evidenced by Certificate No. 3342
issued to and in the name of A. W. Beam;
2,080 shares of stock of Balatoc Mining Company, evidenced by Certificates Nos. 600, 614 and 809
issued to and in the name of A. W. Beam;
5,000 shares of stock of Beam Investment Company evidenced by Certificates Nos. 17 and 26
issued to and in the name of A. W. Beam, Junior;
lawphil.net

Deposit of P2,933.18 in Manila Building and Loan Association in the name and to the credit of A. W.
Beam, Junior;
5,000 shares of stock of Beam Investment Company, evidenced by Certificates Nos. 19 and 27
issued to and in the name of Eugenia Beam;
Deposit of P2,933.18 in Manila Building and Loan Association in the name and to the credit of
Eugenia Beam.

One-half thereof, appraised at P4,050,272.46, was the estate to the deceased Lydia McKee Beam
located in the Philippines and transmitted to plaintiffs and to Syrena McKee and Rose P. McKee by
virtue of inheritance, devise, or bequest, gifts mortis causa or advance in anticipation of inheritance,
and the collector assessed and demanded inheritance taxes thereon as follows:
Heirs
A. W. Beam
A. W. Beam, Jr.
Eugenia Beam
Syrena McKee
Rose T. McKee

Share
P532,375.00
1,749,448.73
1,749,448.73
10,000.00
10,000.00

Tax
P40,480.00
151,409.36
151,409.36
200.00
200.00

P4,050,272.46 P343,698.72
On April 26, 1937, plaintiffs, together with Syrena McKee and Rose T. McKee, both sister of Lydia
Mckee Beam, paid respectively the amounts assessed and demanded by the collector, aggregating
P343,698.72, under protest that was overruled by the collector on May 11, 1937.
A. W. Beam is of age but the other two plaintiffs are minors and are assisted by their guardian ad
litem, John W. Haussermann.
On her death in the State of California on October 8, 1934, Lydia McKee Beam left a last will and
testament which, after due and regular proceedings, was admitted to probate in the superior court of
the State of California for the County of Almeda.
Lydia McKee Beam was the wife of A. W. Beam from their marriage in 1913 until her death, and the
other two plaintiffs are the legitimate children of said marriage. Plaintiffs are, and since birth, have
been, and Lydia McKee Beam was, throughout of her life, citizens of the United States of America. A.
W. Beam was for many years, beginning from year 1902, a resident domiciled in the Philippines.
On April 18, 1934, A. W. Beam, with his wife Lydia and daughter Eugenia, left the Philippines for
California and arrived at San Francisco on May 9, 1934, and since such arrival neither said Lydia nor
any of the plaintiffs have been in the Philippines, except A. W. Beam who was in the Philippines from
December 20, 1936, to January 15, 1937.
At the time of the death of Lydia McKee Beam, she and plaintiffs owned separately and severally,
according to plaintiffs, and jointly with Lydia McKee Beam and A. W. Beam, according to defendant,
the following properties:
LYDIA MCKEE BEAM: 15,000 shares of stock of Beam Investment Company, evidenced by
Certificates Nos. 2, 15 and 25 issued to and in the name of Lydia McKee Beam;
A. W. BEAM: 88,163 shares of stock of Beam Investment Company, evidenced by
Certificates Nos. 11, 23 and 24 issued to and in the name of A. W. Beam; 500 shares of
stock of Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, evidenced by Certificate No. 3342 issued to
and in the name of A. W. Beam; 2,080 shares of stock of Balatoc Mining Company,
evidenced by Certificates Nos. 600, 614 and 809 issued to and in the name of A. W. Beam;
A. W. BEAM, JUNIOR: 5,000 shares of stock of Beam Investment Company evidenced by
Certificates Nos. 17 and 26 issued to and in the name of A. W. Beam, Junior; Deposit of

P2,933.18 in Manila Building and Loan Association in the name and to the credit of A. W.
Beam, Junior;
EUGENIA BEAM: 5,000 shares of stock of Beam Investment Company, evidenced by
Certificates Nos. 19 and 27 issued to and in the name of Eugenia Beam; Deposit of
P2,933.18 in Manila Building and Loan Association in the name and to the credit of Eugenia
Beam.
The Beam Investment Company, the Balatoc Mining Company and the Manila Building and Loan
Association are, and were at all times mentioned in the amended complaint, corporations organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The Benguet Consolidated Mining Company is, and
was at all times mentioned in the amended complaint, a sociedad anonima organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines.
The above-listed properties were acquired in the Philippines during and within the period from the
marriage of A. W. Beam to Lydia McKee Beam in 1913 to April 18, 1934. A. W. Beam has been, and
was up to April 18, 1934, the Vice-President and Assistant General Manager of the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company and a member of the Board of Directors of said company and of the
Balatoc Mining Company. He was also, and up to the present, is, the President of Beam Investment
Company.
Prior to his departure from the Philippines on April 18, 1934, with his wife and his daughter Eugenia,
A. W. Beam filed an application for a tax clearance certificate with the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
On September 30, 1940, the lower court rendered decision dismissing the complaint with costs
against the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs appealed.
Appellants complain that the lower court dismissed the complaint on factual conclusions dealing with
points not at issue between the parties. They allege that the issue of fact, under the pleadings, was
between the appellants' contention that A. W. Beam and deceased wife were residents and citizens
of California on October 18, 1934, and appellee's contention that their Philippine residence and
domicile extended to October 18, 1934, and sometime later, and there was no issue as to whether or
not said A. W. Beam changed his residence and domicile in 1923 from the Philippines to California
and, therefore, the lower court erred in finding that appellant became a resident and citizen of
California in 1923.
Appellee alleges that it has been his original theory from the inception of the action that the plaintiffs
were and continued to be California citizens and that they are not entitled to recover on the ground
that according to California law the property acquired by A. W. Beam in one-half thereof belongs to
the deceased and passed by succession to her heirs subject to the inheritance tax, and said theory
is borne out by the following allegation of the amended answers filed on September 2, 1937:
That under the Inheritance Tax Law, the defendant demanded and collected from the
plaintiffs the sum of P343,698.72 alleged in the complaint, which had been assessed on the
amount of P4,050,272.46, value of the estate of said Lydia McKee, located and having
business situs in the Philippines, and transmitted to the plaintiffs by virtue of inheritance.
(Pages 15, 16, record on appeal; emphasis supplied.)

That the law of the State of California in effect at the time of the death of Lydia McKee Beam
provided that, upon the death of a wife, one-half of the community property shall go to the
surviving spouse, the other half being subject to the testamentary disposition of the
decedent, and that in the absence thereof, that half shall go to the surviving spouse by
inheritance.
The last paragraph reproduces only the penultimate paragraph of the original answer dated October
11, 1937.
The allegations necessarily include by implication the allegation of California citizenship so that the
California law may be invoked as the personal law of the deceased applicable to her personal
property in the Philippines in accordance with article 10 of the Civil Code.
The finding of the lower court is fully supported by the testimonies of A. W. Beam and John W.
Haussermann, wherein the first stated that in 1923 he bought a house in Oakland, California, and
used it as a residence until December, 1930, when he built another in Piedmont, California, which he
has used and occupied as a residence since then, and his children were in school in California and
Mrs. Beam wanted to be with them and made a home for them, and it was his intention to live in
California and from 1923 on, his family spent most of their time in California, where he himself used
to take long vacations, and that he never really intended to live permanently in the Philippines, while
Haussermann testified that A. W. Beam left the Philippines somewhere along 1923 and 1924 when
he established a home for his wife and children on Kenmore Avenue, Oakland, and he went there
frequently.
We are of opinion that, upon the pleadings and the evidence, the lower court did not err in finding
that A. W. Beam and wife became residents and citizens of California in 1923.
On the other hand, appellee maintains that, because the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs to
establish their right to recover, in view of the fact that they had failed to establish that right based on
their alleged Utah citizenship, the dismissal of the complaint is fully justified, and the defendant is
entitled to take advantage of the plaintiff's failure to present sufficient proof and of the evidence
adduced by themselves.
Plaintiff pleaded Utah citizenship to invoke the laws of the state which, it is alleged, is to the effect
that properties acquired by the spouses during marriage belong to them separately, and the Utah
citizenship was thus put in issue in view of the general denial of appellee and his special defense
predicated on the California law.
The evidence of the plaintiff on the Utah citizenship consists exclusively in the deposition of A. W.
Beam wherein he states that he was born in Nevada in 1878; he lived with his parents in Nevada
until 1883 and then in Utah until 1898, when he enlisted in the army; and that upon his discharge
from the army in San Francisco in 1889 he returned to, and stayed in, Utah, until he came to the
Philippines in 1902. As contended by appellee, the evidence does not sufficiently prove the Utah
citizenship claimed by said appellant. There is no evidence that he ever returned to Utah, or has any
interest in that estate, or that he ever intended to return there.
Where plaintiffs themselves show a state of facts upon which they should not recover, whether
defendant pleaded such fact as a defense or not, their claim should be dismissed. Evidence
introduced without objection becomes property of the case and all the parties are amenable to any
favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence.

Appellants complain that they were not given opportunity to present evidence regarding the fact
found by the lower court that plaintiff A. W. Beam became in 1923 a resident and citizen of California
has no merit, because plaintiffs had in fact the opportunity, and taken advantage of it, to present all
the facts which, according to them, would entitle them to recover and they cannot complain of their
failure to present more evidence than that appearing in the record. As a matter of fact, the evidence
upon which the lower court concluded that A. W. Beam became resident and citizen of California in
1923, consists in the testimony of A. W. Beam himself and his witness John W. Haussermann.
Appellants contend that no evidence whatsoever has been adduced to prove the California law of
community property and that the trial court should not have taken into consideration the provision of
said law as quoted in the memorandum filed by the Solicitor General. Appellee alleges that there is
no dispute that California is a community property state, citing 31 C. J., 12 and the decision in Osorio
vs. Posadas (56 Phil., 748 and 756). Appellants themselves assert that, in the absence of proof as to
what the California law is, the presumption would militate against them, because when a foreign law
is pleaded and no evidence has been presented as to said law it is presumed that the same is the
law of the forum. (Yan Ka Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil., 46; Lim vs. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 36 Phil., 472; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil., 876.)
Accordingly, the properties in question which have been acquired by A.W. Beam and wife during
their marriage, should be considered as community property and upon the death of the wife, the one
that belonged to her passed by succession to her heirs, in accordance with the provisions of articles
1401, 1407 and 1426 of the Civil Code, and therefore is subject to the inheritance tax collected by
appellee.
Appellants contended that A. W. Beam has not become a resident and citizen of California since
1923 and that the evidence points out that he changed his residence from the Philippines to
California between the time he left Manila for Piedmont on April 18, 1934, and the time of his wife's
death on October 18, 1934. Appellants point to the testimony of A. W. Beam that his departures
before 1934 were without intention of permanently abandoning his home in the Philippines, while
when he left on April 18, 1934, he had no intention of returning, for which reason he brought his car
and all his household belongings with him, and to the testimonies of Robert B. Dell, John W.
Haussermann, W. H. Taylor, W. H. Lawrence. These testimonies, all hearsay, except that A. W.
Beam himself, notwithstanding, cannot change the effect of A. W. Beam's testimony to the effect that
in 1923 he bought a house in Oakland, California, used it as a residence until December 1930, when
he built another house in Piedmont, California, which he used and occupied as a residence from that
time to the present, and that his children were in school in California and Mrs. Beam wanted to be
with them and make a home for them, and from 1923 on his family spent most of their time in
California. He also testified that "he never really intended permanently to live in the Philippines all my
life." Under the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, "all persons born
or naturalized in the United States are subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the state wherein they reside."
A. W. Beam became citizen of California in 1923 when he established therein a permanent
residence for him and his family.
One's personal presence at the new domicile is not necessary when the intent to change has
been manifested and carried out by sending his wife and family there. (19 C. J., 425.)
As correctly stated by appellee, even granting appellant's contention that the deceased became a
resident of California only in 1934, she was a citizen of that state at the time of her death and her
national law applicable to the case, in accordance with article 10 of the Civil Code, is the law of

California which, in the absence of contrary evidence, is to be presumed to be the same as the
Philippine law.
The question raised by appellants regarding the situs of the properties in question, has no merit in
view of the express provisions of section 1536 of the Revised Administrative Code, specifying shares
issued by any corporation or sociedad anonima organized in the Philippines among properties
subject to inheritance tax. The pronouncement of the lower court that the actual situs of the shares in
question is in the Philippines is fully supported by the evidence as, according to the testimony of
John W. Haussermann, the corresponding certificates of stock were in the Philippines before and
after the death of Mrs. Beam, the owners were represented by proxy at the stockholders' meetings
and their shares voted by their attorney in fact who had the power to collect dividends corresponding
to the share.
The questions raised by appellants that are premised on the Utah citizenship of A. W. Beam and his
deceased wife cannot be countenanced after we have concluded that the lower court declared
correctly that they became California citizens since 1923.
The lower court's decision is affirmed with costs against appellants.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22595

November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers
of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the
purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said
business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure

not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business
to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which,
among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as
well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the
Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to
be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it
when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until
the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error.
It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted
ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being
contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed.
lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a
legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which
says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship
having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and,
on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands
where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the
distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of
my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this
request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees
must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator,
as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil
Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should
the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to
the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate
be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees,
and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11622

January 28, 1961

THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-11668

January 28, 1961.

DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, petitioner,

vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This case relates to the determination and settlement of the hereditary estate left by the deceased
Walter G. Stevenson, and the laws applicable thereto. Walter G. Stevenson (born in the Philippines
on August 9, 1874 of British parents and married in the City of Manila on January 23, 1909 to
Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson another British subject) died on February 22, 1951 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. whereto he and his wife moved and established their permanent residence since
May 10, 1945. In his will executed in San Francisco on May 22, 1947, and which was duly probated
in the Superior Court of California on April 11, 1951, Stevenson instituted his wife Beatrice as his
sole heiress to the following real and personal properties acquired by the spouses while residing in
the Philippines, described and preliminary assessed as follows:

Gross Estate

Real Property 2 parcels of land in

Baguio, covered by T.C.T. Nos. 378 and
379

P43,500.00

Personal Property

(1) 177 shares of stock of Canacao Estate

at P10.00 each

1,770.00

(2) 210,000 shares of stock of Mindanao

Mother Lode Mines, Inc. at P0.38 per
share

79,800.00

(3) Cash credit with Canacao Estate Inc.

4,870.88

(4) Cash, with the Chartered Bank of India,

Australia & China

Total Gross Assets

851.97

P130,792.85

On May 22, 1951, ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance
of Manila for the settlement of the estate in the Philippines. In due time Stevenson's will was duly
admitted to probate by our court and Ian Murray Statt was appointed ancillary administrator of the
estate, who on July 11, 1951, filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return with the
reservation of having the properties declared therein finally appraised at their values six months after
the death of Stevenson. Preliminary return was made by the ancillary administrator in order to
secure the waiver of the Collector of Internal Revenue on the inheritance tax due on the 210,000
shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc. which the estate then desired to dispose in
the United States. Acting upon said return, the Collector of Internal Revenue accepted the valuation
of the personal properties declared therein, but increased the appraisal of the two parcels of land
located in Baguio City by fixing their fair market value in the amount of P52.200.00, instead of
P43,500.00. After allowing the deductions claimed by the ancillary administrator for funeral expenses
in the amount of P2,000.00 and for judicial and administration expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the
Collector assessed the state the amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and P10,875,26 or inheritance
tax, or a total of P16,023.23. Both of these assessments were paid by the estate on June 6, 1952.
On September 27, 1952, the ancillary administrator filed in amended estate and inheritance tax
return in pursuance f his reservation made at the time of filing of the preliminary return and for the
purpose of availing of the right granted by section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
In this amended return the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines, Inc. was reduced from 0.38 per share, as originally declared, to P0.20 per share, or from a
total valuation of P79,800.00 to P42,000.00. This change in price per share of stock was based by
the ancillary administrator on the market notation of the stock obtaining at the San Francisco
California) Stock Exchange six months from the death of Stevenson, that is, As of August 22, 1931.
In addition, the ancillary administrator made claim for the following deductions:

Funeral expenses ($1,04326)

P2,086.52

Judicial Expenses:

(a) Administrator's Fee

P1,204.34

(b) Attorney's Fee

6.000.00

(c) Judicial and Administration

expenses as of August 9, 1952

1,400.05

8,604.39

Real Estate Tax for 1951 on Baguio

652.50

real properties (O.R. No. B-1

686836)

Claims against the estate:

($5,000.00) P10,000.00

Plus: 4% int. p.a. from Feb. 2 to 22,

1951

Sub-Total

P10,000.00

22.47

10,022.47

P21,365.88

In the meantime, on December 1, 1952, Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her rights and
interests in the estate to the spouses, Douglas and Bettina Fisher, respondents herein.
On September 7, 1953, the ancillary administrator filed a second amended estate and inheritance
tax return (Exh. "M-N"). This return declared the same assets of the estate stated in the amended
return of September 22, 1952, except that it contained new claims for additional exemption and
deduction to wit: (1) deduction in the amount of P4,000.00 from the gross estate of the decedent as
provided for in Section 861 (4) of the U.S. Federal Internal Revenue Code which the ancillary
administrator averred was allowable by way of the reciprocity granted by Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as then held by the Board of Tax Appeals in case No. 71 entitled "Housman
vs. Collector," August 14, 1952; and (2) exemption from the imposition of estate and inheritance
taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. also pursuant to the
reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. In this last return, the
estate claimed that it was liable only for the amount of P525.34 for estate tax and P238.06 for
inheritance tax and that, as a consequence, it had overpaid the government. The refund of the
amount of P15,259.83, allegedly overpaid, was accordingly requested by the estate. The Collector
denied the claim. For this reason, action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by
respondents, as assignees of Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson, for the recovery of said amount.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 1125, the case was forwarded to the Court of Tax Appeals which court,
after hearing, rendered decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
In fine, we are of the opinion and so hold that: (a) the one-half () share of the surviving
spouse in the conjugal partnership property as diminished by the obligations properly
chargeable to such property should be deducted from the net estate of the deceased Walter
G. Stevenson, pursuant to Section 89-C of the National Internal Revenue Code; (b) the
intangible personal property belonging to the estate of said Stevenson is exempt from
inheritance tax, pursuant to the provision of section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code in relation to the California Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's estate is not entitled to
an exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax; (c) for purposes of estate
and inheritance taxation the Baguio real estate of the spouses should be valued at
P52,200.00, and 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. should
be appraised at P0.38 per share; and (d) the estate shall be entitled to a deduction of
P2,000.00 for funeral expenses and judicial expenses of P8,604.39.

From this decision, both parties appealed.

The Collector of Internal Revenue, hereinafter called petitioner assigned four errors allegedly
committed by the trial court, while the assignees, Douglas and Bettina Fisher hereinafter called
respondents, made six assignments of error. Together, the assigned errors raise the following main
issues for resolution by this Court:
(1) Whether or not, in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, one-half () of the net
estate should be deducted therefrom as the share of tile surviving spouse in accordance with our law
on conjugal partnership and in relation to section 89 (c) of the National Internal revenue Code;
(2) Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso embodied in Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code granting exemption from the payment of estate and inheritance
taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.;
(3) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the deduction of P4,000.00 allowed by Section 861, U.S.
Internal Revenue Code in relation to section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code;
(4) Whether or not the real estate properties of the decedent located in Baguio City and the 210,000
shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., were correctly appraised by the lower
court;
(5) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the following deductions: P8,604.39 for judicial and
administration expenses; P2,086.52 for funeral expenses; P652.50 for real estate taxes; and
P10,0,22.47 representing the amount of indebtedness allegedly incurred by the decedent during his
lifetime; and
(6) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the payment of interest on the amount it claims to have
overpaid the government and to be refundable to it.
In deciding the first issue, the lower court applied a well-known doctrine in our civil law that in the
absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are presumed to have adopted the
system of conjugal partnership as to the properties acquired during their marriage. The application of
this doctrine to the instant case is being disputed, however, by petitioner Collector of Internal
Revenue, who contends that pursuant to Article 124 of the New Civil Code, the property relation of
the spouses Stevensons ought not to be determined by the Philippine law, but by the national law of
the decedent husband, in this case, the law of England. It is alleged by petitioner that English laws
do not recognize legal partnership between spouses, and that what obtains in that jurisdiction is
another regime of property relation, wherein all properties acquired during the marriage pertain and
belong Exclusively to the husband. In further support of his stand, petitioner cites Article 16 of the
New Civil Code (Art. 10 of the old) to the effect that in testate and intestate proceedings, the amount
of successional rights, among others, is to be determined by the national law of the decedent.
In this connection, let it be noted that since the mariage of the Stevensons in the Philippines took
place in 1909, the applicable law is Article 1325 of the old Civil Code and not Article 124 of the New
Civil Code which became effective only in 1950. It is true that both articles adhere to the so-called
nationality theory of determining the property relation of spouses where one of them is a foreigner
and they have made no prior agreement as to the administration disposition, and ownership of their
conjugal properties. In such a case, the national law of the husband becomes the dominant law in
determining the property relation of the spouses. There is, however, a difference between the two
articles in that Article 1241 of the new Civil Code expressly provides that it shall be applicable

regardless of whether the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines or abroad while Article 1325 2 of
the old Civil Code is limited to marriages contracted in a foreign land.
It must be noted, however, that what has just been said refers to mixed marriages between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. In the instant case, both spouses are foreigners who married in the
Philippines. Manresa,3 in his Commentaries, has this to say on this point:
La regla establecida en el art. 1.315, se refiere a las capitulaciones otorgadas en Espana y
entre espanoles. El 1.325, a las celebradas en el extranjero cuando alguno de los conyuges
es espanol. En cuanto a la regla procedente cuando dos extranjeros se casan en Espana, o
dos espanoles en el extranjero hay que atender en el primer caso a la legislacion de pais a
que aquellos pertenezean, y en el segundo, a las reglas generales consignadas en los
articulos 9 y 10 de nuestro Codigo. (Emphasis supplied.)
If we adopt the view of Manresa, the law determinative of the property relation of the Stevensons,
married in 1909, would be the English law even if the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines,
both of them being foreigners. But, as correctly observed by the Tax Court, the pertinent English law
that allegedly vests in the decedent husband full ownership of the properties acquired during the
marriage has not been proven by petitioner. Except for a mere allegation in his answer, which is not
sufficient, the record is bereft of any evidence as to what English law says on the matter. In the
absence of proof, the Court is justified, therefore, in indulging in what Wharton calls "processual
presumption," in presuming that the law of England on this matter is the same as our law.4
Nor do we believe petitioner can make use of Article 16 of the New Civil Code (art. 10, old Civil
Code) to bolster his stand. A reading of Article 10 of the old Civil Code, which incidentally is the one
applicable, shows that it does not encompass or contemplate to govern the question of property
relation between spouses. Said article distinctly speaks of amount of successional rights and this
term, in speaks in our opinion, properly refers to the extent or amount of property that each heir is
legally entitled to inherit from the estate available for distribution. It needs to be pointed out that
the property relation of spouses, as distinguished from their successional rights, is governed
differently by the specific and express provisions of Title VI, Chapter I of our new Civil Code (Title III,
Chapter I of the old Civil Code.) We, therefore, find that the lower court correctly deducted the half of
the conjugal property in determining the hereditary estate left by the deceased Stevenson.
On the second issue, petitioner disputes the action of the Tax Court in the exempting the
respondents from paying inheritance tax on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother
Lode Mines, Inc. in virtue of the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code, in relation to Section 13851 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, on the ground that:
(1) the said proviso of the California Revenue and Taxation Code has not been duly proven by the
respondents; (2) the reciprocity exemptions granted by section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code can only be availed of by residents of foreign countries and not of residents of a state in the
United States; and (3) there is no "total" reciprocity between the Philippines and the state of
California in that while the former exempts payment of both estate and inheritance taxes on
intangible personal properties, the latter only exempts the payment of inheritance tax..
To prove the pertinent California law, Attorney Allison Gibbs, counsel for herein respondents, testified
that as an active member of the California Bar since 1931, he is familiar with the revenue and
taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by the lower court to state the pertinent
California law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness cited article 4,
section 13851 (a) and (b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as published in Derring's
California Code, a publication of the Bancroft-Whitney Company inc. And as part of his testimony, a
full quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence as Exhibits "V-2" by the respondents.

It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them.5 Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 6
Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of proving foreign laws before our
tribunals. However, although we believe it desirable that these laws be proved in accordance with
said rule, we held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471, that "a
reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will
convince one that these sections do not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to
prove the existence of a foreign law." In that case, we considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law
of San Francisco, California who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code and who stated
that the same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of said law. In line with this view, we find no error, therefore, on the part of the
Tax Court in considering the pertinent California law as proved by respondents' witness.
We now take up the question of reciprocity in exemption from transfer or death taxes, between the
State of California and the Philippines.F
Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code, in pertinent part, provides:
... And, provided, further, That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of
intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a
foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer of tax or death tax of
any character in respect of intangible personal property of citizens of the Philippines not
residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent
was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death
taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the
Philippines not residing in that foreign country." (Emphasis supplied).
On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax Law, insofar as pertinent, reads:.
"SEC. 13851, Intangibles of nonresident: Conditions. Intangible personal property is exempt
from the tax imposed by this part if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a
territory or another State of the United States or of a foreign state or country which then
imposed a legacy, succession, or death tax in respect to intangible personal property of its
own residents, but either:.
(a) Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of any character in respect to
intangible personal property of residents of this State, or
(b) Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which intangible personal property of a nonresident was exempt from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every character if the
Territory or other State of the United States or foreign state or country in which the
nonresident resided allowed a similar exemption in respect to intangible personal property of
residents of the Territory or State of the United States or foreign state or country of residence
of the decedent." (Id.)
It is clear from both these quoted provisions that the reciprocity must be total, that is, with respect to
transfer or death taxes of any and every character, in the case of the Philippine law, and to legacy,
succession, or death taxes of any and every character, in the case of the California law. Therefore, if
any of the two states collects or imposes and does not exempt any transfer, death, legacy, or
succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does not work. This is the underlying principle of the
reciprocity clauses in both laws.

In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non-resident with properties therein,
there are imposed upon his estate and its settlement, both an estate and an inheritance tax. Under
the laws of California, only inheritance tax is imposed. On the other hand, the Federal Internal
Revenue Code imposes an estate tax on non-residents not citizens of the United States, 7 but does
not provide for any exemption on the basis of reciprocity. Applying these laws in the manner the
Court of Tax Appeals did in the instant case, we will have a situation where a Californian, who is nonresident in the Philippines but has intangible personal properties here, will the subject to the
payment of an estate tax, although exempt from the payment of the inheritance tax. This being the
case, will a Filipino, non-resident of California, but with intangible personal properties there, be
entitled to the exemption clause of the California law, since the Californian has not been exempted
from every character of legacy, succession, or death tax because he is, under our law, under
obligation to pay an estate tax? Upon the other hand, if we exempt the Californian from paying the
estate tax, we do not thereby entitle a Filipino to be exempt from a similar estate tax in California
because under the Federal Law, which is equally enforceable in California he is bound to pay the
same, there being no reciprocity recognized in respect thereto. In both instances, the Filipino citizen
is always at a disadvantage. We do not believe that our legislature has intended such an unfair
situation to the detriment of our own government and people. We, therefore, find and declare that
the lower court erred in exempting the estate in question from payment of the inheritance tax.
We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Lara (G.R. Nos. L9456 & L-9481, prom. January 6, 1958, 54 O.G. 2881) exempting the estate of the deceased Hugo
H. Miller from payment of the inheritance tax imposed by the Collector of Internal Revenue. It will be
noted, however, that the issue of reciprocity between the pertinent provisions of our tax law and that
of the State of California was not there squarely raised, and the ruling therein cannot control the
determination of the case at bar. Be that as it may, we now declare that in view of the express
provisions of both the Philippine and California laws that the exemption would apply only if the law of
the other grants an exemption from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every character, there
could not be partial reciprocity. It would have to be total or none at all.
With respect to the question of deduction or reduction in the amount of P4,000.00 based on the U.S.
Federal Estate Tax Law which is also being claimed by respondents, we uphold and adhere to our
ruling in the Lara case (supra) that the amount of $2,000.00 allowed under the Federal Estate Tax
Law is in the nature of a deduction and not of an exemption regarding which reciprocity cannot be
claimed under the provision of Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code. Nor is reciprocity
authorized under the Federal Law. .
On the issue of the correctness of the appraisal of the two parcels of land situated in Baguio City, it is
contended that their assessed values, as appearing in the tax rolls 6 months after the death of
Stevenson, ought to have been considered by petitioner as their fair market value, pursuant to
section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code. It should be pointed out, however, that in
accordance with said proviso the properties are required to be appraised at their fair market value
and the assessed value thereof shall be considered as the fair market value only when evidence to
the contrary has not been shown. After all review of the record, we are satisfied that such evidence
exists to justify the valuation made by petitioner which was sustained by the tax court, for as the tax
court aptly observed:
"The two parcels of land containing 36,264 square meters were valued by the administrator
of the estate in the Estate and Inheritance tax returns filed by him at P43,500.00 which is the
assessed value of said properties. On the other hand, defendant appraised the same at
P52,200.00. It is of common knowledge, and this Court can take judicial notice of it, that
assessments for real estate taxation purposes are very much lower than the true and fair
market value of the properties at a given time and place. In fact one year after decedent's

death or in 1952 the said properties were sold for a price of P72,000.00 and there is no
showing that special or extraordinary circumstances caused the sudden increase from the
price of P43,500.00, if we were to accept this value as a fair and reasonable one as of 1951.
Even more, the counsel for plaintiffs himself admitted in open court that he was willing to
purchase the said properties at P2.00 per square meter. In the light of these facts we believe
and therefore hold that the valuation of P52,200.00 of the real estate in Baguio made by
defendant is fair, reasonable and justified in the premises." (Decision, p. 19).
In respect to the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc.,
(a domestic corporation), respondents contend that their value should be fixed on the basis of the
market quotation obtaining at the San Francisco (California) Stock Exchange, on the theory that the
certificates of stocks were then held in that place and registered with the said stock exchange. We
cannot agree with respondents' argument. The situs of the shares of stock, for purposes of taxation,
being located here in the Philippines, as respondents themselves concede and considering that they
are sought to be taxed in this jurisdiction, consistent with the exercise of our government's taxing
authority, their fair market value should be taxed on the basis of the price prevailing in our country.
Upon the other hand, we find merit in respondents' other contention that the said shares of stock
commanded a lesser value at the Manila Stock Exchange six months after the death of Stevenson.
Through Atty. Allison Gibbs, respondents have shown that at that time a share of said stock was bid
for at only P.325 (p. 103, t.s.n.). Significantly, the testimony of Atty. Gibbs in this respect has never
been questioned nor refuted by petitioner either before this court or in the court below. In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, we are, therefore, constrained to reverse the Tax Court on this
point and to hold that the value of a share in the said mining company on August 22, 1951 in the
Philippine market was P.325 as claimed by respondents..
It should be noted that the petitioner and the Tax Court valued each share of stock of P.38 on the
basis of the declaration made by the estate in its preliminary return. Patently, this should not have
been the case, in view of the fact that the ancillary administrator had reserved and availed of his
legal right to have the properties of the estate declared at their fair market value as of six months
from the time the decedent died..
On the fifth issue, we shall consider the various deductions, from the allowance or disallowance of
which by the Tax Court, both petitioner and respondents have appealed..
Petitioner, in this regard, contends that no evidence of record exists to support the allowance of the
sum of P8,604.39 for the following expenses:.

1) Administrator's fee

P1,204.34

2) Attorney's fee

6,000.00

3) Judicial and Administrative expenses

2,052.55

Total Deductions

P8,604.39

An examination of the record discloses, however, that the foregoing items were considered
deductible by the Tax Court on the basis of their approval by the probate court to which said
expenses, we may presume, had also been presented for consideration. It is to be supposed that the
probate court would not have approved said items were they not supported by evidence presented
by the estate. In allowing the items in question, the Tax Court had before it the pertinent order of the
probate court which was submitted in evidence by respondents. (Exh. "AA-2", p. 100, record). As the
Tax Court said, it found no basis for departing from the findings of the probate court, as it must have
been satisfied that those expenses were actually incurred. Under the circumstances, we see no
ground to reverse this finding of fact which, under Republic Act of California National Association,
which it would appear, that while still living, Walter G. Stevenson obtained we are not inclined to
pass upon the claim of respondents in respect to the additional amount of P86.52 for funeral
expenses which was disapproved by the court a quo for lack of evidence.
In connection with the deduction of P652.50 representing the amount of realty taxes paid in 1951 on
the decedent's two parcels of land in Baguio City, which respondents claim was disallowed by the
Tax Court, we find that this claim has in fact been allowed. What happened here, which a careful
review of the record will reveal, was that the Tax Court, in itemizing the liabilities of the estate, viz:

1) Administrator's fee

P1,204.34

2) Attorney's fee

6,000.00

3) Judicial and Administration expenses as of August

9, 1952

2,052.55

Total

P9,256.89

added the P652.50 for realty taxes as a liability of the estate, to the P1,400.05 for judicial and
administration expenses approved by the court, making a total of P2,052.55, exactly the same figure
which was arrived at by the Tax Court for judicial and administration expenses. Hence, the difference
between the total of P9,256.98 allowed by the Tax Court as deductions, and the P8,604.39 as found
by the probate court, which is P652.50, the same amount allowed for realty taxes. An evident
oversight has involuntarily been made in omitting the P2,000.00 for funeral expenses in the final
computation. This amount has been expressly allowed by the lower court and there is no reason why
it should not be. .
We come now to the other claim of respondents that pursuant to section 89(b) (1) in relation to
section 89(a) (1) (E) and section 89(d), National Internal Revenue Code, the amount of P10,022.47
should have been allowed the estate as a deduction, because it represented an indebtedness of the
decedent incurred during his lifetime. In support thereof, they offered in evidence a duly certified

claim, presented to the probate court in California by the Bank of California National Association,
which it would appear, that while still living, Walter G. Stevenson obtained a loan of $5,000.00
secured by pledge on 140,000 of his shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc.
(Exhs. "Q-Q4", pp. 53-59, record). The Tax Court disallowed this item on the ground that the local
probate court had not approved the same as a valid claim against the estate and because it
constituted an indebtedness in respect to intangible personal property which the Tax Court held to be
exempt from inheritance tax.
For two reasons, we uphold the action of the lower court in disallowing the deduction.
Firstly, we believe that the approval of the Philippine probate court of this particular indebtedness of
the decedent is necessary. This is so although the same, it is averred has been already admitted and
approved by the corresponding probate court in California, situs of the principal or domiciliary
administration. It is true that we have here in the Philippines only an ancillary administration in this
case, but, it has been held, the distinction between domiciliary or principal administration and
ancillary administration serves only to distinguish one administration from the other, for the two
proceedings are separate and independent.8 The reason for the ancillary administration is that, a
grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore, have any effect beyond the limits of the country in
which it was granted. Hence, we have the requirement that before a will duly probated outside of the
Philippines can have effect here, it must first be proved and allowed before our courts, in much the
same manner as wills originally presented for allowance therein. 9 And the estate shall be
administered under letters testamentary, or letters of administration granted by the court, and
disposed of according to the will as probated, after payment of just debts and expenses of
administration.10 In other words, there is a regular administration under the control of the court,
where claims must be presented and approved, and expenses of administration allowed before
deductions from the estate can be authorized. Otherwise, we would have the actuations of our own
probate court, in the settlement and distribution of the estate situated here, subject to the
proceedings before the foreign court over which our courts have no control. We do not believe such
a procedure is countenanced or contemplated in the Rules of Court.
Another reason for the disallowance of this indebtedness as a deduction, springs from the provisions
of Section 89, letter (d), number (1), of the National Internal Revenue Code which reads:
(d) Miscellaneous provisions (1) No deductions shall be allowed in the case of a nonresident not a citizen of the Philippines unless the executor, administrator or anyone of the
heirs, as the case may be, includes in the return required to be filed under section ninetythree the value at the time of his death of that part of the gross estate of the non-resident not
situated in the Philippines."
In the case at bar, no such statement of the gross estate of the non-resident Stevenson not situated
in the Philippines appears in the three returns submitted to the court or to the office of the petitioner
Collector of Internal Revenue. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the revenue officer to
determine how much of the indebtedness may be allowed to be deducted, pursuant to (b), number
(1) of the same section 89 of the Internal Revenue Code which provides:
(b) Deductions allowed to non-resident estates. In the case of a non-resident not a citizen
of the Philippines, by deducting from the value of that part of his gross estate which at the
time of his death is situated in the Philippines
(1) Expenses, losses, indebtedness, and taxes. That proportion of the deductions
specified in paragraph (1) of subjection (a) of this section11 which the value of such part bears
the value of his entire gross estate wherever situated;"

In other words, the allowable deduction is only to the extent of the portion of the indebtedness which
is equivalent to the proportion that the estate in the Philippines bears to the total estate wherever
situated. Stated differently, if the properties in the Philippines constitute but 1/5 of the entire assets
wherever situated, then only 1/5 of the indebtedness may be deducted. But since, as heretofore
adverted to, there is no statement of the value of the estate situated outside the Philippines, no part
of the indebtedness can be allowed to be deducted, pursuant to Section 89, letter (d), number (1) of
the Internal Revenue Code.
For the reasons thus stated, we affirm the ruling of the lower court disallowing the deduction of the
alleged indebtedness in the sum of P10,022.47.
In recapitulation, we hold and declare that:
(a) only the one-half (1/2) share of the decedent Stevenson in the conjugal partnership
property constitutes his hereditary estate subject to the estate and inheritance taxes;
(b) the intangible personal property is not exempt from inheritance tax, there existing no
complete total reciprocity as required in section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
nor is the decedent's estate entitled to an exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of the
estate tax;
(c) for the purpose of the estate and inheritance taxes, the 210,000 shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. are to be appraised at P0.325 per share; and
(d) the P2,000.00 for funeral expenses should be deducted in the determination of the net
asset of the deceased Stevenson.
In all other respects, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is affirmed.
Respondent's claim for interest on the amount allegedly overpaid, if any actually results after a
recomputation on the basis of this decision is hereby denied in line with our recent decision
in Collector of Internal Revenue v. St. Paul's Hospital (G.R. No. L-12127, May 29, 1959) wherein we
held that, "in the absence of a statutory provision clearly or expressly directing or authorizing such
payment, and none has been cited by respondents, the National Government cannot be required to
pay interest."
WHEREFORE, as modified in the manner heretofore indicated, the judgment of the lower court is
hereby affirmed in all other respects not inconsistent herewith. No costs. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Gutierrez David,
Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
ART. 124. If the marriage is between a citizen of the Philippines and a foreigner, whether
celebrated in the Philippines or abroad, the following rules shall prevail: (1) If the husband is
a citizen of the Philippines while the wife is a foreigner, the provisions of this Code shall
govern their property relations; (2) If the husband is a foreigner and the wife is a citizen of
1

the Philippines, the laws of the husband's country shall be followed, without prejudice to the
provisions of this Code with regard to immovable property."
ART. 1325. Should the marriage be contracted in a foreign country, between a Spaniard
and a foreign woman or between a foreigner and a Spanish woman, and the contracting
parties should not make any statement or stipulation with respect to their property, it shall be
understood, when the husband is a Spaniard, that he marries under the system of the legal
conjugal partnership, and when the wife is a Spaniard, that she marries under the system of
law in force in the husband's country, all without prejudice to the provisions of this code with
respect to real property. .
2

IX Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espanol, p. 209. .

Yam Ka Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46; Lim & Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil. 472; International Harvester Co. vs. Hamburg-American Line, 42 Phil. 845; Beam vs.
Yatco, 46 O.G. No. 2, p. 530.).
4

Lim vs. Collector of Customs, supra; International Harvester Co. vs. Hamburg-American
Line, supra; Phil. Manufacturing Co. vs. Union Ins. Society of Canton, 42 Phil. 378; Adong
vs. Cheong Seng Gee, Phil. 53.
5

Sy Joc Leing vs. Sy Quia, 16 Phil. 138; Ching Huat vs. Co Heong, 77 Phil. 985; Adong vs.
Cheong supra.
6

See Sec. 860, Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 USCA 408.

In the matter of the testate estate of Basil Gordon Butler, G.R. No. L-3677, Nov. 29, 1951. .

Rule 78, Sees. 1, 2 and 3, Rules of Court. See also Hix vs. Fluemer, 54 Phil. 610. .

10

Rule 78, See. 4, lbid.

Expense, losses, indebtedness, and taxes which may be deducted to determine the net
estate of a citizen or resident of the Philippines.
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