Burma's authoritarian upgrade: 1990-2010

Published on openDemocracy (http://www.opendemocracy.net)

Burma's authoritarian upgrade: 1990-2010

Author: David Scott Mathieson
Summary: The Burmese junta’s sophisticated and ruthless project of reinvention - “SPDC 2.0” - is
preparing the way for an extension of its rule in civilian guise, says David Scott Mathieson.

The twentieth anniversary of Burma’s last elections on 27 May 1990 was recalled by many Burmese
inside and outside the country as a defining [1] date in the country’s political history. It is also an
opportunity to measure the prospects for the elections scheduled by the country’s military rulers to
take place sometime (perhaps [2] 10 October) in 2010.

It is worth recalling the scale and impact of the events of 1990. The election took place two years
after the Burmese military in August 1988 massacred more than 3,000 protesters, part of a huge
popular uprising [3] that called for an end to military rule and a transition to democracy. In this
context the election itself was a surprisingly free and fair process which delivered a resounding
defeat for the military regime, as the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) won more
than 60% of the popular vote and 80% of parliamentary seats. Yet the stunned regime recovered [3]
its balance, refused to hand over power, and restored its security; in the process it reinvented itself
from the State Law and Order Restoration Council (Slorc) to the State Peace and Development
Council [4] (SPDC).

In the 2000s, the regime [5] started carefully to draft a new constitution and prepare the ground for
the next elections. But this time, Burma’s military junta is not steering any sort of democratic
transition; it is upgrading to a more sophisticated authoritarian model - SPDC Version 2.0. The
generals learnt a valuable lesson in 1990: elections must not be left to the people’s free choice, for
we may not get the result we want (see Joakim Kreutz, “Burma: sources of political change [6]”, 27
August 2008).

The military’s reinvention

The elections may produce a more user-friendly civilian parliament, one that other countries may
feel more comfortable engaging with (which indeed is part of their purpose). But the new parliament
will remain tightly controlled by the same [7] military that has turned Burma into a political and
economic abomination. There is little hope that the so-called “roadmap to disciplined democracy”
will produce any semblance of a genuinely open society, or even begin to address the dire ills of
contemporary [8] Burma: a major health and poverty crisis, a wrecked education system, and
continued social divisions based on wealth, ethnicity and to a lesser extent religion. Burma has been
a divided society for decades, and the military has exploited and profited from such divisions in order
to justify its oppressive rule (see “Burma: A Disastrous Taste of Democracy [9]”, Bangkok Post, 2
May 2010).

The Burmese military, or Tatmadaw, has spent the past twenty years preparing for this upgrade
through marginalising the political opposition [10]; rewriting the constitution; drafting [11] electoral
laws that leave nothing to chance; and exploiting the economy to redistribute assets in favour of the
officer-corps. Some observers contend that this upgrade will benefit the country if Burma [12]
becomes more like Vietnam, China [13], or even Singapore - all authoritarian states with thriving
economies.

The military leadership and their close business associates control [14] key sectors of the economy
and have benefited from recent government “privatisations” of state assets. For instance, in
February 2010, the junta began to sell off a network of government-controlled gas-stations,
shipping-ports, factories, cinemas and other assets. It is suspected such sales may in part provide a
source [15] of electioneering finance for the Tatmadaw’s friends and allies who contest the elections.

Burma’s military government also controls nearly $5 billion in foreign reserves, accumulated thanks
to lucrative natural-gas sales and the use of an accounting trick: for domestic purposes, gas

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 Burma's authoritarian upgrade: 1990-2010
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revenues are recorded at the official exchange rate ($1 to 6 Burmese Kyat) but actual payments are
made in US dollars (worth $1 to 800-1,000 Burmese Kyat at the market rate), the difference being
deposited (it is suspected) in offshore bank-accounts.

At the same time, thousands of military officers are taking off their uniforms in order to take
positions [16] of authority in the civilian government. These former officers will want to be
compensated for the loss of rank and privileges; the result could be the emergence of a new, more
sophisticated patronage system.

The new parliament will ensure this patronage system functions effectively. More than thirty political
parties, many with links to the military, have already applied to Burma’s electoral commission to be
registered. In late April 2010, prime minister Thein Sein [17] and more than twenty other senior
generals resigned [18] from their military posts and - in a move was long expected as part of the
authoritarian-upgrade script - registered the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). This
could make the party supremely powerful, for it will utilise the Union Solidarity and Development
Association [19] (USDA), a mass-based social-welfare organisation created by the regime in 1993,
which currently has more than 26 million members, and offices [20] and economic interests
throughout Burma.

The 2008 constitution reserves one-quarter of lower-house seats to serving military officers, and
one-third of upper-house seats. The most important ministerial portfolios reserved for the military
include defence (control over their budget and military justice), home affairs (domestic repression),
and border affairs (cross-border trade, access to illicit rackets such as drugs, logging and smuggling,
and license to conduct ongoing offensives against ethnic minorities). In other words, the military’s
interests will continue to be safeguarded without civilian oversight, and free from the drudgery of
everyday governance.

The prospect of power

The release of long-awaited [21] electoral laws in March 2010 has set the ground-rules for the
elections [22]. The laws exclude serving prisoners from being members of political parties or
electoral candidates: a cruel provision that neuters more than 2,100 political prisoners, including
dissidents and people who won seats in the last election in 1990. Many of the prisoners, such as
famous student leaders Min Ko Naing and Htay Kwe, and leaders of ethnic-Shan political parties,
have been detained because their peaceful, popular and conciliatory style poses a challenge to the
military government.

An estimated 428 members of the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy [23]
are in detention [24]. The laws prescribe that the party, if it chose to re-register with the electoral
commission, would then have to expel these individuals - including the NLD’s leader, Aung San Suu
Kyi [25], who remains under house-arrest. On 29 March, the NLD decided that these legal provisions
were unjust [26] and announced it would not contest [27] the elections.

Some of the already registered [28] parties competed in the 1990 elections; they include
ethnic-based parties (such as the Pa-O National Organisation) and new configurations of elites. An
optimistic view (to which some analysts subscribe) is that the election may be part of a slow but
inevitable process [29] of change - not a mere SPDC 2.0 upgrade, but a new SPDC 2010. They expect
the new version to bring about real democratic progress, if not overnight but in the years ahead. The
coming months will reveal more about the machinations of the process, but the optimism seems
sadly unwarranted. The basic configurations of power in Burma are unlikely to change, regardless of
the electoral [22] results. It is hard to imagine the military is devoting all this effort only to transfer
its inheritance to civilians it has long repressed [30]. The next two decades may well be the same as
the past [31] two, but with the disguise of a less overt and near-caricatural regime.

The prospect, then, is that the authoritarian upgrade ushers in a new era of military rule in Burma
[32] with a civilian face. The best way to avoid this fate is for the international community to speak
with one voice and refuse [33] to endorse the flawed process in any way, either through election
monitoring or cynical paeans of progress just because polls are being held.

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 Burma's authoritarian upgrade: 1990-2010
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The next step would be to strengthen the targeted financial sanctions [34] against senior members
of the military government; and combine this with principled diplomacy that calls for the release of
political prisoners, an inclusive political process, and more humanitarian assistance directly to
Burmese communities.

These are the vital ways to exert pressure on the SPDC. Only if they are followed will there be hope
that the military’s more outwardly sophisticated control of the country can be exchanged for a
genuinely democratic package.
Sideboxes'Read On' Sidebox: 
Human Rights Watch [35]

Thant Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma [36] (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 

Michael W Charney, A History of Modern Burma [37](Cambridge University Press, 2009)

National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB [38])

Irrawaddy [39]

Mizzima [40]

Democratic Voice of Burma [41]

The New Light of Myanmar [42]

Sidebox: 
David Scott Mathieson is Burma researcher for Human Rights Watch [35]

Related stories: Burma's struggle, Aung San Suu Kyi's role [25]

Burma: protest, crackdown - and now? [43]
Burma and the ICRC: a people at risk [44]
Burma: waiting for the dawn [45]
A chronic emergency: on the Burma-Thailand border [46]
A reality-check in Burma [47]
Burma’s question [48]
Burma: cyclone, aid and sanctions [49]
Burma: the cyclone and the referendum [50]
Burma: sources of political change [6]
India and Burma: time to choose [51]
Topics: Democracy and government
International politics

Source URL:
http://www.opendemocracy.net/david-scott-mathieson/burma%E2%80%99s-authoritarian-upgrade-
1990-2010
Created 06/10/2010 - 22:43

Links:
[1]
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/179369/suu-kyi-party-marks-20-years-since-burma-poll-win
[2] http://www.dvb.no/elections/burma-elections-%E2%80%98on-10-october%E2%80%99/10187
[3] http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/burma601/timeline.html#
[4] http://www.mizzima.com/political-pro/military/military-regime.html
[5] http://www.electionguide.org/country.php?ID=148
[6] http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/burma-sources-of-political-change
[7] http://www.irrawaddy.org/election/analysis/300-bye-bye-democracy-hello-army-state.html
[8] http://www.burmawatch.org/aboutburma.html
[9] http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/05/02/disastrous-taste-democracy

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 Burma's authoritarian upgrade: 1990-2010
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[10] http://www.mizzima.com/political-pro/opposition.html
[11]
http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/3920-juntas-legislative-tactic-reeks-of-illegality-.html
[12] http://go.hrw.com/atlas/norm_htm/myanmar.htm
[13]
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/180009/chinese-and-burma-leaders-sign-deals-discuss-borde
r
[14]
http://www.irrawaddy.org/election/constitution/68-constitutional-impunity-for-generals-in-burma.html
[15]
http://www.dvb.no/news/burma-economy-reveals-%E2%80%98artificial-deficit%E2%80%99/10097
[16] http://www.mizzima.com/candidates/military-candidates.html
[17] http://www.mizzima.com/political-pro/military/military-regime/thein-sein.html
[18] http://www.electionguide.org/country-news.php?ID=148
[19] http://www.mizzima.com/political-pro/military/usda.html
[20] http://www.irrawaddy.org/election/news/324-usda-pulling-down-its-signs-in-rangoon.html
[21] http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=18662
[22] http://www.mizzima.com/election2010.html
[23] http://www.nldla.net/?page_id=2
[24] http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/08/08/burma-s-forgotten-prisoners
[25] http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-protest/rangoon_3805.jsp
[26] http://www.mizzima.com/research/3716-nlds-legal-objections-to-the-2010-election-laws.html
[27] http://www.mizzima.com/towards-elections/opposition/opposition-election-stance.html
[28] http://www.mizzima.com/research/3634-election-commission-law-in-english.html
[29] http://www.mizzima.com/political-background/history-of-burmas-transition.html
[30] http://www.hrw.org/en/asia/burma
[31] http://www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521852111
[32] http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia07/burma_sm_2007.gif
[33] http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/179292/eu-asean-urge-credible-elections-in-burma
[34] http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/177930/obama-extends-sanctions-on-burma
[35] http://www.hrw.org/en/our-work
[36]
http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/0521799147?ie=UTF8&tag=opendemocra0e-21&link
Code=as2&camp=1634&creative=19450&creativeASIN=0521799147
[37]
http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/0521617588?ie=UTF8&tag=opendemocra0e-21&link
Code=as2&camp=1634&creative=19450&creativeASIN=0521617588
[38] http://www.ncgub.net/
[39] http://www.irrawaddy.org/
[40] http://www.mizzima.com/
[41] http://english.dvb.no/
[42] http://myanmar.com/newspaper/nlm/index.html
[43] http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/burmas_future
[44] http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-protest/burma_icrc_4188.jsp
[45] http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/burma-waiting-for-the-dawn
[46] http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/a_chronic_emergency_on_the_burma_thailand_border
[47] http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-protest/burma_4084.jsp
[48] http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/burma_s_question
[49] http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/burma-cyclone-aid-and-sanctions
[50] http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/burma_the_cyclone_and_the_referendum
[51] http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/india_and_burma_time_to_choose

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