In Defense of The Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law

In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
Selected Essays
JanuaryMarch 2015

Selected Essays
JanuaryMarch 2015
Copyright Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, 2015
Published and exclusively distributed by the
Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
Agustin 1 Bldg.,
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Pasig City, Philippines
Telephones: (+632) 636-0701 to 06
Fax: (+632) 638-2216
Website: www.opapp.gov.ph
Contents
vii Acknowledgments
ix
List of Acronyms
xi
List of Boxes
xiii List of Figures

xv Introduction
1
Legislation versus Constitutional Change

SECRETARY TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
On the Matter of Substate

PROF. MIRIAM CORONEL FERRER
Chairperson, Government Peace Negotiating Panel for Talks with the MILF
11 Checks and Balances in the BBL

FORMER SECRETARY SENEN C. BACANI
Member, Government Peace Negotiating Panel for Talks with the MILF
14 The BBL Fully Recognizes and Preserves the Territorial

Integrity of the Republic of the Philippines
JOSE LUIS MARTIN C. GASCON, ESQ.
Board Member, Human Rights Victims Claims Board

Member, 1987 Constitutional Commission
22 Legislation versus Charter Change

JUSTICE ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Chancellor, Philippine Judicial Academy

Retired Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines
vi
26 Sovereignty versus Substate

DEAN JULKIPLI WADI
Institute of Islamic Studies, University of the Philippines Diliman
36 Let Reason and Facts Sway Our Opinion, Not Deeply

Held Biases and Mistrust
ATTY. ANNA TARHATA S. BASMAN
Head, GPH Peace Panel Legal Team
39 Privilege Speech on the Commemoration of the 1968

Jabidah Massacre
HON. SITTI DJALIA A. TURABIN-HATAMAN
Representative, Party List Anak Mindanao (AMIN), House of

Representatives
45 Framers of the 1987 Constitution in Support of the

Bangsamoro

Appendix
57 11 Common Myths on the BBL
Acknowledgments
e would like to express our appreciation to the different authors for

permitting the publication of these statements and essays in this
compilation.
Our thanks as well to Mr. Joser Dumbrique and Mr. Daryl Lasala for the
cover design and to the OPAPP Communications Team for the illustrations
and graphics. We are also very gratful for the assistance of the Australian
Government through its Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)
in the printing and launch of this volume.
And last but not the least, we thank the hardworking staff of the GPH Panel
Secretariatparticularly Ms. Farrah Grace V. Naparan, Mr. Mark Sherwin C.
Bayanito, Ms. Leila A. Halud, Ms. Airiz Jessica Mia T. Parrilla, and Mr. Al-Bari
B. Macalawanfor putting together the manuscript and making the idea for
this book become a reality.
27 March 2015
vii
List of Acronyms
ARMM
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
BBL
Bangsamoro Basic Law
BIR
Bureau of Internal Revenue
BJE
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
BTA
Bangsamoro Transition Authority
BTC
Bangsamoro Transition Commission
CAB
Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro
CCT
Conditional cash transfer
CHED
Commission on Higher Educaion
COA
Commission on Audit
CSC
Civil Service Commission
CSO
Civil society organization
DA
Department of Agriculture
DepEd
Department of Education
DENR
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DOH
Department of Health
DPWH
Department of Public Works and Highways
DSWD
Department of Social Welfare and Development
EDSA
Epifanio delos Santos Avenue
FAB
Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro
GMA
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
GPH
Government of the Philippines
HB
House Bill
IDP
Internally displaced persons
IRA
Internal Revenue Allotment
ix
LGU
Local government unit
MILF
Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MMA
Ministry of Muslim Affairs
MOA-AD
Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
OPAPP
Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Proces
PNP
Philippine National Police
RA
Republic Act
NAPOLCOM National Police Commission

PAGs
Private armed groups
PhilHealth
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
SAF
Special Actions Force
SB
Senate Bill
SPCD
Southern Philippine Council on Peace and Development
SPDA
Southern Philippine Development Authority
TESDA
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
US
United States of America
ZJC
Zones of Joint Cooperation
List of Boxes
Box 1
Creating the Bangsamoro is provided for in the Constitution
Box 2
What comprises the proposed Bangsamoro territory?
Box 3
Justice system in the Bangsamoro
Box 4
Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA)
Box 5
Computing the Annual Block Grant
Box 6
What is the Bangsamoro Police?
Box 7
What is normalization in the GPH-MILF peace process?
xi
List of Figures
Figure 1
North Cotabato barangays in the Bangsamoro core territory
Figure 2
Proposed core territory of the Bangsamoro
Figure 3
Government spending in the ARMM/Bangsamoro
Figure 4
Bangsamoro Waters and Zones of Joint Cooperation
Figure 5
The Bangsamoro Government: Parliamentary System
Figure 6
Annex on Normalization
xiii
Introduction
n fulfillment of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) signed

between the Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front on 15
October 2012, Executive Order 120 was issued on 12 December 2012, creating
the 15-member Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC). The BTC was
tasked to draft the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) as the legal instrument that
will establish the Bangsamoro political entity and replace the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
The signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB)
on 27 March 2014 paved the way for the BTC to complete the draft BBL.
After undergoing a meticulous review process by the Office of the President,
the draft law was turned over by the BTC to Congress under the leadership of
Senate President Franklin M. Drilon and House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte
Jr. on 10 September 2014 in Malacaan Palace. The bill was filed as Senate
Bill No. 2408 with thirteen sponsors headed by the Senate President and as
House Bill No. 4994 with seventeen sponsors led by the House Speaker. Both
Houses separately conducted in-house hearings and public consultations on the
proposed law in Mindanao, Northern Luzon, and the Visayas. These public
hearings have served as avenues for stakeholders with different constituencies
and backgrounds to share their insights on the draft BBL. So have the many
other fora held by various groups and organizations to discuss the important
issues attendant to this endeavor.
The Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP)
believes that it is through such robust and open exchange of ideas that the
crafting of the BBL is made inclusive and transparent. It is in this spirit that
these essays have been compiled.
The OPAPP earnestly hopes that this book will help inform public
discussion and debate on the proposed law, deepen our appreciation of the
imperative for securing sustainable peace in conflict-ridden Mindanao, and
allow us to understand the need to address the Moro struggle as a component
of nation-building and development.
xv
Legislation versus
Constitutional Change*
Secretary Teresita Quintos-Deles
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
hen the negotiations between the Government and the Moro

Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) restarted in 2009, we knew
that we had a daunting task ahead of us. The Supreme Courts decision
to render the contents and the manner by which the Memorandum
of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was drafted as
unconstitutional and contrary to law weighed heavily on our scale of
decision-making. Even more, the immediate repercussions of a botched
peace processthe reignition of violence, the many lives and properties
lost and horribly affected, the general sentiment of hopelessnesswere
our constant reminders that we cannot take every word, phrase, or
statement in any of the political agreements lightly. Thus, we made
it our mission to prevent any misstep in forging the Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB)to keep all the provisions therein
within the flexibilities of our Constitution and as guided by the Supreme
Court ruling in the landmark case of the Province of North Cotabato
v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines or the MOA-AD case.
Since the Government Panel under the Aquino administration
started, we have conducted 442 consultations across the nation,
in keeping with the commitment to make this process inclusive,
* This statement was delivered during the Joint Committee Hearing on SB No. 2408
(Bangsamoro Basic Law) by the Committee on Local Government; the Committee
on Peace, Unification, and Reconciliation; and the Committee on Constitutional
Amendments and Revision of Codes on 26 January 2015 at the Philippine Senate,
Pasay City.
participative, and consultative. Nowhere in the CAB can the term

associative be found, nor any of its features entrenched or alluded
to in the peace agreement. We will also not find a single guarantee
for charter change to accommodate the CAB. The most accurate that
can be said is that this agreement recognizes the right of any citizen of
the Republic, including those who are appointed in the Bangsamoro
Transition Commission (BTC), to propose amendments to the Supreme
Law, through the modalities provided in our Constitution. These and
more distinguish the CAB from the declared unconstitutional MOA-AD.
The draft Bangsamoro Basic Law or Senate Bill No. 2408, the
translation of the CAB into a proposed legislation, is one that can
be well accommodated by the provisions of our Charter. Even as
the Constitution is deemed read into any legislation passed by the
National Congress, SB No. 2408 explicitly guarantees that it will be in
consonance with the Constitution (Preamble) and thus its provisions,
in case of ambiguity, should be read with the parameters of the 1987
Constitution in mind.
The establishment of a parliamentary form of government in
the Bangsamoro intends to bring life to the text of the Charter that
leaves to the wisdom of Congress the determination of the structure
of government for the region, provided only that the executive and
legislative branches will be elective and representative of its constituent
political units (Section 18, Article X, 1987 Constitution). The draft BBL,
as it gives improved autonomy to the Bangsamoro, continues to honor
its place as an integral part of the country (Section 1, Article III) whose
government remains under the general supervision of the President
(Section 3, Article VI). The Bangsamoro Police (Article XI), a unit of the
Philippine National Police and an integral part of its law enforcement
functions, remains true to the constitutional proscription of maintaining
only one national police under the administration and control of the
NAPOLCOM (Section 6, Article XVI, 1987 Constitution).
But perhaps the most glaring difference between the MOAADa political documentand Senate Bill No. 2408a proposed
legislationis the operationalization of the constitutional requirement
Legislation vs. Constitutional Change
to conduct a plebiscite and allow those provinces, cities, and geographic

areas which favorably vote for the BBL to be part of the Bangsamoro
(Section 18, Article X, 1987 Constitution). In this bill, for the first
time, we recognize the spirit of the provision that gives primacy to
the consent of the governed in determining their political status. By
allowing municipalities and barangaysnot just provinces and citiesto
participate in the plebiscite, we intend to right the wrong committed
against the phrase geographic areas when it was all but rendered a mere
surplusage in past legislation.
Senate Bill No. 2408 proposes many novel changes for the proposed
Bangsamoro. As demonstrated, this however does not mean that there is
no constitutional basis for all of these, or that a mere piece of legislation
without charter change can enforce them. We maintain that a closer
scrutiny of the provisions of the draft BBL and a more comprehensive
understandingeven beyond the textual or traditional interpretation
of the words of the Constitution, will bring us to the conclusion that
the framers and the people who ratified the Charter had the foresight
to entrench a unique setup in the autonomous region, one that respects
the peculiar situation in the area that is not inconsistent with but is in
fact a means to preserve our national sovereignty and territorial integrity
under the 1987 Constitution.
On the Matter of Substate*

Prof. Miriam Coronel Ferrer
Chairperson, Government Peace Negotiating Panel for Talks with the MILF
speak before you this blessed morning more as a student and

practitioner of politics, and less of law, as I am not a lawyer. Politics,
rather than constitutional law, I believe, is the best discipline with
which to approach the questions before us: Is the Bangsamoro a
substate? Corollarily, is being a substate in/by/for itself, necessarily
unconstitutional?
Why do I say that political science relative to jurisprudence is our
best recourse in getting to the heart of the matter of the Bangsamoro?
We all know that matters of state are foremost matters of politics
rather than law. Over and above law, is the matter of peace and justice
which, to go back to the Greek classics, constitute the reason for being
of the polity or of the state. Stretching forward to the Enlightenment
period, peace and justice, likewise, are the ends of the social contract.
Madame Chair, the substate word has been unjustly demonized.
As in any demonized term, wave it like a red flag, and people will rail
against it. It is almost like the term Morosay it and in the minds of
many, you generate fear, distrust, suspicion, hate. Such is the unfortunate
state of mind that we have inherited from Spanish and American colonial
rule. Such hatred has led us to continue to think like the colonials: A
Pasay City.
good Moro is a dead Moro. Fast forward 100500 years later: A good
substate is a dead substate. Unconstitutional! Bang, youre dead.
This, when in fact a substate can only mean being a subdivision
of and therefore a part of the state in the subnational sense, in the
same way that a subsetas we learned from grade school mathcan
only mean being part of a bigger set.
Madame Chair, the word substate is not even a legal term.
It is merely a descriptive word pertaining to one part or unit of a state.
How can we judge legality or illegality, constitutionality or
unconstitutionality, by mere mention of the word?
This is not to say that substates or substate entities do not exist.
I have here a copy of the book, Substate Governance through Territorial
Autonomy: A Comparative Study in Constitutional Law of Powers,
Procedures and Institutions (2011) written by the Finnish professor of
comparative law and politics, Markku Suksi. Madame Chair, if I may,
may I respectfully give you a copy, a humble contribution to your library?
This book provides us with a survey of substate entities that are of
particular interest to us. These are substate entities that are in the form
of territorial autonomies such as one finds in countries like China, with
Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet; Finland, with Swedish-speaking land;
Indonesia, with Aceh, West Papua, and Yogyakarta.
Territorial autonomiesa genre that is applicable to our case
on handare here distinguished from federal states and obviously,
independent states.
Madame Chair, independence was never on the negotiating agenda
of the government. The whole idea of negotiation was precisely to keep
the country intact. Any notion of a substate can only mean a setup within
the Philippine state and under the current Philippine Constitution.
Some critics insist that the Bangsamoro in the signed documents is
still the substate as originally conceived when we began negotiations in
2010. They do not realize how the Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro, for the sake of peace, national unity, and social justice,
had arrived at the necessary compromises in accordance with the 1987
Constitution and its flexibilities, without prejudice of course to future

constitutional change.
This brings us to the second level of the claim of unconstitutionality
before us: that the Bangsamoro, being a substate, is not the autonomous
region contemplated in the Constitution. Specifically, that the powers
that have been enumerated in the signed documents go beyond what is
possible in a unitary setup.
Notably, our Constitution did not explicitly say that we are a unitary
state. In fact coming from a highly centralized state under martial rule
where the Executive branch was able to wield wide powers both formally
and informally, the crafters of the 1987 Constitution took pains to
devolve powers through principles and provisions on local autonomy,
decentralization and autonomous regions that it ensconced in Article X,
On Local Governments, and wrote up a whole article on Social Justice
to correct the political, social, and cultural exclusion in our country.
Markku Suksi writes, in the case of Europe: If states that include one
or several autonomous entities are counted together with the number of
federal states, the result at least in Europe is that the regular text-book
example of state, the entirely monolithic unitary state, finds itself in a
minority and is no longer the prime example of a state.
Evidently, there are so many existing possibilities to structure a
relationship between government and its multiple constituencies that
a binary system of political ordering (federal-unitary) can no longer
accommodate.
The members of the Constitutional Commission in 1986 grappled
with adopting a federal system of government. But in the end, they
settled for this unique animalso unique it may be set up only in two
parts of the countryin the Cordillera and in Muslim Mindanao. They
called this animal autonomous region. In so doing, they also produced
a model that is distinct but also finds a semblance in other non-federal
republics such as Indonesia with its three autonomous regions, and China
with its three special administrative regions that I mentioned earlier;
Spain with its seventeen autonomous regions; and the United Kingdom
with its four constituent parts, the most appropriate term for which has
not been found. These constituent parts are Northern Ireland, Wales,
Scotland, and England.
All these are variations of that much derided, although affably neutral
and practical, generic word, substate.
Regardless, other critics say that the structure of government and the
powers enumerated in the Power Sharing and Wealth Sharing Annexes
and now the BBL partake of the nature of a federal state. Proof to such
claim is the concept introduced in the documents of an asymmetrical
relationship between the Bangsamoro and the Central Government.
To the Supreme Courts credit, we have recently been provided
with jurisprudence on what asymmetry could mean. In the League of
Provinces of the Philippines and the DENR, the concerning opinion
penned by Justice Marvic Leonen states that:
Autonomous regions are granted more powers and less
intervention from the national government than territorial
and political subdivisions. They are thus in a more
asymmetrical relationship with the national government
as compared to other local governments or any regional
formation. The Constitution grants them legislative powers
over matters that are usually under the control of the
national government (GR No. 175368, 2013).
While the text did not define asymmetry, it provides us with

the context clues by which we can understand the concept within
Constitutional boundaries.
Another claim put forward to argue violation of the constitution is
the list of powers enumerated in the Annex on Power Sharing: reserved,
concurrent, and exclusive.
Reserved powers are powers or matters over which authority and
jurisdiction are retained by the Central Government. Concurrent powers
shall refer to the shared powers between the Central Government and
the Bangsamoro Government. Exclusive powers shall refer to powers or
matters over which authority and jurisdiction pertain to the Bangsamoro
Government.
Is there anything in this definition and the list of powers that

violates the constitution? Does the granting of exclusive powers to the
Bangsamoro effect its separation from the state?
Not so, in many ways.
Exclusive powers, which are exercised within the Bangsamoro
territorial jurisdiction, may be clipped by the reserved powers of the
Central Government, which are exercised in the whole country, including
the Bangsamoro.
For example, regulation of trade, banking, and finance inside the
Bangsamoro may have been devolved but this matter is governed by
national fiscal and monetary policies; foreign treaties, and conventions
our country has entered into; foreign policy, customs, and tariff lawsall
reserved powers of the Central Government.
Clipping of the powers of the Bangsamoro can very well be justified
by these reserved powers. But then what we envision here is a democratic
relationship based on mutual respector parity of esteemas public
officials and leaders vested with their respective authorities.
Moreover, when the exercise of the Bangsamoro Governments
powers impacts outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the Bangsamoro,
it is understood that the neighboring local government units (LGUs)
and the Central Government can take the appropriate actionagain,
based on the respective powers vested on them.
This is fairly well understood in that the president, as provided
for in the Constitution, shall exercise general supervisory powers over
of the autonomous region as provided in Article X, Section 16 of the
1987 Constitution and reiterated in Article VI, Section 3 of the Senate
Bill No. 2408: The President shall exercise general supervision over
autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Finally, the 1987 Constitution itself grants the parameters for the
autonomous jurisdiction of the autonomous regions when it said that
these regions shall have the following legislative powers, subject of course
to the Constitution and national laws (of course, national laws may
also be qualified by the forthcoming BBL in so far as the Bangsamoro

is concerned, as is the nature of a special law).
Article X, Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and
subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:
1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural
heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for
the promotion of the general welfare of the people
of the region
All so-called exclusive powers listed in the Annex on Power Sharing

and the draft BBL fall under any one of this category, not to mention
that fairly encompassing category of matters for the promotion of
the general welfare of the people in the region. All powers shall not
prejudice the powers and authority of Constitutional bodies, the
Supreme Court and Congress. If certain provisions may have given rise
to such misinterpretation, then certainly we can improve and fine-tune
the languaging.
Truth to tell, many of these powers actually were already given to the
ARMM. However, many of these powersfor examples, the power to
enact its own indigenous peoples rights act and civil service code and to
expand Shariah courts including appellate courtswere never exercised.
10
To say that giving such powers as one now finds in the BBL
compromises the sovereignty of the state is to deny the powers which
the Constitution itself allocates to the autonomous regions.
Remember sovereignty is not just about our standing before other
states and relations with thema matter that remains in the hands of
the national government. Sovereignty is first and foremost the exercise
of the peoples will, and the peoples will operates at different territorial
and political subdivisions of the state, including autonomous regions.
That is why we have local and regional plebiscites, as well as our law on
initiatives and recall.
Modern political and legal thinking on devolution, decentralization,
and autonomy, and the right to self-determination not only of colonies
but of indigenous peoples and minorities are all pointing in this direction
of a multilayered sovereignty within states, as we can glean from these
quotations from authoritative sources:
Sovereignty, like the atom, can be split.
In modern times, sovereignty is divisible.
Indeed, Madame Chair, the world has changed much since the Peace
of Westphalia was forged in the seventeenth century with its emphasis
on state sovereignty.
We credit the framers of our Constitution for their wisdom in
finding the balance between the sovereignty of the Philippine state and
the sovereignty of the people of the Philippines. We thank them for
showing us the manner by which such sovereignty may be shared among
the various peoples and groups making up the Philippine Republic.
And among these groups of people, among the Filipinos, as we know,
are the Bangsamoro.
Let us give to them their due, even as we ensure the protection of
rights and the promotion of welfare of all.
Checks and Balances in the BBL*

Former Secretary Senen C. Bacani
Member, Government Peace Negotiating Panel for Talks with the MILF
o say that there are no checks and balances in the proposed BBL
as compared to those existing in the National Government can
only be due to a complete misreading of the proposed BBL. In fact, the
proposed law that will establish the framework for the future Bangsamoro
Government is replete with so many examples of checks and balances
on the powers to be exercised by the new political entity. The proposed
BBL in the first place is a classic example of trying to balance autonomy,
subsidiarity, and devolution with sufficient internal controls.
Overarching the whole concept of checks and balances is the fact
that the President will continue to exercise general supervision over the
Bangsamoro Government to ensure that national laws are faithfully
executed. It is worthy to note that national laws cannot be amended
by the Bangsamoro Parliament unless authorized to do so by Congress.
Moreover, it is clear in the proposed BBL that reserved powers (both
expressed and residual) of the National Government can at anytime
be exercised within the Bangsamoro territory without any limitation
whatsoever. For example, the Bangsamoro Governments power to
enter into economic agreements and to establish linkages for cultural
exchange, economic, and technical cooperation with other countries
is subject to the Central Governments reserved powers over foreign
affairs. In addition, the exercise of the concurrent or shared powers by
Pasay City.
11
12
the Bangsamoro Government can only be done with the coordination

and cooperation of the National Government.
To supplement the work of the Constitutional bodies in the
Bangsamoro (Commission on Audit, Civil Service Commission,
Commission on Elections, Commission on Human Rights) is the
proposed establishment of auditing, civil service, election, and human
rights units in the Bangsamoro without prejudice of course to the powers,
authorities, and duties of these Constitutional bodies. The only goal is
to assist, and not to replace in any manner whatsoever the powers and
authorities of these bodies.
The Ombudsman shall have the power to act on erring Bangsamoro
officials. The Supreme Court will continue to exercise the powers of
supervision and judicial review over all courts including Shariah Courts.
Moreover, there are clear statements in the proposed BBL that the
Bangsamoro Government will have to adhere to the commitments of
the National Government as embodied in international treaties and
agreements.
The draft law also provides for additional intergovernmental bodies
to be established in order to ensure cooperation and coordination
between the National and Bangsamoro Governments. These are:
1. The Central Government Bangsamoro Government
Intergovernmental Relations Body to resolve issues on
intergovernmental relations;
2. The Intergovernmental Fiscal Policy Board that shall address
revenue unbalances and fluctuations in regional financial needs
and revenue-raising capacity of the Bangsamoro;
3. The Philippine Congress Bangsamoro Parliament Forum
for purposes of cooperation and coordination of legislative
initiatives;
4. The Bangsamoro Sustainable Development Board to ensure the
harmonization of environmental and development plans, as well
as to formulate common environmental objectives; and
Checks and Balances in National Government vs. None in the BBL
13
5. The Joint Body for the Zones of Joint Cooperation which shall
be responsible for drawing up of policies in the Zones of Joint
Cooperation in the Sulu Sea and the Moro Gulf.
Also worthy of note is the provision on the possible vote of no
confidence against the Government of the Day which can serve as a
further check on the performance of the Bangsamoro Government by
the duly elected representatives of the Bangsamoro. Another is the full
disclosure policy of the Bangsamoro Government of its budget and
finances and of bids and public offerings.
Regarding public order and safety, there will be a Bangsamoro
Police Board which shall perform the functions of the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) in the Bangsamoro. The board shall be
part of the NAPOLCOM with the NAPOLCOM ensuring that the
Bangsamoro Police Board performs its powers and functions within the
bounds of its authority.
Above all of these controls within and outside the Bangsamoro
however, what is of paramount importance would be the demand of the
governed for complete accountability from those who govern, supported
by a strong press and strong civil society organizations. That way we can
further strengthen the democratic institutions that will be established,
and ensure the general welfare of the people in the Bangsamoro.
The BBL Fully Recognizes and

Preserves the Territorial Integrity
of the Republic of the Philippines*
Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, Esq.
Board Member, Human Rights Victims Claims Board

he proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), now Senate Bill No.

2408, fully recognizes and preserves the territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines. Nothing in the proposed legislative measure
is incongruent with the time-honored principle of territorial integrity
because the bill, in Article III, Section 1 thereof itself, emphatically and
categorically affirms the preservation of the wholeness of the Philippine
national territory, to wit:
Territory refers to the land mass as well as the maritime,
terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain
above it. The Bangsamoro territory shall remain a part of the
Philippines. (emphasis supplied)
This should more than adequately set aside any fear that the BBL
would threaten any dismemberment of the Philippine territory. The bill
clearly guards against any and all possibility of the proposed Bangsamoro
territory from being separated from the Philippinesas it unequivocally
determines where the Bangsamoro territory shall belong. In plain
Amendments and Revision of Codes on 2 February 2015 at the Philippine Senate,
Pasay City.
14
The BBL Fully Recognizes and Preserves the Territorial Integrity
15
language, Article III, Section 1 states that whatever may be the final
configuration of the Bangsamoro territory; the same shall remain to be
part of the Philippines. The word remain must be underscored because
it evinces a powerful meaning of peculiar significance of this all-important
BBL provision in connection with the inviolability and integrity of our
national territory. The verb remain is defined in the dictionary as to
continue in the same state1 or to continue to be specified.2 The use of
the word remain hence imports a dual recognitionone retrospective
(as to origin) and the other prospective (as to the result)of where and to
whom such territory really belongs (i.e., the Philippines and the Filipino
people), that of course include the people of the Bangsamoro. Simply
put, the BBL recognizes that(1) the territories that may eventually
comprise the Bangsamoro are originally (retrospectively) already parts
of the Philippines; and (2) will continue to be, therefore prospectively,
from the establishment of the Bangsamoro. Significantly, this provision
comes without any qualification or conditionality whatsoever. Under no
circumstances, therefore, shall the Bangsamoro territory not remain to
be part of the Philippines. Evidently, this important provision, after all,
carries with it such potent and forceful meaning that in our last hearing
Mr. Justice Florentino Feliciano had also referred to it as sufficient to
dispel any concern in this matter. Thus, it is not merely window dressing.
It should be clarified that Article III, Section 1 of the BBL does not,
in relation to the powers of the Bangsamoro over its territory, partake
of total exclusivity to the Bangsamoro Government. We highlight
that within the Bangsamoro territory, the exercise of concurrent and
reserved powers by the Central Government shall not be constrained
or compromised within the territory of the Bangsamoro. Thus, to the
fullest extent of the Bangsamoros territory, the Central Governments
authority and jurisdiction shall nevertheless be present and felt. This
finds application for instance, when the army, the navy and the air force
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall exercise full authority there
as directed by the commander-in-chief and depending on the demands
of national security.
As to jurisdiction over the aerial domain, the Bangsamoro will
likewise exercise jurisdiction only in so far as the power involved is
exclusive. An example of the Bangsamoros authority over air space is
16
similar to the LGUs jurisdiction under the Local Government Code

(Republic Act No. 7160) over the regulation of high-rise buildings
by zoning. On the matter of air transportation, specifically, it should
be noted that exclusive powers over the same have not been given to
the Bangsamoro. As proposed in the BBL, these matters would be
determined through the Intergovernmental Relations mechanisms, 3
whereupon we could expect that airside operation will be retained
as pertaining to national competencies while landside operations for
example, maintenance and management of airports, could be shared or
concurrent. The same is true with respect to pollution control, where the
extent of coordination and cooperation between the Bangsamoro and
Central governments shall be determined through the intergovernmental
mechanisms. All of these indicate that there shall be no actual diminution
or reduction in the powers of Central Government in the Bangsamoro
that it already exercises. There would be, instead, a system of devolution
of powers between/from the Central Government to the Bangsamoro
under the BBL, consistent with the framework of autonomy ordained
under the 1987 Philippine Constitution and not beyond it. This cannot
be interpreted as a limitation over the general sovereignty of the Republic
of the Philippines because it precisely conforms to the very expression
of the sovereign will of the people in the Constitution.4
Also, we must recall that what are devolved under the BBL are mere
governmental powers, and not the exercise of sovereignty as such. That
sovereignty still resides in the sovereign Filipino people from whom all
governmental authority emanates.5 Respect for this sovereign will is
adequately reflected in the BBL as it categorically states that all powers
to be devolved shall be in consonance with the Constitution.6 Thus,
whatever Congress enacts in the BBL will be undertaken with that in
mind. More to the point, we must remember that the source of all
the powers that will be delegated to or devolved in the BBL is still the
Central/National Government. Therefore, the Central Government will
certainly not become inferior within the Bangsamoro territory. Residual
powers remain with the Central Government. The autonomous region
cannot rise higher than the source of its authority. Thus, it is a misplaced
notion to believe that the Bangsamoro Government has the authority
17
to abrogate or negate national policies. There is nothing in the BBL

that empowers the Bangsamoro Government, on its own, to change
or disregard the application of national laws within the Bangsamoro
territory. If at all, it will be the BBL itself, a piece of national legislation
once passed by Congress, that will effectively modify other affected
existing national laws of the land in accordance with the doctrine of
specificity.
Autonomy mandates that governmental powers will be shared,
or otherwise clearly delineated as either reserved or exclusive. This,
however, does not necessarily imply any specific functional division
of powers as commonly seen in cooperative federalisms. We are,
after all, not establishing a federal government. It should be stressed
that in cooperative federalism, the vast majority of competencies are
concurrent or shared, thus requiring a strong representation of the
federal units at the central level.7 Also, there is a functional division of
labor in such jurisdictions because there the central level makes policies
while the federal units are responsible for implementing them.8 Such is
clearly not the case for the Bangsamoro. Under the BBL, one can easily
glean that the delineation of powers favors the devolution of powers to
the autonomous region (with over fifty exclusive powers), rather than
the concurrent or shared ones (only fourteen). Hence, the autonomous
region is manifestly not reduced to mere administrative agents of the
Central Government. Too, there is no requirement under the BBL for
strong representation of the Bangsamoro in the Central Government
only adequate Bangsamoro participation in Central Government9 is
sought in the BBL and the same is strictly provided as a matter policy,
not as a mandate.
Neither does the BBL propose a duality type of federalism. As retired
Supreme Court Justice Adolf Azcuna previously pointed out, in the US,
the states retain powers unless given to the federal government in our
set-up, the unspecified powers are retained by the national government.
This is consistent with Article X, Section 17 of the Constitution, which
states: All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this
Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in
the National Government. It is, therefore, false to believe that under
18
the BBL, there will be a Central Government of limited powers. This

residual clause in the fundamental law is fully adopted in a BBL as the
same is being ordained under its Preamble to be consistent with the
Constitution.
In any case, the fact is, the BBL does not promote or adopt any kind
of federalism at all. Full stop. Rather, it creates and establishes an
autonomous region as provided in the Philippine Constitution.
The import of Article III, Section 1 indeed gains further legal
significance in favor of preserving the territorial integrity of the
Philippines when it is read together with the statement of intent in the
bills proposed Preamble that the BBL shall be
In consonance with the Constitution and the universally
accepted principles of human rights, liberty, justice,
democracy, and the norms and standards of international law.
As a matter of interpretation, it becomes apparent that the measure

of what comprises the Philippine national territory under the BBL is no
other than the Philippine Constitution, in particular Article I thereof.
Perforce, when the BBL mentions that the Bangsamoro territory shall
remain a part of the Philippines, it refers to Philippine national territory
as defined in Article I of the Constitution, nothing else. As such, the
Bangsamoro territory is evidently an integral part of the national territory
of the Philippines as defined in the Constitution, not separate therefrom.
This should properly address the concerns raised on the appropriateness
of using of the term territory (to refer to the territorial breadth of the
Bangsamoro autonomous region) or even the reference in the Preamble
to the Bangsamoro ancestral homelandsince all of these areas shall,
in all cases, be subsumed under the fullness of the Philippine national
territory. Parenthetically, the Local Government Code (Republic Act
No. 7160) itself uses the term territory to refer to the areas covered by
the jurisdiction of the different local government units.10 In the words
of Mr. Justice Feliciano (ret.) last hearing,
Under Philippine Administrative law, provinces,
municipalities, municipal districts, etc., do have defined
19
territories as designating the earthly limits of exercises of

their legislative and law enforcement authorities. (emphasis
supplied)11
This is the sole import of defining the territory of the Bangsamoro

to repeat, to delimit the earthly bounds of its legislative and law
enforcement authorities. As defined in Article III, Section 1 of the BBL,
territory pertains to physical (or earthly) realms, not to political ones as
mistakenly understood by some. It is, hence, plainly inaposite to refer
to other political definitions of the word (e.g., as a geographical area
under the jurisdiction of another country or sovereign power) when
the BBL already supplies us the definition.
Finally, from the point of view of international law, we are reminded
that the principle of territorial integrity remains to be a fundamental
and important part of the international legal order and is enshrined in
the Charter of the United Nations, in particular in Article 2, paragraph
4.12 This principle continues to underlie the contemporary rules of
international law, notwithstanding significant inroads and challenges to
it by the emerging influence of international human rights law, including
that of the right to self-determination.13 Indeed, international law still
affords a central place to [preserving] territorial integrity, even in the
context of self-determination.14 This has been interpreted to mean that
the principle of territorial integrity exists even within the context the
right to self-determination.
With respect to the BBL, there have been criticisms raised against
the provision of the BBL recognizing the Bangsamoro peoples right to
self-determination to chart their political future.15 Manifestly, these
have lost sight of the prevailing principles of international law that, by the
incorporation clause, are adopted as part of the law of the land.16 The
BBLs recognition of the Bangsamoro peoples right to self-determination
is not necessarily opposed to the inviolability of the countrys territorial
integrity. In fact, under the precise status of the prevailing international
legal principles on territorial integrity and the right to self-determination,
such provision of the BBL can only be interpreted to mean that the
Philippines territorial integrity takes a central place in the context of
the Bangsamoros right to self-determination.
20
Speaking of the Bangsamoro people, the definition in the BBL

of who the Bangsamoro people are is actually far from the concept of
citizenship, contrary to what has been intimated in the last hearing. We
find the analogy decidedly out of place because there is, in fact, nothing
in the BBL that allows the denial of any privilege (whether political,
social, cultural, or economic) to a non-Bangsamoro. Conversely, it does
not unduly privilege only those who would subscribe to the Bangsamoro
identity. Contrary to what has been claimed, the definition of such
identity does not function whatsoever to screen out outsiders from
certain privileges of national life.17 Proof of this can be abundantly
found in many provisions of the BBL. On the matter suffrage, we look
at Article VII, Section 12 on the qualifications of Members of Parliament
and we find there that, among others, the requirement speaks only of
residency in the Bangsamoro, not identity as a Bangsamoro. The
same is true for the qualification to become Chief Minister (Article
VII, Section 28) or Wali (Article VIII, Section 3). As to economic
privilege, the same non discriminatory policy is found. Thus, in terms
of preferential rights to fishing in the Zones of Joint Cooperation, for
example, the same is extended not only to the Bangsamoro people but
to all other resident fishers in the Bangsamoro (Article XIII, Section 19,
paragraph 3 [d]). When we say residents, of course that is blind as to
cultural or even religious identity. Therefore, under the BBL, anyone
and everyone so long as they qualify under the residency rules regardless
of their subscription to the Bangsamoro identity can enjoy the political
and economic privileges that are provided in the law.
Lastly, we invite everyone to recall that the very reason for the
adoption of the autonomous arrangement is to preclude any separation
or secession, that is, to favor internal and not external self-determination.
The international support for the peace process is there precisely because
of this fundamental premise.
In view of the foregoing, we stand firm in our conviction that the
BBL fully preserves and maintains the territorial integrity of the Republic
of the Philippines.
21
Notes
1. Dictionary.com
2. Ibid.
3. BBL, Article XIII, Section 31.
4. See 1987 Constitution, Article X, Section 1 and Sections 15-21.
5. 1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 1
6. Preamble of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL)
7. Tanja A. Brzel and Madeleine O. Hosli, Brussels between Berlin and Bern:
Comparative Federalism Meets the European Union. Working Papers Political
Science No. 02/2002 (ISSN 1569-3546), Vrije University. Amsterdam, October
2002.
8. Ibid.
9. See BBL, Article VI, Section 9.
10. See Republic Act no. 7160, Section 15; Section 386; Section 442
11. See Statement of Mr. Justice Florentino Feliciano delivered orally during the
hearing on 26 January 2015 of the Senate Committee on Constitutional
Amendments, joint with the Committee on Local Government; presided by the
Chair Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, among others.
12. International Court of Justice, Accordance with international law of the unilateral
Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (2010),
para. 80.
13. Encyclopedia Princetoniesis.
14. Ibid.
15. BBL, Preamble, par. 3
16. 1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 2
17. Statement of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, submitted to the Senate Committee
on Constitutional Amendments entitled SB no. 2408 Beyond the Power of
Congress to Pass.
Legislation versus Charter Change*

Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna
Chancellor, Philippine Judicial Academy

Retired Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines
hank you very much, Madam Chair.

My submission, Madam Chair, is that of my colleagues and the
framers of the Constitutional Commission. We have taken the stand that
there is no need for amending the Constitution in order to effect the
autonomous region that is mandated under the Constitution precisely
because the Constitution has already mandated it.
It is very clear from Article X of the Philippine Constitution that
there shall be created this Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
The only question really is whether the proposed legislation is within
the framework of that provision of the Constitution on the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao. One of the objections presented against
it is because under the BBL, the form of government is ministerial
and, therefore, it goes against the Constitution because under the
Constitution, our form of government is presidential.
I respectfully submit, Madam Chair, that this is not a correct
argument because to start with, the present Constitution of the
Philippines is not strictly presidential in form. There are many features
of the parliamentary form of government that have been incorporated
in our system, including the question hour, the party-list representation,
Pasay City. It has been edited by the author for purposes of this publication.
22
Legislation versus Charter Change
23
and many other features like recall. The framers of the Constitution saw
wisdom in having a mixed form of government where you have features
of the parliamentary system incorporated in our structure of government.
Secondly, Madam Chair, what the Constitution requires for the
form of government in the autonomous region is simply that it should
be elective and representative of the constituent political units. A
parliamentary system will fulfill this minimal requirement. Under our
Constitution, what is, therefore, required of the autonomous region is
that it be representative and democratic. And under the BBL, the form
of government, although ministerial, is also going to be representative
and democratic.
Furthermore, Madam Chair, the practice of mixing the legislative
and the executive in our local governments is not new. In our local
governments, as they are structured today under existing laws, you have
the executive in the provincial levela governor, and a vice governor
participating in the parliamentary legislative body of the province which
is the provincial board.
In the City of Manila, I understand, the vice mayor presides over the
council of the city. So it is not really an oddity but, in fact, a common
occurrence in our country today to have this kind of government where
you have the executive and the legislative working together.
It has also been said that the features of the autonomous region are
unconstitutional because it grants a definite territory to the autonomous
region. And since territory is an essential element of a state, therefore,
to grant a definite territory to the autonomous region is to recognize it
as a separate state.
I respectfully submit, Madam Chair, that that is a flawed argument.
The essential requisites of a sovereign state are territory, people,
government, and sovereignty or independence. It is not enough to have a
definite territory to become a separate state. You must have independence.
And independence is definitely not granted to the autonomous region
in this proposed setup. Therefore, even if they have people, they have
territory, they have government but absent independence, they cannot
be a sovereign state.
24
Furthermore, Madam Chair, the territory granted to the autonomous

region here is definitely stated to be still part of Philippine territory. So
it is not a separate territory taken out of the Philippine territory but
it is just delineated for purposes of governance but still forms part of
Philippine territory.
There are other features that are admittedly objectionable from the
viewpoint of the Constitution such as the police, for instance. Under the
Constitution, there can only be one police force, this is the Natividad
provision, authored by the late Teodulo Natividad and passed without
amendment, that there shall be only one police force in the whole
country, civilian in character, national in scope.
I pointed this out to the Philippine panel of negotiators, and they
assured me that this will be observed. And if it is not, it is up to Congress
to make sure that all these features are aligned with the Constitutiona
separate COA, separate Civil Service, and separate police force must not
be allowed to be really separated from our constitutional bodies because
the Constitution does not allow it. So the objectionable features can
be remedied by Congress, the essential feature which is an autonomous
region that is part of social justice and development of peoples can be
retained.
One of the objections I was surprised by Madam Chair, was that
we would be granting the autonomous region autonomy on matters of
education. But, Madam Chair, educational policy is specifically granted
to the autonomous region under the Constitution. Section 20 of Article
X, subsection seven states educational policies as among those granted
to the autonomous region to legislate over.
Another objection was that the enumeration of powers given to
the autonomous region was too muchfifty-eight against eightbut
it is not the number of the powers but the nature of the powers. The
powers reserved for the national government are precisely those of an
independent state and that is not granted to this autonomous region.
Furthermore, there was an error on the part of one of the speakers
against who said that under the proposal, the residual powers, the powers
neither granted nor reserved, are given to the autonomous region.
That is wrong, Madam Chair. The residual powers are retained by the
Legislation versus Charter Change
25
national government. That is according to the Constitution itself and

that cannot be violated by the BBL. I dont think the BBL has a provision
to that effect either. So you have powers that are retained by the national
government, powers that are shared by both, powers that are exclusive to
the autonomous region and any other power not mentioned is a residual
power and is with the national government.
So, Madam Chair, I submit that the proposed BBL conforms with
the Constitution. The MOA-AD that was invalidated by the Supreme
Court at the time that I was a member of the court suffered from
many defects. One of them was that there was failure of consultation.
Consultation is very essential when you try to change the structure of
government. That has been remedied in the present setup, as there had
been numerous consultations done on this proposed autonomous region.
Another feature was the absence of mention of the Constitution.
Now, it is very clear that this exercise is and must be in consonance with
the Philippine Constitution. So there are, I submit, Madam Chair, big
differences between the MOA-AD that was invalidated by the Supreme
Court and the present proposal. I respectfully reiterate the paper that
our colleagues submitted, Madam Chair, supporting the Bangsamoro
proposal.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Sovereignty versus Substate*

Dean Julkipli Wadi
Institute of Islamic Studies, University of the Philippines Diliman
t is an honor to be given the opportunity to share my view in todays

Joint Committee hearing of the Senate on the Bangsamoro Basic
Law (BBL). In the invitations guideline provided by the Senate Joint
Committee, the resource person is requested to take an affirmative or
negative position relative to the draft BBL given four topics to choose
from and to identify one topic as a focus of discussion. The four topics
are: (1)Legislation v. Constitutional Change; (2)Checks and Balances
in National Government v. None in BBL; (3)Sovereignty v. Substate;
and (4) Territorial Integrity vs. Functional Division.
I would like to discuss Number 3, Sovereignty v. Substate with
emphasis on the latter (i.e., substate) in the context of Philippine
experience in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.
Last Monday (26 January), the Chair of the Philippine panel on
the GPH-MILF peace process exhorted this august body to consider
the broad and dynamic field of Political Sciencenot solely the
legal construction of Philippine Constitutional Lawas a prism in
understanding the BBL, its nature, and the vision it purports to entrench
known as the Bangsamoro Political Entity.
If I may interpret the tone of argument of GPH Peace Panel Chair
Prof. Miriam Coronel Ferrer, she is almost making a plea for Congress
* This paper was presented during the Senate joint committee on SB No. 2408
(Bangsamoro Basic Law) by the Committee on Local Government Joint; Committee
Pasay City. It also appeared in the authors regular column in MindaNews on 23
February 2015. A condensed version was earlier published in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer on 22 February 2015 entitled, Antecedents, Restricting, Possibilities.
26
Sovereignty versus Substate
27
to use a broader and dynamic scale in weighing the merits (or demerits)
of the BBL. It is a scale that is able to harness the tools of political
and legal concepts, theories, and principles relative to todays trend
of subnational level governance discourses and development in many
parts of the world. One of the recent works on this subject is Markku
SuksisSubstate Governance through Territorial Autonomy: A Comparative
Study in Constitutional Law of Powers, Procedures and Institutions (2011).
If I quote Ferrers plea and the work of Suksi, it does not mean that
I conspire with her in pushing for particular perspective on the issue of
substate and its cases as articulated quite comprehensively by Markku
Suksi. Although we are friends with Prof. Ferrer, we hardly talk or share
views as she is too absorbed with her position as Peace Chair, given the
fact, too, that I do not wholly toe the line Office of Presidential Assistant
on the Peace Processs (OPAPP) issues relative to strategic questions of
the peace process. It is just that Suksis work is readily available on the
Internet where any student of Political Science, Public Administration,
and Political and Constitutional Law could easily read.
But there is another scale that I would like to add as part of a
weighing instrument to assess the BBL and its substate proposal. It is
the scale of history. Perhaps, the field of history (particularly Filipino/
Moro history) would provide a comprehensive frame together with
Constitutional Law and Political Science for our understanding of the
issue at hand.
The logic in using these three instruments of weighing scale as tools
in assessing the draft BBL is obviously to make our judgment dynamic
and creative while aware of thelongue dure surrounding the political
dynamics of constitutional interpretation for, without stating the
obvious, even the fundamental law of the land is historically constituted.
This means providing us a bigger canvas as we paint our thoughts about
an issue of supreme importance.
To begin with, allow me to express my thoughts (and this is not to
raise myself ). Like many others, we have followed quite persistently the
issue of the Mindanao peace process these past several years. In 2000,
the year when peace talks between the Estrada Administration and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were in tatters, I published in
28
theDiliman Reviewa paper entitled:Tier-Making and Tier-Changing

in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago (2000).
In that paper, I explored the puzzle regarding the instability of
national-local relations between the Philippine government and Moro
areas and the futility of what I refer to as tier-making and tier-changing
approach that come in the form of military, political, and administrative
units that were created yet abolished as another one was created and
later abolished and so on and so forth.
So that, the trend of creating and abolishing tiers continued since the
American colonial period until the expansion of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao in 2001, and possibly, until the entrenchment of
the Bangsamoro in 2016. This is not to include small and sometimead
hoctiers or offices including proposals that were promised by the
Philippine government to Moro fronts that never materialized.
For historical appraisal, it is worthy to remember that there were
nine (9) tiers or military, administrative, andad hocunits in Mindanao
and the Sulu Archipelago that were created and eventually abolished
successively during the American colonial period. Some of these were:
the Military District of Mindanao and Jolo (created in 1899), the Moro
Province (created in 1903), the Office of Commissioner for Mindanao
and Sulu (created in 1937), and few others.
During these past Philippine administrations, there were fourteen
(14) tiers created and abolished successively starting with Commission on
National Integration (created in 1957), and many others like Mindanao
Development Authority (MDA), Ministry of Muslim Affairs (MMA),
Southern Philippine Development Authority (SPDA), Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), Southern Philippine
Council on Peace and Development (SPCPD), Expanded ARMM,
Maglanco-Socsargen Council (Government proposal in 1999), until
the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), a political arrangement in the
MOA-AD of 2008.
So that, if we count the number of tiers created and abolished
successively since the American period until these days including the
present ARMM and the proposed Bangsamoro in 2016, there were/are
29
already twenty-four (24) tiers, units or entities. In this regard, it was

not surprising when Malacaan declared three or four years ago that the
ARMM is a failed political experiment. Truth is Mindanao and the
Sulu Archipelago had been subjected to continuing political experiments
for 117 years if we include the critical year of 2016.
Before I present my conclusion as to why Mindanao and the
Sulu Archipelago are subjected to this morass of tier-making and tierchanging, I would argue that the subject of substate presents a relatively
new mode of tier-making with its attendant politics with the national
government and its tendency, as feared by many, to become a gateway for
secession, I would like to note another paper that I wrote when the GMA
(Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo) administration was in its twilight year after
being bruised heavily due to the bungled Memorandum of Agreement
on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) in 2008 and the Maguindanao
Massacre in 2009. It is entitled:The Philippines and the Bangsamoro
Polity: Breaking the Sisyphean Ordeal (2012).
Here, with the added but unimplemented tier called the BJE,
while increasing the number of political experiments in the south, I
articulated my frustration after years of the peace process during the
GMA administration with the government and MILF, only to end up
slugging it out once again. I thought the metaphor of Sisyphus fits in
explaining the morass wherein whenever the peace process is about to
reach the peak of a mountain, the weight of its load becomes too heavy
that it would cascade uselessly rendering all peace efforts and other
peace dividends for naught; so that, it would take succeeding Philippine
administrations to take the cudgels by rolling up the stone of the peace
process once again.
In todays presentation, I raise two questions: What explains the
continuing tier-making and tier-changing in Mindanao and the Sulu
Archipelago? Could the substate project contemplated in the BBL
break the cycle and stabilize Philippine intergovernmental relation in
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago?
These questions entail much time to discuss and elaborate. For
brevity, let me quote the first paper mentioned above:
30
The main source of instability is anchored on a century of

unresolved contestation over the political status of Mindanao
and Sulu. Moreover, the colonial mixture of Philippine
political system that failed to address the power vacuum in
Mindanao and Sulu reinforces intergovernmental instability.
The unitary setup of the Philippine government was a
legacy of Spain Yet, the setup was institutionalized by
the Philippine Commission to facilitate the extension of
American sovereignty to the Philippines including Mindanao
and Sulu. The separation of powers (executive, legislative, and
judiciary) was copied from the US. The unitary setup defines
the vertical division of powers (structure of government)
between the national government and local government units
while the horizontal separation of powers defines the form
of government (e.g., presidential or parliamentary).
In all indications, the colonial-political mixture is what creates
a disjuncture between the horizontal and vertical relation
of powers because, from the point of view of governance, a
unitary setup requires a relatively homogenous society while
an effective application of separation of powers presupposes
a stable system of democracy As a consequence, it
emboldened intergovernmental problem and rendered
futile the national government effort of tier-making and
tier-changing and further worsened the power vacuum in
southern Philippines (Diliman Review 2000).
Despite my rather grim view about the relation of the Philippine

government vis--vis the Bangsamoro in terms of gaps, especially their
historically asymmetrical intergovernmental positions ever since, I
thought the concept of substate provides an option where the two
fundamental bases of power in a democratic system of polity (i.e.,
separation of powers and division of powers) could be adjusted in such
a way that while the former is made to share power horizontally (e.g.,
concurrent, exclusive powers) with the Bangsamoro, structural relation
of power (i.e., division of power in terms of national-local relation)
must also be adjusted from the previous strong-executive type to the
31
strong-legislature kind (e.g., parliamentary, ministerial form) to allow

the latter to have a subgovernment that does not necessarily have the
power of national government relative to the first fundamental source
or arrangement of power (i.e., separation of powers), but which is able
to have enough power under the division of power (i.e., vertical power)
that reflects partly a federal form of government but which still enjoys
an autonomous character under a unitary setup of government as in the
case of the Philippines.
As a clarification, this notion of substate reflects Suksis definition as
that political space of organizational options which include federalism
with its intermediate state-level entities, normally distributed over
the entire sovereign territory, and also a variety of different territorial
autonomy arrangements (2011, 1).
According to Suksi, both federal solutions and autonomy
arrangements are used to accomplish the same thing, to bring about
the creation of public authority of a devolved nature for territorially
circumscribed entities at the substate level.
Suksis notion of public authority is normally the power to make
laws, that is, the legislative power or the law-making competence,
managed through institutions of self-government.
The need to have such an adjustment from strong executive to
strong legislature is in consonance with the essentially and historically
asymmetric power relation of the Moros that even the Americans
recognized when they organized the Moro Province in 1903.
Although the Legislative Council of the Moro Province which was
composed obviously of Moros from different districts and tribal wards
was not as powerful, the explicit recognition of the US for such legislature
to coexist with a Governor under the Insular Government (headed by
Governor General and Philippine Commission) proves Americas respect
on Moro asymmetrical relation during the US colonial administration
in the Philippines.
Moreover, the dispersal of power under a unitary setup by simply
touching on the powers of national government under the separation
of power principle or the traditional strong executive approach without
adjusting the corollary structure of division of power (e.g., powers
32
in nation-local relation) assumes a symmetrical relation between the

national government and the Moros, which, in my view, is responsible
for the cycle of tier-making and tier-changing in Mindanao and the
Sulu Archipelago.
Understandably, and from the perspective of the State, the traditional
approach of power dispersal through autonomy using strong-executive
approach is favorable to the national government in terms of maintaining
national power down the line. However, such an approach rests on
the assumption that local areas are relatively homogenous and fully
integrated with the national community. But given the political and
cultural distinction of Moro society honed by separate history different
from Philippine history, then the autonomous, integrative, and strong
executive approach of power relation is inappropriate as it continuously
creates political disjuncture in national-location relation between the
two communities (Filipinos and Moros).
If such an approach of unitary, strong-executive type is made to
persist, it perpetuates patron-client relationship as local or regional
executives in Moro areas are usually forced to kowtow to the national
government particularly the Executive while rendering local or regional
legislature weak and generally underutilized where local executives acting
as alter ego of the President dominates local and regional political system.
In this regard, the notion of autonomy and decentralization loses
its essential meaning as the fundamental function of the government
including the function of legislation in subnational level that supposedly
operates part of the separation of powers (like rule-making, ruleimplementing) fails to fully operate. What happens on the ground thus
is a persistence of pseudo-democratic subpolity with institutions and
processes undermined by patronage politics, warlordism, and so on.
For sure, patronage system, political dynasties, and political bossism
are prevalent not only in the south but in the country as a whole. I
would contend though that due to the depth of political and cultural
asymmetry between Moro society and national community, there are
both qualitative and quantitative differences of patron-client relations
affecting thus the workings of intergovernmental conditions in the area.
33
In this regard, there is a need to adjust the fulcrum of separation

of powers structure (horizontal) with the division of power relation
(vertical) away from strong-executive type to the strong-legislature
one in mid-tier or regional level where check and balances are made to
operate not in traditional presidential form where the three branches
of government are conceived to be independent and coequal but along
parliamentary arrangement where the parliament as legislature minus
the judiciary coexists with the executive headed by the Prime Minister
or Chief Minister for that matter. The rationale of having the stronglegislature type like a parliament is for real autonomy to be fully realized
in regional or local level.
The Constitutional question thus is: Can a State with unitary
structure and presidential form of government accommodate a tier or
substate that carries a strong-legislature feature generally understood
as a parliamentary or ministerial form of government?
I would leave this question for our Constitutional lawyers to argue.
My end at this juncture is to articulate the impact of power dispersal
through traditional mode of autonomy using strong-executive approach
without making adjustment in the fulcrum of power relation on both
separation and division of power that often results in the instability
of political and administrative tiers between national government and
regional and local government as shown vividly in the continuing
political experiments in Moro areas.
But if I may express my 25 cents worth of view on this matter,
Article 10, Section 15 of the Philippine Constitution provides the
creation of autonomous regions with Section 18 underscoring the need
to define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of
the executive department and legislative assembly without identifying
a specific structure and form of government whether unitary or federal
and whether presidential or parliamentary. In my humble opinion, such
a noncommittal structure and form of government in the autonomous
region by the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides space for
Constitutional flexibility that could be viewed or used as a way out
to get rid of the morass of political experiments in Moro areas.
34
By the way, it must be noted that the long political experiment

did not only hamper autonomy and democratization in the south; it
practically exhausted national resources burdening thus the State almost
perpetually. Traditionally, the national impulse is to lay the blame on the
Moros with their doggedness and tenacity in pursuing their right to selfdetermination. But as Moro fronts like the MILF begin to redefine selfdetermination generally in its internal dimension and not in its external
aspects, the government should also be ready to make corresponding
recalibrations beyond the traditional approach of autonomy.
At this point, I would like to leave this major constitutional question
and address the fear of some that the BBL may serve as a gateway for
secession of the Bangsamoro.
Agreeably, this fear is not necessarily unfounded. The draft BBL
is not simply a political or legal document. The BBL is a vision of
possibilities whose tendency could tread in many ways.
One of the possibilities may be captured with this question: Given
that the fulcrum of power in the Bangsamoro contemplated in the BBL
would change from the Executive (headed by the Regional Governor)
to the Parliament which, with some surety, could evolve into difficulty
for the President to control its sixty members, what if the Bangsamoro
Parliament becomes too nationalistic in its orientation and too
demanding or protective of its power, while unyielding with its position
where the situation could possibly reach a point where there would be
polarization of positions between the National Government and the
Bangsamoro Government?
While the BBL provides that the supervisory power of the President
overarches on various Bangsamoro political and military entities with the
attendant intergovernmental bodies, Congress-Bangsamoro Parliament
Forum and subconstitutional bodies as venues to resolve possible tension
between the National Government and the Bangsamoro, I would say, in
fact, I should be frank, these are not enough to ward off the possibility
of Moros growing appetite for secession through the Bangsamoro
Government. Like any politics, Bangsamoro politics, by that time,
35
remains a terrain of possibilities. But for us to fail to distinguish a

phantom or ghost out of such possibilities as if they were real would be
to grip us in fear before we realize that, on its flipside, the BBL can be
viewed too as a key in addressing in a rather different way the political
experiments in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.
At this point, what I would like to point out in order to avoid the
risk of polarization mentioned is to raise a basic postulate that may be
captured with what I indigenously call a tambusah or knapsack metaphor.
It is akin to a natural law or common sense that as one increases the
load of power unto a bag, it is necessary to strengthen the ties that bind
so they wont snap altogether.
In other words, to avoid the Bangsamoro from becoming a gateway
for secession, the process of power dispersal distributed along the
division of power structure must correspondingly be countered not
simply through the Presidents power of supervision and the various
intergovernmental bodies as such bodies could also be politicized
when push comes to shove. Moros should be able to identify with the
national aspiration through ample representation in major branches of
government as these remain the critical sources of power that determine
the working of the separation of power principle.
This way the fundamental basis or structure of national power is
fully utilized not simply as source of empowering the Bangsamoro with
optimum potential of autonomy called substate extended to them but as
a guarantee in making them glued to the Republic and thus ascertaining
the countrys territorial integrity remains intact.
Finally, as the BBL is faced with serious challenge with the so-called
Fallen 44 tragedy in Mamasapano, Maguindanao (on 25 January), the
onus is on the MILF and the whole branches of government including
the legislators.
Like Sisyphus, they face the grand task to roll up the BBL stone even
more doggedly; and, with precious time ticking, they could not afford
to succumb to despair and helplessness, as they are just a distance away
the mountaintop.
Let Reason and Facts Sway Our

Opinion, Not Deeply Held Biases
and Mistrust*
Atty. Anna Tarhata S. Basman
Head, GPH Peace Panel Legal Team
ssalamu alaykum wa rahmatullah wa barakatuh.

The past weeks have taken a toll on the peace process.
Public opinion, which a couple of months ago was overwhelmingly
positive and in favor of our milestones in the negotiating table, has
generally turned against it. Sincerity and commitment are constantly
questioned. Timelines and deadlines have been reset. The BBL,
decommissioning, and other aspects of the Comprehensive Agreement
on the Bangsamoro are under even stricter scrutiny.
The past weeks have taken a toll on our dynamics as a multicultural
Filipino society. Naivet has perhaps made some of us believe that we
were slowly achieving national reconciliation and understanding only
to find out that division was still brimming on the surface just waiting
for a trigger to explode.
But more tragically, the past weeks have taken a toll on the lives
of the families, friends, and loved ones of the sixty-five or sixty-seven
Filipinos who died on that fateful day in Mamasapano.
Calls for justice abound. And rightfully so. Every single one of them
deserves no less than to have those responsible held accountable for the
loss of lives. Let us call for justice but not prejudge.
* This opening statement was delivered during the Media Roundtable on the
Bangsamoro Basic Law held at Pearlmont Hotel, Cagayan de Oro City, on 21
February 2015.
36
Let Reason and Facts Sway Our Opinion, Not Deeply Held Biases
37
Let reason and facts sway our opinion, not deeply held biases and
mistrust.
Let us also not view this incident in isolation.
The reality of the fragility of the security situation in a conflictaffected area is precisely thata reality. We offer the Bangsamoro Basic
Law not as a be-all-and-end-all solution to the decades-long conflict but
as a crucial step towards the right directionthe direction of recognizing
historical injustices, the need to address them, and only then to move
on. We offer the BBL as a means of establishing a regional government
with the authority to craft and implement government policies that
are closer and more responsive to the peculiar needs of these specific
communities. We offer the BBL as a step towards normalizing the
situation on the ground, where law and order prevail not because of fear
of military might but because of the general sense of belongingness and
empowerment without the need to use arms.
This step definitely involves not only the parties to the agreement,
not only the negotiators, not only the various peoples living within the
Bangsamoro, but the entire country. If there is one thing that came out
right from all these, it is that we are given the chance to introduce to
the public consciousness the roots of the conflictthe horrors suffered
not only in the hands of foreign colonizers but also those in power
thereafter. Indeed, voices to this effect have always been weak but they
are getting stronger by the day.
We offer the BBL as an essential tool towards giving the Bangsamoro
something that is guaranteed in international law and reiterated in our
Constitutiontheir right to self-determination within the bounds of
our Supreme Law. By all means review the BBL. Make it stronger and
less susceptible to judicial nullification. Let our lawmakers come up with
a BBL that will stand constitutional scrutiny and address the legitimate
grievances of the Bangsamoro. We remain confident that our legislators
will not shirk from this duty.
The events of late also provide us the opportunity to review and
recheck our perspective.
We have to stop thinking of the BBL as a reward to the MILF, a
prize they earned after negotiating with the Government for seventeen
38
long years. We need to realize that the BBL is a government action, a

legislation, that is due all Moros, all Lumads, all Christian settlers, all
Filipinos in conflict-affected areas who are tired of the status quo, who
are tired of living their lives awaiting the next armed skirmishwhatever
the trigger may bethat will leave them IDPs (internally displaced
persons), out-of-school youths, orphans, widows, or worse, dead. We
should start recognizing that taking away the BBL is not a punishment
to the MILF but a disservice to all the Filipinos who have offered their
lives for peace in Mindanaothe forty-four from the SAF, the eighteen
from the MILF, the three or five civilians, and the 120,000 nameless
others all crying out for justice and peace in the Bangsamoro. We should
not further add to the statistics.
Thank you very much.
Privilege Speech on the

Commemoration of the 1968
Jabidah Massacre
Hon. Sitti Djalia A. Turabin-Hataman
Representative, Party List Anak Mindanao (AMIN), House of Representatives
ismillah ir-Rahman ir-Raheem.

Mr. Speaker, distinguished colleagues, honorable members of
the House of Representatives, ladies and gentlemen, Assalamu alaikum
Warahmatullahi taala Wabarakatuh. Good afternoon.
Over the last eight years as a result of the so-called Muslim MiniWar in the Philippines, more than hundred thousand Filipino Muslims
have lost their lives, over two hundred fifty thousand have come as
refugees in the neighboring Sabah State of Malaysia, and more than one
million have been displaced and rendered homeless
These words, ladies and gentlemen, are not new. In fact, they are
not mine. These were from a speech given by Ninoy Aquino in Jeddah
in May 198113 years after the Jabidah Massacre, which happened
March 18, 1968. Today is its 47th Year Commemoration. Again I quote:
On the other side, according to President Marcos himself,
about ten to 11,000 thousand Filipino soldiers have been
killed over the last eight years as a result of the battle in the
Southern Philippines the Philippine government under
*
This speech was delivered during 47th Commemoration of the Jabidah massacre
held on 18 March 2015 in Corregidor Island with the theme, Baliktanaw sa
Kasaysayan Tungo sa Pagkamit ng Tunay na Kapayapaan. The event was organized
by the ALL-OUT PEACE Network and the Office of Rep. Sitti Djalia A. TurabinHataman.
39
40
President Marcos calls the Muslim fighters as rebels, he calls

them outlaws, he calls them insurrectionists, and he calls
them secessionists or far worsetraitors to the Philippines.
The Muslims on the other hand see themselves as patriots, as
holy warriors, birth right of self-determination from infidel
attacks. It is most unfortunate that Filipinos are fighting
against Filipinos today.
These words, uttered thirty-four years ago, ring true to this very day.
So we ask, why? What did we miss? What have we not learned?
From 2002 to 2013 aloneprior to the signing of the Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro in 20143.5 million Filipinos were
displaced, a large majority concentrated in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. 3.5 million Filipinosthat is more than twice the
population of the city of Manila.
Must we wait for another thirty-four years, hundreds of thousands
more dead Filipinos and millions more homeless and traumatized by war?
We need peace and we need it now. We, who have long been living
in fear and conflict. We, who are more familiar with the sounds of guns
in our fields than the sounds of bells in our schools; we, who are more
experienced in building tents in evacuation areas than building decent
homes in our communities.
We need peace, we need it now, and this peace we hold in our hands,
honorable members of this august body.
Perhaps, for many of us legislators, and for majority of our fellow
Filipinos, the Bangsamoro Basic Law is just a piece of legislation. But
for us, the Bangsamoro people, this is the key to our aspirations, the
recognition of our rights and identity, an acknowledgement of the
historical injustices committed against us as a people, a recognition of
our history and heritage, an acceptance of who we are and that we do
not need to give up our identity to belong to this nation, that we are as
much Filipinos as any other Filipino.
This is what the BBL is to us. It is a product of foremost, seventeen
years of negotiations between the Government of the Philippines and
Privilege Speech on the Commemoration of the 1968 Jabidah Massacre
41
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and second, because it seeks to

preserve and build on the gains of the previous peace agreements, the
BBL contains almost 40 years of peace talks.
But even as such, we know it is not perfect and that as legislators,
it is our duty and responsibility to scrutinize every line, every word,
every letter of the proposed law. By all means, let us do that. Our only
prayer is for us to not lose sight of what this piece of legislation is all
aboutan integral component of a peace process, an enabling law
towards the realization of a peace agreement. Thus, our earnest appeal,
to remain consistent with the spirit of the Comprehensive Agreement
on the Bangsamoro.
Yes, we understand the anger after Mamasapano and we are one
with the nation in calling for justice for all the victims, including the
innocent civilians, most especially, the 8 year old girl, Sarah Panangolang,
who died in the same incident. Justice is due to every soul, regardless of
faith, or sex, or age, or line of work.
But must we choose between Justice and Peace? Must we give up one
in favor of the other? Is there no way we can give Justice to all who claim
it and still give Peace to those who seek it? Cant Justice and Peace come
together, especially when this Peace is also in response to the decades
of and continuing injustices committed against those who yearn for it?
Some of us say, because of Mamasapano, we must give up the BBL.
Napakadali pong sabihin, ngunit napakahirap pong pakinggan at tanggapin
para sa amin na halos buong buhay ay inalay na sa usaping pangkapayapaan
na siyang nagbunga ng BBL. I started as a peace worker in 1997, then as a
student activist. Five children after, we are now about to see a conclusion
to the peace talks, only to be hostaged by an incident which is neither
our fault nor something we asked for.
Some say because of Mamasapano, we must give up the BBL, because
the MILF cannot be trusted. I am not an MILF Your Honor, I cannot
speak in their behalf. But allow me to speak as a Moro Filipino.
September 2008, during the Holy Month of Ramadhan, the
Mandi family were onboard one of the boats ferrying civilians who left
42
their village upon seeing military planes hovering above them. With
their parents, were the Mandi children: Aida, seventeen; Bailyn, ten;
King, eight; Dayang, six; and Faiza, one year old. All of them died,
together with their father, when their boat was hit by a rocket from
one of the planes of the Philippine Air Force. This was in Datu Salibu,
Maguindanao.
As a Moro, I ask, was there a nationwide demand for justice for
them? Was there a call to stop the peace talks because the Philippine
government cannot be trusted based on the actions of some of its troops?
I ask, magkaiba po ba ang halaga ng buhay nila sa buhay ng iba nating
kababayan? Sila, na mga inosenteng sibilyan, at walang sinumpaang
tungkuling paglingkuran ang bayan? Their only fault was to be in the
wrong place at the wrong time, and yet, only a few human rights and
peace advocates were interested to know their story and seek justice for
them, which to this day, has not been served.
As a Moro, I ask, will we, as a people, be made accountable for the
Mamasapano incident? Will we be held responsible for what some of
us think the MILF did?
Yes, the BBL is a product of the peace process between the GPH
and the MILF, but what it contains is the aspirations of the Bangsamoro
people, and not solely the interests of the MILF. Although we were not in
the formal structures of negotiation, we as peace workers and advocates
of the Bangsamoro peoples right to self-determination have ownership
of the BBL. It is an ownership we claim regardless of what the MILF or
the GPH or whoever thinks or says so.
The Bangsamoro Basic Law is not just about the MILF. It is about us.
That is why, when we hear questions like, Do they have the capacity to
run a regional government? Are you ready for democracy? How can we
entrust such and such to them?, these questions are not only directed
to the MILF Your Honors, but also to us, Moro members of this august
body, us, whom you all refer to as your esteemed colleagues.
The Bangsamoro Basic Law, as contemplated in the Comprehensive
Agreement is not a solution that will only temporarily stop the bombs
Privilege Speech on the Commemoration of the 1968 Jabidah Massacre
43
and the bullets. More than anything, it is about us trying to create

a solution that will allow us to live alongside each other peacefully,
while working towards our political, economic, social and cultural
development, the realization of our right to self-determination.
It is not just another piece of legislation. We can have all the brilliant
lawyers argue as to the legal provisions and their interpretations, but we
pray that we also consider, how much it means to us as a people, the
historical perspective of the Bangsamoro struggle it seeks to address.
Kilalanin ninyo po ang Bangsamoro, kilalanin ninyo po kami. Now more
than ever, we call for a deeper understanding of the Bangsamoro people
and their cause, for the greatest injustice we legislators can do, is to enact
or not enact a law, for a people we do not know, we did not care to know.
Lastly, allow me to humbly remind all of us, that enacting the BBL
will not give rise to the Bangsamoro regional government. The decision
of the people will. As legislators, our duty is to deliberate and enact
the best law we can offer them, a law that will best serve the interest of
everyone, not just the Bangsamoro and Mindanao but the whole country
and our people. But at the end of the day, it will be them who will have
the final say, whether or not to accept the law we passed. But to end
it now, to not enact the law, is to decide for them and deny them that
opportunity to make the decision.
Yesterday, the Honorable Speaker Feliciano Belmonte and other
members of this House, met with the delegates of the Basilan Young
Leaders Program. They were asked: What do they think of those who
say the BBL is not the answer to the Muslim Mindanao problem. One
young woman in her early twenties stood up and said, Taga-Basilan po
ako, taga roon. Siguro po kung may nakakaalam kung ano ang makabubuti
o hindi para sa amin, kami po yun. Another young man stood up and
said, he himself was a victim of the armed conflict caught in a crossfire,
and after narrating his story asked, Ano po ba ang mawawala sa inyo
kung ibigay nyo sa amin ang kapayapaan?
Sana, lahat tayo, ay magkaroon ng pagkakataong marinig sila. Listen.
Hear. And so as I end my message, I appeal to everyone, to please, just
44
listen and let us allow ourselves to absorb what each is saying, without
the need to urgently respond or ask, just allow our words to sink in until
it reaches our hearts.
And this time, instead of just hearing ourselves, may I ask each one of
us to listen, to these people, men, women and children of Maguindanao,
displaced by the recent conflict in their homeland. Sana po, sila, hindi
kaming mga politiko o ang mga rebolusyonaryo ang maalala natin sa tuwing
pinag-uusapan ang Kapayapaan para sa Bangsamoro.
Framers of the 1987 Constitution

Support Bangsamoro
PREAMBLE: In a first formal meeting since the drafting of the 1987
Charter, former members of the Constitutional Commission forged a
consensus on the issue of Bangsamoro. Representing the unanimous sentiment
of fourteen of the eighteen surviving members of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission (four of us are either bedridden or could not be reached) out
of the original forty eight, this Statement on the Bangsamoro deals with
the vision, spirit, and the core principles behind the provisions on
autonomous regions which to our mind constitute the essential
constitutionality of the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law.
I. Our Position
The importance of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region to the

future of our country is unprecedented both as an unfulfilled promise
and as a model of equitable autonomy.
We fully support the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous
Region.
We believe that a new organic law is necessary to fulfill the vision and
spirit that guided the constitutional provisions on autonomous regions
since RA 6734 and RA 9054 have clearly not gone far enough to give
life to the concept of autonomy for Muslim Mindanao as envisioned
by the Constitution.
We were aware in 1986 that we were imperfect instruments of the
sovereign will of our people But however imperfect our perceptions
then or our fading memories today, recurring questions on the
constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro
(CAB) and of the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) lead us to
offer our insights.
45
46
II. Bangsamoro is about the development of people, not about

the constitutionality of words
The core principle of the 1987 Constitution in mandating a special

status for the autonomous regions is the human development of the
people of Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Hence, the public
conversation should not be about semantics but about peopletheir
needs, their aspirations, their choicesand about empowering them
with the environment and institutional framework for social justice.
Social justice that calls for genuine social change is the central theme
of the 1987 Constitution; and here, it is broader in scope and intent
than in the 1973 and the 1935 Constitutions. An interpretation of any
relevant provision of the Constitution that results in war and abject
poverty would be contrary to its intention.
During the deliberations of the Commission, the testimony of an
old man from the Cordilleras is instructive on the real issue that should
be considered:
We asked government for a teacher, it did not give us one, we
asked for help to repair our road, it did not send us any, we
asked for a doctor, it did not send us one. Instead government
men came to build a dam and sent in the Philippine
constabulary and the army. Thiswe did not ask for.
It is a simple statement but one that has far-reaching implications on

public policythe people of the Cordilleras and of Muslim Mindanao
do not want war. They want human development, and they want to
be heard. And the government needs to listen. This is mandated by a
new provision in the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people and
their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels
of social, political, and economic decision-making.
The 2005 Philippine Human Development Report entitled Peace,
Human Security and Human Development validates the context and
vision of the Constitution. It discusses human development in all its
dimensions, with the following excerpts of the Report:
Framers of the 1987 Constitution Support Bangsamoro
47
Development is about people and about freedomfrom fear,

from want, from humiliation and prejudice. It is about the
security of real people and not of a state or a regime. It goes
beyond the material benefits of an end to armed conflict, and
care must be taken not to reduce it to a question of money or
of economics. Nor can we delimit the Muslim situation as a
Mindanao issue because it is a human development issue
that touches all Filipinos.
Its also about the non-monetary cost of displacement,
diaspora, and discrimination that lead to a breakdown
in the social cohesion of communities, and ultimately of
national solidarity. Rather than hardship alone, the sense
of deprivation, injustice, and indignity lie at the heart of
armed conflict. Often, not even the most abject conditions
by themselves cause grievances, much less revolutions. The
revolutionary argument is that deprivation and indignity can
be relieved, injustice remedied, and national cohesion achieved
only by pursuing resolutely some promised alternative. People
must perceive and be convinced that something higher and
better than their present condition is possible.
III. The larger context of the CAB and BBL
Human development is a noble end in itself. But the larger context

of the CAB and the proposed BBL is our failure to effectively address
the longest running insurgency and the development of our peoples,
especially those of Muslim Mindanao.
Excerpts from a paper sent to the Constitutional Commission in
1986 briefly describes that perspective:
Autonomy is an expression of the Bangsa Moros conviction
of its being a viable alternative to separation. The Bangsa
Moro is historically and culturally a distinct and separate
nation. and the political fusion with the Christian majority
is workable only under a framework of political autonomy
which shall allow the full flowering of the genius of Bangsa
Moro in the context of his Islamic culture.
48
The full flowering of the genius of a people is human development. And

it needs a place of its own because it is a basic human right.
Both sovereignty and property are premised on exclusion.
That leaves us with a problem. How do we reconcile our
needs and our borders?
If all human beings are free and equal, then each person is
entitled to belong somewhere and to obtain the things they
need to live and to be free. If people cannot obtain what
they need where they are, or if they have no place where
they are entitled to be, then our exclusion of them denies
their humanity.
The full flowering of Bangsamoro is assured if their leaders

from a long line of heroic resistance to colonization can believe that
Bangsamoro, with meaningful self-determination within the framework
of the Republic, has a future and they can help create that future.
IV. Social Justice under the 1987 Constitution
The flagship provision is Article XIII, Section 1 which states:

The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people
to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership,
use, and disposition of property and its increments.
While all the ramifications of social justice cannot be fully discussed,

the provision clearly decrees the removal of cultural inequities.
Social justice in the 1987 Constitution is not just about negative
rights to be protected such as civil and political rights in the United
States Constitution and in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Nor is it limited to equal opportunity. It is also about
49
affirmative action and the attainment of desirable social and economic

outcomes. It is about the development and the liberation of people.
Especially the poor and the indigenous peoples who are being left
behind because of an often undue focus on growth per se, on market
mechanisms which are never perfect and have no moral limits, and on
deference to the interests of the rich and the powerful in social legislation,
jurisprudence and program implementation.
V. Closing the gap between law and justice
International Law is not an iron law imposed by a supra-body above

all nations that disallows interpretations of words and language to fit
the diverse situations of individual nations.
We are not restricted from defining Bangsamoro as an integral and
permanent part of the Philippines, which is sui generis descriptive of
the historical fact that it is the homeland of Filipino citizens with
institutions of governance that conform with our Constitution. And our
decision, rooted in its own history, can become part of international
law upon its approval in a plebiscite of those affected by the creation
of Bangsamoro, and by its acceptance by the community of nations.
According to a learned justice of our Supreme Court, the whole
development of law is about closing the gap between law and justice,
Tracing the changing jurisprudence on human rights from the infamous
Dred Scott 1847 Supreme Court ruling that blacks are inferior to whites,
to the 1896 Plessy promulgation of separate but equal doctrine, and
to the 1954 Brown decision which finally closed the gap, he concludes:
Historically, the gaps between law and justice have been closed
either through force of arms or through force of reason. This
constant struggle to close the gaps through reason and the
legal processes may be tedious but this is the only way to avoid
a bloody closure of the gaps between law and justice. This is
the only guarantee to maintain peace in our land.
Reason tells us that a Bangsamoro Autonomous Region can close

the centuries-old gap between law and justice and that we are on the
cusp of a historic opportunity to make it happen.
50
The negotiations on a Bangsamoro peace agreement have dragged on

for seventeen years. The Aquino government committed itself to bring
the peace process to fruition and has earned the trust of the Bangsamoro
people that it will stay the course. We must bring about that fruition, not
because it is the will of one man, but because it is the shared vision of a nation.
The efforts and sincerity of both panels are demonstrated by the
broad consultations that were conducted, by the explicit requirement
in the BBL that the new organic law should be in conformance with
the Constitution, and the unequivocal statement that the Bangsamoro
territory shall remain part of the Philippines. A new organic law is the
second of a two-stage process mandated by Article X, Section 18 and is
the proper subject of the Supreme Court power of judicial review. The
CAB is equivalent to the first stage of that process.
VI. The price of peace
The story of how the Israel-Egypt Peace Agreement of 1978, despite

its acknowledged shortcomings, at least restored peace to their borders
that lasts to this day, exemplifies what ultimately counts in a peace
agreement:
After thirteen days of negotiations brokered by then President Jimmy
Carter of the United States, Israel Prime Minister Begin refused to sign
the Agreement already signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat,
primarily because it called for the return of certain annexed territories
to Egypt which he had said was nonnegotiable:
There was a stalemate. The three, by now tired and
emotionally drained, were about to depart without any
peace accord. As President Carter and Prime Minister Begin
were about to depart they remembered that they had earlier
agreed to sign photographs for each others families. They met
on the front porch of Prime Minister Begins cabin for the
signing. President Carter asked for the names of the children
to make the signing more personal and Prime Minister Begin
reciprocated. Then President Carter decided to show the
photographs of his grandchildren describing the personality
51
of each; Prime Minister Begin did likewise. As they looked

at the pictures, tears filled their eyes. What type of world
would their grandchildren grow up in? Prime Minister Begin
returned to his cabin and re-emerged after five minutes asking
to look at the peace proposal once again.
This is peace-making without borders and self-limiting mental models.

But there is always a price to pay for any worthy vision. Sadat was
assassinated by disgruntled elements of the military in 1981 but not
before he and Begin were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
VII. What our people want
The decision on the Bangsamoro will ultimately rest on what

the people want of our country. And what the deliberations and the
overwhelming vote in the plebiscite for the Constitution tell us is that
they dream of a free people in a democratic society where peace and justice
reign. It was clearly a vision borne of EDSAan extraordinary event in
our history because it was the coming together of ordinary people from
all walks of life to peacefully regain their freedom.
The challenge of the BBL presents to us another chance at national
incandescence. It is within our reach. Let us set aside partisan politics and
stop the urge to exhibit our ability to find nuances of legalism that can
delay, or worse, derail the process, feeding on the cynicism and playing
on the fears in the national psyche that are more reflex reaction than
reasoned response.
Former Speaker and Commissioner Laurel Jr. described the new
Constitution as the imprisonment of the past and the unfolding of the
future.
It has been twenty-seven years since it was approved by our people
but we are still living in the mass poverty, gross inequalities, and cultural
inequities of the past, and the promise of genuine social change has
not unfolded. There is no better way to demonstrate out commitment
to peace and development than by giving the Bangsamoro people the
opportunity to create a higher and better future for themselves than
52
what they have. This calls for courageous statesmanship from our leaders
and the generosity of spirit of a united nation.
In turn, the challenge to the Bangsamoro people is to demonstrate
the same commitment by treating other indigenous peoples and uniting
other Muslim communities with magnanimity and statesmanship. In this
manner, Bangsamoro can be a model for us to do the same for the rest of
the country and thereby build together a more just and peaceful nation.
Those who are bedridden or could not be reached: Ponciano L. Bennagen, Teresa F. Nieva,
Florenz D. Regalado, and Napoleon G. Rama (4).
In memoriam of those who are no longer with us: Cecilia Munoz-Palma, Yusup R. Abubakar,
Ahmad Domocao Alonto, Jose F. S. Bengzon Jr., Lino O. Brocka, Jose D. Calderon, Crispino
M. de Castro, Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jose C. Colayco, Roberto R. Concepcion, Vicente
B. Foz, Serafin V. C. Guingona, Alberto M. K. Jamir, Jose B. Laurel Jr.. Eulogio R. Lerum,
Regalado E. Maambong, Teodulo C. Natividad, Jose N. Nolledo, Ambrosio B. Padilla, Blas
F. Ople, Minda Luz M. Quesada, Cirilo A. Rigos, Francisco A. Rodrigo, Decoroso R. Rosales,
Jose E. Suarez, Lorenzo M. Sumulong, Christine O. Tan, Gregorio Tingson, Efren B. Trenas,
and Lugum I. Uka (30).
53
Notes
1. RCC, Volume III, August 11, 1986, page 172.
2. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall
not be abridged. (Article XIII, Section 16).
3. RCC, Volume III, August 11, 1986, page 184.
4. Titles of Nobility: Poverty, Immigration and Property in a Free and Democratic
Society, by Joseph William Singer. Journal of Law, Property, and Society (August
2014).
5. Excerpts from a speech of Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio during the
regional convention of Mindanao lawyers on November 20, 2007.
6. 13 Days in September by Lawrence Wright (2014).
7. Preaching to a Postmodern World: A Guide to Reaching Twenty-First Century Listeners
by Graham Johnston (pages 14344) which cites President Carters Keeping Faith
as the source.
Appendix
11

Common Myths on the BBL
Debunking lies. Just factual.
MYTH # 1
That the Bangsamoro will be an independent state separate from the
Philippines, with its inhabitants having a citizenship different from the rest
of the Filipinos.
FACT
The Bangsamoro will not be an independent state. It will
be an autonomous region that will replace the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The Bangsamoro will
remain part of the territory of the Republic of the Philippines
and its inhabitants are Filipino citizens.
Article III, Section 1 of the BBL (HB 4994/ SB 2408) provides
that, Territory refers to the land mass as well as the maritime,
terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain
above it. The Bangsamoro territory shall remain a part of the
Philippine.
Box 1. Creating the Bangsamoro is provided for in the Constitution

There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the Framework
of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity
of the Republic of the Philippines.
Article X, Section 15, 1987 Constitution
57
58
MYTH # 2
That the Bangsamoro identity is imposed on all inhabitants in the
Bangsamoro areas irrespective of their socio-cultural and religious affinity
and ancestry.
FACT
The proposed BBL provides that those who at the time
of conquest and colonization were considered natives or
original inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago
and its adjacent islands including Palawan, and their
descendants, whether of mixed or of full blood, shall have
the right to identify themselves as Bangsamoro by ascription
or self-ascription. Spouses and their descendants are
classified as Bangsamoro.
This means that a person has to claim himself or herself as
Bangsamoro. The Bangsamoro identity is not being imposed
on anyone.
The proposed BBL also expressly states that the freedom
of choice of other indigenous peoples shall be respected.
See Article II, Sections 1-2 of the BBL (HB 4994/SB 2408).
59
Appendix
MYTH # 3
That inclusion in the proposed Bangsamoro entity requires only a local
government unit (LGU) resolution or petition of 10 percent of the registered
voters in the area.
FACT
The LGU resolution or the petition of 10 percent of qualified
voters will only be for purposes of being included in the
plebiscite. A favorable vote (i.e., majority of votes cast in a
plebiscite) is still needed for an LGU to be included in the
Bangsamoro territory upon its creation.
Other areas who may wish to join the Bangsamoro
autonomous region after its creation need:
a. to be contiguous to the region;
b. a petition to hold a plebiscite for inclusion signed by at
least 10 percent of the registered votes in the area; and
c. a plebiscite where majority of the votes cast in the area
and its mother LGU favor inclusion.
The consent of the political unit/s directly affected, which
is required by the 1987 Constitution and Local Government
Code (R.A. 7160), will apply to the LGUs outside of the
Bangsamoro.
60
Box 2. What comprises the proposed Bangsamoro territory?

The core territory of the Bangsamoro shall be composed of (see Article III,
Section 2; Article XV, BBL):
a. The present geographical area of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao which includes five (5) provinces (Basilan, Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi), and two (2) component cities (Marawi
and Lamitan).;
b. Areas that voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite:
i. 6 municipalities of Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and
Tangkal in the province of Lanao del Norte
ii. 39 barangays in the Municipalities of Kabacan, Carmen, Aleosan,
Pigkawayan, Pikit and Midsayap in the province of North Cotabato
(see table below):
Barangays
No. of brgys
Aleosan
Municipality
Dunguan, Lower Mingading, Tapodoc
Carmen
Nasapian, Manarapan
Kabacan
Nanga-an, Sanggadong, Simbuhay
Midsayap
Damatulan, Kadigasan, Kadingilan,

Kapinpilan, Kudarangan, Central
Labas, Malingao, Mudseng,
Nabalawag, Olandang,
Sambulawan, Tugal
12
Balacayon, Buricain, Datu Binasing,

Kadilingan, Lower Baguer, Lower
Pangangkalan, Matilac, Patot
Bagoanguid (Bagoinged), Balatican,

Balong, Balungis, Batulawan,
Buliok, Gokoton (Gokotan),
Kabasalan, Lagunde, Macabual,
Macasendeg
11
Pigkawayan
Pikit
c. the cities of Cotabato and Isabela; and

d. all other contiguous areas where there is resolution of the local government
unit or a petition of at least ten percent (10%) of the registered voters in
the area asking for their inclusion at least two months prior to the conduct
of the ratification of the Bangsamoro Basic Law and the process of
delimitation of the Bangsamoro.
In order to ensure the widest acceptability of the Bangsamoro Basic Law in
the core areas abovementioned, a popular ratification shall be conducted
among all the Bangsamoro within the areas for their adoption.
Figure 2. The areas in green refer to the prospective Bangsamoro political entity. (Map courtesy of OPAPP)
Appendix
61
"
Figure 1. The areas in dark green are the thirty-nine barangays in the municipalities of Kabacan, Carmen, Aleosan, Pigkawayan, Pikit, and
Midsayap that voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite.
"
62
63
Appendix
MYTH # 4
That the Bangsamoro will be an Islamic state where Shariah law will be
applied to all of its inhabitants, Moros, Christians, and Lumads alike.
FACT
First, there is nowhere in the proposed BBL that an Islamic
State is mentioned, even more so to be established.
Second, the justice system in the Bangsamoro shall consist of
(1) Shariah law which shall have supremacy and application
over Muslims only; (2) the traditional or tribal justice system
for the indigenous peoples in the Bangsamoro; (3) the local
courts; and (4) alternative dispute resolution systems.
It is clear that Shariah law and the recourse to Shariah
courts apply to Muslims only.
Box 3. Justice system in the Bangsamoro
The proposed BBL (HB 4994/SB 2408) provides that the administration
of justice is a concurrent power between the Central Government and
the Bangsamoro Government:
Administration of justice shall be in accordance with the relevant
provisions of this Basic Law and with due regard to the powers of the
Supreme Court and the competence of the Bangsamoro Government
over Shariah courts and the Shariah justice system in the Bangsamoro.
The supremacy of Shariah and its application shall only be to Muslims.
Article V, Section 2, para. 11, BBL (HB 4994/SB 2408)
The proposed BBL also provides for a plurality of justice system in the
Bangsamoro:
The justice system in the Bangsamoro shall consist of Shariah law

which shall have supremacy and application over Muslims only; the
traditional or tribal justice system, for the indigenous peoples in the
Bangsamoro; the local courts; and alternative dispute resolution
systems.
For Muslims, the justice system in the Bangsamoro shall give primary
consideration to Shariah, and customary rights and traditions of the
indigenous peoples in the Bangsamoro.
Nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of nonMuslims and non-indigenous peoples.
Article X, Section 1, BBL (HB 4994/ SB 2408)
64
MYTH # 5
That the Bangsamoro will have its own armed forces, foreign policy, and
currency.
FACT
It is clearly stated in the proposed BBL that defense and
external security, foreign policy, coinage and monetary
policy, among others, are reserved powers of the Central
Government. Therefore, the Bangsamoro will not have its
own armed forces, foreign policy, and currency.
See Article V, Section 1 of the BBL.
MYTH # 6
That the Bangsamoro Government will receive an initial funding of about
PHP7075 billion on its first year of operation.
FACT
The amount that will go directly to the Bangsamoro
Government for the first year is as follows:
a. PHP 1 Billion transition fund which will go to the
Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) to enable it to
carry out the requirements of transition from ARMM to
the Bangsamoro (see Article XVI, Section 13, BBL);
b. PHP 7 Billion as Special Development Fund for purposes
of rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development (see
Article XIV, Section 2, BBL); and
c. The Annual Block Grant which will be approximately
PHP 27 billion Block Grant based on the formula in the
proposed BBL (Article XII, Sections 15-20, BBL).
65
Appendix
The formula is 4 percent of 60 percent (or 2.4%) of the

National Interval Revenue collections three years prior to
the current year. This means that the Annual Block Grant for
2016 will be based on the national internal revenue collection
for 2013 which is estimated to be PHP 1.1 trillion.
The LGUs in the Bangsamoro will continue to receive their
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) just like the other LGUs
in the country. The salaries of public school teachers and
other public servants under it shall be shouldered by the
Bangsamoro Government.
Box 4. Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA)

The BTA refers to the interim government or the
governing body in the Bangsamoro during the transition
period that shall exercise executive and legislative
functions for this purpose. It will be composed of
fifty members, all of whom shall be appointed by the
President. Non-Moro indigenous communities, women,
settler communities, and other sectors shall have representatives in the BTA.
The BTA is also MILFled (Art. XVI, Sec. 24, BBL).
Box 5. Computing the Annual Block Grant
The net national internal revenue collection of the Bureau of Internal

Revenue is understood to be the sum of all internal revenue tax collections
during the base year less the amount released during the same year for
tax refunds, payments for informers reward, and any portion of internal
revenue tax collections which are presently set aside, or hereafter
earmarked under special laws for payment to third persons (Art. XII, Sec.
16, BBL).
66
(contd) Box 5. Computing the Annual Block Grant

The computation shall be based on collections from the third fiscal year
preceding the current fiscal year (Art. XII, Sec. 16, BBL).
The formula shall be adjusted if, after the effectivity of the BBL, there
occurs a change in the total land area of the Bangsamoro (Art. XII, Sec.
16, BBL).
Figure 3. Government Spending in the ARMM/Bangsamoro

(in Billions of Pesos)
1.
2.
2015
Actual
2016
Projected
Existing in the ARMM

a.
Subsidy to the ARMM in the General

Appropriations Act
24.3
27.0
(Block Grant)
b.
IRA of Local Government Units in the

ARMM
18.0
20.0
c.
Spending of National Government

Agencies in the ARMM (PNP, CCT,
DPWH, and other agencies)
Will continue to be budgeted and

spent by National Agencies as these
have not been devolved.
Incremental Spending in the Proposed BBL

a.
Special Development Fund for the

Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and
Development
b.
BTA Transition Fund
c.
Normalization Fund in Different

Line Agencies (DA, DepEd, TESDA,
PhilHealth, DOH, CHED, and DSWD)
for ex-combatants
7.0
1.0
3.0
4.0
Notes:
a. From 2017 to 2021, the Special Development Fund is Php 2 Billion per year.
b. BTA Transition Fund is only allotted for 2016.
c. Normalization fund consists of programs to assist the return to normal life of ex-combatants
Source: General Appropriation Act 2015, draft BBL (HB 4994/SB2408)
67
Appendix
MYTH # 7
That only Bangsamoros will be allowed to exploit, develop, and utilize
natural and other aquatic resources found in the Bangsamoro Waters and
Zones of Joint Cooperation (ZJC).
FACT
Bangsamoro Waters are part of the territorial waters of the
Philippines and are for the benefit of all Filipinos.
Preferential rights for local fishers are subject to regulation
by the Bangsamoro Government and the respective LGUs
with respect to their municipal waters.
The Zones of Joint Cooperation (ZJC) in the Sulu Sea and
the Moro Gulf outside of the Bangsamoro Waters are not part
of the Bangsamoros jurisdiction. It is only established for:
a. The protection of the traditional fishing grounds,
b. Benefitting from the resources, and
c. Interconnectivity of the islands and the mainland parts
of a cohesive Bangsamoro political entity.
The ZJC remain available to all Filipino citizens but the
preferential rights of the Bangsamoro people, other
indigenous peoples in the adjoining provinces, and resident
fishers in the Bangsamoro over fishery, aquamarine, and
other living resources in the ZJC shall be respected.
Figure 4. Indicative map of the Bangsamoro Waters and Zones of Joint Cooperation. The ZJC covers areas in Sulu Sea and Moro Gulf outside
the Bangsamoro Waters which shall extend up to 12 nautical miles or 22.224 km from low-water mark. (Map courtesy of OPAPP)
68
69
Appendix
MYTH # 8
That the proposed parliamentary form of government in the Bangsamoro
is unconstitutional.
FACT:
The parliamentary form of government in the Bangsamoro
is possible under the Constitution.
The Constitution does not prescribe a particular form
of government for autonomous regions. It only provides
that the organic act shall define the basic structure of
government for the region consisting of the executive
department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be
elective and representative of the constituent political units
(Article X, Section 18).
A parliamentary form of government satisfies these
conditions. The legislative authority shall fall on the
Bangsamoro Parliament composed of party representatives,
district representatives, and reserved seats and sectoral
representatives, to be chosen by the voters in the
Bangsamoro. The head of the government, the Chief Minister,
shall be elected by a majority vote of the Bangsamoro
Parliament from among its members. The Chief Minister is
thus an elected official.
70
71
Appendix
Figure 5. Proposed composition of the

Bangsamoro Parliament.
72
MYTH # 9
That the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) will automatically replace the
police in the Bangsamoro areas (former ARMM) and that the Bangsamoro
Police will be independent from the Philippine National Police (PNP).
FACT
The proposed BBL neither provides for automatic absorption
or replacement of existing PNP officers and personnel by
MILF combatants, nor does it put forward the establishment
of a police force independent from the PNP. Under the
proposed BBL, the Bangsamoro Police shall be primarily
responsible for law enforcement and maintenance of peace
and order in the Bangsamoro, and it shall be part of the
Philippine National Police (see Article XI on Public Order
and Safety).
Box 6. What is the Bangsamoro Police?

The Bangsamoro police force shall be a regional unit
of the Philippine National Police. All regions have the
same such regional commands, including the ARMM
today.
All police officers, from regional director down to
the municipal police, shall come from the PNP. The
MILF combatants will not become the police force
for the Bangsamoro, unless they apply and qualify
as individuals.

Under the PNP Law (RA 6975 of 1990, as amended by RA 8551 in 1998),
local executives have operational control over the Police, and certain
disciplinary powers. That the proposed BBL gives the same powers to
the chief executive of the Bangsamoro Government is nothing new.

The Bangsamoro Police will be under the command and direction of
the PNP Chief and the administrative control and supervision of the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).

The Bangsamoro Police shall be professional, civilian in character,
regional in scope, effective and efficient in law enforcement, fair and
impartial, free from partisan political control, and accountable under the
law for its actions. It shall be responsible both to the Central Government
and the Bangsamoro Government, and to the communities it serves
(Art. XI, Sec. 2).
73
Appendix
MYTH # 10
That the absence of a provision in the BBL on the disarmament of the MILF
proves that the negotiation was flawed.
FACT
The Annex on Normalization of the Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsmoro includes, among others,
the commitment of the MILF to decommission its forces
and weapons, working side-by-side with the Independent
Decommissioning Body.
The first phase or the ceremonial turn-over of high-powered
and crew-served weapons of the MILF will occur even prior
to the passage of the law. By the time the Bangsamoro
Government is fully established, the full decommissioning
of the MILF should have been accomplished. The process
would be accompanied by the disbandment of private
armed groups (PAGs) and other lawless elements, the
socioeconomic upliftment of previously conflict-afflicted
communities, and various confidence-building measures
See Annex on Normalization and Program for Normalization.
Box 7. What is Normalization in the GPH-MILF peace process?

Normalization will simultaneously happen alongside the roadmap towards
establishing the Bangsmoro.
Normalization is process whereby communities can achieve their desired
quality of life, which includes the pursuit of sustainable livelihood and
political participation within a peaceful deliberative society.
Normalization aims to ensure human security in the Bangsamoro and build
a society that is committed to basic human rights where individuals are
free from fear of violence or crime.
Source: Annex on Normalization (signed by the GPH and MILF Peace Panels on 25 January 2015 in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia)
74
Figure 6. The different components and aspects of implementing the normalization process.
Appendix
75
76
MYTH # 11
That the Government of the Philippines (GPH) should not be negotiating
with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) because it does not represent
the sentiments of the Muslim Filipinos.
FACT
The GPH negotiates with armed groups that are committed
to providing pragmatic solutions in building peace in conflictaffected Muslim Mindanao. The MILF is by far and currently
the largest revolutionary organization. When the peace talks
resumed in 2011 under the administration of Pres. Aquino III,
following the all-out-war under Pres. Estrada in 2000 and the
MOA-AD debacle under Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo in 2008,
the GPH and the MILF restarted the peace talks with the aim
of finding lasting solution for peace in Mindanao.
Although the MILF acts as a principal party in the
Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), the
proposed BBL does not represent alone the interests of the
MILF as an organization. Rather, the proposed BBL aims to
address the Moros grievances for social justice and selfdetermination, acknowledging these sentiments and bringing
in solutions to address the Moro struggle with the end view
of resolving economic and political marginalization. At the
same time it protects the welfare and interests of all Filipino
citizen-residents in the prospective Bangsamoro.
The BBL, which brings into legislative process the ideals
and commitments espoused in the CAB signed on 27
March 2014, was crafted by the fifteen member-Bangsmoro
Transition Commission (BTC) representing the diverse
perspectives of Moros, Christians, and lumads in Muslim
Mindanao.
Both the CAB and the draft BBL were informed by hundreds
of consultations which include a variety of activities and
meetings for small audiences, workshops and public fora.
These were conducted separately and jointly by the GPH
and MILF Peace Panels, as well as by various civil society
groups and other stakeholders.
Appendix
77
From 2010 until March 2015, the GPH Peace Panel
has conducted 511 public consultations with different
stakeholders such as the academe, civil society organizations
(CSOs), business sector, religious groups, media, government
agencies, local government units (LGUs), military, police, and
the diplomatic community, among others.

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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law