REPORT ON THE ARl\fY.

"'..;..~) ~V'''f~";,.,~;:;,~
. :';-:st-;":I~~ ;:'";'"" ;';i\".
. July 1, 1939

June 30, 1943

, .,
I ","
f"'"~'~:::Wh ," '. ~.;~;
,'1
I

}{EPORTONT-HE
I .
i ,ARMY
JuLy ~"I939 to Jun~ 30, I943

BIENNIAL REPORTS OF

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

.
Chief of StafJ of the United States
to
Army
.

The Secretary ot War

Morris s';"ett library I usAFAS

'PropertY. of U.S. Army.

WASHINGTON

THE INFANTRY JOURNAL

. 1943
 CONTENTS

PART ONE: BIENNIAL REPORT COVERING

JULY 1, ,1939, TO JUNE 30, 1941

TIlE FIRST PHASE . - 12

STATE OF THE ARMED FORf:ES JULY 1, 1939 . 12
THE PRESIDENT'S EMERGENCY PROCLAMATION,
SEPTEMBER 8, 1939 _ 13
THE SECOND PHASE . 17
THE PRESIDEN-T'S l\IESSAGES, l\IAY 16 AND MAY 31~
1940 . . _. . . . 17
PROGRESS DURING THE \VINTER OF 194-41 23
SPECIAL PROBLE1VIS INCIDENT TO THE EXPANSION 24
REORGANIZATION OF COMMAND AND STAFF. 27
STATE OF THE ARMED FORCES JULY 1, 1941 29
RECOM~{ENDATIONS FOR THE EUl\HNATION OF CER-
1
TAIN LEGAL LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS 3
6
GENERAI~ COMMENTS 3
39
ORGANIZATION .
. . . 42
. . . . .
ARMORED FORCE
44
TRAINING
PERSONNEL
.. -
51
51
Regular Army 53
Regular Army Reserve . . . _. 53
Enlisted Reserve. 53
Selective Service
54
CONSTRUCTION AND HOUSING
ARAfAAIENT AND EQUIPAGE 57
NATIONAL GUARD 63
ORGANIZED RESERVES . 67
UNITED STATES AlILITARY ACADE1H~ 69
RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS 7
 CONGLUSI01V . ,

ORGANIZATION
LOGISTICS'
TRAINING
AIR FORCES
, .
PLANNING

PART THREE: NOTES

1. BATTLE :MANEUVERS REALISTIC

165
2. ORGANIZATION GEARED TO REQUIREMENTS, 165
3. AMERICAN-AuSTRALIAN COOPERATION . 166
4.
5.
OVERSEAS
REVERSE
UNITS
LEND-LEASE
FULLY EQUIPPED
, . 166
166
6. V0LUME .OFSHIPP1NG 'REQUIRED
167
7. CLOSE COOPERATION BY BRAZIL 168
8. ALASKA l\fILITARY HIGHWAY
16~
9. UNITY, OF COMMAND
169
10. JAPANESE 1\;fISCALCULATIONS
171
1L NUCLEI
12. AIRBORNE
OF PACIFIC
MOVE:MENT
AIR FORCE
OF TROOPS
. , 171
.171
13. lVIoVES AGAINST JAPAN. PLANNED
171
14. BOMBER ATTACKS EFFECTIVE
172
15. J}..MERICAN-BRITISH CONFERENCES
172

I
)6. GOVERNMENT OF OCCUPIED AREAS
173
17. ARMS SUPPLIED TO FRENCH
174
)8. CASABLANCA CQNFERENCE '
175
/
) 9. '''' ASHINGTON CONFERENCE
175
20. CIVILIANS AID FIGHTING UNITS
176
21. l\fIDDLE EAST 'CONSTRUCTION CURTAILED ..
I .
176
22. PACIFIC OPERATIONS PLANNED
177
'23 .. AID TO, RUSSIA 1.. ..,
, I
24. ''''OMEN'S ARMY AUXILIARY CORPS
177
25. OFFICER PROGRAM
179
26. CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM 182
27. PUBLIC RELATIONS 185
28~ HEALTI.I IN THE ARMY , 187
29. ORGANIZED LEISURE TIME 'ACTIVITIES 188
3. EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM EXPANDED 191
1 .3 1. TRAINING
191
li
\

J
j

3
 PART ONE

,BIENNIAL REPORT
, i
of the
Chief of Staff of the United States Army
-July I" I939" to June 3D} I94I
to
The Secretary of War

" \
 BIENNIAL REPORT OFI
GENERAL GEORGE C. l\fARSHALL
Chief of Staff of the United States ArnJ,y

July I~ I939~ to -June 30) I94I

,\ to /

The Secretary of War

. Dear Afr. Secretary:

'Vith the Nation in a state of unli1nited e1ner-

. gency, the undersigned submits the att:ched
. rep.?rt covering the period from his assign111entas
Cluef of Staff on September 1, 1939 to] uly f, 1941._
In reviewing the events of the past two years,
. the extent of this nation's military. preparation
luay roughly be divided into two distinct phases,
ea-ch coincident with decisive events in the Euro-
pe'an war. The first phase, conllnencing with the
beginning of the current conflict' and extending
until the late spring 6f i 940, ,vas a period of un-
certainty as to its influence on the United States.
The General Staff, aware of the possibilities of the'
situation, particularly with regard' to the time fac-
tor, directed Its attention to the urgency of creating .
and equipping an army capable of operating under
; the exacting conditions of modern warfare. Upon
' lOr ' .. (I 939- I 94 I)

I'. .' .
~~==..,-
 the part of the 'Ameri~an people this period was
Iuarked .by a slow awakening to the necessity of
augmenting our armed forces. _
In a democracy such as ours the vVar Depart-
ment is lilnited'in its action by the appropriations
approved by the President and provided by. the
Congress. These agencies are in turn motivated
by tne will of the people. Consequently the out-
standing. characteristic of the first phase was. an
increasing interest in national defense, but an in-
terest still irisufficient to prevent reductions in
Inilitary appropriations which the War Depart-.
ment had requested as necessary ~o' carry oJ1t
certain objectives. This phase terminated with.
the decIsive sllccesses of the Gennan Army in
\Vestern Europe in May, 1940. .
The second phase, which covers approxim~tely .
the fiscal year 1941, was marked by a growing
national consciousness of the seriousness of the
international situation, and by the ready appro- '
,priation of billions of dollars for national defense.
It witnessed the peacetime mobilization of a citizen
anny upon a wartilne scale, and the establishment
of scores of great military cainps in large training
areas. It required the reorientation of national .
industry to an unprecedented peacetime produc- .
tion rate .. It involved, in effect, a great experiment
i.n denl0cracy, a test of the ability of a government'
such as ours' to prepare itself in time of peace
,against the ruthless and arbitrary action of other
governments whose leaders take such measures as
they see fit, and strike -\vhen and where they will
with sudden and terrific violence.
(I939-I94I) . 11

,
 i
THE FIRST PHASE ~
STATE OF'THE ARM'ED FORCES JULY', '939 J
THE UNDERSIGNED became Acting Chief of Staff
on July I, 1939 and Chief of Staff, September I, ~
. 1939. On July 1 the active Army of the United
States consisted of approximately i74,000 en~isted "
men' scattered over 130 posts, camps and stations.~
A schematic view of the organization of the active~
anny at this time is given by Chart I. * .
; \Vithin the United States we had no field army. 1
There existed the mere .framework of about three ~
an.d one-half .square divisions approximately fifty
per cent complete as to personnel and scattered
alnong a number bf army posts. There was such,
a shortage in motor transportation that divisional
I

~ training was i!J1practicable. There were virtually'

no corps troops, almost no army' troops or G H Q
special troop units, which are necessary for the
functioning of the larger tactical units. The Air'
Corps consisted of but sixty-two tactical squadrons.
The funds which were authorized for training
were less than five per cent of the annual "Var
pepart~ent app~opriations. As an army we were
Ine~ectlve. Our equipment, 11lodern at the con-
ChlSIOn of the \Vorld War, was now, in a large I

11leasure, obsolescent. In fact, during the post-

. 'war period, continuous paring of appropriation~
t had reduced the Army virtually to the status' of
i that of a third-rate power. . , .
I
.\
'j
':
, 'In February 1939, while Deputy Chief of Sta~,~
All" <harts and maps are in the back of this book. Maps begin,
on page J 99; charts on page 210.' . 8

II 12 , (I 9 J9- I 94 ~)

t ...
 'my statement to the Senate 'MilitaryAffairs Com- "
mittee included this summary of the situation"
that it was of vital importance that we have mod-
,ern equipment for the Regular Army and National
Guard; that: we modernize our artillery; that',ve
replace our 34-yea~-0Id rifles with more modern,
weapons; that we have the antitank and antiair- I

craft materiel, in the actual hands of the troops;

that we have the necessary reserves of ammuni-
ti0l!; and that these matters be emphatically re-
garded as fundamental to the entire proposition'
()f ,national defense. During the post-war period
th'e ..encouraging moves in-national defense prepa-
rations had been the augmentation of the Air.
Corps to an authorized 5500 plane program, in-. _
cluding an il).crease on July 1, 1939, of the,_
strength of the Army from 174,000 to 210,000 '.
men, and an appropriation of $1 16,000,000 for
materiel and 'seacoast defenses. The increase in
man power 'was entirely devoted to the garrison:
in Pan~ma and to the increase C?fthe Air Corps.
THE PRESIDENT'SEMERGENCYPROCLAMATION.
SEPTEMBER8, 1939 . ,
At the outbreak of the European war ~he Presi-
dent issued a limited emergency proclamation in
w~.i~h he auth~rized an expansion of the aet~ve
army from 210,000 to 227,000 men,. and an In-
crease of the National Guard to 235,000 men.
The War Departm~nt' .was also authorized to
create certain deficiencies including the purchase ,
of approximately twelve million dollars worth of.
motor .transportation. This - small increase of
(I939-I94z) 13.

z.. -.i.;.._...;._~....;.
 17,000 n1en to the Regul~r Anny permitted the"
reorganization of our pathetically incoI11plete.
square divisions' into five new type triangular ~
'divisions, and also permitted the assembly of those .
divisions, along with other units, in the field for ~
the winter .. It enabled us to establish the peace'1
compielnent of corps troops for one army corps.
The limited emergency permitted the number of
armory drills of the National Guard to be in-
creased froln 48 to 60 per year' and an additional
week of field training to be conducted that' fall
. suppleIUentary to the two weeks of summer can1p
and to provide for the training of the recentlyte-
. cruited men.
The urgent necessity for Army maneuvers- in-
Volving large units was manifest. For the past
five years field training had been limited to the
assernbly of the four paper' organizations, called'.,
field annies, once every four years, and then only
for a two-week period, of which about five days
could be devoted to very limited action due to
lack of Inotor transportation and the unseasoned
,state of the National Guard personnel. This sys-
ten1,.together with a general lack of corps troops,
heavy artillery, engineers, medical regiments, sig-
nal _battalionS',quartermaster truck trains, and a
complete lack of corps headquarters and experi~
ence.d high~.r commanders, made it virtually im-
pOSSIble for the mobile combat troops of the
~{e&"ular Army to be prepared as an immediately
a~aIlable COlllbatforce, experienced in the tech-
. ~Ique of l~rge-scale,field operations. It w<;Ls
essen-
tIal that the. higher commanders and staffs' be
14 (:I939-I94I )
I
!.
 , .

given opp'ortunities for training in the technique~

tactics -and teamwork involved; that the troops be
accustomed 'to operating in large gro~ps.The
authorized deficiencies and later appropriations
for this purpose permitted the assembly in the
late spring of 1940, some 70,000 Regular Army
troops for the first genuine corps and army
maneuvers in the history of this nation.
The organization of the Army on January 31,
1940, as a result of these changes, may be seen
by referring to Chart 2. ".
During this p'eriod the war in Europe was in a
quiescent 'state. Poland had been conquered 1?ut.
the ~i~uation in Western Europe was to all i!1tents
stabIlIzed. There was a feeling my many that the
field fortifications established in France and Bel- ~
gium furnished ample' security to those n'atioris.
Requests for further increases in the armed forces
of the United "States were regarded in many quar-
ters:as mere war mongering. On February 23,194,'
I stated to the Appropriations Committee of th,e,
I House of Representatives that if Europe blazed in
the late spring or summer we must put" our house
in order before the sparks reached the Western
Hemisphere~ Ie was urged that definite mea'sures
should be taken step by step to prepare the nation
against the possibility of chaotic world conditions.
Opposed to plunging into a'sudden expansion of
personnel in s~ch a manner that oursmall nucleus
of trained troops would be fatally diluted, but yef
conscious of the importance of the time factor,
the General Staff was equally opposed to the policy
of waiting until. the last moment and then attempt~
(I939-I94I) 15

z
 ing tl~e impossible. With respect to the time fac'
,1:'

tor, a grave feature was the matter of critical muni- "

tions' which required a long time to produce, and ,'Ii

it was felt that there could be no longer delay in "

obtaining the deficiencies in equipment .for the ,
initial issue to the Regular Army and the National I'.,
,'Guard. The Army was almost completely lack-
.ing in clothing for prospective increases of the
Regular Army or the National Guard from a small ~
peace strength organization status to full strength.
The,fundamental obstacle .at the time was the fact.
that the American people were unable to visualize
the dangerous possibilities of the'situation. For
example, as late as March of 1940 War Depart-
Inent estimates for a small number of replace-
lUent airplanes were cut by the House to 57
planes. An estimate of $12,000,000 for the devel-
, 0pIUent of a defensive force in Alaska1vas refused.'
During rv1ayand June of 1940 the German
, avalanche completely upset the equilibri~nn'of the
European continent. Franc'e was eliminated as a
' world power and the British Army lost luost of
.its heavy equipment. To luany the invasion of'
Great Britain appeared'imminent. The precari-
Ousnessof the situation and its threat' to the secur-
ityof the United States became suddenly apparent
to OUf pe~ple, and the pendululu of public opinion
reverse~ Itself, swinging violently to the other ex-
trelue, In an urgent demand for enormous and
imluediate increases in nl0dern equipment and
of the armed forces. It was at this time that the
second phase of the period of the current enler-
gency commenced.
, . 16 {I939-I94I)
 'THE ,SECOND PHASE
THE PRESIDENT'Sl\fESSAGESOF i\JAY 16, ~ND
l\fAy'31, 1940,
ON MAY 16, 1940, in a special message to Congre~s,
the President recommended the appropriation of
approximately $1,000,000,000, of which $732,-
000,000 was forequiplnent and to increase t~e
Army by 28,000 men including 13,ooofor the Au
Corps. OnlVlay 31 in a second defense Inessage
to Congress the Pre'sident recommended an addi-
tional appropriation of approximately $1,000,-
000,000., .,
Supplementary to the amounts reconlnlended
by the President in his messages of i\fay 16 and
May 31, two additions. made by cOlnmittees of
Congress were of inestimable assistance to the
War Department in carrying out its progranl. On
May 20, four days following the President's mes-
sage of May 16, the Senate Appropriations' Com.
mittee inserted into the bill under consideration
an additional appropriation of $50,000,0~0 fora,
further personnel increase of 25,000 men, bring-'
ing the Army to an authorized strength of 255,000
men. A few days following the President's mes-
sage of May 31" the House Appropriations' Com':
mittee added $322,000,000 to the bill under con-
sideration which permitted an increase in strength
of the Army of 95,000 lnen, bringing it to a total,
authorized strength 'of 375,000. Although these
,. SunlS of money and increases in personnel, which
the committees of Congress added, do not seem
espec~ally significant today in the light of the
(I939-I94I J, 17
 , hillions recentlYappn:lpriated', they enabled the
,War Department to take a preliminary step of .:,1
'I
vast importance to the great expansion soon to
come. 'Skeleton units' could he ,organized and
manufacturers started to work, 011" clothirig' and
equipment which had to be available by October.
It ,was largely for this reason that the induction
of the National Guard and the first of the selectees
was made possible.
Further authorizations included in the legisla-
tion at this'time consisted of a substantial increase
in the number of aircraft and funds for additional
,. pilot training together with the inclusion of civi-
lian schools to assist in this training; additional
'.money for field exercises, an increase in seacoast
. defenses, funds. for modernization of existing
planes, -'establishment of ordnance munitions
plants and the additional purchase of critical items
of equipment. The Air Corps was authorized to
be increased to 54 combat groups, and funds for
the organization of an armored force were in-
',cluded. The tangible influence of these events
on the organization of the Army is indicated in
Chart 3.
At this time Jhe President referred to the desir~
/ ability of authorizing him to call out the National
Guard. Although sadly lacking in mod~rn equip-,
ment and at less than 40% of its full strength, the
Guard represented one of the few organized, de-
fense assets, and its federalization therefore be-
came a matter of pressing importance. Another
significant development of, the phase' which we
were' entering Was the changing attitude' of our
18, ( I 939- I 94 I)
-\"

':1
 industrialists regarding their production capacities
and rates of deliveries with respect to airplane
engines and other itenis of heavy ordnance. As
th.e ~risis abroad developed, they grew increasingly
wIllIng to undertake production schedules that
had previously been regarded as out of the ques-
tion.
The expansion of the ArnlY during the SU111nler
of 1940 in general followed the long standing pro-
~ective mobilization plan, but the violent change
In the international situation as to the French
!)eet al?d the peril of England, necessitated an
1111nledlate reorientation regarding the Ineans at
?ur disposal. The possible loss of the British Navy
Introduced a new time factor for our defensive
preparations, and ilTIrnediately imposed an urgent
and trelnendous delnand for the manufacture of
tilne-conslulling critical iteiTISof equipluent.
In. 'weighing the problems of the tilTIe factor
. against the possibilities of the situation, two aspects
of the ..matter had to be considered. One related
to the.'possible dangers of the .situation within the
next SIXmonths. The other related to what should
be done over a period. of years. I t was considered
~hat for the tinle being the first issue was of dOln-
Illant ilnportance. Ordnance, anll11unition and
other critical itenls of equipment could not be
produced overnight, but the other requisite for
an arnled force, that is, personnel, was available
and could be conditioned, discipliped and trained
with the old vVorld vVar material available and
the materiel then under manufacture. It was not
believed that the Inen necessary to fonn an anny
(I 939- I 94 I). 'J 9
 of the size required to meet the contingencies of
the'situation could be ob~ained by voluntary en-
listment. The alternative was a selective service
system which would furnish sufficient personnel
to bring the National Guard and the Regular
Army to full streng~h in the shortest possible time,
and to do this in a controlled and therefore effi-
cient manner, in contrast to the piecemeal, un-
balanced basis of voluntary enlistments. It was
suggested by members of Congress that the Regu-
lar Army be tremendously increased. However,
this would have been a futile procedure unless
the necessary equipment could be made available,
and this could have been arranged only by sub-
verting the National Guard and making a funda-
mental change in the existing military policy of
the Government. The decision was made to call
the National Guard into the Federal service and
. utilize its personne\ and equipment with t.hat of
the Regular Army to. train the first contingent of
the thousands of men necessary for the defense
of the country. .
The federalization of the National Guard and
the speedy enactment of selective service legisla-
tion at once became matters of urgent importance
to the 'Var Department in the summer of 1940.
The original request for the federalization of the
National Guard occurred in l\lay with the purpose
of utilizing summer calnps while preparing
the cantonments for the' expanded artny, so that
when cold weather set in, the necessary semi-per- ..
manent preparations would have been completed
for the firstincrelnent and construction well under
20 (I939-I94I)
way for the relnainder. The delnocratic.processes
of legislation resulted in a prolonged debate on
these two measures, which continued throughout
the SUlnlner.
In my testinlony before the Senate Appropria-'
tions COlnmittee on August 5, the following state-
Inen ts were nlade:, '
"Shelter is a serious problem at the present mo-
ll1ent. \Ve thought that Congress would settle the
question of authority to order out the National
Guard, and the matter of cOl1lpulsory training by
the first of August. On that basis, the Guard ,vas to
be brought into the Federal service during Sep-.
tember and the first induction of Inen under the
Selective Service Act during October. \Vhat has
happened is that the ,veeks have been passing and
we have no authority to enter into contracts to
provide the additional shelter required.
"\Ve have been tryit1g to find SOIne' manner,
SOlne Ineans for getting startec;l. \Ne want to pro-
ceed in an orderly and businesslike manner. 'Ve
know exactly what we 'want to do and exactly
where we want to do it, but we have neither the
authority nor the funds and titne is fleeting. So far
c~s construction is concerned the winter is upon us,
because it requires froln 3 to 4 months to provide
proper shelteL vVe had hopes at first to gain time
by providing a progressive tnobilization of the
National Guard during the sunlnler. \Ve plannt::d
to ~'put troops in tent calnps, while better shelter
Was being prepared in the climates that delnand
-special protection against the winter. However,
weeks have CODleand have gone and we have been
(1939-1941) Morris Swett Library, USAF1\S
 urtable to. Inake a start. The present uncertainties"
make a businesslike procedure almost impossible.
We must make a start. toward getting water lines
laid; a'start on the sewage-disposal syStems; a start
on the te!!lporary roads and certainly the walks to
keep our people out of the mud; and we must get
under way the start of construction of temporary
h()spit'l.l facilities. These are fundalnental necessi-
ties and take time to develop."
One factor of assistance in this dilemma was the
$29,500,000 which the President authorized from
his emergency .fund on August 2, 1940. The avail-
.ability of this Sum permitted the initiation o~ con-
struction of basic utilities,. hospitals and ware-
houses in twelve National Guard camps and also
a divIsional cantonment at Fort Dix, New Jersey.
The problelns of funds were further compli-
cated by the concurrent consideration of author-.
ity to call the National Guard and Selective Serv-,
ice legislation. Authorization for the National
Guard to be called into Federal service was finally
given on August 27, 1940, but the $128,000,000
1
necessary for initial construction was not appI::O-
.J
priated until September 9. The" first Guard units
"were inducted on September 16, the same day that ,j
the Selective Service Act was signed by the Presi-
dent. Incidentally, the departlnent would have pre- l
ferred to delay these inductions for about a month J

91:at least for two weeks, in order to put the money

ir " just appropriated ~o work. This action was pre-
cluded by the advice that the announcement of
such plans would probably defeat the passage oC
the. Selective Service Act. 'l\foney for Selective
2
I' 2 ( I 939- I 94 I)

l j
 Service construction becalue available September
24:, as the leaves were beginning to fall.

PROGRESS DURI:'\G THE "\VrNTEI\ OF 1940-41

The expansion of our anned forces fronl 172,-

000 to approxiluately one and one-half Inillion
Ine"n in a relatively short tilne illlposed a tremen-
dous responsibility on the vVar Departnlent. A
basic requireluent was .the establisl1lllent of shel-
ter, hospital facilities and trainiilg areas in strategic'
and. favorable training localities throughout the
Uluted States. vVith winter upon us, the problems
of construction incident to unusually bad weather
-:-snow, rain and IHud-added further cOl1lplica-
t~ons. It was highly i111portant to provide recrea-
_ t!onal facilities and to nlake suitable provisions
for the spiritual ,velfare of our citizen soldiers.
T'he problenls of acquiring land were cOlnplicated
by the fact that in sOlne areas selected as canlp
si.tes, the local population viewed the projects with
dIsfavor. In other instances the War Department
Was bOlnbarded with requests fronl local business
bureaus and political delegations .. Errors were
made in the trenlendous prograln which the Anny
H~ldertook during the winter of 1'940-4 I, but
vIewed in the light, of the actual achievelHent, it
',vould appear that the task was creditably per-
lormecl.
The passage of the Selective Service Act in effect
authorized the Annyof the United States to con-
sist of 1,400,000 Inen, of which 500,000 were to be
in the Regular Anny, 270,000 in the National
Guard, and 63,000 selectee$. A graphical picture
( 1939- I 94 I) 23
 , of the active army on ] nne 30, 1941 ~ is indicated
; by Chart 4, and its tactical organization by Chart _
5.
SPECIAL PROBLEMS INCIDENT-TO THE EXPANSION

, ' The training of this large force required a tre-

:mendous broadening of our Regular Army activi-
ties. The continuous formation 'of training cadres,_
for new units or schools, resulted in a succession of
drafts on the rapidiy expanding Regular Army
units for -experienced officers _and noncommis-
sioned officers. This ,vas .a disheartening process
fOr the commanders concerned, air and ground,
who, while struggling to merge large increments of
untrained men into efficient combat teams, were
called upon time after_time to give' up their best
leaders -in all grades, and compelled by -circum,.
stances to drive ahead in their training ptogram
while developing new leaders and training new re- .
\ cn~its to replace the losses. The National Guar~
. unIts were spared this demoralizing process in or-
, der. to give them the fullest opportunity to perfect -
theIr organization. Profiting from events in the
European.wa'r, new organizations, new methods of ,
employment, and new types of equipment became
- a constant. matter of re-examination and experi-
ment. The tempo of the school system was rapidly
increased, and courses were -quickly established to
.graduate about 600 officers every five weeks. _
The procurement of suita~le officer personnel
- was fortunately solved by the fact that during the
lean, post-war years over 100,000 Reserve officers
h~d been continuously trained, largely. the prod-
24 (i939-I94I )
,1
1
J
 Uct of the Reserve Officers Training Corps. These
Reserve officers constituted the principal available
asset w'hich ,ve possessed at this time. Without,
thei: assistance the program could not have bee~:,.
carned out except in a superficial manner, as IS' .
evidenced by the fact that today they constitute
75% to go % of the officer strength with Regular
Arrny units. , .
For the induction of selectees"ve established
29 large reception centers throughout the. United
States, where thousands of men could be classified;
uniformed and routed to the replacement training
. ~enters where they would receive their basic train-
Ing. The locations and capacities of the reception
centers are indicated by Chart 6.
For the basic training of recruits, 2 I replace-
'inent training centers ,vere established .where each
~rm and service of the Army could give individual-
lZ.edbasic training in th~ fundamentals of a' sol-
dIer. Each .soldier entering- the Anny receives 13
weeks of basic training, after which he is assigned
to a tactical unit ready to participate in the tactical
training of those units. These establishnlents were
. c~nstructed and placed into operation during the
WInter and spring of 1940-41, despite seriously'ad-
verse ,veather conditions, bottlenecks of material,
and shortage of facilities. Their location and ca~
pacities are i'ndicated on Chart 7.
The establishment of these centers.marked our,
a:rrival at a normal method of maintaining an
. army, and yet they consti~uted' ~ fundamental de-
parture from past practices. No phase of the' de-
velopment of the present field army has been'sC?
( I 939- I 94 I) . f 25
 iratifyingand impressive as' the product of the'
,.training centers, both in quality of selectees and
in the amazing amount of instruction they have
absorbed in the short period of 13 weeks_.Froln
. now on our. regiments and divisions can steadily
advance with their combat -training, unburdened
by the necessity of training recruits or delaying
their work in order to conduct individual instruc-
,tion in weapons or silnilar matters. ,
' During the spring of 1941, the program of ex- .
'pansion continued. In March, further increases in
the ,Air Corps were 'authorized and plans under-
.~aken to train 30,000 pilots and 100,000 mechan-
ICS annually. Steps were taken 'towards the occu-
pation of the new bases in the Atlantic, leased froln
the British Govenllnent. The augmentation of the
garrisons in our foreign possessions and in Alaska
continued. Closely interrelated with the problems
of procur,enlent, incident to a colossal expansion
. of Our defense forces were rlational cOInmitments
. t?furnish great quantities of critical n~unitions to
.'SIster democracies. Though short of equipment
ourselves, the international situation demand~d
, t?at ~e furnish equipInent to others. This 'situa-
tlon Introduces the nlost difficult problem of co-
ordination and ,direction imposed on the War
Department iri the present emergency. It repre-
sents a complete reversal of the situation iP.1917-'
18, when ou.r Allies provided us with practically all'
..o~ our munitions. l~he passage of the Lease-Loan
bIll inl\farch, 1941, pennitted the coordination
of the entire matter of placing contracts, the types
of materiel to be lnanufactured and the inspection
26 (I939-I94 I J
service to be carried on during this period of pro-
?uc~ion. Increased production due to the author-
IZatIon of the necessary funds should add. to our
own strength rather than diminish our resources.
To provide additional officer personnel, to offer
a fair. opportunity to the man in the ranks, a~d
n10st lInportant of all, to utilize a rare opportunIty
for securing outstandinO' leaders, the War Depart-
lnent has established a ~eries of oHicers' candidate
schools, the students for ,vhich are selected froln
enlisted men of the Army who have given positive
evidence of lnarked capacity as leaders. In a series
of three-n10nth courses these schools will produce
a IninilllU111 of 10,000 officers a year and are ca-
l)~ble of rapid expal~sion if the situation den1ands.
1 he location and type of training given. at the
various officers'. candidate schools is indicated on
Chart 8.

REORGANIZATION OF COMIVIAND AND STAFF

In the gradual merging of the Army from a

peacetilne basis into an organization' for possible
action, the following additional changes have
taken place: .
General I-Ieadquarters of the field forces was
set up at the Army War College last July to direct
and supervise the training of the troops. More re-
cently it was placed on an operating basis by the
addition of a portion of the War Plans Division
of the 'Val' Department General Staff. By this ar-
rangelnent, General Headquarters not only'super-
vises training throughout the Army but is being
(I939-I94I) 27

<~._"<'I.' _. ~ ,.,. ,;>Ii, . .-.. ;;"'" .',-, ',_"

 prepared to perform its nornlal ~heatre of opera-
tions .functions if required.
,To enable the field forces to concentrate on
training, the Zone of Interior functions pertaining
to administration and supply have been taken over
by the nine Corps Areas distributed geographically
over the United States. Under these Corps Areas,
Service Comnlands have been established and are
performing the necessary overhead duties, freeing
the field forces froin obligations of this nature.-
For purposes of Air Defense, the United States
has been' divided into four Air-defense Areas.
where the coordination of aviation, antiaircraft,
aircraft warning and balloon barrage defense has
been placed in the hands of the respective Air
Force Commanders, under the Comnlander of the
GHQ Air Force, now the Combat COInnland. '
To insure unity of conlmand 'in the entire
Caribbean area, Puerto Rico, Panaina and all the
newly acquired' leased bases in that region have
been organized into the Caribbean Defense Corri-
, I uland and placed under one cOInnlander. The
strategic location of Newfoundland has required "-
t~e development and occupation of this base by
all' and ground forces, all of which have been
placed under the command 0f an Air Force officer.
The Port of Embarkation facilities in New
York, Charleston, New Orleans, San Francisco
and Seattle have been' expanded treinendously
throughout the enlergency incident to the move-
l1lents of troops and supplies to overseas garrisons,
and the reception and redistribution of certain
supplies in continental United St~tes. For sonle
28 (I939-I94I)

-"--
 tilne the New York base alone has been handling
a v~lume of tonnage comparable to that handled
d unng the W orId War.
Incident to the tremendous amount of business
handled by the General Staff during this current
expansion, it has been found necessary to increase
the number of Deputy Chiefs of Staff from one. to
. three .. One of these Deputies is charged solelyWit?
all matters pertaining to the air force. Another. IS
charged with matters pertaining to supply, equIp-
. Inent, construction and the Armored Force. The
other Deputy handles all other matters incident
to General Staff business. .
STATE OF THE ARMED FORCES JULY 1, 1941

Today the Army has been increased eightfold

and consists of approximately 1,400,000 men. The
ground forces in the continental United States
f~rm four annies of nine anny corps and twenty-
lune divisions, and an armored force of four divi-
sions, soon to be increased to six. l.~he air force
includes fifty-four combat groups, and the initial
equipment requirements of these forces will be
met with the stocks now on hand and under man-
ufacture, plus those to be produced from funds set
up in current estimates. i

The strength of the Army is now allocated ap-

proximately as follows: 456,000 meI1 to the 29
divisions of the field armies; 43,000 Inen to the
Annored Force; 308,000 men to some 215 regi-
Inents or silnilar units of field and antiaircraft ar-
tillery, engineers, signal troops, ete., who form the
Corps, Anny, and GHQ troops to support the
(I939-I94I) , 29
divisions; 167,000 men in the Air Corps; 46,000 1
filen manning our harbor defenses; 120,000 men
in overseas garrisons in'eluding Alaska and New- I
foundland; and 160,000. men who provide the
.overhead to Inaintain and operate some 550 posts
or stations, the supply depots, and the ports of
elnbarkation; and finally from 100,000 to 200,000
selectees under recruit training in the replacelnent
training centers. Our long coast lines and numer-
ous overseas bases involve the employulent of a
large nUlnber of men not related to the field forces
now being developed in continental United States.
The organization of the air force has been ,t~-
vised to insure its l1l0St efficient elnploYlnent for
the welfare of the Nation. Alnongthe units formed
or expanded, as necessity dict.ated, are annored
di,:isions, parachute troops, ski troops, antitank
~lnIts, antiaircraft units, nlountain troops, nlotor-
Ized units, and a great nUlnber of servicenlainte-
nance units essential to the existence of a modern
anny which must be prepared to operate, in any
one of a varied nUlllber of elinlates or terrains.
The members of our armed forces have passed> 1
throug? a winter of rigorous training and are in. d:

splendId physical condition. The training and wel- j

fare agencies have produced a gratifying state of

1110.ra.le.Although suHicient equiplnent exists for
traInIng pur.poses, the necessary al110unt of critical
itel11s is still far short of requirel11ents and only
a sl:lall portion of the field Anny is at present
equIpped for. extended active operations under
conditions of nlodern warfare. However, quantity
production has been getting under way for an in;.
3 (I939-I94I )

j
creasing nUluber of items and the next four
months should greatly inlprove the situation.
Small as it was, the Regular Army personnel has
b~en the invaluable leaven of the present forces
wIthout which developments to date would have
been impossible except in rather superficial results
to be measured principally in numbers. The prog-
ress made has proved the soundness of the plans
laboriously prepared throughout the years ~y the
General Staff, despite the lack of opportunity to
work with large bodies of troops, or for that mat-
t~r, ,~ith a complete organization of any kind in
ContInental United States. The elaborate school
system of the Army maintained since 1920 has de-
clared a huge dividend. Our experienced officers
and noncommissioned officers have been ready in
te~h.nical knowledge, in skill as instructors and
abIlIty as leaders to unify the various elements of
our professional and citizen soldiers into a great
anny of the United States.
RECOMMEDATIONS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF CER-
TAIN LEGAL LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS

The foregoing has been largely a recital of prob-

lenls and progress during the past two years. An
. effort has been made to indicate some of the com-
plications involved in the rapid creation of a large
army under peacetime conditions. As this report is
submitted the possibilities of a year ago have be-
~ome dangerously near probabilities today, and. it
ISvital to the security of the nation that the hazards
of th~ present crisis be fully recognized.
What has happened is history. Of grave concern
(I939-I94 I) 31
 ., . "

' today are the contingencies of the present and the

future. There are legal restrictions on the use o~
the Armed Forces which should be removed with~
out delay. Events of the past two months are con~~
' ,

,vincing proof of the terrific striking power pos~

sessed by a nation administered purely on' a mili-;
tarybasis. Events of the past few days are even.
more forcible indications of the suddenness with,.
which arm,ed conflict can spread to areas hitherto
considered free from attack., ' .
It is therefore urgently. recolnmended that the l
War'Department be given authority to extend the:
period of service of the Selective Service !nen, the .
.officers of the Reserv~Corps' and the, unIts of the
National Guard. . I'
It is the purpose of the War Departlnent to pro-
ceed with the military training of annual incre-
Inen.ts of selectees, rep.lacin.g those ~ow in a~tive j
serVIceas soon as the SituatIon permits, especIally.
th.e older men. In general, the same i,:,tention per-,
talns to the Reserve officers who we WIshgradually:"
to replace with others who have not yet been l

brought into active service. However, a fixed rule

cannot be applied at this time, in our opinion.
Some are in Hawaii, SOlnein'the Aleutian Islands,
,others in units to be dispatched to overseas bases;
and still others are in organizations to be trained I

, as "task forces" for possible special operations. '

In the light of the situation it is believed that
I 'our interests are inlperiled and that a grave na- .1
I
i tional emergency exists. \Vhatever we do for the i

I national defense should be done in the mQst effi-

cient luanner. Differences of views regarding I
"
I
i'
32 (I939-I94I Y,
j
e national policy sho~ld not, it SeeIl1S to Ine, be
f permitted to obscure the facts relating to the
preparation of the anned forces for service, which
has been the purpose of our vast prograIn of the
past twelve months. When and where these forces
are. to serve are questions to be deternlined by
theIr Commander-in-Chief and the Congress, and
should not be confused with the problenl of their
readiness for service. All, it is believed, .will adlllit
that the time factor has beep of dominant ilnpor-
~ance in the march of events since Septelnber 1939,
In the availability of materiel, in the effect of the
complete readiness of huge, highly trained units
for employment in chosen theaters. The lnateriel
phase of Our task is generally understood. The
~er~onnel phase is not, and it is here that legal
lImItations, acceptable at the tilne of their passage,
now halnstring the development of the Army into
a force immediately available for whatever de-
fensive measures may be necessary.
To illustrate: In accordance with plans of long
standing we have reached the point of availability
of troops and materiel, where we now can, and
urgently should organize and train certain "task
~orces" against the possibility of the necessity aris-
Ing for their use. What is the status of these troops?
The Regular Army divisions contain froln 75% to
9% Reserve officers whose ternl of service is legal-
ly lilnited to twelve months. In other words, SaIne
600 officers in a division under the law would
SOon be entitled to drop their present duties and
return to their haInes. The twelve months' service
period of many, if not Inost of the officers in the
(I939-I94I) 33

,I
bz
 fiist priOrity
.. d... "lid
.IVlSlons, IS.now near y camp ete .4 1
Must we replace most of the trained officer per-"
sonnel of a division-the leaders __at the moment
of departure for strategic localities? In two of the
regular divisions we have restricted the enlisted
personnel to three-year men, but in the others, of
necessity, the number of selectees varies from 25 %
to 50%. The problem here is the same as for the"
Reserve officer personnel. The National Guard
units involve three distinct limitations as to per- ~
.sonnel-that for the National Guard unit, that for
the 10% Reserve- officers in their regiments and
now being increased, and that pertaining to selec-
tees who comprise more than 50% of the men in
the ranks. Eurthermore, a task force involves all
components. vVhile we may select regular units as
the divisional components for task forces, we must
utilize National Guard organizations for the spe-
cial supporting units-antiaircraft, heavy artillery,
engineers, ete. So we have becorne involved in a
complete confusion of restrictive details, regard-
ing personnel. Add to this problern the fact that
plans for large '\.lnitsmust cover every conceivable
contingency, based on the means "available; that
time is required to prepare such a force; and that
under present conditions we must submit these
pl~ns to the time consuming business of public
investigation and debate-alof.g with the advertise-
. ment of such plans to the world at large, and I
. submit that the limitations referred to. should be
removed as quickly as possible if we are to have a
fair opportunity to protect. ourselves against the
coldly calculated, secret and sudden action that
\ 34 (I939-I94 I )/1
\
I
d
 n:ight be directed against us. Incidentally, our
hIstory includes SOl1le.unfortunate incidents re-
sUlting

from quite sinlilar le<ral
b
difliculties, which
. rIsked. a. battle or possibly a calnpaign. In the pre~-
ent cnSIS the risks to the nation are far l110re sen-
ous .
.A year ago last July the Arni.y was c~nfronted
WIth a problem very silnilar to that of thIS July so
far as the time factor and an eflicient basis for pro-
cedure are concerned. 1~hen ",vedesired authority
to put the first increnlent of the National Guard
into s.ummer caInps to conunence its training, and
We wIshed to be <riven the nJ.oney so that we could
proc~e? ilnmedi'ately under favorable weather
COndItIons with the construction of cantonl1lents
suitable for occupancy in the winter season. The
summer had passed before we were able to pro-
ceed in this matter.
Another limitation at the present til1le involves
leadership. There has been sublnitted to the Con-
gress within the past few days the draft of a joint
resolution designed to vitalize the leadership in
the Anny. .
The purpose of this legislation is to remove froin
the active list a few officers who slow down the
deve!opinent of our emergency anny through lack
of qualities of vigor, and intelligent, aggressive
leadership. Under existing law the. commissions
of officers of, the Reserve Corps Inay be revoked at
the discretion of the President and the Federal
recognition of officers of the National Guard Inay
be Withdrawn upon the recommendation of a
board of officers appointed by the Secretary of
(I939-I94I) 35
 . '. ' '.' .J
War. In the case of officers of the Regular Army,
however, the law governing their removal froIl1
, the active list requires a procedure so cumbersome
as to make it totally ineffective during a national
emergency. In brief, the War Department desires
Iauthority to correct deficiencies in the. Regular
, Army as it is now able to do-'for the National
Guard and the Officers Reserve Corps. -
So far as temporary promotions are concerned,
the War Department has recently established a
mechanism to improve leadership. A system of
promotion by selection to the grade of colonel has
been instituted, and to date 286 lieutenant colo-.
nels have been selected for advancement. It is in-
tended that this procedure will be carried pro-
gressively . into the lower grades. / In all these
matters the interests of the soldier and the nation,
rather than that of. the individual officer, have
governed. L

. These proposals which the \VarDepartment

recommends for action' by Congress have but one
purp~se, the security of the American people; to
permit the development of the National Defense
on the orderly and businesslike basis necessary if
the dangers of the present situation are to be met.
Such a purpose does not admit of delay.
GENERAL COMMENTS

.While all branches of the service have had to

carry a rapidly increasing burden in the expan-
i sion program, I do not think the publi~ generally
appreciates the vastness of the undertaking which,
has been imposed upon the Air Corps in both per- ,
36 (I939-I94I) -I

--=~~~~ __ J.
sonne! and Il1ateriel, the Ordnance Departlnent in
production of anns and anuJlunition, the Quar-
tennaster Corps in construction, supplies and
~llotor transportation, and the Corps of Engineers
In the organization of new units and the sudden
undertaking of a construction program for the Air
Corps and for the leased bases. 1'he creation and
developnlent of the Arnlored Force has been an
enornious task, and is being accomplished with
the ,utnl0st speed and with relnarkable efficiency .
.1. he Inerging of the three cornponents of our
lluhtary establishnlent into a unified AnnyoLthe
United States has been acconlplished with high
Inorale and a generous spirit of cooperation
throughout. The nlen in the ranks have worked
hard and uncoInplainingly in good weather and
bad and throughout a difllcult .winter. Probably
the Inost gratifying feature of the past year has
been the quality and the attitude of the nlen
drawn into the ArnlY unde'r the Selective Service
Act. They have been a fine exaIl1ple of Inen cheer-
fUlly and earnestly perfornling the duties to ,vhich
they have been called as citizens for the security
of their govenunent. This particularly applies to
the older men for whOln this service has iInposed
the greatest sacrifice and the heaviest physical or-
deal.
'[he dealings of the War Departlnent with the
Bureau of the Budget and with the C0111nlittees
of Congress during the past year have been .with-
O~lt precedent in the evident desire of those offi-
~lals to lend every possible aid to the Departnlent
In Ineeting the situation. -
( I 939- /94 I) 37
 '. .\ ,.... I
, In closing ,this repor,t it Shouldbe.srated that the 1'\
I progress achIeved dunng the past two years .could
not have .been made without the highly efficient .\
cooperation of the War Department staff and the
commanders and staffs in the field. Their cheerful
acceptance of the tremendous burdens of respon-
sibility has furnished a reassurance which cannot
be measured :n words of thanks. .

G. C. MARSHALL,
General~ United States Army,
Chief of Staff.,
Washington~ D. C.~
July I~ I94I ..

"

I
j
d
 ORGANIZA TION
l\IILITARY OPERATIONS abroad constitute a gl'eat
laboratory and proving ground for the devel?p-
TIlent and testing of organization an~ Inaten.el.
These operations have been charactenzed by In-
~reasinguse and ilnportance of armored, Inotor-
lzed and other specialized divisions and by con-
current effort for developrnent of means to coun-
ter annored (tank) divisions operating in close
coordination with air and Inotorized units from
1l10?ile striking forces of great ,speed and pow~r
wlllch so far have been unifonnly successful In
th~ir operations. We have given careful consider- :
allon to foreign Inilitary developlnents and, as a
result, ourb.
own of<Yanization is undergoing con-
~ta~lt cllange and developlllent. We do not mIn-
~mlZe the enonnous power of armored units used
In conjunction with accOlnpanying air power; but
we do not overlook the fact that the Anny of the
~ l~ited States differs in one important character-
IstIC fronl the annies of Europe. Ours Inust be an
all-purpose ArnlY as we are in an entirely different
position fronl a European nation which knows its
traditional or potential enemies and the terrain
over which it will have to fight. We must be pre~
pared to operate in the Arctic or in the tropics, in
deserts or rnountains, and the elements of our
ground forces rnust be properly balanced to meet
any contingencies. Our organization nlust be a
balanced one with arrnored, air and foot elenlents
in proper proportion to provide the rllaxinllull
flexibility.
(1939-1941) 39
 _ After three years of careful. study and tests, an
. organization for a triangular infantry. division waS
approved and placed in effect in the Regular Army
during the fiscal year 1940. The square division,
adopted during the World War 'and modified sev~
eral times since, has been retained in the National
Guard.
The organization of the horse cavalry regiment
was revised as a first step in the reorganization of
the horse cavalry' division. New organizations
adopted included the horse-mechanized cavalry
.regiment designed as the reconnaissance unit of
a corps; the antitank battalion,' and the corps topo-
graphic company. In addition, approximately 100
tables of organization for other units were re~
viewed and brought up to date without ,any essen-
tial changes in organization.
Six Regular Army infantry divisions and twO
.sets of corps troops were formed during the report
period, partly by consolidations or conversions of
existing units and partly by utilization. of in-
creased personnel made available by augmenta-
tions to the Army. In addition to these large units.
a number of small units' were organized. These
~vere.used to complete battalions and regiments
and to provid~ service elements, previously lack-
ing. 'The organization of these units not only
materially increased the field efficiency of the
~rmy, but greatly facilitated the greater expan-
SIon soon to conle. The new organizations were
tested in division, corps, and Army maneuvers in
.the winter and spring of 1939-194. These ma-
40 (I939-I94I)
 I ." .

.neuvers formed a sound basis for future planning,

revision,. and further tests.. . "
. Continuing study is given our own and foreign
organizations to take full advantage of develop- ,
ments in weapons, transportation, equipment, and'
technique. In general, our organizations are sound
and well balanced and fully adaptable to modern
warfare. Because we have no definite theater of .
?perations, most divisions are necessarily g~neral .
In purpose and are not specialized. A new type
m~torized division organization which is intended
pnmarily to complement armore9- units has been
app:oved. Current study is being given to the or:
ganlZation of a division designed' primarily for
operation in mountainous country; and of other
~pecial units which have only a restricted use. -
There are 33 divisions now in a-ctiveservice, as
follows.' '. ..' .
26 Infantry Divisions incl~ding 18 National
, Guard (Square) and 8 Regular Army
, (Triangular);
1 . Motorized Division (Triangular);
4 Armored Divisions; .
2 Horse Cavalry Divis~ons, one partly, com-
. plete.
There are. also enough, service and reinforcing';'
troops to complete a balanced field force to two'
_ armies, 'totalling four army corps. The two re-
maining armies, totall~l1g five army corps, are. in-
complete. .,..
. Present trends in organizatio~ are in' the direc-
tion of increasing the proportion of armored,
motorized, and anti-mechanized units.
(I939-
. .
I94I)
,
- 41

I
 ARMORED FORCE

A 'Var Department directive dated July 10,

1940, created for service test an Annored Force to
incl ude all armored corps and G H Q reserve tank
units. It also prescribed the duties of the Chief of
the Armored Force, combining the conllnand
functions of a cOlnmander of a large tactical unit
and many of the responsibilities of the chief of a
combatant arm. This included the developlnent
of tactical and training doctrines for all units of
the Annored Force and,' research and advisory
functions pertaining to developlnent and procure-
ment of all special transportation, armament, and
equipment used primarily by annored units.
Regular Army personnel, consisting of the 7th
Cavalry Brigade (nlechanized), the 66th Infantry
(light tanks), and a few scattered Infantry tank
units, were the nucleus for the initial'organization
of the Armored Force. This organization consisted
of the ] st Armored Corps, the 1 st and 2nd Ar-
mored Divisions, one GHO reserve tank battalion
"'-
(70th), and the Armored Force Board. The station
of the ]st Corps, the 1st Annored Division and
the Board was at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The 2nd
Arnlored Division was organized at Fort Benning,
and the 70th Tank Battalion at Fort l\leade, 1\Jary- ,
land.
In Novenlber, 1940, the Annored Force School
was activated at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The over-
head for this unit consisted of about 182 officers
and 1,847 enlisted men. This school has a capacity
of over 6,000 students at anyone tilne, or a grad-
12 (I939-If)4 I)

I
 I,

uating capacity of about' 26,000 students per 'year.

During the months ofN ovember and Decem-
ber, 1940, and January, 1941, four National Guard
reserve tank battalions were activated and brought
into the federal service. These were' the 191st at
Fort Meade, Maryland, the I92nd at Fort Kn~x,
Kentucky, the 193rd at Fort Benning, GeorgIa,.
and the 194th at Fort Lewis, Washington. .
In February, 1941, the 1st GHQ Reserve Tank
Group Headquarters was activated at Fort Knox,
!<-entucky.All GHQ reserve tank battalions in ex-
, Is.tenceat that time were placed under this head- '
.quarters.
Early in March, the Armored Force Replace-
ment Center was activated with an overhead of
24 officers and 1,241 enlisted men. The capacity
of the Replacement Center was 9,000. It was filled
up with selectees in l\1arch; these selectees were
us~d later for. newly activated Armored Fprce
units. ,
On April 15, 1941, the 3rd Armored Division
was activated at Camp Beauregard, Louisiana, and
the 4th Armored Division was activated at Pine
Camp, New York.:
The Armored Force Headquarters and Head-
q~arters Company was activated in May, 1941,
WIth headquarters at Fort Knox, Kentucky.
In early June, five light and five medium GHQ
reserve tank battalions were activated. The cadres
for this activation came from the 1st and 2nd
Armored Divisions, and the fillers came from the
replacement center.
Critical and controlled items of equipment have"
(Z939-Z94z) ':-- 43
 ~~
- , '". '-,~.'
'. ;
_. .I
been aval'1a bl'e In su ffi' . quanuqes
lCIent ." for min. 1~~
~

mum training only. This,condition will c9ntinue -

until about September, 1941.
Training tests of arnlored units have indicated
that these units have met their training require- j
mente Due, however, to the tr~mendous expansi,on .
. involved, armored ul)its have not reached their
ultil11ate efficiency.
TRAINING

Trained, disciplined manpower is the funda-

mental requirement of any army. Our traini~g
program, has been designed to build a seasoned
body of men who have the basic knowledge and
skill to handle any job that may be assigned to
them. Its purposeJs to build soldiers and leaders;
men who, when they' have cOlllpleted their basic
/ training, can take their places in planes or in tanks
or hehind guns or in the operation of technical
equipl11ent with only the final detailed instruction
necessary to cover the' mechanislll which they are
to use. Regardless of other 'materiel shortages, we
have the equipment to give this basic training, and
, our purpose has been to cOlllplete it while the pro-
, duction of modern weapons is catching up with
our develop111entof modern lllanpower. i'he sol-
dier of today has devoted only 20 hours to close
or~e~ drill ~ut of a total of 572 hours of his basic
traInll~g penod. He has spent his tirne in learning
the thUlgS that rnake a man efficient in cOlllbat;
that cause him tO,ac'tintelligently in an eillergency,
a!ld ,that toughen him physically to withstand the
ngors of modern warfare. Basic training cuhni-
44 (I939-I94I)
 .n~tes in field maneuver~ designed to weld in-
dividuals into seasoned efficient' combat teams and
to develop the cbm~and leadership and staff
technique necessary for the handling of large units
on the modern battlefield. The comprehensive
training program carried out during the Fiscal
Ye~r .1940 was made possible through th~ appro-
pr~atIon of addi.tional special field' exerCl~es as a
:esu~t of the unlimited emergency and the Increas-
Ing Importance of national defense. j

By early September, 1939, the following h~d

been. completed: the First Army maneuvers In
New York and Virginia, training about 100,000'
officers and men of the Regular Army, National
Guard", and Organized Reserves; the Fourth Army
command post exercise, held at the Presidio of
San Francisco anG training about 700 officers of
all components. " . '
Further intensive training for all individuals
and units 'of the Regular Army was initiated in
September and October, 1939, and continued
. throughotIt the year. Armory drills for National'
. Guard units were increased by twelve, and seven
.additional days of field training away from home
armories were given all units. Five complete Reg-
u~~r Army infantry divisions and one cavalry di..:
VISion were assembled in divisional. camps or
.cantonments for intensive training as 'divisions. in
the field. Corps area commanders assembled 'their
non-divisional troops for intensive field training.
, Troops of the overseas garrisons conducted special
field training and field>exercises pertinent to their
as~igned missions. ., , . ('
(I939-I94I) . 45
 -~~
, '/~
.The training of pilots and mechanics for the!
. 'augmented Air Corps was successfully expanded
by use of civilian schools in addition to full capac-
ity of expanded Air Corps ~raining agencies. Pro-
curement of missing equipment was pushed to the
utmost in order to provide a sufficient amount for
best training results. Several thousand Reserve
Officers were ordered to active duty for varying'
periods to assist in and benefit from the intensified
training.
'The 3rd Djvision assembled at Fort Lewis"
Washington, and underwent preliminary training
there. In January, 1940, it moved by transport to
join the fleet in the Pacific and to participate in
landing exercises in the vicinity of Monterey, Cal-
ifornia. After these exercises, the division was
given intensive field training at Fort Ord, Cali-
fornia. _ .
The assembly and divisional training of the 1 st,
5th, and 6th Divisions, together with Fourth Corps
troops and nondivisional units,- culminated in.
April, 1940, with three weeks of corps .maneuvers
at Fort Benning, Georgia. During this time the
2nd Division and 1st Cavalry Division and corps
troops luaneuvered in eastern Texas. This was
followed by three weeks of corps versus corps
l11aneuversbetween these two forces, plus the 7th
Cavalry Mechanized Brigade, in the Sabine Area
of. Louisiana.' .
During major divisional and corps field exer-
cises, the division commander and staff of each
National Guard division was given a three-day
period of training in actual commahd and han.... !.

6
4 (I939-I94I) ,
1

j
1
 ?ling of. one of the Regular Army' divisions;' Dur- .
lng the large .maneuvers in the Sabine Area, any' ,
Nat~onal Guard state adjutant general and 'any
National Guard division commander who had not
patticipatedas a division commander in a,corps
exercise was invited to attend the maneuvers as
observer: , .
Throughout the' fiscal year 1940,' practical
training in the' field for officers of all grade,Swas
stressed. Courses at the Command and General
Staff School and the spec~al service schools of the
arms and services were suspended February .I~t;
1940, and officers on duty there were sent to unIts
of the Army undergoing field training. :
In order to disseminate to officers and men_of
~he Army the lessons gained from the current war
l~ .Europe, steps were taken to facilitate the re- ,
VISIonof our training literature and revision of.,
all mobilization training programs; Increased ap-
propriations by Congress for' this purpose -have. '
made this possible.- - -;':
.' During the fiscal year_1941, the Army ~xtended'
Its training activity on a scale never before at-
~empted in peacetime. The. primary training ob-
Jective Was the preparation of units to take the
field on short notice at existing strength ready to
function effectIvely in combat. - ' ..
Taking advantage of the lessons learned in the
~xercises conducted by Regular Army' units dur-
Ing the preceding winter and spring; all four'
.armies c'lrried out maneuvers in the summer and
fall, of 1940, involving all continental Regular
Army and National Guard mobile forces. Progress I

(Z939-Z94z) 47 .
 -- "---- ~~~-~

't attained was marked, but the exercises demon- 'Ii

strated the necessity of continuing it:It<7nsive
train- ' '
ing.
. To assist the Chief of Staff in his capacity as
Commanding General ot"the Field Forces, a' nu-
cleus of General Headquarters was created and
charged initially with the dir~ction of training of
all harbor defense and mobile troops within the
continental United States and GHQ aviation.
The passage of the Selective Service Act, the
induction of the National Guard into federal serv-
ice for a period of one year, and the expansion of
the Regl~lar Army created a training problem of
vast proportions which necessitated adjustment in
I the prograln.
,The vVar Department instituted its planned
mobilization training progralll, modified to meet
these new conditions. Troop units generally ,were
stationed at large posts and camps to facilitate
training and to develop teamwork. l\1ost of the
large posts are in localities which permit year-
round training, although enough are .in other
parts of the country to insure training and experi- ... 1

' Inentati~n in all types of terrain and in various'

climates. The year of' training prescribed was
divjded into three 4-mdnth periods; the first de-
voted to individual and small unit training; the
second to progressive combined anns training; and
the third to corps, and army training including
field maneuvers. The climax of this period will
COlneduring the summer and fall of 1941 when
the four annies, the GHQ Air Force, the Armored
Force and parachute 'troops lvill participate in
8
4 (I939-I94I)

- d
 maneuvers' involving" mo're than -half a million
men. ' . ,'."
oro provide means for the training of selectees,
those inducted early were assigned to Regular
Army and National Guard units. The replacement
training center prograIll of the army mobi~ization
plan wa3 initiated and as fast as constructIon was
completed, 21 cen~ers were opened. The nlajority
began operating in ~Iarch. and April,. and by J~ne
were functioning at Illaximum capacity, receIVIng
sel~c~eesfronl reception centers. At replacen:~nt
traInIng centers selectees and recruits are gIven'
basic training iI; their arm -or service for a period
of 13 week~ and then are assigned to units. The
luaximum trainee capacity of these centers is now'
ap~r.oximately 182,500. This systeIll is greatly
faCIhtating the training of the entire arnlY, "
Training in special operations was conducted
?y selected units. Two divisions trained in land-.
~n~operations, two combat teams participated in
]Oln~ exercises with the Navy' in the Caribbean
~rea, and units stationed in the snow belt special-
Ized.in winter,warfare training and tests of special
eqUIpment. - ':
Special attention has been given to air training.
Tactical squadrons in continental United States '
and overseas stations have increased 500 per' cent.,
fr~m the 1939 total. This has required additional
flY~ngpersonnel, 'likewise has accounted for,' the
?f1ginal three schools operating iri1939, expand~
lng to a total of 40 schools, 28 of which are con':
dueted through civilian, contract arrangement.
Additional flying training schools' are authorized
. (Z939-Z94I) , 49

.Z ~ .
2J
 ;:tr~dlikely by the end of the present calendar y~ar
will be in full operation. rT'welve of the flyIng
schools have been design'ated for the training of
R. A. F. Hying c;dets.
, .Pilot training has been, increased 700 per. cell;t
from the output of graduates in. 1939. It is esU-
mated that at the close of the present fiscal year,
the production of pilots for this period will be
approximately 3,400. Enlisted personnel has kept
.pace in the development, for its strengtH has in-
cr~ased six times over that existing in 1939. The
present figure of 132,0_o0 has been augmented by
nearly 10,000 flying cadets, together with perso~-
.nel from former National Guard squadrons noW
inducted into Federal service. To assure that suf-
" ficient technicians are available for combat crewS
and' ground crews, the technical schools have
stepped up their productioriof trained graduates
16 times over the output of 1939. The close of the
current fiscal year will see 20,000 graduates r.eturn
to squadrons where'their services will be largely
instrumental in the success of the Air Corps ex-
.pans ion program.
Evaluation of lessons learned from current op-
erations abroad and numerous changes in our or-
ganization and equipment have necessitated a wide
, ,revision of training literature for the Army. Sixty
".1
I
field manuals and one hundred sixty technical
:1
I':; \ manuals ivereprepared and printed during the
J ~! fiscal year. Complete revision of army extension
Iii cqurses is in progress.
. Supplemented by the facilities of the motion

J
picture industry, the Signal Corps is engaged in a
5 '. (I939-I94I)

;
 compl~e~lensivetrai~ing film prod~ction prograr~.
Some eighty training films and ninety fihn strip
sU.bject~have already been completed and ,~is-
tnbuted throuo-hout the service. These visual aids
are proving
. new army.
ot
great value in the training of the
.

PERSONNEL
REGULAR ARMY
Officers: rrhe authorizedco~missioned strength
of the Regular Army at 'the close of the fiscal year
1940 was 13,637, and at the close of the fiscal year
1941, it, was 14,0 16. Under the provisions of the
A~t ?f April 3, 1939, the comlnissioned strength
wIll !ncrease to 14,490 in the fiscal year 1942, and
ContInue to increas'e annually by approximately
equal increments until the strength of 16,719 is
reached on June 30, 1949. Present plans do not
I Contemplate any additional increase in the Reg-
ular Army cOlnmissioned strength beyond that
now authorized. Increased demands for commis-
~ioned personnel will continue to be met by bring- .
Ing Reserve officers to extended active duty. _
. During the past fiscal .year there has been a re-
dIstribution of Regular Army officers in an effort
to. maintain the greatest possible number on duty
WIth the field forces and in the overseas garrisons. \
As new units have been activated and new installa-'
tions have been created, it has been necessary to
reassign Regular Army officers so as to provide a
l nUcleus 6f experienced officer personnel with these,
( I 939- I 94 I) 51 '
 -=-.1

new units and installations. The additional posi .

tions created throughout the military establish'
ment which could' not be filled by Regular ArIl1Y
officers have been filled by calling Reserve officer
to extended active duty. .' ,
Enlisted"Nlen: At the beginning of the fiscal year
1940, the Regular Army was in the process of e~'
pan ding from 174,000 to 2 10,000 enlisted men 111
order to provide for the increased strength author
ize,dfor the A,.ir,Corps and for augmentation of t.hi.
Panama garrison." .
. In the limited -emergency proclamation of sep
t,ember 8, '939, the Presid,ent ordered that the en.
listed strength of the Regular Army be increase
. to 227,000 enlisted men as rapidly as possible b
means of voluntary enlistment. After an'intensiv
.,'recruiting drive, this objective was reached in Feb
ruary, 1940.
l
Rapid expansion was still being effected at th
ou.tset of the fiscal.year' 1941. The annual appro
pnation act provided for an increase to the author
i~ed .strength of 280,000, which permitted the aC
tlVatlon of three additional triangular divisions
certain coast defense units, rnechanized units an
certain corps, army, and GHQ troops: The Firs
, Supplemental National Defense Appropriatio
Act, 1941, furnished funds for increasing thes
forces by 95,000, bringing the strength for whic
appropriat~ons had been made to 375,000. Thi
augmentatIon permitted the activation of two ar
'il
I 'fl ~o:e.d divisio.ns, certain increases in triangula
~I~
dIv1sIons prevIously autnorized, ,as well as the im
plementation of organizations in the zone of th]
52 (I939-I94I
 .interior, such as reception centers. 'The Third Sup-
plcrnental National Defense Appropl:iation Act,
]911, provided a total enlisted strength for the
l~eguI~r Anny and the National Guard, including
Sel~ctlve Service Trainees, of 1,418,000 by the end
of fiscal year 1941.

REGULAR ARMY RESERVE

In the beginning of fiscal year 1941, the strength

~f the Regular Army Reserve was 28,099. In F~b-
1uary, 1941, this component was ordered to actIve
,duty under the authority of Public Resolution No.
J 96, Sev.enty-Sixth Congress. Discharges for depend-
ij ency, In accordance with the above-ll1entl0ned
~ resolution, reduced the available nlunber of Reg-
1
~
ular Arn1Y Reservists to 12,260.

I
~i
ENLISTED RESERVE

'rhe ~tre.ngth of the Enlisted Reserve Corps at

I'j th c ~eglnlllng of the .fiscal year I 941 ,~as 3,233 . By
"~!al ch 3 I, 1941, tlns strength had Increased to
:1 ~,6~8, of wh~ch nUInbe~ 34 were on active duty.
1'\ Enhstinents In the Enhsted Reserve Corps were
Jl suspended except in case of men who had served
t; two years in the Regular Army, and of ll1ell1bers
Ji of tl~e Air Corps Enlisted Reserve over Selective
9 SerVIce age.
J
51 SELECTIVE SERVICE

"1 '[he Selective l~raining and Service Act, ap-

fj pro~ed Septernber. 1.6, 1910, pre.scribed the regis-
l-\ trat10n of lli.ale CItIzens and ~hens between the
e(ges of 21 and 36, and authorIzed the call of not
-) (IrJ39-I94 I) 53

~ JICli4"'III';;II.s!l .L.2.2l1!d.:".J!Il_>!!I4!"4!1.Jll!!!llJ"")ilil.1111&1 .. ~I.ll&I&II~_m._I_I.~I.I",I&I.I_I._II. 1.[1..I_n'l. _

 more than 900,000 registrants in anyone year fo
a period of twelve consecutive months' train~Il
and service. Each such man, after the completIotl
of his period of training is to be transferred to
reserve component of the Army of the Unite
States. Until he attains the age of .orty'"five 0
until the expiration of a period often years afte
such transfer, he is to be a member of such'reserV
component and shall be subject to such hainiIl
and service as may be prescribed by law.'
CONSTRUCTION AND HOUSING
Appropriations authorized by t,he se,venty-Sixt~
Congress and allotments from the WP A mad
available approximately $127,000,000 for! perl
manent and temporary construction during th J
fiscal year 1940. The larger, part of this sum wa 1
~sed for increasing the operating facilities at estab
hshed air fields and for establishing two air base
and two air depots in the continental Unite
States, one air base in Puerto Rico, one air base i
Panama, and an air station at Fairbanks, Alaska.
In addition, three new posts were established i
the Panarn~ CanalDepartmen~. These provide aC
commodatl0ns for an increase. of about 5,800 en
listed men of the coast artillery. '
Temporary housing was provided at all postS
camps, and stations where garrisons were increase j
'a.s a result of the Army's expansion to 227,000 en
hsted men. ' .
For the fiscal year 1941, funds in the amount 01
$1,633,13?,355 have been appropriated by th(
Seventy-SIxth Congress for construction necessar1
54 (I939-I941
"

, .
---L
 to acc?mmodate the Army, -as autho~ized by the \,
S.elective Service Act and the act calling th~ Na-
tIonal Guard into federal service for a period ?f
one year. _ .
9-ua:termaster Corps Construction: This legis-
latIon Imposed upon the Quartermaster Corps the
tremendous task of housing approximately 1,4?0,-
000 Illen. As time was a major factor, cons~rucuon
was pushed vigorously throughout the wI~ter of
]940-41. Progress was hampered by excepuonally
unfavorable climatic conditions and shortages of
labor and materials. However, construction neces-
sary to house the above number of men has now.
been ac~omplished, and some 45 communities with
PopUlatIons ranging from 10,000 to 63,000 have
been COI1.structed.l\Jore than one-half of these com-
,Illunities have been erected at new camp sites,
f where initiation of 'construction ,vas dependent
, :upon land acquisition.
The developlnent of the necessary services in a
gr~~t .many cases called for the instalhition of basic
utl~ItIes at some distances frOlll the centers of popu-
latIon. The established 'policy provided. for tent
camps for National Guard units in those sections
where climatic conditions permitted such housing
for the period of. National Guard service, and for
mobilization type cantonment construction in
~ther cases. The housing for well over half a inil-
~l?~ men at new camps is approximately evenly
dIVIded between teruporary cantonments and tent
camp construction. HOllsing constructed during
the emergency at established permanent Regular
Army posts consists 1110Stlyof. cantonment con-'
(1939-1941) 55
 I.,'i,',.:
r, ,
struc~ion. Existing perm~~ent~a~~ties have bee~
utilized wherever possible, and no new permane~i
,,'j housing has been authorized. ',]
, Hospitalization has been provided at the' postS
, :'.'.1\,1,:
:( and camps by enlarging existing hospitals, can:,
I,
,I
verting permanent barracks into hospitals, or b~
I::
. the erection 'of new cantonment hospitals. The
capacity of general hospitals has been increase~
approximately 10,0<;>0 beds by the c~:)l:struc~ion. 0;
9, new,' general hospItals and by addItIons to, eXlst
ing hospitals. " ,
'. . In addition to the housing and hospitalizatio J J
ne(:essary to accommodate an army of 1,400,00.
men, recreation facilities,' chapels, service clubs
hostess houses, railroad facilities necessary fo i l
their con,venience ,and comfort have been prlf.
vided. '
Corps of' Engineer Construction: In order t;i
distribute the load of construction and to assisP
in expediting the Air Corps construction progra
the transfer, from the Quartermaster Corps to th
Corps of Engineers of all construction at Air Corp
stations, Panama excepted, and all construction i
Alaska, was authorized on Novemb~r 20, 194
The authority for this transfer is contained i
Section 102, Public 781, Seventy-Sixth Congresi
approved September 9, 1940. Seventy-two project~
were transferred during the period December 1
1940-l\larch 1, 1941, and 15 additional project!
were a~signed directly to the Corps of Engine~rs.
Dunng the early part of the fourth quarter 0:
the fiscal year 1941, the Corps of Engineers wa!
respons~ble for Air Corps construction work ir
56 (I939-I94r'
: the ~otal a'~ount' of $624,465,000. The 'Corps of-
I EngIneers has been able to assume, this additional,
~onstruction load by making use of its decentral- '
IZ~d'organization of eleven divisions and fifty,
dIstricts covering the entire ~ontinental Unite~
Stat.es,Alaska, and the insul~.r possessions. In those
projects which were taken over from the Quarter-
master Corps, the continued orderly progress of
the work during the transition period was assured
by absorbing in the organization of the Corps of
Engineers a large "part of the local personnel of,
the Quartermaster Corps. ~ I ' : ....

Defense Housing: As a result ofappr?pnatlo~s

mad~ by the Se-venty-Sixth Congress In PublIc
Numbers 671, 781, and 849, the Pres~dent has ap- ",
prov~d the construction of '21 ,893 unIts of defense
hOUSIngfor the families of non-commissioned pffi-
cers of the first three grades and perman'endy em-
ployed civilians of the War Department. This ~
program is well along toward completion. " ,
WPA Projects: Under the terms of the "Emer-
gency Relief Appropriations Act, fiscal-year 1941," ,_
WPA projects totalling apprQximatey $70,000,000 '
,~ave been approved by the President for construc-
tion or improvement .a~ War Department' posts,
camps, and stations.
I I, " , .

ARMAMENT AND EQUIPAGE

Troop bases for a protective mobilization plan
I

of approxima~ely 1,400,000 men and an, aug~

mented force representing a ground army of about' ,
, 2,200,000 men, plus an ait force and replacements; >'
, have heen established. Funds provided during fis-
(Z939-Z94z) 57 '
 = ~1
cal year 1941, plus stocks on hand. or under p.ro-
cureillent, will, with some exceptions, provIde
IllOdernequipment for the over-all require111e~ltS
in critical and essential items for the protectlve
lllobilizarion plan and initial allowances in critical
itellls for the augnlented force. The e~ceptions
lnentioned con1prise largely amnlunition, cOlnba~,
.rnaintenance in 1110tor vehiCles, cOlllpletio11 of the
l1lodernized seacoast defense program, sonle chem-
icallllunitions, and cOlnbat reserve stocks of cloth-
ing and equipage. Financing of these shortages
' S!lou~d be provided in subsequent estiluates. '
" a.1'vIechanization:' 'Fhe mounting experience
and'lessons learned 'from the present European r

conflict dictate a greater proportion of mechanized,

units in Our Anny. This' has been acco111plished by
the provision in the protective Inobilization plan
and the augmented force of 6 and 8 annored divi-
- sions, 9 light tank battalions, 6 and 16 Inedillll1'
~an!< battalions to I,>eeqnipped with heav~ t~nks I l

In these respective forces. From the appropnations

proVi~e.d.during fiscal year 1941, procurenlent has
been InItIated to cover-the various types of cOlnbat
vehicles, such as light" and mediuln t<:Lnks,SCO~lt
, c~~s"and cross-country personnel carriers, in qU31l1~
t~tIes to nleet the needs of our protective l11oblhza-
tlon plan and, with luinor exceptions, sufficient to
supply the initial requirements of theaug111ented
force. Developlnent is well along on a' new heavy
. tank. In' addition, scout cars will be available to
i: et
nle . the needs of 2 cavalry divisions, the initial
reqUIrements of 27 triangular infantry divisions,.
and 1 I mechanized cavalry regilllents... '
58' (I939-I94I)

I
 b. A.ntiaircraft: Consid~rable progress has beel1
ma?~ In providing for- critical items of. modern
antIaIrcraft equipment. Funds made avaIlable. by
a~propriations for the fiscal year 1941, together
WIth.items previously provided Jar, will generally ,
provIde guns and automatic weapons, as well as the
necessary searchlights and fire control instrumen~s
for t~e 88 antiaircraft regiments, mobile and s~mI-
?1ob1Ie, and the 16 separate antiaircr~ft battahons
Included in the expanded force. ..'
The only items of this type remaInIng to be
financed to complete the requirements of the f?rce
of approximately 2,200,000 men, are some cahb~r
.50 machine.guns and mounts, 37-mm. automatIc
guns, the necessary fire control equipment for.
these weapons, and some searchlight trucks .
. The 90-mm.antiaircraft gun has been standard-
Ized, and a large number of these guns are in pro-
duction.
c. Se.acoast Defense: A modernization program
Was initiated in fiscal year 1941 to replace out-
moded armament with equipment. of the mQst
~odern type for all harbor defenses in the con-
tInental United States. The 'programs for augmen-
tation of the seacoast defenses of Hawaii and the
Panama Canal were substantially advanced in fis-
cal year 1941. .
. Funds made availab'le by appropriations for the
fIscal year 1941 will' provide essential fire control
elements and some ordnance materiel for existing
annament aid installations. Shortages in equip-
ment for the modernization progralll initiated in
fiscalyear 1941 must be financed by subsequent' ap-
(I939-I94I) 59
 .- .>4!:c.',

propriations 'as constructIon on the various

prbjects progresses. . "
d .. Miscellaneous Equiprnent: lVloderns111aIl
anns and art~llery weapons have beel).Jinance~t ?y
appropriationsfor the fiscal year 1941 in quantltles
sufficient to tneet, with 'but few exceptions, the
over-all requiremen~s of the protective Inobiliza-
. tion pl~n and the initial requiren1ents of the aug-
. luented force. These Inodern 1veapons include 60-
111111. aI).d 81-1111n.mortars, 111achine guns of variot~S
types, selni~automatic rifles,3.7-1111n. tank and anU-
tank guns, lOS-111m.howitzers, and heavy artillery
ci:unprising 15S-1111n.and 8-inch guns and 240-111111
howitzers. About 900,000 seini-aut~)lnatic rifles
,,,ill have been provided upon the cOlnpletion of
, the. present progra 111 , which represents. the ap-
proxilnat.eover-all requirements of the protective
lllobilization plans as well as the initial require-
inents of the auglnented force. .
- Procurelnent of sufficient 105-aim. howitzers for
~h~ .initial needs of the auglnented force ha~ been
InItIated for the purpose of replacing the 75-11llIl .
. glin in the divisional light artillery regilnents .
. Upon cOlnpletion of the program for the fiscal \
' year 1 ~41, there will be sufficient 155-111111guns, . I
c0111pnslng modernized (high-speed) and new ~I I
types, to cover the initial requirement of the ex-I
. panded force. Fl~rther prOcl.lrelnent ~f these \veap-
ons to nleet ~"equireinents to cover Inainten~nce has I
been held In abeyance pending conclUSIons on.
tests now in process relating to the adoption ofal
new 155-1~ln. howitzer and 4.5-inch gun. 'rhese
Ja~ter weapons are Inounted on identical carriages.
60 -' (I939-I94 I)
 They present no production 'difficulties, and ~p-
pear to offer great promise. Special ordnance maln~
tenance vehicles have been financed to meet the
oyer-all requirements of the protective mobili~a-
tIon plan and, with but few exceptions, the nee~s
of t.his force in signal, chemical, quarterI?aster~
engIneer, and medical items are being provIded.
e. Motorization: Funds .provided for.procure-
ment of motor vehicles during the fiscal year 1941,
f:om both regular and supplemental appropria-
tIo?,s, were adequate to complete the initial re-
qUIrements of the' protective mobilization pl~n
~nd provided a limited amount for normal traIn-
Ing replacement.. .
~actical organizations are being completely--,-,
equIpped with new equipment, Model 1939 and
later, and the replaced vehicles made available for
administrative use. Approximately 50% bf the
above requirements in motor vehicles will be filled
by July 1, 1941, by actual deliveries of vehicles
now under procurement. The delivery of 100%
of the above requirements will be accomplished
by about March, 1942,' provided none of the ve-
hIcles under procurement are diverted to other,
Uses. . _'
. A 'marked improvement in cross-country mohil-
. Ity of tactical vehicles has resulted from develop-
ment of the all-wheel drive.
f. Distribution: All Regular Army and National
Guard organizations have been arranged on one'
priority list for the distrib'ution of the more impor- "
tant items of equipment which are essential to
combat or. training. Individual National Guard
I (Z939-Z94Z) / " 61

I
 .,-,------- ........... ,.!"".:
.. :::...--,~~
ii::
1j:1 I
. . ~
J! 'and Regular Army units are placed on. this list.j
j according to their probable elnployment in t~e.
,,', event of an emergency" and. according to '~~ell
t~aining needs. AJI equipment and alnulun!tl0
resources, ,whether procured from Natlon~ l
Guard, Regular Army funds, or funds not specIf-
ically appropriated to either, have been pooled"
and distribution is being Inade to both componentS,
in such a manner as to best meet ,the problems of
the present emergency. The Chief of the National,
Guard Bure~u has cooperated in every way in the
establish.ment of policies affecting the diversion of
equipment or, funds to or from the National,
Guard. . _I

. Shortages of equipment exist in most organiza',

,tions and, with but few exceptions, are being
~i~~ overcome .. These shortages are primariIY

. (I) The rapid, far-reaching expansion of tbe.'

l
Army. "I i
(2) The time lag between the availability of
funds' and delivery of supplies. ~
(3) Lack of modem or modernized d,epo.t
stocks. .,
(4) Tir:te required for overhaul o.r'moderniza-,
, " , lIon of old equipment which has been
, . stored since 1918 " t
g. Atrplane Procurement: A substantial number
of airplanes of the most Inodern combat and train- ~
ing types are being provided from appropriations;
for .the fiscal year 1941. These, along with present ~
avaIlable resources, will provide the 54 combat,
and 6 transport groups of the Air Corps program

.l_~_._.
, 6~_ _ _ __ ._, ( r 939- r 94I 1
 with init~al requirements andq.ll1ple reserves.
Some equipment for service units under the pro-'
gram has been deferred to the fiscal ye~r 1942 .
.l\faterial progress has been made in the develop~
meq,t and acquisition of combat aircraft which. ~re
equal or ~~perior in performance and adaptabilIty
to any mIlitary planes in the world today.
l\fanufacturing plant space has ~een exp~nded
130 ~er cent to facilitate production ?f aircraft
an~ aIrcraft accessories. Actual production, mean-
whIle, was three times greater in the fiscal year
1941 than in the,fiscal year 1939.
NATIONAL GUARD
The National Guard has made more substantial
~ains in training, personnel, and equip~ent dur-
l~g .the fiscal years 1940 and 1941 than during a?y
Slml~ar peacetime period in its history. Upon In-
ductIon it provided 20,006 officers, 216 warrant
officers, and 282,805 enlisted men. The following
~omparative figures illustrate the steady increase
In the total strength of the actual Guard:
June 30,1939 199,491.
June 30, 1940 241,612
June 30, 1941 303,027.
For the fiscal year 1940, armory drill periods
were increased from 48 hours to 60 hours, and
seven days were added to the normal period of field
training at or near home stations. A resulting im-
provement in the combat efficiency of the Guard
~vasnoted during the maneuvers of the First Army
In August, 1939. "
(I939-I94I) 63

I
 . ., '. ' e
'Plans had long been establIshed for the entranc
of the.' Nationai Guard into the active military ser
vice of the United States in the event of a natIona,
elnergency declared by Congress. Pressure of inter:
national events made, it apparent that the. Na'
tional Guard would be used even though the
specific emergency should not exist as legally CoIl
templated. ;
- Joint Resolution No. 96, approved August 27'
194, authorized the President to order the Na:
tional Guard into serVice' for twelve consecutive,
Inonths. Executive orders designated units to be
.inducted in successive increments commencing o~
Septelnber 16, 1940,' with four infantry divisio~s'i
eightee'n coast artillery units, and four Air Corp:
squadro~s, and continuing until the last divisiot1'
1
entered active service on' March 5, 194 I, and the
last unit on June 23, 1941. By the end of the fisca!
year, all of the National Guard was in active serv'
l
l~e except for one new infantry battalion and~
~lght n.ewly organized observation sql~adrons. The,
inductIon dates and stations of NatIOnal Guard
units are indicated on' Chart 9. lI
While this induction was being planned and
put into effect, other activities were initiated and'
continued to perfect the training and organization'
of the Guard for prospective tasks. Training was:
intensified. There was an attendance of 802 officerS
and 261 enlisted men at;Anny Service Schools, andl
733 officers and 402 enlisted Inen at temporary;
sch?oIsand canlps ?f instruction. !his attendance'l
whIch w~s. approxImately four times the normal,
quota, utIlIzed the facilities at the various schools
64' . . - . (I935'-I9P!

11 ....... _
 to capa~ity. For the fiscal year 1941 th~ annual
field traInIng period was again increased from 15
to 21 days and an additional period of seven days
was."authorized; the number of armory drills was
a~aln increased; there was nation-wide participa-
tIon in the maneuvers held by all four field armies
during the summer of 1940
To make the character of our forces conform
~ot~e new demands of modern war, many reorgan-
IZatIons, conversions and increases were made
prior to federal indu'ction. Four National Guard
cavalry divisions were broken up. Sevent.een cav-
alry regiments were converted into 7 horse-mec~-
I anlzed cavalry regiments, 7 field artillery regI-
I ments: 7 coast artillery regiluents :and s.epar~te
battahons, and one antitank battahon. EIght In-
fantry regiments were converted into 4 field artil-
ler~ regiments, - 8 coast artillery regituents, one
antitank battalion and one luilitary police bat""
t r '
I a IOn. Tank companies were withdrawn from in-
fantry divisions and formed into tank battalions.
IAntitank units were expanded and increased in
! number. Nine new observation squadrons '\Tere
I organized. " - .
I Officer allotments were increased from mainte-
! nance strength to equal Regtilar Army peace
Istrength. The .increase in strength authorized by
i executive order of September 6, 1939, was virtu-
ally complete at the beginning of the fiscal year.
I As a result of increases in officer strength, con-
Iversion of units, and officer losses for physical and
IOther reasons; a great Inany appointnlents and
promotions were made in the National Guard
i (Z939-Z94 I) 65
I
I.
 -~~I
. .1
throughout the country. This necessitated exa~:j
ination and formal procedure for fede:a~ re~ogIldl
tion, and the magnitude of the task IS IndIcate i
by the fact that the National Guard Bureau cOrll.
pl~ted action on cases as follows: :
July, 1940 ......... 1089 January, 1941 3521 1

August 1281 February .. ~. ~ 314~

September 1500 March 39
October - 1870 April 1404,
November 1553 May 573
December 1314 June 41~
Because there was no legislative provision for,
money allowances to dependents of enlisted mel1
in federal service, and because it was understood
that draft boards would defer draftees with depend-,
ents, instructions were issued on. July 23, 1940'1
that upon request, discharge would be granted eIl',
listed men with persons dependent solely upol1,
them for support. This process was initiated early,
in all units regardless of prospective inductiol1,
dates, in order to give opportunity for filling va',
cancies by local enlistlnents. From the date of these,
instructions on June 30, 1941, it was reported that,
51,501 enlisted men had been discharged all,
account of dependency. This loss would appear,
large, but it made the Guard conform in personnel,
to the other elements of the Army and it wasi
rapidly remedied by enlistments. .
Induction of the National Guard left the statesj
without their normal forces for suppressing localf
disturbances. By act of Congress, approved Octo'
ber 21, 1940, a state is authorized to organize and
maintain local defense forces so long as any part 01
66 (1939-1941

&
 its National Guard is in active federal service.
Under this authority, and by virtue of existing and
new state legislation, these forces were created
under such designations as State Guard, Defense
Force, Reserve Militia Active Militia, Reserve
~lilitary Force, Home 'Guards, Protective Force,
Home Defense Force Defense Guard, State De-
f
ense Corps, Reserve ' Defense Corps. More than
three-fourths of the states have raised suchforces.
Rifles and bayonets have been made available
for issue in quantities equal to fifty pe~ cent of the
normal National Guard allotment to each state,
a.nd training literature has been issued. Ammuni-
tion, cartridge belts, mess kits, and other items of
field equipment have been made available for sale
to the states, while procurement of uniforms has
be:n left to the states alone. By June 30, 1941,
UnIts had been organized "\fith a total strength of
85,587.

ORGANIZED RESERVES
. The activities of "thiscomponent show a marked
Increase throughout the two years c~vered by this
repOrt. Never before has the Officers' Reserve
Corps been afforded stICh splendid opportunities
for training in peacetime.
During the fiscal year 1940 appropriations made
POssible the training.of a greater number of offi-
cers for'14-day periods than previously. The num-
ber of students taking 3-month courses at service
Schools ,vas three times greater than it had been
the year before. In addition, about 2,500 officers
(I939-194~) 67
were trained for 28-day periods with units of the
Third Army during the spring of 1940.
During 1939-40, opportunities for extended ~c'
tive duty for periods of six' months or more ~lt~
the Air Corps and other Regular Army unItS
including opportunities offere~ under the ThOJ11i
ason Act-were expanded dunng the last half 0 i
the fiscal year, and on June 30, 1940, more thaIlI
2,700 Reserve officers were on such duty. I
Even greater strides were made during the fiscal'
year 1941. The passage of Public Resolution No.
96, Seventy-Sixth Congress, which became effective
August 27, 1940, permitted the ordering of Re'
serve officers to extended active duty, with OJI
without their consent, for a period of twelve coIl'
secutive months. Pursuant to this authority thel
number of Reserve officers on active duty h~si
steadil y increased, and on J tine 30, 1941, approxl,l
mately 55,000 Reserve officers, or about 55 % of
those eligible, were on active duty. These officers,l
have been used to meet the need for additionall
officers in carrying out the current military expan'
sion and wherever possible have been assigned as,
replacements, thereby making additional RegUlarl
Army officers available for troop duty.
Fourteen-day training was discontinued, except,
in isolated cases, as the opportunities for bringing
Reserve officers to doty f9r extended periods,l
elirninated the need for this type of trailJing.
Although the eligible strength. showed no ma'
terial increase during either of the fiscal years,
greater effectiveness of the Officers' Reserve Corps
has been attained through improved training op'
68 (I939-I941
POrtu~~ties and physical ;;andards. An i.ncre~s~of.
appr:oximately 1 o~ over previous years In ongIn,!l1
appointments fromothe Reserve Officers' Training
Corps was a contributing factor. This inc~ease was
offset by a corresponding decrease of app0111t,?ents
from .civillife as a result of a general suspensIon of
appOIntments from this source imposed at the close
0. the calendar year 1939. In addition, a classifica-
tIon system, which was set up during t~e past y~ar, \
has made readily available detailed InformatIon
pertaining to the Officers' Reserve Corps along
SUch lines as civil pur.suits of th~ .individual,
progress of training,. and other statIstIc~1 data.
yoluntary training performed through the pur-_
S~lItof courses of instruction of the Army Exten-
~lon Courses and attendance at troop schools was
~nc~e~sed,resulting in a better preparation of the
In~IVIdual for entering upon a tour of extend~d
actIve duty. Improvelnent in all phases was satIs-
fact?ry with possibilities of further progress as the
avaIlable facilities (lre augmented. .
UNITED STATESMILITART ACADEMr
Legislation for the fiscal years 1937 and 1938
appropriated funds for the acquisition of approxi-
mately 6,068 acres of land. Of this alnount, the
War Department has acquired title to 2,533 acres.
At the end of the fiscal year 1941, the renlaining
land-approximately 3,535 acres-"\vas in process of
acquisition by condemnation proceedings through
the Department of Justice, and it was expected
that the greater part of this land would be secured
before January I, 1942.
~1939-I94I ) 69
 \ .i
.RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS
The applications for new R.O.T.C. units in i

both the junior and senior divisions were extensive

during the fiscal year 1940 .. Estimates indicated 1
that if the applications for junior units ,were ap'l
proved, the enrollment would be increased by',
200,000. Because of the requirements of the Arl11Y
itself and the consequent lack of suitable person-'
ne! for the proper operation of new R.O.T.G.
units, however, none has been established since
August, 1937 .
. During the school year 1939-40, appro~imate1y
7,623 Reserve officers were commissioned froW
the R.O.T.C. The 9,000 Reserve officers which it
is planned to produce annually in the future are
expected to meet anticipated- requirements 1vith-
out the establishment of additional units.
Strength at the end of the fiscal year 1940 waS
as follows;
Senior Division (226 units)
Advanced Course 17,387
Basic Course 86,431
---------------------
To tal 1b 3,8 18
Junior Division (139 units) 66,1.34
5'5c units (35) : 10,268
During the fiscal year 1941, for the first time
since the establishment of the R.O.T.C., large
numbers of Reserve officers have been called to
extended active duty. By the end of the fiscal year
, 7 - (I939-I94 I)
 the figure had .reached approximately 56,000,
mostly officers of company grade, a large percent-
ag~ of whom are recent graduates of R.O.T.e.
unIts. This has afforded the first real opportunity
to make a practical appraisal of its prod?ct.. The,
success already attained by these officers IndIcates,
, tJ:e i~p<:>tranceof the role of the R.O.T.C., espe-
Cially the senior division in our national defense .
. \Yithout these officers the successful rapid expan-'
Sl<>,~O~ our Army during the past year wo.uld have ,
~een Impossible. Reserve officer productIon from
'IR.O.T.e. has met immediate reqiurements from
. t?a~source.Nearly 8,50 graduates werecommis: _ (,
.sl0ned,in June and ordered to active duty.
n~mands for expanding R.O.T.C. trainin~ have,
contInued. An increase of 1,000 enrollments In the
advanced course was authorized for the school year
1940-41. In order to meet special requirements
three new units have been established as follows:
, University of Alaska, Tuskegee Institute (Col-
?red), and the Harvard School of Business Admin-
Istration. The number of active Regular Army
officers on R.O.T.C. duty has been reduced by
approximately two-thirds. Officers thus relieved'
h~ve been replaced by retired and Reserve officers
With very satisfactory results. Other than for the
foregoing, the R.O.T.e. establishment has, in gen-
eral, remained unchanged.
Training program~ have been revised to bring
teXtreferences in line with the latest training man- _,
Uals.Since stude~ts are to be ordered to active duty
shortly after graduation, greater emphasis has been .
(Z939-Z94z) 71
 - .~

~
~
,'I
'placed on practical training, including methods'~
instruction, in order to prepare the graduate 01
the. imlnediate command and instruction of sllla!.
unIts. "
\ "

CITIZENS' MILITARr TRAINING CAMP

62,587 applications for this traBlIng were re
ceived; 37,152 were enrolled; and 36,151 coIJ1
pleted the Inonth of training offered during the
fiscal year 1941. Jhese totals are approximatelY
the same as for the previous year. J
In order to concentrate all available Ineans an,.
facilities on the vitally important and immediate,
task of training the cOlnbatant forces, C.l\l.'f~

~;~;v::::~e:o::~:::
;~~:ec::::e
During the period covered by this report, the
War Departlnent continued to carryon its assigned,l
missions pertaining to the administration and
- supply of the Civilian Conservation Corps. These;
. diversified activities have been- accomPlisheo,
pro111ptly and efficiently.' .
The authorized enrolled strength of the CorpSi
was 300,000, composed of 272,800 juniors and,
27,200 veterans. These enrollees were allocated,
al1long 1,500 companies, 1,364 of which were made
up of juniors and 136 of veterans. The 1,500
camps, each having a capacity of 200 enrollees,'
were distributed throughout the United States,
with sonle located in every state, as well as in the
2
7 /, ( I 939- I 94 I)

i
 I

District of Columbia; in addition, two companies

Wer . .
e assIgned to Annette Island, Alaska.
!l~e Civilian Conservation Corps has been
aSSIstIngin th~ expanding national defense p:~-
gram. CCC companies have been allocated to mIlI-
tary reservations for the purpose of clearing and
developing maneuver and training areas.
MORALE
~he proble~s incident to the maintenance of
i a hIgh state of morale in our expanded Army have
been of primary importance during t~e past ~wo
fiscal years. The introduction of selectIve serVICe,
~heinduction of the National Guard and the call-
Ing to active duty of a large number of Res~rve
officers have brought many diverse elemen~s Into
tl~eArmy. This rapid expansion, coupled wIth the
~hfficultiesencountered in housing, clothing, feed-
Ing and traIning the new Army produced ma~y
new problems in the field of morale. These speCIal
problems were recognized early in the expansion,
and steps were taken immediately to solve them.
As a result of these timely measures, it can be re-
PO.rtedthat a high state of morale is now clearly
eVIdent throughout our Army. .
One of the outstanding indications of improve-
~el1t in morale has been the continuous diminu-
tIon of court martial rates. During the fiscal year
194.0, the general court martial rate per thousand
enlIsted men fell from eleven to nine; the special
COurtmartial rate, from 23 to 21; and the summary
COurtInartial rate, from 56 to 48. -
A growing consciousness of the importance of
( r 939- I 94 I) 73
 'Inorale activities led to the creation, on l\1arch
1941, of a separate branch for military morale ~lt if
~ I

a general officer as Chief of Branch. The functIOn.

previously exercised by the lVIoraleDivision of tbe
AGO were transferred to the lVlorale Branch;
'which thereafter functioned under the supervisiO~
and control of the Chief of Staff. '~
A new impetus was imparted to nlorale activit~
both on the part of the War Department and 01
cOlnmanders in the field. The Chief of the.l\10ralt
Branch was charged with the development 0
l11ethodsand procedures to enable hiin at all time~
to know the state of morale of the Army. Ther~
was no disturbance of the conception that morale
and leadership are inseparable. That conceptio~
,vas strengthened by increased latitude permitte~
to regional and. tactical commanders by the gran1
of authority to conduct conferences of morale offi
cers and the authorization of a special staff office
without add~tional duty, for Ino:ale purposes. J'
The appOIntment by the PreSIdent of the Fe
eral Security Adlninistrator' as Coordinator ~
Health, \Velfare, Recreation, Education, Nutn
tion, and all other activities related to the defens1
prograin pennitted a nonnal division' of responsi
bility for morale activities. Under this arrang~
Inent, the \Var Departillent assumes full responsi
bility for Inorale activity within the borders d
\' military reservations and other Federal agencie~
~ssunle the responsibility for morale work outsidl
Inilitary boundaries. /
1 'I \Vithin the borders of a military reservation, thl
, 74 ( I 939- I941
,t I
:J1.L_l ,_
commander is held accountable for the state of
m.orale. The Morale Branch exists to coordinate,
stImulate, and influence morale activities and to
act as consultants and advisers on morale. Athletic'
equipment has been made available by reasonable
allotments of funds for that purpose and inclem~nt
Weather problems are being solved by the erectlo.n .
of field ho~ses ~hich permit continui.ty o~athleuc
programs In waiter months. The prImary source
of entertainment has been, and will continue to
be, motion picture programs. To. date ~~5. posts
and ~amps have been provided wIth faCIlIues for
sh~wIng pictures to approximately 214,000 men at
a sIngle showing. Amateur theatricals have been
encouraged and have proved highly successful. A
system of mobile units has been inaugurated to
provide entertainment with volunteer professional
talent. The' social life within military camps has
b.eenthe subject of extensive thought and prepara-
tion. The outstanding need of a place to gather,
to read, to hold dances and entertain friends has
been met by the construction of 1 13 Service Clubs,
the great majority with a library and ~ cafeteria.
Provision in the form of 97 guest houses has been
n:ade to furnish simple overnight accommoda-
tions to families and friends who may visit the
soldier in camp. Due recognition has been given
the need of feminine influence in the guidance
of morale activities by the employment of 297
hostesses and 96 librarians.
A new problem arose with camps far removed
from communities of sufficient size to meet the rec-
(I939-I94I ) 75
 -._--,;;'.- ~-_ ..::~
c
n~ation needs of a larg, lllilitary population. A sO
lution ~as been found by the construc~1(~lU. erl
0 f teI1
camps III the nearest sizable COmmUUltIes.wh Ii
recreational facilities are already in eXIste?'J
Currently 26 such camps have been authorIZ k
which will aCcommodate 15,000 men eac~ wee I
end. The basic consideration in the estabhshm.ell
of a recreational camp has been to provide soldle~. s
at nominal COstwith a place to spend a full ~eel
~nd in enjoying the normal pleasures'avaIlab e
111 an average AmeriCan community. .
Another important step in our morale pro.
gram was the establishment in December, 19 '1
of a' civilian committee which subsequently 4b~1
ca~ne known as the Joint Army and Navy C~~I
nl1tt~e on R~creation and Welfare. The fU~C~I~s
of thIS commIttee is to Coordinate welfare actIVItl
between the "Var Department and other govern'
m~nt departments and to develop closer rel.a~ioll'
ShIp between
ns civilian COmmunities and mIhtarj'
!?rriso in order to provide a wholesome, leisure'
tnne atmosphere for the enlisted men. The work
of the committee has been of great value in ~k
VeIoping public morale and in directing civih~1l
effOrt into channels which wiII best serve to w'
crease the lnorale of the Army. '
Because of the intimate relationship to morale,
the Supervision of the Post Exchange system haS
been charged to the Chief of the Morale Branc~.
Modernization of Post Exchange methods is III
process and Within a shOrt time a centralized ArmY
EXchange Service will be announced.
76 (I939'I941!
 While the physical comforts and recreational
~eeds will remain in the spotlight of attention, it
:s r~cognized that everything physical and psycho-
.oglcal affects human conduct. The l\;Iorale Branch
~ ~onstantly engaged in the study of all factors
hlch contribute and adversely affect morale and
of advance plannincrb for morale work in the event
the
a U10veUlent to theaters of operatiori.

77
 PART TWO

BIENNIAL REPORT
of the
Chief of Staff of the United States Army

July I~ I94IJ to June 30~ I943

to

The Secretary of War

 BIENNIAL REPORT OF

GENERAL GEORGE C. l\fARSHALL

Chief of Staff of the United States Anny

July I, I94I to June 30, I943

To
The Secretary of War

This report sUll1111arizesthe ilnportant events

affecting the United States Anny between July
1,.1941, and June 30, 1943. It is a record of what
Was done and why it was done and is sublnitted
while America is at. war .to permit a better un-
?erstanding of the great offensive' operations now
In progress.
Fonnal reports of operations in the Philip-
pines, North Africa, and the Southwest Pacific
have not yet been received. This report is based
On messages, current reports and official records
of the War Departlnent which are sufficiently
c0 nplete to fonn an accurate picture.
1

(1941-1943) . 81
 Dear Mr. Secretary: ..
-_ ...

With the nation 'at 'war I submit a ~iennia.

.
--_._~

... !
Report covering the period from July 1, 1941, to.
June 30, 1943. . d'
In my first report, which covered the peno ~
between July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1941, the evel!ts
Were treated in two phases. The first phase .I
cluded the fall of France and covered the peno ~ dl
of national uncertainty as to the influence of thf
war upon the United States. The second phase,~i
commencing with the Battle of Britain and ter'
minating with the German declaration of ,~arj
agains~ Russia, was conspicuous for a grOWlI1
national appreciation of the seriousness of ~hfj
international situation and was marked by a IIm"1
ited peacetime mobilization of the cit.izen ,army, ,I'

large appropriations by Congress of funds ~o de" ~

velop the military establishment, and. the orIenta'j.
tion of industry to speed up the peacetime pHY
duction rate of munitions of war.,
The initial period covered by this report COU
stitutes a third phase which was brought to aUj
abrupt conclusion by the Japanese attacks of De",
cember 7, 1941. With war upon us we entere~ ~ I
fou.rth phase which covered th~ complete mob1.h"
zatlon of the power of the United States and ItS/
coordination with that of our Allies. .
Duri~g the fo.urth phase the United States au~ j
. the United NatIons were forced to assume a de
fensive role while mobilizing their strength f~r
a global fight to the finish. Efforts during thIS
period were devoted to the rapid deployment of I

82 (Z94Z-Z943) J
 ~e? and resources to check the momentum of the
tIS assaults, while establishing protected lines
o communication around the world, and at the
same time initiating a vast expansion of our mili-
tary and naval establishments. (Chart 10.) *
~emocratic governments devote their resources
fhlI?arily to improving the standard of living of
. elr people. Therefore, when attacked by na-
~Ions which have concentrated on preparations
or a War of conquest, the initial successes inevi-
ta?ly will go to the aggressors. This was the case
~lth the democracies of Western Europe' ~nd
ater on was found true in the case of the UnIted
Sta.tes. Approximately eight months were re-
q~Ired by this country, acting in collaboration
WIthits Allies, to accumulate the munitions, train
the initial forces, and then to transport them to
theaters. of operations where they could be em-
plOyedin offensive action against the enemy. This
phase of the great emergency ended in August,
194.2, with the successful assault on the Japanese
POsItionsat Guada1canal and Tulagi in the Solo-
lUonIslands. i '-

'. The fifth phase} in which we are now engaged,

Inv?lves'the launching of Allied military power
agaInst our enemies in a series of constantly in-
creasing offensive blows until they are beaten into
cOmplete submission.
""All charts and maps are in the back of this book. Maps begin
On page 199; charts on page 210.
 . THE T~IRD PHASE. ..]
ON JULY 1, 1941, the internatio'nal situation wa~1
extremely critical. The full power of the G~ri
Juan Army, overwhehningly successful in all. It\
previous conquests, had just been loosed agaln~l
Russia, and the Illomentum of its first drive ha ,
overrun vast areas of Russian territory. Sizeable,
concentrations of G-ennan troops relnained de'l
ployed along the English Channel, a constant,
Inenace to the security of Great Britain; and Ger',
Inan activities in both the North and Sout~ At',
lantic threatened the security of the vVeste:t1 1

HelIlisphere. * Strong Italian forces lueanwhlle,

were ma~sing in Africa. In the Pacific the menac'\
ing preparations of Japan were regarded as 3i
possible preface to attacks upon British and Dut.ch
P?ssessions in the Far East and upon the. PhilIp' l
pInes, ~lalaysia, Hawaii and the Panama Cana~'1
Aggression in Indo-China gave unnlistakable eVl'
dence of Japan's plan to enlarge her elnpire at
the expense of weaker countries. " .
EXTENSION OF SERVICE

In this grave situation in the SUInmer of 1941

the \Var DepartInent was faced with the disinte':
gration of the Anny, which had reached.a st~engthl
of nlore than 1,500,000 l1len, unless leglslatlve aC'
. II~ August,. 19:1, . fOlloWing the fall of France and tI.l~ critical
SltUatlO,? resuItll1g with regard to the security of the BrttIsh IsI.es
the Ul1Ited States and Canada had formed a Permanent JOll1l
Board on Defense, This hoard consists of six members from eacb
country. Mayor F. H. LaGuardia of New York City is presentlY
the chairman of the American sectioll of the board. Vice Admiral
A .. \V. Johnson, is the senior United States Navy member and,
l\laJor General (,uy V. Henry the senior Army member. Po

84 (I94I-I943J

I
ti'.on Intervened to save the situation. Under the
I

terms of the Selective Training and Service Act,

selectees could only be retained in the service for
a ~eriod of one year unless a national emergency
ex.Isted.Also, National Guard units' and Reserve
Officersmust be returned to an inactive status after
o~e year of service. The critical international situ-
atIon demanded the retention of these men and
organizations if the security of the Western Hemi-
sphere was to be assured, and such a recommenda-
tIon Was made to the ConO'ress by the President
early in July. The SelectiveOServiceExtension Act
of 1941 was approved th~ latter part of August,
four months before the attack on Pearl Harbor.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMY

. At this time the Army of the United States con-

SI~t~~of a partially equipped force of 28 infantry
d~v~s~ons,a newly created armored force of four
dIVIsIons, two cavalry divisions, the harbor de-
~ensesof the United States, and an air force of 209
Incomplete squadrons. There was in existence a
number of establishments such as induction sta-
tions, replacement training centers, and officer
candidate and specialists' schools, which provided
the ~ecessary basis and experience for a rapid ex-
pansIon of the Army in event of war. (Chart 11.)
During the summer of 1941, Jarge battle re-
hearsals continued which included maneuvers in
August, Septe1nber and November of some 900,-
000 troops. 1 * The organization and training of the

~ '"'.Th.ese figures throughout the text refer to the numbered notes

eglllnlllg on page 165-
(I94I-I943) 85'
 .- 'I
necessary non-divisional units (heavy artillerY'
engineers, etc.) to support our divisions were
expedited, while special attention was directed t
the development and training of the armoreld
force and antiaircraft organizations which ~erel
faced with the prospect of enormous expansIO~S
S"lected units were given specialized trainin~ 10,
mountain and jungle warfare and amphibIouS,
operations, and a 'rank Destroyer Center ,:as
created. Supply and administrative units and 10'1l
stallations were activated and trained to meet the
greatly increased logistical demands of combal l
~orces, b.ut we were never able to provide th,eJll
In sufficIent numbers to meet service requ!rejl
me,nts for the active employment of the tactlCa I
units, During this period, port installations were I
e~panded
tIons.2 to suPPOrt possible overseas opera-

REINFORCEMENTS FOR OVERSEAS GARRISONS.

Lack of luodern materiel, especially in air-

planes and antiaircraft guns, as well as lack of
trained units embarrassed the War Department
during this period both in the training of troopS
(inclUding air units) and in the preparation of
our overseas establishments to meet possible at-
tacks in both oceans. Since 1935 the Ha,~aiiaJ1
Islands, having been given first priority, had been
provided with more complete troop ga~ri~ons and,
munitions than any other overseas garrison. It
now became imperative that the defenses of the
Panama Canal and Alaska be given immediate
priority. Also, the uncertainty of the European
.86 (I94I-I943)
s.ituation involving the peril of the British Isles *-
~nd the British Fleet made it urgently necessary
or Us to secure the defenses of the Western Hemi-
sphe.re by establishing air bases and d~fensive
garnsons throughout the Caribbean 'and In New-
foundland. With our limited means the situation,
?eveloped into a problem of priorities in attempt-
Ing. to meet these requirements, and it was not
Unt.II. February, 1941, that additional aircr~ft,
antIaIrcraft, and other items of modern equlp-
rne~t could be shipped to the Hawaiian Islan~s.
A lIttle later the first shipments of modern alr-
c~aft Were made to the Philippines and the Philip-
pIne Scout organization was doubled in strength,
draWing the necessary personnel from the trained
cadres of the new Philippine Army. The fighter
planes secured for these purposes were largely
ob.tained by stripping the limited number of
squadrons then in training in the United States.
In July, 1941, the development of quantity
"(The substance of the following paragraph for secrecy reasons _
could not be included in my Biennial Report of June 30, 1941.)
Immediately after Dunkirk in 1940, the British Isles were in
~ffect defenseless so far as organized and equipped ground forces
b ere concerned. Practically all their field army equipment had
een lost and an immediate invasion was threatened. In this'sit-
Uation, Lee Enfield rifles, Browning automatic rifles and machine
~ns, 75mm artillery, with limited ammunition and TNT of the
f or.ld War stock were hurriedly released to the British in return
or Immediate contracts to be let in the United States for modern
materiel. For the United States the military issue immediately at'
T~ke was the security of the British Fleet to dominate the Atlantic.
t ese releases left us with World War stocks of materiel of the
ypes mentioned sufficient to equip 1,800,000 men, with quantity
Pr<~duction to be underway in time to meet additional troop re-
{Utrements. Incidentally, at this time great Lend-Lease shipments
0
f Great Britain, Russia, China, and our other Allies were un-
oreseen.
(Z94z-I943) 87
 production made it possible for the first time to
ass~g.n r:l0dern materiel, in 'sizeable lots. to th~
PhIhppIneS. On August 28th the first flIghts. 0
Flying Fortresses were started acrqss the PaCIfic
via l\Iidway and \Vake Islands and thence so~th
through Rabaul, Port l\Toresby or Port DarwI~'
and north to the Philippines. By the first week I?
November SOlne 35 Fortresses had completed thIS
trip. A gap in airplane deliveries from the factory
combined with adverse winds between San Fran-
cisco and Hawaii prevented the ferrying of all
additional 48 Fortresses, prior to the attack 011
Pearl Harbor. , . ,
' In view of the potentialities of the situation ill
,the Philippines, orders were issued in February,
1941, t~ evacuate the dependents of Army person-
nel statIoned there. The decision was also taken
to retain in the Islands lnost of the Regular Army
personnel beyond the two-year tour of service.
' July 26th General Douglas, MacArthur was re-
called from duty with the Philippine Common-
. wealth, placed on active duty, and designated ~s
, Commander of the United States Army Forces In
the Far East. Intimately familiar with the situa-
tion in the Philippines, 'he at once proceeded to
expedite preparations for defense within the lim-
its of the available ITlunitions and trained man-
power. .
(During the late summer of 1941, arrangements
were made for the improvenlent of the landing
strips at Rabaul, Port Moresby and Port Darwin,3
and the Conlnlanding General of the Philippines
was directed to deliver gasoline and bOlnbs to
88 (I94I-I943)
these pOInts
S' . .'
and to Bahkpapan In B orneo an d
1 Ingapore in ~falaysia. Deliveries to all but the
ast two points had been completed when the
Japanese took the offensive, December 7th.)
National Guard antiaircraft and tank units
Which had proQTessed sufficiently in training and
tor whic? the ~ecessary modern eq.uipme:1~ c~uld
e provIded were dispatched to the Phlhpp~nes
dUfIng this period of preparation. SOlne 100 lIght
tanks and the first r 0 self-propelled artillery weap-
ons delivered by :Jour arsenals were shipped to
the Philippines and arrived prior to the outbreak
of War.
h~ August, President Roosevelt issued a procla-
lUation mobilizing the Philippine National A:my
an~ steps were taken to furnish these partIally
traIned forces with whatever equipll1ent could be
I~lade available from the United States, in addi-
tion to that held in reserve in the Philippines.
Referring to this mobilization of the Philippine
forces and the shiplnents from the United States
of troops, planes and other munitions already
fffected or in progress, General l\facArthur in a
etter to the Chief of Staff on August 30th made
the following comment:

I wish to express my personal appreciation for the

splendid support that you and the entire "Var Depart-
l~lent have given me along every line since the forma-
tIon of this command. With such backing the develop-
Iller,a of a completely adequate defense force will be
rapId. .

In early Septell1ber the \Var Department rec-

(1941-1943) 89
 ommended to Congress, that the Philippine In'
dependence Act of ,1934 be amended so as.t0
authorize the expenditure of certain Sugar ExCISe
Tax funds and currency devaluation funds accrl1'
ing in the Treasury of the United States fof
defensive purposes in the Islands. These funds
amounting to approximately $52,000,000 were
wanted primarily for the extension of airfields.
While awaiting legislative action the War Depart'
ment obtained $10,000,000 from the EmergencY
Fund for the President to be utilized for Ph~lip'
pine defenses. This, plus a~other $10,000,000
from Army Air Forces funds, was quickly e~'
hausted and an additional $5,000,000 was o~'
tained from the Emergency Fund for the, Pres1'
de.tit while the debate was in progress in Cong~ess:
Still later when the Sugar Excise Tax legls1a
tion did not receive favorable action the Waf
Department included in the Third Supplemental
National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, $269:'
000,000 for the Army of the Philippines, but thiS
did not become available until the Act was ap'
proved on December 17, 1941. .
By October, 1941, it had been found pOSSIbl
\. to assemble 500,000 tons of supplies and 20,000
fully equipped and fairly well trained troops as
reinforcements for the Philippine Islands .. Fe'~
troop transports were available, but with hastJ
conversion of passenger ships to troop carrierS,
11 troop ships were scheduled to sail betweeJ1
November 21st and December 9th. Twelve carg
vessels were to sail between November 21st an
January 6th. Six of the troop ships and nine carg
go (I94I-I943
 bessels were a: sea whe~ word of the Pearl Har~"
or attack was received; Orders were flashed to all ..
of these vessels to proceed to the nearest friendly
POrt and to observe radio silence. Four of the
troop ships returned to San Francisco. The other
two, which were "well out from Honolulu with
4,500 troops aboard, made Brisbane, Australia,
~fter 15 days of silence and uncertainty. All but
ne of the cargo vessels reached friendly ports.
!he exception was presumed captured after hav-
Ing reported on January 1st fronl 600 miles south
~f Tahiti that an unidentified airplane had or- .
Nered her to halt but that she was proceeding to'
ew Zealand. Another vessel whose cargo in:=--
cI.u~ed P-40 fighters, motor vehicles, rifles~ amnlU- .
nhItl0n, and gasoline, was at ChristInas Island, at \
t e time the Japanese struck. It immediately put
to sea and no word was heard from it until the
h 3rd of Decenlber when it sailed into Los Angeles
arbor ~ith its cargo i'ntact. .
h Further deliveries to the Far Eastern area were
.ampered by the loss of Wake Island which neces-
SItated the inlnlediate developlnent of an alternate
~rans-Pac;:ificroute via Christmas Island, Canton
sland, Fiji and New Caledonia. The new route
~as opened to traffic during-January 1'942. In the
~nterim all heavy bomber air movements were
I~mediately undertaken from Miami, Florida,
~la Brazil,' equatQrial Africa, and India through
Umatra to Java and ..Australia. The loss of Su-
matra in February terminated deliveries by this
fhOute.\Vhile this sudden reversal of a movement
alf way around the earth demoQstrated the mo-
(1941-1943) . ' 91
 - - - ]
oility of the airplane, it also demonstrated the
lack of mobility of air forces-until a lengthy pr~
ess of building up ground service forces an
supplies (mechanics, ordnance and radio tech'
nicians, sig~~l personnel,_ radar "'arning detach;1
ments, antIaIrcraft, medical and quartermaste
units, as well as the troops to capture airfields and
defend them against land attack, and the accuIIl'd
lation <;>f
repair machinery, gasoline, bombs an
ammunition) had been laboriously completed bY
transport plane, passenger and cargo ship-the,
last two largely being slow-moving means of tranS'
portation. rrhe planes flew to Australia in 10
days. The ground units and mater,iel to service, th~
7 planes and keep. them flying required appro~l'l
maiely two and a half months or longer for the
transfer.
TIME FACTOR

-Our greatest problem during this period waj

the recognized urgency of the situation as oppose~
by the fact that we were just in the process 01
obtaining ammunition, arms and equipment al
a result of appropriations made from a ,year tO
two years previously and of having available onlyI
parti.a~ly ~rained troops as a result, of the recent
mobIlIzatIon and expansion to war strength of the
National 'Guard and the few Regular Army units,
and the passage of the Selective Service Act the
previous fall. Our first obligation had been to see
that the troops assembled in this country pas'
sessed enough equipment (about 30 to 50 pe

l
cent per divisiQn)4 to permit them to be traine
2
9 (I94I-I943
 ~r employment wherever the defenses of the
est~rn Hemisphere might require, and to make
certaIn that we had in the Panama Canal Zone,
I-Iawaii and Alaska ,sufficient garrisons and arma-
~ent to prevent a hostile landing. All this took
tune, and time was ,vhat we lacked. .
. Deficiencies in arms and equipment especially
~n ammunition and airplanes required for the
Immediate defense of the Western Hemisphere,:II=
~he Panama Canal Zone, .Alaska, an~ for the Re~u-
ar Army and National Guard with supporting
troops, were so serious that adequate reinforce-
ments for the Philippines at this time would have
left the United States in a position of great peril
should there be a break in the defenses of Great
Britain. It was not until new troops had been
trained and equipped and Flying Fortresses,
fi?~ter planes, tanks, guns and slllall arms amlllU-
~ltion began to COllle off asseinbly lines on a par-
tIal quantity production basis in the late SUllllller
of 1941 that reinforcelllents for our most distant
OUtpost could be provided without jeopardy to
COntinental United States.
i' .. Vitally important in the strategic defense of the United States
t~ Brazil which offers the nearest point of approach to this con-
2 nent from the East. It is also vital to the security of the Panama
t al~~l that the various avenues of approach through Brazilian
d~r~ltory be in friendly hands and adequately guarded. The tra-
pitlonal friendship between Brazil and the United States and com-
tete agreement between the two peoples on matters of interest
dO tbe \Vestern Hemisphere has had an important bearing on our
a efense ~reparations. (:Iose cooperation betwee~ the Unite.d States
z.7d H.raZlI was crystallized through the formatIOn of a JOlllt Bra-
s~-Unlled States Defense Commission in May, 1942. This commis-
Ion has since been working on mutual defense plans and matters
related to our common w~r eft'ort.
(I 94 I. I 94 3 ) .
93
 As an example of the degree of our shortages,
the necessity for disapproving the requests ~f th~
Government of the Netherlands East IndIes
cited. After urgent requests through the variot1~
channels the representatives of that governmetl
fin~lly called on me personally in the latter part
of August, '94', and made a moving appeal fori l
among .other things, an initial allotment 0J
25,000,000 rounds of small arms caliber .30 a~l
munition. They stated that they feared the d1S'j
integration of their ground forces unless at least
a small amount of ammunition was promrtlYt
issued. We had an extremely critical situatlo/I
here in the United States but the dilemma 0t
these fine people was so tragic in the face of tbe
Japanese threat that it was finally decide? tOl
accept the hazard of reducing the ammUnitIOn
reserve for the troops in movement to Icela?d. tO
an extent. which would permit seven mIlh~~I
rounds bemg turned over to the Dutch. Four mill
lion of these rounds were to be made quicklY
available by shipment from Manila, replacemeIl(j
shipments being started from San Francisco iJ1
mediately. (Incidentally, seven million round~
was to be the daily delivery of a plant which was
due to get into production in early October, b?t
that, was to be too late for the gathering storm 111
the Far EasL)j
On all the fighting fronts the Allies were in ~
desperate situation due to lack of adequate mate:
riel while facing an enemy who possessed a~
abundance of the lnost modern equipment COIl~
ceived at that tilne. The trying problenl of the
94 (I94I-I94J)

.~
 'Y~r Department was to meet the urgent neces-
SItIes.of critical fronts without jeopardy to the
iecunty of continental United States. l\10ney in
arge appropriations had been made available but
not available was the time in which to convert this
money into munitions ready for issue.
b T~e Lend-Lease Act was passed in March, 1941,
Ut It was not until the latter part of that year
that it began to be effective in its results. An agree-
~e.n.t for aid to Russia in cooperation. with .the
bflhsh was implemented in October and was Just
ec~ming effective when we entered the war .as a
bellIgerent. In spite of our situation, it was vital -
that We help both Russia and the United King-
~orn for out: own security. This. matter ",:as con-
~dered so important that Lend-Lease aId con-
tInued throughout the crisis of our entrance into
the War without notable interruptions except in
the case of a few critical items.5 .

CHANGING SITUATION

In connection with the foregoing and with

what follows, it is difficult to keep in ~ind the.
Constant changes in the international situation
and in the development of trained troops and
n:unitions which dictated the succession of deci-
SIons and actions. For example, in the light of
the situation today, the summer of 1943,' we are
~ot justified in maintaining large air and ground
Installations in the Caribbean from Trinidad
north to Cuba and even in the Panama Canal
Zone itself so far as mobile ground forces are con-
cerned. The original program was undertaken in
I (Z94z-Z943) . '95
 -_i

view ~fthep~ssibility tnata great trage~y~u;;

denly might befall the. United Kingdom wIth t
consequent complete reversal of the naval Sit . ua-s
tion in the North and South Atlantic. Then, ~
well as much later Our military developments If}
the Caribbean had to be measured by the con-
stant threat of a German occupation of 1\-lorocco
and Dakar and fifth column activities throughotlt
Latin Alnerica. '*' As these possibilities, at timeS
seeming probabilities, were wiped from the slat
the requiren1ents in the Caribbean were altere, d
Inateriallyand construction of installations ~a~
canceled and large portions of the garrisons wIth
drawn. ..f
Our 'deployments were made In the lIght 0
. limited resources in troops and equipment at th~
time and a continuing lack of sufficient ocea~ toIl.
nage or landing craft, or both, and were lI?-fltl
- 'enced also by the length of ..turn-around req ul~e?
of ocean shipping and the limited docking faold
ties at. many ports. As these conditions changed I
our strategical approach to the war .was altere I
.accordingly. The'recent opening of the l\1editer-
ranean to convoys, for instance, has profoundlY
affected the logical possibilities in this world-
I wide war.G

In \Ia"ch, 19.12, the Inter-American Defense Board was created

(:olll}>osed of miiitary and naval technicians appointed by the goY'
ernments co.ncerned. to consider measures necessary for .the .defens.~
of the COntment. LIeutenant 'General Stanley D. EmbIck IS pres
ently chairman of the board and is senior United States member.
All of the Latin American countries are represented. The charter
of this board is contained in the resolutions of the Third Con-
ference
1932. of Foreign i\ljnisters held at Rio de Janeiro in January.
6
9 (I94I-I943)
 THE FOURTH PHASE
WAR Is
\
DECLARED

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on De-

cember. 7, 1941, galvanized the entire military
organization of our nation into the immediate
t~Sksof protecting the United States, Alaska and
t e Panama Canal Zone against surprise attack
and sabotage. It also precipitated the movement
of additional men and materiel to guard our ex- .
~ended naval. and air lines of communications
rorn the United States to active and prospective
~eaters of operation's, and to replace losses in
aWaii. Plans which had been formulated in
preparation for a possible state of war were put
I?to effect according to the demands of the actual
SItuation.
. Since the Japanese ~ttacks on the Pacific Fleet
~ Hawaii had uncovered the entire west coast of
orth America, the reinforcement of garrisons
along the West Coast, Panama, Hawaii, and in
~laska was given first priority. ~e movement of
aIr forces and antiaircraft units was initiated im-
lllediately by flight and fast freight specials. The
~ovement of an army corps of two infantry divi-
SIOnsand corps troops to the West Coast started
On December 14, 1941, and was completed a few
days later. By December 17th the critical areas
On both the Pacific and Atlantic coasts had been
provided with a reasonable degree of protection
(1941-1943). 97
 ag-ainst aIr and sea attack. *. Additional antI"air-
craft units were sent by sea, and air rem f or ce'
'-J
he

ments were flown to the Panama Canal.' In t ..

first five weeks of the war these deployments ~?
conjunction with the forces enroute to Hawaii;
Alaska, and other bases involved a rail movelue~1
of approxinlately 600,000 troops with their vehle-
ul~r transportation, guns and eq':lipment. Th~
railroads of the nation handled thiS sudden and
trelnendous vOlume of traffic in personnel al1
!Uateriel in an extremely efficient mann~r, ~han~~
In part to the previous elaborate orgaIllZatlon I,
?epth of coastal pOrts of embarkation wi~h thel~
l~1tennediate storage depots and r'eg~latln!S SUl.
lIons extending as far inland as PhoenIx, Anzona,
Ogden, Utah, and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. ** e
A first necessity was to Inake good the daruag
in Hawaii and to strengthen its defenses and. thOS~
at l\Iidway, to establish a succession of Islan
bases to guard the Pacific lines of communicatio~
with A"ustralia and New Zealand and to permIt
the transport of bombers and transport planes a~d
the servicing of naval aircraft and shipping. ShipS
in the Pacific Coast harbors were ilnmediate1Y
requisitioned, reloaded and sent westward with
COInbat and service personnel, aircraft equipment
and other 11lateriel. Two fast convoys were orga~:
izeel, loaded and left San Francisco for HawaII
In. F~hruary. 1942, the Joint Mexican-United Stat~s Defens~
CommiSSIon was established to consider problems relating to th
common defense of the United States and Mexico. The coopera'
tion between the two governments
plete. . in these matters has been cotll'

The rail tonnage <:oncentrated on the Brooklyn Army Base

in the fall of 1941 exceeded that of 1918 on the Port of New Yorj{.
8
9 (I94I-I94J)
d .
u.nng the first 10 days of the 'war. A convoy en
rOUteto the Philippines was diverted to Australia.
!~oops were sent to relieve the Marines and
Bnhsh forces in Iceland and, at the same time, the
first echelon of troops was sent overseas to Nort~-
~rn Ireland to assist in the protection of the Bnt-
Ish.I~lesand to pave the way for future American
actIVItiesin Europe.
The outposts of the Panama Canal defens:s
Wererapidly extended by the establishment of aIr ..
bases in South and Central America7 and by the
provision of small coast artillery detachments with
155mm guns to defend the critical points along
the South American coast as -far as Chile. .
To meet the situation in the United States the
areas contiguous to the East and West Coasts were
organized into the Eastern and Western Defense
Commands respectively and placed under the
Command of Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum
and Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt. Inte-
~ated into this command setup was the opera-
tIonal control of interceptor aircraft assigned to
protect our coastlines. In addition, General De-
Witt retained control over the Alaskan Defense
Command and General Drum over the United
States troops in Newfoundland and Bermuda.
(Chart 12.) .
Work on the Alaska Military Highway was ac-
celerated ,and the road was opened to traffic on
OctOber 29, 1942-, despite the difficulties of
Weather and terrain.8
z-
(Z94 Z943)
99
 STRATEGY l'\ND CONTROL - I
. '~

On December 23, 1911, Winston Chu;chl, 'jl

Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompan.led.b
the British Chiefs of Staff, arrived in Washrngto"j
'to confer with the President and the Arnerica!
Chiefs of Staff. Out of tile series of discussiO~
which then followed resulted an agreement, n~
only regarding the imrllediate strategy for OIl,
combined conduct of the war, but also for th~
organization. of a nlethod for the strategical CO~~
mand and control of British and American lnrl~
!ary resources. Probably no other Allied actioJl
IIIthe. field or otherwise, has exert~d as powerf~
an effect On the conduct of this war as the promp
~stablishnlent of a prescribed procedure 01
achieving unity of effort through the nlediunl~
the Combined Chiefs of Staff acting under th:
direction of the leaders of their respective govern;
lnen ts, There has been a gradual expansion of the
system to include most of the activities involvei
in the war effort and We have been able to solv,
our problerllS and settle our differences in, an 0:'
derly and effective manner. The .control of mib:
tary intelligence, of secrecy, the requirements i~
l~lanpower, troop types and rllunitions, the aJloca~
tron of organizations, lnateriel and shipping, the
coordination of cOlllmunications, the intricat?
civil administration to be established under th~
lnilitary governrnent of newly occupied or cap'
tu.red regions, all these and other factors involved
in the conduct of a global war have been resolved
100 ('94I"94JI
 tb .
rough the orderly channels of the adopted
systeu1.9
.During this first meeting between the British
and American military authorities, which term i-
~a~edJanuary 14, 1942, steps were taken to insure' '1,1
nlfied direction of the war effort in the Far East 1

to m~et the rapidly spreading attacks of the Japa- ~

nese In that area. General Sir Archibald Wavell,
fommander-in-Chief in India, who was in Chung-
ll.ng, China~ at the tinle with l\lajor General (now
lJle~"ltenant General) George H. Brett of the ,
nlted States Anny, ,va.s designated Supreme ~i,
Commander for Alnerican, British, Dutch and \~:
~Ustralian forces, with General Brett as. his
epUty, and although the strong, carefully pre-
~a~e? tide of. the Japanese advance overran the
~h1hppines, the Netherlands East Indies, the
faIay Peninsula, and 'Bunna, the cooperative
~hsults o~tained 'in t~is desperate emerge.ncy by
fi e creatIon of a unIted command establIshed a
rrn basis for future combil1;ed operations.

GLOBAL WAR

b The attack by Japan and the'declaration of war

y ~ermany and Italy ilnmediately involved the
Unlted States and Great Britain in a war of global
IpropOrtions unique in the history of the world. It
I 'has not merely ,var on two fronts but in several
ItI.eaters, with lines. of comnlunication encir-
cIng the earth and extending over 56,000 miles.
(Chart 13.)
For both Great Britain and the United States, ,
(/94/-/943) 101
 military operations in, the Pacific Area and t~
Far East created unprecedented logistical pro!
lems with respect to shipping. Time and spac
"'
factors dictated our strategy to a considerable d,~
gree. To land and maintain American forces 1
Australia required more than twice the ship to?
nage necessary for similar American forces,'~
- Europe or North Africa. In this critical peno I

however, it was necessary to e"stablish without d~

lay large supply bases in Australia. both for a1
and ground troops and especially for the pl!rpos
of giving logistical support to our forces In the
Philippines. By June, 1942, 150,000 Army troop
as well as Marine and Navy ground echelons ha,
been established in the South and Southwest pa
cific areas. * The peculiar topography and char'
acter of the Australian continent made the tasj
there one of extreme difficulty, Austr~lia~ d~
tances are tremendous, the communIcatIonS
road, rail, and electric wire-were limited an
complicated by the absence of standardizatioI1!
and the frontier for 4,500 miles was exposed to
possible Japanese landings.
Japan struck at Hawaii, the Philippines, Ma'
laya, and strategic islands in the central Pacific.
With the advantage of a long period of pr.epara'
tion including numerous initial moves in China
and IndO-China to establish advance air and other
American units were also landed in New Zealand. The gov'
ernment of New Zealand and the local municipal governme~tS
hav~ cooperated. i~ every practicable manner to provide faciliues;
servIces, and bU.Ildm~ required by our forces. New Zealand tro?PJ1
~ow are. operatmg with American forces in complete cooperaUo
m carrymg out assigned missions.

102 (I94I-I943!
 I

bases,a~d, capitalizing upon surprise action, the

Japanese launched their thrust to prevent the
Concentration or reinforcement of Allied forces
t ohalt the drive south toward Australia and
nurma.10 '
STRUGGLE FOR THE PHILIPPINES

The left wing of the southward advance .of the

Japanese was concentrated on the reductIon of
the Philippines. Our strength in the Islands at
that time consisted of 19,000 United States Army
troops, 12,000 Philippine Scouts and approxI-
~ately I?O,OOOmen of the ne,",:lymobili~~d ~nd I

Ut partIally trained and equIpped PhIlIppIne

~rmy. Included in these forces were SOine 8,000
rmy Air Forces personnel equipped with some
250 aircraft, of which 35 were Flying Fortresses
and 107 were P-40 fighters. . ,
. The enemy led off with systematic bombing of
~lrfields,and key points in Luzon which resulted
~nthe destruction of a large number. of our planes
.Ue to limited dispersal fields' and lack of suffi-
CIentradar warning equipment, anti-aircraft guns,
and other materiel.
. On December loth and 22nd, Japanese land-
~ngs!were made in northwestern Luzon. Outnum-
ered and incompletely equipped, lacking air
~llpport, and~utilizing troops but recently mobil-
IZed and organized for the first time into regi-
ll1ental.groups, General MacArthur was left no
a!ternative but that of a delaying action. His ac-
~IonWasfurther com plicated by another Japanese
anding, in force, on the eastern coast of Luzon.
(1941-1943) . 13
Under great diffic'Ulties an orderly withdrawal w~
effected into the Bataan Peninsula for a final d
fensive stand. protected and supported by t~~
fortress of Corregidor. The remaining born
ing planes" were sent to Mindanao (later to Aus-
tralia) with the mission of securing bases fro~
which to support the operations on Bataan. Tb
eneiny rapidly concentrated his forces ashore an.d
l;ulllched heavy attacks against the Bataan garr\
son, which heroically contested every foot 0
f

ground.. . d
.(By the .end o~ January, Japanese troops ha e
seIzed the Important oil center of Tarakan on th
northeast coast of Borneo, captured Rabaul ~nd
Kavieng in the Bismarck Archipelago and Kleta
on Bougainville Island in the Solomons, were
rapidly approaching Singapore* from the no.r~h,
a':ld controlled the sea and air routes to the P!l1hP i
pInes. They stood along a 4,00o-mile frontler. 0
the Dutch East Indies and the l\lelanesian Barner
with their f?rces in position to threaten the- re-
maining Dutch possessions, Australia and the
islands to its north and east.)
The difficulties of the supply situation 011
Bataan, under the Japanese blockade, were greatly
aggravated by the fact that thousands of civi~ians
accompanied the army into the Bataan Peninsula .
.The number/ of people to be supplied quis:klY
forced a reduction of the entire comn1and to half
rations. Efforts were iInlnediate1y initiated to or-
ganize b.ockade running from the N ethe:l~nds
East IndIes and Australia and to carry medIcInes,
Singapore fell to the Japanese on February 15, 1942 ..
10'1 (I94I-I943)
 speCialfuses' and othe'r 'criticallnunitions
ll1 .' ,
by"sub-
t anne. The blockade r~nning, financed ..from
S~e funds placed at the disposal of. the C.hIef of
aff by Congress, involved many dIfficultIes; for
example, it was found that the small ship owners
and crew Inembers approached in Java, l'imor,
~nd New Guinea would not accept checks on our I

ederal funds deposited in ~1elbourne, but de-

~anded cash. Therefore the actual money had to
e flown. across Africa and India by plane for
delivery in Java. A cOlnplete report of these peril-
ou.soperations has never been received. Of seven
S?IPs dispatched froln Australia only three ar-
rI~ed at Cebu. Atternpts to trans-ship these sup-
plIes from Cebu to Corregidor failed because of
I ~he rigid enemy blockade. At least 15 of these
lockade runners, totaling 40,000 tons, were sunk
~r captured by the enerny while attempting to get.
Upplies throug-h
St ~
to Bataan. Several overage\
de-
brOyers were also fitted out as blockade runners
pu~ .none of these succeeded in reaching the
~lhppines prior to the fall of Corregidor. Deliv-
erIes of supplies and the evacuation of certain _ -
Phrsonnel by submarine continued at intervals
t .roughout the siege. _ .
The difficulty of penetrating the Japanese
~lockade and getting supplies to Corregidor and
ataan caused the military situation to deterio-
rate. The half rations issued since January II,
1942, had been further reduced by the e'nd of
l\Iarch, and horses and mules were being slaugh-
tered for food. .
In 'view of the enelny's capabilities throughout
(19'1I-1943) \ 105 .,
 .
thc .. Pac.ific and our .u~tenable POSitIOn in .t
~I
PluhppInes, the major efforts of the UnI~ed
States were directed toward a rapid concentratlot1
of defense forces along our route to Australia, tb~
creation of an effective striking force on that cor
tinent, and the dispatch of material aid to t d-
forces of our Allies in the East Indies.ll Accor
ingly, Hawaii was strengthened, additional is~and~
along the South Pacific air ferry route were gar
risoned, and a large force was provided for tbel
defense of New Caledonia. The components of a
balanced air force were shipped to Australia, t~et
heavy bombers being flown in via Hawaii or IndIa"
Shipping limitations precluded the early dispatcbl
of large bodies of ground troops.
In February, 1942, General MacArthur
instructed by the War Department
waS
to proceed .to
I
Australia to assume command of the newly dcsIg-1
nated Southwest Pacific Area. His directive froIJ1
the Combined. Chiefs of Staff included the mis-
sions of holding Australia, checking the ene~Y's
advance along the ~1elanesian Barrier, protectIng
land, sea and air communications with the Soutb-
I
west Pacific and maintaining our positio. n in the,
Phi!ippi~es. Lieutenant General Jonathan, 1\1,
\Vamwnght, succeeding General MacArthur aS
com~ander of the forces in the Philippine IslandS'tI
contInued the gallant defense which has becoll1e.
an epic in American history .
. ~n ~larch 31st the Japanese initiated the. an'
tIcIpated general assault on the Bataan positIOI1'
an attack relentlessly maintained during the ne"t
seven days. As our lines were finally penetratedj
. 106 . (I94I-I94 J)
k~d. ~eld hospitals were shelled by Japanese artil-
became apparent that the courageous but
~, It
ex austed defenders could no longer avoid dis-
aster.
fOn April 9th the following radio was received
rom General Wainwright on Corregidor:

r ShOrt.ly after-
flag of truce- passed through the front
ilne thIs morning, hostilities ceased for the most part
R' Bataan .. At about 10 o'clock this morning General
lng was sent .,
Illa d
for to confer with the Japanese cam-
I n er. He has not returned, as of 7 0' clock p.m., nor
nas result of conference been disclosed. Since the fall of
Cataan the hostile air force has renewed its attack on
n orregidor. This island was heavily bombed this after-
Oon but has suffered no damage of military conse-
qUence.

Despite Bataan's loss, Corregidor, Fort Drum,

a.nd Fort Hughes (all island fortifications) con-
tInued to resist enemy attacks with counter-battery
and antiaircraft fire for nearly a month. On April
{3th and 14th a squadron of American bombers
rom the south successfully attacke'd Japanese in-
Stallations and shipping in the Philippine area.
On May 5th, after a week of intensive bonlbard-
lllent which buried many of the shore defenses
N nder landslides, the enemy made a landing on
fOrth Point of Corregidor. The shattered de-
fenses were unable to dam the Japanese tide. The
ollowing day the exhausted and depleted forces
\~ere overwhelnled and finally surrendered.
The final spirit of General Wainwright's heroic
Command is indicated by the extract from a letter
\vritten by hiln just before Corregidor fell: '
(1941-I 943) 107
 0-s
., .
I write this we are subjected to terrific air aeO
J
artillery bombardment arid it ts unreasonable to e"te
thatth we can hold out ror long. We have done our st~
b.o here and
still unashamed. on Bataan, and although beaten we a I
Concurrently with the campaign to red~ce th:.,
Philippines, the enemy tJ.a~ exploited ~IS s~f
ces~es on the Malayan Pentnsula to .brtng .t a'
ttre
e.n Netherlands East Indies under hIS damn! d
~lOn. C,?ncentration <;>fJapanese forces there aDe
111 the BIsmarck ArchIpelago and Solomon Islan .
constituted a direct threat to aUf lines of colll
lnunication in the PaCific and to the north coaslt
of Australia. .
These initial Japanese successes were ~ue .to
Allied lack of nlilitary means, especially In a1r
craft and its SUPPOrting warning and mainten~nc~
services, to oppose an adversary whose preht?
' nary strategic deployments permitted successI~e
. concentrations of overwhelming superiorit~ 1I1
land, sea, and air forces on selected objecuvej
The effects of the desperate resistance offere
by the Philippine Army and United States fo~cel
on Bataan, holding' as they did a sizeable port~OO
of Japanese strength, were now being felt. DUring
the delay thus gained men and materials 'were
dispatched to Australia, New Caledonia and' other
'ql
Pac~fic islands. 1~he growth of power of the
United Nations in the Southwest Pacific was pre'
~aged by our air forces which were now perfor~'
lng I
long-range bOlnbing lllissions aO'ainst Japan's
.
new Y aC<}lured . the Blslnarcks
bases In . b an dNoJ
1 e'
Guinea, and were also making Japanese attemptS
108 (194 1-194})
 ~o bomb Port l\loresby and northern Australia
Iner . ' costly. The bombing of Japan b your
1 easingly
P a~es commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (now
~aJor General) James H. Doolittle was a hearten-
~ngeVent in' a generally somber picture. Despite
Aeayylosses in men and materials sustained by the
h1hesin ~1alaya, the N etherlands Eas~ Indies, and
It e Philippines, the military balance was ap-
. rroaching an equilibrium. The initiative was no
Onger completely in enemy hands. '

CORAL SEA: HIGH TIDE OF AGGRESSION

That Japan intended to exploit her victories to

the limit was indicated by preparations for an
.offensive toward Australia based on the Bis-
ll1~reksand the upper Solomons. On May 4~ 1942,
thIs new adventure was signalized by the seizure
~f the port of Tulagi in the centra,l Solomons.
etWeen l\1ay 7th and 1 I th, however, a heavy I

~olumn of enemy naval vessels and transports mov-

Ing southward in the Coral Sea was decisively
defeated by Allied naval and air forces off the
Louisiade. Archipelago. Suffering heavy losses the
lnemy retired toward bases in the Mandated Is-
ands. Army aircraft supported this action by
repeated attacks on Japanese bases at Lae, Sala-
lb.aua, Rabaul, Kieta, and the Shortland areas in
SOUthern Bougainville, where concentrations of
enemy shipping provided lucrative targets.
The Coral Sea action marked the high tide of
Jap~nese conquest in the Southwest Pacific. The
pOSSIbilitythat the enemy would shift his strength
(1941-1943) . 109
 THE FIFTH PHASE
, THE SOLOMONS

~l-IE .oPERATION against Guadalcanal in~ugura~ed

h senes of offensive moves in the PacIfic whICh
oaVecontinued to the present date. T~e eneI?Y
CCUpationof the Solomon Islands permItted hIm
the use of advance air and naval bases from which
to attack our long Pacific supply line and the
llOrth coast of Australia. On August 7, 1942,
~h.erefore,United States Navy and Marine for~es
, elzed beachheads on Guadalcanal and Flonda
I~land and occupied Tulagi. The highly 'prized
aIrfield on Guadalcanal was held by' the Marines
against a long series of heavy air, sea, and ground
assaults by the enemy. The resolute defense of
these Marines under Major General (now Lieu-
tenant General) AlexanderA. Vandegrift and the
desperate gallantry orour naval task forces marked
the turning point in the Pacific.
Army ground units' commenced reinforcement ,
of the Marines on October 13th. On December
9th, command in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area
passed to the Army under Major General Alex-
ander M. Patch. Early in 1943, a series of well-
e:xecuted and vigorous operations by A!my divi-
Sl?ns and one Marine regiment in conjunction
~lth air offensive, defensive, and support opera-
ho~s comrressed and then destroyed all enemy
reSIstanceon the)sland. (Map A.) .
(I94I~I94;) III
 , PAPUA
,
\\Thile strongly
'. .
contesting our offensIve 111 he
'" tbe
Solomons during the summer and fall '.'f '942,. t !
enemy's determination to exploit h:J.s preVl?~,
gains Was indicated by persistent reports of act1V~1
. In
tIes . th e Blsmarcks,
. upper So 1omons an d Ne"
Guinea. These proved to be preparations for all
overland push from Buna through the OW~
Stanley ~lountains with Port lVloresby, our a
vance base on the south coast of New G.Ulnea, as
the immediate objective. (Map B.) . d
By September 12th, the Japanese had ~orce f
Allied ground forces back to within, 30 mIles d
POrt ~foresby in an advance which demonstrate
great skill in jungle and 11l0Untain fighting; hoW'
, ever, reinforcenlent of Allied ground troops cotl'
pled with effective air suppOrt finally turned b~ck
this threat. By the end of November, convergmg
attacks by Alnerican and Australian troops had
confined the enemy to pockets along the no~th'
east coast. In the final stages of the Allied dnve;
the Anny Air Forces under Lieutenant Genera
. George C. Kenney, while destroying the enem.1
shipping employed in attempts to supply hIS
troops, flew a COlllplete striking force-troops,
equipment, and food-from POrt ,l\foresbyover
,'II
~he Owen Stanley Range to the Buna area, utiliz-
,lOg bombers 'as well as transport planes.12
Our air offensive ultinlately forced the now
des~erate Japanese to use parachutes and s,:,l;>-
mannes to SUpply their forces which were resIst-
ing our ground pressure with fanatical tenacity.
II 2 ( I 94 I _I 943)

.......
 Early in !943, the northeast coast of New Guinea
Wasfinally cleared of the enemy by American ~nd
AUstralian troops under the command of LIeu-
tenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, as far
nOrth as Buna, but only after he had been sys-
tematically rooted out of his foxholes along the
beaches and destroyed by the determined assaults
of our men. Success in this campaign is all the - ~~I

more remarkable in view of the fact that through-

OUtGenerall\1acArthur's operations he was handi-
capped by a serious lack of small vessels, transport
planes and special jungle equipment i~ a climate.
deleterious to white races. .
_The United Nations in the Pacific theater now
Possessed nlore secure rositions from which to
COunter Japanese offensive ventures; also, conl-
manders and troops had secured valuable experi-
ence in battle. Unified command arrangeillents
'~ere Welding sea, air, and ground forces into effi-
CIent fighting teams. Air superiority was deillon-
Strated by a loss ratio of .four to one in our favor;
(Chari 14) and a more complete control of the sea
was made possible by the "skip-bombing" tactics
kerfected in the Southwest Pacific by General
enney's ainllen. In a single instance, a convoy
proceeding through Vitiaz Strait into Huon Gulf
W~sCOl11pletelydestroyed by this type of attack: In
tIllS Battle of the Bisillarck Sea, Allied losses were
One bomber and three pursuit planes, with a
casualty list of 13 nlen, compared to a known
JaI?anese lost of 61 planes and 22 ships, and an
estlInated loss of an entire division of 15,000 nlen.
Rapidly increasing military resources in the
(I 94 I -I 94 3 ) 11 3
 Pacific now afford us considerable fr:eedom of
aCtion. The. characteris'tics of the theater, pre;,
dominantly oceanic, demand precise and ~fliC1el
teamwork on the part of our naval, aIr, an
ground forces. There are no shortcuts in the aC-
complishment of the arduous task. Successes thU~
far in piercing the enemy's protective scre~n. 0
island citadels prove the soundness of combInIng
surface and sUbmarine attacks on hostile sea routeS
of communication, strategic employment of ';lur
long-range bombers against the enemy's stagwfJ
and supply bases, and coordinated assaults by a
elements upon successive objectives.13

EUROPEAN THEATER

Prior to our entry into the war, the United

States, through Lend-Lease operations, had sup'
pOrted British war economy and had includ~d
measures t? insure safe delivery of these sup~ltes
- an~ matenals. When we Were precipitated lI~tO
actIve participation in the struggle, the necessl~Y
for the protection and Control of the trans-AtlantiC
sea routes became both urgent and vitaL Init~al
preparatory measures on Our part therefore 10-
clUd~d t~e strengthening of both sea and air com-
munIcatIon routes and this in turn involved'the
further development of bases in Newfoundland,
Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom.
\Vhen we entered the war, Germany, although
cOU1mitted on the Eastern Front had sufficient
divisions in Northwestern Europ~ to threaten a
cross-Channel invasion or a possible thrust to
114 (I94 I'I913)
 ~seize Iceland on the Hank of the sea lanes frOll) 'r he
-l.!nited States to the' United Kingdolll and R~s-
Sla. American forces, in sufficient strength to ,dIS-, I
,C~urage such a venture, previously had be:n 1
dIspatched to augment the Bri.tis~ garr.ison In
Iceland. The latter was relieved In Its entIrety by
the SUllllner of 1942.

UNI~EO STATES TROOPS IVlovE TO UNITED

KINGDOM

Despite the fact that the initiative at this time

lay Wholly in the hands of the Axis our prelimi- ;'
nary movements were based on future aggressive 1'.1

~ction. The tillle factor now became increasingly.,

I
1

Ilhportant, tillle in which to train the new armies,

to, procure the shipping and munitions, and to 1.,

organize the long lines of communications, while .'

holding the enemy at bay. Detailed planning for I'
specific future offensive operations was already
under way in line with the basic strategy which
had been previously determined. .
Upan our entry into the 'war it becallle urgently
desirable to move United States troops into the II
United Kingdom as early as possible 'to bolster 11,1
the defenses there which had been seriously Ii
. Weakened by the dispatch of troops to the l\fid-
~~e and the} Fanr ~~slt: and lfor Athe hPsychological
ect on t le ntlS 1 peop e. t t at llloment,
t
~I
however, the 'threat to Australia was so serious. ~
~hat most of the shipping imlllediately available ,1
In the Atlantic in January had to be hurriedly li~
n1
e ployed for the Illovement of 25,000 troops to 1.I.tl,I .

(I 94 1-1943) . lIS I~

III
 the Southwest Pacific, largely to garrison Ne~
Caledonia. It therefore Was not possible to. se~
I more than a single division to ,Ireland until t e
folloWing summer. .
Steps were immediately taken to build up in the
United King.d?m a strong American !1ir forc
. notably precIsIon bombers. These unIts woul
afford additional protection to the British IsleS
d
against ariy invasion attempt.
The movement of United States troops to the
United Kingdom utilized our shortest line of c~I1I'
munications overseas and effected a concentratIOl1
of British, Canadian and American forces .which,
with the suPPOrt of the powerful metropolita~
Royal Air Force, forced tfie enemy to employ addl'
, tional troops in northwestern France, thereby re'
ducing the strength he could employ elsewhere.
In the latter part of January, 1942, the first
. convoy of our troops arrived in Northern Ireland.
The complicated transportation, construction and
administrative problems were solved with t!'e
close' cooperation of all the British agenCieS
concerned.
By June -the gathering strength of United
States forces in the United Kingdom made it ~ec'
essary to establish a headquarters and organlza-
tio~ for a EJiropean The".ter of Operations,: and
Major General (now General) Dwight D. Elsen'
hower Wasplaced in command. ..
The United States Army Air F~rces assault 011
, the continent of Europe was launched on July 4.
1942, when six American aircraft and crews par-
ticipated in a Royal Air Force attack on tar-
116 (I94I-I943)
 tetsomber
in Holland. The combined American~British
offensive against the continent of Europe
tOday gives prolnise of being a decisive factor in
~he ultimate destruction of the German citadel. ~t '
as for its objectives the reduction of German aIr
Com~at strength to a virtual impotenc~; t~e dis-
rUption of vital elements of the enemy s hnes of
c~mmuni"cations; the progressive destruction and
dIslocation of the Gernlan 111ilitary, industrial and
e~ononlic system; and by the resultant psycholo:
gI~al impact on the German people, the under-
llllning of their nlorale and their willingness to
CO~tinue to support the war. effort. Thus the
objective of the combined homber offensive is the
elinlination of both the Gennan ability and will
to Continue to "\vage war. .

AERIAL ASSAULT ON FORTRESS OF EUROPE

The British heavy bOlnber conlmand ,vas de-

Ve!oped for the purpose of carrying out night
lUISsions, while the Alnerican Flying Fortresses
a.nd Liberators were developed for daylight opera-
tIons. In the British planes, speed and annalnent
~ere limited in favor of lot:Jg range and heavy
.olnb loads. This type plane is especially effec-
tIVe for night operations over industrial areas
Where a high degree of precision in bOll1bing is
nOt vitally necessary. On the other hand the
~nlerican bOlllber design tends toward a fast, very
eavil y anned and armored high altitude plane.
~ts 11lorelimited bOlnb capacity is compensated for
Y the perfection of the precision bombsight_
(1941-1943) 117

"tnn
 .which permits small specific targets to be singled
out for destruction. The viplence of the Genna?
fighter plane reaction to our daylight attacks ~~
convincing evidence of the deadly effect of preel
I'" sion bombing. The enemy must find a counter t.o
this technique or 'accept the emasculation of hlS
.~ .i
industries and his fighter command. b-
I
Allied operations to cope with German SU f
marine activities furnish an excellent example 0d
British and American cooperation, coordInate
to achieve maximum results. There are three pos-
sible types of offensive action against sUbmari',l~s;
that is, to sink them at sea, to destroy the factone
which build and equip them, and to attack the
bases from which they operate. Factories and
bases may be. rendered inoperative either by 3
night mass attack to effect general destruction 011
the area or by daylight precision attacks against
vital utilities such as power plants, fuel supplY
installations or special repair facilities. . d
Reports during the past months have menti~le
with increasing frequency air attacks agallls:
Lorient, St. Nazaire, Brest, and LaPallice, al
V-boat bases on the Westcoast of France. The pre-
cision attacks have been aimed against critical
points, the destruction of which render the gen-
.eral installations ineffective, a particularly impor-
tant procedure Where the docks and other vital
installations have been protected by heavy con-
crete overhead cover. The night bombing attacks
carried out by the British have involved loads of
over 1,000 .tons dropped in a single operiltio~
with the effect of devastating general service facilt~
118 (I94I-I943)
 ties ' k'
efli . and of shattering the morale and wor lng
. Clency of the personnel operating the subma-
~lne bases. At the same time heavy attacks h~ve
I se~n made day and night against the sUblnarll;e
hhlpyards at Vegesack (near Bremen) and \VI1-
~e1mshaven, and against the Essen, Dusseldorf,
lannheim, Karlsruhe and other industrial areas
producing component parts for submarine~.
~hese bombing operations, together 'with the
f~tIon of the Anti-Submarine Command and AI-
led destroyers and escort vessels~appear to be in
processof driving the submarine from the seas.
Experience over the European continent has
demonstrated the soundness of the tactical doc-
trines of our air forces and of the basic design of
the~r aircraft. Notable early examples were raids
~galnst Vegesack and Wilhelmshaven during
dlarch, 1943, in which 180 of our heavy bombers
bestroyed over 80 German fighters with a loss of
Utfiye of our own planes. These raids effectively
CUtOut of action for a period of many months the
egesack plaint and administered crippling dam-
age to the naval installations at Wilhelmshaven.
E: Our air assaults on Germany and northwestern_
urope have grown heavier a~d heavier with the
Constantly increasing strength of the 8th Air Force
operating out of th~ United Kingdom. More re-
cently it has been possible to coordinate these
~tacks closely with operations using bases in
orth Africa. The enforced concentration of the
Germans' most experienced fighter pilots in north-
'Vestern.Europe had an important bearing on air.
/194 1.1943) llg
 Operations during the final ba'ttle in TUliisia aI1d
on the situation in Russia." . . js'
The bUild-up of depots. airfields and adnu.11d
trative services for our operations in the Unite f
Kingdom has involved a tremendous program 00
shippi?g, cons.truction, and the orgaJ.lization of ~o
extenSIVeservice command. These vital factor~ 0
modern war are time-consuming in preparatl0
and impose a heavy burden on our air an? ocefe 1
transportation facilities, but they provide ~ .
solid foundation which is an imperative.xequ~rel
Inent in conducting the specialized and technlca
warfare of the present day. Hi
. On May 10, 1943, following the unfortun~tl
aIrplane accident which resulted in the death 0
Lieutenant General Frank M. Andrews, coJ1l;
and
Ill of the Enropean Theater of Operations,~
assllll1ed ~by Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devel .

NORTH AFRICAN THEATER

In January, 1942, when the Prirne..1\linister and

~is Chief of Staff were in Washington, operat!o~S
In nOrthwest Africa, in ~iforocco and AlglelS,
were discussed in detail. \Our lirnited nleans at
the tilne made it impracticable to .lllount such aI1
expedition. There were further discussions at the
time of the Prime Minister's visit to WashingtoP
the following June and the final decision waS
' taken in July to launch an expedition into north-
.n
"
west Africa in conjunction with the preperationS
for the advance westward of the' British Eightb
Anny then reorganizing on the EI Aialnein line.
] 20 (I94 I-I94})
 I

l'he openi~g of the Med~terranean wouldfacili- ,",

, tate"Allied global operations, and the removal of -
the COnstantthreat of German activities in west-
ern l\forocco and at Dakar wbuld add immeasur-
ably to the security of the Allied position while
~ath~ring strength to administer the final punish-
, I~g blows. Furthermore, ,if our occupatio~ 'of
North Africa could be carried out without fatally"
embittering the Frenc~ troops and ~uthorities in
that region it would provide a setting for the
Ieco.nstitution of the French Army in preparation
OrIts return in force to the homeland. The, psy-
chological effect of the conquest of North Africa
'v .Oud I be' tremendous.
fr The adopted plans provided that task' forces
S Om both the United Kingdom and the United
tates should strike simultaneously at Algiers,
Gran, and Casablanca. It was urgently desired to
~lake initial landings to the east of "Algiers at"
lone, Philippeville, and possibly Tunis, but the '
ack of shipping and of landing boats and aircraft
c~rriers at the time made this 'procedure imprac-
tIcable. It was desired to carry out the operation
N arlyin the fall but it was necessary to delay until
Tovember in order to receive a large number of
craft from the shipyards and provide and train the
crews for the operation of these vessels. Some of
the larger vessels did not become available until a
Weekbefore the convoys sailed.' "_ \
The success of the operation depended on the
efficient handling of a mass of qetails as well as on
the training and fighting qualities of the troops,
(194 1'1943) 12 1
 and abov~ all, upon the secrecy
, wit. h 'h'
w Ie h this
vast undertaking had to, be prepared. .' . to
General Eisenhower, who was deslgnat~d d 3
COllllnand the Allied forces involved, organIze
COInbined staff in Londol1 and directed the plaIlt'
ning. Three task forces were formed; one enur. e YS
American sailed directly from the United State,
and carried out the landings along the west coa
of Morocco, another of American troops. es~orted d
by the British Navy sailed frolu Great Bntaln an
landed in tIre vicinity of Oran, the. third, a COlIl'
bined British.American "Tound force escortedb
the British Navy, sailed &om the British Isles ~n J
landed at Algiers. There were naval cove.nn~
forces, both British and Aluerican. The cOlubIne
. air forces, other than carrier-borne and a fe~
transpOrts and heavy bombers, had t'? be f~nncle
through the' single restricted field at GIbraltar
which could have been put Out of action in less
than an hour. There was no choice but to accept
this hazard.
The problenl of ho"w to avoid fighting with the
Fren.ch forces in Africa Wasdifficult of approacl~
In the first place, and m.ost im!.'ortant of all, ~h1
hazard to the secrecy WIth wlllch the. operat101
lllUst be prepared and launched presented an e'"
tremely delicate balance in the choice of lnethods
to be followed. Should an approach be lllade to a
~ ,
single Frenchman who proved unsympathetic to
I,
1'" our purpose Werisked the slaughter of soldie~s .on
" '
the beaches of North Africa as well as deCISIVe
losses in shipping. The psychological impac~ fron1
such a defeat, at that particular Illonlent In the
122 (I94I-I94}j
 . \

~varWould have been little short of catastrophic in

Its Possible consequences.To a cet:tain degree,.
~?wev~r, this risk had to be.accepted ..~ven so, the
bIScUSSIons regarding such an expedItIon had to
e conducted on a more or less indefinite basis as i
to timing. Not until four days before the convoys
would deploy off the beaches at Algiers, Oran and
Casablanca were the few Frenchmen we had con- .~
t~cted informed of the actual date for the opera- il
~Ion. This of course made it extremely difficult,
In cases impossible, for these French officials to
~akeall the steps necessary to facilitate our land--
,lngs. The consequences of disclosure of our pur-
pos~ to the enemy, however, involved too great a
peni to justify earlier notification.
V' The singular relationship existing between the
Ichy government and Berlin, and with the \
French provinces in North Africa, together with.
the differences of religion and race and the deep-
rOoted-hatreds of the heterogeneous populations
~f Algiers and Morocco, imposed a political prob-
em of maximum complexity on General Eisen-
hower. At the moment his energies and direction
~ad to be concentrated on the successful penetra-
.~on of an Soo-mile coastline and a vast hinterland
ya force of but 107,000 meri. To further compli-
cate .the situation he must be on guard against the
pOSSIbilityof an Axis stroke through Spain to sever
our communications through the Straits of Gib-
r~ltar and interrupt by aerial bombardment the
SInglerailroad line from Casablanca through Fez
to Oran.
Concurrently' with the preparation in the
( 1941-1943) 123
'I United Kingdom of two task forces, one ofAIner'
icans to land at Oranand the other a mixed forc
. to land atAlgiers, a third task force composed
r
the 3 d Infantry and 2nd Armored Divisions, t.,e
t1
fmajord pan of the 9th Infantry Division, and rell1-
orce .Wit. h. supportmg arms and servIces,
.. waS.
organized in the United States under Major GeIl
eral (now Lieutenant General) George S. P";ttOl
I.
Jr. His headqu.arters ~v~r~temporarily estabiIshe 11 d
'I: In the OperatIons DIVISIon of the General Sta
in \Vashington which becalue the coordinatiIlg
medium between General Eisenhower and GeIl'
eral Patton. Rear Admiral (now Vice Ad~i~al~
H. K. Hewitt, who commanded the expedItIoJ
until its disembarkation in Africa, assembled the
force at sea on October 24th and sailed" for C~sa'
blanca. This task force was to effect a junCtIOn
with the force under Major General (now Lieu'
. tenant General) LLoYd Fredendall which was to
land in the vicinity of Oran.
General Fredendall's troops consisted of the 1St
Infantry Division and one-half of the I st Armored
Division, reinforced by corps troops. In addition
to seizing Oran and the adjacent airfields. and
making contact with General Patton's force in the
vicinity of Fez, this expedition was also charged
with the mission of effecting a juncture with'the
,~:: Eastern Task Force which had the mission of cap'
I- turing Algiers. The latter force under Lieutenant
General K. A. N. Anderson of the British Army,
consisted of British commando and infantry units
together with two United States regimental COIU'
4
I -2 ( I 94 I _I 94 3)
 fat teaulS, one from the 9th and one rOin the 34th
fi~fantry Divisions, and.a Ranger battalion. !he
tioSt landin~ was. to be effected under the dlrec-
A n ~f J\Ia]or General Charles W. Ryder of the
lllencan Anny. General Anderson took over
cOlllmand after the American troops had been,
establ'Ished ashore.
The two task forces sailed from the British Isles
hOctober 25th under British naval escort~ All
~h~ee task forces ~vere provided the pr?tection of
lee naval covenng forces, one Alnencan.
o To facilitate ~he :apture of the airflelds near
ran a I,5oo-mile flIght was undertaken by our
t~oop-carrier command with United States para-
C Ute troops.
~ovember 8th was designated as D-day on
\vhIch the three task forces were to strike simul-
~aneously. Three days previously General Eisen-
oWer opened his command post at Gibraltar, and
~P:opos of Allied unity of purpose in this war it
IS Interesting to report that for the time being he
CtOmmanded the .Fortress of Gibraltar. Just prior
ho h'IS departure from London, General Eisen-
oWer radioed me the follo.wing rnessage:
inI cannot leave the United Kingdom without express-
vl to you once more, and to all of your assistants in the
f ar Department my lasting appreciation for the per-
yect assistance and support you have provided us. If
oOudeem it appropriate, and a convenient occasion will
ict
cur, I should like you to pay my respects to the Pres-
alfnt and the Secretary of vVar and to say to them that
Su of us are determined to make this operation a real
ccess.
(194 I -I 94 3 ) 125
 THE LANDINGS

Despite the negotiations which had been caf'

Tied on with a few French officials the amount 0'o
resistance which the landing forces would encotl
ler .remained problematical. General EisenhoW er
o. &,
broadcast a proclamation of our friendly lnt d
tions toward French oNorth Africa and instructJ.
the French forces to display certain signal~ to ill ~
cate their non-resistance. However, each ta;r
force proceeded on the assumption that det e
rnined resistance must be expected. They we~e
under orders not to fire until fired upon. A co.e
signal "Play Ball" was to be broadcast to the ent1~
force at the first hostile act on the part of t
French in any sector, as a warning to initiate
vigorous offensive action. (Map C.)
At the moment the landings. in Algeria begaO
at one o'clock on the morning of November 8th;
President Roosevelt assured the French people b),
short wave radio that the Allies sought no territor)
and asked for French cooperation. The Span1S. h
governnlent was also informed at this time thaI
the occupation was in no way directedagaillSI
~panis? l\forocco or other Spanish possessiot1\
In Afnca. . .
~
.
..~~
l-i
:
;
.The landings were carried out in accordance
WIth plans and with a boldness and efficiellC1
I. h . I
I

W He secured the initial objectives, the major all',

"i fields and ports in North Africa, within a perioO
i
I of 48, hours. ' I
!
126 (I94I-I94}}

-j
 DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS

b These military operations were staged against a

wae.kground of diplomatic negotiations through
hleh speedy cessation of French resistance was
~hug~t.Both General Charles de Gaulle, .1ea~er of
we FIghting French, and General Henn GIraud.
hho had escaped fro In Germany to France and
~ en .from France to Gibraltar, broadcast pleas for
rench cooperation when our operations started.
General Eisenhower had announced that Gen-
er~l Giraud would be responsible for civil and
l11~l~taryaffairs in North Africa, but the French
FI1Uary officials on the ground were found to be
~Yal to lVIarshal Petain's governlnent. President
oosevelt's note to the French Chief of State had
assured l\'1arshal Petain of our desire for a liber-
fted France but the Vichy answer wa.sdisappoint-
N g. Our ambassador was handed his passports on
V?velnber 9th and orders were dispatched frolTI
lehyto French African units to resist our forces
w.h ie.h by then had already accomplished their'
1lliSSIons except on the Casablanca front.
d ~nexpectedly, Admiral Jean Darlan, Petain's
eSlgnated successor, and Commander-in-Chief of
flI French forces, was found to be in Algiers visit- .
t g a sick son when our forces landed. He was
t ken into protective custody and ,,,,hen it was
V,und that the French leaders stood loyal to the
I.lehy government, a series of conferences imlne-
~lately followed ,with the purpose of calling a halt
to the French resistance against General Patton's
ask force in the vicinity of Casablanca. vVhen, on
(194~-I943) 127
 ~he morning of November I I th, .the . Gerrn~~;
Invaded unoccupied France, Darlan reJect"d d
pseudo-independent Vichy government, assurn; J
authoritY.in North Africa in the name of Mars d
Petain, and promulgated an order to all ~r~~es.
commanders in North Africa to cease hosuhtl
This order reached Casablanca a few minutes b
fore the assault on that city was to be launche. d
on the early morning of November II tho .' ed
The North African government was reonent
and brought into close collaboration with th:
United Nations under a provisional govern.rnend
headed by Admiral Darlan with General GIraud
as Commander-in-Chief of the French ground anr
air units. SUbsequently French West Africa und;s
Governor-General Pierre Boisson announced It
adherence to the Darlan regime, bringing to. th
Allied cause additional naval power and tralne J
ground units and making- immediately possible a
short air route from the United States to the
North-African battle fronts. Cordial relations were
quickly established with the Sultan of 11\10rocco,
Later it was possible to convince General OrgaZ,
High Conlmissioner of Spanish Morocco, that the
A .
11lencan forces contemplated no action agaIn '.5t
~panish territory. . . .
Upon the cessation of hostilities General Else
,,' hower's forces were faced with numerous aUf
~,: . pressing problems. Harbors had to be cleared 0
d
I.!; sunken ships, wharves and docks repaired, neg'd'
I"i' lected and slender lines of rail communication ha
to be developed to carry heavy traffic, anti-sub'
Inarine patrols organized to protect our sea routeS
128 (I94I-I94J)
~. ~n the ~~editerranean, the civil population had to '\
r e provIded for and its economy started on the
! ~a~ to reconstruction,16 French troops in North - i
d.frica had to be equipped,17 our forces had to be, I
ISposed to prevent a successful Axis thrust J~
~hrough Spain, and finally, and Inost importa~1t H'
i al!, .our forces h:>d to clos~ wi~h the enemy. m
unlsla to effect Ius destructIOn 111North AfrICa. f1
n,
RACE FOR TUNISIA r~
The rapid extension of the offensive eastward ~
'vas. facilitated by the expeditious landing atf! ':1
.~Iglers resulting fr0111French cooperation. Our ~
th:ces ha? suffered ~oInparatively. felv casual~ie~in JJ,:.

.. ISpartIcular landIng and as qUIckly as logIstIcal ~

SUPPOrtcould be prepared they were headed j:
tOWardsTunisia. " Ii!
b It Was apparent that a strategical surprise had :1.1
hen effected. Tunisia was lightly garrisoned by II

~e French. Far to the east the Gernlan Afrika ',:,'.,4

~orps and the. accompanying Italian .forces. ~ad ..

been hutled back from the El AlaIneIn pOSItIOn /
AY General Sir Bernard Montgolnery's Eighth
l1.rl1lya few days prior to the'landings. I ,~."'.'I!

. Despite the manifest difficulties of supply, the

~nl1lediate occupation of Tunisia appeared man-
atory. As soon as French collaboration was as-
A red, the leading elenlents of the British First
rt;ny, including a few of the American units
'i
"
whIch had landed at Algiers, re-enlbarked for a ~
;ovelnent eastward to Bougie where they landed Ii:
d~ NoveInber I I tho An overland nlarch inlIne- !.
lately followed and Bone was occupied. tlie fol- I
(1941-1943) 129 .
 lowing day by' two companies' of Britis? pa~
chutists and a commando unit which arrived be
sea. On November 15th orders were'issued for t d
movement of French troops then at Algiers a~e
Constantine to protect the southern flank of t d.
American and British units which were noW a 5
vancing into Tun'isia along the coastal corrid~r,
crossing the frontier. The French units were rel~
forced with American troops, including ta~
destroyer units, and one of their assigne~ rnl~
sions was the protection of advance air~elds.1ll t~o
.Tebessa.Gafsa area. Meanwhile, our air UUltS ~ g
moved into eastern Algeria and were render~J1,
support to our columns from inadequate or 1~
prqvised airfields despite shortages of gasoline aJ1 ,
the great difficulty of supply. b
Immediately follOWing the landings in ~ ort
Africa, Axis forces were rushed into TunisIa bY
sea and air. As early as November 16th our advan ~
'.

ing troops encountered German patrols 60 D:'i!~

west of Tunis. The leading units of the BntlS
.Fjrst Army, with American reinforcements!
reached Medjez-el-Bab, 30 miles southwest .0,
Tunis, on November 25th and took possession
the airfield at Djedeida on November 28th. Far
ther to the south, Allied units reached Pont dt1
~ahs .and American parachute troops were ?pera~
..~;.j Ing In the Sbeitla-Gafsa area. Axis reslstanC
I
, .: steadily increased, with intensified mechanized
I
I~ i
and artillery activity. Our advance on the StatioJ1
I

de lefna, 32 miles sOlghwest of .Bizerte, was reo

I
I
pulsed on November

. 1'3
0
30th. Strong Axis counter'
attacks with tanks forced Allied withdrawals frol1l I
(I94I-I94})
I
 Jebourba, but similar enemy aggressiv~ action
rlr~eted against Medjez-e1-Bab was successfully
I
i eSlSted.The short and easily maintained air and
Sea Ii.~es 0 f communlcat::.on
l' .. b etween S..lleI y an.d
f UnISlapermitted the rapid build-up of the AXIS
aorees.The nearest ports of Allied entry at Bone
Tn.;; Philippeville were of very limited capacity.
th e enemy's greatest advantage, however, lay In
e possession of all-weather airfields, as the devel-
~Prnent of the rainy season for a time rendered
gh~er-plane support of our advance troops im-
ihsSlble. Difficulties of .supply became so serious
i at active operations were practically suspended
n
r .early December. Meanwhile the enemy rapidly
elnforced his positions which assumed the char-
:ct er of a bridgehead protecting the Bizerte- Tunis
irea and extending southward to cover the bases
~to the coastal plain leading to Sousse, Sfax, and
thabes. Medjez-el-Bab remained the key point of
e Allied position.
Of In the midst of this campaign, the assassination
tv Admiral Darlan created a political crisis which
asIllet by the action of the French North-African.
~ov,ernorsin designating General Giraud as Dar-
n s SUccessor. -
FALL OF TUNISIA

l' T~~ new year opened with the opponents in

Ur:lsla
testing each other'& strength along the
b~hally stabilized line and matching each other's
a1 ~ for air supremacy, both forces concentrating
ga1nstports and lines of communication. .
(~In Libya, ROlnmel's Afrika Korps with its com- .
4 z -z 943) 13 1
 . " . n
plement of Italians abandoned a 'successlO 'pl
defensive positions, withdrawing finally ~~
Tripolitania. By February his troops were es. i~
lished on the Mareth Line in southeast T ull1s~
l\f eanwhile, General Eisenhower's troops We
being re-grouped on the Tunisian front pre'A'~
tory to rene"iing the offensive against the. 3
positions. The troops were under the ope':'llo~b1
co~n~nand.of General Anderson, commandl~gbJI
British F,rst Army. So far as was pracllca cl
American units were concentrated and the FreI1a
units organized into a combat corps. Genu (
thrusts at weakly held French positions, howe;:e~
necessitated
18
a further intermingling of AIle;
UUltS., hi!
Throughout the African operation up t,o t J
time, c.eneral Eisenhower had retained ~,?lllro~e
the UUlted St~tes A:my forces in t~e Brlllsh Iso~
ground and aIr. TIns arrangernenthad been C I,

~inued in order to afford him a free hand in .dra;l

mg on such resources as we had eSt:lblished 11l\1
United Kingdoln. Plans had been made before t
launching of the African enterprise to effect f
separation in February, and this 'vas actually OI!
ried out on February 4th when General Aridre'~1
a highly specialized air officer who had been seP
to the ~Iiddle East for experience in combat aD, J

""il
;,1
in contacts with our Allies, was appointed CoJ1
,. Inander of the United States, , forces in the Eu .0'

pean Theater of Operations with headquarters ';

r
(I
London. This order was paralleled by the cre
tion of a North-African Theater of OperationS,
under General Eisenhower. , I
132 (I94I-I94)
I lJpon' the arrival of the British Eighth Army
of the Mareth Line, it came under the direction
a General/Eisenhower .. General Sir Harold Alex-
dnder, of the British Army was appointed his
A~PUty and given direct ..command of. t~e I ~th
i A Illy Group, which consIsted of the BrItIsh ~Irst
S tIlly, the British Eighth Army, the U nlted
~ate~ .II Corps, and the French units on the
ll~lsian front. North African air units were or-
ganIzed into the lVIediterranean Air' Command
~~der Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder,
C Uh Major General (now Lieutenant General)
lll.atl Spaatz of the United States Army as Com-
heander of the Northwest African Air Force. All
avy
'tVe bom~ers, together with fig~ter support,
i ~e organIzed by General Spaatz Into the Stra-
:gIC. Air Force under General Doolittle. Action
u a~ Initiated at this time by General Spaatz to
an1fy command of light and medium bombers
;d ~ghter support into a force known as the
a actical Air Force to lend close support to land
And naval operations. Admiral of the Fleet, Sir
lll.ndrew Cunningham, became Naval Com-
e ander in Chief in the Mediterranean under
c eneral Eisenhower's direction. These Allied
t o~rnand "arrangements led directly to the vic-
aOties which soon followed (Battle 9f Tunisia
nd conquest of Sicily).
\1 The junction of the veterah Afrika Korps with
e On Arnim's command in Tunisia permitted the
l,nerny to launch offensive strokes against the
rghtly held portions of the long Allied line. Ori
(ebruary 14th, hostile armored units reinforced
191Z-Z943) . 133
 , d ~

by artillery and infantry and supported b di0

bombers struck westward from, Faid and Ybr~
;. ,I

I through the Kasserine Pass. (Map D.)' By th ~

I ernoon of February 21st the Axis forces hallii d
':!'f,~ vanced a three-pronged armored thrust 2 I jOl
- beyond the pass, threatening the Allied posl~n
.F~~ in central Tunisia. Of this operation Gell .
.J '\l',~

j
H
11 Eisenhower radioed. the following comments .

" Our present ta~ticaI diffiCUlties resulted f~om

teu:,pt to do possibly too much, coupled wilh t '0
~l
ds
terlOratiou
ea of resistance in the central mounta\ 0
a.r , which began abOut January 17th. That deterl"
lIOn
t has absorbed the bulk of the United States 1Stb~
31 h Divisions which formalions had originally e
P~shed forward to provide general reserves and lOb!"
nut us to attack from the line which we were then
iug. ~
You would have been impressed could yOll have ~~
the magnificent display everywhere' by the Am '",
er
enlisted men. I assure you that the troops that come ,i
of this Campaign
call y efficient. are going to be battle-wise and t3

. There were considerable tank l.osse~ on. bose] ti

Sides. The enemy Was able to 'mailltam hlln r
in his forward position for only two days bel',
he recoiled under a concenttated attack by ~~
ground forces powerfully assisted by the entl~
........,~ Allied air force in North Africa. Even the he3 i
I'! bom bers Were Used.' agaillst t h elr. retreatm. g cO~
i~1
f .j umns. During this Withdrawal, the enemy ~r
deavored to capitalize upon possible Allied re't
forcing moves t,o the south, delivering heavy :
tacks in the Medjez-el-Bab arca, but these we.
'34 , (I94 I-J91J
I'V held . .
)~ we or. checked after, small gains. These thru~ts
If I "t reo~he last o!fensive efforts of the enemy In
10 ill1unISla." The raIns had ceased, the ro~ds.had b~en
I A. pr~ved; the railroad had~een vItalIzed WIth
tnencan methods and matenel, and more than
.10 gasoline pipe lines, the two most important be-
;ng from Bone to Ferriana and from Phili ppeville
o OUIed Bamoun, had been built. These in-
I ~eas~~ facilities permitted the movement i.nto
h UnISlaof additional American troops. The tIme
wadCome for a coordinated Allied effort which
"t0Uld free the African continent of Axis forces.
'I

. he development of the plan is succinctly stated

In the following paragraph of a radio from Gen- /
eral Eisenhower on March 11 th:

0p OUf. own plans contemplate a rising scale of offens~ve

dr erahons and it will be t.he role of the II Corps to
as aw all possible strength (enemy) from the south so
th t~Khelp General Montgomery's Eighth Army through
th e .lV1arethGap. Once we have the Eighth Army through
i idft bottleneck, this campaign is going to assume rap-
drY a very definite form with constant pressure and
IVekept up against the en<:my throughout the region.

o The last phase of the Battle of Tunisia opened

1)nthe evening of March 20th when the Western
A. eSert Air Force in rear of the British Eighth t,':
u rrny (including the 9th United States Air. Force f:
/der General Brereton) launched an air oJIen- 3,'
~\T~ with continuous 24-hour bombing of the ~
a/CIS pOsitions and installations in the Mareth ~
ea, surpassing the intensity of any previous
rreparations since the capture of the EI Alamein
liq
1941-1943) 135 IjlJ
1
 -0 . d
position. The Eighth Army attacked and s.ectl~
a bridgehead through the mine-fields IUdtil
. north, while the New Zealand Corps flanke tl~
lVIareth Line to the south. Coordinated pr~s tb
by the British First Army, the French, an 'pJ1
American II Corps under General Patton agaltJ
the Axis bridgehead served to divert the ene Iii
effort from the south. His. position gradtl~b
crumpled
t and finally on Apnl 7th patrols of fs3
I 9 h Division, advancing southeast from Ga ,0
I. made Contact with units of the Eighth Anny
miles inland from the coast. J
I
!
;
Sfax Was captured on April loth by Gene ~
MOntgomery's forces. Rommel's columns wea
unable to make a stand at Sousse because of t
Allied breakthrough at Fondouk, with the Be
- SUIting capture of Kairouan and Pichon. i
!. therefore fell back to a prepared and final pOs
.. tion through Enfidaville. .

ENEMY. AIR PO.WER SHATTERED

. 'c
The air attacks of this period provided a .claS~.
example of strategic and tactical use of air powe
Allied air forces over a long period of time ha~ J
studied every aspect of the enemy air trans1.'0J
activity across the Sicilian Straits. They awal~~o

,... ,
the moment to catch a maximum concentrat! 0
," of transpOrt aircraft on the Tunisian or Siciha.
fields and to strike When the enemy was in grea\
t need of this air transport service. On Apil
est
5 h the oPPOrtunity developed and air attac..
of consistent intensity Were launched on the all)
6
13 . (I94 I-I94J
 ~~OlU~s of Sicily and Tunisia, resulting in the de-
uetIon of over 150 enemy airplanes on. th.e
ground and 50 more shot down in the air; AXIS
fOrts and shipping were also heavily attacked.
~ all, during a period of 14 days, 147 transport
~ anes and 31 vessels, large and small, we~e danl-
fed or. dest!oyed. The suddenne~s of thIS c~m.
~ ete and vIolent rupture of AXIS COmmUl1lCa-
tlO~s with their Tunisian forces undoubtedly
calUeas
aCt' a surprise
.. , ..upset
, their plans for delaying
IOns and the defense of the Cape Bon Penin-
~~la,and precipitated the. collapse of the German
d Italian forces.
thThe 'advance of the British Eighth A~myup
.e eoast pinched out the II Corps whIch was
\Vlthdrawn and started on an extremely difficult
~ovement across the, rear of the British F~rst
forrny to reappear on th~left flank of the AllIed
rees. General Patton, who had commanded the
horps during the operation concerned with the
reaking of the l\lareth Line, was withdrawn in
~rder to go ahead with the plans for the expedi-
IOn to'Sicily, and l\lajor General (now Lieuten-
h~t General) Omar N. Bradley, who had been
.Is deputy, assumed cOffilnand.
" ~ecognizing the weakness of the .broad river
.t leys within the bridgehead, ,Von Arnim heav- .
~Y.rnined all possible avenues of mechaniiedap-
aroac~. By the 20th of April the II Corps was
~tacklng across the mountainous terrain north
1\fedjez-el-Bab, clearing the way for an arm-'
~red thrust into the. Tine River Valley which
(esUlted in the fracture of the Axis position. On
/941-1943) 137
 feet meant an immediate increase ofshipP~
equivalent to Some 240 vessels. A Fren<;h N b'
had been reborn, celebrating its birthday by t ~
capture of 48,719 prisoners following a deep pe
etration of the enemy's position. American tro~
had demonstrated their battle efficiency and :
~ined. a wealth of experience which co.uld aJ
dIssemmated throughout' the army. AllIed. u
forces had successfully demonstrated a technlq
involVing effective coordination with groUV
forces and the strategic application of air powe
Unity of Allied effort, command and staff, ~
been demonstrated to the world in a most CO I'
vincing manner, as evidence of the gI;owing col
centration of power which will sweep' the enetJ1
out of control of the European continent:19

MIDDLE EAST

Under the Lend-Lease program large quaIl tl'~

ties of American equipment were being. sent t
the Middle East in the mOnths immediately prc
ceding the Pearl Harbor attack. Technical pe;
sonnel, largely civilians, for servicing Amenca
planes, trucks and tanks, was provided by USot/
assist the British in maintaining the efficiency 0
the American equipment in their hands.2. AIll~f
...... ican missions were established in Egypt and I'
,. Iran to coordinate and supervise Lend-Lease. at,
tivities and to establish the necessary air-fer~
r'
routes over which American aircraft could be dt:'
patched to the Middle East, to Russia, .to Indt~
and to China.
14
 Ou tJpon,our enJry into war the mISSIons previ-
t sly referred to, .con1posed largely of civilian
t~ChniCians,were gradually transferred to mili-
ry COntrol. In June, 1942, it became necessary
~. designate' a' comillander for the United States
b.r~y Forces in the l\tfiddle East with responsi-
I~Itynot only for the North African and Iranian
Inissions but also for military personnel in the
~rea.21At the same time a similar command was
Frll1ed for the. control of United. State~ Arm.y
.Orcesacross equatorial Africa, whICh unIfied aIr
~a~sport command activit~es along the trans-
frlcan air routes.
h The crisis which developed in June, 1942, with _
~ e Withd~awa~of ,the British Eighth Army to the
1 Alalueln hne threatened 110t only the Suez
Canal but also our air transport routes to Russia
and to Asia, Therefore, such aircraft as could be
~pared from other' operations were concentrated
In th'e Middle East to operate against the COlll-
11111nications of the Afrika Korps in Libya and
across the Mediterranean. l\tfedium tanks and
I I05lUm guns on self-propelled n10unts were
rushed by train and ship to the British Eighth
A rll1Yand every possible measure consistent with
h
t e military situation in other parts of the world
~as taken to assist the Eighth Army in maintain-
. ~ngits position while it was refitted and prepared
o.r its triumphant march westward through
l Ibya.
In subsequent months our heavy bornbers ex-
tended their operations over the ~lediterranean
(194z-Z9./J) . 141
 in attacks against Axis .ports along the sou.. theere
ro
European coast. Such heavy shipping lossesI ~ to
inflicted on the enemy that he was compel e bl
prov.ide a heavy e~cort for his convoys, the~~c1
considerably reducmg the volume of cargo w 0
he could move. American medium bo~bers 0111
.the Middle East Were ferried across Afnca fr tJ
the United States and fighter aircraft in 1~81'
numbers were delivered in Cairo, some by. b
away" from aircraft carriers shuttling acrosS ~ol
Atlantic and others, delivered in crates to T~leI
radi on the West coast of Africa, were assern
there and flown to their destinations. e
By October, General Montgomery's improV f'd
situation in troops, equipment and logistical ~e
rangements enabled him to crash through t 0
EI Alamein line and pursue the enemy 1,50
miles into Tunisia. Our aircraft, heavy and ~ee
dium
th bombers and fighters, organized into ~ci
9 Air Force under General Brereton, partl t.
pated in the preparation that preceded ~he ad
tack on the enemy's positions at EI Alamem ani
made important contributions to the subsequen,
' pursuit. Planes from this air force struck heaV}
blows against German transport flights across th;
.. Sicilian Straits in the 'last phases of the Battle 0
Tunisia. Thereafter, the 9th Air Force was o~'
cupied in the bombing operations against A,,!I
.Mediterranean positions inclUding Pantellefll
and Sicily, and in destructive raids against Na'
pIes, Messina, Reggio and other points in ItalY;
142 (I94I-I94J
:1I of which provided an important ~ontribution
o the shattering of Italian .morale. *

ASIATIC THEATER

. In January, 1941, the Curtiss Plant, complet-

~ng a British contract. for the man~facture of
-40 fighter planes, announced that If an order
C?llid be placed within 10 days it would be pos-
~lbleto produce 300 additional P-40'S by Jun~ of
Shat year. Under the British contract the U nlted
.tates Army controlled the allotments of addi-
;lonal planes. The Chinese were in grave distress
hr lack of fighter aircraft. I proposed, therefore,
t at if the British would immediately turn over
50. P-4o's to the Chinese government from their
eXI~tingcontracts followed by 25 in February and
~5In March, the United Sta'tes government would
permit the allocation of the 300 planes, referred
to above, for delivery in June to the British. This
arrangement was accepted and the 100 planes
r~a~hed China in the early summer of 1941, pro-
VI~Ing the equipment for the famous "Flying
JlgerS" organization piloted by volunteers un-
er the leadership of Colonel (now Major Gen-
~al) Claire Chennault, a former United States
rmy officer, then in the service of the Chinese
government.
F .. On August 1st the heavy bombers of the 8th and 9th Air
\iOfces struck a devastating blow at the lubricating oil and gaso-
Sire resources of the Germans by destroying in a single raid pos-
of)ly. 75 percent of the Ploesti refineries in Rumania. The length
of flIght, the astonishing accuracy of the bombing and the daring
th the enterprise present a conspicuous example of the quality of
e American flyers and their planes.
(194 z-z94 3) 143
 Through the medium of Lend-Lease, mat erial '
of various types and character had bee.n reachalp pg
China by way of the Burma Road. WIth Jap as-
entry into the war China's position grew mc -
Cbi
ingly critical because of the possibility, that b'pg
I
Ilese air fields might become bases fo~_born Ibe
't"llr
operations against Japan proper. In vle~ of t p'
gravity of the situation in that region, Major ~~il
eral (now Lielllenalll General) Joseph W. e!
well Was selected to represent the United .S.taty
in the manifold activities relating to our mlht~~
interests as to pilots, planes, air transport servlc.;
materiel for Chinese ground forces' and thel
technical and tactical instructIon. 'j

By January, 1942, Japan's drive into Malays~1

had spread into Southern Burma. With the f~e
of Singapore in February the Japanese were ~~b
to launch a successful offensive against the BnU
and the reinforcing Chinese troops in Burma, a
success which Was rapidly followed up by tbe
capture of Lashio, the western tenninus of' the
Burman Road. In this unsuccessful Allied oper~'
tio General Stilwell commanded two small ChI'
nese annies whose willingness to fight was gr~a~lj
hampered by an almost complete lack of aIr,
artillery and adequate logistic suppOrt. (Map y.)
Following the cutting of the Burma Road, Gen'
eral Stilwell immediately initiated plans for ~p
air-ferry service roUte Over the Himalayas, utilIz'
ing Army personnel and equipmeut, together
with a Small combat air force, The nUcleus of the
latter was provided by bombardment and pursul 'r
141 ('94 '-'94 J)
 fla~es. and service. units sent fromA~s,tralia to
ndla late in February. .. ' ...
I ~he development of American air power in
ndla to meet the hostile challenge across the Bay
O,f Bengal permitted offensive bombing opera-
gons. to be initiated on April 2nd against en~my .
, eet units in the Andaman Islands. The first fhght
Of, the Air Ferry Command' into China over the .
. I1Irnalayas was ~ompleted six days later. Moving
Pe;Sonnel, equipment, gasoline and other s~p-
plIes over the mountains into China follOWIng
Its transportation by sea and air half-way around :!
the globe, imposed an unparalleled logistical
P~oblem. T~e operations of our air for<;es in In-
dIa, Burma and in China held in that region Japa-
. nese airplanes which might have been employed
e~seWhere; losses were inflicted on the enemy's
~Ir force, depots and communications; and, most
ImPortant of all, Chinese morale was greatly stim- -r

ulated by this evidence of America's intention to

.SUPpOrtChina in every way pOssible. . '
There have gradually developed since the sum-
mer of 1942 increasingly destructive bomber at-
~acks over Burma and out of China with targets'
rom Hopei to French Indo-China, including
I-Iainan Island. '*' The enemy's retaliatory attacks ,II
hstially have b~en. repnlsed with astonis~ingly i~
G 'Ifo The fortitude of the Chinese people under the leadership of
tJ e~eralissimo Chiang Kai-chek has been an inspiration to the
a OIled Nations. For six years these brave people have resisted the
\\,s.saultsof the enemy despite the lack of arms and equipment and
hllthout protection against the enemy's fighters and bombing
1" anes. .
(194I-I943)
H
I,.~
 our air offensive. in these regions is growing, :~:
forcing a dispersion of Japanese means along t 0
Southern front, eXtending from Burma, 5,a 0
miles to the Solomon Islands, to meet our atta~v ld
which are involVing them in losses so destructl
as to threaten the maintenance of theIr. aIr
. p oWer
and the efficiency of their sea forces. 22 of
By the summer of 1942 a large amount. b
equipment had accumulated in India whl~e
could not be transpOrted into China under t /
limiting conditions of air trallic. It was theref~r
decided to move the Chinese troops to the equI~
ment rather than follow the usual proced u~e ~'
deli"ering equipment to the troops. A consl~:b'
able Chinese force had retired into India on WI 5
drawing from Burma and this was the nu~ler
around which General Stilwell developed a lugh J
modern trai~ing center for infantry, art!lIery ~~I
the supportmg arms and services. ThiS proJe.
has developed with most gratifying results: pro
vi?ing complete tac.tical units th.oro.ughly md~f
tnnated as to techmque and tactics 1I1 the use
weapons with which they are equipped, and f.u~:
nishing cadres for the training of Chinese dlVI
sions beyond the mOUntains in China proper .. d
.A somewhat similar project has been carne
Out for the training of Chinese air cadets in t~/
United States and with our loth Air Force 10
India.

OPERATIONS IN ALASKA

The threat to th~ security of Our Pacific Coast

region reached its peak in June, 1942, when the
146 (I91 "'943)
 large ]apan'ese. task force approached Midway
andanother force approached the Aleutians. Both
~ere turned back after suffering punishing losses.
hUtch Harbor in the Aleutians appeared to be
~ e immediate objective of the Japane,se. ~ostile
econnaissance planes .had appeared over the
;VesternAleutians, submarines had been reported
~nthe Vicinity of Umnak and Unalaska and our
Intelligence had reported the presence of a naval
task force proceeding toward Alaskan waters.
t On ] une 4th, following an enemy bomber at-'
A ck on Dutch Harbor the preceding day, our
.r~y and Navy flyers located an enemy fleet con-
SISt ' . d
. lng of at least two carriers, two crUIsers an
~I~htdestroyers, 165 miles to the southwest. De-
uPUe . fog, rain and most unfavorable weather,
'c r.aIrcraft, attacking repeatedly, sank one enelny
ttUlser, damaged another and forced the enemy
o Withdraw. Ten days later a hostile task force
~f cruisers and transports was discovered at Kiska
hSla~d,suggesting the probability that the enemy,
aVlng retired out of range of our aircraft, had
oc~upied Kiska with troops initially destined for
an assault on Dutch Harbor. Attu Island and
Agattu Island were also discovered to have been
OCCupiedby the enemy.
IIStrategically the occupation of these. barren
sands was of comparatively small importance
~hcept for the possibility of infiltrations along
t e Island chain, which might eventually permit
t he enemy to operate against our sea routes along
t~~ Southwestern coast of Alaska. Psychologically
IShostile occupation was productive 6f serious
(194:1-:1943) 147
 repercussions 'in Our Pacific Northwest. It f~~~
. .

decided, however, in view of our almost a~1

limitations in ships, planes and trained .troo~ P'
this1 time to mai.ntain the situation in the d,e
tra , South and Southwest . . Pacific, no Imrn,e
'. ~te
,',~
. would be ....undertaken to recapture K~~
actIon .d
and Attu. Measures were taken"however, to brI~;
these islands within effective air range of 01
combat
b craft. Advanced airfields were developCl 0 I

y .troops landed on Adak Augus~ 3', '~42, frol waS

whIch the first mass raid agamst KIska air
launched on September '4th. The Japanese 0
forces in the Kiska region were soon destroyee
and his attempts to'reinforce the garrison w~rp
rendered relatively ineffective by the destructlO
. of his shipping en route to Kiska. . to
Bases still farther west were required .
strengthen our air position in the Aleutians. co~
sequently in January, '943, an American t~Ss
force landed unopposed On Amchitka, 69 mIle
east of Kiska. In less than a month the fightel
strip had been developed and our aircraft wa.
operating from this advanced base against Kisk~
and Attu. . . b
In the late spring shipping and materiel, thoug
limited, at last became available to launch a for'
mal challenge to the enemy's occupation of th~
Aleutians. A task force composed of a portion 0
the 7th Infantry Division, reinforced, landed .o~
Attu Island, the Outermost island of the AleutIa
chain, on the morning of May 1 Ith, heavily sup'
pOrted by its naval eSCOrt.Heavy fogs linlited at!
a~tion. Despite the mOUntainous character of th~
148 (I94I-I94J
 ~~untry, deep snow and the absence of roads, the
t oop~, strongly supported by our Navy an.d, by
f he all' forces so far as the' weather permItted.
JOttght their way across t~eislan? to encircle the
,;-panese troops defendIng' ChIchagof Harbor.
f here on l\fay 31st the' operation was success-
d~lIy tenninated after a loss of 512 American sol-
lers against the annihilation of 2,350 Japanese.
The capture of Attu evidently came as a corn-
plete surprise to the enemy who had anticipated
an assault on Kiska.which now lay trapped by
Ott: planes and naval craft bpetating frorn Am-
chltkaand from Attu, a fighter strip having been
COUlpletedin 12 days on the latterislancl. *
on. ~ith the occupation of Attu by our forces, the cnern y posi tion
PUt Iska became untenable. On August 15th a landing- force was
met ashore at Quisling Cove on the western' coast of Kiska, which ~
avo'ctno opposition, the enemy' having evacuated the garrison to
1 further losses.

149
 SUMMARY
Reviewing briefly the military situation as "'d
find it on July I, 1943, it will be remember:~
that our entry into war was marked by a ~ucche
sion of serious reverses, at Pearl Harbor, m t ..
Philippines and through the Malaysian Arc hIt
pelago. It was a time for calm courage and st.ou
t!
a,
resolution on the part of the people of the Umt~ d
f' States. With our Pacific Fleet crippled and t e
Philippines overwhelmed at the outset, we we~f
forced to watch the- enemy progressively en~ .
our resistance to his advances. One year ago t ~
German offensive in Russia was sweeping through
the Donetz Basin, jeopardizing the whole -of sout .
Russia and the Caucasus and ominously menaC
ing the Allied positions ip the Middle East, par'
ticularly the oil supply at Abadan on which the
naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean, th.e
Indian Ocean and Australia depended, in addl'
tion to the air and ground motorrequireme?~
in those theaters. Rommel's Afrika Korps WIt.
selected Italian troops had the British with thelr
backs to Cairo, threatening the lifeline of the
British Empire. Our successes in the Coral Sea
and at Midway and the repulse of the Japanese
forces in the Aleutians had not prevented the
Ja~anese from carving out a vast empire frolll
whIch they threatened India, Australia and our
position in the Pacific. Just a year ago also the
ability of the United States to transport its power
in s~pplies, I.nunitions and troops across the ~t.
lantlc was bemg challenged by sUbmarines whICh
15 (I94I-I943)
 ~h.a
s~ngle month had sunk 70o,~OO gross tons of
!
"I

Ipplng.. .,' ,
-julyi. 1943, finds the United States.Army-and .~
Navy united ao-ainst the Axis powers In purpose
~~d in operati~n, a unity shared when the ~ccai.
N n. delnands by the British Commonwea l t 1 0
1II

1\
figahtI?ns.the Chinese, Dutch, Ffr~ncdhanddother ~
. tIng elements among our nen s an sup- '~~

~o:ters. Across the Atlantic the enemy had been :'!I

.rl~en froin North Africa, and Europe has been ~
~clrcled by.a constantly growing military poweL"
Ghe Russian Army, engaging two-thirds of the ~;
erman ground forces and one-third of the Ger~_
~an air fleet In deadly and exhausting cOInbat.
as dispelled the legend. of the invincibility of
the German Panzer divisions.23
'The British Isles are stronger than ever. before
and a new France is arising roln the ashes of
1940. Strategically the enemy in Europe has been
reduced to the defensive and the blockade is
Cornplete.~In the Pacific the Japanese are 'being
Steadily ejected or rather eliminated frOin their
hOnquered territory. The Aleutians are about to
Ie cleared of all tracks and traces of the enelUY.
7 ~he South and Southwest Pacific two facts are
~ aInly evident to the Japanese comn1~nd as well
S to the world at large: our progress may seem
~ow but it is steady and detern1ined, and it has
een accoll1panied by a terrific destruction of
eneIl1Yplanes and surface vessels. This attrition
~ust present an appalling problem for the enemy
Ilgh c01l1111and.Whatever satisfaction they may
(raw from the fanatical sacrifice of their soldiers
(19-/1-Z9-1 ./~) 151
 with ~hom our forces come in COnt~ct,.the 00- de-
s~ructlOn of their air power and shlp~mg \le
tlnues on an increasing and truly remarka
s~le. . 11
. In brief, the strength of the enemy is stead~e
declining while the combined power of t ,
United Nations is rapidly increasing, more rate
idly with each Succeeding month. There can j!
but one result and every resource we possess 1
being employed to hasten the hour of vieto!
without undue sacrifice of the lives of our rneJ1.
 CONCLUSION
ORGANIZATION

o During the past two years the enlisted str~n~th

f the Anny has been increased by five mIllIon
(en; 24 t,he officer corps has grow.n frotn 93.000
.0 521,000.25 (Chart )6.) Included In these figur~s
IS,the development of an air forceof 182,ooooffl- .
cers and ),906,000 men. Expansion as t? ,time'
an~ numbers, having in mind the technIcal re-
qllirernents of nlodern warfare, has been without
precedent. - For example, the expansion of the
, SerViceunits for the Army Air Forces has been
:pproximately 12,000 percent, and that of the
Ir forces proper about 3,500 percent. The Corps
~f Engineers has been increased, by 4,000 per-
Cent,2G

This tremendous e~pansion req uired a fu nda-

~ental reorientation of the conduct of the\Var
. epartment and its methods of doing business: 27
It required that the various services and supply
a~encies be integrated into a command organiza~_
.lIon which would riot only' insure the efficient
~ssembling of the means of war ,yit~in the United
t~tes, but also would provide for their transpor-
~atIon and distribution to combat units overseas;
It required that the air arm be granted the fullest
~Xercise of initiative in developing and produc-
~ngmodern types 'of cOtnbat aircraft and in creat.,
lng the Inost powerful' air force in the world; it
required_ that the training installations of the
grOund forces of the Anny be centralized into one
19 1
( 4 '1943) l[)~l
 -
authority which would provide orderly pr<;>cesss
in building a huge citizen,anny and would lUStJ\
maximum effectiveness of our troops on thel
first entry into battle. .' .e
Early in 1942, after a period of eXhaust!;
. study extending over a year, and paralleled :
. I a nUlnber of preliminary moves or.readJ.ustment.
a committee headed by Major General (now L.Iett'd
tenant General) Joseph T. McNamey compIet
the plan which established three great commaOd5fl
under the direct su pervision of the Chief of Sta
-the Army Air Forces, the Army Ground Forces.
and the Services of Supply (later designated ~~
the Army Service Forces). (Chart 17.) The pf '
pOsed reorganization was approved by the p r~ sj
'/
dent and the Secretary of War and made effect!'
March 9, 1942. Later, on his appointment a~
Deputy Chief of Staff, it fell to General McNar
ney to supervise the procedure of reorganizati?l~
and integration. Decentralization of authoflt}
was an imperative requirement for the trem~I1'
dous war expansion, which could not otherWIse
have been achieved without confusion, inefIl-
ciency and the delays inherent in the transforma-
tion from a small peacetilne army to the present
vast organization. The fact that this complete re'
organization of the machinery of the War De'
p.artment and. the Army at large was quiet!y car;
ned out dunng the most perplexing penod 0
Our War effort, .without confusion and with the
best of good will by those concerned, was a tribute
to the singleness of purpose of the senior officers
154 (I94I-I943)
 ~nd also to. the ntanner in ""hich the plans ~ere
eveloped and launched. .
LOGISTICS

. The Army Service Forces' are charged primar-

lly With logistical matters which include the sup-
ply, equipping, and movement of troops at home-
and overseas; food, clothing,. equipment, am-
lllunition, medical service; 28 motor, 'rail, and ship
transportation; records of personnel, and mail
service. Under the present War Department or-
ganization many. matters pertaining to morale,
sUchas movies, educational programs, and news-
papers, are also included within the supervision
of this command.29 In addition, the coordination,
0. production requirements for military II}uni-
tlOns in the United States, the actual issue of
:veapons and equipment, considerations pertain-.
lng to efficient maintenance of this equipment,
and the provision of a steady stream of supplies
practically on an automatic basis to the various
. theaters of war, are functions concerned with'
~ogistical!equirements. (Chart 18.) Global war has
Introduced lines of communication encircling the
earth (a rough check indicates that present pro-
~ected supply lines extend over 56,000 miles). It-
as made necessary harbor improvements with
'~epots and railroad management, as in the Per-
I Ra~ Gulf for the transportation of supplies to
ussia, and in the region of the Suez Canal and
~heRed Sea. It has required construction of bases
In Australia and through~ut the Pacific and bases
at
(
Karachi and Calcutta on the west and east
\15)41-1943) 155
 o .
roasts of India; pipelines and.pumping pla~ts/c.
fac~litate movelnent of gasoline, and a multlp J
. . 0f' reqmrements to support ..our figh't~n.gfore
uy es
d at.
and permit them to devote their undlvlde in'
tention to the enemy. All these matters are, 'n
volved in the logistical problem for the Arn1} 1,
this war. The cOntinual flow of trained repla~~.
ments, many of them specialists, must be ll1a:~.
tained. (Chart 19.) Each new venture usua,ux oal
volves new convoy routes with the add~tlo. g
naval escorts required. It imposes a contl11UIOt
burden of supply of Inen and materiel which muse
b
e ta k'en' Into
. .
accOunt when new operatIons ar 1
considered which inevitably iInpose add~tiol1a
and continuing supply burdens. . .
Along with this goes the problem of provld1l1~
..
111UnltIons ancI at IleI' supplIes
. to our All' Ies,.sall(
in most cases transporting them overseas to pOIl1\
of delivery. \Ve are equipping the Chinese t:O?P '
and French troops, we have been provlel1Il g
equipnlent for the British, the Australians, the
New Zealanders, and the Canadians, we ha.v~
furnished supplies to Latin-American _repubh~l
-We have been truly an arsenal of den10cracy. ~
this delnands the Inaintenance of an elaborate
system [or allocation, distribution, and transporj
tation, to be coordinated with our daily nonua
problen1 of lneeting the delllands of our o,vl1
forces.
l'he requirelnents of logistics are SeldOlll uIl'
derstood. The burdens they impose on the re:
sponsible military authorities are rarely appre
("jated. The conflicting demands of our theater
) r)fi (1941-19-13)
 commanders, of Allied sovereign powers and of
the ~ome front, pose difficulties. never bef?re ap'
proXImated in "war. The necessIty for a hIgh de-.
~ee of efficiency in management is evident and
It has been found in the coordination of all the
various supplie~ and administrative departments
~: the Army, under the comtpand and leadership
Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell.
TRAINING

The vital importance of adequate training in

the technical warfare of today is evident. Such
tr~i~ling involves not only the basic elements of
mIlItary science, but their coordination into team-
\vork involving the platoon, company, battalion,
and regiment, and later, combined training of
the various arms into divisions "and army corps
capable of a sustained and coordinated effort on
the battl~field. The organization of training cen-
t~rs, expansion of our school system,30 the activa-
~on of new units, the development of training
hOctrines, and the conduct of maneuvers, have
Ceen the primary responsibility of the ArnlY
round Forces (Chart 20) which, under the com-
mand of Lieutenant General Lesley J. 1\1cN air,
has. achieved remarkable results that today are
paYIng heavy dividends on the battlefield.31
.While meeting this expansion, we were faced
~hth the problem .of so training our units that
ey would be able to compete successfully in
~he~r first battle experience with veteran organ-
Zations of the enemy. Until 1943, urgent de-
mands of crises in various parts of the world
(1941-1943) 157

l
 forced us to organize special units and ship the~
abroad without the desired degree of prepa!a.
tion. Fortunately, the development of the traIl1
.lUg program. the adequacy of ammunitIOn. .. an(I1
1 the -influence of officers who have been returnC(
I to the United States after participation in C01I1i
~. bat have given us for the first tin1e a reserve- 0
: trained units ready for dispatch to the v~riot
I theaters as rapidly as shipping becomes avallab e:
Another factor is now operating to our ad:an
I
j
:: tage. We are reaching the end of the expansH~n,
I ;already it has been possible to reduce many tral~'
ing installations to a purely maintenance bas;S
to furnish replacements for the present strengt.1
of the army. It also has been practicable. a~~ 11
is h.ighly desira~le. to .lengthen the basic tr~mJll~
penod for soldl(:~rs and to extend the perIod 0
training for officer candidates; and most ilnp~r'
tant of all. it is no longer necessary to drain ~nIt:
of their best officers and -men to furnish traul,ec
cadres for new organizations or students for the
officer candidate and technical schools. In other
words, General l\fcNair and his people are noW
, free for the first time to concentrate their atten-
tion on polishing up the existing lnilitary ma-
chines and developing them to the highest de'
gree of efficiency in preparation for the great bat-
tles to COlne.
AIR FORCES

The problelns and accomplish111ents of the

Army Air Forces (Chart 21) during this elner-
gency are so colossal in scope that the' story ca~
be properly told only b): their Chief, Genera
8
15 (I94I-I94 3)
, Ii. B. Arnold. The outstanding feature to date
of America's war effort has been the manrier in
\\Thichour air forces have carried the war, in its
ll10stdevastating form, to the enemy. Limited by
~ppropriations prior to the ernergency, they have,
~na remarkably short time, been able to produce
0rnbat planes which have matched or surpassed
t~ose of other nations. The high degree of tech-
nIcalproficiency necessary to operate rr:ilitary air-
blanes in combat has been'secured by a complex
lIt remarkably efficient training progran:.
The Army Air Forces are now attackIng the
enemy on 10 different fronts throughout the
\\Torld.Their victories wherever they come in
COntactwith the enemy testify to the gallantry
and. skill of pilots and crews, to the Inechanical
effiCIencyof planes, and to the leadership of Gen-
e:al Arnold and the fighting commanders of the
aIr_!orces in the field, Kenney in New Guinea,
~WIning in the Solomons, Hale in Hav.raii, Spaatz,
Irereton, and Doolittle in Africa, Eaker in Eng-
and, Butler in Alaska, Bissell in India, and Chen-
nault with his unique contribution in China.
PLANNING

The orderly step-by-step development which

the Army has' undergone could not have been
~anaged without the background of careful plan-
nIng over a period of years. The framework for
OUrArmy today and its development through the
grOWingpains in the early part of th~ emergency
were laid during the period preceding Pearl Har-
bor. In matters of personnel, military intelligence,
(1941-1943) 159

L
 . .
trall1l11g,suppl .
y and preparatIOn of war p laOs
.b-
sound principles and policies had been esta f
lished in preparation for just such an emergelrr.
as arose. \Vhen the \Var Department was re f.
ganized, an increased proportion of air forceo
g
ficers were assigned to the General Btaff an,l. a1
the same time it was divorced from operano s
activities except in the case of the \Var PlaI1
Division. The latter group became the Opc:t
tions Division of the General Staff, charged WIt
t he
preparation of strategic plans and the coor;
dination of operations throughout the world. 7e.
th~ Army it prepares the proposals and the. d
taIled plans for the Joint and the ConlbIIle
Chiefs of Staff. Its divisions are in direct contact
'. w
~lth every' the~ter of war. Its members are CO d
tInually travehng by air to secure first-han
knOWledgeof local conditions and requiremen :
Their participation in bombing raids, in Ian.
ing operations and in the fighting has result,cd \0
d
a growing casualty list reflecting the intunate
Contacts they maintain with conditions in tbe
field. The practice has been established wherebY
members of the Operations Division serve. a
period of duty in each theater" in exchange WJth
representatives of the staff of theater commanders
who serve a corresponding tour of duty in. Wa:
Depa~tment Operations Division. Under the d~'
rection of 1\Iajor General T. T. Handy and hIS
predecessors, Major General L. T, Gerow an~
General Eisenhower, the Operations Division 0
the "Var Department General Staff has been a
tower of strength to the undersigned in the diree'
160 (I94I-I94J)
 tion and. coordination of our military effort.
An outstanding feature of operations in the
present war has been their amphibious character
\vhich requires close coordination with the Navy 'I','
nOtonly in the protection furnished to t.he trans- .j
P?rts en route to landing beaches but In "actual ~
(lIr, antiaircraft and <Tunfire'support of landing JI
parties after the troops leave the ships. In trans- ;~
POrting more than two million Inen of the Anny :t
~~ersea5 throu<Th subrnarine-infested waters, the .J
i~avyhas livel' up to its traditional record. .'
The developtnent of the powerful war a.rmy
ff today was rnade possible by the detennuI.ed
~
~
ea~ership of the Constitutional Commander-In-
ChIef, and the wisdorn and firm integrity of pur-
Poseof the Secretary of \Var. It has been depend-
ent Upon vast appropriations and the strong sup-
!,
POrt of the Congress, and the cooperation of I
I
TlInerous governrnent agenc~es. Individuals, civ-
I Ian organizations-patriotic and commercial-
all have given strong support to the Army pro-
gram. Outstanding has been the courageous ac-
ceptance of sacrifice by the families of those men
\vho have already fallen in the struggle. .
. The end is not yet clearly in sight but victory
l~ C:rtain. In 'every emergency the courage, ini-
~IatIve,and spirit of our soldiers and their young
eaders and of our pilots and their crews have
been an inspiration at the n10rnent, and a com-
plete assurance of the final victory to come.

TVashington D. C.
J G. C. l\IARsHALL,
JUly I I943.
J Chief of Staff.
\ 161

L
 PART THREE.

NOTES

L
 NOTES
I, Battle Maneuvers Realistic
s'These maneuvers are conducted under the. supervi.
/on of the Army Ground Forces, the divisions in train. f1
tJ:
g ~eing organized into army corps and armies. Real-
IS emphasized and wherever possible they are con-
.f'
~I

lIt~teldon a two-sided basis. Und~r Lieutenant ~eneral '~

a g 1 A. Drum, Commanding the First ArJ?Y, Lleuten- II
l~t General Ben Lear, Commanding the Second Army, II:
a eutenant General Walter Krueger, later Lieuten- I
i\nt General Courtney Hodges, Commanding the Third
rntrny, and Lieutenant General John L. De''''itt, Com-
e anding the Fourth Army, extremely valuable experi-
nce has been gained in preparing our troops for battle.

2. Organization Geared to Require.ments

i A. number of o'rganizational changes have been made
i~ tactical units to meet the requirements of th~ war as
Q' ~~veloped. The World ''''ar type square infantry
IVISlonhas been replaced by the hard hitting trian.
tUlar division. Rapid moving tank destroyer units have
weendeveloped, equipped with towed and self-propelled
. die~~ons capable of knocking out enemy tanks. Armored
t VISIonshave been reorganized to provide two combat
tearns, to improve mobility of supporting artillery and
bO combine service functions. :Motorized divisions have
then eliminated, the transportation formerly a part of
Ue~e divisions to be held in pools to meet a special sit-
batIOn. Horse. and mechanized cavalry regiments have
8cen eliminated by substituting mechanized separate
t(luadrons. Airborne divisions of glider and parachute
v~oopshave been established. Also there have been pro-
aIded many new types of units for service functions such
thPOrt. battalions to facilitate landing operations and
b e .rapid development of new ports, petroleum distri-

"'"8,Ut1onunits, air ferrying organizations, ete. N on-divi-

;onal units except infantry, horse cavalry and armored
em,enls are being organized in battalions or smaller

t (1941-1943) 165
, .
 formations with command groups capable of d1. f.ectio~
pi'_
the operations of from two to eirrht such units. ThIS ireD
mits rapid assembly of exactly ~he type un~ts req~ziJl
for any type operation and is the basis for organl
supporting troops for task forces.

3. A merican-A ustralian Cooperation 'reo

The support and cooperation furnished the V('IJ'!
States by the Australian Government and the peop e fa
been a vital factor in the conduct of the war in the 'ea~J
East. All possible assistance was offered to the A~efl'lld
commanders in that area in building up the aIr of'
supply bases and facilitating the establishment of trO
units. . I 0'
Previously the Australian government had asslste\c
in the development of the air route ham the Unl ere d
States to the Philippine Islands. These airdromes W ol
of great value in the fight to stop the tidal wave eel
Japanese advancement. Much of Australia's resoU \ld
inclUding aircraft factories, hospitals, warehouses, tl
even manpower, were assigned directly for the supp ort
of American forces in Australia.

4. Overseas Units Fully EquijJped r-

In general, it has been the policy to furnish 100 P;of
cent equipment, with reserves and maintenance t11
units scheduled to be sent overseas within three mon 15
\Vhen it became apparent that units in training c~t1tI5
not be supplied with complete allowances of numelO b'
critical items of equipment, the War Department esttl '
Iished a policy of providing half of the allowan~o(1 C5
Even this goal could not be reached as the expansl o'
of the Army rapidly exceeded increases in arms prol
duction. Munitions were assigned to various th~aterS 0'-
war according to a priority based upon strategIC pia
5. Reverse Lend-Lease
A feature .
of Lend-Lease is the so-called. "~ev\lrsc
Lend-Lease," the term applied to the furOlslung )
166 (I94I-Ig43
Oth ' , . f '1" \
an er nations of sUjJplies, equipment, serVIces, aCl ~tIes '
S d patent ri<Yhts to the' armed forces of the United ,I
h~t.es without\::)cost. The most important single contri- i
. tlon of Reverse Lend-Lease in the war effort has been 'I
~\~saving in shipping requirements. Reverse Lend-L~ase '~
o reduced demands on United States raw matenals,
~roductive facilities and manpower. It further. contrib- '
/ed to the more efficient utilization of all the produc-
~ve resources of the United Nations.. Overseas c.o~-
alfnders of American forces have been dIrected to utIlIze
l available sources of local supply on a Reverse Lend-
t ea~e basis. Procurement organizations have been es-
ta?hshed in the principal theaters of operations to ob-
.aln supplies locally for American forces and to assist
~ the development of local resources. Within the United
rnlngd.om in the fiscal year 1943, .1',500,000 ship tons of
r atene! were provided the United States forces sta-
t~Onedthere in addition to a large quantity of construc-
~on materials. Had all these supplies been shipped
;erseas in American vessels it would have required
Z ore than 500 fully loaded ships. In Australia and New
t ea~and, American forces have obtained almost' all of
tge1r food requirements locally. In the Middle Eastern
f eater the British have provided for United States
iorces in -the area all maintenance requirements, includ-
ng food supply, clothing and equipment.

6. ,Volume of Shipping Required

'the tremendous amount of shipping required for a
fOdern army is not generally understood. For instance,
o~ c?mputing initial shipping requirements an average
.SlXmeasurement tons of cargo space per man is re-
~Ulred. Maint~nance requirements average one meas-
()rement ton per month. Also involved is the creating
af a balance between shipping available for personnel
shd that for cargo. At the beginning of the war an acute
s.Ortage in troop carr:ying capacity was met by conver-
Ions of all existing passenger ships and certain selected
Cargo ships. Also, additi~nal capacity was obtained by
16
L941-I~4.3) 7
 , '(isb
a.rrangi ng for the u.se of sev~ral of t.he larger ~f1rWI[
hner:, and troops shIps. Late m'19-12 It :was foun iliti~
despIte the foregoing steps. cargo carrymg ~apab d .6
were again in excess of troop carrying capacIty ~n 'WaS
!II
extensive program of conversion of fast cargo ShIpS
undertaken in order to maintain the proper balance.

7. Close Cooperation by" Brazil , h,

O
' ra I permIsSIon
" was obtained from BraZl'1' In :MafC
I 1J1,
1942, for the establishment of air facilities in B~ e of
N~t.al an~ Recife, permitting tp.e unlimi.ted tranS1t;\ir
mIlItary aIrcraft and the stationIng of UnIte9- StateS rer
Forces technicians in Brazil. The agreeme~t. was t adl'
formalized with permission to construct additIonal ~.~
ities and' station United States personnel in !I0rt ~ter
Brazil. The close cooperation of Braz,il in tIus rna air
has been of inestimable value in building up our
forces in Europe and North Africa.

8. Alaska l\filitary Highway . C'

A project which wnl result in a permanent impro~a
ment in the transportation system of North Arne~l h"
has been the construction of the Alaska Military I-Ilg
way through the vaguely mapped virgin wilderne~s 'ot of
'Vestern Canada. The project, authorized by a JOI as
agreement between Canada and the United States, w "
c~rried out un.cler the direction of the .Chief of frO'
O
gmeers. The hIghway was built to functIon as a~ aY
ponant military supply route connecting the rallw fl
and highway system of the United States and So~the~s
Canada with routes in Alaska, in addition to serVIng da
a feeder road to several military airfields in Can'
whicI: previously had depended u pan air transport for
supplIes. 0'
. On February 14, I~)42, the Office of the Chief C?f~tl~
gmeers was instructed to prepare plans for the buIld 1 c
of the h,ighway. Early in .March, 1942, Quartermast , r
and EogIneer troops had arrived at the end of the ilr~k
road at Dawson Creek in Canada. Engineer units wO )
168 (1941-1943
~~gon the highway from each end and in both direc-
o~onsfrom the half-way point had completed nine miles
\vathe road by April; by the end; of October the ~ast gap
engSclosed on the 1,480-mile pIOneer road, whlc~ h~d
Coaged approximately 10,000 Engineer troops ,In Its
nStruction. ' .
f Irnprovements currently under way provide for a. 26-
o~Otroadbed width, with surfacing placed to a WIdth
an from 20 to 22 feet. Local ~~teri";ls, iIl:cluding .gravel
i d crushed stone, will be' utilIzed In this surfaCIng. It
tS estimated that the cost of constructing the pione~r
SO ad, together with improving it to present proposed
t~andards, will be $115,000,000, which figure includes
Ste replacement of a considerable number of temporary
t tUctures destroyed during the recent spring thaw. Cur-
cent improvements are scheduled for completion De-
teIl1ber 31, 1943, and ,are going ahead largely by con-
thact labor forces under the immediate supervision of
d,e ,Public Roads Administration and the general juris-
s.lCtlon of our Northwest Service Command and Divi-
Ian Engineer of the Northwest Division. '

,9, Unity of Co~mand

ofDnder, the direction of the President, the Joint Chiefs
Staff, composed of the Chief of Staff to the Com-
~ander-in-Chief of the -United States Army and Navy"
e Chief of Staff of the United States Army,. the Com-
~ander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and Chief
<\. Naval Operations, and the Commanding General,
t trny Air Forces, are responsible for coordination be-
tWeen the Army and Navy, and in operations for which
t~e United States has sole or primary responsibility,
'thY ar~ charged with the strategic conduct of the war,
t; ~ Combined Chiefs of Staff, composed of the above
n ~1~ed States members and four representatives of the
t{ltIsh Chiefs of Staff insure complete coordination of
1\ e war effort of Great Britain and the United States.
b' development of the Join(Chiefs of Staff and Com-
Ined Chiefs of Staff organizations. is the unity of com-
, (1941-1943) , 169
 - d
- mand principle which places the responsibility ~~
authority for a contemplated operation und~r one ~l'"
mander directly responsible to the J oint ~h~es of co
or the Combined Chiefs of Staff_ When a Jomt or rJ11 lJl
III bi~ed f<;>rcecommander has been designa~ed an dtlI'P~
unus Composing his force are assigned, hIS c,?m j;ol
responsibilities are the same as if the forces Jf~VO pis
were all of one service or one nation, He exerC1se~icl
Command through' the. commanders of force~ W tpiS
have been assigned him, and normally in operau,ons JIlj,
wiII consist of the assirrnment of their respectIve cp'
sions, In carrying OUt its mission the tactics an~, te 0
nique of the force concerned are the responsibIlIty 1
the commander of the subordinate force, , tit'
Allied to the principles of unified command IS lJI'
mechanism of operational planning on a joint and CO as
bined level, The command functi,';n of the President I'
Commander.in-Chief of the United States forces isl ,
ercised through the United States Chiefs of Staff. b~
British Chiefs of Staff function in a similar m.anner
der the Prime Minister and his War' Cabmet.
;b'
'po
United States Chiefs of Staff have organized planr;';
and supporting agencies consisting of representau'lJI
from the Army and Navy and, where applicable, f~od
other interested governmental agencies. These U~'~~I
States supporting agencies assist and advise the 101 (\
Chiefs of Staff in matters of strategy, operation~1 .OJ,
administrative planning, psychological warfare, ~nt:o'
gence, transportation, the assignment of matenals ,""
war, communications, meteorology. weapons, petroler. g
civil ~ffairs and other m~tters. Most of the supporttC,
agenCIes of the J 01l1t Clllefs of Staff orgamzatlOn ha .
a British counterpart with which they work, thus for;::.
ing combined agencies to advise and assist the Cab'
bined Chiefs of Staff. An outstanding example of ~ p
success of this system is the complete harmony of actt0
of the American and British forces in the Mediterranea t1
area under the command of General Eisenhower. )
0
17 (I94I-I943
10
. Japanese Miscalculations
ap1'h~major miscalculation of the Japanese was the
coNarent expectation that the Russian Army would
w apse under the German grand assault then under-
fi:Y against Moscow which ended in the first winter
ofsco. Also unanticipated was the prolonged defense
fa the Philippine Islands which upset their timeta.ble
il1~IOt~er offensive operations in the Southwest PacIfic,
- Udmg Australia.
II. Nuclei of Pacific Air Force ' '
o'the air forces in the Pacific were built up piecemeal'
(n the skeleton of the 11th Bombardment Group
(li eavy) in Hawaii and the 19th Bombardment Group
h' eavy) which moved into Australia from the Philip-
{'lUes.

12 . A' trborneMovement of Troops

fa'the most noteworthy feature of th~s project was the
Pt~tt?~t only hastily prepared landing strips of the most-
II I1lItIve character could be made available. An un-
a~h~l amount of skill and daring made possible its
levement.
13. Moves Against Japan Planned
I1l. Initiallyour operations in New Guinea and the Solo-
teon~ were handicapped by limited resources. To de-
sol'l1lmethe best use of our -growing strength in re-
e urces, certain commanders and staff officers of the
seentral, South, and Southwest Pacific Areas were as-
lalllbIed in Washington in March of 1943. Here the
tn.test combat intelligence was integrated and supple-
ab~nt~d with strategic and logistical, intelligence avail:-
It e m War and Navy Department agencies to develop
in clear picture of the enemy situation and capabilities
the areas concerned. At the same time the plans pro-
ihsed by the theater commanders were coordinated with
b Osedeveloped in the War and Navy Departments and
(tought into consonance with the overall strategical
, 194Z-Z943) 171

l
 , ' i
' theSe
concept for the prosecution of the war. Based ~n tiv ,
considerations a plan which set forth .the obJe~,i
es
allotted the available means, and prescnbed CoIllr ''&,
arrangem~nts w~s deyeloped an? subseq.uen~ly a~p do tbe
'II!II - by the Jomt ChIefs of Staff. ThIS planmng mdu d!'lel
ri clearing
Georgia. of the Japanese from Rendova Island an .1
-t ! .
I,

,',
,.. ,

'j,
'4. Bomber Attacks Effective - 'ro~I

."
~H
Large. scal~ ~aylight rai~s reql.!ire unlimited
for precIse aImmg from lUg'll altItudes. Days of ~ tpe
ce~;i'"
':1
it~d ceilings are rare in Europe, particularly In tbe
wmter, and, in order to avoid a waste of good dayS, e 9
development of -accurate weather forecasting ~ec~ to
matter of extreme importance. It has been desIra b'
build up bombing missions of 300 planes or more '0&C
jl cause of the strength of the German fighter force
:II the antiaircraft defenses on the western front. By jtllrtb
1, 1943, over 1,000 heavy bombers were based In si~e
/I
II
United Kingdom. During the last week of July, rOb
American missions, averaging almost 300 heavy bOrer-
II ers each,' were flown, all but one against Germany; fort
haps the greatest tribute to the heavy bomber ehe~
was the enemy's recognition of its importance. 1 ref
attacks caused him to increase his production of figJ \0'
aircraft at the expense of bombers, to allocate neW P ".
duction largely to the western front, to withdraW 'ae
perienced single-engine fighter pilots from the RUSSI f1vo
and Mediterranean fronts for the defense of G~rrn~h;
and later to withdraw fighter aircraft from RUSSIa.du
net result was that the Germans were unable to con 'Idcl
any sustained offensives this summer in Russia or bU\o
up sufficient strength in the central Mediterranean
oppose the Allied offensive,.

15. A merican-British Conferences i

In April, 1942, I visited London for a series of
ferences with the Prime Minister, the War CabIll a'
~o~
and the British Chiefs of Staff regarding future oper.) j
172 (1941- 94)J
1
Hons. Plans aO"reedto at that time were later modified as
a .result of andther visit to London in July, in company
\VI~hAdmiral King, to permit the launching of the cam-
paIgn in North Africa the following November. "
Between these two visits. there was interpolated a
conference in WashinO"ton of the President, the Prime "t
Minister, and Genera{'Sir Alan F.Brooke, Chief of the i
Irnperial General Staff and the United States Chiefs ii
of Staff. It was during' this conference that the British !1 i

forces in the l\fiddle East were forced to retire to .the 'I

El Alamein line. The attention of the conference there- 'i
after was largely devoted "to measures" to meet the des- ~
perate situation which had developed in Egypt, 'lUp-
plemented by a German threat t.hrough the Caucasus ;!
tOward the Abadan oil refineries in the Persian Gulf
region. In this emergency 307 medium tanks and 90
self-propelled 105 mm guns were rushed to the "Middle
East from New York. One transport loaded with 51
tanks and 28 105's was torpedoed and in order to re- I
place this loss a. corresponding number was taken with-
OUt explanation from the American armored divisions
then engaged in maneuvers. The arrival of these tanks
a!l? guns. proved to be an important factor in the de-
CISIvevictory of the British Eighth Army on the El Ala-
rnein line in October.

16. Government of Occupied A 'yeas

Throughout military operation~ in foreign territory
orderly civil administration must be maintained. In
anti~ipation of this function the 'Val' Department es-
tablIshed in :May, 1942, a School of Military Govern-
rnent at Charlottesville, Virginia, designed to train Army
officers for these important functions. Also, in order to
~stablish policies and plan for the coordination of civil-
Ia? activities in occupied territories a War Department
CIVil Affairs Division was established on March 1, 1943.
"this division, acting in collaboration .with other gov-
ernment agencies involved, coordinate~ civil affairs in
areas occupied by the United Nations in combined
( 194 I -I 94 3 ) 173
 the bombing of rail communications through. ~o~~
and the destruction of the Rumanian oil refinenes
Ploesti.

'i,'! 20. Civilians A id Fighting Units i.

In addition to Lend-Lease activities a number of ,c
vilian experts have been furnished by private industrtesal
organizations 'as observers to accompany field fOf.cb
overseas. These experts, most of them engineers of h1&I'
d
stan .mg, went to such places as Cairo,, Austra rla, HawaII
lse'
England, the Southwest Pacific, North Africa and e d
where. They were given a status similar to officer~ a~tl
accompanied the troops in actual combat to assIst Ie.
operation of equipment and to observe its performanctO
Reports received from them have been of great value
troops in the field and to the Army Service Forces.. ve
In addition, several thousand civilian technicians ha y
been employed within the United States in an advis?f
or supervisory capacity for the repair and reclamaul tlr
of Army equipment. These technicians are also use~ Os
the instruction of mechanics of all types and as adviserb
to Army officers on maintenance activities. Throug e
their assistance standards of preventative mainten3;nc
were raised, training of maintenance troops expedItedd
and damaged equipment speedily repaired and !eturr~~e
to the troops. The employment of qualified aut0ll1;0U _
and maintenance men from American industry has p~r
mitted the knOWledge gained by years of experience 111
automotive maintenance to be passed on to the A~Jl1Y'

21. 1\1iddle East Construction Curtailed

. Construction of large ordnance and aircraft depo
was undertaken in the Nile Delta area, in Eritrea, an,
in the Levant States at a time when the enemy's success
d
in Libya and Egypt indicated a long campaign ~f re-
cO\'ery on the part of the United Nations in the MIddle
East with a possible withdrawal to bases in Eritrea qr
t~e Levant. In the fall of 1942 after it appeared that. th~
Llby~n Campaign coupled with the North Afnca
6
117 (I94I-I943)
!anclings would eliminate the enemy from Africa, Amer-
~~n S~lpport of the above depots was almost completely
.lthdrawn, with the result tha~ United States trOOps
Involved were then employed primarily in support of
f Army (mostly aIr. force) operatIons
0llr .' In t h e area an d
~rther construction was canceled. :Most of the above
~ep~t activities were taken over and operated by the
ltltlsh.

22. Pacific Operations Planned

lieutenant General Stilwell and Iviajor General Chen-
nault were ordered to 'J\Tashington in April, 1943, to
present first-hand informatiOll on the situation in China
~ ~he President, th.e ~rime l\'~inister and the Combined
hlefs of Staff. Snllilarly FIeld Marshal '\Tavell de-
scribed the situation in Burma and India, and the mili- I'

tary and economic problems of China were described

Y Dr. T. V. Soong. Plans prepared by these theater
c~lnmanders were supplemented by and coordinated
'h th those of the Combined Staff Planners resulting in
t e development of a logistical program and plans for
elffective military operations which were approved by
t Ie Combined Chiefs of Staff.

23. A id to Russia
b 'fhe following assistance has been rendered to Russia
Y the United States in the form of military equipment:
oVer 3,000 airplanes, 2,400 tanks, 109,000 sub-machine
gUns, 16,000 Jeeps, 80,000 trucks, 7,000 motorcycles,
130:000 field telephones and 75,000 tons of explosives,
\vhlCh have actually arrived in Russia with a great
lllany other items of munitions as well as foodstuffs and
raw material.
24. lVomen's Army Auxiliary CorJ)s
. On May 14, 1942, the President signed the bill estab-
lishing the 'Vomen's Army Auxiliary Corps. The basic
Purpose of this organization was to utilize the services
of Women wherever possible and thus release a corre-
(194I-I943) 177
 Spondmg . number of soldiers
. . for combat duty..
. Although
d by
the immediate authorized strength was estabhsh~ bad
the President as 25,000, by November the W AA tb
justilied
0 its purpose to such an exte~a tha~ the streftrng
of 15 ,000 Was authorized and an mtenslve recru
Campaign was undertaken. fori
The lirst W Mc training center was open~d :'-t fOO
Des Moines, Iowa, On JUly 20, 1942, and wahm sl%
weeks a basic training course for auxiliaries and ~'nt'
Weeks' course for officer candidates established.
that time training centers have been establis!ted at foCI
bat
tona Beach, Florida, Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, and
Devens, Massachusetts. (Chart 22.) I1lp'
The training which the Women receive in the~e caTh'
prepares them to take their place in Army hfe.. nl-
.four weeks' basic training course is. designed to m
C
cate the principles of Army discipline, customs and 01
COurtesies as well as to teach the members metho~ it
caring for government property. Followiug the d as
course, WAAC's may immediately go into the lie! , to or
Where special talents are indicated they may be sent t.
specialist schools to receive additional training. For 1\1
ample, women assigned to the administrative speera "
schools are trained in Army administrative procedu ~
r
a matter which can be handled as efficiently by a WOUl\
as by a man. The schools for bakers and cooks tea~.
'Y AA C's . the fundamen tals of Army cooking and 'e s
Clent methods of preparation of foods for large group
as well as the principles of dietetics and balanced menl~
Those assigned to motor transport duties are not 0(1
taught the basic principles of operating Army vehic1 :-
c
but also elementary repair and maintenance wor-
Women, Whose tests indicate they have aptitudes, Ul~:
be assigned to schools for radio operators and reparr
men, Or given instruction in photographic techniques
and developing and printing pictures and camera u;'
and repair. Those Who manifest qualities of leadership
are selected for officer candidate school and there they
receive8 more intensive training in military procedure
'7 (Z94I-z94J)
 :nd .di.scipline and receive further ins~r~c.ti~:min Army
dmIllIstration and command responsIbIlItIes.
There is a growing demand for WAAC's se!vices
~hroughout the Army. Enlistees represent the hIghest
Ypeof American womanhood and as a whole the women
~ave maintained the highest standards in .every respec~.
hey have fulfilled their duties in an effiCIent and bUSI-
ness-like manner and have been a definite asset to the
Army. Each woman enrolled in the W AAC has post-
Poned the induction of a man since they are counted as
a man in computing the ultimate manpower require-
l1lents of the Army.
A. little over a year after the Corps 'Was established,
~ore than 65,000 women were members and are serving
In more than 240 posts, camps and stations in the United
States and abroad. In the 155 specialists jobs they have
taken over they have fulfilled their primary purpose of
:eleasing able-bodied men for active duty on the fight-
Ing front. In addition, a number have been shipped to
?verseas stations and are performing valuable functions
I~ activities as chauffeurs, and in administrative capaci-
tIes at the various headquarters. Plans for the inc;rease
ff the Army during the calendar year of 1943 provide
?r approximately 150,000 \VAAC's, an equivalent in
~le to almost 10 divisions of soldiers released for com-
at duty .
. On July 1, 1943, the President signed a bill chang-
In.g the status of the Corps from an auxiliary serving

~te
WIth the Army to a component of the Army and giving
members the right to Army ratings, grades, priv-
1 eges, responsibilities, and benefits.

25. Officer Program

A. factor of vital importance in the development of
the Army has been the insistence that high standards
i leadership be maintained throughout all echelons.
he basis of the structure was a nucleus of 14,000 Reg-
Ular Army officers augmented by 21,000 National Guard
and 110,000 Reserve officers, the great proportion of
(Z94z-I943) 179
 whom were not on active duty. At the outset 1'tAJ1llY was
apparent that the limited number of Regular derlY.
officers would be spread extremely thin and the or neY
development during the early stages of the emerge ,oir
could not have proceeded without utilizing the res~r_' ill'
of Reserve officers who were brought to active duty ,.nn.
creasing numbers as the expansion proceed~d. N au~s 1
Guard officers came in with their own umts, and. d.
rUle were not available for the new units organized In
dental to the passage of the Selective Se.rvice Act. lJle
. In anticipation of the even greater expansion to co a
there was established during the summer of 1 \,e
number of officer candidate schools designed to g~t
94"
special training to enlisted men who had displayed? JlS
standing qualities of leadership (chart 23). Selecuoed
for attendance at officer candidate schools were basil'
on the democratic theory that the schools were ava a'
able to any man who demonstrated outstanding '"Si"
~iliti~s of leadership, w!'o po~essed the intell~ct a.s to
tmgUIshed from edUcatIOn WIlIChwould permIt. h!I1l ed
perform the functions of an officer, and who indICat in
that he was morally and physically qualified to tra!li'
troops and lead them in combat. By June 30, 1943, ~.n
cer candidate schools had given the Army mor~ t ll'
206,000 officers, serving in grades from second heute
ant to lieutenant colonel. . . r
In order to meet a demand for officers who w~oe
specialists in various technical professions and W fl.~
would not be involved in direct command of tro~rii
approximately 47,000 officers were appointed from ell
life, thus releasing experienced military personnel . ~ '
r

other duties. This figure is in addition to chaplatn ~

doctors and former officers. These commissions ~er,
granted chiefly for duty in highly specialized positIOn
in tbe JUdge Advocate General's Department, Corps OJf
EnQ'ineers, Ordnance Dep.artment, Sig'nal Corps an
Army Air Forces. Early in 1943 when the officer sh rt-
U

age in the Army had been overcome, procurement f~o~

civil life was restricted to professional and technIC')
180 (I94 I-I94)
~ec~alist~ not otherwise obtainable, and a gradual r~-
d ctlon In the capacity and output of th~ officer call;dI-
iate schools was initiated to keep step wIth the declIne
n the expansion rate of the Army.
General Officers ,
:P
I

faSucce~s or failure of military campaigns and th~ .~e1- \

re of Innumerable lives are dependent upon deCISIOns ;!
~fde by general officers. OUf generals, therefore, .are . "
ected from men who have measured up to the hIgh-
eSt standards of military skill, who have demonstrated
a Comprehensive understanding of modern methods of
warfare and who possess the physical stamina, moral
cO~.trage,strength of character and the flexibility of
~lnd necessary to carry the burdens which modern com- ,
at conditions impose .
.\Ve had on June 30,. 1943, 1,065 general officers to
~ommand and staff the Army. This represented a net
~~crease of 722 during the past two years as shown in
e following table:
Net
Rank July 1, June 3, Increase
___ 1941 1943
~~ne-r-al-.-.-.-.-.-.-..-.-.-.-.-.-.-.---1 5
~e~ltenant General .... 8 25
B ~Jor General ,.,..... 89 271
~gadier General ..... 245 764
, -Total............. 343---1-,6-65
~
This increase, however, did not keep pace with the
.eXpansion of the Army, for on July 1, 1941, there was
one, general officer for every group of 4,241 officers and
enhsted men, while on June 30, 1943, there was one
to 6,460.
Of these 1,065 generals, 18 were officers of the Re-
serve Corps, 80 from the N ationar Guard and nine were
promoted to brigadier general after being commissioned
In lower grades directly from civil life. Of those hold- .
(194 1.1943) 18 1
 ing- commissions in the Reg-ular Army, 47 were rell'red
officers on active duty.

GENERAL OFF_leERS-JUNE 30'~9j3 ----total

RA Gen. Lt.Gen. Maj. Gen. Br~.Gen. ~

--~--
Active
Retired

Res
NG :
ADS
. Sub-total .. 5
.
.
.
9,
2
22

24
2 647
24
671
16
68
957!
8
910
47

1
80

---
10
Total 5 25 9
==-=---===~---.::-= 6
7 4 1,065
~
Of .the 910 active ~ist RegUlar Ar.my generals,
, 865
f1ic
were temporary appOllltments only III general 0 de' ef
grades, while 45 held permanent rank in those g-ra is'
~lthough only about 3.7 percent of the Army's com~o,
SlOned strength Was made up of National Guardsm of.
somewhat over seven percent of the Army's general
fieers had come from the National Guard.

2G. Construction Program he

The War construction program, begun under t of
<?ua.rtermaster Corps and transferred to the CO~P~O[i'
EngIneers on December 16, 1941, presented a prod1g1 lIe
engineeringproblem,.<chart
total
G COst 01 the enttre program amounted
24). By March 31, 1943, :6,
to $9,2 d
4 'I.?00, of which $2,588,000,000 was for ground .lUs-
se~-vl(-enf.'''";es facilities, .h,82,~'5IO,ooo went for Ul :n-
trIal fa
. lllIes, and ,$<>. ~',h)o3 , 096 , 000 was devoted to C te d
Strunton for the air forces. The balance represeu .
Such items as the Civil Aeronautics Administration pro
graI~1,
tectton. storage and shipping facilities and passive pro- B
In the accom plishmellt of this program, 18,139,09
acres of land were acqUired at a COst of $249,039. t3~
-At the peak of employment, in JUly, 194 , more tba)
2
!82 (I94I-I943
prOne lllIlhon
'. ..
persons were involved In some phase of the
So gram, which figure, by March, 1943, had fallen to
of~eWhatover 350,000. At that time about 75.8 percent
di .he authorized projects had been completed, an ad-
IV tIOnal 6,4 percent were ready for use and 17.5 percent
toere Under construction and only 0.3 percent of the
tal authorized had not been started.
folIousing for 4,919,617 men was provided-3,507,552
for t?e ground units, 1,412,065 for the air forces and
o{ cIvilian workers. A total of 222, ~54,054 square feet
pi depot storage space was made" avaIlable; 230,235 hos-
thtal beds were provided, representing 76.2 percent of
e authorized number.
a.l11l'hecost of air forces projects to March 31, 1943,
tl.1OUnted to $2,500,000,000. Plants for the manufac-
obr~ and storage. of munitions and warfare. chemicals
k lIgated approxImately $3,000,000,000. RepaIr and up-
v~~p of installations by the Chief of Engineers are pro-
th eq for by an authorization of about $40,000,000 for ,
f e current fiscal year ending June 30, 1943. A program
tor ~amouflage and other passive protective measures
aO YUal war factories and installations is being provided
th a Cost of about $40,000,000. All of this work is under
r e supervision of 51 Engineer Districts within the con-
t~nental limits of the United States and nine extra-con-
Inental District Engineer Offices.
a Various types of military training facilities and camps
Chd cantonments have been built-ranging from para-
u~e training towers to rifle ranges. .
ofSInce the health of the soldier is a vital responsibility
p" the Army, many health facilities, in addition to hos-
Itals and housing, have been built. These include
proper provision for food storage and cooking, inciner-
btor plants providing for the prompt disposal of gar-
hage. and refuse, ample laundry facilities and proper
eatIng. '
b Recreation centers operated by the usa have also
be~n . constructe~ . by the Army. Attractive, modern
UIldmgs, contammg club rooms and lounges, a social
(194I-I943) 183
 ~ ":'' gi
hall with a stage and dressmg > ooms, . d
study an d eadtl1bat,
rooms: as well. as a refreshment lounge and so a. I
were meluded m the program. ..' .orshil
To further the high .purpose of rehglOus wI ar
plans called for the construction of 478 chapels.
pearance, the chapels resemble the typical small c ofed
:urd'
of the a~er~ge American community~the slant'~ap'1
frame bmldmg with steeple at the front.. Each bOa'
has
00 an electric !>rgan and a seating capaClty for a et"
1 soldiers .and is so designed and equipped th~t s
Ices of any denomination can be conducted. loti'
In January, '941, work was started on the At a jo'
bases leased from Great Britain-a huge program, atl
VOlving construction of permanem housing, tempor cb'
h?using, . ~i~fields,. fortifications and miscella~eous teall'
. mcal facd Ilies. WIth the approach of war, thIS. pr.o?'oal
was accelerated and expanded to include ,.addlllO rl
bases in the Caribbean area, while in J~lr, 1~41, ~~o'
Was started on the construction of faCIlItIes In Gr
land. DC'
Late in 1941 efforts were directed toward cons~ fIJ
tion of Supply routes to our own overseas possess~O se
and to those of the Allied Nations. The first of tees
provided a chain of airfields for delivery of airplal1 d
to some of our Pacific Island outposts, Austra 1Ia . allit
the South Pacific area. Attention was also given ~o.~es
routes over the North and South Atlantic; air faClht'.
. the northeast portion of South AmerIca
In . wet e el'11
panded and Work . Was started in the Red .' Sea area, Ira s'
and Iraq to deVelop ports and rail and highway traO
portation facilities. ,e
ConStruction prOblems of almost every variety ha~y
been encountered; Some ferry route airfields have mer~d
been graded and permitted to freeze; others were pav'
with steel mats, while stilI others have been overlaID d
.with concrete. Housin~ has varied from simple wooded
structures used iu the~ters of operations to brick ao .
tile18 bUildings in South America. Housing in areas a.)d

/ 4 (I94I-Ig43
jacent to the Arctic Circle is of special design, with
.Plenty of insulation, vestibules and storm windows.

,27. Public Relations

, 'fhe War Departrhent Bureau. of Public Relations
.~as established on February 11, 1941. During the w~r. ,'f1
~ e ~uiding principle of the conduct of. Army p'ubhc
e.latlOns has been to release all informatIon consIstent
~Ith safeguarding military security. Also by the estab- Ii!
Ishment of a code of war time practices for the press ~
~d radio, a genui~e co.ope:ation has. been attained by I'l
ese great news dIssemInating agencIes. .' . ~
'fhe global character of the war and the early dIs-
~atch of American troops to widely separated areas ,1
d~cessitate a world-wide organization for the prompt:~,
hIssemination of news. Public relations offices in the ~
.eadquarters of each theater of operations provide con-
tInuous access to important announcements by com-
manding generals overseas. Commanders of units in.
the field are instructed to assist the correspondents ac-
cr~dited to their organizations, and to provide them
\\lIth quarters, subsistence" transportation within the
area, and with the' means of communication which as-
SUre that their dispatches and pictures will be carried.
promptly from battle' zone to the homefront. '
As a method of providing news, free from hint of
propaganda, the' principle has been accepted that civil-
lahncorrespondents rather than public relations officers,
s ould prepare the news for the public. \Vithin the
~ureau an accrediting service considers and processes
bpplications for the dispatch of civilian representatives
S oth to posts in this country, and to overseas theaters.
Ome 500 writers, photographers and radio commenta-
tors, representing press feature services, individual news-
rapers, picture syndicates and radio networks.have thus
, a~ been accredited by the Bureau to theaters of oper-
.atlons.
The difficulties of making a full pictorial record un-
der conditions of active warfare have been the object
(I94 I-I94 3) 185
 -
of sP~cial arran~eme~t. A photograp~ers' poo,I bow
ater.
for stili and motIOn p1ctures, operates 10 every the ta~
Under its regulations, still pictures and newsreel foo all.
taken by one representative are made ava1la!,le to bY
Early in 1943 facilities were set up for the d1spatc h JlS,
radio of still pictures from North Africa. By. th~s mea al'
photographs appear in the American press WIthIn a rn
ter of hours from the time they are taken. . clia
. The News DiviSion, subdivided in terms of th~ m~Jld
it serves, has separate branches for press, magaz1O~ 'Jlg
book' pUblishers, radio and pictorial services, aSSlstire.
them to obtain such news of the Army as they des f!I
Through the Press Branch all news emanatin~ fro
the War Department is distributed to the pubhc. T' be
Pictorial Branch provides pictorial news throug~ .sO I10
pictures, newsreels and other films and maintains halsa,
with the film industry through the War Activities Co~
mittee, Motion Picture Industry. The Radio Bran~ b
in addition to serving as War Department contactW1\
the broadcasting industry, produces each week an hOU~e
program, The Army Hour, presenting reports from tur
war lones, a summary of news, and developments of C? "
training establishments. Through its Continental. !;-Ia1
. son Branch, the News Division maintains close halso
~it~ all public relations officers within the continenta
lImIts of the United States.
J
T~e War Intelligence Division prepares such co!,,:
mUllIques as are issued by the War Department, -maI.J1
tai.ns .Bureau contact with theaters of operations and. ~s
.pr~nC1pal officers are available at all times to prov~ ~
gUIdance on war news. This division is charged WIt
the accrediting of all war correspondents and photog'
raphers. Lists of casualties and prisoners of war are all'
nounced to the public by this division, which also safe:
gu~rds .military security through the review of ma~~J
scnpts Intended for release to the public. The Indostrl I
Services Division is charged with a continuous study 0
morale in manufacturing plants engaged in the prodUC-
tion of war materiel.

186 (I94I-I94J)
 , The Bureau maintains direct contact with the arms ,i

:~d s~rvices through Offices of Technical lnfo~n?ation ill'

tabhshed in all branches of the Army. In addItIOn to I
llews of special activities, these offices provide answers i!
to many of the inquiries addressed to t~e ~Var Depa.rt-
ie~lt from publicity media, other organIzatiOnS and Ill-
IVIduals.
.;11
~

The expansion of 'activity in combat zones has devel-

oped an increasin<T demand for the interpretation of
eVents and for ne~s from the battle areas. First hand
aCCOuntsof
~ life on the battlefronts' reach the public-

nstantly from officers returned from the combat zones.

28. Health in- the Army

l' ~he expansion of the Army was accompanie~ by a
apid development in the knowledge and applIcation
of medical science as it pertained to the Army. Of out-
Standing importance were the measures taken to pre~
".ent such diseases as could be prevented by innocula-
tion and vaccination. Our soldiers have been vaccinated
With an improved variety of typhoid and para-typhoid,
and all have been immunized against tetanus. Also,
where necessary, troops have been vaccinated against
.typhus, bubonic plague, cholera and yellow fever.
h The necessity for giving prompt and effective care to
;ttlefield casualties has resulted in the development
o .special types of equipment, induding mobile X-ray
~nItS and mobile field operating units which can give
~mediate treatment to serious battlefield casualties.
h f all developments in the present war, however, per-
daps the most outstanding are the application of sulpha
f rugs to wounds and the use of dry human blood plasma
Or transfusions.
h Despite the continuous expansion since 1940 the
ealth record of the Army as a whole has made a con-
iant improvement. For instance, the record for the
seal year 1943 was better than that for 1942 and both
re~resented peak att<;l.inments. The number of cases re-
qUIring medical treatment was lower during 1942 and
(1941-1943) . 187
 15,000
. . .. .
IS sent to the Navy, Coast Guard. an
d MariJ1e
'ted
Corps, the Canadian Army, and war plants i!, t~e U~ t'
States, A smaller "overseas edition" is dIstnbute
theaters of operations and to hospitals in this countrw,
Four of seven feature films in the series "w~y '"
t, Fight," have been completed. These motion plctU!"
I give a graphical and 'historical pOrtrayal of the cau I'
and of a depiction of tbe war itself and are shown '"
all military personnel. In addition a daily news sUb"
mary is distributed daily by radio to points in all t
aters. ~.
' To assist soldiers moving overseas in adjusting t~des"
selves to new environments a series of "Pocket GUl of
to foreign areas has been produced. These .small v ill
umes acquaint the soldier with the area in whIch he w
serve. More than 2,000,000 copies have been distTI'bu tedo..
In addition, phonograph records and instruction ~ao'
uals have been produced to give instruction in 30 ~ g
guages. Phrase bOOks and dictionaries are now ~elJ1
produced in 20 languages. " ,
To provide correspondence courses for off-duty ~sO
of troops, the Special Service Division" in cooperat1?"
with 81 colleges and universities. has established a se~~.
?f correspondence courses whereby the soldier, at ~ h.
lted financial cost, can continue his education whIle 1.o
the Service. On April 1, 1943, Army enrollment ~.
c~eded 20,000 persons, 50 percent of whom we!e S
diers overseas. "
The War Department has given considerable att~o:
' tion to delivery of soldiers' mail as a means of malO.
taining morale, particularly in the active theaters. ~~r
.
mg the past year so-called V-mail service has been 1&.
stituted by which letters are microfilmed and tranS
mitted by air and reproduced at their destinations.
Since the operation of V-mail service commenced 14
months ago, 110,000,000 pieces of V-mail have bee;,
processed and delivered. \Vhen in microfilm form t
saving in weight is 99 percent.
0
19 (I94I-I94})
30. Educational System Expanded
1\l~ order to increase the output of the United Sta!es
lhtary Academy and to provide its graduates with
the course 0 f Instruction
act . .
Ual combat experience
th ere was reduced to three ' years. Of special slgm
. 'fi can~e
~as the addition of air instruction and the commlS-
nlllg of many. graduates directly into the A'II' Corps.
810

t The Command and General Staff School at Fort

. eavenworth, Kansas, was tremendously expanded dur-
Ing ~he past biennium in keeping with the need for
qUalIfied general and special staff officers. Also a course
~as added for the training of officers in operations of
t e Army Service Forces. .
t I~ April, 1943, an Army-Navy Staff College was es-
abl.lshed as an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 01'-
ghnlzation to provide for training of senior officers of
~ e ~rmy, Navy and Marine Corps with specia~ train-
I~g In all phases of joint or coordinated operations of.
all', land and sea forces.

31. Training
Ground Forces Training
h T~e technical warfare of today requires that all troops
e ~lghly trained in a variety of complicated subjects.
l'hls training involves not only physical conditioning
~opermit men to effectively operate in climates ranging
rom the sub-arctic to the tropics, but it also requires
that troops be prepared to conduct difficult amphibious
Operations, be qualified in jungle, mountain and desert
Wa:fare, and also be capable of fighting as a coordinated
lInn in large scale mobile operations.
d' Before they can undertake advanced training, all sol-
.lers must be indoctrinated with certain basic prin-
CIples, such as discipline, personal sanitation, first aid,
~Uard duty, the use and care of weapons, etc. Accord-
l~gly, branch replacement training centers were estab-
lshed throughout the United States to which selectees
\\rere assigned upon their induction for a period of 13
\\reeks, following which they were assigned to tactical
(194I-I943J 191
 -------!iiliii!!lIi_IIlIIlI~
":Iit~ for their advanced trammg (chart 26). At th'd be'
to
gUlllmg of the war, trammg centers were expande da
a capacity of .~'J6,ooo hut stilf could not ac;commo tC w"
the large numbers being inducted at that t1m~. It "
mnsequently necessary for certain divisions ':Vlnch .w~ g
being activated to organize their own baSic tral~~t
centers and give this primary training to the sol I
upon his assignment to the division. . .. 0'
Between July I, '941, and July I, 1943, 50 ~lVISlftO
were activated within the Army. This expa?s!~n a
posed a difficult problem. To organize ~ dlvlSlOn'od
nUcleus of trained personnel had to be avaLlable .arou t
which the di\'ision could be built. This reqU1reUle~1
. resulted in the establishment of a cadre system where,;,
the cadre, or nucleus, of a new division was drawn fro.
divisions then in existence. The situation was not e~
tirely satisfactory because divisions were being activate
at such a rapid rate that a parent division, for instanc~
might be called upon to' furnish two or more cadr~.
While itself iu the primary stages of training and ~eve I
0plllent. Also, the requirement that the cadre conSJSt i,
hlg-h type personnel imposed unfortunate and praet
cally a ('"ontinuous drain on the key men of the parent
division.
Activating and !ransforming an infantry. divisi<;m ~ntd
a competent flg-htIng-team of 15,000 men IS a long an
complicated job (ch'art 27). A unit of this size demandJ
not only ma'.'~ of the skil!s and special services nece~f
sary for a CIVlltan communIty of comparable SIZe, but I
mUst also be prepared to move with all its equipment
and Sustain itself in the field under combat conditions.
For instance, within a 'typical infantry division ,the
transportation of men, equipment and supplies reqll~res
more than 1500 men. The preparation of food reqUlreS
more than 650 men. The administrative duties in COil'
nection with food and supplies require more than 700
men; medical, 600; communications, 150; repair, and
maintenance of equipment, 4/';0 soldiers; while a variety
of other specialized services a~counts for 1600 additional
1
92 (I94I~I5J4j)
 men. All of these soldiers receive not only intensive
tra' . b . ..
t Inmg in their specialties but also ~om at tr.al?~ng
o SUpport effectively the 8000 men In the divISIOn
:hose principal job is at the. fighting front. (All .figures
re approximate.) \ . - .....
.To meet the urgency the War Department evolved a
?stem to insure that when the approximate 15,000 se-
ectees arrived at their division training area there
~ould be a minimum of lost motion and waste of time
~n immediately instituting the training program. For
~ns~ance, the. key officer personnel of a division' were
heSIgnated and assigned approximately three months
efore a division was to be activated. These officers were
then given a course of instruction at a school pertinent
~~ ~~eir activities, following which they arrived at the
IVISlOnactivation area approximately 43 days before
the activation date. The remainder of the officers and
e!llisted cadre, which was to furnish thenon-commis- -
sioned officers and certain 'specialists, such as cooks and
technicians, arrived at the division activation area ap-
proximately 38 days before the activation date with the
~sult. that .w?~n the selectees themselves arriv~d on
f -day the divIsIOn program could be launched without
ur.ther delay. Normally the enlisted personnel are not
assI~ned to a division until they have undergone a
perIod of 13 weeks basic training in a replacement train-
Ing center and are versed in the fundamentals of being
.a soldier .
. Following assignment to a division 13 additional
wee~s are spent in learning the tactics and techniques
of hIS particular arm moving progressively through the.
~latoon, company,. battalion, and regimental. training.
t the end of the 26 weeks the various components of
th~ division-the infantry regiment, field artillery bat-
tahon, and service regiment-are trained and are ca-
rab!e of working as a team within themselves. The' fol-
d~W.lI~g13 weeks are devoted to divisional training. The
b~VlslOnitself learns. to opera.te as ~ teaT? of the com-
Ined arms and servIces. Dunng thIS penod the in fan-
(194I.~943) 193
 t~y, field artillery, division reconnaissance trooS~auce en"
gmeer battalions, quartermaster company, or all
company, medical battalion and signal compa~~ne""
have been integrated to one smooth running mac 11 eu'
the division. The final 13 weeks are'devoted. t? m;u 01-
vers and field exercises during which the dlVISlO ~ a
is!les its fie!d training and learns to work as part ~
lug-her unit. in
To meet the need for specialized training of cert~n_
~nIts selected for specific operations the Desert Tr~ib'
' !ng Center was established in 1\1arch, 1942, the AmPtain
10USTraining- Center in .May, 1942, and the 1\10un Ill-
. Training-~.' Ce~lter at Camp .' Hale California, . in SepteD~ rt
ber .o! "942. The 30,000 square miles. of the tpe
Trammg Center terrain havc becn a major asse.t.to to
training facilities of the ground forces. In adchtlOn ce
providing experience in desert operations, the abse~e"
of restrictions on the use of land permits complete .Iror'
dom of action in large scale maneuvers. Th~ area !S 'ug
ganized as a theater of operations to prOVIde tralIll d
under realistic conditions and maneuvers are condu.ct~e"
with the accompanying problems of supply, ma'~al
nance, field bivouacs, etc., prevalent in actual corn aI
and under the nearest permissible approach to actUas
combat conditions. In addition, large maneuverar;si'
have becn establishcd in Tennessce, Oregon, and Lou '~
ana, where units of all the arms and services, compfl t
ing forces approximately the size of army corps, are,s'fu
at the conclusion of the division training phases . 0r
eight weeks of intcnsive practical field training. . d
~ practical aspect of the training given .to gro~lna_
unIts has been the establishment of "battle Incloctnn S
tion" courses which are intended to simulate, as fara
is practical, actual conditions existent on the field r d'
battle. Exercises requirino-' the breaching of barbe
wire entanglements, crossil~o-other obstacl~s which may
b
e encountered in combat, sHch b as streams, wooe1s, to wns,f
mined and fortified areas, all while under a screen ?u
live ammunition fire, has been an important factor 1)
191 (I94I-I943
 Pr~?ucing units competent to enter combat against ex-
perIenced and seasoned enemies.

, A ir Forces Training
I In a general way the training schedule of an air. ~orce
COrnbat group is characteristic of any other mIlItary
~earn(chart 28). The group, however, ge~erally does .not
t SS~~ble until the completio? .of a peno~ of t~c?nIc~1
~alUlI:g of various key indIvIduals. ~hIS trall:llng IS
tlVen In technical schools where the pIlots, naVIgators,
b ornbardiers, radio operators, aerial gunners~ a~d othe~s
/C?~e expert as individuals in their speCIaltIes. ThIs.
dndividually trained group i~ then asse~b!ed ~nd un-
e.rgoes.a period of progressIve team traInIng In ~per-
a.tIonal training units similar, with obvious modIfica-
tIons pertinent to the air forces, to ground force units.
the expansion of the Army necessitated a carefu.uY
E1anned program to insure that the standards whIch
ad been established during peactime were not low-
tred. The extent of the expansion is indicated by the
act .that in the 19 years prior to 1941, the total number
o~pIlots trained was less than 7,000. Today the rate of
PI~ot production is about 75,000 per year not including
g.hder, liaison, observation and women pilots. In addi- .
tIon there has been incorporated a substantial training
P:ogram for British, Dutch, Canadian, and Chinese
hilots. The program for the training of the Chinese has
ad an important bearing on operations against the
J apanese and is continuously expanding .
. ~? addition to the combat flying crews who, although
IndIvidual specialists, must attain a high degree of co- ...
Operative effort, the air forces have been faced with a
problem of training competent ground crews-soldiers
~ho regardless of the weather or the hour, service planes,
.0 rush repair jobs, keep vitally important instruments
l~ precise order and carry out other maintenance activi-
hs.
t ~he s.izeof th~ ground crews ne~essarily varies with
~ e sItuatIon but In general compnses a substantially
arger number than the flying crews themselves. The
(z94I-I943) 195
 . ,m. the ntimber
, . ed,
~xpan.SlOn of'h ground tec n1c1an~
.. traInriot
IS mdlcated by the fact that in the 20-year penoddEa
tes
to JUly 1, 1941,' there were less than 15,000 gra ring
from the A.ir, Corps technical training schools. D~eted
the su.cceedmg" 21 months over 503,000 men c?mPeased'
prescnbed courses ,which' incidentally had Inc~ teS
from 30 to 90 specialties. The total number of gra. u:
for the period covered by this report approxl1l1 tes
621),000. '0-

' The. welding together of the groundan~ air C~~)1UfIle

nents mto a coordinated team is accomplIshed 10 be
operational training units which function under ~ ~
fo~r Ai~Forces located in the United St~tes. Durt~d
~llls penod a bomber group, for instance, 1,Sdevel?P to
mto a coordinated team and then moves as a uUlt. b
combat theaters. In addition, the four Air Forces furnlSd
operational trairiing to replacement crews, both groun _
and air, which are then sent to combat theaters to ref
place the attrition inevitable in the aerial warfare 0
today. . , . a
In addition, the Army Air Forces have establIshed I
sort of post-grad~late system of training in th~ Scho~l
of ApplIed TactIcs at Orlando, Florida. At thIS sch~ .
?ffice.rs and enlisted men participate in specialized tral~f
mg In all branches of air defense, bombardment, a _
support, and air service. In addition, the school C:0~l
d~lCtS operational research, develops and tests tactICI
aIrcraft and equipment in field operations, and actua~l
engages in evcry phase of aerial warfare under co~ al
,tions simulating reality. Selected members of tacqc 'f
... groups undergo a pcriod of trainin()' here before thelf
umt tram mg. As part of its component the Sch 00 I 0te
" !")

Applied Tanics possesses a model task forc~ compI~_

WIth fighter, bomber, air support, and air service co
mands with all their respective elements, equipment,
- and problems.
F.ollowing completion of operational training' in t~~
Umted States, units are then dispatched overseas-mul
engine type~, flying as u.nits wherever practicable. III
196 (I94 I-I943)
~e ,:heater a further period of operational training is
tequIred to prepare the units for the particular type 01

tt
target~ and operating conditions which wil1 be encoun- ,
redm
that particular theater. For instance, the prob-
of a fighter groUp in the Solomons. is entirely dil-
rns
s~re~tfrom those operating out of the United Kingdom.
a:~tla~ly a different situation exists in the units opt:<-
lUg In Burma, India, and China.
., ....
SCAL!

STATUTE MILES

Map A: Solomon Islands Area

199
 CAPE YORK
PENIN. CORAL

200
 eo
40
Mll (appraxima'.>
'=

ARCHIPEI.AGO

-~ LOUISIAOE

..".",
ARCHIPELAGO

Map B: New Guinea-Bismarck Area

201
202
I

\TEST AFRICA
'- 1lAJ.LROAD Narrow Gauge'

Map C

23
24
Map D: Battle of Tunisia, January I2-April 28, I943

25
 i

Map E: Final Break Through to Tunis and Bizerte

 BAY
OF
BENGAL

ANDAMAN
ISLANDS

Map F: Southeast ASIa

208
, -~

C' ...
Itt

CHARTS.
 / . ,/

DORGANIlED ...... AR ARMy ........

\

r-,
I lPARTIALLY ORGANIZED REGULAR
L - ..J , \
ARMY UNITS

, ~ T~OOPS ASSIGNED TO I UNITS

-
~~ 8,600

E:J. I
~-.."
I

!!!!! TRO~PS ~

[ I
.A!l. .fQBg, 17,000

OVE~~
GARRISONS (4S.3OOJ

210
I" . I

ENLISTED PERSONNEL OF

THE ACTIVE ARMY

JULY 1,1939
SCATTERED AMONG 130 pOSTS, CAMPS. ~ND STATIONS II'

1-

~ 56000 . :\'11
,,'

, . ~ ~ ~
~

~

I

I
I
I
. I I.
.I
I :f
l'~
1 I
..JI I ,.j

I
L ___ I I.. ~_..J
I
.... --~1 I
~__ I-__ J
.J
U

i:!:!:Q. RESERVE (11,000)

Chart I

211
 I
o ORGANIZED REGULAR ARMY UNITS

r-'
I IPARTIALLY ORGANIZED REGULAR
, L_..J ARMY UNITS

~ TROOPS ASSIGNED TO UNITS

o PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO
COMPLETE I)NITS

MECHANIZED BRIGADE. }$9.

r
AIR FORCE 31,300

OVERSEAS GARRiSONS

212
 ENLISTED PERSONNEL. OF
THE ACTI~E ARMY
JANUARY 31,1940- 227,000
(AuttloriZ ed 5ept.8,1939)

INFANTRY ~ ~OOO

.~~'

.U.
~.~. ,/~~O p;:
" \ L---'
.. _----, I \
'JI

(~~
\
, ,,
.... -."'"

,i

Chart 2
213
O~ANIZEO REGULARAR"~ UNIT.

r-'.
'.
. .
'PARTIALLY ORGANIZED REGULAR
t._..J ARMY \mITS

.TROOPS t.SSIGNED TO UNITS

OPERSONNEL REQUIRED TO
COMPLETE UNI.lS

1 (

MRSEA~ GARRISONS .
ENLISTED PERSONNEL Of
THE ACTIVE ARMY
AUGUST15.1940-280,000
(AuthOrized June 13,1940)

OVERHEAD ~7.800

- Chart J 21
5
 , E

O ORGANIZED RE~LAR ARMY

AN~
NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

~ TROOPS ASSIGNED TO REGULAQ

~ ARMY UNITS

~ TROOPS ASSIGNED TO NATIONAL

~ GUARD UNITS

O PERSONNEL REQUIRED
COMPLETE UNITS
TO

CAVALRY DIVISIONS \17,500)

.!.~~(2,900)

-
M! ~ ~ (549'",,1(167,600)

~ (I ~ ~(46,500)

~~

216

 ARMORED DIVISIONS (43,200)

,~~~~

.~~~0
~.,
, . ~(161.100)

~
~'~ i"'."71

Chart 4

217
218
 ( ;

Chart 5
STATES ARMY

~ ,
,~

!
,.1

~ T='::'"' :::::=
~ NotloMl Gl,tQrd $q\lGN D;., .. tons

~C"OI" 01,"'0"

l
Q]Armo'.d CM.,I.IOftI

*eo. .. "'........ - ...

,.

Cha1'~ 5

219
220
 Chert 6

CENTERS

. '.

Chart 6

221
 Chart 7

~G CENTERS

" ~
',:1
... ~

Chart 7

223
 , j
I ._:.. '.'~~ .
I\.- ...
:... ...r---'-
. -- _.~._.:..
:

'- 0
.....

o
f . CHART 8

~HOOLS

~I

It

\
.j

,. ,
,

Chart 8
 I
INDUCTiON OF Nlf

t :.
IN~
. SEPT. 16,1940'::

.,

... c
Jl I C 0

226
 , .

110 NAL CHART 9

GUARD
~RVICE
'JUNE 1941

j'

\1
OJ

..
j;l

oil
:~.

. /

Cllmt 9', (K ey 'b ~gtnson

. page 228)'

22j
 ., , 'KEY:TO CHART 9 '
Map I~DUCTION OF NATIONAL',GUARD
Refer- Date of
ence Induction Location and Units
Sept. 16, ~940 Camp Barkeley, Texas' .
45 Division,
Fort Bliss, Texas
202 Coast Artillery (AA)
Columbia, South' Carolina "
105 Observation Squadron.
Fort Dix, New Jersey
44 Division
119 Observation Squadron
Camp Edwards, Mas~achusetts.
198 Coast Artillery (AA)
'Harbor Defenses of Boston
241 Coast Artillery (HD)
HD of Chesapeake Bay
246 Coast Artillery (HD)
HD of the Columbia
249 C9ast Artillery (HD) .
HD of Long Island Sound
242 Coast Artillery (HD)
HD of N arragansettBay
, 243 Coast Artillery
HD of Portland, Maine
240 Coast Artillery (HD)
HD of Puget Sound
248 Coast Artillery (HD)
HD of, Sandy Hook
245 Coast Artillery aID)
Hawaii ,
251 Coast Artillery (AA)
Camp Hulen, Texas
197 Coast Artillery (AA)
203 Coast Artillery (AA)
211 Coast Artillery (AA)
Fort Jackson, South Carolina
, 228 30 Division
Map
Refer- Date, of Location and Units
ence Induction Fort Lewis. Washington
. 41 Division .
116 Observation Squadron
Camp McQuaide. California
250 Coast Art~llery (155mm
gun) ,
Camp Pendleton, Virginia
244"Coast Artillery (155111m
gun)'
Fort Screven.. Georgia
. 252 Coast Artillery (155111ffi
gun)
Fort Sill. Oklahoma'
154 Observation Squadron
Camp Stewart, Georgia
213 Coast Artillery (AA)
Camp Beauregard, Louisiana
107 Observation Squadron
Hawaii, .
298 Infa~try (less 3d Bn.)'
299 Infantry (less Co. L)
Camp Livingston, Louisiana
32 Division.
Fort McClellan,. Alabailla
27 Division
102 Observation Squadron
Meridian, Mississippi .
153 Observation Squadron
Puerto Rican Department I

92 Infantry Brigade Hq. &

Hq.Co.
295 Infantry
296 Infantry
253 Coast Artillery (1st Bn.)
123 Coast Artillery Bn .
. 162 Field Artillery (1st Bn.) .
'130 Combat Engineers (1StBn.)
229
'Map
Refer.: Date of
I
~
ence - Induction Location and Units
Camp Shelby, Mississippi f
d

. 37 Division r
(3) Nov. 18. 1940 Fort McIntosh, Texas
56 Cavalry Brigade
. (4) Nov. .25, 1940 Camp Blanding, Florida
31 Division
Camp Bowie, Texas
36 Division .
III Observation Squadron
Fort Bragg, North Carolina
112 Observation Squadron
Fort Devens, Massachusetts
152 Observation Squadron _
Camp Edwards, Massachusetts
101 Observation Squadron
Fort Jackson, South Carolina
128 Field Artillery (75mm)
Jacksonville, Florida
106 Observation Squadron
./ Fort Knox, Kentucky
192 Tank Battalion
Camp Livingston, Louisiana .
106 Cavalry (horse-mechan-
ized) . I I
Fort Ord, California-
102 Radio Intelligence Co.
147 Field Artillery (75mm
gun)
Camp Stewart, Georgia
214 Coast Artillery (AA)
(5) Dec. 23, 1940
Little Rock, Arkansas
110 Observation Squadron
Camp Robinson, Arkansas
~5 Division
(6) 153 Infantry
Jan. 6, 1941 Fort Beni. Harrison, Indiana
201 Infantry (less 3d Bn.)
230
 '\
Map
Refer.- Date of , Location and Units ~
ence Induction; Fort Benning, Georgia
101 Antitank Battalion
193 Tank Battalion
Fort Bliss- Texas
,120 Observation Squadron
200 Coast Artillery (AA)
206 Coast Artillery (AA)"
260 Coast Artillery (AA)
Fort Custer, Michigan
184 Field Artillery (155mm-
hoW)
Camp Edwards, Massachusetts
102 Coast Artillery Bn. (AA)
208 Coast Artillery (AA) ,
_Camp Haan, California
101 CA Brigade Hq. & Hq.
Battery
'"215 Coast Artillery (AA)
216 Coast Artillery (AA)
HD of Galveston, Texas
265 Coast Artillery (HD)
Camp Hulen, Texas
10
5 Coast Artillery Bn. (AA)
106 Coast ArtilleryBn. (AA)
204 Coast Artillery (AA) ,
Fort Jackson, South Carolina
, 102 Cavalry (horse-mechan-
ized)
Fort McClellan. Alabama
151 'Medical Battalion
Fort Sam Houston, Texas
104 Antitank. Battalion
Fort Sill, Oklahoma -
142 Field Artillery (155mm
how)
Camp Bowie, Texas
113 Cavalry (horse-mechan-
ized) " 231
 Alap ~
R'e!er- Date oj
ence. Induction -
Location and Units r a
I

HD of Charleston, So. -Caro 10

263 Coast Artill~ry (HD)
Fort Ontario, New York.
369 Coast Artillery (AA)"
Camp Shelby, Mississippi
73 FA BrigadeHq. & Hq.
Battery _ .
101 Radio Intelligence Com-
pany I

10.1Signal Battalion.
102 Antitank BattalIon
135 Medical Regiment
141 Field Artillery (155mm
.. how)
166 Field ArtiIIery (155mm
how)
190 Field Artillery (155mm
(8) '~ gun)
Jan. 16, 19'P)
Camp Edwards,' Massachusetts
(9) Jan.
- 26 Division
17, 1941
Meridian, Mississippi
113 Observation Squadron
Camp Shelby, Mississippi
(10) Jan. 38 Division
22, 1941
\
Indiantown Gap Military
Reservation
Service Co., 103 QM Regiment
2d Bn., 103 QlVIRegimen~ ,
Company F, 103 QM RegI-
(11) Jan. ment
27, 1941
Fort' Bragg, North Carolina
. 112 Field Artillery (horse-
drawn)
134 Medical Regiment
178 Field Artillery (155mm
how)
Camp Claiborne, Louisiana
232 ,151 Combat E~gineers .
Map '\
Refer- Date or' Location and Units
ence Induction f
Fort Devens, Massachusetts
101 Cavalry (horse-mechan-.
ized) 1
. Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont
186 Field Artillery (155mm I I
how) .
Harbor Defenses of the Delaware
122 Coast Artillery Bn. (gun)
261 Coast Artillery Bn.(HD)
Battle Creek, Michigan .
!\
i'
~ .
.108 Observation Squadron
Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont
71 FA Brigade Hq. & Hq.
Battery
187 Field Artillery (155mm
how)
Frederick, Maryland
104 Observation Squadron
Fort Geo. G. Meade, Maryland
2g Division
105 Antitank Battalion
Ig1 Tank Battalion
Fort Lewis, Washington, .
144 Field Artillery (155mm
how)
205 Coast Artillery (AA)
Madison Barracks, New York
258 Field Artillery (155mm
gun)
Camp Beauregard, Louisiana
log Observation Squadron
Camp Claiborne, Louisiana
34 Division
Camp Haan, California
217 Coast Artillery (AA)
Fort Lewis, Washington
103 Antitank Battalion
194 Tank Battalion (less Co. D)
233
"'lap
Refer- Doteot
'ence Induction
Location and Units
Camp. Stewart, georgia. (AA) .
Hh Coast ArtIllery Bn.
102 CA Brigade Hq. & Hq .
. Battery
14 Coast Artillery Bn. (A1
17 Coast Artillery Bn. (A .
207 Coast Artillery (AA)
209 Coast Artillery (AA)
212 Coast Artillery (AA)
(14) Feb. 17, 1941
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
13 Observation Squadron
Indiantown Gap Military~es't.
28 Divisi9n (less units mdLl~)
eel on January 22, 194
14 Cavalry (horse-mechan-
'ized)
Camp Blanding, Florida
43 Division
74 FA Brigade Hq. & Hq.
Battery
.172 Field Artillery (15Smm
how)
.179 Field Artillery (155mm
h<?w)
Camp Forrest, Tennessee
75 FA Brigad~ Hq. & Hq.
Battery
168 Field Artillery (155mm
gun)
181 Field Artillery (1.55mm
how) .
191 Field Artillery (155mm
how)
Jacksonville, Florida .
118 Observation Squadron
Fort Lewis, Washingtol1
115 Cavalry (horse-mechan-
234 ized)
M~p
Refer- Date of Location and Units
ence Induction Fort Sheridan, Illinois.
103 Coast Artillery Bn. (AA)
210 Coast Artillery (AA)
Paso Robles, California
115 Observation Squadron \
CampSan Luis Obispo, California
40 Division'
\ Camp Forrest, Tennessee
(17) March 5, 1941
, 33 Division'
107 Cavalry (horse-,mechan-
,

ized)
Fort Dix~ New Jersey }
(18) MarcJ:110, 1941 101 Military police Battalion ' "III
372 Infantry' . .t
Fort Francis E. Warren,
(19) April 1, 1941 Wyoming
76 FA Brigade Hq. & Hq.
Battery
183 Field Artillery (155mm
hoW) ,
188 Field Artillery (155mm
how)
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri
(20) April 7, 194 1
~72FA Brigade Hq. & Hq.
Battery . - .
119 Field Artillery (155mm
gun) .
177 Field Artillery (155ffiffi
,how). "-
182 Field Artillery .(155ffiffi
how)
1
Fort Dix, New Jersey
(21) June 2, 194 126 Observation Squadron
Camp Haan, California .
(22) June 23, 1941, .121 Coast Artillery Bn. (gun)

23,5
 o C E

o C E A N

--
DEPLOYMENT OF P
WITH ARRIVAL .DATE (

.L.
 ,t
;111

. .
...

I N D I

OCEAN

~ERICAN TROOPS
~ FIRST CONTINGENT
5000
= ""'"

Chart 10; (Key on tJage 238) 237

 KEY TO CHART 10

Map Reference, Location and Date of Arrival

1941 (22)' Bora~Bora, Febru.ary

(1) Newfoundland, .Jan-. 17 I ,"
uary 29 . (23) Venezuela, Marc/ ;
Bermuda, April 20 Caledonia, .Marc 11 .
Trjnidad,1\lay 5 (24) Chile, l\Jarch 15
Greenland, June 30 (25) Efate, .March 18.
British Guiana, July (26) Ascension IsI~nd,
20 . I l\farch 30 .
(6)
St, Lucia, August 4 (27) Labrador, April 9 'I
(7)
Iceland, August 6 (28) Fanning Islands, Apfl
(8).
Antigua, October 2 26.
(9)
Jamaica, November 21 (29) Liberia, 1\1ay 6
(10) S .
,unnam, December () (~o) TonO'atabu,
oj b lVlay 9
(ll) '')Galapagos, May 9
(12) Brazil, December 19 (31) India, May 16
Guatemala,
22
Decemb~r China, .MaY16
(32) Espiritu Santo, May
1942 28
/' (13) Ecuador, January 16
(;13) New Zealand, 1\1ay 3(J
(14) Haiti, January 19
(15) Cuba, January 20 (34) Bahamas, June 2
(16) British Isles, January (35) Guadalcanal, August
26 . 7
(17) Fiji, January 29 (36) Peru, August 15
(18) Egypt, February 2 (37) Tongareva, November
8
(19) Christmas Island, Feb.
ruary 10 North Africa, N ovem-
bel' 8
(20) Aruba, February II
Cura~ao, February II (38) Aitutaki, November
14
(21) Canton Island, Febru-
ary 13 (;19) Iraq, Decem bel' I 1
238 Iran, December II ,
 EXPANSION OF'THE ..ARMY
1941-19~3

FMAMJ
1943

Chart II

239
 SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
NUMBER (Fifth Air Force)
600

. L;~~END
Lost Possibly
D.. " ~.. m,
1//;'::.
.".o.n{;;\%< ProbObly Lost
Due to U.S Action
500

Due.to Enemy Action Due to U.S. Action

400

300

200

100

U.S. ENEMY
MAR.
1943 .

Chart z4: Comparison of U. S. and Ene";y Plane Loss~s in SouthvJ

244
 NORTH "AFRICA
(Twelfth Air Force) NUMBER
600

500

400

300

200

u.s. NEMY
MAY

est Pacific and Nm-tll African Tliealers,~Novemb-er I942 to Mi!): I94J

245
 '.~
- .... ." 4-

......... ~

,-~--
I
Chart 15; (Key OIl page 2-/8)

247
I-
...
0
fIl:Q 0
~ 0
~
0... 0 0
~ ~ 0
0 ~
0
~ ~ ~ Q

~E' ~
00
<t <t

~
Chart I6
249
""--~-~--t-: -, ' "' ,

ORGANIZATION'

STAFF L

Blli
 OF WAR

I
______________ JI

~F STAFF I

Chart I7
. 'j
 .'

..ORGANIZATION. OF THE
. '
\~y SERV1CE FORCES

Chart IS

253
 ACTiVATION OF ~RM.I
ARM OR SERVICE , STRENGTH
./

o
ADJUTANT GENERAL' 11,378

CHEMICAL WARFARE' 7,833

ENGINEER
50,562

FINANCE
882

MEDICAL
53,295

MILITARY ,POLICE

ORDNANCE

QUARTERMASTER

, SIGNAL

TRANSPORTATION

SPECIAL SERVICE

WAAC

,HEADQUARiERS

254
SERVICE . FORCE UNITS

NO.OF .UNITS
200 . 300 400 500 GOO

MAR9,1942- JAN 1,1943-

DEe 31,1942 JUNE.30 1943
 ORGA~lf~TIONOF THE

STATISTICS

GROUND
TECHNICAL
INFORMATION
, SECTION

GPO
G-2
PLANS" MILITARY
PERSONNEL
INTELLIGENCE

."

corMA.
IARMY GROUND' .FORCES

r GENERAL
A

~D FORCES

\
r STAFF
It)

I,STA~F (GSC)

a G;'4 REQUIREMENTS

~IONS SUPPLY, CONSTRUCTION, DEVELOPMENT PUBLICATIONS

TRANSPORTATION AND ORGANIZATION a EQUIPMENT
ING EVAcuATION PERTAINING TO THE ARMS

257
 ORGANIZATION OF T~

QllSTUY __ , 0" .... iT""

en AOVtSI ""u,
.) ACT 'II ea's -.111 DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

:: ::::':":0
,
-:::'''YING
""UCIES
OUT-OF eG's POUC?
AND CHANOES IN POLICIES TO
~
CO

ASS'" CHIEF' OJ' AlA STAFF

INTELLIGENCE

PLA"" 8 LIJ.ISO ..
OPEfil:ATIONAI.. DIVISION AIR CREW TRAINING
DIVISION
DIVISION

MILITARV P[RSON~L
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE UNIT TR,lINING
DIVfS ..,)N
~VISION ... DIVISION

CIVIU"'N ,,RSO"'!'4[L
TECHNICAL TRAINING
, OIvt$ION INFORMATIONAL DIVISION
DIVISIO~

SPCCIAL. SEItVICES
OIvIS:::JN TJtAIN~NG PLANS TRAINING AlDS DiVISION
DIVISION

A'A CHAPLA.,.
PLANS, ANALYSIS tl
HISTOmCAL DIVIStON
REPORTS DIVISiON

I
I.
I
I
I
I
I
-r------.=-t -------1
r----l.l r----J'
I
L.
I
AI:I:~~CE'r
JI
i AI~OU:::C!!
L
I -'I
fEARMY . AIR. FORCES

ASS'T (;HIEF OF' AlR STAFf ASS'T CHIEF OF' AIR STAFF' ASs'r CHIEF' OF AIR STAFF
MATERIEL.. MAINTENANCE. OPERATIONS, CC)t.tM1TMENTS
AND OlSTR1BUTIO'II
a REQUIREMENTS
-CO~TROi.-orFICC-
RESOURCES DIVISION
COMBINED SUBJECTS
MAT[FnEl DIVISION
REQUIREMENTS OIVISION DIVISION
TRAFFIC DiVISION

AlA TRANSP'QRT
DiVISION
STRATEGICAL PlANS BUDGET AND fiSCAL
AIR COMMUNIC.ATtONS
SUPPLY ANO SERVICES
DIVISION
DIVISION

---------AiR ENGINEER

OPERATIONAL PLANS AIR JUDGE ADVocATE

AIR CHEMICAL OFFICER ALLOCATIONS 8 PROGRAMS

DIVISION DIViSiON
AIR ft~ANCE OfFICER

, AiR ORON,1~C[ OFFICER

LOGISTICAL PLANS PROJECTS
OPERATIONS sPECIAL
AIR PROvOST MARSHAL
DIVISION DIVISION

AIR WAC OFFICER

AIR QUARTERMASTER
POLICY AND SPECIAL SPECIAl. ASSISTANT
TECHNIC-AL SERVICES
GOMMU""CATlcr,tS EQUIPMENT
SU8JECTS DIVISION ON GLIDER PftOGRAM
orrlCER DIVISION
WORKING COMMITTEE
AERONAUTICAL BOARO

,..------ ---'-----, I
r-~--.
I;:.: :i::;:;
: ~~.::::
W'JII_L'l.'\f1'1
~
Chari 21
'j
Chart 2)

- ~""
 MAJOR WAR CONSTRUCTION- CORPS OF ENGINEERS
'llllON VALUE OF WORK IN PLACE , BilliON
$10
$10

e
s

-4

2
2

o
.J A SON D .. F M AM" .. A' SON D .. F M .A M .. .. A SON 0 .. F M A MJ
1940 . 1941 194Z' 1943

Chart 24
 U.s. ARMY BATTLECASOALTIES
7 DECEMBER 1941T1fPOUOIt JO ""UNit 1945

\'
TOTAL CASUALTIES, OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN .

THOUSAND
10

IlISSING

'1lIS0NE~S
lNTERNEl;:$
OFFICERS OVERSEAS AS PERCENT
OFFICERS KILLED AS PERCENT OF TOTAL OVERSEAS STRENGTI1
OF TOTAL KILLED o ,5 10.
AIlM OR SERVICE 0' 10 15 20 25 " 30

AIR CORPS

INFANTRY

TOTAL CASUALTIES, BV ARM OR SERVICE,

,.&tONERS
IOllEO _(JUNOEI) MISSING 8INTEAN[[$

F*' 4:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.1
THOUSAND
ARM OR SERVICE 0 5 '/ 10 15 20. 25

AIR CORPS

INFANTRY

ARTILLERY ~

OTHERS

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBunON
ARM OR SERVICE 0 20 40 60 eo 100

AIR CORPS

INFANTRY

ARTILLERY

OTHERS

Chart 25
 '/

& ORDNANC[ DEPARTMENl

~ ARMOREl)

11' OUA.nERMAST[R CORPS

~ SIGNAL CORPS

......
W CORP!. OF E~C'H[[R9
X CORPS OF MILITARY_ PaLteE

n..ANSPORTATIO" COAPt
~
AI" eoftP$
X
TAHtt'1)[STAOn,
X FIELD ARTI1.LEIt'f

FlftANC[ OMRTMEfr(f
X ANfl-AIReRAF'T APTlll-En" \AA/or
COAST APTILLER CORPS (CAel

266
 . 1
~.
~
,.
\

i~ . , 0
, .~ I \"

.~ . \
-
Chart 26

I
 BUILDING' AN
ACTI\

~~~
otC ....'\ISJ
A"TlLLERY COMPONENT

"-"10",3)

~;:I~ ~._CO\OF E,~JJ.'-~l,t

::::!:~~:m,
"'-g1$-4"
B"CIllO,1I
8.,1['0',
c.e-. .. e...
Toto'
nJ
It)
,."

84
\~f~~ECi!~
FABlI\.IIOINllil
Toto'S.

O i.qIll'''''tnIU"i' ~

of 1'8"Off,u IAr.1u 0-38

O'd
"

t. <t ..

Li,II'

of
OUit

Mo;""I\II.,.O

101illl4
.. Clld

Com~OIl';

C..... ""lu
OM COlli".,

D-"
.... ,A __ .n""
AI"'oi" .. ,. " Of he .. Co""1.~,,tt'1Iott'c~ 1 1,"1.... 0.22 '0 ~.19

"."'GI 01 E.."., ...... -".,Iu OtoO.IO

OtI,U' O .... ", ... ,,1l 11940llie,.,1 Aniut81'il,,,,,in, O'S!I

Tro.I\,,,o (lI~ip"'''1 1Allll'U ~O.", T8.o\) A.,; B.9i .... ' ..o D-'I

T~:;:~n.~.~::~:id~:,m"' I:.,: H W'~i~:~:.:~:;:~:'0:~:~:O~:'

..~~:~~
en~2: d -.

, 268
 D~VISION

Cl""PLAINCOMPl)ffI:NT

O~:'ICJ':'CIl0'" tn
UtIli '''I,...
111'''-''
f.
e"
0'11"-', Izt
Me. In '0
r
~
hlol. ,It

Chopla' .. ,

REMAINDER OF COMPLEMENT

:::~~ll::~
ot~:?!:~'~::~:~:.~::~~~~:~'i
~;~~
:0;: ~'~\1~:411

'I[I..D ARTILLERY

~':~l~:~'$'~:
:::~~.I,;::[/.~'tfJC'~'":l~ltl~'~:';-:~
::~lJ,\e~'~:~III"UJ
..'.10,,:'1 t:~
~~i:,":,.~t7 ~~II~611 a.,. ai', fA aft IMl.O" Ill
' SPECIAL SERVICES

Ip" ,.,. 031: Dlwll'oilltl, R'I, toll!

Di. Hc:I tit'll

"'.
he 0" t21,
~
8" 0" Inl, Atcllf"" 0'1 (SI)
,..2!.!!.!!!:..
..... "o"', "rtt Deft'OIS .. ".f.".t." ,)
!1l,i .... !~:il\l~~,R.UTI

A~OJ~::~~n9~~:R~\1

Chart 27

269
 TRAINING A
(HEAVY
CO\.:
BP~"
-eo ...
Numb.' 0' ........ {"1
.\.'.~
Il~
I

il

-r \'
 "

I I.

Chart 28