Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty.

Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR
FIRST SEMESTER AY 2005-2006

I. DEFINITIONS & PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS a. Inquisitorial  Prosecutions of crimes are wholly in the hands of
prosecuting officers and the court.
A. Definition  The procedure is characterized by SECRECY.
1. Concerned with the procedural steps through which a criminal case  Presence of accused before the magistrate is not a
passes, commencing with the initial investigation of a crime and requirement thus, magistrate can proceed with inquiry
concluding with the unconditional release of the offender. and judgment even in the absence of the accused.
2. A network of rules, which governs the procedural administration of  Judgment does not become final until it has been
criminal justice, that is, laws and courts rules (Black’s Law ratified and confirmed by the court of last resort (US vs.
Dictionary). Samio).
3. Method prescribed by law for the apprehension and prosecution of  During the Spanish period.
persons accused of any criminal offense and for their punishment b. Accusatorial  Requires all crimes except private offenses (must be
in case of conviction (Clark’s Criminal Procedure) commenced by the complainant of the offended party)
to be prosecuted by a public prosecutor
B. Sources  Accused has a right to be heard personally or by
1. Philippine Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 110 to Rule 127) of counsel
the Rules of Court (took effect on January 1, 1964). The Rules  Public trial, right of accused against self-incrimination is
were revised three more times. The latest took effect on guaranteed.
December 01, 2000).  Accused enjoys presumption of innocence; guilt must
2. 1987 Constitution under Article III (Bill of Rights) be proven beyond reasonable doubt
3. various acts passed by the legislature like BP Blg. 129  There is a right to appeal
4. Presidential decrees  Judgment does not require the imprimatur of the court
5. Executive Orders of last resort before t may attain finality.
6. Decisions of the Supreme Court  There should be moral certainty of guilt to defeat the
constitutional presumption of innocence (People vs.
Egot).
C. Criminal Law vs. Criminal Procedure c. Mixed  Contemplates of two contending parties before the
Criminal Law Criminal Procedure system court, which hears them impartially and renders
 Both relates to crimes  Both relates to crimes judgment only after trial (Queto vs Catolico).
 Substantive: it defines crimes,  Remedial: provides for the  Mix of the last two systems (ex. our law provides that
treats of their nature and method by which a person preliminary examination must be conducted by a judge
provides for the their punishment accused of a crime is arrested, before he issues a warrant of arrest which is an aspect
tried and punished of inquisitorial system while accused has a right to be
 Declares what acts are punishable  Provides how acts are punished. heard, which is an aspect of the accusatorial system)

D. Systems of Criminal Procedures Note: Courts proceeding in our Judicial Setup is accusatorial or adversarial and
Systems Definition not inquisitorial in nature. But there are opinions that our country subscribes
to the third system.
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005

C. When does jurisdiction attach

E. Construction of rule Jurisdiction attaches when law has given a tribunal capacity to
1. Rules will be liberally construed, enough to protect the substantial entertain the complaint against the person or thing sought to be
rights of the accused (section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court). charged or affected, and that such complaint has actually been
2. Rules of Court should not be interpreted as to sacrifice the preferred, and that such person or thing has been properly brought
substantial rights of the litigants at the altar of technicalities to the before the tribunal to answer the charge therein contained (Republic
consequent impairment of the sacred rules of justice (Alonzo vs. vs. Sunga).
Villamor).
D. Exercise of Jurisdiction
II. JURISDICTION The authority to decide a cast and not the decision therein is what makes up a
jurisdiction. Where the jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the
decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the
A. Definition
jurisdiction (de Veyra vs. Avila).
1. Came from the Latin words “juris” and “dico” (I speak by the law)
which means “the power or the capacity given by the law to a
A court may act, first, without jurisdiction (makes the judgment void); and
court or tribunal to entertain, hear and determine controversies”
second, having power or jurisdiction, may exercise it wrongly (decision is
(People vs. Mariano)
wrong and must be reversed upon error); or third, irregularly (must be
2. The right to put the wheels of justice in motion and to proceed to
corrected by motion).
the final determination of a cause upon the pleading of evidence.
3. the power and authority to hear and determine matters in
E. Source
controversy according to established rules of law and to carry the
1. Jurisdiction must be conferred by:
sentence or judgment of the court into execution (Morando vs.
(1) Constitution
Rovira).
(2) Law in force at the time of the institution of the action
4. Vested in the courts, not in the judges. This when a complaint is
(People vs. Adolfo)
filed before one branch or judge (of the same court, ex. RTC)
2. Cannot be fixed by the will of the parties or diminished by the
jurisdiction does not attach to said branch or judge alone. Trial
omission or act of said parties
may be had or proceeding may continue by and before another
3. Apportionment of jurisdiction is vested in the legislature; may not
branch or judge.
be conferred on the court by the parties involved in the offense.
B. Distinguished from venue
F. Criminal Jurisdiction
The particular country or geographical area, which a court with
1. Definition: the power of the tribunal to hear and try a particular
jurisdiction may hear and determine a case; place of trial.
offense and impose the punishment for it (People vs. Mariano).
2. While a court has abstract jurisdiction to and decide criminal cases
Jurisdiction Venue
committed within its territorial jurisdiction, it cannot do so unless a
Treats the power of the court to Deals with locality, the place where
complaint or information has been filed in court.
decide the case on the merits the suit may be had
3. requisites
Substantive (defines and regulates Procedural (Prescribes methods of
(a) the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take
rights or duties which gives rise to a enforcing rights or obtains redress for
cognizance of (JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER).
cause of action) their invasion)
(b) the offense must have been committed within its territorial
jurisdiction (JURISDICTION OVER TERRIRTORY).
In civil cases, venue can be waived or
(c) person charged with the offense must have been brought to
be a subject of agreement.
its presence for trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his
In criminal actions, venue cannot be
voluntary submission to the court. (JURISDICTION OVER THE
waived or stipulated upon because it is
PERSON OF THE ACCUSED).
an element of jurisdiction.

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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
NOTE: It is a general rule that jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter
of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or
agreement of the parties (UY vs. CA)
G. Jurisdiction over continuing crimes
Note: For continuous crime to exist, there should be plurality of acts
performed separately during a period of time; unity of the penal provision
infringed upon or violated and unity of criminal intent or purpose. This is
means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are unite in one
and the same intent leading to the perpetuation of the same criminal purpose
(People vs. Zapata and Bondoc)
GENERAL RULE: The accused in a continuing or transitory offense may be
tried in any jurisdiction in which he is found (US vs. Cunanan). But the court
where the case was first filed acquires jurisdiction over the same to the
exclusion of all other courts, provided it has custody of the accused or has first
acquired jurisdiction over his person.
H. Territorial Jurisdiction
1. Determined by the allegations in the information as to the situs of
the crime and this determines, in the first instance, whether said
court has jurisdiction to try this case.
GENERAL RULE: the offender must be prosecuted in the territory where the
offense was committed.
2. Exceptions:
2.1 Where the offense was committed under the exceptional
circumstance provided in Article 2 of the RPC (although committed
outside Philippine jurisdiction, these crimes are triable in Philippine
courts):
2.1.1 should the crime be committed while on Philippine
ship or airship
2.1.2 should the crime consist of counterfeiting or forgery of
any coin or currency note of the Philippine Island or
obligations and securities issued by the Government
of the Philippines.
2.1.3 Should the accused be liable for acts connected with
the introduction into these Island of the Obligations
and securities mentioned in the preceding number
2.1.4 While being public officers or employees, should
commit and offense in the exercise of their functions
2.1.5 Should commit any of the crimes against national
security and the law of nations
2.2 Cases of Piracy
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Reason: The law considers pirates “hostes humani generis”. It is
committed not against any particular state but against all mankind
(People vs. Lol-Lo and Sarao)
2.3 Where the offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft
or in any other public or private vehicle while in the course of its
trip. The criminal actions may be instituted and tried in the court
of any municipality or territory where such vehicle passed during
such trip including the place of departure and arrival (Section 14,
Rule 110).
2.4 Crime was committed on board a vessel in the course of its
voyage. Action may be tried in the proper court of the first power
of entry or any municipality or territory through which the vessel
passed subject to the generally accepted principles of international
law.
2.5 When the Supreme Court, in the interest of truth and impartial
justice, transfers the place of trial from one place to another.
(Article Xiii, Section 5(4))
2.6 In cases of written defamation (Act 4363)
Criminal action will be filed in the CFI of the province or city where
the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of
the offended parties reside. If one of the parties is a public officer
who office in the city of Manila, the action shall be filed in the CFI
of Manila or where he holds office.
I. Jurisdiction over person of the accused – acquired upon either his
apprehension with or without a warrant or his voluntary submission to
the jurisdiction of the court (which may be effect by posting bail or
filing a motion to quash.) But this may be waived.
J. Criminal Jurisdiction: how determined
Jurisdiction is determined by the fine and imprisonment prescribed by
law or extent of the penalty which the law imposes together with other
obligations on the basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or
information constitutive of the offense charged.
K. Apportionment of Jurisdiction
1. Extent of jurisdiction is ascertained by:
1.1 Power conferred by express or implied provision of a statute
1.2 Constitution (article VIII, Section 1 and 2): Congress shall have the
power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
court subject to the proviso that it may not deprive the SC of its
jurisdiction over cases set forth in Article VIII section 5.
2. Criminal Jurisdiction of courts
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
(a) Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts
 Section 32 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980: except in
cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC
and Sandiganbayan, these courts shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over
(i) all violations of city and municipal ordinances
committed within their respective jurisdiction
(ii) offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding 6 years irrespective of the amount of fine
and other accessory penalties. Provided that in
offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence, they shall have original
jurisdiction
(iii) offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence.
 Under PD 1606 as amended by RA 8249, MTC, MCTC, MeTC over
government officials and employees where the penalty is not more
than 6 years and officers charged do not fall under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan (Salary grade 27 and above)
Note: Under RA 7691: fine is no longer a factor in determining jurisdiction.
(b) Regional trial Courts
 Vested the exclusive jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of any court tribunal or body with
penalty higher than 6 years,
 Court with general jurisdiction
 Exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the first
level courts in their respective territorial jurisdiction
(c) Family Courts – created under the Family courts Act of 1997
 Has exclusive jurisdiction over cases:
(i) Criminal cases where one or more of the accuse is
below 18 but not less than 9.
(ii) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
(d) Court of Appeals
(e) Sandiganbayan
 Exclusive jurisdictions over all cases involving
(i) Violations of the Anti-Graft and corrupt Practices Act,
RA 1379 and Chapter II, section 2 of Title VII of the
RPC where one or more principal accused are officials
occupying positions in the government (national and
Local officials with salary grade 27 or higher)
 Appellate jurisdiction over accused whose position is lower than
salary grade 27.
(f) Supreme Court
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I. CASES
L. General Principles
PEOPLE VS. MARIANO
G.R. No L-40527 30 June 1976
Facts: Hermogenes Marioano, a Liason officer by then incumbent municipal
mayor Nolasco of San Jose del Monte Bulacan, was authorized to receive from
USAID for the use and benefit of the said municipality electric cables
measuring 150 ft and 250 feet and a cable power measuring 525 ft. with a
total value of $717.50. Instead of delivering the said materials to the mayor,
he appropriated the same to his personal use to the prejudice of the
municipality. The provincial Fiscal of Bulacan then filed an information for
Estafa against the accused with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The
accused filed a motion to quash on the ground contending that the court has
no jurisdiction over him considering that the military commission had already
taken cognizance of the malversation case against Mayor Nolasco involving the
same subject matter. The judge granted the motion, hence this appeal.
Issue: W/N the civil courts and military commissions exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over the offenses of Estafa of goods allegedly committed by a
civilian.
Decision: Jurisdiction is the basic foundation of judicial proceeding, which
fundamentally means the power or capacity given by the law to court or
tribunal to entertain, hear and determine certain controversies. It is the
authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment for it.
The jurisdiction of courts is derived from the constitution and statutes in force
at the time of the commencement of the action. Under the Judiciary Act of
1949, courts of First Instance shall have jurisdiction over all crimes in which
the penalty provided by the law is imprisonment for more than six months, or
a fine of more than two hundred pesos. The crime committed by Mariano is
punished by imprisonment from 4 months to two years. This falls under the
original jurisdiction of courts of first instance.
The rule is that the court which first take cognizance of the case acquires
jurisdiction thereof exclusive of the other applies only where both courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over particular case charged. The situation does not
involve two tribunal vested with concurrent jurisdiction over a particular crime
so as to apply this rule. As specifically stated in General order no 49, which
redefined the jurisdiction of military tribunals, the military commission, is not
vested with jurisdiction over the crime of Estafa.
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
UNITED STATES VS. JUEVES
G.R. No. 6992 30 August 1912
Facts: On several instances several men entered towns, all within the
jurisdiction of Ambos Camarines (which at the date of the commencement of
the action were already part of the province of Tayabas), robbing, kidnapping
and killing several persons. They were charged with the crime of brigandage
and their guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. The appellants’
counsel insists however that the court of Tayabas had no jurisdiction to try the
accused for the reason that the territory where the acts complained of were
committed belonged to the Province of Ambos Camarines at the time of the
commission of the acts although it has been since transferred to the Province
of Tayabas and that Section 3 of Act No 518 is invalid as opposed to the
Philippine Bill.
Issue: W/N a court has jurisdiction over crimes committed in a particular
locality prior to the time such locality was included within the jurisdiction of
such court
Decision: the general rule is that jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
(1) geographical limits of the territory over which it presides, and (2) the
actions it is empowered to hear and decide. A court has inchoate right of
jurisdiction over all crimes committed within its jurisdiction, which is perfected
on the institution of the action. If however, it loses jurisdiction over a
particular action because its territorial limits are restricted prior to the
institution of the action, it also loses this inchoate right to jurisdiction in favor
of the court to which the territory is transferred since it is unnecessary to
prolong a court’s existence indefinitely after being legally abolished.
The territory where the acts complained of in the case at bar were committed
having been transferred to the Province of Tayabas prior to the institution of
this action, the court of the that province where the units have been
transferred shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the case. The
assumption of jurisdiction over crimes committed before jurisdiction was
conferred is not a violation of the ex post facto clause.
The decision was affirmed.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY VS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL
G.R. No. 6287 01 December 1991
Facts: Plaintiff filed an action for condemnation of certain real estate lands in
the CFI of Tarlac. It is alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff is authorized
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by law to construct a railroad line from Paniqui to Tayug in the province of
Tarlac. After filing the complaint. The plaintiff, pending final determination of
the action, took possession of and occupied the lands described in the
complaint, building its line and putting the same in operation. On the 4 th of
October, plaintiff gave notice to the defendants that a motion would be made
to the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, because as determined
by the plaintiff, the land sough to be condemned was situated in the Province
of Nueva Ecija instead of Province of Tarlac as alleged in the complaint.
Issue: W/N the CFI of Tarlac has jurisdiction over the case
Decision: Section 55 and 56 of Act No 136 of the Philippine Commission confer
jurisdiction upon the Courts of First Instance of these island with respect to
real estate stating that the jurisdiction of the CFI shall be of two kinds: Original
and Appellate. It was the intention of the Philippine commission to give to the
CFO the most perfect and complete jurisdiction possible over the subject
matters mentioned in connection therewith. There is no suggestion of
limitation. The jurisdiction is universal. So far as jurisdiction over subject
matter is concerned, the CFI of one province may, if there is no objection by
any of the parties, take cognizance of an action in reference to real estate
located in another province,
Certain statues confer jurisdiction, others provide for the procedure by which
that jurisdiction is made effective. The purpose of procedure is not to restrict
the jurisdiction to the court but to give it effectiveness.
The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. They
establish a relation, not between the court and the subject matter, but
between the plaintiff and the defendant.
The Philippine Commission has in fullest phrase given the CFI unrestricted
jurisdiction over real estate in the Island by act no 136 and that jurisdiction
ought not to be held to be withdrawn except by virtue of an act equally express
or so clearly inconsistent therewith as to amount of the same thing.
Venue is not connected with jurisdiction over the subject matter. If the parties
consent thereto there is no legal reason why the CFI of Manila may not
cognizance of and determine a controversy affecting the tile to or an interest in
real estate situated in another province. With the consent of the defendants,
express or implied, the venue may be laid and the action tried in any province
selected by the plaintiff. Any one of the defendants who have lands lying in
another province may also choose the venue. In such case, the action as to all
the defendants not objecting would continue as to the objecting defendants.
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
The plaintiff having brought the action must submit itself to the jurisdiction of
the court. It took advantage of the situation itself created and took possession
of the land while the case is being litigated. It is estopped from alleging that
the court has no jurisdiction over it.
EMILIO REYES VS. DIAZ
G.R. No. 48753 26 November 1941
Facts: The protestee is questioning whether the protestant’s certificate of
candidacy has been duly filed. Such will eventually determine whether the
court has jurisdiction over the matter. The parties are in agreement that if
indeed the protestee filed his candidacy, then the court has jurisdiction over
the case. Otherwise, the court will have to dismiss the case. They are
therefore not questioning whether the trial court has jurisdiction according to
the law.
Issue: W/N the trial court has or has no authority to pass upon the validity of
the ballots adjudicated to the protestant, which have not been challenged by
the protestee in his counter protest.
Decision: It has been held that the word “jurisdiction” as used in the
contribution and in the statues means “jurisdiction as to the subject-matter
only, unless an exception arises by reason of its employment in a broader
sense. Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine
cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is
conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its
powers.
In order that the court may validly try and decide the case, it must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and jurisdiction over the persons of the
parties. But in some instances, it is said that the court should also have
jurisdiction over the issue, meaning thereby that the issue being tried and
decided by the court within the issues raised in the pleadings.
Jurisdiction over the issue is different from jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
The latter being conferred by law and the former by the pleadings. Jurisdiction
over the issue may be conferred by consent either express of implied of the
parties. Although an issue is not duly pleaded, it may be validly be tried and
decided if no timely objection is made thereto by the parties, this cannot be
done when jurisdiction over subject matter is involved. Jurisdiction over the
issue is an exception of a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the
persons of the parties.
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The original question posed by the court was not answered.
VELUNTA vs. CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY
G.R. No. L-71855 20 January 1988
Facts: Petitioner, a member of the Integrated National Police of Tacloban, was
directing traffic at around 6PM in the intersection of Burgos-Tarcela-Lucente
Streets in Tacloban City when he apprehended one Romeo Lozano, a motorized
tricycle driver, for a traffic violation. An altercation ensued which resulted in
the death of the latter. His widow filed an administrative complaint with the
NAPOLCOM, which found petitioner guilty of less grave misconduct and
suspended him for six months without pay.
Pending the case, Ramon’s widow also filed another case for homicide at the
Fiscal’s office in Tacloban. Finding prima facie evidence, the First Assistant City
Fiscal recommended that the case be referred to the Tanodbayan which
endorsed the filling of the homicide case. The said case was referred to the
military authorities pursuant to PD 1850. The general court Martial was
convened but petitioner assailed its jurisdiction over the case alleging that EO
1040 in relation to EO 1020 transferred jurisdiction over members of the PNP
to the NAPOLCOM.
Issue: W/N the General Court Martial has jurisdiction over the case.
Decision: Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for
administering justice fore hearing and deciding cases. Courts in the Philippines
have no common law jurisdiction or power, but only those expressly conferred
by the Constitution and statues and those necessarily implied to make the
express powers effective.
It is expressly stated under EO 1012 that it is only the operation supervision
and direction over all units of the Integrated National Police force stationed or
assigned in the different cities and municipalities that was transferred from the
Philippine Constabulary to the city or municipal government concerned.
Likewise, EO 1040 transferred merely the exercise of administrative control
over all units of the Integrated National Police throughout the country to the
President. This is not the same as transferring of jurisdiction or authority of a
court-martial to hear, try and decide a criminal proceeding against a police
officer.
When the case was filed in 1982, there can be no question that the respondent
General Court Martial had jurisdiction. Since jurisdiction had properly been
exercised from the start, it remains with the military court martial unless a law
expressly divests it of the jurisdiction. It is a rule that once jurisdiction is
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
acquired, it remains until validly transferred by the proper authority according
to law.
It is not intended by the legislators to repeal PD 1850, thus, the court martial’s
jurisdiction remains.
UY VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 105965-70 09 August 1999
Facts: Petitioner George Uy was the deputy comptroller of the Philippine Navy
designated to act on behalf of Captain Fernandez, the latter’s supervisor, on
matters relating the activities of the Fiscal Control Branch. Six informations for
Estafa through falsification of official documents and one information for
violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 (anti-graft and corrupt practices act) were
filed with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and 19 other accused for
alleged. The petitioner was said to have signed a P.O. stating that the unit
received 1,000 pieces of seal rings when in fact, only 100 were ordered. The
Sandiganbayan recommended that the infomations be withdrawn against some
of the accused after a comprehensive investigation.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash contending that it is the Court Martial and
not the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the offense charged or the
person of the accused. Petitioner further contends that RA 1850 which
provides for the jurisdiction of court martial should govern in this case.
Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases
or the person of the petitioner
Decision: The fundamental rule is that the jurisdiction of a court is determined
by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Thus,
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the petitioner at the time of the filing
of the informations and as now prescribed by law. RA 8249, the latest
amendment of PD 1606 creating the Sandiganbayan provides that such will
have jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 of members of the Philippines
Army and air force colonels, naval captains and all officers of higher rank.
In the case at bar, while the petitioner is charged with violation of RA 3018, his
position as Lieutenant Commander of the Philippine Navy is a rank lower than
“naval captains and all officers of higher rank”. It must be noted that both the
NATURE of the OFFENSE and the POSITION OCCUPIED BY THE ACCUSED are
conditions SINE QUA NON before Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance of
the case. Thus, regular courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the person
of the accused as provided by the Sandiganbayan Law which states that “in
case where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
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Salary Grade 27 or higher, exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the
proper RTC, MTC, MCTC or METC pursuant to BP Blg. 129.
Consequently, it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over the offense charged
since under Section 9 of RA 3019, the commission of any violation of said law
shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than Six years and One
month to FIFTEEN years. The indictment of the petitioner therefore cannot fall
within the jurisdiction of the MTC, METC or MCTC.
M. Jurisdiction determined by the position
SUBIDO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. 122631 20 January 1997
Facts: Bayani Subido, then BID Commissioner and Rene Parina, then BID
Special Agent conspired and caused the issuace of a warrant of arrest against
James Maksimuk. The accused knew hat Maksimuk’s deportation order was
not yet final and executory pending a Motion for Reconsideration, resulting in
the detention of the latter which caused him undue injury. A case for arbitrary
detention was filed against the accused with the Sandiganbayan. The
petitioners filed a motion to quash contending that in view of the effectivity of
RA 7975, which is an act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural
Organization of the Sandiganbayan, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over the offense charged and the person of the accused. Said motion was
denied, hence this petition.
Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case at bar
Decision: The court dismissed the case. It is true that the crime committed no
longer falls within the purview of RA 7975. However, RA 7975 only took effect
one year after the commission of the crime charged. It must be remembered
that for purposes of Section 4 of RA 1606 which provides that Sandiganbayan
has exclusive jurisdiction over cases committed by public officer and
employees in relation to their office, the reckoning point is the time of the
commission of the crime.
Under PD 1606, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over persons who at the
time of the commission of the crime is occupying a position having a Salary
Grade 27 or higher. It is true that Parina held a position with a salary grade of
less than “27”. However, he is being prosecuted as co-conspirator of the
principal accused who held a position higher that grade “27” thus, section 4 of
PD 1606 which provides that “in cases where none of the principal accused are
occupying the position to salary grade 27 or higher, RTC, MTC, METC or MCTC
shall have exclusive jurisdiction” will apply.
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
It must be noted that before the enactment of RA 7975, what matters is not
the kind of offense so long as it is alleged in the crime committed in relation to
the office of the public official, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction try and hear the
case. This has been cured by Section 4 of RA 7975 by limiting its jurisdiction
only to persons (principal accused) having a salary grade of “27”. This, being
a curative statute, may be given retroactive effect.
Petition was denied.
CUYCO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No 137017-18 08 February 2000
Facts: the Graft Investigation Officer found probable cause against Ramon
Cuyco for violation of Section 39 of RA 3019 as well as Section 3E of the same
act. Two informations were recommended against Cuyco and the other
respondents. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation and the
prosecution filed he information with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a
motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction contending that at the time of the
commission of the offense in 1992, he was occupying the position of Director
II, Salary Grade 26, thus RTC has jurisdiction over the case. The prosecution
did not oppose such action. The Sandiganbayan however denied the motion,
hence, this appeal.
Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.
Decision: The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violation of Section 3a
and e of RA 3019 unless committed by public officials and employees
occupying position of regional director and higher with Salary Grade “27” and
higher. Petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director II with salary
Grade “26” under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
thus, Sandiganbayan incurred serious error of jurisdiction entitling petitioner to
the relief prayed.
Petition was granted.
N. Jurisdiction determined by the allegations of the complaint.
BUAYA VS. POLO
G.R. No. 75079 26 January 1989
Facts: Petitioner Solemnidad Buaya was an insurance agent of Country
Bankers Insurance Corporation who was authorized to transact insurance
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/vvverga 101005
business and collect premiums in behalf of the corporation. She was required
to make periodic reports and accounting of her transactions and remit premium
collections to the principal office of private responded located in the City of
Manila.
An audit was conducted on petitioner’s account which showed a shortage of
Php 300T. As a result, she was charged with Estafa before the RTC with
respondent Hon. Polo. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss which motion was
denied by respondent Judge. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of
this order of denial was also denied.
Petitioner contends that RTC in Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based
in Cebu City and the funds she allegedly misappropriated with collected in
Cebu City.
Issue: W/N the RTC in Manila has jurisdiction
Decision: The general rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash,
being interlocutory in character cannot be questioned by certiorari and cannot
be subject of appeal. However, this rule is subject to certain exceptions. The
reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to
undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial of the court had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.
It is a general rule that averments in the complaint or information characterize
the crime to be prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried.
Section 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal prosecution
the action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or province
wherein the offense was committed or any of the essential elements thereof
took place.
The subject information charges the petitioner with Estafa committed during
the period 1980 to June 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila. Clearly them.
From the allegations of the information the RTC of Manila has jurisdiction.
Besides, the crime of Estafa is a continuing crime, which may be prosecuted at
the place where any of he essential elements of the crime took place. The
petitioner clearly prejudiced private respondents in Manila and therefore, the
crime was committed here.
Petition was dismissed.
US VS. GALLEJOS
G.R. No. 12739 08 December 1917
8
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Facts: From November 1914 to October 1916 in the municipality of Cebu, the
accused Mariano Gallejos and complainant’s wife Benita Antioquia had illicit
relations and begot a child. The complainant filed a complaint against the two
of the Justice of Peace of the Municipality of Cebu. Mariano was arrested but
Benita remained at large. Mariano was arraigned and was found guilty of
adultery. However, Mariano filed a motion to suspend the trial until his co-
defendant is arrested and brought to the court. The motion was denied.
Record shows that the complaint included both defendants.
Issue: W/N the court could proceed with the trial of Mariano even if Benita is
not present.
Decision: While the complaint for the crime of adultery must be presented
against both of the culprits and by the offended person, yet the law permits
separate trials for each. Not only is there no law requiring that they should be
tried separately, but there is a positive provision of law permitting them, to be
tried separately. Separate trials may be had: (1) when either of the parties
request it; (b) when the government is satisfied that the man did not know
that the woman was married; (c) when one of the parties has died before the
time of the trial; and (d) when one of the parties escaped the jurisdiction of
the court and has not been arrested.
Moreover, the law clearly provides that in furtherance of justice, the court may
grant either of the parties the right and opportunity to adduce additional
evidence bearing upon the main issue in question. The question of jurisdiction
of the court is always a question of importance; and if the evidence is
necessary to prove the fact, as it is in all criminal cases, so far as the place of
the commission of the crime is concerned, and the prosecution fails to prove
that fact, in the interest of justice the court may always admit additional
evidence.
Sentence of lower court was affirmed.
O. Jurisdiction acquired for the person of the accused.
REPUBLIC VS. SUNGA
G.R. No. L-38634 20 June 1988
Facts: The complainant Jose Dadis filed a case for the attempted homicide
against Ariston and Rafael Anadilla. While the case is pending, Jose Dadis filed
an affidavit of desistance and was no longer interested in the prosecution of
the case. Jose said that he had forgiven the accused and that his material
witness could no longer be contracted the court then lifted the order of arrest,
cancelled the bail bond and ordered the release of the accused.
Vena V. Verga
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The Provincial Fiscal moved for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal,
which was denied, hence this appeal.
Issue: W/N the court may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit
of desistance executed by the offended party, but without the motion to
dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal.
Decision: The filing of a complaint or information in the Court initiated a
criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. When
after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant of arrest of the
accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily
submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the court thereby
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the
court which has the option to grant or deny the same. The rule therefore in
this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the court. Although the fiscal retains
the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the
case is already in court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court because
the determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. The only qualification is that the action of the court must not
impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due
process of law.
But to avoid similar situation, the court takes the view tat while Cespo doctrine
has settled that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case
should be dismissed, still, any move on the part of the complainant or offended
party to dismiss the criminal case even if without objection of the accuse,
should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal for his own vie on the matter.
He is after all, in control of his prosecution of the case and he may have his
own reasons why the case should not be dismissed.
P. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by waiver
UNITED STATES VS. DE LA SANTA
G.R. No. 3181 10 October 1907
Facts: The complainant Teofila Sevilla charges the defendant with the crime of
seduction under a promise of marriage at the time when she was less than 21
years of age. The complaint was filed by her father when she was already 24
years old. The court contends that the alleged seduction could only be
9
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
instituted and maintained at her instance since she was already of legal age,
otherwise the trial court shall have no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Issue: W/N the court has jurisdiction over a complaint.
Decision: as provided by the RPC, complainant can institute criminal action
against the defendant in cases of seduction should it be proven that she is
already of the majority age. Although the parents and guardians are
mentioned disjunctively, still, the right to institute criminal proceedings in
cases of seduction is exclusively and successively reposed in these persons in
the order in which they are named so that no one of them has authority to
proceed if there is any other person previously mentioned therein with legal
capacity to appear and institute action.
Under the Civil code, a woman 23 years of age is already in the full possession
of her civil rights, save only in certain exceptional cases expressly prescribed in
the code. The right to appear and prosecute or defend an action in the court is
not one of these exceptions and, indeed, it is inherent to the full exercise of
civil rights.
Under the provision of the RPC, jurisdiction over the crime of seduction is
expressly denied the trial court unless such jurisdiction be conferred by one of
certain persons specified in the law, in this case, by the offended person
herself. This is important not only for the sufficiency of the complaint but goes
directly to the jurisdiction of the court over the crime. Lack of jurisdiction over
the subject-matter is fatal and subject to the objection at any stage of the
proceedings, either in court below or on appeal. Where the subject matter is
not within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero
motu.
Jurisdiction over subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority, which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in
the manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the lack of such
jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties.
Judgment was reversed and the complaint was dismissed.
Q. Jurisdiction not conferred by consent
US VS. REYES
G.R. No.472 28 April 1902
Facts: the complaint charges the defendant with the crime of Estafa and
falsification and alleges the former, being an employee of the Manila Dagupan
Railway issued a ticket to a passenger who was going from Manila to Caloocan
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and continued his trip to Malolos. The difference in the fare is 1 peso and 22
cents. The ticket issued simulated that the tip was from Manila to Boacau and
the charge only 18 cents, rendering the said amount to the company while
appropriating the balance of the sum.
The complaint was not able to precisely designate the place where the
falsification was committed not where the appropriation occurred.
Issue: W/N the court of Tarlac has jurisdiction to try the case
Decision: The crime of Estafa was committed at the where his account was
rendered and the stub of the false ticket was turned it. In this case, the stubs
and false tickets were turned in Tarlac. The court in Tarlac therefore has
jurisdiction since it is within this territory that the accused made use of the
document alleged to be false and where the falsification was committed.
The fact that the CFI took jurisdiction of the offense charged, because in the
opinion of the court, the place of the commission of the crime was not clearly
shown, is not an obstacle to the courts declaration itself to be without
jurisdiction as soon as the lack of jurisdiction appeared from the proceedings
subsequently had. Jurisdiction over criminal cases cannot be conferred by
consent.
The appeal was granted.
R. Estopped by laches to bar attacks on jurisdiction
PEOPLE VS. REGULARIO
G.R. No. 101451 23 March 23, 1993
Facts: Accused together with several others murdered on Menardo Garcia in
Lucena. During arraignment, the appellants entered a plea of not guilty
however, before the prosecution rested its case, Regalario and his accomplice
Pabillar, changed their plea to guilty. After trial, all appellants were found
guilty of the offense charged. Appellant’s counsel filed a motion for
reconsideration on the 14th day of the 15-day period for appeal, which was
denied, by the trial court. They then filed a notice of appeal, which was denied
for having been filed out of time (10 days after the receipt of the first denial).
Issue: W/N the court can still exercise jurisdiction over the case considering
that the appeal was filed out of time.
Decision: The trial court was correct in rejecting appellant’s notice of appeal
since it was filed beyond the reglamentary period. However, as in People vs.
Tamani, although the appeal of the accused was demonstrably filed out of
10
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
time, to obviate the miscarriage of justice, the court nevertheless reviewed the
case and rendered judgment on the merits thereof in view of the fact that the
filing of the appeal out of time was due to the inadvertence of the defense
counsel. The same may also be granted in the present case adopting the
principle of estoppel by laches to bar attack on jurisdiction.
TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY
G.R. No. L-21450 15 April 1968
Facts: Spouses Serafin and Felicitas commenced a civil case against spouses
Sibonghanoy to recover from them a sum of Php 1T+ with legal interest. A
writ of attachment was issued by the court against the defendants properties
but the same was soon dissolved. After trial, the court rendered judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs and after the same had become final and executory, the
court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ being
unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of writ of execution against
the Surety’s bond. Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the
ground that the same was issued without summary hearing. This was denied
by the RTC. Surety appealed in the CA, which was against denied. This time,
the surety just asked for an extension in order for them to file the motion for
reconsideration. But instead of filing for a motion for reconsideration, it file a
motion to dismiss saying that by virtue of RA 296 which is the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1948, section 88 of t which placed within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions were the value of the
subject matter does not exceed Php 2,000.00 CFI therefore has no jurisdiction
over the case. The question of jurisdiction was filed by the Surety only 15
years from the time the action was commence in the CFI.
Issue: W/N the case should be dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction.
Decision: After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or
power of the court.
The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the
courts exclusive by law and as the lack of it affect the very authority of the curt
to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstance of the present
cases, a party may be barred by laches from involving this plea for the first
time on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case. A
party cannot invoke a court’s jurisdiction and later on deny it to escape a
penalty.
S. Adherence of Jurisdiction
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DELA CRUZ vs. MOYA
G.R. L-65192 27 April 1988
Doctrine: Once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up the end of
the litigation.
Facts: Rodolfo de la Cruz is a member of the Armed Force of the Philippines
assigned to the Intelligence and Operation Section of the PC Company,
together with other PC me, received a mission order to proceed to Davao for
the purpose of verifying and apprehending persons who were engaged in illegal
cockfighting which they complied with. The operators of the illegal cockfights,
including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto followed the soldiers on their way back
to the headquarters. Fighting ensued and in the scuffled, dela Cruz shot
Cabilto.
The petitioner was charged with homicide in the CFI. Claiming that the crime
for which he was chaged was committed in relation to the performance of his
duties, petitioner filed a motion to transfer the case to the military authorities
so he could be tried in a court martial. The motion was denied.
Issue: W/M the civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case at bar.
Decision: One of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is that the
court hearing the case must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case. If the court is acting without jurisdiction, then the entire proceedings are
null and void. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute
in the force at the time of the commencement of action.
The case was filed on August 2, 1979. On such date, by virtue of General
Order No 59, military tribunals created under general order No. 8, exercised
exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by military personnel of the
AFP while in the performance of their duty provided that a certificate from the
Secretary of National defense for the purpose of determining whether the
offense was really committed while in the performance of a duty. This proviso
does not in any way preclude the courts from making any finding as to whether
an offense is duty-connected. Nor doe it make the certificate a condition
precedent for the exercise by either civilian courts or military tribunals of their
jurisdiction over offenses committed.
The fact that there was a mission order and that the victim was shot while
petitioner was executing the mission order compels the court to declare that
respondent court was without jurisdiction.
11
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Petition was granted.
PEOPLE VS. MAGALLANES
G.R. No. 118013-14 11 October 11, 1995
Doctrine: Jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative
enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with the court
until the case is finally terminated. Sandiganbayan or the court as the case
may be cannot be divested of jurisdiction over cases filed before them by
reason RA 7975. They retain their jurisdiction until the end of litigation.
Facts: The Dumancas spouses complained with the police saying that a certain
Rufino Gargar and Danilo Lumngyao swindled them. The accused together
with civilian agents arrested and abducted the swindling suspects and forced
them to produce the money they got from the spouses. The two were found
dead a few days after. Two informations for kidnapping for ransom with
murder were filed with the RTC against members of the PNP and nine other
civilians who confederated with each other for the purpose of extorting money
through kidnapping the two victims. Petitioner contends that the crime was
committed in the course of the performance of duties of the accused, thus,
Sandiganbayan should have jurisdiction by virtue of PD 1606.
Issue: W/N the RTC of Bacolod or the Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction
over the two criminal cases for kidnapping for ransom with murder wherein
some of the accused implicated as principals are members of the PNP.
Decision: At the time the informations in the said cases were filed, the law
governing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was section 4 of PD No 1060
which provided that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction in all cases
involving public officers and employees who committed felonies in relation to
their office, which must be alleged in the complaint. An offense is considered
as committed in relation to the office if it cannot exist without the office or if
the office is the constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute.
It is a fundamental rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. In the case at bar, the information in the court do
not indicate that the victims were killed in the course of the investigation.
What was alleged is that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or
exhorting a sum of money, abducted, kidnapped, detained and killed the two
victims. The allegation of “taking advantage of his position” incorporated in
the information is not enough to bring the offenses within the definition of
“offenses committed in relation to public office”.
The Sandiganbayan partly lost its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases
involving violation of RA 3019 as amended, RA No. 1379 and the RPC. It
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/vvverga 101005
retains only cases where the accused are national and local officials classified
as Grade “27” and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989. RA No 7975 cannot affect the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
since jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative
enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with the court
until the case is finally terminated. Hence, the Sandiganbayan or any other
courts cannot be divested of jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
subject criminal cases as the informations were filed before the RTC.
Assuming that the informations were filed with the said tribunal, the
Sandiganbayan can no longer proceed to hear the cases in view of the express
provision of Section 7 of RA 7975 that all criminal cases in which the trial has
not yet begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
RTC was ordered to resume hearing the case.
UY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119000 28 July 1997
Facts: While Rosa Uy was helping her husband manage their lumber business,
she and a friend, Consolacion agreed to form a partnership wherein the latter
will contribute additional capital as industrial partner for the expansion of
Rosa’s lumber business. Various sums amounting to Php 500,000.00 were
claimed to have been given by Consolacion for the business, but no receipt was
ever issued. The friendship of the two turned sour, thus, Consolacion
demanded the return of her investment but the checks issued by Rosa were all
dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Consolaction filed a complaint for Estafa and for violation of BP 22. The Manila
RTC acquitted the petitioner of Estafa but convicted her of the charges under
BP Blg. 22.
Petitioner contents that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the
offenses under BP 22 and assuming arguendo that she raised the matter of
jurisdiction only upon appeal, she cannot be estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction
Issue: W/N the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations of the
Bouncing checks Law.
Decision: Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the
court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused. This it cannot take jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside that of that limited
territory. Jurisdiction of the court over a criminal case is determined by the
12
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
allegations in the complaint or information. Once it is shown, the court may
validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during
the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, the crimes of Estafa and violation of BP are two different
offenses having different elements and necessarily, for the court to acquire
jurisdiction, each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied.
The respondent court is wrong to conclude that inasmuch as the RTC of Manila
acquired jurisdiction over the Estafa case then it also acquired jurisdiction over
the violation of BP 22.
No proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered, dishonored
or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are essential
elements necessary for the Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction. BP 22 on the
other hand, as a continuing offense, may be tried in any jurisdiction where the
offense was in part committee.
Petitioner also timely questioned the jurisdiction of the court
As provided by jurisprudence, we can see that even if a party fails to file a
motion to quash, he may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court over a subject matter of the
action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of
the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court, may be raised at any stage of
the proceeding, even on appeal.
However, this rule has been qualified in the case of Tijan vs, Sibonghanoy
wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court can be held to be barred
by laches. This case however cannot be applied in the case at bar since the
accused is not guilty of laches.
RTC of Manila has no jurisdiction over the case.
Exceptions to the General Rule of Adherence to Jurisdiction
BINAY vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
316 SCRA 65 01 October 1999
Facts:
BINAY CASE
On Sept. 7, 1994, the office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan
one information for violation of art.220 of RPC (illegal use of public funds) and
2 for violation of RA3019 (anti-graft), which were amended on Sept 15, 1994,
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/vvverga 101005
against Jejomar Binay alleging that these were committed in 1997 during his
incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila. On June
13, 1995, after RA 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, took
effect (May 16, 1995), Binay filed a motion to refer his cases to the “proper
court” for further proceedings, but was denied by the Sandiganbayan. As such
he filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and Mandamus questioning the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan before the Supreme Court.
MAGSAYSAY CASE
Mario Magsaysay is the mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual,
Batangas, all of his co-petitioners in this case are officials of the same
municipality. On April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, V-mayor of the same
municipality, charged petitioners with violation of RA3019 for overpaying
Vicente de la Rosa (also petitioner herein) of TDR Construction for the
landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School. A resolution by Graft
Investigation Officer Alarilla recommended the filing of the information with the
Sandiganbayan. However, it was filed in the RTC of Batangas instead,
peculiarly the information was signed by the same Alarilla.
Subsequently, the Concerned Citizens of San Pascual, batangas, filed a
complaint before the Ombudsman against the petitioners for the same
violation. Thereafter another information alleging the same offense was filed
before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners moved to quash the information alleging
that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case.
While the cases were pending, Congress enaceted RA8249, redefining
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving municipal mayors accused of violations of RA3019 and
Art.220 of the RPC. Considering that:
1. At the alleged commission of the crimes, municipal mayors were
not classified as Grade 27
To support this contention, they presented certifications saying that
the salary they received was below that of the salary received by a grade 27
officer. For Binay his salary was only P10, 793/month equivalent to Grade 22
and for Magsaysay P11, 828/month equivalent to Grade 25. They based this
on RA6758 (Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989).
2. Municipal Mayors are not included in the enumeration in Sec.
4a(1) of Pd1606 as amended by RA 7975.
Petitioners invoke the rule in statcon: inclusion unius est exclusion alterius:
what is not included in those enumerated is deemed exluded.
13
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
3. Congressional records reveal that the law did not intend municipal
mayors to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan
Decision: THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION. Where a statute
changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be
applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute.
The Court does not subscribe to the manner by which petitioners classify
Grades. The Constitution states that in providing for the standardization of
compensation of government officials and employees, Congress shall take into
account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to and the qualifications
required of their positions, thus RA6758 provides that the Grade depends upon
the nature of one’s position relative to another position. It is the person’s
grade that determines the salary not the other way around.
It is possible that a local gov’t official’s salary may be less than that prescribed
for his Grade since his salary also depends on the financial capability
of his respective government unit. Nevertheless, it is the law, which fixes the
official’s grade.
RA 6758 instructs the Dept. of Budget and Management (DBM) to prepare an
Index of Occupation Services listing the Salary Grades of Gov’t officials. Both
the 1989 and 1997 version of said Index classifies municipal mayors
under Grade 27, as such municipal mayors come within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Resort to Statcon is not appropriate where the law is clear and unambiguous.
The enumeration under section 4a(1) is not exclusive.
Again statcon does not apply where the law is clear.
MORE ON BINAY
Under sec.7 of RA 7975: upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases
in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the
proper court. The proper import of this section is laid down in Bengzon v.
Inciong:
The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is
exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed
the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation
placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The
exception to the rule is where the stature expressly provided that it is
intended to operate to actions pending before its enactment. Where
the statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the
enactment of the statute.
To this effect, RA 7975 is retroactive. Effects of Section 7:
1. If trial of cases before the Sandigan has already begun as of the
approval of RA7975, then RA 7975 does not apply.
2. If trial of cases before the Sandigan has NOT begun as of the approval
of RA7975, then it applies.
a. if by virtue of sec.4 of RA7975, the sandigan has jurisdiction
over the case, then the case shall be referred to the sandigan.
b. If by virtue of sec.4 of RA7975, the sandigan has no
jurisdiction, then the case shall be referred to the regular
courts.
As the trial of Binay had not yet begun as of date of the approval of RA7975,
the Sandigan retains jurisdiction over the case.
MORE ON MAGSAYSAY
Petitioners invoke the rule that jurisdiction of a court one it attaches
cannot be ousted by subsequent event, although of such character which would
have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. They claim
that the filing of the info in the Sandigan was a subsequent even which cannot
oust the RTC of its jurisdiction.This rule has no application here as the RTC had
no jurisdiction over the case in the first place. Furthermore, when the info was
filed with the RTC RA7975 was already in effect, thus the need to be referred
to the Sandigan.
Petitioners invoke that respondents are estopped from filing an info
with the Sandigan considering that they had already filed another info alleging
the same facts before the RTC. While the court in certain cases has ruled that
estoppel prevents a party from questioning the jurisdiction of the court that the
party himself invoked, estoppel remains the exception and not the rule, the
rule being that jurisdiction is vested by law. Furthermore, the respondent in
this case is the State and estoppel is not applied to the State.
SANCHEZ and MANAGAY vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
313 SCRA 723
Facts: Petitioners are officers of the Phil. Army. Lt.Col. Lino Sanchez was
Commanding Officer, 9th Post Engineer Detachment, Headquarters and
Headquarters Support Group (HHSG), while Major Vicente Managay was G-4,
HHSG. On June 16, 1993, court martial proceedings were initiated against
them and Gaudencio Romualdez based on a report stating that there was a
prima facie case against them for violation of Art. 95 of the articles of war for
causing the wrongful release of Php 5,995,47 for payment of repair of G10
office of the Phil. Army, equivalent to 88.55% completion of the work, when in
fact only 25% of the work had been completed to the damage of the
government. The judge advocate of the Phil. Army referred the findings to the
14
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, recommending the filing of info with the
Sandiganbayan
On April 8, 1994, Sanchez was arraigned before the Gen. Court Martial No.2
while Managay on July 1, 1994. They both pleaded not guilty. Meanwhile on
April 18, 1994, an info was filed against them before the Sandigan for violation
of RA 3019. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case before the
Sandigan alleging that it has no jurisdiction over the case as the court martial
had acquired original and exclusive jurisdiction and that the acts complained of
before the court martial and the Sandigan are one and the same.
Decision: Although the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction at the time the charge
was filed, it lost its jurisdiction upon the enactment of RA 7975 because he falls
below the rank of full colonel and trial has not yet begun.
LACSON vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
301 SCRA 298
Facts: see subsequent Lacson digests
Decision: The amendment in RA no 8249 that in cases where none of the
accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary grade “27” or higher,
as prescribed in the said RA 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
RTTC, MTC, MeTC, MTCT, as the case may be in pursuant to BP 129. The
previous law vests jurisdiction in the RTC where none of the principal accused
are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27. The term principal
was deleted so that under the amendment, if an accomplice belongs to Salary
grade 27, then jurisdiction is with the Sandiganbayan even if none of the
principals belong to a lower salary grade. The amendment was applied
retroactively.
T. Action of the Court when determined that is had no jurisdiction
1. Under its supervisory authority, the Supreme Court, even the
Court of Appeals may properly refer the case to the court of
proper jurisdiction.
2. Courts of the 1st and 2nd level are without authority to order the
transfer. If the courts believe that it has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, its jurisdiction is limited to simply dismissing the
case.
US VS. MORALES
6 Phil 403
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
Facts: Rosauro Sabino, Francisco Primoso and Romualdo Ramos were arrested
in Caloocan while Balbino Morales was arrested in Malabon, both municipalities
are beyond the limits of the city of Manila. They were convicted in the CFI of
Manila for the crime of Brigandage. Evidence, however, discloses that the
offenses were committed in the Provinces of Bulacan and Rizal.
Decision: When the record discloses that the crime as alleged in the complaint
was not committed in the province wherein the trial was had, and the accused
was not arrested in that province and defendant had not fled there from, the
Court of First Instance of that Province has no jurisdiction to impose sentence.
In such cases, of the court has reasonable ground to believe that the crime has
been committed; the accused should be remanded to the court of proper
jurisdiction for trial.
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING vs. ISANI
242 SCRA 158 06 March 1995
Facts: In a complaint filed a few days after the effectivity of RA7691
(expanding the jurisdiction of municipal and metropolitan trial courts) with the
Makati RTC, Lolita Encelan sought to recover from RCBC actual damages of
$5,000 or P137,675. RCBC moved for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction on
the ground that it is under the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) not the RTC, the
principal demand prayed for not being in excess of P200,000. Respondent RTC
judge Isnani, instead of dismissing the complaint, transferred the entire
records of the case to the MTC.
Decision: It has been held that where the court has no jurisdiction at the time
of the filing of the complaint, instead of ordering the transfer, the court should
dismiss the case.
REPUBLIC vs. ASUNCION
231 SCRA 211
Facts: Alexander Dionisio y Manio, member of the PNP, was assigned to the
Central Police District Command Station 2 in Novaliches, when he was
dispatched to Dumalay Street to respond to a complaint that a person was
creating trouble there. Dionioso proceeded to the place, where he
subsequently shot to death T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang. While trial for homicide was
already in progress in the RTC of QC, the case was dismissed for refilling with
the Sandiganbayan on the ground that it is the Sandiganbayan which has
jurisdiction over the case. The private prosecutor moved for dismissal citing
the opinion of the Sec of the DOJ that crimes committed by PNP members are
not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan because they fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regular courts as provided in RA 6975 and the
15
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special court as stated in the 1973
constitution and as the 1987 constitution provides that the present anti-graft
court shall continue to function and exercise it jurisdiction.
Decision: The Court sanctioned the transfer of cases from the RTC for lack of
jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan.
The court ruled that the Sandiganbayan is a regular court. While it is a special
court, it is a regular court within the context of RA 6975 because “it is a court
normally functioning with continuity within the jurisdiction vested on it” and
that the term regular courts is used in Sec. 46 of RA 6975 to distinguish the
said courts form courts-martial for it seeks to divest the latter of such
jurisdiction and mandates its transfers to the former pursuant to the policy of
the law to establish a police force national in scope and civilian in character.
The Sandiganbayan is a regular court as stated in the Administrative Code of
1987.
However, for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction it is necessary that the
offenses were committed by public officers in relation to their office. In here,
there is no indication that the trouble-maker was the victim and that he was
shot by Dionisio in the course of the latter’s mission. As such, the court
directed the RTC of QC to conduct a preliminary hearing within 15 from receipt
of decision, to determine if the crime was committed in relation to public office.
If it be determined in the affirmative, the case shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan as if the same were originally fined with it. Otherwise, the RTC
should proceed with the trial of the case and render judgment thereon.
CUNANAN vs. ARCEO
242 SCRA 88
Facts: Accused, a PNP officer was on a mission at Candaba Pampanga. He
went out of the police station after hearing a commotion and fired a warning
shot, with the intention of restoring peace and order which was disturbed and
broken by the fight between the victim and Rogelio Agustin and alter between
the victim and one Pfc. Basa. An information for murder was filed against the
accused. Petitioner now contents that he committed the offense charged in
relation to his public office. RTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case
since the offense charged was done in the performance of petitioner’s official
functions thus the judge dismissed the case. A month after, the decision was
modified stating that the same must be transmitted with the Sandiganbayan.
Issue: W/N the transfer was valid
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
Decision: Petitioner contends that jurisdiction over the case was fixed in the
RTC as the Asuncion ruling is inapplicable, since here trial had already ended
and the case was submitted for decision when the Asuncion ruling was
promulgated. A transfer of his case to the Sandiganbayan at this late state will
expose him to double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
The RTC’s initial assumption of jurisdiction does not prevent it form
subsequently declaring itself to be without jurisdiction as it was found out in
the hearing that Cunanan had committed the offence while he was in the
performance of his duties as policeman. He shot the victim in the course of
trying to restore local public order which had been breached by a fistfight
between the victim and 2 other individuals. The absence in the info of an
allegation that Cunanan committed the offense charged in relation to his office
is immaterial and easily remedied. As the case had already been forwarded to
the Sandiganbayan, the said info may be amended at any time before
arraignment before the Sandiganbayan, considering that such amendment
would not affect the juridical nature of the offense charge, it would not
prejudice Cunanan’s substantive rights. There is no double jeopardy as the RTC
was without jurisdiction and the dismissal of the info by the RTC was not
equivalent to acquittal, it simply reflected that the proceedings therein was
terminated
LACSON vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 128096 20 January 1999
Facts: Petitioner Lacson is assailing the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of
RA No. 8249 – an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Lacson was being held liable for the killing of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group. It was contended that it was a rub-out and not a shoot-out which took
place on the night of May 18, 1995.
The PNP officers were originally absolved from any liability because of the
finding of the Blancaflor Commission that the incident was a legitimate police
operation. However, after a review of Ombudsman Villa, the findings were
modified thus Lacson and 11 others were charged with murder. All of the
accused questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan saying that the RTC
should take cognizance of the case at bar since by virtue of RA 7975, the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was only to cases were the principal accused
is a public officer with salary Grade of “27”. It was contended that the highest
principal accused in the amended information has the rank of Chief Inspector
only, and none has the equivalent of SG 27.
16
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
While the motions for reconsideration were pending, RA 8249 was passed by
the Congress, which expands the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting
the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of RA
7975. The new law now expands the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cover Lacson.
The amended information mere alleges that the offense charged was
committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office.
Decision: The court ordered the transfer of the cases from Sandiganbayan for
lack of jurisdiction to the RTC which has exclusive jurisdiction over said cases.
CUYCO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. 137017-18 08 February 2000
Decision: The court ordered the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction, but informed the Ombudsman that it may re-file the cases with the
court of proper jurisdiction, the RTC of Zamboanga City.
Concurring Decision (Davide): The case should be referred to the RTC instead
of being dismissed.
J. Jurisdiction Over Dangerous Drugs Cases
MORALES vs. CA
283 SCRA 211 12 December 1997
Facts: Ernesto Morales y Cruz was charged in the RTC of Pasay with violation
of Section 15 of the Dangerous Drugs Act involving only 0.4587 grams of
shabu, as such the imposable penalty would at most be only prision
correctional (6mos.1day-6 yrs). Morales moved to dismiss in light of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, it is the Metropolitan Trial Court which
has jurisdiction over the case. This was denied, so he filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. But the petition was dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction as the CA adjudges that only the Supreme court has
jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari questioning the jurisdiction
of an inferior court.
The Supreme court held that the CA had jurisdiction in that the certiorari was
an original action and does not relate to the appellate jurisdiction of the CA.
Under sec 9(1) of BP 129, the CA has concurrent original jurisdiction with the
SC pursuant to the constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1948, to issue writs of
certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus and quo warranto. These are
original actions not modes of appeals.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
Issue: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction
Decision: The CFI, Circuit Criminal Court and Juvenile and Domestic Relation’s
Court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over all cases involving
offenses punishable under RA 7691. Provided that in cities or provinces where
there are Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the said courts shall take
exclusive cognizance of cases where the offenders are under 16 years of age.
K. Criminal Jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts. (Section 20, Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 as amended by RA No. 7691)
 Vested the exclusive jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of any court tribunal or body with
penalty higher than 6 years.
 Court with general jurisdiction
 Exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the first
level courts in their respective territorial jurisdiction
L. Criminal Jurisdiction of Metropolitan and Municipal Trial Courts
1. Section 32 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 as
Amended by Section 2 of RA 7691: except in cases falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC and Sandiganbayan,
these courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
all violations of city and municipal ordinances committed within their respective
jurisdiction
offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding 6 years irrespective of
the amount of fine and other accessory penalties. Provided that in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
original jurisdiction
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence.
2. Under PD 1606 as amended by RA 8249, MTC, MCTC, MeTC has
jurisdiction over government officials and employees where the
penalty is not more than 6 years and officers charged do not fall
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (Salary grade 27 and
above)
Note: Under RA 7691: fine is no longer a factor in determining jurisdiction.
3. Guidelines for the implementation of RA 7691
3.1 RTC no longer has original jurisdiction over offenses commute by public
offices and employees in relation to their office where the offense is
punishable by more than 4 years, 2 months up to 6 years.
3.2 Fine was already disregarded however, in cases where the only penalty is
fine, the amount thereof shall be determined by the jurisdiction of the
court in accordance with the original provisions of Section 32(2)of BP 129.
17
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
3.3 If Fine is more than Php 4,000, the RTC has jurisdiction including those
commute by public officers where amount of fine does not exceed Six
Thousand.
M. Special Jurisdiction of Courts (Section 35, Bp 129)
Note: In the absence of RTC judges, the MTC, MCTC and MeTC may hear and
decide petitioner for writ of habeas corpus or application for bail in criminal
cases in the province or city where absent RTC judge sits.
N. Jurisdiction over PNP by Regular Courts (Article 46, RA 6974)
1. Criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within exclusive
jurisdiction of the regular courts
2. Courts-martial appointed pursuant to PD 1850 shall continue to try
PC-INO members who were already arraigned in pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No 408 (Article of War) as amended by EO
178 or Manual for Courts-Martial
3. Criminal cases not yet arraigned when RA 6975 took effect will be
transferred to the regular courts.
(a) Regular Courts – civil courts
(b) Courts Martial is not regular court (People vs. Asuncion) for they
pertain to the executive department of the government and are
simply instrumentalities of the executive power.
(c) Purpose of law: remove jurisdiction over PNP members from
courts marital that transfer it within the Philippine Judicial
System.
O. Jurisdiction Over Complex Crimes
ALFREDO CUYOS y. TULOR vs. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-46934 15 April 1988
Facts: Alfredo Cuyos was charged before the Municipal court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, with homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and damage to
property through reckless imprudence. He was a driver of a cargo truck which
had collided with a Volkswagen in a vehicular accident which resulted in the
death of 1 person and physical injuries to 4 others. He pleaded guilty at his
arraignment but before trial could commence he moved to remand the case to
the RTC alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Municipal Court. He
alleged that since under the RPC the fine for his crime would correspond to 3x
the amount of damages and as the estimated damages was Php 18,000, he
would be fine to up to P54,000. Under the Judiciary Act of 1948, Municipal
Courts only had jurisdiction over cases punishable by a fine not exceeding Php
6,000 and less than 6 years imprisonment. The Municipal judge denied the
motion, hence this petition for Certiorari
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
Decision: Jurisdiction over the whole complex crime must logically be lodged
with the trial court having jurisdiction to impose the maximum and most
serious penalty imposable on an offense forming part of the complex crime. A
complex crime must be prosecuted integrally as it were, and not split into its
component offenses and the latter made the subject of multiple information
possible brought in different courts.
P. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (RA 8249 – An Act to Strengthen the
Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Amending
PD 1606).
Exclusive Jurisdiction
1.1 Violations of RA 3019 (anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act); Violations
of 1379 (Act declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State any property Found
to have been unlawfully Acquired by any Public Officer or Employee and
Providing for the Proceeding Therefore) and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII Book II of the RPC (Article 210: Direct Bribery; Article 211: Indirect
Bribery and Article 212: Corruption of Public Officers), where one of the
accused are officials occupying positions in the government
whether in a permanent or interim capacity at the commission of
the offense:
1.1.1. Officials of the executive branch occupying a salary grade of “27” and
above as classified by the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989.
 Phil army, air force colonels, naval captains and all officers of
higher rank
 PNP officials with position of Provincial director, senior
superintendent and higher.
 City, special and provincial Prosecutors
 Presidents, Directors, trustees of GOCC’s and SCU.
1.1.2 Members of Congress and officials classified as Grade “2”.
1.1.3 Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
constitution
1.1.4 Members of the constitutional commissions
1.1.5 All other national and local offices with Salary Grade “27”.
1.2 Offenses and felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime
committed by public offices (salary grade of 27 and above).
1.3 Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to EO 1 (Creation of PCGG), 2 (Ill-
gotten wealth of the Marcoses), 14 (Jurisdiction over cases involving Ill
gotten wealth of the Marcoses) and 14-A (Amendment of EO 14) issued in
1986.
18
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
1.4 Private Individuals charged as co-principals, accomplice or accessories
with the public officers or employees including those employed in GOCCs.
2. Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of the RTC whether in the exercise of their own
original jurisdiction or appellate jurisdiction
3. Exclusive Original Jurisdiction
3.1 writs of mandamus, certiorari etc. arising from cases filed under
EO 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, provided that the jurisdiction over these
petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
PEOPLE VS. MAGALLANES
249 SCRA 212
Doctrine: Sandiganyan’s jurisdiction would depend on the Salary Grade of the
public officer involved provided that when a private individual is an accomplice,
accessory or conspirator, the rule that “accessory follows principal” will be
applied.
Facts: The Dumancas spouses complained with the police saying that a certain
Rufino Gargar and Danilo Lumngyao swindled them. The accused together
with civilian agents arrested and abducted the swindling suspects and forced
them to produce the money they got from the spouses. The two were found
dead a few days after. Two informations for kidnapping for ransom with
murder were filed with the RTC against members of the PNP and nine other
civilians who confederated with each other for the purpose of extorting money
through kidnapping the two victims. Petitioner contends that the crime was
committed in the course of the performance of duties of the accused, thus,
Sandiganbayan should have jurisdiction by virtue of PD 1606.
Issue: W/N Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the case at bar
Decision: At the time the informations were filed, the law governing the
jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan was section 4 of PD 1606, as amended by PD
1861. The Sandiganbayan partly lost its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases
involving violation of RA No. 3019 as amended, RA 1379 and Chapter II
Section 2, Title VII of the RPC. As consequences of these amendments, the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is only retained in cases where the accused are
those enumerated in subsection A and generally national and local officials
classified as Grade “27” and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 9RA 6758). Its jurisdiction over other offenses or
felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office is
no longer determined by the prescribed penalty (that which is higher that
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
prision correctional or imprisonment for 6 years or a fine of Php 6,000.00); it is
enough that they are committed by those public officials and employees
enumerated. However, it retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil and
criminal cases filed pursuant to EO 1, 2, 14 and 14-A
The PNP officers only has a Salary Grade of “18” therefore, Sandiganbayan has
no jurisdiction over the case.
(a) Jurisdiction over Public Officers
SANCHEZ VS. DEMETRIOU
227 SCRA 627 09 NOVEMBER 1993
Facts: The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of
appropriated chareges against several persons including Mayor Antonio
Sanchez of Calauan, Lagauna, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen
Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Acting on this request, the Panel of
State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary
investigation. Subsequently, the prosecutors filed with the RTC of Calamba 7
info against Sanchez and the other persons accused. However, to avoid
miscarriage of justice the venue of the seven cases was transferred to Pasig,
where they were raffled to Judge Harriet Demetriou.
Sachez now contends that the proceedings conducted by the DOJ are null and
void for want of jurisdiction, as such is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman
to conduct the investigation of all cases involving Public Officers. The Court,
however, held that as in the case of Aguinaldo v. Dumagas, this authority is
not exclusive but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the
offense charged. In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such
as the DOJ may conduct the investigation.
Sanchez also contends that the case should come under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as most of the accused are public officials.
Decision: The court held that the crime of rape with homicide does not fall
under paragraph 1 of PD1606 as amended by PD1861, which deals with the
jurisdiction of the Sandigan in graft and corruption cases. Neither does it fall
under paragraph 2 because it is not an offense committed in relation to the
office of the petitioner. There is no direct relation between the commission of
the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner’s office as municipal mayor
because public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The
offense can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged
in the info that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected
with the performance of the petitioner’s official function. Thus, the case is
triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
19
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Prior to the amendment of RA 7975, jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for
felonies other than violation of R.A. No 3019 as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, RA 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the RPC, embrace all other offenses provided, the offense was
committed in relation to public office and the prescribed penalty is more than
six years
UY VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
321 SCRA 77 August 1999
Facts: Petitioner George Uy was the deputy comptroller of the Philippine Navy
designated to act on behalf of Captain Fernandez, the latter’s supervisor, on
matters relating the activities of the Fiscal Control Branch. Six informations for
Estafa through falsification of official documents and one information for
violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 (anti-graft and corrupt practices act) were
filed with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and 19 other accused for
alleged. The petitioner was said to have signed a P.O. stating that the unit
received 1,000 pieces of seal rings when in fact, only 100 were ordered. The
Sandiganbayan recommended that the infomations be withdrawn against some
of the accused after a comprehensive investigation.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash contending that it is the Court Martial and
not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction over the offense charged or the
person of the accused. Petitioner further contends that RA 1850, which
provides for the jurisdiction of court martial should govern in this case.
Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases
or the person of the petitioner
Decision: In the case at bar, while the petitioner is charged with violation of
RA 3018, his position as Lieutenant Commander of the Philippine Navy is a
rank lower than “naval captains and all officers of higher rank”. It must be
noted Under the present law, both THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE AND THE
POSITIONS occupied by the accused are the CONDITIONS SINE QUA NON
before the Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance of the case. Thus,
regular courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the person of the accused
as provided by the Sandiganbayan Law which states that “in case where none
of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or
higher, exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper RTC, MTC,
MCTC or METC pursuant to BP Blg. 129.
(b) Offense deemed committed in relation to public office
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
PEOPLE VS. BARTOLOME
142 SCRA 464
Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted Rolando Bartolome y Perez, Senior Labor
Regulation Officer and Chief of the Labor Regulations Section of the Ministry of
Labor, and Elino Coronel y Santos, Labor Regulation Officer of the Ministry of
Labor, of the crime of Falsification of Official Document where they made it
appear in the Civil Service Personal Data Sheet of Bartolome that he had taken
and passed the Career Service with a rating of 73.5% in Manila and that he
was a 4th year AB student at FEU, when in truth, as both accused knew,
Bartolome had not taken the said exam nor was he a 4th year AB student in
FEU.
Decision: The office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in
the statute. The test is whether the offense cannot exist without the office.
Falsification of an official document is not within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan unless committed in relation the public office of the public
officer.
The information does not allege that there was an intimate connection between
the discharge of official duties and the offense, thus, it cannot be brought
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Note: When is an offense said to have been committed in relation to
office:
General Rule: offense may be considered as committed in relation to accused’s
office if the offense cannot exist without the office such that the office is a
constituent element of the crime as defined and punished in RPC (People vs.
Montilla).
Exception: Where the offense charged in the information is intimately
connected with the respective offices of the accused and was perpetuated while
they were in the performance, through irregular or improper, of their official
functions and had no personal motive to commit the crime and would not have
committed it had they not held their public office and merely obeyed the
instruction of their superior office, the offense may be said to have been
committed in relation to their office (the victim in this case was killed whiled
under custodial investigation in a police substation, murder was charged)
(People vs. Montejo).
20
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
PEOPLE VS. MAGALLANES
249 SCRA 212
Doctrine: It is a fundamental rule that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. In the case at bar, the information
in the court do not indicate that the victims were killed in the course of the
investigation. What was alleged is that the accused, for the purpose of
extracting or exhorting a sum of money, abducted, kidnapped, detained and
killed the two victims. The allegation of “taking advantage of his position”
incorporated in the information is not enough to bring the offenses within the
definition of “offenses committed in relation to public office”. In the case of
Montilla vs. Hilario (murder was committee outside office house and for
personal or political motives), such an allegation was considered merely as an
allegation of an aggravating circumstance, and not as one that qualifies the
crime as having been committed in relation to public office
CUNANAN VS. ARCEO
242 SCRA 88 01 March 1995
Facts: accused, a PNP officer was on a mission at Candaba Pampanga. He
went out of the police station after hearing a commotion and fired a warning
shot, with the intention of restoring peace and order which was disturbed and
broken by the fight between the victim and Rogelio Agustin and alter between
the victim and one Pfc. Basa. An information for murder was filed against the
accused. Petitioner now contents that he committed the offense charged in
relation to his public office. RTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case
since the offense charged was done in the performance of petitioner’s official
functions thus the judge dismissed the case. A month after, the decision was
modified stating that the same must be transmitted with the Sandiganbayan.
Issue: W/N the modified decision is correct considering that the absence of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC became apparent to the RTC only AFTER the
trail and submission of the case decision.
Decision: Under PD 1602 as amended by PD 1861, there are two requisites for
offenses to fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan: (1) the offence must have been committed by the accused
public officer in relation to his office and (b) the penalty prescribed for the
offense must be higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years of a fine of Php 6,000.00.
Where the killing committed by a PNP officer was committed while in the
course of trying to restore local public order, which had been breached by a
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
fistfight between the victim and two other individuals, the killing was
committed in relation to the accused’s public office.
The transfer to Sandiganbayan was valid.
LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
301 SCRA 298
Facts: Petitioner Lacson is assailing the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of
RA No. 8249 – an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Lacson was being held liable for the killing of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group. It was contended that it was a rub-out and not a shoot-out which took
place on the night of May 18, 1995.
The PNP officers were originally absolved from any liability because of the
finding of the Blancaflor Commission that the incident was a legitimate police
operation. However, after a review of Ombudsman Villa, the findings were
modified thus Lacson and 11 others were charged with murder. All of the
accused questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan saying that the RTC
should take cognizance of the case at bar since by virtue of RA 7975, the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was only to cases were the principal accused
is a public officer with salary Grade of “27”. It was contended that the highest
principal accused in the amended information has the rank of Chief Inspector
only, and none has the equivalent of SG 27.
While the motions for reconsideration were pending, RA 8249 was passed by
the Congress, which expands the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting
the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of RA
7975. The new law now expands the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cover Lacson.
The amended information mere alleges that the offense charged was
committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office.
Issue: W/N such an allegation is enough
Decision: For jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers in relation
to public office to fall within jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan – the intimate
relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must
be alleged in the information. There must be specific factual averment of this
relation.
Mere allegation that the crime was committed in relation to public office is not
what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is
21
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
the SPECIFIC FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS in the information that would
indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accuser’s official
duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime
as having been committed in relation to public office.
Where the information alleged that principal accused committed the crime in
relation to the public office, but no specific allegation of facts that the shooting
of the victim by said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge
of their official duties as police officer, or does not indicate that the aid accused
arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their
custody. The offense charged in the subject criminal case is plain murder and
therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, not the
Sandiganbayan.
PEOPLE VS. CAWILING
G.R. NO. 117970 28 JULY 1998
Decision: In the absence of any allegations that the offense was committed in
relation to the office of the accused or was necessarily connected with the
discharge of their functions, the RTC not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case
(c) Jurisdiction not determined by allegations
REPUBLIC VS. ASUNCION
231 SCRA 211 11 March 1994
Facts: Alexander Manio, a member of the PNP assigned to the central Police
District Command in QC was dispatched by his commanding officer to Dumalay
Street to respond to a complaint that a person was creating trouble there.
Dionisio proceeded to that place, where he subsequently shot to death Sgt.
Romeo Sadang. An information for the crime of homicide was filed against
him. Responded judge, in view of the decision in Deloso vs. Domingo, which
says that Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public
officials when the penalty prescribed by law for the offense is higher than
prision correccional, ordered the dismissal of the case and refilling with the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that the Sandiganbayan and not the RTC which
has jurisdiction over the case. The original information did not disclose that
the offense of homicide charged was committed in relation to the office of the
accused.
Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.
Decision: The absence in an allegation that the crime was committed “in
relation to his office” was due to the erroneous doctrine in Deloso vs. Domingo,
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
which conveyed the impression that such is not necessary. Hence the action of
the court to conduct a preliminary hearing to determine whether the crime
charged was committed by the respondents in relation to his office was valid.
Since it was proven that the act was done in relation to the accused’s office,
the validity of the transfer of the case to the Sandiganbayan cannot be refuted.
For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is the allegations that shall
control and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
Note: The Asuncion case has not however departed from the rule that
jurisdiction is to be determined by the allegations of the complaint. On the
contrary, it stressed that the public officers or employees committed the crime
in relation to their office must, however be alleged in the information for the
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over the case The allegation is necessary
because of the unbending rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations
of the information.
CUNANAN VS. ARCEO
242 SCRA 88 01 March 1995
Facts: The information for murder against Cunanan contained no averment
that the offense charged was in relation to his public office, hence the court
proceeded to trial and after both parties presented evidence, the court
declared that the case must be refilled to the Sandiganbayan
Issue: W/N the refilling was valid
Decision: Jurisdiction over the offense charged is a matter that is conferred by
law. Wherever the two requisites [(1) the offence must have been committed
by the accused public officer in relation to his office and (b) the penalty
prescribed for the offense must be higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years of a fine of Php 6,000.00.] are present,
jurisdiction is vested upon the Sandiganbayan. This is true even though the
information originally filed before the RTC did not aver that the accused public
officer committed the offense charged in relation to his office. In the absence
in the old information filed before the RTC of an allegation that petitioner
Cunanan has committed the offense in relation to his office is IMMATERIAL
insofar as determination of the locus of jurisdiction is concerned.
DELOSO VS. DOMINGO
191 SCRA 545
Facts: Governor Deloso of Zambales went to pre-wedding celebration when his
car was allegedly ambushed. He was able to escape and later on learned that
22
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
the ambushed were killed while his group suffered no casualties. Based
however on the testimonies of the eyewitnesses, Delosos’s group was not
ambushed but were the ones who ambushed the persons killed. Thus, the
military servicemen of the Governor’s security force were charged with murder
while the civilians were investigated by the Provincial Fiscal. The governor was
charged with multiple murder.
The governor now seeks to stop respondent Manuel Domingo, deputy
Ombudsman of Luzon from conducting a preliminary investigation of the
charge against him of multiple murder contending that the ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over the case for the acts were not connected with the performance
of the governor’s duties.
Issue: W/N the ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate the charge of
multiple murder allegedly committed by the petitioner as provincial governor.
Decision: Yes. The constitution empowers the ombudsman to investigate any
act or omission of any public official without any qualification that said act or
omission must have been committed or incurred in relation to his office.
The Ombudsman Act of 1989 vests in the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. A murder charged against the
petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman has
primary jurisdiction to investigate it.
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offense committed by public officials
when the penalty prescribed by law for the offense is higher than prision
correctional. The murder charged against the petitioner carries the penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death hence, it is cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to
investigate it.
The law does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected
with or arise from the performance of official duty. Since the law does not
distinguish, neither should the court distinguish.
Note: The doctrine in this case which provides that the when the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction, without stating the offense was committed in relation to the
offender’s office is a MISTAKE.
(d) Distinguished from Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over Public
Officers
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
AGUINALDO VS. DOMAGAS
227 SCRA 627
Decision: The Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and Prosecute
Public Officers for any illegal act or omission is not exclusive but a shared
concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.
NATIVIDAD VS. FELIX
G.R. No. 111616 04 February 04 1994
Doctrine: The Ombudsman’s primary power to investigate is dependent on the
cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction is
dependent on the cases cognizable by the former. But the authority is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies. However, the
Ombudsman may take over the investigation of such case at any stage from
ant investigative agency by the government. This is only directory.
Facts: Mrs. Lourdes Aquino wrote a letter to the PNP requesting them to
investigate the Municipal Mayor of Tarlac for the death of her husband Severino
Aquino. The PNP then requested the Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor to investigate
the petitioner for the death of the victim. Petitioner wrote to the secretary of
justice requesting the preliminary investigation be done in Manila, but this was
denied. The petitioner then moved to remand his case for preliminary
investigation contending that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the
case because it was the Ombudsman and not the provincial prosecutor who
has jurisdiction to conduct the investigation. Respondent judge denied the
petition.
Decision: In Deloso vs. Domingo, it was said that the Ombudsman has the
power to conduct preliminary investigation on any illegal act or omission of any
public official which is broad enough to encompass any crime committed by a
public official. However, looking at the latest law on the Sandiganbayan,
Section 4 of said law provided that the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction in all cases involving: a) offenses or felonies by public officers and
employees in relation to their office and b) penalty prescribed be higher than
prison correctional or imprisonment for 6 years or fine of Php 6,000.00. In the
case at bar, the second requirement was met but the first is wanting.
Moreover, Deloso vs. Domingo has already been re-examined in the case of
Aguinaldo vs. Domagas and Sanchez vs. Demetriou which both provided that
the authority of the Ombudsman is not an exclusive authority but rather a
shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. Accordingly,
the Ombudsman may take over the investigation of such case at any stage
from any investigative agency of the Government. Also, a careful reading of
Section 15 of the Ombudsman act would give us an idea an idea that the
23
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Ombudsman’s investigatory powers are but directory in nature. The petition
was dismissed for lack of merit.
(e) Certiorari Jurisdiction (conferred by R.A. 7975).
(f) Public Officer charged as accomplice of private individual
TOTAAN VS. FELIX
G.R. No. 81847 07 August 1988
Decision: Section 4 of PD No. 1606 as amended by PD 1861 provides in part
that in case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices, or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government owned or controlled corporations they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in ordinary courts. The rule is that
“accessory follows the principal”. Thus, if the public officer or employee is
mere accomplice and the private individual as principal, the former shall be
tried jointly with the latter in the ordinary courts. The rationale is justified by
the absence of a provision in PD 1606 directing that all criminal cases involving
public officers and employees, without distinction, be tried by the
Sandiganbayan, even if the criminal involvement of the public officer is minor
or subordinate. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is not meant to be all-
encompassing or broad.
(g) Exclusive Jurisdiction over PCGG cases
OLAGUER vs. RTC
G.R. No. 81385 21 February 1989
Facts: Petitioner Olaguer is questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC in the case
at bar. Sometime in 1977, Philippine Journalist Inc, publisher of several daily
periodicals, obtained a loan from Development Bank of the Philippines. Due to
some financial difficulty, PJI requested the restructuring of the Loan with DBP.
PJI defaulted in its obligations, thus DBP was able to control 67% of the stocks
and voting rights of the corporation, which enabled Olaguer and four others to
sit in the board. Olaguer was elected president of the board and due to some
illegal acts done by him, private respondents filed for injunction and damages
in the RTC. Olaguer alleged that RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since
PJI was under the investigation of PCGG in connection with Marcos ill-gotten
wealth.
Issue W/N the PCGG has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Decision: There is no dispute that the PJI is under the sequestration by the
PCGG and that Civil case 0035 was filed in the Sandiganbayan wherein PJI was
listed as among the corporation involved the Marcos ill-gotten wealth.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
Under Section 2 of EO No. 14, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original
jurisdiction over all cases regarding the “funds, moneys, assets and properties
illegally acquired by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, civil or criminal,
including incidents arising from such cases. The decision of the Sandiganbayan
is subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.
In the exercise if its functions, the PCGG is co-equal body with the RTC and co-
equal bodies have no power to control the other. The RTC and the CA have no
jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of its powers under the applicable EO
and section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, may not
interfere with the restrain or set-aside the orders and actions of the PCGG
acting for and in behalf of said Commission.
Petition was granted.
PCGG VS. PEÑA
G.R. NO. 77663 12 APRIL 1988
Facts: PCGG ordered the freezing of assets, effects, documents and records of
two export garment manufacturing firms named American International
Corporation and De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation. Properties of
both companies were sequestered and placed under the custodia legis of
PCGG. On 1987, the officer in charge of said corporations withdrew Php
4000,000.00 fro the Metropolitan Bank for the salaries of the employees. After
some time, a case was instituted by the company’s Hong Kong investors
against the Bank, PCGG and Commissioner Bautista who authorized Ms. Saludo
(the OIC) to revoke authorizations that were previously issued to the Hong
Kong investors.
Respondent Judge issued ex-parte the questioned temporary restraining order
enjoining the bank, from releasing any funds of the companies without the
Signature of Yim Shing, one of the Hong Kong investors;
The Commission filed this petition for dismissal of aforesaid decision since the
trial court has no jurisdiction over the case at bar.
Issue: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the petitioner PCGG and properties
sequestered and placed in its cusotdia legis in the exercise of its powers under
EO 1, 2, and 14.
W/N courts can set aside order of the Commission.
Decision: The courts have no jurisdiction over the PCGG as vested in the
commission and holds that jurisdiction over all sequestration cases fall within
24
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to review
exclusively by the Supreme Court.
The commission exercise quasi judicial functions. In the exercise of quasi
judicial functions, the commission is a co-equal body with RTC and “co-equal
bodies have no power to control the other.”
The creation of the PCGG is mandated by the people. Proclamation Number 3
specifically gives priority to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses
and their cronies and to protect the interest of the people through orders of
sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts. The corporations, being
subject of said sequestration proceedings comes within the jurisdiction of the
PCGG.
(h) Jurisdiction to Annul Judgments
PCGG VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 132738 23 FEBRUARY 2000
Facts: World Universal Trading and Investment Co (WUTIC) was registered in
Panama but was not licensed to do business in the Philippines. The trial court
rendered judgment in favor of WUTIC enforcing a foreign judgment and
ordering another company, the Construction Development Corporation (CDC),
which is a company duly organized in the Philippines and under the
sequestration by the PCGG, to pay the former $2M.
CDC filed with the trial court an appeal from the decision of the said decision.
CA affirmed the decision.
PCGG contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain the complain
and enforce a foreign judgment considering the case involved a sequestered
corporation. PCGG then filed with Sandiganbayan a petition to annul the RTC’s
decision. Sandiganbayan dismissed the petition saying that it has no
jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the RTC since the case before the trial
court was for enforcement of a foreign judgment and not for recover of ill-
gotten wealth.
Issue: W/N the decision of Sandiganbayan was correct.
Decision: Pursuant to EO 14, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over
all PCGG cases involving ill-gotten wealth whether civil or criminal, and all
incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to annul the judgments of the RTC in a
sequestration related case, such as a judgment of the RTC for the enforcement
of a foreign judgment involving property that has been lawfully sequestered.
Petition was granted. The decision of the RTC was set aside.
(i) Jurisdiction over Military and PNP
 Republic Act. No. 7055 (An act Strengthening civilian supremacy over the
military by returning to the civil courts the jurisdiction over certain
offenses involving members of the AFP and other persons subject to
military law and PNP).
(1) Offenses defined under RPC, special laws, local
government ordinance regardless of whether a civilian is
co-accused, victim or offended parties shall be tried in
proper civil court except if offense is service
connected which shall be tried by court martial
(2) The president of the Philippine may order or direct at any
time before arraignment that the proper civil court try
such a crime.
UY VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
312 SCRA 77 August 1999
Facts: Petitioner George Uy was the deputy comptroller of the Philippine Navy
designated to act on behalf of Captain Fernandez, the latter’s supervisor, on
matters relating the activities of the Fiscal Control Branch. Six informations for
Estafa through falsification of official documents and one information for
violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 (anti-graft and corrupt practices act) were
filed with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and 19 other accused for
alleged. The petitioner was said to have signed a P.O. stating that the unit
received 1,000 pieces of seal rings when in fact, only 100 were ordered. The
Sandiganbayan recommended that the infomations be withdrawn against some
of the accused after a comprehensive investigation.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash contending that it is the Court Martial and
not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction over the offense charged or the
person of the accused. Petitioner further contends that RA 1850, which
provides for the jurisdiction of court martial should govern in this case.
Issue: W/N Court Martial has jurisdiction over the case
25
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Decision: The law (RA 7055) does not include violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
Law) even if the act is service connected. Violations of RA 3019 falls under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or the RTC depending on the nature of the
position of the offender and not the court martial.
Q. Jurisdiction of Military Court
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROLANDO
N. ABADILLA
G.R. No. 79173 09 June 1988
Facts: Abadilla was said to be one of the leaders of the unsuccessful mutiny by
officers and enlisted men who seized and control of the radio-television
broadcasting facilities of the GMA-7 and Fort Bonifacio for the purpose of
toppling the existing government. The Board of Officers investigating the
matter recommended that the case of Colonel Abadilla be endorsed for pre-trial
and that charges be filed for violation of the Articles of War and the RPC.
Colonel Abadilla was at large when both investigations were conducted. Chief
of staff Ramos issued general Orders No, 342 dropping herein petitioner form
the rolls of regular officers of the AFP.
Meanwhile a case for slight Physical injuries was filed against Abadilla with the
Metropolitan Trial Court. When he was arrested, his wife and children filed for
a petition for habeas corpus.
The counsel of Abadilla now contends that in as much as Abadilla was arrested
after he had become a civilian, the charge sheets prepared against him by the
military authorities are null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the Colonel.
Issue: W/N the military courts have jurisdiction over Abadilla after he was
dropper from the rolls.
Decision: The fact that Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls should not
lead to the conclusion that he is now beyond the jurisdiction of the military
authorities. If such a conclusion were to prevail, his very own refusal to clear
his name and protect his honor before his superior officers in the manner
prescribed for and expected from a ranking military officer would be his shield
against prosecution. His refusal to report for duty or to surrender when
ordered arrested, which led to his name being dropped from the roll of regular
officers of the military cannot thereby render him beyond the jurisdiction of the
military courts for the offenses he committed while still in the military service.
The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Abadilla at the time
of the alleged offenses. This jurisdiction having been vested in the military
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
authorities, it is retained up to the end of the proceeding against Colonel
Abadilla. It is a well settled rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon
the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.
(a) No jurisdiction over civilians
OLAGUER VS. MILITARY COMMISSION
150 SCRA 144
Facts: Petitioners, all civilians, were all arrested by military authorities and
initially detained at Camp Crame and later on, Camp Bagong Diwa. They were
charged with subversion upon the recommendation of the respondent Judge
Advocate General and the approval of the Minister of National defense. On
June 13 1980, the chief of staff created the Military commission no 34 to try
the criminal cases filed against the petitioners. An amended charge was filed
against petitioners stating that they tried to assassinate President Marcs,
Enrile, attempted murder and proposal to commit rebellion among others.
Petitioners now seek to enjoin the military tribunal from taking cognizance of
their case contending that said commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians
for offenses alleged to have been committed during the period of martial law.
Issue: W/N the military commission has jurisdiction over the petitioners for
crimes allegedly committed during martial law.
Decision: the trial contemplated in the constitution is a trial by judicial
process. Military tribunals are not courts within the Philippine judicial system.
Even during martial law, a military commission or tribunal cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by the
petitioners, as long as civil courts are open and functioning.
Military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department and are merely
instrumentalities of the executive power. This is provided by the legislature to
the President to aid him in properly commanding the army, navy and enforcing
discipline therein. The power and duty of interpreting laws reside within the
Judiciary and not with the executive branch.
ABADILLA VS. RAMOS
G.R. No. 79173 01 December 1987
Facts: Abadilla was said to be one of the leaders of the unsuccessful mutiny by
officers and enlisted men who seized and control of the radio-television
broadcasting facilities of the GMA-7 and Fort Bonifacio for the purpose of
toppling the existing government. The Board of Officers investigating the
matter recommended that the case of Colonel Abadilla be endorsed for pre-trial
and that charges be filed for violation of the Articles of War and the RPC.
26
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Colonel Abadilla was at large when both investigations were conducted. Chief
of staff Ramos issued general Orders No, 342 dropping herein petitioner form
the rolls of regular officers of the AFP.
Meanwhile a case for slight Physical injuries was filed against Abadilla with the
Metropolitan Trial Court. When he was arrested, his wife and children filed for
a petition for habeas corpus.
The counsel of Abadilla now contends that in as much as Abadilla was arrested
after he had become a civilian, the charge sheets prepared against him by the
military authorities are null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the Colonel.
Issue: W/N the military courts have jurisdiction over Abadilla after he was
dropper from the rolls.
Decision: Any judgment rendered by military courts relating a civilian is null
and void for lack of jurisdiction. However, months before Colonel Abadilla was
dropper from the rolls of officers, the military authorities began the institution
of proceedings against him. As of that time, he was certainly subject to
military law.
TAN VS. BARRIOS
190 SCRA 18 OCTOBER 1990
Facts: On the basis of Proclamation No 1081, President Marcos authorized the
AFP Chief of Stage to create tribunals to try and decide cases of military
personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them. In General order
21, the military tribunals were vested with jurisdiction among others over
violations of the law on firearms, and other crimes which were directly related
to the quelling of rebellion. Later on, the jurisdiction was enlarged to include
crimes defined under the RPC.
The petitioners and twelve others were charged with murder through the use
of unlicensed firearm. The military courts took cognizance of this case which
acquitted the petitioners while convicting the other. On May 22, 1987, the
court promulgated the Olaguer decision declaring that military commission and
tribunals have no jurisdiction over civilians.
In 1988, the case was reopened for investigations by virtue of the courts’
decision in Cruz vs. Enrile. Without conducting investigation, Fiscal barrios filed
two informations (illegal possession and murder) against the petitioners.
Issue: W/N the fiscal has authority to re-file in the civil courts the criminal
actions against petitioner tried and acquitted by the Military commission.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
Decision: The court’s pronouncement in Cruz vs. Enrile nullifying the
proceedings in military courts against civilian petitioners therein and ordering
the refilling of informations against them in civil courts may not affect the right
of persons who ere not parties in the case.
Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and
cases still on going or not yet final when the decision was promulgated.
Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether
of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before
the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be
disturbed by the state.
Only in particular cases were the convicted person or the state shows that
there was a serious denial of the constitutional rights of the accused, should
the nullity of the sentence be declared and retrial be ordered based on the
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and not on Olaguer
doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released
since the judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his
constitutional rights and denial of due process.
Petition was granted.
(b) Jurisdiction acquired by reason of arrest does not apply to military
proceedings
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROLANDO
N. ABADILLA
G.R. No. 79173 09 June 1988
Issue: W/N jurisdiction over a person is acquired not by mere filing of charge
or by commencement of an investigation but by arrest of the defendant.
Decision: The rule that jurisdiction over a person is acquired by his arrest
applied only to criminal proceedings instituted before the regular courts. It
does not apply to proceeding under the military law. Thus, there is no merit to
the contention that since Abadilla was already civilian when he was arrested,
the military tribunal has no jurisdiction over him.
II. Other matters
27
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
U. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
bail is not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular
preliminary investigation
V. In applications for bail however, the Accused must be in custody of the
law to be entitled to bail (Pico vs. Combong)
W. Custody how acquired:
1. By virtue of a warrant or warrantless arrest, or
2. when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court by surrendering to the proper authorities (Dinapol vs.
Baldado)
X. The mere filing of an application for bail is not sufficient (Santiago vs.
Vasquez). The application for admission to bail of a person against
whom a criminal action has been filed, but who is still at large is
premature (Guillermo vs. Reyes).
Y. Exceptions when mere filing of motion sufficient (Paderanga vs. CA)
1. House arrests
2. Hospital Arrests
3. Being confined to quarters or restricted in military camps
F. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused by Arrest or Voluntary surrender
is not a condition for court to Grant Affirmative Relief (dismissal of the case)
(Allado vs. Diokno)
RULE 110
Prosecution of Offenses
I. PROVISIONS AND NOTES
SECTION 1: Institution of criminal actions
Criminal actions shall be instituted as follows:
(a) For offenses where a preliminary investigation is
required pursuant to section 1 and Rule, by filing the
complaint with the proper officer for the purpose of
conducting the requisite preliminary investigation.
(b) For all other offenses by filing a complaint or
information directly with the municipal trial courts and
municipal circuit trial courts, or the complaint with
office of the prosecutor. In Manila and other chartered
cities, the complaint shall be filed with the office of the
prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.
The institution of criminal action shall interrupt the running of the
period of prescription of the offenses charged unless otherwise
provided in special laws.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
Source
The present rule covers all offenses except those that may be provided in the
charter of cities and other special laws.
Modes of instituting criminal action.
1. May be commenced by any person presenting to a court a
complaint. Where complaint has been already presented, no other
further pleading on the part of prosecutor is necessary
2. Commence by prosecutor by filing with the court an information
(such information is the process which institutes the action and
prosecution proceeds upon it as People’s pleading)
3. When preliminary investigation is required (Section 1, Rule 112),
criminal action must be instituted by first filing the corresponding
complaint with the proper officer for purposes of preliminary
investigation.
Note: Preliminary investigation is required. Except where the accused is under
arrest (penalty for the offense must at least be for Four years, two months and
one day, without regard to the fine).
4. Where offense falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC, MCTC
(penalty is less than 4 years, 2 months and 1 day), action may be
instituted through a complaint or information filed directly with
said courts or with the office of public prosecutor.
Note: Exception: In manila and other chartered cities where action is ALWAYS
commenced by a complaint filed in the officer of the prosecutor, unless the
charter provided otherwise.
Meaning of “Proper Officer”
Refers to officers authorized to conduct the required to conduct the requisite
preliminary investigation:
1. provincial or city prosecutors and their assistants
2. judges of the municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial courts
3. national and regional state prosecutors
4. other officers authorized by the courts.
Note: Their authority to conduct PI shall include all crimes cognizable by
the proper curt in their respective jurisdiction
Interruption of prescriptive period
1. By filing the criminal action either by complaint or information for
preliminary investigation or trial on the merit unless provided by
special laws.
2. This true even if the court where the complaint or information is
filed cannot try the case on merits.
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005

3. Reason: The mistake of the prosecutor in filing a compliant should justify a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense still lies in
not operate to prejudice the interest of the state to prosecute the prosecuting officer.
criminal offenses. Note: If for any reason the fiscal failed to include the name of one or more
Note: This rule does not apply to violations of municipal ordinances and criminals in the information, such persons are not relieved of penal liability nor
special laws. escape penal liability just because it develops in the course of the trial that
Institution vs. Commencement there were other guilty participants in the crime (People vs. Catli).
Institution Commencement
By filing of complaint with Upon filing of criminal Corollary rule: The exercise of judgment and discretion of prosecuting officer
the appropriate officer for action in court may not be controlled by mandamus (Gonzales vs. Serrano) for where the law
preliminary investigation demands that all persons who appear responsible for an offense shall be
charged in the information, it also implies that those against whom no
sufficient evidence exist are not to be included in the charge; and the
SECTION 2: The complaint or information determination of whether or not there is, as against any person, sufficient
The complaint or information shall be in writing, in the name of the evidence of guilt to warrant his prosecution necessarily involves the exercise of
People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to be discretion by the prosecuting officer.
responsible for the offense involved.
4. Exceptions to the rule that fiscals cannot be compelled by
A. Necessity of formal accusation mandamus (subject to judicial review in proper cases)
This requirement cannot be waived because no criminal proceeding can be  Where from the evidence submitted and gathered by the prosecuting
brought or instituted until a formal charge is openly made against the accused officer a person appearing responsible for the commission of an offense is
by complaint or information. not included in the information (de Castro vs. Castaneda)
B. Form
1. Accusation must be in writing SECTION 3: Complaint defined
Vox emissa volat; litera scripta manet (the spoken word flies; written letter Complaint is sworn written statement charging a person with an offense
remains). subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer or other public officer
2. Accusation must be in the name of the people. charged with the enforcement of the law violated.
Irrespective of the mode by which the criminal proceeding is to be commenced,
the action must be under the name of the People, whose peace in legal theory A. Person authorized to file a complaint (exhaustive list)
has been breached. 1. The offended part
(a) Rationale: To prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by (a) Definition: person against whom or against whose property
private individuals (Chua-Burce vs. CA). the crime was committed.
(b) However, a criminal action instituted in the name of the (b) Rationale:
offended party or of a particular city, although erroneous, may (1) in principle, the declaration of the criminal liability carries
not be quashed for the defect is merely in form (City of Manila with it the declaration of the resulting civil obligation.
vs. Rizal) which may be cured at any stage of the trial (Ngo (2) There are crimes which cannot be prosecuted other than
Yao Tit vs. Sheriff of Manila) at the formal instance of the person injured.
Note: If there is a mistake in jurisdiction, the private complainant, who has (c) The right however, to file a criminal complaint is personal. It is
interest in the civil aspect of the case) may question jurisdiction. In doing so, abated upon complainants death and intransmissible to his
the action should not be in the name of the People but in his name (Bernando heirs.
vs. CA).
3. Accusation must be against all persons responsible for the offense 2. a peace officer
This is demanded by the sound public policy, which would deprive prosecuting Persons who are competent to file a criminal complaint (law enforcement,
officers to use their discretion in order to shield relatives and friends. agents of NBI etc.)
However, the matter of determining whether the evidence is sufficient to 3. a public officer charged with the enforcement of the law
violated.
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005

Ex. Internal revenue agents, customs agents etc. (j) When acts of officer are without or in excess of authority
(k) To prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.
B. Complaint may be filed with the court or the office of the fiscal.
Unlike an information, a complaint need not necessarily be filed with the court II. Juridical person cannot be impleaded in the accusation
and may therefore be laid before the City Fiscal for investigation. In cases of corporation, the officer through whim the corporation acts, answers
criminally for his acts.
C. Lack of oath is not a fatal defect

D. Filing of complaint does not require mediation of prosecutor. SECTION 4: Information defined
An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense,
Thus, lack of mediation of prosecuting attorney is not a ground for dismissal of subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court.
complaint (Trinidad vs. Jarabe)
E. When complaint is not required. B. Complaint vs. Information
1. When the offense is one which cannot be prosecuted de oficio Both are written accusation of the commission of a criminal offense.
(must be brought at the instance of and upon complain expressly Difference:
filed by the offended party – those enumerated in Title XI, Book II Complainant Information
of RPC – adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction or acts of Signed by the offended party, any Signed by the fiscal or an authorized
lasciviousness, including defamation). peace officer or other public officer prosecuting officer.
2. when offense is private in nature charged with the enforcement of the
3. where it pertains those cases which need to be endorsed by law violated.
specific public officers (ex. those concerning immigration that is Sworn to by the person signing it Need not e under oath since the
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on prosecuting officer filling it is
Immigration). charged with the special duty in
Note: the right to commence criminal prosecution is confined to regard thereto and is acting under
representatives of the government and persons injured; otherwise, it shall be the special responsibility of his oath
dismissed. of office.
May be filed either with the fiscal’s Always filed with the court.
F. General rule: Criminal Prosecutions cannot be enjoined office or the court
Public interest calls that writs of injunction or prohibition to restrain a criminal Note: where the accused underwent preliminary investigation pursuant to
prosecution are generally not available Section 1(d) of PD 911, the certification must be under oath.
Exceptions: when the writ is necessary: An information not properly signed cannot be cured by silence or even express
(a) For orderly administration of justice and to avoid multiplicity consent.
of suits C. Persons authorized to filed information
(b) When there is a prejudicial question 1. city or provincial prosecutor and their assistants
(c) To afford adequate protection to constitutional rights of the 2. duly appointed special prosecutors
accused 3. a lawyer appointed by the secretary of Justice (pursuant to
(d) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or Section 1696 of the Revised Administrative Code).
regulation
(e) When double jeopardy SECTION 5: Who must prosecute criminal actions
(f) Where court has no jurisdiction over the offense All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information
(g) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public
(h) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor,
lust for vengeance or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor
(i) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the prosecutor office or
and a motion to quash on the ground has been denied. the Regional state Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the
Vena V. Verga 30
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
approval of the court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal
action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up
to the end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor,
unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party
cannot institute criminal prosecution without including the guilty
parties, if both are alive not, in any case, if the offended party has
consented to the offense or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall
not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party
or her parents, grandparents or guardian, not, in any case, if the
offender has been expressly pardoned by any of them. If the offended
party denies or becomes incapacitated before she can file the
complaint, and she has no known parents, grandparents, or guardian,
the state shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf.
The offended party, even if a minor, has the right to initiate the
prosecution of the offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of
lasciviousness independently of her parents, grandparents, or
guardians, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so. Where
the offended party, who is a minor, fails to file the complaint, her
parents, grandparents, or guardian may file the same. The right to file
the action granted to parents, grandparents, or guardians shall be
exclusive of all other persons and shall be exercised successively in
the order herein provided, except as stated in the preceding
paragraph.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of any of the
offenses mentioned above shall be brought except at the instance of and upon
complaint filed by the offended party.
The prosecution for violation of special laws be governed by the
provisions thereof.
A. General rule: all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.
The right of the offended party to institute the criminal prosecution or the
commission of a public offense ceases upon the filing of the complaint in court,
the fiscal taking charge of the prosecution of the suit in the name of the People
until the termination of the case.
B. Motion to dismiss case in court should be addressed to the discretion of
the trial court
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/vvverga 101005
Rule: Where the information has already been filed in court, the court steps in
and takes control of the case until the same is finally disposed of, so that the
fiscal has no more control over it.
Note: If court refuses to dismiss the case at the instance of the fiscal, the
least the fiscal can do is continue appearing for the prosecution and then turn
over the presentation of evidence to another fiscal or a private prosecutor
subject to his supervision and control.
C. When prosecution may be controlled by a person other than the public
prosecutor
Private prosecutor, in case of heavy load, with authorization in writing by the
Chief of the Prosecution Office of the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute
the case subject to the approval of the prosecutor (may be withdrawn).
Note: There is no need for public prosecutor to give his authorization unless
the written authority requires it. The written authority must be clear especially
when it covers plea bargaining, amendment of the information or the dismissal
of the case.
However, the private prosecutor:
1. Is not entitled to be served with copies of the pleadings as a
matter of right since a notice of the court to the fiscal is a notice
to the prosecutor (Sese vs. Montesa). Note however that failure
to serve pleadings and orders upon government counsel renders
the court orders issued upon such such petitions or motions of an
accused as void.
2. Cannot make a stand inconsistent with the state.
3. Cannot appeal from an order dismissing the case on motion of the
fiscal.
4. May not continue to take part in the proceeding after the death of
the offended party since the latter is the principal and the private
prosecutor, merely an agent.
D. Exclusive right of the Solicitor General to handle criminal cases in the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
It is only the Solicitor general that is authorized to bring and defend action in
behalf of the People of Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought
before the Supreme Court or CA in cases concerning:
1. writs of error
2. petition for review
3. automatic appeal
4. special civil actions where the People of the Philippines
Exception: cases elevated in the Supreme Court by way of petition for review
against decisions or final orders of the Sandiganbayan, it is the Office of the
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005

Ombudsman through its Special Prosecutor, which shall represent the People of H. Prosecution of a private crime (enumerated in Title XI, Book II of RPC
the Philippines. and defamation) complexed with a public offense
Where one of the component is a private crime and the other a public offense,
E. Control of Prosecution and Control of Court the fiscal may initiate the proceeding de oficio.
Control by prosecution Control of Court once case is filed
Rationale: Since one of the component offenses is a public crime, the latter
 What case to file  Suspension of Arraignment should prevail, public interest being always paramount to private interest.
 Whom to prosecute  Reinvestigation
 Manner of prosecution  Prosecution by Fiscal Rules:
 Right of prosecution to withdraw  Downgrading Offense or dropping 1. No crime of adultery and concubinage shall be prosecuted except
information before arraignment of accused even before pea upon a complaint filed by the offended party. Offended spouse
even without notice and hearing  Dismissal cannot instituted criminal prosecution without including both the
guilty parties and if he/she consented or pardoned the offenders.
F. Limitations on Control of Court Note: bigamy is an offense against civil status, which may be prosecuted at
1. Prosecution entitled to notice and hearing the instance of the state.
2. Court must always result of petition for review 2. Crime of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall not
3. Prosecution’[s stand to maintain prosecution should be respected be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
by the court party, or her parents, grandparents or guardians (mandatory
4. Ultimate test of court’s independence is where fiscal files a motion requirement).
to dismiss or withdraw information 3. If the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she
5. Court has authority to review Secretary’s recommendation and was able to file the complaint and she has no known parents,
reject it if there is grave abuse of discretion. grandparents or guardians, the state shall initiate the action in her
6. To reject or grant motion to dismiss court must make own behalf, pursuant to the doctrine of PARENS PATRIAE.
independent assessment of evidence 4. No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation
7. Judgment is void if there is no independent assessment and of a private crime can be brought except at the instance of and
finding of grave abuse of discretion. upon complaint by the offended party.
G. Intervention of the aggrieved party (a matter of right) 5. Defamation which consists in the imputation of a public crime (ex.
Rule: Aggrieved party may intervene because: Prostitution) can be prosecuted de oficio.
1. the declaration of the criminal liability carries with it the
declaration of resulting civil obligation and SECTION 6: Sufficiency of complaint or information
2. there are crimes which cannot be prosecuted other than at the A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the
formal instance of the person injured. designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
Exception: complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; that
1. The accused pleaded guilty before the commencement of the trial approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
2. Offended party waives the right to the civil action or expressly offense was committed.
reserves his right to institute it after the terminal of the criminal
action. When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them
3. Offense is one of those, which do not necessarily produce civil shall be included in the complaint or information.
liability.
Corollary Rule: The aggrieved party is prevented from dictating to the fiscal as I. Purpose of the rule
to the conduct of the case since government prosecution must always be under 1. to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation
the control of the fiscal (he may not appeal an order of dismissal by the court against him
entered upon motion of the fiscal since to permit him would be tantamount to 2. to notify the defendant of the criminal acts imputed to him so that
giving said party a right to control the criminal proceeding -- Gonzales vs. CFI). he can duly prepare his defense
B. Test of sufficiency
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005

The complaint or information must set out:

1. the names of the accused SECTION 8 Designation of offenses
2. the designation of the crime charged The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by
3. the acts complained of as constituting the crime in ordinary and the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
concise language qualifying and aggravating circumstance. If there is no designation of the
4. the offense committed within the jurisdiction of the court offense, defense shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute
5. the name of the offended party punishing it.

Two criteria in measuring sufficiency: A. Rationale

1. whether the indictment contains the elements of the offense The accused has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
intended to be charged and sufficiently apprises the defendant of accusation to give him opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly
what he must be prepared to meet. (People vs. Purisima).
2. whether the records show with accuracy to what extent he may
plead a former acquittal or conviction (in case any proceedings are B. The designation of the offense is not mandatory
taken against him for a similar offense) The accusation is good so long as the facts are alleged and set out in
F. It is the number of acts charged and not counts that is controlling. such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to
know what is intended, and the court to pronounce judgment
G. Defects in the complaint
according to right.
General Rule: any defect in the accusation other than lack of jurisdiction may
be cured by good and sufficient evidence.
A complaint is sufficient if it describes the offense in the language of
the statue, if the statute contains all of the essential elements
Exception: Substantial defects cannot be cured by evidence for such would
constituting the particular offense.
jeopardize the accused’s right to be informed of the true nature of the offense
he is being charged with.
There is no law which requires that in order that an accused may be
convicted, the specific provision which penalizes the act charged be
SECTION 7: Name of the accused
mentioned in the information.
The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the
accused or any appellation or nickname by which he has been or is
General Rule: Mere deficiency in form (erroneous classification of an
known. If his name cannot be ascertained, he must be described
act, mistake in caption of indictment etc) is not fatal and may be cured
under a fictitious name with a statement that his true name is
at any stage because it is the facts alleged therein that determines the
unknown.
nature of the crime.
If the true name of the accused is thereafter disclosed by him or
SECTION 9: Cause of accusation
appears in some other manner to the court, such true name shall be
The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
inserted in the complaint or information and record.
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in
A. Rationale
terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
To make a specific identification of the person to whom the commission of an
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
offense is being imputed and to preclude the possibility of having a wrong
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
person apprehended and brought to trial while in the meantime the real culprit
goes scot free.
A. Rationale
The constitution guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the
B. Error in name is not reversible as long as his identity is sufficiently
accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
established (People vs. Ramos). This defect is curable at any stage of the
against him.
proceeding.

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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
B. Clarity of allegations required (no need to follow the language of
the statute)
1. to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged
2. to enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.
C. A complaint or information is not defective simply because it
contains irrelevant or evidentiary matters.
D. Every element must be alleged.
1. Matters of evidence as distinguished from the facts
essential to the description of the offense need not be
averred. All that is required is that the offense charged be
set forth with particularity as will enable a person to
prepare his defense.
2. Elements of the offense must be in the body of the
information
D. Allegations in complex crimes
Allegations contained therein do not necessarily have to charge a
complex crime as defined by law. It is sufficient that the information
contains allegations, which state that one offense was a necessary
means to commit the other (People vs. Alagao) otherwise, the
complaint or information charges two crimes or offenses independent
from one another (Parulan vs. Rodas).
E. Defect in complaint or information
An accused person cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is
charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried, or
necessarily included therein. Where the information does not state all
the essential facts and ingredients of the crime, the accusation cannot
stand (Sugay vs. Pamaran).
F. Negative allegations and Exceptions
Rule: If a statute exempts certain persons, or classes of persons from
liability, the complaint should show that the person charged does not
belong to the class (U.S. vs. Pompeya).
G. Defendant cannot be convicted of an offense graver than that
alleged or an offense of which he has not been informed no matter
how conclusive the evidence of guilt may be (People vs. Austria).
H. Allegations of aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be
alleged in the complaint or information otherwise, they cannot be
properly appreciated (People vs. Gano).
Note: While circumstances which were not specifically alleged in the
information may not aggravate the crime, insofar as the civil aspect of
the case is concerned they may be considered to determine exemplary
damages in accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
SECTION 10: Place of commission of the offense
The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its
allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular
place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense
charged or is necessary for its identification.
A. Rationale
This provision serves double purpose:
1. Sufficiency of allegation informs the defendant of the
nature and cause of the accusation and
2. Fixes the jurisdiction and venue.
B. Allegation of specific place
It is not required, save in certain instances, that the complaint or
information state with particularity the place where the crime was
committed. Requirement is satisfied when it was alleged that the
offense occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court.
Exceptions:
The place need be averred:
1. when the place of the commission of the offense
constitutes an essential element of the offense (ex. robbery
in an inhabited house, public worship etc.)
2. where the offense charged is the doing of an unlicensed act
and the exact location is essential to individuate the
offense (ex. violation of a zoning ordinance)
SECTION 11: Date of commission of the offense
It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the
offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense.
The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission.
A. General Rule
When time is not an element of the offense, the precise time at
which the offense is charged to have been committed is not
material. However, this rule does not authorize the total omission
of a date or such an indefinite allegation.
Note: It is important that the act should be alleged as having been
committed at some time before the filing of the complaint or
information.
B. Exception
When time is a material ingredient of the offense charged, it becomes
mandatory to allege the same with precision or particularity (ex.
offense is infanticide – killing of a child less than three days old).
34
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
SECTION 12: Name of the offended party
The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the person
against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any
appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known. If there
is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious
name.
(a) In offense against property, if the name of the offended party is
unknown, the property must be described with such particularity as to
properly identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose
property the offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or
ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be inserted in
the complaint or information and the record.
(c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its
name, or any name or designation by which it is known or by which it
may be identified., without need of averring that it is a juridical person
or that it is organized in accordance with law.
General Rule
Name of the party should be alleged in the complaint especially in
crimes against property where ownership must be alleged a matter
essential to the description of the offense. This is also true in the
case of defamation cases.
SECTION 13: Duplicity of offenses
A complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law
prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.
A. Definition
Duplicity is the joinder of two or more distinct and separate offense in
the same count of an indictment or information. A complaint or
information is duplicitous if it charges two or more different offenses.
B. General rule: Complaint or information must charge only one
offense.
C. Test of duplicity
Test should not be depended upon the evidence presented at the trial
but upon the facts alleged in the information.
Exceptions:
the right under this provision may be waived when accused fails
to object to the multiplicity of crimes.
Complex crimes (a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies)
Special complex crimes
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
Continuous crimes or delito continuado (a single crime
consisting of a series of acts arising from a single
intent.
Crimes susceptible of being committed in various modes
Crimes of which another offense is an ingredient.
SECTION 14: Amendment or substitution
A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea
and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of
court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the
offense charged in or excludes any accused from one complaint or information,
can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended
party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the
motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the
offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complainant or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed
in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial
CASES
LLENES VS. DICDICAN
G.R. No. 122275 31 July 1996
Doctrine: The rule that filing of complaint with fiscal’s office interrupts
the prescription of the offense charged also applies to cases filed with
the Ombudsman for preliminary Investigation.
Facts: On October 13, 1993, Vivian Ginete, then OIC of the Physical Education
and School Sports Division of the regional Office of region VII in Cebu (DECS)
filed a complaint for grave an doral defamation with the deputy Ombudsmand
for the Visayas against Susan Llenes, an Education Supervisor II of the same
office.
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
The information was filed with the MTC on 28 March 1994 upon
recommendation and approval of the investigation officer and the city
prosecutor respectively.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the
offense of grave oral defamation prescribed in 6 months and that since the
information was filed 6 months and days after the alleged commission, the
crime already prescribed.
Private respondent contends that Rule 110 of the Rules of court provides that
for offenses not subject to ther ile on summary procedure, the filing of the
complaint in MTC or MTCT interrupt the period of prescription of the offense
charged.
The motion to quash was denied by the MTC and said decision was affirmed by
the RTC, hence this petition.
Issue: W/N the filing of a criminal complaint with the Ombudsman interrupts
the prescription period.
Decision: Yes. In the case of People vs. Olarte, it was said that the filing of the
complaint with the MTC even for purposes of preliminary investigation only
suspends the running of the prescriptive period. This decision was further
broadened by the case of Francisco vs. CA where the court reiterated that the
filing of the complaint in the fiscal’s office for preliminary investigation also
suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
The constitution vests upon the ombudsman powers to initiate or conduct
preliminary investigations in criminal cases filed against public officers or
employees. The Ombudsman-Visayas then has authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of the private respondent’s complaint against Llenes. The
rationale of the Olarte and Francisco cases must then be applied to the present
case. Since the complaint was filed on 12 October 1993, or barely 20 days
from the commission of the crime charged, the filing of the information was
very well within the six moth prescriptive period.
The petition was dismissed.
INGCO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 122584 23 May 1997
Doctrine: The rule that filing of complaint with fiscal’s office interrupts
the prescription of the offense charged also applies to cases filed with
the Ombudsman for preliminary Investigation.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
Facts: PNB Vice President Domingo Ingco was charged on May 26, 1987 along
with top officials of Cresta Monte Shipping Corporation by the PNB before the
Presidential Blue Ribbon Committee for violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). The matter was referred at once to the Ombudsman.
In 1977 and 1978, Ingco allegedly conspired with officials of Cresta for the
immediate grant of loans amounting to $13.4M for the purchase of cargo
vessels under grossly disadvantageous terms and conditions prejudicial to the
PNB (e.i, loan approval without project feasibility, notwithstanding the adverse
comments of the credit department on this particular loan).
An information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on 21 July 1993. Petitioners
moved to quash the information on the ground of prescription but the same
was denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this petition.
Issue: W/N the offense already prescribed
Decision: The prescription period for the offense allegedly committed by Ingco
is ten years. Although more than ten years have elapsed from the time of the
alleged commission of the offense on September 1977 and March 1978 to the
date of the filing of the information on 21 July 1993, the prescriptive period
has been effectively suspended by the filing of the complaint on 26 May 1987
with the Ombudsman.
Applying the case of Olarte and Francisco, the complaint filed on 26 May 1987
before the Ombudsman is deemed to have tolled the running of the
prescriptive period. Thus, the filing of the information on 21 July 1993 is
within the ten-year prescriptive period.
PEOPLE VS. REYES
G.R. No. 74226-27 27 July 1989
Doctrine: Civil Law rules on prescription is applicable to criminal cases
Facts: Spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land in Lipa
City. They were survived by their children, the accused Mizpah Reyes and the
complaints Cristina Masikat, Julieta Vergara and Aurora Vda de Ebueza.
On June 1983, complainant discovered from the records of the Register of
Deeds of Lipa City that the said property was already transferred to Mizpah
Reyes and that the signature of their parents in the sale was falsified. The NBI
found that the said signatures were forged. Consequently, two informations
for falsification of public document and for making an untruthful statement of
fact in the deed of sale were filed on 18 October 1984. The crime of
falsification prescribes in 10 years and commences to run “from the day on
36
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
which the crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their
agents (Article 91, RPC).
Before the arraignment, the accused filed a motion to quash on the ground of
prescription and non-compliance with the pre-conciliation requirement. The
trial court granted the same which was later on affirmed by the CA, hence this
appeal.
Issue: W/N the offense already prescribed
Decision: Where a notarial document recorded with the Registry of Deeds was
sought to be annulled, the court, interpreting the phrase “from the time of
discovery” found in the provisions of the civil code, ruled that in legal
contemplation, discovery must be reckoned to have taken place fro the time
the document was registered in the Register of Deeds, for the rules is that
REGISTRATION IS A NOTICE TO THE WHOLE WORLD.
The court will not hesitant to apply the rules of construction in civil cases in the
interpretation of criminal statues of the factual and legal circumstances so
warrant especially if it is favorable to the accused.
In the case at bat, the deed of sale was registered on 26 May 1961. The
criminal actions having been filed only on October 18, 1984, or more than ten
years from May 26, 1961, the crime for which the accused was charged has
prescribed.
There was no error in the decision of the CA.
NGO YAO TIT AND CHIA ENG CHENG VS. SHERIFF OF MANILA
G.R. No. 9619 and 9620 28 March 1914
Doctrine: A mere defect or error curable at any stage of the action
does not deprive the court of the power to pronounce a valid judgment
and impose a valid sentence.
Facts: Before the court is an application for the writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioners were charged of visiting a house (A Chinese Club) where opium was
smoked in violation of Section 3 of Ordinance No. 152. The accused alleged
that there was no crime committed since there was no evidence that they lived
in that place since they were employed by the club as clerk, cashier, collector
and cook. They also contend that the case should have been in the name of
the United States and not in the city of Manila. The action having been
wrongly entitled, the court acquired no jurisdiction of the person or the subject
matter of the action, makings its decision void.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
Issue: W/N the court has jurisdiction to try the case.
Decision: It is not a jurisdictional defect and one which deprives the trial court
of its authority to try, convict, and pass sentence, that a criminal action is
brought in the name of the city of Manila instead of the United States. That
fact constitutes a mere defect or error curable at any stage of the action does
not deprive the court of the power to pronounce a valid judgment and impose
a valid sentence. Offenses committed in the Philippines are crimes against the
people of the Philippines.
DEL ROSARIO VS. VDA DE MERCADO
G.R. No L-25710 28 August 1969
Doctrine: A widow may be considered an offended arty within the
meaning of the applicable rule of court entitled to file a complaint for
the murder of her husband.
Facts: Aquilino del Rosario, Jr and Aquilino Sr.. were confined on the municipal
jail in La Union as of July 11, 1965 until the filing of a petition for habeas
corpus. The former was detained based on a criminal complaint for murder
filed by the widow. Del Rosario contends that the complaint is null since the
widow was not authorized to file the same, she being merely the heir of the
offended party and not the offended party herself. Consequently, his warrant
of arrest is also void, hence his confinement should be declared as arbitrary
and unlawful.
The lower court sustained the writ, hence this petition.
Issue: W/N a widow may be considered as an offended party
Decision: A widow may be considered an offended arty within the meaning of
the applicable rule of court entitled to file a complaint for the murder of her
husband. The injury to the widow – loss of right and consortium and material
support – should be sufficient to consider her an offended party within the
meaning of the Rules of Court provision. A contrary holding is likely to be
attended with deplorable consequences.
PEOPLE VS. ARCILLA
G.R. No. 116237 15 May 1996
Doctrine: The absence of a prosecutor cannot be raised by an accused
to invalidate the testimony of a state witness if he cannot prove
personal prejudice.
37
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Facts: The accused Fe Arcilla y Corejo and victim Antonio Arcillal were
married. Antonio developed an illicit affair with Lilia Lipio. During this
amorous union, Antonio and Lilia had two children. When Fe learned of this
infidelity, he went to Albay and looked for Antonio. A fight between them
ensued which resulted in Fe stabbing Antonio with a fan knife which led to his
death. The accused contends that she was merely protecting herself when she
stabbed Antonio. Fe was charged with parricide before the RTC of Daraga,
Albay which found her guilty. The court did not give credence to the testimony
of the accused.
Issue: W/N the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Lilia Lipio
despite the absence of a public prosecutor in the taking thereof
Decision: The presence of a public prosecutor in th trial of crimnal cases is
necessary to protect vital state interests at stae in the prosuction of crimes,
foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law. As the
representative of the state, the public prosecutor has a right and duty to take
all steps to protect the rights of the people in the trial of the accused. It ought
to be self-evident that the right belongs to the public prosecutor and not to the
accused. The absence of a prosecutor cannot therefore be raised by an
accused to invalidate the testimony of a state witness if she cannot prove
personal prejudice as in the case at bar.
Decision of the trial court was affirmed.
SANCHEZ VS. DEMETRIOU
227 SCRA 627 09 November 1993
Facts: See previous notes
Decision: As a general rule, the prosecutor cannot be compelled to include in
the information a person against whom he believes no sufficient evidence of
guilt exists. While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge all those
who, in his opinion, appear to be guilty, he nevertheless cannot be compelled
to include in the information a person against whom he believes no sufficient
evidence exists.
The possible exception to this rule is where there is unmistakable showing if a
grave abuse of discretion that will justify judicial intrusion into the precints of
the executive. But in such a case, the proper remedy to call for such exception
is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition. Moreover, before
resorting to this relief, the party seeking the inclusion of another person as a
co-accused in the same case must first avail itself of other adequate remedies
such as the filing of a motion for such inclusion.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
DIMATULAC VS. VILLON
297 SCRA 679 (1998)
Facts: SPO3 Dimatulac was said to have spoken against Mayor Yabut thus, on
November 3, 1995, the accused, led by the mayor went to Masantol,
Pampanga for the purpose of killing the victim. Riding a truck, they first went
to the Municipal Hall and then to the house of Masantol’s mayor. Finally, they
cruised to Dimatulac’s place. When they got there, some of the accused
positioned themselves around the house while the leader of the pack, the
mayor, stayed in the truck protected by the love of his bodyguard. Some of the
accused went inside the house to ask Dimatulac to go down to apologize to the
mayor. Enticed by the invitation, Dimatulac went down. But as he descended,
he was shot by a certain Danny. His son Peter Paul was unsure who of the
accused shot his father but he was sure it was someone from the party who
went to their house. Before Dimatulac expired, he was able to point at the
party of Yabut as the ones responsible.
Judge David issued warrants of arrest for the accused after finding probable
cause that a crime of murder has been committed. However, even before the
accused was brought into the custody of the law, Pampanga Assistant
Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation. In a resolution dated
January 1996, Flores found that the Yabuts and assailant Danny, excluding all
the other accused, were in conspiracy for the offense of homicide, and not
murder as concluded by Judge David. This finding was based on Flores’
conclusion that although there was treachery, the assailant did not consciously
adopt the position of the victim at the time he fired the shot. He also
recommended a bail of Php 20,000 for all the accused. An information for
homicide was filed by Flores against the accused.
Before the filing of the said information, Dimatulacs appealed the Flores’
resolution to the DOJ Secretary. Flores was given a copy of this appeal and yet
he still filed the information. The Yabuts, contended that the pendency of the
appeal to the DOJ Secretary was not a ground to defer arraignment, and that
the Dimatulacs should have filed the motion to defer with the office of the
Provincial Prosecutor or sought from the DOJ Secretary an order directing the
Provincial Prosecutor to defer the filing of the information in court. The
prosecution also filed a petition with the CA to enjoin Judge Roura of the RTC
from proceeding with the arraignment. Nevertheless, Roura voluntarily
inhibited himself and was replaced by Judge Villon.
Despite the fact that an appeal in the DOJ was on-going, Justice Villon
proceeded with the arraignment where the accused pleaded not guilty saying
that the Yabuts has a right to a speedy trial and that the petitioners did not
obtain conformity of the prosecutor before they filed the motion to defer the
proceedings considering that the case should but under the control of the
38
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
prosecution. Justice Secretary Guingona resolved the appeal in favor of the
petitioners saying that the crime must be murder and not just homicide He
basically said that the crime must be murder and not just homicide. With this
development, the Dimatulacs through an ex-parte manifestation called the
attention of the RTC to the DOJ ruling. The Yabut’s opposed this, saying that
they would be placed in double jeopardy. Later, the DOJ Secretary set aside his
order to amend the information from homicide to murder as this was already
rendered moot by the arraignment. RTC Judge Villon denied the motion to set
aside arraignment. Hence, this petition for Certiorari/Prohibition and
Mandamus.
Issue: W/N the prosecutor was wrong in (1) opening a reinvestigation
considering that even if the warrants of arrest were issued, the accused still
were not brought under the custody and (2) filing the information for homicide
despite knowledge of the appeal to the Secretary of Justice.
W/N Judge Villon acted in excess of jurisdiction for denying the
motions to set aside the arraignment considering that the pendency of the
appeal in the DOJ.
Decision:
YES. The reinvestigation was uncalled for since the accused were never
brought into the custody of the law, notwithstanding the warrants of arrest
given by the MCTC. Although under the Rules of court (112) a prosecutor may
disagree with the findings of the judge, this difference in opinion must be
based on the evidence on record transmitted by the judge. It is also apparent
that Flores is biased, favoring the Yabuts since he allowed them to submit
counter affidavits without first demanding their surrender. The Php 20,000
bond is clearly inappropriate considering that the crime charged was murder.
Moreover, despite knowledge of the appeal, Flores did not inform the RTC of
the pending appeal in the DOJ thus, arraignment was not suspended. The
public prosecutor was also wrong in saying that he will no longer allow the
presence of the private prosecutors (lawyers of the offended party). Since the
offended parties never waived the civil action nor expressly reserved their right
to institute it separately from the criminal action, then they have the right to
intervene in the criminal case pursuant to Section 16 Rule 110 of the rules of
Court.
YES. Although Judge Villon was not bound to wait for the DOJ resolution, he
should have noticed that the offense committed was murder and not homicide.
The fact that he rushed the arraignment negates prudence on his party thus,
he gravely abused his discretion.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
DOJ order 223 recognized the right of both the offended parties and ten
accused to appeal from resolutions in preliminary investigations and
reinvestigations.
PEOPLE VS. PINEDA
20 SCRA 748
Facts: Teofilo and Valeriana were asleep when guns were fired in rapid
successions from outside their house. Teofilo died instantly. After which, the
accused went inside the house of the couple killing three of their minor children
and wounding Valeriana. The accused Narbasa, Borres and Alindo were then
indicted before the CFI of Lanao del Norte as principals in five cases (four for
murder and one for frustrated murder). Narbasa and Alindo moved for the
consolidation of the case into one since they said that the cast arose from the
same incident, which was motivated by one single impulse. Such motion was
granted by the judge stating that since the crime stemmed from series of
continuing acts they should be treated as one crime. This decision was
questioned by the city fiscal saying that since more than one gun was used and
more than one shot was fired, killing more than one person.
Issue: W/N there should be only one information, either for the complex
crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex crime of robbery
with multiple homicide and frustrated homicide
W/N the decision of the judge should prevail considering that it
clashed with that of the fiscal.
Decision: The prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the
prosecution of offenses, should determine the information to be filed and
cannot be controlled by the offended party. Although there was an affidavit
from the witnesses that the real intention of the accused was to commit
robbery and that the acts consisting of murder were committed in pursuance to
the original intent which would bring the crime within the purview of complex
crimes as provided in Section 48, it is within the power of the fiscal to
disregard such an affidavit.
When various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate
and distinct crimes. This however, is not to discount the possibility of abuses
on the part of the prosecutor.
The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound
discretion of the investigating fiscal. The info he lodges in court must have to
be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. A clash of
views bet the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did or between
39
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the fiscal’s should
normally prevail. This doctrine however, is subject to several exceptions, to
wit:
1. For orderly administration of justice;
2. Prevent the use of strong arm of the law in an oppressive and
vindictive manner;
3. To avoid multiplicity of actions; and
4. To afford adequate protection to constitutional rights
PEOPLE VS. DEVARAS
228 SCRA 482 (1993)
Digest by: Tim David
FACTS: A pedicab driver and his passenger were attacked without provocation
by two men who hacked them to death and later threw their bodies over the
bridge with the help of another. They were subsequently accused of murder
alleging that they committed the offense in conspiracy and with treachery and
abuse of superior strength.
The principal witness, Raul Animos, claimed that at about 7:00 in the evening,
the appellants were drinking tuba with him and thereafter joined him in his
duty as bantay-bayan. While making the rounds at Daguitan bridge, they saw
a zigzagging pedicab approach. When it was halfway the bridge, Blademir who
was then carrying a bolo suddenly attacked the driver. At the same time,
Ronilo attacked the passenger with his bolo. Pablo did not participate in the
slaying but later helped in throwing the bodies over the bridge. Raul himself
was ordered to help and, although initially hesitated, had to comply because he
was threatened with death. The abandoned pedicab was reported, curiously
enough, to the 3 accused who went to see the barangay captain. Upon noticing
the blood on the back of Raul’s shirt, brgy. chairman notified the police.
Blademir and Ronilo were sentenced reclusion perpetua while Pablo was
convicted as an accessory.
Note: Did not identify the assignment of errors. Those in ( ) are most probably
the errors raised
COURT:
1. (The offense should be homicide only without the attendance of treachery)
Evidence clearly shows Bladimer and Ronilo suddenly attacked their unarmed
victims with bolos, thereby insuring commission without risks to themselves
2. (Raul Animos should likewise have been charged)
The determination of the person to be prosecuted on the basis of
evidence rests primarily with the prosecutor. As an exception, the
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
prosecutor can be compelled by mandamus if he abuses his discretion
and refuse include co-accused against whom there appears to be at
least prima facie evidence. This, however, is available only if petitioner
shows that all remedies have been exhausted, such as motion filed
with the trial court for the indictment of person(s) excluded by the
prosecutor. It does not appear that such a motion was filed by
appellants
The Court agree that there was no conspiracy as there is no evidence that
Blademir and Ronilo had earlier come to an agreement to kill the victims.
“From bantay-bayan, they turned into bantay-salakay in an incomprehensible
rampage that needlessly wasted 2 innocent lives. Was it the liquor in their
brain that urged them to kill, or was it simple, inexplicable wickedness? The
answer lies in the dark recesses of their minds, and of their prison cells”
Decision of Trial Court affirmed.
PEOPLE V. NAZARENO,
260 SCRA 256 (1996)
Facts: Romulo Bunye II hailed “stainless” tricycle to drive him to Molina St..
Unknown to him, two men who were waiting outside his house and hailed
another tricycle to follow him. Bunye then alighted at the corner of T. Molina
and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinlupa and crossed the street. Shortly
after, the other tricycle arrived and stopped in front of “stainless” tricycle
carrying Bunye. One of the men jumped out the tricycle and shot Bunye at the
back of the head. When Bunye fell face down, two more shots were fired, one
from the assailant and another from the other accused, all directed at Bunye’s
head.
The incident was witnessed by the two tricycle drivers who executed a sworn
affidavit and another passenger.
The accused Ramil Regala, Narciso Nazareno, Orlando “Boy” Hular, and Manuel
Laureaga were all arrested. The first two were identified by the tricycle drivers
in the police line-up.
Regala executed affidavits admitting participation in the slaying of Bunye
however, claimed that a certain Hular paid him Php 30,000 to kill the
victimthat they had been hired by Hular to kill the victim.However, Regala and
Hular who both claims being tortured recanted their earlier admission of the
crime.
40
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Hular and Larureaga were acquitted for lack of evidence against them.
Nazareno and Regala however, were found guilty.
Issue: W/N the arrest without warrant was illegal.
W/N the non-inclusion of the supplier of the guns would nullify the proceeding.
Decision: NO. Nazareno and Regala waived objections based on the alleged
irregularity of their arrest, considering that they pleaded not guilty and
participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest must be deemed cured when
they voluntary submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused .
Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the
arrest was illegal is not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid
judgment.
NO. The manner by which prosecutions of a case is handled is within the
sound discretion of the prosecutor and the non-inclusion of other guilty parties
is irrelevant to the case against the accused.
Judgment of RTC which found Nazareno and Regala Guilty was affirmed
DONIO-TEVES vs. VAMENTA JR.
133 SCRA 616 (1984)
Facts: Petitioner Milagros Donio Teves questions the criminal proceeding
initiated against her by her husband for the crime of Adultery. The complaint
was filed by Julian Teves, the petitioner’s husband stating that on the months
of My 1980 to December, his wife has been having sexual intercourse with a
certain Manuel Moreno. Milagros filed a motion to quash on the contention
that the court has no jurisdiction over her case since there was an absence of a
valid complaint.
Issue: W/N there was an invalid complaint.
Decision: NO. adultery, being a private offense, cannot be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offenses spouse who cannot institute the criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty spouses, if they are both alive,
not in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. The law
leaves it to the option of the aggrieved spouse to seek judicial redress for the
affront committed by the erring spouse. The complaint filed by the offended
spouse was the one necessary to start the required preliminary investigation
by the fiscal’s office.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
The complaint was also sufficient for it stated the name of the defendants; the
designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
time of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed which is in absolute compliance with Section 5, Rule 110.
Petition was dismissed.
PEOPLE VS. BULAONG
G.R. No. 37386, 106 SCRA 344 (July 31, 1981)
One afternoon, Delena Segapo, 14, and her sister, Nena, 8 (both Bilaans), left
their house at Barrio Landan, Polomolok, South Cotabato, to perform an errand
for their father. After walking, they boarded a passenger jeepney and arrived
in the public market of General Santos City at 6pm. They were going to collect
an account from Tamigo. But, Claudio Bulaong, a 35-year-old married man
with five children, pointed his gun at the two sisters and forcibly took them to
the New Bay View Hotel in the city where Bulaong raped Delena 8 times at the
sight of her sister and with death threats. The sisters knew him since he
administered his family lands in Barrio Landan where many Bilaans resided
The following day, they went to his parents' bungalow in Barrio Landan which
was then unoccupied. They were locked in a room guarded by Fonso Laurecio,
a houseboy armed with a gun. Bulaong raped Delena in that place. Meanwhile,
Nena was able to escape through the ceiling. She told her parents what
happened who was accompanied by Rudy Ante, a barrio councilor, to
accompany him to Bulaong's house. They were able to retrieve Delena who
was found to be raped by an examination of the city health officer.
A complaint for forcible abduction with rape, signed by Delena and Dalama,
was filed in the city court against Bulaong. The judge interrogated the sisters.
Bulaong and Laurecio surrendered voluntarily and waived the preliminary
investigation. The city fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance an information
for forcible abduction with rape against Bulaong and Laurecio where the two
pleaded not guilty.
Claudio Bulaong was convicted of eight complex crimes of forcible abduction
with rape. Alfonso Laurecio was convicted as an accomplice. Both were
sentenced to pay indemnities to Delena Segapo. Bulaong alleged in his appeal
that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because the
information was fatally defective for the information should have been signed
by the girl and not by her father.
Issue: W/N Bulaong committed 8 counts of forcible abduction with rape.
41
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
W/N the information was defective
Decision: Bulaong who abducted the victim and had sexual intercourse with her
for several days is not guilty of separate offenses but of a continuing offense of
abduction with rape.
In this case, the complaint for abduction with rape against Bulaong was filed in
the city court by the offended girl and her father. That complaint was sworn to
before the city judge which was the basis of the preliminary examination. The
judge examined the witnesses under oath. The examination was reduced to
writing in the form of searching questions and answers. On the basis of that
examination, a warrant of arrest was issued.
The accused waived in writing the second stage of the preliminary
investigation. In such a case, the fiscal is not called upon to conduct another
preliminary investigation. He could file an information on the basis of the
preliminary investigation conducted by the inferior court because the
prosecution of the offense is under his direction and control. He could not have
certified that he held a preliminary investigation because the preliminary
examination was actually conducted by the city court and the second stage of
the preliminary investigation was waived by the accused.
In cases involving crimes against chastity, the prosecution may be conducted
by the fiscal on the basis of the complaint filed in the inferior court. There is
no need to file an information. Thus, the Rules of Court does not require that
the offended girl in a crime against chastity should sign the information filed by
the fiscal.
PEOPLE VS. TAÑADA
166 SCRA 361 (1988)
Digest by: Don Dieta
Facts:
An information was filed charging one Romulo Postrero of rape in the CFI of
Cebu. A sworn letter-complaint for rape filed by Victoria Capillan was attached
to the said information. Capillan alleged that Romulo Postrero induced her to
consume a bottle of seven-up that caused her to feel drowsy and weak and
that Potrero then brought her to Queen Hotel where Postrero raped her.
However, accused’s motion to dismiss the information was granted by the
judge on the ground that the court did not acquired jurisdiction over the
offense charged since the information filed by the judge is not a complaint
signed by the offended party as required by Article 344 of RPC and Sec. 4, Rule
110 of the rules of Court.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
Issue: W/N the letter-complaint filed by the offended party is a valid
complaint as required by Article 344 of RPC and Sec. 4, Rule 110 of the rules of
Court.
Held: It was a valid complaint. The Supreme Court held that the rule of
“complaint-filed-in-court” enunciated in the case of People vs. Santos was
already modified by Valdepeñas vs. People which held that the provisions of
Art. 344 of RPC do not determine or confer the jurisdiction of the courts over
offenses enumerated therein since the same is already governed by the
Judiciary Act of 1948. The required complaint is only a condition precedent to
the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty
parties. The letter-complaint filed by the offended party contained all the
elements of a valid complaint required by Sec. 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court. Thus the said letter-complaint is a valid complained as required by
Article 344 of RPC and Sec. 4, Rule 110 of the rules of Court.
PEOPLE vs. DIMAPILIS
300 SCRA 282 (1998)
Facts: Sharon Degala, 11 years old alleged in her complaint affidavit that
sometime in September, 1994, February 1996 and May 1996, the exact dates
already unknown to her, she was forced by the common law spouse of her
mother, using a knife, to undress. Thereafter, she was raped by the said man
on five different occasions while her mother was gambling. She told her
mother about the incidents but here mother merely dismissed them as
“lambing”. She then went to her grandmother who took her to the NBI for
medico-legal examination. It was found that indeed, she was raped on several
times.
It was the contention of the petitioner that informations filed against him were
defective for failing to allege the specific dates of commission of the three
cunts of rape.
Issue: W/N the informations were defective.
Decision: Section 11 of Rule 110 provides that it is not necessary to state in
the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was
committed except when the time is material ingredient of the offense. In the
case at bar, the time of commission is not a material ingredient of the offense.
The dates provided in the information already suffice if the acts complained of
area led to have taken place “as near to the actual date at which the offenses
are committed as the information will permit.”
42
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
The decision was affirmed with modifications since the fact the accused is the
common law spouse of the mother, which should have qualified the offense
was not alleged in the complaint.
PEOPLE VS. NARVAES
59 Phil. 738 (1934)
Facts: Petitioner and victim had a heated altercation when the later told the
former that he should be ashamed of himself for still threshing palay despite
the fact that all others were already plowing the land. The accused said that
he was embarrassed by said statement of the victim. A fight ensued with the
petitioner stabbing the victim with a penknife. It was the contention of the
petitioner that the information and the trial proceeded against him was void for
he was Pedro Naravaes, and not Primo Narvaes as stated in the complaint.
Issue: W/N the mistake in name is fatal.
Decision: In the at bar, the mistake in the name was not fatal since the only
difference relates to the name of the father (Pedro’s name was Lucio while
Primo’s father was Leoncio). This, according to the court has no consequence
to the case at bar. Furthermore, when the appellant was arraigned under the
name of Pedro Narvaes, which is the name appearing in the information, he
entered the plea of not guilty under such name. Thus, it is already too late to
question the discrepancy in the name.
Petition was dismissed.
US VS. PANLILIO
No. 9876, 28 Phil 608 (Dec 8, 1914)
On or about 2 Feb 1913, all of the carabaos of Adriano Panlilio were ordered
quarantined in a corral in Masamat, Mexico, Pampanga by a duly authorized
agent of the Dept of Agriculture after having been exposed to rinderpest, a
dangerous and contagious disease. On said date, Panlilio, who being authorized
and the quarantine still in effect, ordered said carabaos taken from the corral
and drove them from one place to another for the purpose of working them in
the hacienda. An information was filed charging Panlilio of violation of sec 6 Act
No 1760. it was amended but it failed to specify the particular law violated. The
accused alleged that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a
violation of said law.
ISSUES: WON Panlilio committed a violation of Act 1760.
WON Panliklio counld be convicted of violation of Art 581(2) RPC even if it was
not alleged in the information.
Vena V. Verga
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HELD: the acts committed by Panlilio is not violative of the Act 1760 or any
provisions thereof. There was neither importation nor transfer of the said
carabaos. The law nowhere makes it a penal offense to refuse to comply with
its sections, nor is it phrased as a [penal statute. Nowhere in the law states
that it is prohibited or unlawful to violate the orders of the Bureau of Agri nor is
there any punishment provided for violation of such orders.
The acts of Panlilio is a violation of Atr 581 par 2 of the RPC. The fact that the
information charged a violation of Act 1760 does not prevent the court from
finding the accused guilty of the RPC. It is not a violation of his right to be
informed of the charges against him because the allegations required under Act
1760 include those required under Art 581. The accused could have defended
himself in no different manner if he had been expressly charged with a
violation of Art 581.
PEOPLE VS. AMBRAY
GR 127177, 303 SCRA 697 (Feb 25, 1999)
Melanie Hernandez, an 11 year old, is the daughter of Vinia Hernandez, the
common law spouse of the accused Romeo Ambray. They, including Melanie’s
half brother Robin and 3 other children, rented a single room with one bed with
the children sleeping on the floor. Her mother leaves the house before dawn
everyday and goes to the Pasig market. One day at around 2am, she woke up
when the accused carried her to the bed. She tried to shout but her mouth was
quickly covered. The accused then sexually abused her. She fell asleep still
feeling the pain. When she woke up, she left to pick up the laundry from her
grandmother’s place. Unable to locate her mother to reveal her ordeal, she
went to her Aunt Vilma Perez who accompanied her to the police, They went to
their house where Melanie pointed to Ambray as her rapist. The medico-legal
examination revealed that she had lacerations in her vagina but with no trace
of sperm cells. Ambray denied the allegations alleging that he could not have
raped her because the slightest movement could awaken his other children and
that it was just false charges because Vilma wanted to end their common law
relationship because he is a gambler. Others also testified that Melanie tells her
ordeal to others while laughing, The TC found Ambray guilty of rape with a
penalty of death.
ISSUES: WON the testimony of the complainant is credible and the defense not
credible
WON the statutory rape was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: The testimony of the victim was a truthful account of what transpired
during the incident. It is impossible for her to concoct such a story since she
allowed her private parts to be examined and publicly expose her sexual
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
abuse. The denial of the accused is unsubstantiated and cannot be given
greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of Melanie. Rape is no respecter
of time and place. It is not impossible for the members of the family to be in
deep slumber when the assault was being committed.
However, the penalty should have been reclusion perpetua. The special
qualifying circumstance that the accused is the common law spouse of the
victim’s mother was not alleged in the information. Such failure is fatal and
bars conviction of its qualified form which is punishable with death. qualifying
circumstances must be pleaded.
PEOPLE VS. JAVIER
GR 126096, 311 SCRA 122 (July 26, 1999)
Julia Ratunil, a minor of 16 years of age, was held and pulled by his father,
Amado Sandrias Javier, by means of force, into the conjugal room while her
mother was out doing laundry work. She was boxed and hit in the stomach
which resulted in her being unconscious after she refused and shouted for help.
The accused then raped her. When she woke up, she had no panties and she
felt pain in her private parts. The incident took place at around 1pm at Zone 5
Baikingan, CDO. It maws again repeated twice in Nov and Dec 1994. When she
can no longer bear the pain, she confessed to her grandmother and with
mother, they reported the matter to the police and filed 3 separate complaints
of rape against the accused. The examination of the NBI revealed that she was
raped and pregnant. Meanwhile, he was charged with illegal possession of
firearms and was sentenced accordingly. The accused pleaded not guilty and
alleged that he was working as a mason during those times and that the
damages were engineered by his mother-in-law who despises him for being a
drunkard and that Julia was an errant daughter who at age 14, started
attending dances and acquired sweethearts. The RTC found him guilty of rape
and qualified seduction and sentenced him to death and an indeterminate
sentence of prision correcional minimum to prision mayor maximum. Accused
appealed.
ISSUES: WON the alibis of the accused can hold.
WON he was found guilty and sentenced accordingly.
HELD: The alibis of the accused cannot hold. It is highly inconceivable that
complainant would impute a crime so serious as rapeee against her own father.
She cannot be faulted for her delay in reporting the rape and it does not
undermine the charges where it is grounded on the death threats of the
accused. Further, the place where he supposedly was is merely 200 meters
from his house, a distance which could be covered by a 5min walk. For alibis to
serve as a basis for acquittal, it must be established with clear and convincing
evidence. The requisites of time and place must be strictly met. In rape
Vena V. Verga
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committed by a father against her daughter, the former’s moral ascendancy
and influence over the latter may substitute for actual physical violence and
intimidation. The accused charged with rape cannot be convicted of qualified
seduction under the same information. Rape and qualified seduction are not
identical offenses. Lastly, the victim is 16 years old which qualifies rape.
However, the prosecution failed to present her birth certificate. In this case,
age is vital and essential and should be proved. Hence, the accused is liable
only of simple rape with a penalty of reclusion perpetua.
AGBAYANI VS. SAYO
No. L-47880, 89 SCRA 699 (Apr 30, 1979)
Conrado Mahinan was the manager of the Cagayan branch of the GSIS in
Cauayan, Isabela. Wilson Agbayani, Carmel Bautista, Pablo PAscula and Renato
Dugay were his subordinates. The affidavits of Pascual and Bautista were
signed at Cauayan, the latter’s letter asking for Mahinan’s dismissal.
Agbayani’s unusual incident report was subscribed and sworn to before a
Manila notary with evidence to support malversation and falsification against
Mahinan. The documents depicted Mahinan as an incorrigible managerial misfit,
despoiler of public office, spendthrift ofGSIS funds, invetereate gambler,
chronic falsifier and an unreformed ex-convict. Mahinan then field a complaint
for written defamation against his subordinates with the fiscal at Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya. Two days later, he was terminated by the Board of Trustees of
GSIS but was reinstated on appeal to the CSC. The provincial fiscal filed an
information for libel against the four in the CFI of Nueva Vizcaya. The 4
accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that the said court has no
jurisdiction over the case because MAhinan was a public officer holding office at
Cauayan when the alleged libel was committed and that the fiscal of N. V. had
no authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to file the information.
The court denied it on the ground that he was not a public officer since the
insurance business of GSIS is not an inherently governmental function. Hence,
his residence in Bayambang, N. V. would be the criterion for determining the
venue.
ISSUES: WON Mahinan is a public officer.
WON the CFI of N. V. has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: Mahinan is a public officer. As GSIS branch manager, he is
unquestionably a public officer.
The proper venue of Mahinan’s criminal action for written defamation is the CFI
of Isabela since as a GSIS branch manager, he was a PO stationed at Cauayan
and the alleged libel was committed when he was in the public service. The
preliminary investigation should have been conducted by the provincial fiscal of
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Isabela or municipal judge of Ilagan, the provincial capital, or by the CFI of the
same province. It could have also been filed in the CFI of the province or in the
city court where the libel was printed and first published.
The information is defective or deficient because it does not show that the CFI
of N. V. where it was filed has jurisdiction to entertain the criminal action for
written defamation and that the provincial fiscal of that province had the
authority to conduct the preliminary investigation.
SANTIAGO VS. GARCHITORENA
G.R. No. 109266, 228 SCRA 214 (Dec. 2, 1993)
Petitioner was charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e)
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, when she allegedly favored
"unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program.
Petitioner filed with the Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition, to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the Criminal Case on the
ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a
presidential candidate. She filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena which the SC granted and directed to reset the arraignment
pending resolution of the inhibition of Garchitorena and the bill of particulars.
The SB denied the motion for disqualification. The SB admitted the 32
informations and the arraignment was set. Hence, the filing of the instant
petition.
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s case is a continuous crime warranting the filing of a
single information and not 32 separate informations.
HELD: We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed
in petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one information to be file
against her. The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito
continuado or "continuous crime."
For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed
during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal
intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal
provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the
perpetration
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with
performing a single criminal act — that of her approving the application for
legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege.
Vena V. Verga
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The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on
the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong
probability even exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of
the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the
approval was embodied in the same document. Hence, the said informations
should be consolidated.
CRESPO VS. MOGUL
No L-53373, 151 SCRA 462 (June 30, 1987)
Asst Fiscal Proceso de Gala, with the approval of the provincial fiscal, filed an
information for estafa against Mario Crespo in the circuit criminal court of
Lucena City. The accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground
that there was a pending petition for review with the Sec of Justice. The judge
denied it but deferred the arraignment. Upon petition, the CA restrained the
judge from proceeding with the arraignment until the DOJ has resolved the
petition for review. The Justice Undersecretary directed the fiscal to move for
the dismissal of the information for insufficiency of evidence but the judge
denied it. The CA issued a TRO but later lifted it. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WON the TC may refuse to grant the motion to dismiss and proceed
with the trial of the case despite a motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon
order of the Sec of Justice.
HELD: Once an information is filed in court, the court’s prior permission must
be secured if the fiscal wants to reinvestigate the case. Whether the accused
had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the
fiscal or a review by the Justice Secretary whereby a motion to dismiss was
submitted to the court, the court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the
motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the
proper determination of the case. In this regard, the fiscal should continue to
appear in the case although he may turn over the presentation of evidence to
the private prosecutor but still under his discretion and control.
PEOPLE VS. PANLILIO
GR 113519-20 255 SCRA 503 (Mar 29, 1996)
At about 11:40am, Leah Marie Jordan, a 10 year old student, was waiting for
her younger sister outside of St. Jude School in Malinta, Valenzuela. Then,
Danilo Panlilio approached her and inquired of a certain Aling Rosa. She replied
that she did not know her. Danilo then suddenly poked a knife, concealed
inside a hat, at the right side of the neck and handed her a cigarette pack with
a note and ordered her to give it to Aling Rosa. Then, they walked, with the
knife still at her neck. They boarded a jeepney where he forcibly took her
earrings. They were the only passengers on board. Upon reaching Navotas,
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
they alighted and he dragged her to a vacant lot where he let her chose
between rape and death. She then struggled and ran. She saw policemen and
shouted for help. Danilo ran but the police caught up with him and both were
brought to the Navotas police station. Her parents arrived and brought her to
the Valenzuela police station where they filed a complaint against the accused.
The accused alleged that the RTC of Valenzuela where the case was being
heard has no jurisdiction over the case since the robbery was not perpetrated
in Navotas.
ISSUE: WON the Valenzuela RTC has jurisdiction.
HELD: Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, aircraft or in any
other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action
may be instituted and tried in the court any municipality where such train,
aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip, including the place of
departure and arrival. In the case at bar, it would seem that the prosecution
failed to establish the precise place where the highway robbery was supposedly
committed other than Navotas. Hence, the Valenzuela RTC had no jurisdiction
over the offense.
Leah Marie did not know the place/s where their vehicle passed, the exact
place where they boarded the jeep and the exact place where Panlilio took her
earrings. Panlilio was however correctly found guilty of kidnapping.
PEOPLE VS. YABUT
76 SCRA 624
Digest by: Bong Malibiran
KEYWORDS: Yabut Transit Line; Freeway Tires Supply; Malolos Bulacan/Caloocan
BRIEF: Respondent issued a check in Malolos, Bulacan, drawn against Merchants
Banking Corporation in Caloocan City where it was dishonored for lack of
funds. Continuing offense.
FACTS: (CHARACTERS: Cecilia Que Yabut, Treasurer of Yabut Transit Line;
Geminiano Yabut,Jr., President of Yabut Transit Line  Respondent; Alician P.
Andan, owner and operator of Freeway Tires Supply and Freeway Caltex
Station  Complainant; 1970s, Decision Promulgated April 29, 1977)
• Sometime February 1975, Cecilia Yabut and husband Geminiano
Yabut, Jr., treasurer and president of Yabut Transit Line respectively,
issued checks in favor of Freeway Tires Supply, drawn against
Merchants Banking Corporation.
o The amounts of the checks were P6,568.94 and P37,206.00 as
payments for “articles and merchandise delivered to and
received by accussed” (2 informations)
Vena V. Verga
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• Both Yabut Transit Line and Freeway Tires Supply were doing business
in Bulacan, while the bank was located in Caloocan city.
• The checks bounced because of insufficient funds, hence, the accused
were charged with estafa. (B.P. Blg. 22 Bouncing Checks Law took
effect only on April 18,1979)
• Respondents filed a motion “to quash the information on two grounds:
(1) the facts recited do not constitute an offense because the checks
were issued in payment of pre-existing obligation; and (2) the venue
was improperly laid” because the information was filed in Bulacan, but
the damage was done in Caloocan City.
RELEVANT ISSUE: W/N the information was filed at the proper venue (Bulacan)?
COURT RULING: Yes.
RATIO: (PONENTE: MARTIN, J.)
“Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Art. 315¶2(d) of
the RPC may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its basic element of deceit
and damage may independently arise in separate places. In the even of such
occurrence, the institution of the criminal action in either place is legally
allowed. Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court1 provides: ‘In all
criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the Court of the
municipality or province wherein the offence was committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took place.’ x x x The estafa charged in the two
informations involved in the case before Us appears to be transitory and
continuing in nature. Deceit has taken place in Malolos, Bulacan, while the
damage in Caloocan City, where the checks were dishonored by the drawee
banks there. Jurisdiction can, therefore, be entertained by either the Malolos
court or the Caloocan court.
SECONDARY ISSUE:
“Ad interim, We hold that the facts charged in the information against
private respondents, contrary to their claim, constitute estafa x x x. In
considering a motion to quash based on the ground ‘that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense,’ the point of resolution is whether the facts alleged,
if hypothetically admitted, would meet the essential elements of the offense as
defined in the law. The facts alleged in the criminal charge should be taken as
they are.”
PEREZ VS. HAGONOY RURAL BANK, INC.
GR 126210, 327 SCRA 588 (Mar 9, 2000)
1
Now Section 15(a) of Rule 110.
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. owns Hagonoy Money Shop employing Cristina Perez
as OIC, Cashier and Teller, Alberto Fabian as bookkeeper, Cristina Medina and
Milagros Martin as solicitors/field managers. The Laya, Manabat, Salgado and
Company, an independent management, consultancy and accounting firm,
conducted an audit of the financial affairs of the money shop. It found
anomalies in more or less 28 saving accounts consisting of withdrawals
amounting to Php 879,7270.08, which were recorded in the subsidiary ledgers
but not in the passbooks. The signatures in the slips were forged. Respondent
then filed an affidavit –complaint for estafa against the said employees and 2
outsiders, Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas. Finding prima facie evidence,
the Acting provincial prosecutor filed the corresponding information with the
Malolos RTC. The charges against Jordan and Mangahas were dismissed. Upon
appeal to the DOJ, the Sec of Justice ordered the prosecutor to cause the
dismissal of the information against Perez for insufficiency of evidence. The
judge granted the motion to dismiss on the basis of the secretary’s
recommendation and that private respondent had no legal personality to
question the said dismissal.
ISSUES: WON the judge correctly dismissed the charges against Perez.
WON private respondent has personality to question the said dismissal.
HELD: the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he granted the
motion to dismiss the criminal charges against Perez on the basis solely of the
recommendation of the Justice Secretary. The judge did not make an
independent evaluation /assessment of the merits of the case. His reliance on
the recommendation of the Secretary was an abdication of the court’s duty and
jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.
Private respondent, as private complainant, has legal personality to assail the
dismissal of the criminal case against Perez. Respondent retains the right to
bring a special civil action in his own name in criminal proceedings before the
courts of law. It follows that it could move for a reconsideration of the order of
the trial court dismissing the charges against Perez.
RULE 111
CASES
REPUBLIC VS. CA
403 SCRA 403 (2003)
Facts: Private Respondent Navotas Industrial Corporation (NIC) was awarded
one of the dredging contract by DPWH worth Php 195M to be completed within
a year. NIC filed a complaint against the Republic through the DPWH
maintaining that they accomplished 95% of the work and yet DPWH has paid
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
them only 79% of the total amount due to them. In its answer, DPWH
contends that NIC is not entitled to the amount claimed since according to the
fact-finding committee of the former, the contract between them and the latter
was void. It was said that NIC started the work even before the contract was
awarded to them. It was clear therefore that the contract was awarded
without public bidding and through connivance with some DPWH officials.
DPWH later on filed a case at the Office of the Tanod Bayan (Estafa through
falsification of public documents)and a case in the Malabon RTC to recover the
sum already paid to the NIC. In addition, petitioner Republic then filed, also
before the Malabon trial court a motion to consolidate the civil case (filed by
NIC) and the case in the Sandiganbayan arguing that the civil case for
collection and the criminal cases arose from the same incidents and involve the
same facts. The CA ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have any
jurisdiction over collection of sum of money since the latter not involving
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. Hence this appeal.
Issue: W/N the CA erred in not ordering the consolidation of the Civil case
filed with the RTC and the criminal case that was filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Decision: No. Consolidation is a matter of discretion of the court. It becomes
a matter of right only when the cases sought to be consolidated involve similar
question of fact and law provided certain requirements are met. The purpose
of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, prevent delay, clear congested
dockets, etc. Such consolidation cannot be ordered in this case since: 1) the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the collection case and 2) the Rules of
court do not allow the filing of a counterclaim or a 3 rd party complaint in a
criminal case.
An essential requisite of consolidation is that the court must have jurisdiction
over all the cases consolidated before it. Since Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over collection case, the same cannot be consolidated with the
criminal cases even if these cases involve similar question of fact and law.
A counter claim in a criminal case must be litigated separately to avoid
complication and confusion in the resolution of the criminal cases. This is the
rationale of Section 1 Rule 111. This same rationale applies to NIC’s collection
case against the petitioner and DPWH. NIC’s case must be litigated separately
to avoid confusion in resolving the criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan.
FRANCO VS. IAC
GR 71137, 178 SCRA 331 (Oct 5, 1989)
Facts: At around 730pm, Macario Yuro, driver of Franco bus, swerved to the
left to avoid a truck with a trailer parked along the cemented pavement of
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Macarthur Highway in Capas, Tarlac, and collided with an incoming Isuzu Mini
Bus driven by Magdaleno Lugue. The mini bus was a total wreck while the
Franco bus was also damaged but not as severe. The two drivers died instantly
along with two other passengers of the mini bus, Romeo Bue and Fernando
Chuay. The registered owner of the mini bus, wife of victim Chuay and wife of
driver Lugue filed an action for damages through reckless imprudence before
the CFI of Angeles City against Mr and Mrs Federico Franco, the owners and
operators of the Franco Transportation Company. The defendants alleged that
they exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of all of their
employees which however was rejected by the trial court when it held that the
act of the Franco bus driver is a case of criminal negligence resulting in a civil
obligation. On appeal, the IAC found Yuro guilty of reckless or criminal
imprudence resulting in the subsidiary liability of the owners. The IAC
increased the award of damages.
ISSUES: W/N Franco, as Employer, is liable for the acts dome by his driver.
W/N the IAC may increase the damages in favor of respondent
Chuay and Lugue who did not appeal the said decision.
HELD: Under Art 103 RPC, before the employer’s liability may be proceeded
against, it is imperative that there should be a criminal action whereby the
employee’s criminal negligence on delict and the corresponding liability
therefore are proved. In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted
because the driver who is primarily liable died. Petitioner’s subsidiary liability
cannot stand since it is merely secondary to the employee’s primary liability.
However, under Art 2176 and 2180, NCC, petitioner’s liability is based on culpa
aquiliana which holds employer primarily liable for tortuous acts of its
employees subject to the defense of the exercise of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its employees. In the case at bar, appellants
were not able to establish the said defense. Hence, petitioners are liable for the
said damages pursuant to their primary liability under the NCC. The IAC erred
in increasing the amount of damages in favor of Chuay and Lugue, neither of
whom appealed.
YONAHA VS. CA
GR 112346, 255 SCRA 397 (Mar 29, 1996)
Facts: At about 11:45am in Lapu-Lapu City, the accused Elmer Ouano is
driving a Toyota Tamaraw registered in the name of Raul Cabahug and owned
by EK SEA Products when he unlawfully maneuvered his vehicle in a reckless
manner, bumping Hector Cañete which resulted to the victim’s reqath due to
multiple severe traumatic. The accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced
accordingly. Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued for the satisfaction of
the monetary award but the accused was unable to pay for it. Respondents
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
then filed a motion for subsidiary execution with neither notice of hearing nor
notice to the petitioner. The trial court issued the writ and the sheriff went to
petitioner’s residence to enforce it but petitioner filed a motion to recall the
writ for lack of prior notice and the employer’s liability had yet to be
established.
ISSUE: W/N the subsidiary liability could be enforced against the petitioner.
HELD: It is a measure of due process to the employer that a hearing be set to
prove the subsidiary liability of the petitioner. The employer must be given his
full day in court.
The employer must be afforded due process by holding a hearing to determine
his liability on the basis of the conditions required by law, namely: (a) the
existence of an employer-employee relationship; (b) that the employer is
engaged in some kind of agency; (c) that the employee is adjudged guilty of
the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of
his duties (not necessarily any offense he may committee; and (d) that said
employee is insolvent. All of these were not afforded to the petitioner.
The orders of the CA should be set aside and the case remanded for further
trial.
NAGUIAT VS. IAC
G.R. No. 73836, 164 SCRA 505 (August 18, 1988)
Facts: Timog Silangan Development Corporation is engaged in the business of
developing and selling subdivision lots in Timog Park in Angeles City, with
Manuel P. Lazatin as its President. Petitioner Antolin T. Naguiat purchased, on
installment basis, 4 lots from TSDC, Lots Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16, of Block 26
of Timog Park, each with 300 square meters with a price of P60.00 per square
meter. Petitioner made a down payment of P7,200.00 which is 10% of the total
price of P72,000.00.
The Contract to Sell between them stipulated a two-year period within which to
pay. Naguiat fully paid the price of Lot 16, after which, the title was issued. He
again paid the balance of the 3 other lots. Then, petitioner demanded that the
titles thereof be issued but TSDC refused on the ground that the balance was
not yet fully paid and non-compliance with the stipulations in the contract that
constructions on the lots be finished within 6 months and that petitioner failed
to make constructions as to other lots. Petitioner was not entitled to the 10%
rebate (since he was not able to finish building within 6 months), hence, the
previous payments did not amount to full payment.
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Petitioner then filed a complaint for specific performance with damages, with
the RTC of Angeles City, praying for the delivery of the TCTs and damages. He
also filed with the City Fiscal of Angeles City a criminal complaint against
respondent Lazatin, for violation of PD No. 957, Section 25, which states that
the owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot upon full payment.
Thereafter, information was filed against Lazatin. Petitioner filed a motion to
consolidate the Civil Case and Criminal Case, which the court granted.
However, the CA reversed the decision on the consolidation issue,
ISSUE: W/N the cases may be consolidated.
HELD: Civil Actions that may be consolidated under Section 3(a) of Rule 111 is
one for civil liability arising from the criminal offense or of ex-delicto and not
ex contracto or one that is base on a contract to sell. In the case at bar, the
civil action filed by the petitioner was for specific performance with damages.
The main relief sought in the latter case, i.e., the delivery of the certificates of
title to the lots which petitioner had allegedly fully paid for, was grounded on
the Contract to Sell between the petitioner and the private respondent. Hence
the civil action filed by the petitioner was for the enforcement of an obligation
arising from a contract, or ex contractu and not one for the recovery of civil
liability arising from an offense; hence, the law invoked by the petitioner is
inapplicable.
But, as held in Canos v. Peralta, the consolidation of a criminal action with a
civil action arising not ex delicto, may still be done, based upon the express
authority of Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court (actions involving a
common question of law or fact – court may order a joint hearing). In the case
at bar, the nature of the issues involved, at least, the factual issues in the civil
and criminal actions are almost identical. The evidence would virtually be the
same.
Hence, petitioner's counsel may act as counsel for the plaintiff in the civil case
and private prosecutor in the criminal case which will be conducive to the early
termination of the two (2) cases, and will redound to the benefit and
convenience of the parties; as well as to the speedy administration of justice.
Case may be consolidated not y virtue of the provision of Section 3, Rule 111
but y virtue of Section 1, Rule 31.
BUNAG VS. CA
G.R. No. 101749, 211 SCRA 440 (July 10, 1992)
Facts: One afternoon Conrado Bunag, Jr. brought Zenaida Cirilo, his 26 years
old sweetheart, to a motel where he deflowered her as his companion held her
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feet. Later Bunag jr brought her to his grandmother’s house in Pamplona, Las
Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21
days. Bunag, Jr. and Zenaida filed their respective applications for a marriage
license but the former withdrew the same. Bunag jr left her and never
returned. He also promised to marry her but did not fulfill it. A complaint for
damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by Zenaida Cirilo
against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr.
praying for damages. Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and all liability.
Respondent appealed decision absolving Bunag, Sr. from civil liability in the
case. Bunag, Jr. field this appeal alleging that court failed to take into
consideration the alleged fact that he and private respondent had agreed to
marry.
ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the criminal case carries with it extinction of the
civil case.
HELD: A person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other
words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same
felonious act results in damage or injury to another, and is the direct and
proximate cause thereof. Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of civil liability, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist.
In the case at bar, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with
rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage.
There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way
affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising
from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not
carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
VILLEGAS VS. CA
G.R. No. 82562, 271 SCRA 148 (April 11, 1997)
Facts: Assemblyman Antonio V. Raquiza filed a libel suit against Manila Mayor
Antonio J. Villegas, who publicly imputed to him acts in violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in a public statement, a radio-TV interview and
a public statement prior to his appearance before the Senate Committee on
Public Works. The Committee observed that the allegations in the complaint
were based on the uncorroborated testimony of a certain Pedro U. Fernandez,
whose credibility turned out to be highly questionable.
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
After the investigation, Raquiza was cleared of all charges by the Committee.
Then, an information for libel was filed by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila
with the then CFI of Manila against Villegas who denied the charge. After losing
in the 1971 elections, Villegas left for the US where he stayed until his death.
Nevertheless, trial proceeded on absentia. The court dismissed the criminal
aspect of the case and ordered that Raquiza be paid damages by the heirs of
Villegas. The CA affirmed the lower court. Hence, this appeal by Villegas’ heirs.
ISSUE: W/N the death of Villegas before final judgment extinguished his civil
liability.
HELD: The survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be
predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. The death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed.
Corollarily, his claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
(the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
against the executor or administrator of the estate of the accused, depending
on the source of obligation.
In the case, the source of Villegas' civil liability is the felonious act of libel he
allegedly committed. Yet, this act could also be deemed a quasi-delict within
the purview of Article 33 in relation to Article 1157 of the Civil Code thus, civil
liability may still be enforced (Bayotas Doctrine). The Bayotas doctrine makes
enforcement of a deceased accused’s civil liability dependent on two factors:
that it be pursued by filing a separate civil action and that it be made subject
to section 1 of rule 111.
In the case at bar, the civil action was deemed instituted with the criminal.
There was no waiver of the civil action and no reservation of the right to
institute the same, nor was it instituted prior to the criminal action. Hence, the
court should have dismissed both actions against Villegas which dismissal will
not, however, bar Raquiza as the private offended party from pursuing his
claim for damages against the executor or administrator of the former's estate,
notwithstanding the fact that he did not reserve the right to institute a civil
separate civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code.
PAREDES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
252 SCRA 641 (1996)
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Facts: Teofilo Gelacio, then vice mayor of San Francisco Agusan del Sur filed a
complaint against Paredes, then provincial governor and Mansueto Honrada for
alleged conspiracy in making it appear by falsifying public documents that
arraignment has been held in a case involving Paredes when in fact, no
arraignment was done. An information was filed by the Sandiganbayan against
the Paredes and his accomplice. An administrative case for falsification was
also filed with the trial court by Gelacio against Mansueto, the clerk of court
who made the certifications. The second case was dismissed for insufficiency
of the evidence. But the Graft Investigation found probable cause to proceed
against the defendants. Paredes now contends that the case in the
Sandiganbayan should also be dismissed invoking the ruling in the case of
Maceda vs. Vasquez that only the regular courts has the power to oversee
court personnel’s compliance with laws and take the appropriate administrative
action against them for their failure to do so.
Issue: W/N the case in the Sandiganbayan should also be dismissed since the
administrative case was also dismissed.
Decision: It has been held that one thing is administrative, quite another is the
criminal liability. The determination of the administrative liability for
falsification of public documents is in no way conclusive of his lack of criminal
liability. The dismissal of the administrative case does not necessarily bar the
filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the
subject of the administrative complaint.
RULE 112
CASES
RULE 112 CASES
PANGANDAMAN VS. CASAR
No. L-71782, 159 SCRA 599 (Apr 14, 1988)
Facts: On 27 July 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao
del Sur, leaving at least five persons dead and two wounded. The next day,
Atty. Mangurun Batuampar, representing the widow of one of the victims, filed
a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi City, asking for a "full
blast preliminary investigation" of the incident and the filing of the affidavits.
The Provincial Fiscal indorsed it to the respondent Judge. However, no case
was presented until 10 August 1985, when a criminal complaint for multiple
murder was filed by P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laruan. The judge examined personally
all 3 witnesses reducing to writing the questions witnesses and answers.
Thereafter, the Judge approved the complaint and issued the corresponding
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
warrant of arrest against the 14 petitioners and 50 John Does. Atty. Batuampar
filed an ex-parte MR to recall the warrant and to conduct a thorough PI on the
ground that the judge’s initial investigation was hasty and with no searching
questions, which the judge denied. Petitioners alleged that the judge could not
have determined probable cause against the 64 accused since the MTC is open
only from 8am to 1pm. They further alleged that the judge disregarded the
fiscal who had taken cognizance of the case and about to conduct its own PI
and that the warrant violates the constitution requiring that such warrants
should particularly describe the persons or things to be seized. Hence the
present petition.
Issue: W/N the judge had the power to issue warrant of arrest without
completing the PI.
Decision: In PI, a judge of an inferior court must observe the proceeding
prescribed in Sec 3, Rule 112, 1985 Rules of Court. Pi consists of two phases.
The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the
complaint and the affidavits and other documents offered in support thereof.
And it ends with the determination by the Judge either: (1) that there is no
ground to continue with the inquiry, in which case he dismisses the complaint
and transmits the order of dismissal, together with the records of the case, to
the provincial fiscal; or (2) that the complaint and the supporting documents
show sufficient cause to continue with the inquiry and this ushers in the second
phase.
This second phase is designed to give the respondent notice of the complaint,
access to the complainant's evidence and an opportunity to submit counter-
affidavits and supporting documents. At this stage also, the Judge may conduct
a hearing and propound to the parties and their witnesses questions on
matters that, in his view, need to be clarified. The second phase concludes with
the Judge rendering his resolution, either for dismissal of the complaint or
holding the respondent for trial, which shall be transmitted, together with the
record, to the provincial fiscal for appropriate action.
Such procedure must be followed before the filing of the complaint in the RTC.
Otherwise, there is a denial of due process. In the case, no information has yet
been filed with the RTC. There is no pretense that the PI has been completed
and the judge does not intend to undertake the 2 nd phase. In this situation, it
cannot be said that he has failed to observe the procedure. Completion of the
entire procedure of the PI is not required before a warrant of arrest may be
issued. The rule authorizes the MTC to order such arrest even before the
completion of the PI if said court is satisfied that a probable cause exists.
Hence, the warrants were validly issued.
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WEBB VS. DE LEON
GR 12134, 247 SCRA 652 (Aug 23, 1995)
Facts: On 19 June 1994, the NBI filed a letter-complaint with the DOJ charging
petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio Lejano and six others of
the crime of rape with homicide. The DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors
headed by Asst. Chief Prosecutor Jovencio Zuno to conduct the preliminary
investigation on the killing on 30 June 1991 of Carmela Vizconde, her mother
Estrellita and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in BF Homes, Parañaque.
In the PI, the NBI submitted sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, 2 former
housemaids of the Webb family, 2 of the Vizconde maids, a security guard, and
a car engineer. An autopsy report was also submitted confirming the presence
of spermatozoa on Carmela. Before submitting his counter-affidavit, Hubert
filed a motion for production of evidences and documents with the DOJ which
was granted and the NBI reproduced it. However, the original statement of
Alfaro was lost but they were able to get a copy from Atty Mercader, Jr. Hubert
failed to get a copy of the FBI report. Hubert claimed that he was in the US at
the time of the crime which was corroborated by evidences and testimonies.
The same was done by other accused.
The DOJ found probable cause and recommended the filing of an information
for rape with homicide against the petitioners with the Parañaque RTC which
was eventually presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued the arrest
warrants. The accused voluntarily surrendered, but in their present petition,
they contend that the judge abused their discretion when they failed to
conduct a PI before issuing the warrant.
ISSUE: W/N the judge should conduct its own PI before issuing a warrant of
arrest.
W/N there is probable cause for the crime of rape with homicide.
W/N the warrant has been properly issued.
HELD: The investigating fiscal finds probable cause to hold respondent for trial.
He shall prepare the resolution and the information. In determining probable
cause, facts and circumstances are weighed without resorting to technical rules
of evidences, but rather based on common sense. Probable cause are the facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and was committed by the
suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidences of guilt. In
the case, the DOJ panel did not abuse its discretion when it found probable
cause against the petitioners. It correctly adjudged that enough evidences had
been adduced to establish cause and clarificatory hearing was unnecessary
since PI is not part of trial.
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. The DOJ‘s report satisfied
both judges that there is probable cause to issue such warrants. They do not
conduct a hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just
personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding probable
cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidences. The fiscal need not call
the wirnesses for clarificatory questioning if the evidence on hand already
yields probable cause. The fact that it took respondent judges a few hours to
review and affirm the probable cause determination of the DOJ panel does not
mean that they made no personal evaluation of the evidences of the case.
DRILON VS. CA AND DR. AGUILA
GR 115825, 258 SCRA 280 (July 5, 1996)
Facts: Godofredo Añonuevo was shot in the back by Manolo Ramos and was
then brought to a hospital for treatment of head injuries. Later, he was again
shot and treated after being confronted by Marcia Reyes regarding his
revelation of her indebtedness secret. After which, he was taken to a poultry
farm in Conception where was shot and subsequently brought to the Batangas
Regional Hospital where Dr. Aguila (which was said to be an accomplice)
refused to treat him. Añonuevo gave 3 statements to narrate the whole crime.
His counsel then requested petitioner DOJ Secretary Drilon to order the
transfer of the PI from Batangas to the office of the State Prosecutor at the
DOJ which was granted. State Prosecutor Reynaldo Lugtu conducted a PI and
found a prima facie case for Kidnapping with frustrated murder against Ramos,
Agapito Reyes, Marca Reyes, Egay Perez, Ariel Hubilla, Dr Aguilar and
Adoracion Moraleja. An information was then filed with the Batangas City RTC.
Subsequebtly, a petition for review and reinvestigation was denied by DOJ
USEC and DOJ Secretary. The case was reassigned and re-raffled to the Manila
RTC.
Dr. Aguila sought prohibition with TRO and preliminary injunction to set aside
the resolution of Lugtu with the CA which was granted. Unaware that the raffle
had already been conducted, the accused filed a motion to hold in abeyance
the issuance of a warrant of arrest and to defer the raffle with the Manila RTC.
Not knowing of the said motion, the Manila RTC issued the order of arrest. The
CA enjoined the RTC from proceeding with the case. CA likewise excluded Dr
Aguilar from the information having found no probable cause against him.
ISSUE: W/N the criminal prosecution can be restrained upon the claim of
accused Dr. Aguila that there is no prima facie case against him.
HELD: the purpose of the PI is to establish PC, which implies probability of guilt
and requires more that bare suspicion but less than evidence which would
justify conviction. PC should be determined in a summary but scrupulous
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manner to prevent material damage to the constitutional rights of the accused
and guarantees of freedom and fair play. Courts should give credence, in the
absence of clear showing of arbitrariness, to the finding and determination of
PC by the prosecutors in the PI, who are vested with quasi-judicial discretion in
the discharge of said function. Hence, the state prosecutor did not abuse its
discretion in finding PC against Dr Aguilar. The court directed his inclusion in
the information and the continuance of the case.
GO VS. CA
GR 101837, 206 SCRA 138 (Feb. 11, 1992)
Facts: Rolito Go’s car nearly collided with the car of Eldon Maguan when the
latter entered a one-way street in San Juan, MM. Go went to Maguan and shot
him, and then he left. A security guard saw the plate number of Go’s car which
the police verified that it was registered to Elsa And Go. The police also
retrieved an empty shell and a round of live ammunition for a 9mm pistol. The
police also obtained a facsimile of Go’s credit card which it used in a bakeshop
before the incident and a positive verification by the security guard. The police
conducted a manhunt. Go surrendered and was positively identified by the
witnesses. A complaint for frustrated homicide was then filed with the office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. Go executed a waiver of Art 125 of the RPC
to avail of a PI be Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio. Maguan died before the
information could be filed. The prosecutor filed instead an information for
murder with the RTC, wherein the prosecutor certified that there was no PI
since Go did not waive Art 125. Counsel for petitioner then filed an omnibus
motion for immediate release and proper PI alleging that no PI was conducted
and the warrantless arrest was unlawful. Go’s petition for bail was approved
and his release was ordered. The prosecutor filed a motion for leave to conduct
PI and to suspend proceedings in the court which was granted. However, the
judge recalled the bail, PI, and immediate release and set aside the case for
arraignment. Petitioner was admitted at the Rizal Provincial Jail. Petitioner was
arraigned and hearings were conducted. Go then filed a petition for habeas
corpus in the CA which was issued. The CA also denied the deferment of the
arraignment and his other motions. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless arrest was lawful.
W/N petitioner effectively waived his right to PI.
DECISION: Go’s arrest took place 6 days after the shooting. The arresting
officers had no personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner was
the gunman. The information upon which the police acted had been derived
from statements of eyewitnesses. It is clear that there was no lawful
warrantless arrest of petitioner. Since he had not been arrested, he was also
not entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the PI.
The prosecutor should have conducted the PI upon the filing of the complaint
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
for frustrated homicide by the police since he should have been accorded with
such right without any conditions.
The court held that petitioner did not waive his right to PI. Such right is a
substantive right. To deny him of such right would deprive him of his right to
due process. PI is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the
time of entering a plea at arraignment. In the case, Go insisted on his right to
PI before his arraignment. He even asked for bail in one motion. Hence, we
cannot reasonably imply waiver of PI.
CRESPO VS. MOGUL
No L-53373, 151 SCRA 462 (June 30, 1987)
Facts: Asst Fiscal Proceso de Gala, with the approval of the provincial fiscal,
filed an information for estafa against Mario Crespo in the circuit criminal court
of Lucena City. The accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground
that there was a pending petition for review with the Sec of Justice. The judge
denied it but deferred the arraignment. Upon petition, the CA restrained the
judge from proceeding with the arraignment until the DOJ has resolved the
petition for review. The Justice Undersecretary directed the fiscal to move for
the dismissal of the information for insufficiency of evidence but the judge
denied it. The CA issued a TRO but later lifted it. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the TC may refuse to grant the motion to dismiss and proceed
with the trial of the case despite a motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon
order of the Sec of Justice.
HELD: Once an information is filed in court, the court’s prior permission must
be secured if the fiscal wants to reinvestigate the case. Whether the accused
had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the
fiscal or a review by the Justice Secretary whereby a motion to dismiss was
submitted to the court, the court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the
motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the
proper determination of the case. In this regard, the fiscal should continue to
appear in the case although he may turn over the presentation of evidence to
the private prosecutor but still under his discretion and control.
CRUZ, JR. VS. PEOPLE
GR 110436, 233 SCRA 439 (June 27, 1994)
Facts: GSIS filed 2 separate complaints against Roman Cruz, Jr., then
President and General-Manager of GSIS and President of the Manila Hotel, for
violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019. The first was filed with the Office of the
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Special Prosecutor for violation of RA 3019 while the second was filed with the
PCGG which was later endorsed to the Ombudsman. PCGG filed an information
with the Sandiganbayan after conducting a preliminary investigation. The OSP
likewise filed information for estafa through falsification of public documents
with the Sandiganbayan. The OSP earlier denied the motion to dismiss by
petitioner. Sandiganbayan consolidated the two cases but remanded the same
to the Ombudsman for reinvestigation. During the preliminary investigation,
petitioner submitted counter-affidavits and documents. The prosecutor
recommended the withdrawal of the information but the Ombudsman ordered
the prosecution to proceed. Petitioner filed an omnibus motion to quash the
information and for the Ombudsman to conduct further proceedings but the
same was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: W/N the Ombudsman should dismiss the information on the
recommendation of the prosecutor.
W/N the records of the preliminary investigation should be reproduced.
Held: It is discretionary upon the Ombudsman if he will rely mainly on the
findings of fact of the investigating prosecutor in making a review of the
latter’s report and recommendation as the Ombudsman can very well make his
own findings of fact. The Ombudsman does not conduct another investigation
but merely determines the propriety and correctness of the recommendation of
the investigating prosecutor that is, whether or not probable cause exist.
Hence, the courts should not interfere in the exercise of the Ombudsman’s
discretionary power. The fact that the information filed by the ombudsman
consists only of two paragraphs is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness on his
part, absent a clear showing that he abused his discretion.
The court is not tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted duing the
preliminary investigation. The lim case wherein it was held that if a judge
relies entirely on the certification of the prosecutor , he or se has not
personally determined probable cause, is not applicable in the case at bar. It
is sufficient that the judge evaluates the report and supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutin in determining probable cause.
There is no reason to deny the reproduction of the records of the preliminary
investigation since there was good cause on the part of the accused for the
reason that he may prepare for his defense.
DOLALAS vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 118808, 265 SCRA 819 (December 24, 1996)
Facts: Judge Ana Maria I. Dolalas, Evelyn K. Obido and Wilberto B. Carriedo —
Presiding Judge, Clerk of Court and Clerk II, respectively of MCTC of
Kabasalan, Zamboanga del Sur, were administratively charged by respondent
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Benjamin Villarante, Jr. for "miscarriage of justice, dishonesty, gross neglect of
duty, unnecessary delay in the administration of justice and for failure to
prosecute Criminal Case no. 5881 for an unreasonable length of time in the
Ombudsman-Mindanao.
The letter-complaint was due to a criminal case of alarms and scandals filed
against respondent by a police officer. Respondent alleged that after
submitting his counter-affidavit with the court, there has been no pre-
conference, arraignment or pre-trial held or conducted by the judge. He further
alleged that it was maliciously filed by P/Sgt. Salutillo in connivance with
petitioner judge in order to discourage the former from instituting a criminal
complaint against said police officer's men for abuse of authority and police
brutality with physical injury. The case was delayed due to the failure to
prosecute within a reasonable time. The Graft Investigation Officer I of the
Ombudsman directed petitioners to comment and denied the latter’s motion for
reconsideration. Hence the petition before this Court.
Issue: W/N the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over petitioners for purposes of
investigation and prosecution.
Decision: This Court agrees with petitioner-judge. The complaint against
petitioner-judge before the Office of the Ombudsman is basically administrative
in nature. In essence, petitioner-judge is being charged with having violated
Rule 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
It must be borne in mind that the resolution of the administrative charge of
unduly delaying the disposition of the said criminal case involves the
determination of whether, in resolving the alarms and scandals case,
petitioner-judge acted in accordance with the guidelines provided in the Rules
of Court and in the Administrative Circulars in pursuance of the ideals
embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Such is clearly an administrative
matter. Unquestionably, this Court is mandated of the 1987 Constitution to
assume under section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to assume
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. Hence,
the ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case at bar.
ACOP VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
GR 120422, 248 SCRA 566 (Sep 27, 1995)
Facts: On 18 May 1995, 11 suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng were
killed in a shootout by the NCR Command, Traffic Management Command,
PACC, CPDC and Criminal Investigation Command. Later, SPO2 Eduardo de los
Reyes of the Central Intelligence Command exposed that there was no
shootout. Then, the relatives of the slain suspects accused the policemen of
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murder and asked the CHR to conduct an investigation. The Ombudsman
directed petitioner Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs Casaclang to
monitor the investigations by the CHR, Senate and PNP. Casaclang requested
documents relative to the shootout from these bodies and agencies. SPO2
Corazon de la Cruz testified and corroborated the statements of de los Reyes.
He then created a panel of investigators which recommended the conduct of a
preliminary investigation after being furnished with documents and transcripts
of the Senate’s proceedings and the “After Operations Report” from PNP. He
ordered petitioners to submit counter-affidavits and evidences but the latter
neither complied nor moved for reconsideration. Instead, they questioned the
preliminary investigation without the required preliminary evaluation in their
respective petitions with the SC, which ordered both parties to comment.
However, Acting Ombudsman Villa ordered petitioner to file their counter-
affidavits, which caused petitioner to cite him in contempt. Villa likewise took
the petition from Casaclang who suspended the same pending resolution of the
petition by the SC. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WN the Ombudsman of the OSP has jurisdiction over the complaint.
W/N the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs may conduct PI.
Decision: Petitioners, who are PNP officers, are civilian personnel of the
government. The Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs is not prohibited from
performing other functions or duties affecting non-military personnel. The
Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-military personnel for investigation
by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs. Hence, there is no irregularity
attending the referral by the Acting Ombudsman of the case to Casaclang who
in turn created a panel of investigators.
Casaclang did not set the case for PI without the preliminary evaluation
required. In the case, Casaclang issued the questioned order after the panel of
investigators submitted its evaluation report. The conduct of such evaluation
involves the exercise of discretion which has not been abused in the case.
Through RA 6770, the OSP was made an organic component of the Office of
the Ombudsman. The ombudsman was granted with the power to investigate
public officers and employees over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
The OSP is also authorized to conduct PI over criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under the supervision and control and upon
the authority of the Ombudsman.
OCAMPO, IV vs. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. Nos. 103446-47, 225 SCRA 725 (August 30, 1993)
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Facts: Governor Mariano Ocampo III and his son, petitioner Mariano Ocampo
IV, were charged with violation of Sec. 3 (h) of Republic Act. No. 3019 in two
(2) separate informations filed before the Sandiganbayan. Mariano Ocampo III,
then Tarlac Governor and President-Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the
Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc. (LTFI), connived with Ocampo IV in loaning
P5,476,031.00 and P7,000,000.00 out of the National Aid for Local
Government Funds (NALGF) of Tarlac to the IMCOR, now the New Territory
Manufacturing, Inc., a private corporation where Ocampo IV is an incorporator
and stockholder, under terms and conditions grossly disadvantageous to the
government the same being interest-free, without collateral, and without, a
definite date of repayment.
Ocampo IV filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for reinvestigation which
was granted. After the reinvestigation, Special Prosecutors Roger C. Berbano,
Sr. and Rodolfo F. Reynoso of the OSP found that Ocampo IV did not connive
with his father, Gov. Ocampo III. The special prosecutors then recommended
that the informations against them be dismissed and withdrawn. However, the
Ombudsman disapproved the recommendation. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the Ombudsman abused its discretion in proceeding with the case
despite the recommendation of dismissal by the special prosecutor.
Decision: Criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either through a
preliminary or final injunction or, a writ of prohibition, except in some
instances. Courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or the
Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of the
offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be
insufficient in form or substance or if he otherwise finds no ground to continue
with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation of the complaint is,
in his view, in due and proper form.
The petition failed to show a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Ombudsman, whose act of disapproving the recommendation of the special
prosecutors to dismiss the informations filed is not whimsical or capricious.
Neither is it tainted with vindictiveness or arbitrariness. He disapproved the
recommendation of the special prosecutors because he sincerely believed that
there is sufficient evidence to indict both accused.
It should however be reiterated that, while it is the Ombudsman who has
full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in
Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is
Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of
case so much so that the informations may not be dismissed without
approval of the said court.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
RODRIGUEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR 61355, 120 SCRA 659 (Feb 18, 1983)
Facts: On 24 Jan 1964, Maximo Rodriguez was the provincial fiscal of Misamis
Oriental when he was designated as Ex-officio Register of Deeds of Misamis
Oriental and CDO City upon the register of the former Register of Deeds. Later,
respondent Digno Roa filed an affidavit complaint before the fiscal of CDO
charging Rodriguez of estafa, falsification and usurpation of public functions. A
subpoena was issued to petitioner who submitted his counter-affidavit. State
Prosecutor Lilia Lopez, who assisted the fiscal conducted a PI. Two months
later, he resigned from the service. Then, Lopez found probable cause against
petitioner with Isidro Udang and Josefa Ebora Pacardo. Before her resolution
could be approved by the DOJ, the office of the Tanodbayan was created to
which the entire records of the case were transferred. The Tanodbayan
prosecutor Francisco Rabanes set the case for PI but later dismissed the case
for lack of PC by just considering the records and counter-affidavit submitted
by petitioner. The Tanodbayan legal officer however recommended the setting
aside of the resolution and the filing of an information for violation of RA 3019.
A team of special prosecutors conducted the PI upon the recommendation of
the Tanodbayan prosecution and investigation office. The subpoena was served
upon petitioner’s wife since the former was in Catarman Northern Samar
hospital attending to his sick mother and proceeding directly to Manila for an
appearance before the CA. The PI was conducted in the presence of petitioner’s
law partner and son, Rufus Rodriguez, but petitioner denied them as his
representative since he was unaware of such PI. Consequently, an information
for violation of RA 3019 was filed before the SB. Petitioner’s motion to quash
was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: W/N PD 1606 creating the Tanodbayan is an ex-post facto law.
W/N the PI was properly conducted.
Decision: The Sandiganbayan is a national court stationed in Manila the fact
that an accused is placed to defraying greater expenses because the SB holds
courts in Manila only does not work PD 1606 which created it an ex post facto
law. It is not disputed that a subpoena was sent to petitioner as received by his
wife and that he was represented by his law partner and son who actively
the participated in the proceedings. Even if he denied their representation, it
the appears that petitioner had submitted a memorandum to the Tanodbayan and
the had ventilated his arguments at a hearing before the latter. Thus, petitioner
the had ample opportunity to be heard and was in fact heard. Further, PD 911
the authorizes the holding of an ex parte PI. If respondent does not appear, the PI
may proceed without him. Hence, the PI was properly conducted.
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
RULE 113
ARREST
Section 1. Definition of arrest. – Arrest is the taking of a person into
custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission
of an offense.
What is arrest?
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that hey may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense
Sec. 2. Arrest; how made. – An arrest is made by an actual restraint of
a person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the
person making the arrest.
Note: No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an
arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to a greater restraint
than is necessary for his detention.
How is an arrest made?
Arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest
Sec. 3. Duty of arresting officer. – It shall be the duty of the officer
executing the warrant to arrest the accused and deliver him to the
nearest police station or jail without unnecessary delay.
What does it mean when jurisprudence says that the officer, in making the
arrest, must “stand his ground”?
It means that the officer may use such force as is reasonably necessary to
effect the arrest
What is the duty of the arresting officer who arrests a person?
He must deliver the person immediately to the nearest jail or police station
Sec. 4. Execution of warrant. – The head of the office to whom the
warrant of arrest was delivered for execution shall cause the warrant
to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10)
days after the expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was
assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge who issued the
warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state
the reason therefore.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
Within what period must a warrant of arrest be served?
There is no time period. A warrant of arrest is valid until the arrest is effected
or until it is lifted. The head of the officer to whom the warrant was delivered
must cause it to be executed within 10 days from its receipt and the officer to
whom it is assigned for execution must make a report to the judge who issued
it within 10 days from the expiration of the period. If he fails to execute it, he
should state the reasons therefore
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112.
When is an arrest without warrant lawful?
A peace officer or private person may arrest without warrant:
1. when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is about to commit an offense
2. when an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause
based on personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it
3. when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another
Note: the phrase “just been committed” is used to hinder the abuse of
law enforcers
Personal Knowledge:
1. facts based on information
2. facts based on Reasonable Grounds of Suspicion Rule
3. of the death of victim and facts indicating that accused was the
assailant
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
NOTE:
1. Sec 5(a) – in flagrante delicto
• Knowledge must be at the time of, not after, arrest
• Personal knowledge is required
2. Sec 5(b) – hot pursuit arrest
• Elements
2.1 Offense have been committed
2.2 Offense has just been committed
2.3 Probable cause based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that persons to be arrested committed it
2.3.1 Personal knowledge of facts based on information allowed
2.3.2 Personal knowledge of facts based on reasonable grounds of
suspicion rule is not the rule
Buy Bust operation
• It is a form of entrapment which has been repeatedly accepted to be a
valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. The
violator is court in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting
the operation are not only authorized but duty bound to apprehend the
violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or
used in the commission of the crime
• “objective test”  demands that the detail so the purported
transaction must clearly and adequately shown: the initial contact
between the poser-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the
promise of payment of the consideration until the consummation of the
sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale
• buy-bust must be continuous
i. buy bust operation and search rejected for NOT being
continuous
Sec. 6. Time of making arrest. – An arrest may be made on any day
and at any time of the day or night.
Sec. 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant.
– When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the officer shall
inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and the fact
that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he flees or
forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or
when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer
need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest
but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant
shall be shown to him as soon as practicable.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
Sec. 8. Method of arrest by officer without warrant. – When making an
arrest without a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be
arrested of his authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter
is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued
immediately after its commission, has escaped, flees, or forcibly
resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when
the giving of such information will imperil the arrest.
Duty of the arresting officer to inform the accused of:
• the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any
• his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
any statement he might make could be used against him
• right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative or anyone he
chooses by the most expedient means
• arresting officer must see to it that this is accomplished.
• No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested or by any
person on his behalf or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf
• Right of counsel may be waived but the waiver shall NOT be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel
• RA 7438 adds
o The accused must be informed in a language he
understands
People vs. Mahinay – updating the Miranda case
1. Stating rights must be made in a language known and understood by
accused
2. Right to be assisted by a lawyer
3. If indigent, a lawyer will be provided
4. Right to remain silent
5. Informed that no custodial investigation in any manner may be
conducted without presence of accused’s counsel
6. At any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most
expedient means with his lawyer, any immediate family member,
medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from
his immediate family or by his counsel
7. Right to waive rights; in writing, voluntary, knowingly and intelligently
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
8. With the presence of counsel (this right was made effective on April
26, 1983)
9. May indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he
does not wish to be questioned – interrogation must cease
10. Waiver of right does not bar accused from invoking it at any time
11. Name if the arresting officer
12. Charge and reason for arrest
13. Inadmissible evidence
• It is only the solicited confession that would be inadmissible.
Warrrantless search/arrest are valid and admissible
Sec. 9. Method of arrest by private person. – When making an arrest, a
private person shall inform the person to be arrested of the intention
to arrest him and the case of the arrest, unless the latter is either
engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after
its commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before the
person making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him, or when
the giving of such information will imperil the arrest.
Sec. 10. Officer may summon assistance. – An officer making a lawful
arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to
assist him in effecting the arrest. Every person so summoned by an
officer shall assist him in effecting the arrest when he can render such
assistance without detriment to himself.
Sec. 11. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure. – An
officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or
without a warrant as provided in section 5, may break into any
building or enclosure where the person to be arrested is or is
reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance thereto, after
announcing his authority and purpose.
Sec. 12. Right to break out from building or enclosure. – Whenever an
officer has entered the building or enclosure in accordance with the
preceding section, he may break out therefrom when necessary to
liberate himself.
Sec. 13. Arrest after escape or rescue. – If a person lawfully arrested
escapes or is rescued, any person may immediately pursue or retake
him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the
Philippines.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
Sec. 14. Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested. – Any
member of the Philippine Bar shall, at the request of the person
arrested or of another acting in his behalf, have the right to visit and
confer privately with such person in the jail or any other place of
custody at any hour of the day or night. Subject to reasonable
regulations, a relative of the person arrested can also exercise the
same right.
QUESTION
A police officer was chasing a person who had just committed an offense. The
person went inside a house, so the police officer followed. Inside the house,
the police officer saw drugs lying around. Can he confiscate the drugs? Can he
use them as evidence?
Yes. The plain view doctrine is applicable in this case because there was a prior
valid intrusion, the police officer inadvertently discovered the evidence, he had
a right to be there, and the evidence was immediately apparent
What if the officer merely peaks through the window of the house and sees the
drugs – can he confiscate then> can he use them as evidence?
He can confiscate them without prejudice to his liability for violation of
domicile. He cannot use them as evidence because the seizure cannot be
justified under the plain view doctrine, there being no previous valid intrusion
When should an arrest be made?
It can be made on any day at any time of the day and night
Can an officer arrest a person against whom a warrant has been issued even if
he does not have the warrant with him?
Yes, but after the arrest, if the person arrested requires, it must be shown to
him as soon as practicable.
RULE 126
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Section 1. Search warrant defined. – A search warrant is an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a
judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for
personal property described therein and bring it before the court.
SEARCH WARRANT VS. WARRANT OF ARREST
SEARCH WARRANT WARRANT OF ARREST
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005

The applicant must show: The applicant must show: However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the
1. that the items sought are in fact 1. probable cause that an offense has application shall only be made in the court where the criminal
sizeable by virtue of being been committed; and action is pending.
connected with criminal activity; 2. that the person to be arrested
and committed it Where should the application for search warrant be filed?
2. that the items will be found in the As a general rule, it should be filed with the court within whose territorial
place to be searched. jurisdiction the crime was committed. But for compelling reasons, it can be
The judge must conduct a personal, The judge need not conduct a personal filed with the court within whose judicial region the offense was committed or
searching examination of the applicant and his where the warrant is to be served.
examination of the applicant and his witnesses. He may rely on the affidavits But, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application for a search
witnesses of the witnesses and the warrant can only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending.
recommendation of the prosecutor.
Sec. 3. Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be
issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
What is a search warrant? (a) Subject of the offense;
It is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, (b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search (c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
for personal property described therein and bring it before the court.
Subject Of A Search Warrant: Personal Property, Which Is:
Why are the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant more 1. subject of the offense,
stringent than the 2. stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense, or
requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest? 3. used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The violation of the right to privacy produces a humiliating effect which cannot
be rectified anymore. This is why there is no other justification for a search,
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall
except a warrant. On the other hand, in a warrant of arrest, the person to be
not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
arrested can always post bail to prevent the deprivation of liberty.
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may
Note: A search warrant requires strict compliance with the
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
Constitution
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must, before

Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. – An
application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed.
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court
within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the
place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
Vena V. Verga
Requisites for issuing a search warrant
1. There must be probable cause
2. Which must be determined personally by the judge
3. upon personal examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and
his witnesses in the form of probing and searching questions and answers on
facts personally known to them
4. the probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense
59
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
5. particularly describing the place to be searched and the items to be seized
6. the sworn statements together with the affidavits of the witnesses must be
attached to the record.
When is the affidavit or testimony of the witness said to be based on
personal knowledge?
The test is whether perjury could be charged against the witness.
Is it necessary that the person named in the search warrant be the
owner of the things to be seized?
No. Ownership is of no consequence. What is relevant is that the property is
connected to an offense.
What are the requisites of the personal examination that the judge
must conduct before issuing the search warrant?
The judge must:
1. examine the witnesses personally;
2. under oath;
3. and reduced to writing in the form of probing and searching questions and
answers.
What is the meaning of probable cause?
Probable cause for a search is such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched.
What is the meaning of personal knowledge?
Probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the
complainant or witnesses he may produce and not based on mere heresay.
What is the meaning of probing and searching questions and answers?
The examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro
forma, not merely answerable by yes or no.
Can you issue the warrant by claiming that the priest saw it?
No. because personal knowledge refers to personal knowledge of the applicant
for search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a
person whom one considers to be reliable.
• the abode is sacred
1. once transgressed, cannot restore the transgressed right
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
2. violating rule on searches and seizures is actionable under the
Civil Code because a man’s house is his castle
• personal knowledge is required so he can be liable for perjury
• there must be a hearing to determine probable cause
1. not merely Yes or No answers
2. cannot be base d merely on reliable information
• search warrant is severable, and those items not particularly described
may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant
What is a “scatter shot warrant”?
It is a warrant of arrest that is issued for more than one offense. It is void,
since the law requires that a warrant
of arrest should only be issued in connection with one specific offense.
A warrant was issued for the seizure of drugs connected with
“violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law.” Is the warrant valid?
The warrant is valid. Although there are many ways of violating the
Dangerous Drugs Law, it is not a scatter shot warrant since it is in
connection with only one penal law.
Sec. 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. – If the judge is satisfied
of the existence of facts upon which the application is based or that
there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the
warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these
Rules.
Sec. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. – The officer, if
refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice
of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door
or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to
execute the warrant to liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding
him when unlawfully detained therein.
Sec. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of
two witnesses. – No search of a house, room, or any other premises
shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or
any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses
of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
Note: the 2 witnesses rule applies if there is no other occupant of the
home
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Sec. 9. Time of making search. – The warrant must direct that it be
served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is
on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a
direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or
night.
General Rule: time of making the search is at the day time
Exceptions:
1. if there are emergencies
2. property is on the person or place to be searched
Sec. 10. Validity of search warrant. – A search warrant shall be valid
for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter, it shall be void.
Note: unlike a warrant of arrest, which is valid until served but the
officer must make a report after 10 days
Sec. 11. Receipt for the property seized. – The officer seizing the
property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to
the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and
seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the
presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he
found the seized property.
1. inventory must be signed by 2 witnesses
2. a peace officer cannot ask the accused to sign if there are
no 2 witnesses because that would violate the right against
self-incrimination
Sec. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and
proceedings thereon. – (a) The officer must forthwith deliver the
property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a
true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing
judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall
summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him
to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the
judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been
complied with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been
complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the
custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein
the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.
1. property will be in custodia legis
2. items in the search warrant will be the only items to be seized
• except: if malum prohibitum
3. particular description of: to avoid abuses
• place to be searched
• things to be seized
4. if there’s an error in the warrant, they should go to the court
to have it corrected
5. Anything not included in the warrant cannot be seized EXCEPT
if it is mala prohibita, in which case, the seizure can be justified under
the plain view doctrine. Even if the object was related to the crime,
but it is not mentioned in the warrant nor is it mala prohibita, it still
cannot be seized.
6. person need not be named; may be named John Doe as
long as described with particularity or with descriptio personae
QUESTIONS
What should the police officer or court do to things seized illegally?
Anything seized illegally must be returned to the owner unless it is mala
prohibita. In this case, it should be kept in custodia legis.
When should the search warrant be executed?
If possible, it should be executed during the daytime. But in certain cases, such
as when the things to be seized are mobile or are in the person of the accused,
it can be served during nighttime.
For how long is the search warrant valid?
It is valid for 10 days, after which the peace officer should make a return to
the judge who issued it. If the peace officer does not make a return, the judge
should summon him and require him to explain why no return was made. If the
return was made, the judge should determine if the peace officer issued a
receipt to the occupant of the premises from which the things were taken.
seized.
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005

If the warrant was executed even before the expiration of the ten-day
period, can the peace officer use the warrant again before it expires?
No. If the purpose for which it was issued has already been carried out, the
warrant cannot be used anymore.
The exception is if the search was not finished within one day, the warrant can
still be used the next day, provided that it is still within the 10-day period.
Sec. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.
• if detected through smell, not case of plain view but
probable cause (decided case)
• if detected by canines - as if police themselves have
smelled it
• if police chases a person, accidentally hits a jar,
where drugs pour out – not plain view
• if mall – private place, you waive your right against
unreasonable searches and seizures

Sec. 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence;

Warrantless Searches and Seizures:
where to file. – A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress
1. incidental to lawful arrest
evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the
• search must be contemporaneous and within immediate court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has
vicinity/control of the person arrested been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court
2. consented search that issued search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the
• conditions: motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the
a. right exists motion shall be resolved by the latter court.
b. person making the consent knows that he has the right
c. in spite of knowledge of the right, he voluntarily and I. SUMMARY
intelligently gives consent 1. The Constitution does not prohibit all kinds of searches and seizures. It
3. search of moving vehicles only prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
• search must be cursory i.e., don’t make a thorough search; 2. A search and seizure is unreasonable if it is made without a warrant,
just to have a look not to open trunks or the warrant was invalidly issued.
4. customs 3. A search and seizure without a warrant is still reasonable if conducted
5. checkpoints under the following circumstances:
6. RA requiring inspections or body checks in airports a. Incident to a lawful arrest
7. stop-and-frisk i. It must be made AFTER the arrest. The objective is to
8. emergency make sure that the life of the peace officer will not be
9. enforcement of health and sanitary laws or ordinances endangered.
ii. It must be contemporaneous with the arrest in both
time and place.
Plain View Doctrine b. Search of moving vehicles
1. valid intrusion c. Consent searches
2. item must be visible – seen without any further search; e.g. in i. Only the person whose right may be violated can give
a transparent bag the consent; it is a personal right.
ii. The requisites are:
3. inadvertent discovery 1. The person has knowledge of his right against
the search;
e.g. police chasing a person, sees a box, takes a peak and sees drugs 2. He freely gives his consent in spite of such
• can be seized because malum prohibitum but cannot knowledge.
d. Objects in plain view
be introduced as evidence because not in plain view
Vena V. Verga 62
Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
i. Requisites:
1. There must have been a prior valid intrusion,
and the officer must have had a right to be at
the place searched at the time of the search;
2. The evidence was inadvertently discovered;
3. The evidence must be immediately apparent;
4. There was no need for further search.
e. Customs searches
f. Stop and Frisk/ Exigent circumstances
g. Emergency
CASES:
PEOPLE VS. OANIS AND GALANTA
74 Phil. 256 22 July 1943
Facts: Captain Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan
received from Mayor Guido a telegram stating that a certain Anselmo Balagtas,
an escaped convict, was living with a ertain Irene in Cabantauan. Monsod
immediately ordered the arrest of Balagtas, dead or alive, should he offer
resistance or aggression. The accused Chief of Police Oanis and the
constabulary soldier Galanta were sent out to arrest Balagtas. The accused
arrived at the house of Irene who was supposedly the paramour of Balagtas.
When they were there, they saw a certain person who resembled Balagtas in
all his bodily appearance sleeping on a bamboo bed but facing the other
direction. The accused, without going around the house, started firing at the
man. They found out later on that the man was not really Balagtas. They
tried to invoke the justifying circumstance of having acted in fulfillment of a
duty.
In support of their theory of non-liability by reason of honest mistake of fact,
the two relied on the case of U.S. vs. Ah Chong were a cook accidentally
wounded a friend who was playing a trick on the latter.
Issue: W/N the two accused should be held liable.
Decision: Yes. Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in
using such force as is reasonable necessary to secure and detain the offender,
overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and
protect himself from bodily harm, yet he is never justified in using unnecessary
force or in treating him with wanton violence or in resorting to dangerous
means when the arrest could be affected otherwise. No unnecessary or
Vena V. Verga
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unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested
shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention.
A peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses
unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest. Although it is true that
Anselmo is a notorious criminal, but such does not constitute any justification
for killing the man when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in
fact asleep.
GALANG vs. CA
324 SCRA 139 (2000)
Facts: The victim, Carlos Oro, coming from his birthday celebration, went
home drunk. At around 8:00 in the evening, he figured in an altercation with
one Jojo Marcelo. The altercation reached the appellant who together with a
policeman proceeded to the place. Upon seeing Carlos, appellant drew his gun
and pointed it at the victim. The victim said that he will not fight back.
Thereafter, appellant grab the right arm of Carlos and forced him to kneel on
the ground with his right hand behind his back still being held by the appellant.
It was in that position that appellant pumped 2 bullets into Carlos’ which
caused his death.
Appellant claims self defense.
Issue: W/N the appellant should be held guilty as charged.
Decision: Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to [rove the guilt of
the accused. However, if the accused admits killing the victim and pleads self-
defense, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove such claim. Galang
was unsuccessful in proving his claim because the physical evidence supports
otherwise.
Granting form the sale of argument that unlawful aggression was attendant at
the initial stage, the same ceased when Carlos dropped his gun. The threat to
appellant’s life is no longer attendant.
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine-qua non for the justifying circumstance
of self-defense. There can be no self-defense complete or incomplete unless
the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the person defending
himself.
Policemen are bound by their duty to protect life, liberty and property. As their
position gives them great deal of advantage. A police officer is not justified in
using unnecessary force in enforcing arrest or in treating with wanton violence
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the arrested person or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could
be affect otherwise.
UNITED STATES VS. MOJICA
42 SCRA 784 (1922)
Facts: Artemio Mojica is a policeman in the city of Manila. On the evening of
December 13 1920, a constabulary soldier and a woman were arrested inside
the Walled City by the police, which caused considerable irritation among
constabulary troops stationed at Santa Lucia Barracks. The constabulary
soldiers, Armed with rifles and bayonet, convinced that Mojica was with the
men who arrested their fellow soldier, threatened the appellant with death if he
will not produce the arrested soldier and woman. The arrival of the patrol
wagon saved Mojica. The following day, the constabulary men returned.
Mojica, after calling for reinforcement, ran into a restaurant to avoid altercation
with the soldiers. When the reinforcement arrived. He re-appeared. However,
the victim and his two other companions resisted arrest. The deceased
Macasinag struck the appellant with his club. When he was about to stab
Mojica, the latter drew a shot inflicting a wound from which Macasinag died a
few days later.
The appellant contends that it was self defense.
Issue: W/N the appellant should be held liable for the death of Macasinag.
Decision: No. The appellant killed the victim in self-defense. The revised
penal code provides that anyone who acts in self-defense of his person shall be
exempt from criminal liability. Provided that the following circumstances
concur:
1. Unlawful aggression
2. Reasonable necessity for the means employed to prevent or repel it.
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
There was unlawful aggression on Macasinag’s part. A police officer, in the
performance of his duty, must STAND HIS GROUND and cannot, like private
individual, take refuge in flight; his duty requires him to overcome his
opponent. It was the deceased who attacked the appellant. He had the best
reason to believe that his life was in imminent danger.
It may be argued that the appellant should have used his club instead but a
policeman’s club is not very effective weapon against a drawn knife and a
police officer is not required to afford a person attacking him the opportunity
for a fair an equal struggle.
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UMIL vs. RAMOS
G.R. No. 81567 09 July 1990
Facts: These are eight (8) petitions for habeas corpus filed before the Court.
In Umil v. Ramos, the CAPCOM received information about a member of the
NPA Sparrow Unit being treated for gunshot would at the St. Agnes Hospital.
Upon verification, it was found out that the wounded person is Rolando Dural,
a member of the NPA liquidation Squad, responsible for the killing of 2 capcom
soldiers the day before. As such Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical
Services of the CAPCOM, where he was positively identified by eyewitnesses as
the gunman who killed the 2 Capcom soldiers. The arrest without warrant was
assailed in that Dural was not arrested while in the act of shooting, nor just
after the commission of the offense. Dural was arrested for being a member of
the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest of Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he
was committing an offense when arrested.
In Roque v. De villa, Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the NPA who had
surrendered, confessed that the house occupied by Renato Constantino was
being used as a safehouse of National United Front Commission of the CPP-
NPA, as such the house was put on military surveillance and a subsequent
search warrant was issued. Firearms, ammunition, radio and other
communication equipment were seized. Constantino then admitted that he
was a staff member of the executive committed of the NUFC. On the evening
of the same day, Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at the house of Constantino.
When accosted, he admitted that he is a regular member of the CPP-NPA and
was to deliver letters to the other members of the group. Found in
Buenaobra’s possession was a piece of paper containing a jumbled phone
number of Florida Roque, Sister of Amelia Roque alias Ka Nelia, at 69
Geronimo St, Caloocan. Acting on the leads provided as to the whereabouts of
Amelia Roque, military agents went to the place the next day. After seeking
permission to search the place, which was granted, they conducted a search in
the presence of the occupants of the house and the brgy. Capt. Of the place.
They found ledgers, journals, vouchers, subversive documents, as well as live
ammunitions. Amelia admitted ownership of the articles. Their arrests without
warrants were justified in that as members of the NUFC-CPP, they committed
subversion, which being a continuing offense, they were arrested while
committing an offense.
In Anonuevo V. Ramos, Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived of the
house of Renato Constantino, which was still under surveillance by the military.
The military agents noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked,
the agent found them to be loaded guns, for which the two did not possess
license to carry. They were later identified as Ka Ted and Ka Totoy of the CPP,
by their comrades who had already surrendered to the military. Their arrest
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without warrant is also justified because they were carrying unlicensed
firearms and ammunitions in their person why they were apprehended.
In Ocaya V, Aguirre, police officers, armed with a search warrant were
searching a house believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-
NPA. In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny
Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunition were found
in the car of Ocaya and so they were brought to the police headquarters. Vicky
Ocaya was arrested in flagrante delicto so that her arrest without warrant is
justified, since she had with her unlicensed ammunition when arrested.
In Espiritu v. Lim, Petitioner, who is the General Secretary of the
Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators nationwide, claims that at
about 5 am of 23 Nov. 1998, while he was sleeping in his home, he was
awakened by his sister who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his
jeepney. When he went down, he was immediately put under arrest. When he
asked for the warrant, none was presented. The respondents claim that the
petitioner was lawfully arrested without a warrant since when arrested he had
in fact just committed a crime in that in the afternoon of 22 Nov, 1998, during
a press conference at the National Press club he urged drivers and operators to
go on a nationwide strike, which is tantamount to inciting to sedition.
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Press Club in order to
investigate him, but he gave them the slip. Police finally caught up with him
on 23 November and thus, he was invited after which an information was filed
against him.
In Nazareno v. Station Commander, in the morning of December 4,
1988, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near Mendiola. One of
the suspects was Ramil Regala who was arrested by the police on 28 December
1988. Upon questioning, REgala pointed to Nazareno as one of his companion.
As such, police officers, without warrant, picked up Nazareno and brought him
to the police headquarters. As held in People v. Ancheta, the obligation of an
agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not
presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable
existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that
the agent making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the
existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same
grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated
therein.
Issue: W/N the arrest without warrant is legal.
Decision: Yes. In all these petitions, the record shows that the persons in
whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly
committed or were actually committing an offense when apprehended so that
their arrest without a warrant were clearly justified.
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UMIL vs. RAMOS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 03 October 1991
Facts: The petitioners seek a reconsideration of the court’s decision
upholding the validity of the warrantless arrest of the suspected NPA
members.
Decision: The court stressed that mere suspicion that one is a NPA member is
not a valid ground for the arrest without warrant. However, the court found no
merit to the motion for reconsideration. It was stressed that the writ of habeas
corpus being applied for by the petitioners exists as a speedy and effective
remedy to relieve the persons from unlawful restraint. However, there is no
unlawful arrest in this case. Again, as a general rule, no peace officer has the
power or authority to arrest anyone without a warrant of arrest except in those
cases expressly authorize by law specifically by Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules
of court which provide that:
A peace officer or a private person may without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
In the case of Rolando Dural, Dural was committing an offense when arrested
because he was arrested for being a member of a new people’s army, an
outlawed organization, where membership is penalized and for subversion,
which like rebellion is a continuing offense. Dural did not cease to be a
subversive simply because he was at the time of the arrest confined in St.
Agnes. Nor can it be said that Dural’s arrest was grounded on mere suspicion
by the arresting officers of his membership in the CPP-NPA. His arrest was
based on a probable cause as supported by actual facts. Dural’s arrest falls
under paragraph B of Rule which requires 2 conditions for valid arrest without
warrant: 1) that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense and
2) that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the
offense. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts
such as in this case: 1) the day before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2)
CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural, 2)
a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was
actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound and 3)
"Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.. These requisites were
complied with in the UMIL case.
As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done
in good faith by the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the
peace officers who arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in
good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform
their official duties. Dural was also promptly placed under the judicial custody.
In the case of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo and
Ramon Casiple and Vicky Ocaya their arrests, without warrant, are also
justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of
law and were found with unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition in
their persons. They were, therefore, caught inflagrante delicto which justified
their outright arrests without warrant, under Sec. 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of
Court.
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and
Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military agents to make the
arrests without warrant was the information given to the military authorities
that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantino and the other by
Benito Tiarnzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with
information as to their exact location mid the names of Renato Constantino and
Benito Tiamzon as residents. Also, there were several circumstances which
confirmed the belief of the military agents: first: search warrant was duly
issued to effect the search of the Constantino safehouse; second: found in the
safehouse was a person named Renato Constantino, who admitted that he was
a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were unlicensed
firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in
their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive
documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership
in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively
identified by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members.
An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to
arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of
Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public
interest in peace and order in our communities.
As in the case of Nazareno, the court held that the arrests of Espiritu and
Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by factual
circumstances.
Petition was denied.
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MALACAT vs. CA
G.R. No 123595 12 December 1997
DOCTRINE: There can be no valid flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of
the police officer that a crime had just been committed, was being committed
or was going to be committed.
The search was neither within the allowable scope of a stop of frisk for such is
limited to protective search of outer clothing for weapons. While in a stop and
frisk, probable cause is not required, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion
or hunch will not validate a stop and frisk. A genuine reason must exist in light
of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions.
Facts: Petitioner Sammy Malacat y Pandar was charged with violating Section
3 of PD No. 1866 which codified laws on illegal/unlawful acquisition and
disposition of ammunition and explosives. During the trial on the merits, the
prosecution presented police officers as witnesses. Rodolfo Yu, the arresting
officer and Josefino Serapio, the investigating officer testified that on 27
August 1990 at about 6:30 PM, in response to bomb threats reported seven
days earlier, he was on foot patrol wit three other police officers, all in uniform,
along Quezon Boulevard, in Quiapo near the Mercury Drug store in Plaza
Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim looking men posted at
opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard. It was said that the men
were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast. Yu positioned
themselves and observed both groups for about thirty minutes. When the
police approached one group, they all ran in different directions. As policemen
gave chase, Yu caught and apprehended the petitioner. Yu found
fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner’s “front waist line”. Yu’s
companion apprehended one Abdul Casan from whom a caliber revolver was
recovered. Yu added that he conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a
group of Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in Plaza Miranda.
Yu also recognized the petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990,
likewise in Plaza Miranda, he say petitioner and two others detonate a grenade.
The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen chased petition and his
companions. He also admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing
on the corner of Quezon Blvd. When he saw them on 27 August.
It was the contention of them petitioner that he merely went to Plaza Miranda
to catch a breath of fresh air when policemen arrived and ordered all males to
stand aside. The police searched petitioner and two other men but found
nothing in their possession.
Trial court ruled that the warrantless search was akin to a stop and frisk where
a warrant and seizure can be made without necessarily being preceded by an
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arrest and whose purpose is either to maintain status quo while police seeks to
obtain more information.
Issue: W/N there was a valid search.
Decision: NO. There are serious doubts surrounding the story of the police
officer. For one, the grenade that was supposedly found in Malacat’s
possession was not identified in court. Second, if indeed the petitioner had a
grenade with him and that two days earlier he was in a group about to
detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, and Yu and fellow officers chased but
failed to arrest them, then considering that Yu and his companions were in
uniform, and therefore easily cognizable as police officers, it was unnatural
that petitioner simply stood there in proximity to the police officers.
The search was invalid. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that
arrest without warrant is lawful if a police officer or private person, arrest a
person:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (in
flagrante delicto)
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it (hot pursuit arrest)
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped.
Valid warrantless searches are limited to: 1) customs searches; 2) search of
moving vehicles; 3) seizure of evidence in plain view: 4) consent searches; 5)
a search incidental to a lawful arrest and 6) stop and frisk. The trial court
validated the warrantless search as a stop and frisk. It was noted that the trial
court confused the concept of stop and frisk and of a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. In the latter, a precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search. In this instance, the law requires that there must first be a
lawful arrest before search can be made.
In the present case, there can be no valid flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of
Yu that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going
to be committed.
The search was neither within the allowable scope of a stop of frisk for such is
limited to protective search of outer clothing for weapons. While in a stop and
frisk, probable cause is not required, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion
or hunch will not validate a stop and frisk. A genuine reason must exist in light
of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions.
Vena V. Verga
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In the case at bar, stop and frisk was invalid for: 1) there are doubts as to Yu’s
claim that the petitioner was member of the group which attempted to bomb
plaza Miranda, 2) there was nothing in petitioner’s behavior or conduct which
could have reasonable elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes
were moving fast which is hardly recognizable considering that it was already
6:30PM, and 3) there were no bulges to even indicate the hidden weapon
inside the front waistline.
The challenged decision was set aside.
PEOPLE vs. MENGOTE
G.R. No. 87059 22 June 1992
Facts: Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the
strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his
warrantless search. On August 8, 1987, the western police district received a
call from an informer that there were two suspicious looking persons at the
corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was then dispatched. The officers observed two men looking
from side to side, one of whom was holding his abdomen. The police
approached them and identified themselves, the two men tried to run away but
to no avail. They were then searched and on Mengote a .38 caliber Smith and
Wesson revolver with 6 live bullets was found. They were turned over to the
police headquarters. It was found that the gun was owned by a certain
Rigoberto Danganan who identified the gun as among the articles stolen from
him during the robbery of his house in Malabon. Accused assails the
admissibility of the revolver in evidence because of its warrantless seizure.
Solicitor General contends that Mengote’s acts created a reasonable suspicion
on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an
offense had been committed.
Issue: W/N the search and seizure as well as the arrest was lawful.
Decision: The requirements for a warrantless arrest were not satisfied in this
instance. At the time of the arrest, Mengote was merely looking from side to
side and holding his abdomen. There was apparently no offense that had just
been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted
by Mengote in their presence for what offense could have been committed by
such unsinister acts. Mengote was arrested at 11:30 AM and in a crowded
street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with his companion. He
was not skulking in the shadows nor was any clandestine about his being on
the street at that busy hour. Moreover,
In the recent case of People vs. Malmstedt, the Court sustained the warrantless
arrest of the accused because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the
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suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned out to be a
pouch containing hashish. This case is different because there was nothing to
support the arresting officers' suspicions other than Mengote's darting eyes
and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have
been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was
actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.
Par. 5(b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have
also not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of
Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the
arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had
committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller,
and about a crime that had yet to be committed. The arresting officers had no
personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed an offense.
All they had was hearsay information from the phone caller. As the arrest was
illegal, the search incidental to it is likewise illegal and the item seized is not
admissible in evidence.
As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person, the
policemen discovered this only after he had been searched and the
investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor was he
licensed to possess it. As in the case of Burgos, it was reiterated that the
officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground
therefore. Such personal knowledge is lacing in the case at bar.
The arrest and the search being unlawful, the pistol cannot be admitted as
evidence.
Decision was reversed.
PEOPLE vs. BURGOS
144 SCRA 1 (1986)
DOCTRINE: Arrest without warrant is lawful when persons who have
committed, are actually committing, or attempting to commit an
offense in presence of arresting officer. In such cases, there can be no
illegal detention. Rule allowing arrest without warrant is strictly
construed. On the other hand, the usual cause of arbitrary detention is
arrest without warrant.
Facts: Ruben Burgos appeals to the court to reverse the ruling of the Lower
court finding him guilty of illegal possession of firearms. Evidence shows that
by virtue of intelligent information obtained by the constabulary stationed in
Digos Davao, Burgos was arrested and his house searched without warrant for
being an NPA member and committing subversive acts.
Vena V. Verga
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Issue: W/N the arrest and the search were valid.
Decision: No. The trial court justified the warrantless arrest saying that at the
time of the arrest, the accused is committing a crime and therefore, the search
was also valid as being incidental to a lawful arrest. However, the Supreme
Court held that the police had no personal knowledge of the fact that indeed
Burgos was committing a crime when he was arrested. Whatever knowledge
they possessed was merely furnished by the informant. At the time of the
appellant’s arrest, he was plowing his field and was not even in possession of
any forearm or subversive document. There is also no compelling reason for
the police not to apply for a warrant of arrest or a search warrant. Under
Section 6(a0 of Rule 112, the officer arresting a person who ahs just
committed, is committing or is about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or
within his view. Considering that the firearm and the subversive documents
were found in violation of the right of Burgos, they cannot be admitted in
court. Conviction of the lower court was reversed.
PEOPLE vs. AMINNUDIN
163 SCRA 402 (1988)
Facts: Accused appellant claims that his business was selling watches. He was
arrested on June 25, 1984 shortly after disembarking from MV Wilcon 9.
Based on the testimony of the police, they received a reliable tip two days
before of a drug operation allegedly headed by the accused. He was already
identified by name and the police knew exactly the date of his arrival. When
Aminnudin descended from the plank, he was immediately arrested after an
informer had pointed to him. His bag was found to contain three kilos of
marijuana leaves.
Issue: W/N the arrest was valid.
Decision: No. There was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a
judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause.
Contrary to the contention of the government, the appellant was not caught in
flagrante delicto nor was a crime about o be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless search under Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court. There was expedience to support the authorities’ contention. They had
at least 2 days to procure the warrant. The authorities knew exactly the name
of the accused and the date of his arrival thus it would have been easy for
them to persuade the judge that probable cause existed. Yet they did nothing.
The present case cannot be categorized as a buy bust operation either since
the culprit was not caught red handed. The accused was not committing any
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
crime when he was arrested. It was the authorities that determined probable
cause in this case and not the judge. Mere information or tip is not enough.
Accused was acquitted.
PEOPLE vs. YUMANG
222 SCRA 119 (1993)
Facts: On February 25, 1990, an informer reported to Kalookan Police that
accused appellant Gilberto Yumang was selling marijuana along Buklod ng
Nayon st. in Kalookan. They immediately planned a buy bust operation. When
the team headed to the place, Garcia, approached Yuman and asked to buy
marijuana cigarettes. Yuman handed him three sticks and unfolded them
exposing the marijuana leaves inside. Garcia immediately arrested Yumang.
The three sticks were marked by Garcia with his initials and submitted for
examination.
Issue: W/N there was a valid search.
Decision: A buy bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace
officers to catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. The idea to commit the
crime originates from the accused and nobody induces him to commit the
offense. The buy bust operation was formed to test the veracity of the tip.
Having caught the culprit red-handed, the peace officers are authorized to
apprehend the accused. It ahs not been shown that the officers had ulterior
motive that prompted them to verify the false claim. The decision finding the
appellant guilty was affirmed.
HARVEY vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
G.R. L-82544 28 June 1988
Facts: Andrew Harvey and John Sherman are both American nationals while
Adriaan Van Den Elshout is a Dutch citizen. They were residing in Pagsanjan,
Laguna where they were apprehended by agents of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation. On March 07 1988, Warrants of Arrest were
issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of the Immigration Act
and the Revised Administrative Code. Seized during their arrests were rolls of
photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious
poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sexual act. Deportation
proceedings were then instituted against them and warrants of arrest were
subsequently issued. Petitioners contend that the arrests, searches and
seizures were unlawful as the CID agents did not have valid warrants.
Issue: W/N the arrest, search and seizure were invalid.
Vena V. Verga
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Decision: No. The arrests of petitioners was based on probable cause
determined after close surveillance for 3 months during which their activities
were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the
seizure of articles, which were then seized as incident to a lawful arrest, and
thus, admissible in evidence.
Records show that formal deportation charges have been filed against them, as
undesirable aliens, on 4 March 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued against
them on 7 March 1988. A hearing was conducted by a Board of Special
Inquiry. The restraint against their persons, therefore, has become legal.
That petitioners were not caught in the act does not make their arrest illegal.
Petitioners were found with boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John
Sherman naked. Under those circumstances, the agents had reasonable
ground to believe that petitioners had committed pedophilia defined as psycho-
sexual pervasion involving children. Further, the issuance of warrants of
arrests by the CID commissioner, did not order petitioners to appear and show
cause why they should be deported. They were issued for violation of the
immigration act and before that deportation proceedings had already been
commenced against them.
Arrest is a step preliminary to the deportation of the aliens who had violated
the condition of their stay in this country. deportation proceedings do not
constitute a criminal action. The order of deportation is not a punishment, it
being merely the return to his country of an alien who has broken the
conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our borders
The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a judge, does not
extend to this case for probable cause had already been shown to exist before
the warrants of arrest were issued. Petition was dismissed.
RULE 114
BAIL
I. Provisions and Notes
Section 1. Bail defined. – Bail is the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to
guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the
conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of
corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
A. Definition of Bail
Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any
court as required.
B. Forms of Bail
1. corporate surety
2. property bond
3. cash deposit
4. recognizance
C. Recognizance is an obligation of record, entered into before a court or
magistrate duly authorized to take it, with the condition to do some
particular act, the most usual condition in criminal cases being the
appearance of the accused for trial.
Section 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements. – All kinds of bail are
subject to the following conditions:
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless
cancelled, shall remain in force at all stages of the case until
promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective
of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it;
(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever
required by the court of these Rules;
(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without
justification and despite due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his
right to be present thereat. In such case, the trial may proceed in
absentia; and
(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for
execution of the final judgment.
The original papers shall state the full name and address of the
accused, the amount of the undertaking and the conditions required by
this section. Photographs (passport size) taken within the last six (6)
months showing the face, left and right profiles of the accused must be
attached to the bail.
Section 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail. – No
person under detention by legal process shall be released or
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transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to
bail.
Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. – All persons in custody
shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties,
or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a)
before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment.
A. Bail as a matter of right
• MTC: bail is a matter of right before or after conviction, regardless of the
offense.
• RTC: bail is a matter of right before conviction, except for offenses
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life sentence and the evidence
of guilt is strong, in which case it is discretionary. After conviction, bail is
a matter of discretion regardless of the offense. The application for bail
may be filed and acted upon by the trial court as long as the original
record of the case has not been transmitted to the appellate court.
However, if the decision of the trial court changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application should be addressed
and resolved by the appellate court.
Section 5. Bail, when discretionary. – Upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application
for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing
of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original
record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court
conviction the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-
bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and
resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to
continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal
under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six
(6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accuse, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or
has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight
if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during
the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party,
review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the
adverse party in either case.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment greater than 6 years,
the prosecution may move for denial or cancellation of the bail of the accused,
with notice to the accused, upon showing of the following circumstances:
1. He is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteracion.
Art. 14(9) RPC A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime,
shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of this Code.
2
A person, after having convicted by final judgment, shall commit a new felony
before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same
3
The offender has been previously punished by an offense to which the law
attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it
attaches a lighter penalty
4
The offender has already served out sentence for prior offenses.
2. The he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification.
3. That he committed the offense while on probation, parole or
conditional pardon
4. That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
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5. That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
Section 6. Capital offense defined. – A capital offense is an offense
which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and of the
application for admission to bail, may be punished with death.
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. – No person charged with
a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the state of the criminal prosecution.
Section 8. Burden of proof in bail application. – At the hearing of an
application for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the
commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but,
upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for
additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the
Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify.
A. When is bail hearing required
Bail hearing is mandatory when bail is a matter of discretion. It is incumbent
upon the prosecution to show that the evidence of guilt is strong. Even if the
prosecution is absent or refuses to present evidence, the court cannot grant
bail without conducting a hearing. The court must first be convinced that the
evidence does not warrant the denial of bail.
Section 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. – The judge who issued the
warrant or granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount of
bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the following factors:
(a) Financial liability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstance of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
Section 10. Corporate surety. – Any domestic or foreign corporation,
licensed as a surety in accordance with law and currently authorized
to act as such, may provide bail by a bond subscribed jointly by the
accused and an officer of the corporation duly authorized by its board
of directors.
Section 11. Property bond, how posted. – A property bond is an
undertaking constituted as lien on the real property given as security
for the amount of the bail. Within ten (10) days after the approval of
the bond, the accused shall cause the annotation of the lien on the
certificate of title on file with the Registry of Deeds if the land is
registered, or if unregistered, in the Registration Book on the space
provided therefore, in the Registry of Deeds for the province or city
where the land lies, and on the corresponding tax declaration in the
office of the provincial, city and municipal assessor concerned.
Within the same period, the accused shall submit to the court his
compliance and his failure to do so shall be sufficient cause for the
cancellation of the property bond and his re-arrest and detention.
Section 12. Qualifications of sureties in property bond. – The
qualifications of sureties in a property bond shall be as follows:
(a) Each must be a resident owner of real estate within the
Philippines;
(b) Where there is only one surety, his real estate must be worth at
least the amount of undertaking;
(c) If there are two or more sureties, each may justify in an amount
less than that expressed in the undertaking but the aggregate of the
justified sums must be equivalent to the whole amount of the bail
demanded.
In all cases, every surety must be worth the amount specified in his
own undertaking over and above all just debts, obligations and properties
exempt from execution.
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Section 13. Justification of sureties. – Every surety shall justify by
affidavit taken before the judge that he possesses the qualification
prescribed in the preceding section. He shall describe the property
given as security, stating the nature of his title, its encumbrances, the
number and amount of other bails entered into by him and still
undischarged, and his other liabilities. The court may examine the
sureties upon oath concerning their sufficiency in such manner as it
may deem proper. No bail shall be approved unless the surety is
qualified.
Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail. – The accused or any person acting
in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal
revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of bail
fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who
investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate
of deposit and a written undertaking showing compliance with the
requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged
from custody. The money deposited shall be considered as bail and
applied to the payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any, shall
be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit.
Section 15. Recognizance. – Whenever allowed by law or these Rules,
the court may release a person in custody on his own recognizance or
that of a responsible person.
Section 16. Bail, when not required; reduced bail or recognizance. – No
bail shall be required when the law or these Rules so provide.
When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than
the possible maximum imprisonment prescribed for the offense
charged, he shall be released immediately, without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal. If the maximum
penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall
be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum
of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged, without
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying
circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own
recognizance, at the discretion of the court.
Section. 17. Bail, where filed. – (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
filed with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or
unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge,
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial
judge in the province, city or municipality. If the accused is arrested in
a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending,
bail may also be filed with any regional trial court of said place, of if no
judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal
trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
(b) Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused
seeks to be released on recognizance, the application may only be filed
in the court where the case is pending, whether on preliminary
investigation, trial, or appeal.
Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for
bail with any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is
held.
Section 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. – In the application for
bail under section 8 of this Rule, the court must give reasonable notice
of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his
recommendation.
Section 19. Release on bail. – The accused must be discharged upon
approval of the bail by the judge with whom it was filed in accordance
with section 17 of this Rule.
When bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending,
the judge who accepted the bail shall forward it, together with the
order of release and other supporting papers, to the court where the
case is pending, which may, for good reason, require a different one to
be filed.
Section. 20. Increase or reduction of bail. – After the accused is
admitted to bail, the court may, upon good cause, either increase or
reduce its amount. When increased, the accused may be committed to
custody if he does not give bail in the increased amount within a
reasonable period. An accused held to answer a criminal charge, who
is released without bail upon filing of the complaint or information,
may, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings and whenever a
strong showing of guilt appears to the court, be required to give bail in
the amount fixed, or in lieu thereof, committed to custody.
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Section 21. Forfeiture of bail. – When the presence of the accused is
required by the court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to
produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the accused
fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared
forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to
produce their principal and to show why no judgment should be
rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said
period, the bondsmen must:
(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-
production; and
(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first
required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against
the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The
court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the
bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted.
Section 22. Cancellation of bail. – Upon application of the bondsmen,
with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon
surrender of the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the
accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of
conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any
liability on the bail.
Section 23. Arrest of accused out on bail. – For the purpose of
surrendering the accused, the bondsmen may arrest him or, upon
written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking,
cause him to be arrested by a police officer or any other person of
suitable age and discretion.
An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity
of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without
permission of the court where the case is pending.
Section 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. – No bail shall be
allowed after a judgment of conviction has become final. If before
such finality, the accused applies for probation, he may be allowed
temporary liberty under his bail. When no bail was filed or the accused
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005

is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release on The order should contain a summary of the evidence presented and the reason
recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the for the denial, otherwise it shall be void. This is in order to safeguard the
community. In no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has constitutional right to presumption of innocence and also because there is a
commenced to serve sentence. need for clear grounds before a person can be denied of his liberty.

Section 25. Court supervision of detainees. – The court shall exercise Remedy of the court when there is possibility that a person will jump bail:
supervision over all persons in custody for the purpose of eliminating 1. Increase the amount of bail
unnecessary detention. The executive judges of the Regional Trial 2. Require periodic reports of the accused to court
Courts shall conduct monthly personal inspections of provincial, city, 3. Warn him that the trial may proceed in absentia
and municipal jails and the prisoners within their respective
jurisdictions. They shall ascertain the number of detainees, inquire on Duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
their proper accommodation and health and examine the condition of
the jail facilities. They shall order the segregation of sexes and of 1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing or require him to submit his
minors from adults, ensure the observance of the right of detainees to recommendation
confer privately with counsel, and strive to eliminate conditions 2. Conduct a hearing
inimical to the detainees. 3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon
In cities and municipalities to be specified by the Supreme Court, the the approval of the bailbond. If evidence of guilt is strong, the petition
municipal trial judges or municipal circuit trial judges shall conduct should be denied.
monthly personal inspections of the municipal jails in their respective
municipalities and submit a report to the executive judge of the Guidelines in setting the amount of bail:
Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction therein.
1. Financial ability of the accused
A monthly report of such visitation shall be submitted by the executive 2. Nature and circumstances of the offense
judges to the Court Administrator which shall state the total number of 3. Penalty for the offense
detainees, the names of those held for more than thirty (30) days, the 4. Character and reputation of the accused
duration of detention, the crime charged, the status of the case, the 5. Age and health of the accused
cause for detention, and other pertinent information. 6. Weight of evidence against the accused
7. Probability of the accused appearing at the trial
Section 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or 8. Forfeiture of other bail
irregular preliminary investigation. – An application for or admission 9. The fact that he was a fugitive from the law when arrested
to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his 10. Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail
arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefore, or from assailing
the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary Where should bail be filed:
investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them
before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as It may be filed with the court where the case is pending. In the absence of the
practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case. judge thereof, bail may be filed with any RTC or MTC judge in the province,
city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or
municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with
and RTC of said place, or if no judge is available, with any MTC judge therein.

QUESTIONS: But where bail is a matter of discretion or where the accused seeks to be
What is required of the judge who denies an application for bail? released on recognizance, bail may only be filed in the court where the case is
pending.
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005

2. Nature and circumstance of the offense

Any person in custody who is not yet charged may apply for bail with any court 3. Penalty for the offense
in the province, city or municipality where he is held. 4. Character and reputation of the accused
5. Age and health of the accused
Remedy of the accused if he is denied bail: 6. Weight of evidence against him
7. Probability of his appearance in trail
He should file a special civil action in the CA, not the SC within 60 days. 8. Forfeiture of their bonds by him
9. If the accused is a fugitive from justice when arrested
10. Pendency of other cases where he is also under bail.
II. Connection to Constitutional Law Provisions and Cases
SULE vs. BITENG
SECTION 13: ALL PERSON, EXCCEPT THOSE CHARGED WITH OFFENSES
PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION PERPETUA WHEN EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS In hearings for bail, what should be considered is the prima facie evidence and
STRONG SHALL BEFORE CONVICTION BE BAILABLE BY SUFFICIENT SURETIES not the penalty. In capital offenses, bail would be granted only if the evidence
OR RELEASED ON RECOGNIZANCE AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW. THE RIGHT of guilt were not strong.
TO BAIL SHALL NOT BE IMPAIRED WVWN WHEN THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS IS SUSPENDED. EXCESSIVE BAIL SHALL NOT BE PADERANGA vs. CA
REQUIRED.
One who is under the custody of the law either when he has been arrested or
has surrendered to the jurisdiction of the court has a constitutional right to bail
A. RIGHT TO BAIL CHIN vs. GUSTILO
LAVIDES vs. CA Even if bail is a matter of right, there is still a need to give notice to the fiscal
for him to attend the hearing for bail.
Bail should be given before arraignment. Arraignment should not be made a
condition to bail. B. WAIVER OF THE RIGHT
PEOPLE vs. GAKO JR. PEOPLE vs. JUDGE DONATO
Judge did not hold hearing, merely based his decision to grant bail from a Accused charged with rebellion.
medical certificate 9 months old.
Compromise agreement is a valid waiver to the right to bail
Bail is a matter of right with respect to persons charged with penalty of
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, when evidence is strong. PEOPLE vs. MAPALAO
Before a bail is granted, a hearing must be conducted in order to determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong or not. An accused who escapes from confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or submits
YAP vs. CA himself to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waives any right
Imposing bail in excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. to seek relief from the Court.
Setting the bail in the amount of the civil liability is excessive.
C. EXCESSIVE BAIL
FACTORS TO CONSIDERED IN SETTING THE AMOUNT OF BAIL (MAGSUCANG
vs. BALGOS) DE LA CAMARA vs. ENAGE
1. Financial ability of the accused

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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring
a sum that is excessive. A bail of one million is clearly excessive.
CHU vs. DOLALOS
Circular No. 8 which provides that bail should be set at Php 1000 for every
year taking into consideration the maximum penalty for the offense is
instructive not only to fiscals and their assistants but to the members of the
bench as well.
D. PERSONS NOT ENTITLED TO BAIL
COMENDADOR vs. de VILLA
A soldier under court martial does not enjoy the right to bail because of the
different disciplinary structure of the military as well as their capability of
causing havoc and chaos.
PEOPLE vs. NITCHA
If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is
convicted by the trial courts and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is
neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor a matter of discretion
on the part of the court. Bail must not be granted to accused during the
pendency of his appeal because his conviction clearly imports that the evidence
of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.
GOVERNMENT OF US vs. PURGANAN
Right to bail is not applicable in extradition proceedings. Constitutional bail is
available only in criminal proceedings. Extradition, being sui generis and not a
criminal proceeding, the accused therefore has no inherent right to bail. The
following are exceptions to this rule:
(1) applicant is not flight risk
(2) there exists a special humanitarian reason.
III. Case
SERAPIO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
396 SCRA 443
Facts: Petitioner Edward Serapio was a member of the Board of Trustees an
the legal counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Sometime 2000,
petitioner received on its behalf a donation in the amount of Php 200M through
Chavit Singson. Petitioner received he donation worth the Foundation’s
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/vvverga 101005
account. In 2000, Chavit Singson publicly accused President Estrada and his
family members and friends of engaging in several illegal activities which
triggered the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal
complaints against the petitioner, Joseph Estrada and his son.
On April 4, 2001, Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan Informations
against the former president, one of which, for plunder. No bail was
recommended for the provisional release of all the accused including the
petitioner. The case was raffled to a special division which was subsequently
created by the Supreme Court. On 25 April 2001, Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of arrest
for the accused. Arraignment was set on 27 January 2001. In the meantime,
petitioner filed with Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for bail, which was set
for hearing on May 4, 2001. Petitioner’s co-accused Jinggoy Estrada filed a
motion alleging that he was entitle to bail as a matter of right.
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioner’s Urgent Petition for Bail, the
prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier
than the June 27 schedule. However, Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the
prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and
should be heard BEFORE petitioner’s arraignment on 27 June. On June 1,
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as
well as all the other accused during the hearing on the petitioner for bail
considering that under Section 8, Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court,
whatever evidence adduced during the hearing shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial.
The people insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may be
commenced because it is only upon arraignment that the issues are joined.
The people further stress the it is only when an accused pleads not guilty may
he filed a petition for bail and if he pleads guilty, then there would be no need
for him to file said petition. It is also the contention of the people that it is
only during arraignment that the accused is informed of the precise charge
against him. He must then be arraign first prior to bail hearings to prevent
him from late on assailing the validity of the bail hearings on the ground that
he was not properly informed of the charge considering that under section 8 of
Rule 114, evidence presented during bail hearings are reproduce in the trial.
Arraignment before bail hearings also diminished the possibility of accused’s
flight since trial in absentia may be had only if an accused escapes after he has
been arraigned.
However, the bail hearing again did not proceed because the petitioner filed
with the information a motion to quash the amended information on the
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
grounds that as against him, the amended information does not allege a
combination of series of over or criminal acts constitutive of plunder.
According to the prosecution, the motion to quash the amended information
was antithetical to his petition for bail.
Petitioner also prays for the issuance of habeas corpus.
Issues:
(a) W/N petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his
petition for bail may be conducted.
(b) W/N petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended
Information during the pendency of his petition for bail.
(c) W/N a joint hearing of petition for bail for all the accused is
mandatory
(d) W/N petitioner should instead be released through a writ of
habeas corpus.
Decision:
(a) Although the petitioner was already arraigned, no plea has yet been
entered thereby rendering the issue of whether an arraignment is necessary
before the conduct of bail hearings in the petitioner’s case moot. Nonetheless,
the court held that arraignment of an accused is not a pre-requisite to the
conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for
bail as soon as he is deprived of his of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or
voluntary surrender.
In Lavides vs. CA, the court ruled that in cases where it is authorized, bail
should be granted before arraignment otherwise the accused may be precluded
from filing a motion to quash. However, this pronouncement should not be
taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times
precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty
by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he
is deprived of liberty even before a complaint or information is filed against
him. The case of Lavides must be understood in light of the fact that the
accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash.
Hence, in that case, the court held that to condition the grant of bail to an
accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he had
to choose between filing a motion to quash and thus delay his petition for bail
and forgoing the filing of the motion to quash so that he can be arraign at once
ad therefore be released on bail. Such would undermine the constitutional
right of the accused.
When a bail is matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail
even prior to arraignment. The Lavides case also implies that an application
for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to
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death may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Sandiganbayan
therefore committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the
hearing of his petition for bail.
(b) Court dins no inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for
bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail, is the security given for the
release of the person in custody of the law. A motion to quash on the other
hand is a mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complain
filed against him for insufficiency on its fact in posit of law. These tow relied
have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other. However,
it is true that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or information on the
ground that the same does not charge any offense is granted and the case is
dismissed and the accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an
accused may become moot and academic.
(c) Petitioner argues that a joint bail hearing would negate his right to have his
petition for bail resolved in a summary proceeding since said hearing might be
converted into a full blown trial. Prosecution on the other hand claims that
joint hearings will save the court form having to hear the same witnesses and
the parties from presenting the same evidences. There is no provision in the
Rules of Court governing the hearings of two or more petitioner for bail filed by
different accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard
simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other accused. The matter
should be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the exercise
of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the
convenience of the sate, including the prosecution but also that of the
petitioner and the witnesses.
In the case of Ocampo vs. Bernabe, the court ruled that in a petition or bail
hearing, the court is to conduct only a summary hearing, meaning such brief
and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is early to
determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. The court does not try
the merits or enter into the inquiry as to the weight that ought to be given to
the evidence against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the
trial or on what further such evidence as has reference to substantial matters.
In the case at bar, the case against former President Estrada is an entirely
different matter. For, with the participation of the former president in the
hearing of petitioner’s petition for bail, the proceeding assumes completely
different dimension. The proceeding will no longer be summary since the
proceedings will be full blown which is antithetical to the nature of a bail
hearing. The joinder of the petitioner’s bail will be prejudicial to the petitioner
as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of the right of petitioner
to obtain provisional liberty and seek relief from his court. The Sandiganbayn
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again committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering a simultaneous
hearing of petitioner’s petition for bail with the trial of the case against former
president.
(d) In the case at bar, bail is not matter of rights since the accused is charged
with a capital offense, but discretionary upon the court. Under Section 8 of
rule 114, there must be a showing that the evidence of guilt against a person
charged with a capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him bail.,
thus, upon an application for bail, by the person charged with a capital
offense, a hearing must be conducted where the prosecution has the burden of
showing that the evidence of guilt against an accused is strong. When the
evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of right, which is not so in
the case at bar.
In exceptional cases, habeas corpus may be granted ny the courts even when
the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary
surrender. The writ may be issued where the deprivation of liberty while
initially valid under the lad had not later become invalid. However, there is no
basis fir the issuance of the writ in the case at bar. The general rule is that the
writ does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction
to issued the same applied, because petitioner is under detention pursuant to
the order of arrest. Petitioner in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities.
RULE 115
RIGHTS OF ACCUSED
I. Codal Provision and Notes
Section 1. Rights of accused at trial. – In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
A. Definition of right of presumption of innocence:
The right means that the presumption must be overcome by evidence of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Guilt beyond reasonable doubt means that there is
moral certainty as to the guilt of the accused. Conviction should be based on
the strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. The
significance of this is that accusation is not synonymous with guilt.
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B. Exceptions to the constitutional presumption of innocence:
• Presumptions – If there is a reasonable connection between the
fact presumed and the fact ultimately proven from such fact
a. When an accountable public officer fails to account for funds
or property that should be in his custody, he is presumed to be guilty
of malversation;
b. Persons in possession of recently stolen goods are presumed
guilty of the offense in connection with the goods.
• Self-Defense – One who invokes self-defense is presumed guilty.
The burden of proving the elements of self-defense (unlawful aggression,
reasonable necessity of the means used to prevent or repel it; lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the one defending himself) belongs to
the accused.
C. Definition of reverse trial
Usually, the prosecution first presents its evidence to establish the guilt of the
accused. But a reverse trial happens if the accused admits the killing but
claims self-defense. He must first establish the elements of self-defense in
order to overturn the presumption that he was guilty of the offense.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage
of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the
judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial
pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is
specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The
absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which
he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present
thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed
to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates
until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be
allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the
court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of
counsel.
A. Requisites of a valid trial in absentia
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1. The accused has already been arraigned;
2. He has been duly notified of the trial
3. His failure to appear at the trial is unjustifiable.
• Right to be present at the trial be waived except in the following
situations, where the presence of the accused at the trial is required:
1. Arraignment;
2. During promulgation of judgment, except if it is for a light offense;
3. When the presence of the accused at the trial is necessary for
purposes of identification, unless he admits beforehand that he is the
same person charged.
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-
examination on matters covered by direct examination. His silence
shall not in any manner prejudice him.
Note: A testimony of a witness who testifies on his own behalf but refuses to
be subjected to cross-examination will not be given weight. It will not have
probative value because the prosecution was not given a chance to test the
credibility of the testimony through cross-examination.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against
himself.
Scope of the right against self-incrimination
The right against self-incrimination covers testimonial compulsion only and the
compulsion to produce incriminating documents, papers, and chattels. It does
not cover the compulsion to produce real or physical evidence using the body
of the accused.
Exception to the right against self-incrimination
The right cannot be invoked when the State has the right to inspect documents
under its police power, such as documents of corporations.
Rationale for protecting the right against self-incrimination
For humanitarian reasons: To prevent the State, with all its coercive
powers, from extracting testimony that may convict the accused.
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For practical reasons: The accused is likely to commit perjury if he were
compelled to testify against himself.
Persons who may invoke the right against self-incrimination, and time when
they an invoke the right.
1. An ordinary witness may invoke the right, but he may only do so as
each incriminating question is asked.
2. The accused himself may invoke the right, and unlike the ordinary
witness, he may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse
to answer any and all questions.
But, once the accused waives his right and chooses to testify in his
own behalf, he may be cross-examined on matters covered in his
direct examination. He cannot refuse to answer questions during
cross-examination by claiming that the answer that he will give could
incriminate him for the crime with which he was charged.
However, if the question during cross-examination relates to a crime
different from that with which he was charged, he can still invoke the
right and refuse to answer.
Note: It would depend whether or not an accused or witness can invoke the
right against self-incrimination if he is asked about past criminality. If he can
still be prosecuted for it, questions about past criminal liability are still covered
by the protection of the right against self-incrimination. But if he cannot be
prosecuted for it anymore, he cannot invoke the right.
Rights of the accused in the matter of testifying or producing evidence
Before the case is filed in Court but after he has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his liberty
the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to counsel
the right not to be subjected to force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate free will
the right to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights
rejected
After the case is filed in court
to refuse to be a witness
not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal
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to testify in his own behalf subject to cross-examination by the
prosecution
while testifying, to refuse to answer a specific question which
tends to incriminate his for some crime other than that for
which he is being prosecuted.
Immunity statutes
The immunity statutes are classified into two:
1. Use immunity statutes -- prohibits
the use of a witness’ compelled testimony and its fruits in any
manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness.
(Therefore, the witness can still be prosecuted, but the compelled
testimony cannot be used against him.)
2. Transactional immunity statutes --
grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to
which his compelled testimony relates. (The witness cannot be
prosecuted at all.) Examples are state witnesses and those who
furnish information about violations of the Internal Revenue Code,
even if they themselves offered bribes to the public official.
Effect of the refusal of the accused to refuse to testify in his behalf
As a general rule, the silence of the accused should not prejudice him.
However, in the following cases, an unfavorable inference is drawn from the
failure of the accused to testify:
1. If the prosecution has already established a prima facie case, the
accused must present proof to overturn the evidence of the
prosecution.
2. If the defense of the accused is alibi and he does not testify, the
inference is that the alibi is not believable.
Note: DNA testing is not covered by the right against self-incrimination
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the
trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a
witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found
in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in
another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the
opportunity to cross-examine him.
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Definition of right of confrontation
It means that the accused can only be tried using those witnesses that meet
him face to face at the trial who give testimony in his presence, with the
opportunity to cross-examine them.
Reasons for the right
1. To allow the court to observe the demeanor of the witness while
testifying.
2. To give the accused the opportunity to cross-examine the witness in
order to test their recollection and credibility.
Note: the right of confrontation can be waived either expressly or impliedly. It
is waived impliedly when an accused waives his right to be present at the trial.
The right of confrontation may also be waived by conduct amounting to a
renunciation of the right to cross-examine. When the party was given an
opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to
take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone, he is deemed to
have waived the right.
C. Effect when testimony of a witness who dies or becomes unavailable
If the other party had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness before he
died or became unavailable, the testimony may be used as evidence.
However, if the other party did not even have the opportunity to cross-
examine before the subsequent death or unavailability of the witness, the
testimony will have no probative value. (An opportunity to cross-examine is all
that is necessary in order to allow the use of the testimony of the witness.
There need not be an actual cross-examination, as long as there was an
opportunity to do so.)
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of
witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf.
A. Definition of right to compulsory process
It is the right of the accused to have a subpoena and/or a subpoena duces
tecum issued in his behalf in order to compel the attendance of witnesses and
the production of other evidence.
Note: if a witness refuses to testify and his testimony is required, the court
should order the witness to give bail or even order his arrest, if necessary.
Failure to obey a subpoena amounts to contempt of court.
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B. Available only if: • The right to speedy trial is violated when there are unjustified
postponements of the trial, and a long period of time is allowed to
(1) witness is really material elapse without the case being tried for no justifiable reason.
(2) he is guilty of no neglect in previously obtained the
attendance of said witness • right to a public trial means that anyone interested in observing the
(3) The witness will be available at the time desired manner that a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may
(4) No similar evidence could be obtained do so. The trial should be public in order to prevent abuses that may
be committed by the court to the prejudice of the defendant.
Note: Trial in absentia is only allowed after arraignment, accused duly notified Moreover, the accused is entitled to the moral support of his friends
of the trial and absence is unjustified and relatives.

• The court may bar the public in certain cases, such as when the
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial. evidence to be presented may be offensive to decency or public
morals, or in rape cases, where the purpose of some persons in
attending is merely to ogle at the parties.
A. Definition of the right to speedy trial
• There is no violation of the right to a public trial if trial is held in the
The right means that the trial should be conducted according to the law of
chambers of the judge since the public is not excluded from attending
criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexations,
the trial.
capricious, and oppressive delays.

C. Speedy Trial Act and Circular 38-98
According to the Speedy Trial Act and Circular 38-98, arraignment and pre-trial
if the accused pleads not guilty should be held within 30 days from the date
the court acquires jurisdiction of the person of the accused. In no case shall
the entire period exceed 180 days from the first day of trial, except as
otherwise authorized by the Court Administrator.
D. Remedy of an accused whose right to speedy trial is violated
1. File a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to
speedy trial. (For purposes of double jeopardy, this has the same
effect as an acquittal.) This must be done prior to trial, or else, it is
deemed a waiver of the right to dismiss.
2. File for mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information.
3. If he is restrained of his liberty, file for habeas corpus.
4. Ask for the trial of the case.
Note:
• The limitation is that the State should not be deprived of its day in
court. The right of the State/the prosecution to due process should be
respected.
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• To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegations
and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that
they might be, by the barrage of publicity.
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by
law.
Note:
• The right to appeal is a statutory right and not a fundamental one,
except in the case of the minimum appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court granted by the Constitution. Anyone who seeks to
exercise the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of
the rules.
• it can be waived expressly or impliedly.
• When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the
court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to
appeal from the judgment rendered against him.
II. Constitutional Law Notes
Rights of the accused in criminal prosecutions
1. To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond
reasonable doubt;
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2. To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;

3. To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of Right to counsel during custodial investigation and the right to counsel during
the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment; the trial
4. To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-
examination on matters covered by direct examination; Right to counsel during custodial Right to counsel during the trial
5. To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself; investigation
6. To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial; The right to counsel can only be The right to counsel means the right
7. To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of waived in writing AND with the to effective counsel.
witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf; assistance of counsel.
8. To have a speedy, impartial, and public trial; The counsel required in custodial
9. To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law. investigation is competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his
Two aspects of due process: own (the suspect’s) choice.
The requirement is stricter during Trial is in public thus, the danger
1. Substantive due process – this refers to the intrinsic validity of the law custodial investigation because of does not exist. During trial the
2. Procedural due process – one that hears before it condemns, proceeds danger that confessions will be purpose of counsel is not so much to
upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial and based on the extracted against the will of the protect him from being forced to
evidence presented therein. defendant confess but to defend the accused

• There is no need for trial-type proceedings in order to satisfy due

process. What is important is that there was an opportunity to be • Right to counsel afforded during trial because it is embraced in the
heard. Notice and hearing are the minimum requirements of due right to be heard.
process.
• The right to counsel may be invoked at any stage of the
Requirements of procedural due process (in general): proceedings, even on appeal. However, it can also be waived. The
accused is deemed to have waived his right to counsel when he voluntarily
1. There must be an impartial and competent court with judicial power to submits himself to the jurisdiction of the Court and proceeds with his
hear and determine the matter before it; defense.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant
or over the property subject of the proceeding; But in US v. Escalante and People v. Nang Kay, the Court held that the
3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; defendant cannot raise the question of his right to have an attorney for the
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. first time on appeal. If the question is not raised in the trial court, the
prosecution may go to trial. The question will not be considered in the
Requirements of procedural due process (in criminal cases) appellate court for the first time when the accused fails to raise it in the
lower court.
1. The accused must have been heard by a court of competent
jurisdiction; • The duty to appoint counsel-do-oficio is mandatory only up to arraignment.
2. He must have been proceeded against under orderly processes of the
• As a rule, the mistake of counsel binds the client. Therefore, the client
law;
cannot question a decision on the ground that counsel was an idiot.
3. He may be punished only after inquiry and investigation;
However, an exception to this is if counsel misrepresents himself as a
4. There must be notice to the accused;
lawyer, and he turns out to be a fake lawyer. In this case, the accused is
5. The accused must be given an opportunity to be heard;
entitled to a new trial because his right to be represented by a member of
6. Judgment must be rendered within the authority of a constitutional
the bar was violated. He was thus denied of his right to counsel and to
law.
due process.

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 Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
• The right of choice must be reasonably exercised. The accused cannot
insist on counsel that he cannot afford, one who is not a member of the
bar, or one who declines for a valid reason, such as conflict of interest.
Also, the right of the accused to choose counsel is subject to the right of
the state to due process and to speedy and adequate justice.
• The accused can defend himself in person only if the court is convinced
that he can properly protect his rights even without the assistance of
counsel.
III. Cases
SIQUOIN VS. PEOPLE
171 SCRA 223 (1989)
Facts: Isabela Mayor Manuel Siquoin was charged with falsification of public
document for signing a false document appointing Jesusa Carreon to the
position of clerk in the office of he Municipal Secretary and stating that such
position exists and with available funds when in fact, there was no such
position nor available funds allocated from the budget. Carreon filed the
complaint when she did not receive her salaries for several months. The trial
court found the petitioner guilty of falsification of public documents, which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, hence, this appeal. It was the contention of
the accused that he was deprived of due process when the trial proceeded in hi
absence despite a pending petition for change of venue which he filed with the
Supreme Court.
Issue: W/N there was deprivation of due process.
Decision: Petitioner was afforded with due process when the trial court, in
view of the absence of petitioner, granted continuances to enable the defense
to present its evidence although the prosecution had rested its case already. It
is a basic postulate in aw that what is repugnant to due process is not lack of
previous notice but absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. If an accused has
been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction and proceeded against under
the orderly processes of law, and only published after inquiry and investigation,
upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded
within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of
law.
There was no denial of due process when an accused was afforded the chance
to present evidence on his behalf but due to his repeated, unjustifiable failure
to appear at the hearings, the trial court ordered the case to be deemed
submitted upon the evidence presented by the prosecution. It is true that he
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filed a petition for change of venue with the SC, however, on the date set for
the hearing of the petitioner’s urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in the
trial court due to the pendency of the petition for change of venue, he also
failed to appear.
Even the counsel of the petitioner admitted that he lost contact with his client
when the latter went abroad. Hence, the trial court cannot be faulted for
rendering its decision on the basis solely of the evidence presented in the
prosecution.
PEOPLE VS. ORTEGA
276 SCRA 166 (1997)
Facts: The victim Masangkay, Romeo Ortega, and several others were in a
drinking spree when Masangkay excused himself in order to answer the call of
nature. Benjamin Ortega followed him. Thereafter, the witnesses heard
shouts of help coming from Masangkay. One of the witnesses, Quitlong
testified that when he reached the scene of the crime, he saw Benjamin,
profusely stabbing Masangkay. Several others went to fetch Benjamin’s father.
Romeo Ortega went to the scene in order to pacify his brother. Quitlong
further testified that he saw Ortega, Masangkay and their brother in law Garcia
lift the victim and throw his body inside a well. The three then threw heavy
stones at the body to prevent it for resurfacing.
The defendants however contend that Masangkay was the first one who
attacked Ortega and that the latter was merely defending himself against the
former.
Garcia on the other hand contends that Masangkay was already dead when he
assisted Ortega, hence, he should only be liable as an accessory.
Issue: W/N Ortega is guilty of mere homicide.
W/N Garcia should be acquitted.
Decision: Ortega should be liable for homicide only and not murder. The court
noted that the victim Masangkay six-footer while Ortega was only five feet and
five inches tall. The accused and the victim were already grappling when
Quitlong arrived. Nothing in the testimony or circumstances can be interpreted
as abuse of superior strength, hence, Ortega is liable only for homicide.
With regards Garcia, it is true that Garcia merely assisted in concealing the
body of the victim. But the autopsy conducted by the NBI showed that tie
victim at the time he was thrown to the well, a still alive, and that he died of
drowning as evidenced by the muddy particles in the stomach and air tract of
the victim. The drowning was the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
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the felony that Appellant Garcia had intended to commit. However, in spite of
the evidence showing that appellant Garcia would be held liable as principal in
the crime of homicide. There are two obstacles barring his conviction, even as
an accessory.
The information accused appellant Garcia of attacking, assaulting and stabbing
repeatedly with appointed weapon on the different parts of the body of
Masangkay. The prosecution’s evidence shows that Garcia has nothing to do
with the stabbing which was solely perpetuated by Ortega, an accused cannot
be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or
information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than
charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this
constitutional right.
In all criminal proceedings, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
proven guilty. He shall have the right to be informed and cause of the
accusation again him, to have a speedy trial, impartial, to meet witness face to
face.
Also, Garcia can enjoy the exemption provided for in Article 19 and 20 of the
civil code being the brother in law of the principal Ortega. Thus, he must be
acquitted.
BORJA VS MENDOZA
77 SCRA 422 (1977)
Facts: Manuel Borja was accused of slight physical injuries. The city court of
Cebu proceeded the trial in absentia due to his failure to appear in the hearing
and Borja without being arraigned. The court found him guilty. The CFI
affirmed it without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit
his memorandum. Petitioner contended that the failure to arraign him violates
his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him and
his right to be heard and counsel. The Solicitor-General agreed that the
procedural defect would render void the city court decision.
Issue: W/N petitioner was denied due process.
Decision: Arraignment is an indispensable means for bringing the accused into
court and informing him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The accused should also be given the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
After arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified. Further, the absence of arraignment can be invoked at anytime in
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view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial. In
the case, petitioner was denied due process. He was not informed of the
accusation against him via an arraignment. The case is remanded for trial with
the observance of due process starting with an arraignment.
MARCOS VS. RUIZ
213 SCRA 177 (1992)
Facts: After the preliminary investigation, the Acting Asst City Fiscal Lopena
filed two informations with the Bohol RTC against Bienvenido Marcos for
violating BP 22 when he delivered to Fulgencio Oculam two checks in the
amount of P3,000 each in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry taken by
petitioner’s wife Anacleta Marcos knowing that he did not have sufficient funds.
Petitioner posted a surety bond for his temporary liberty. The arraignment was
reset due to the withdrawal of petitioner’s lawyer. However, petitioner settled
his obligation with the offended party who executed an Affidavit of Desistance.
Fiscal Lopena filed a Motion to Dismiss in lieu of the desistance.
Two cases were filed. In one of the cases, neither petitioner nor his counsel
appeared in the hearing, but the court received a telegram from petitioner’s
wife that petitioner was indisposed. The arraignment was then rescheduled
without any objections. In the arraignment, petitioner together with his counsel
pleaded not guilty they were notified in open court of the trial of the case. But,
both did not appear during the trial. The court then forfeited the bond of
petitioner, accepted the evidence of the prosecution and submitted the case for
decision.
Thereafter, the court received a motion from petitioner via registered mail for
the resetting of the case. The counsel alleged that they believed that the
hearing would not proceed due to the desistance of the offended party and the
Motion to Dismiss filed by the Fiscal Lopena. Both motion as well as the Motion
for Reconsideration were denied. Both motions did not contain a notice of
hearing to the Prosecuting Fiscal. A notice of promulgation of sentence was
then sent to the parties in the two cases. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
W/N petitioner was denied the right to confront the witnesses of the
prosecution and to be heard.
W/N the judge erred in forfeiting the bond.
Decision: The judge abused his discretion when he ordered the forfeiture of the
bond despite the absence of the accused. Due notice should be given to the
bondsman to produce the accused before the court but there is no showing
that such was complied with.
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
The accused is required to personally enter his plea. In the case, this did not
happen. Hence, there was no valid arraignment in one of the criminal cases.
The motion for resetting was a mere scrap of paper because it did not contain
a notice of hearing to the Prosecution which is a violation of Section 5, rule 115
of the Rules of Court. Without such notice, it is not even a motion for it does
not comply with the rules and should not have been received by the clerk.
The judge abused his discretion when he considered one of the criminal case
because there was no valid arraignment. He thus disregarded Sec 2c of Rule
114 and Sec 1c of Rule 115, which merely consider the accused’s non-
appearance during the trial -- in this case, April 8-- as a waiver if his right to
be present for trial and not for the succeeding trial dates.
The absence of the accused without notice shall be considered a waiver of his
right to be present on that trial. When an accused under custody had been
notified of the date of the trial and escapes, he shall be deemed to have
waived his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates
until custody is regained.
GIMENEZ vs. NAZARENO
160 SCRA 1 (1988)
Facts: Private respondent Teodoro de la Vega and 5 others were charged with
the crime of murder. On August 22, 1973, all the accused were arraigned and
each of them pleaded not guilty. Following the arraignment. The respondent
Nazareno set the hearing of the case the following month. But before the
scheduled date of hearing, de la Vega escaped detention and failed to appear
in court. The fiscals filed a motion to continue hearing the case and de la Vega
be tried in absentia.
The lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but gave the respondent
the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in court.
The lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the five
accused while holding in abeyance the proceedings against the private
respondent.
Petitioners filed a Motion for reconsideration questioning the above-mentioned
decision, hence this petitioner. It was the contention of the respondent court
that jurisdiction over private respondent de la Vega was lost when he escaped
and that his right to cross-examine and present evidence must not be denied
him once jurisdiction over is person is reacquired.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
Issue: W/N the court lost its jurisdiction when the prisoner escaped from
detention.
Decision: The lowered acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused-
private respondent when he appeared during the arraignment and pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is acquired either by his arrest for voluntary appearance in court.
Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for arraignment as
what accused respondent did in this case. Jurisdiction, once acquired is no lost
upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated.
Where the accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the
crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and this
continues until termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the
custody of law.
A valid trial in absentia has the following requisite: (1) that there has been an
arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to
appear and hi failure to do so is unjustified.
The respondent was validly arraigned and he escaped. The lower court
therefore correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the
prosecution and the other accused in the absence of the private respondent.
But it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to private respondent and
rendered a decision as to the other accused only.
Upon termination of the trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon
the evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the one who
escaped to finally decide to appear. The contention of the judge that the right
of the accused to be presumed innocent will be violated if a judgment is
rendered as to him I untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of
conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court.
Therefore, no violation of due process since the accused was given the
opportunity to be heard.
By the failure of the accused to appear, he waived his rights to cross examine
and to present evidence on his behalf. Such rights are personal right but may
be waived.
There was valid trial in absentia in this case. The judge should have proceeded
with the decision.
SAYSON vs. PEOPLE
166 SCRA 680 (1988)
Facts: Petitioner was charged with the crime of Estafa through Falsification of
a Commercial Document. Sayson, who was known as “Fiscal Perez” was
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
introduced to Anselmo Aguiling, secretary of Ernesto Rufino of Mever Films. He
then presented a Bank of America check in the amount of $2,250.00 payable
to the order of Atty. Perez to be exchanged for Pesos. Mever Films readily
prepared a checking the amount of Php 14,850.00.
Sayson then went to Banco Filipino where he opened an account, using the
check given by Mever as deposit. The check (dollar) turned out to be one of
the drafts surreptitiously taken from a shipment to Bank of America. Mever
ordered to stop payment and Sayson was charged with Estafa.
Appellant raised the issue of due process alleging denial of his right to be heard
and to present evidences. It turned out that after arraignment and the
prosecution was able to present evidence, the defense postponed the case
several times. At the hearing on December 09, 1974, when the defense was
scheduled to present evidences, only the petitioner appeared. He said that his
counsel had another case in a different court. In the morning of the said day
the lawyer of Sayson sent a telegram to the court requesting cancellation of
the hearing because he was sick. The court denied the motion for
postponement and the case was considered submitted for decision without
petitioner’s evidence. The trial court rendered judgment finding the accused
guilty as charged contending that the petitioner waived his right to be heard by
counsel and to present evidence.
Issue: W/N there was a waiver on the part of the appellant.
Decision: No. While the accused has the right to be heard by himself and
counsel and to present evidence for his defense by direct constitutional grant,
such right is not except form the rule on waiver as log as the waiver is not
contrary to law.
In the case at bar, there was a valid waiver. First of all, the petitioner’s motion
was not seasonably filed as the three-day notice required by the rules of court
was not complied with. Moreover, it was not accompanied by an affidavit nor a
medical certificate to support the allege illness of counsel contrary to Rule 22,
Section 5 of the rules of court which mandates that postponement on the
ground of illness may be granted if it appears upon affidavit that the character
of his illness is such as to render his non-attendance excusable.
The conflicting stories advanced by the petitioner and his counsel only indicate
the lack of good cause for the postponement.
Two circumstances that should be taken into account in granting a motion for
postponement: the reasonableness of the postponement and the merits of the
case of the movant. Both circumstances were not presented by the petitioner
thus, there can be no abuse of discretion on the part of the court.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
Moreover, petitioner’ plea that it was incumbent upon the trial court to appoint
a counsel de officio for him is utterly without merit. The duty of the court to
appoint a counsel de officio is mandatory only at the time of the arraignment.
This is no longer so where the accused has proceeded with the arraignment
and the trial with a counsel of his choice but when the time for the
presentation of the evidence for the defense, he appears by himself alone and
the absence of the counsel is inexcusable.
The petitioner’s failure to appear with counsel of his choice at the time of the
hearing of the case, notwithstanding repeated postponement and warning that
failure to do so would be deemed a waiver of his right to present his evidence
and the case would be deemed submitted for decision upon the evidence
presented by the prosecution.
PEOPLE VS. MAQUEDA
242 SCRA 565 (1995)
Facts: Maqueda was one of the accused in the slaying of Horace William
Barker, a World Bank consultant and battery of his wife, Teresita. The spouses
were living at Tuba Benguet. In the morning of 27 August 1991, Richard
Severino, the spouses’ former houseboy, entered the house of the spouses and
tried to strangle one of the maids. The commotion woke up Teresita. When
she went down and saw Severino and another unknown person, the former
house boy beat her up. According to the two househelps, they heard William
begging the two accused to stop beating his wife. When the two had courage
to go out from their hiding room, they asked for help. When they returned to
the house with the authorities, they saw the dead body of William. The
authorities rushed Teresita to the hospital where she was comatose for two
days. Authorities concluded that the main motive of the accused was to rob
the victims.
Two other witnesses testified that they saw the two accused. One of the
witnesses said that one of the accused had an amputated hand. This, together
with the other descriptions given by the other witnesses fit the accused Hector
Maqueda alias “putol”
Maqueda contends that on the day of the crime, he was in Quezon City working
in a polvoron factory. Records show that after being informed of his rights,
Maqueda signed a “Sinumpaang Salaysay” wherein he narrated his
participation in the crime at the Barker house. Maqueda also filed a motion to
Grant Bail stating that he was willing to be a state witness. Prosecutor Zarate
asked the Maqueda whether he was in the company of Salvamante. Upon
giving an affirmative answer, the prosecutor denied the motion. The owner of
the factory contended that it was impossible for Maqueda to have worked in his
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shop when it was only on 30 August when he opened his shop. The trial court
admitted the statement of the accused although it was taken without the
assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since an information
had already been filed in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a
warrant of arrest issued by the court, the statement was not therefore, taken
during custodial investigation.
Issue: W/N the statement of Maqueda should be admitted
Decision: the exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be
informed under Section 12 (1) Article III of the Constitution are not confined to
that prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available
at the stage when a person is “under investigation for the commission of an
offense”.
The court did recognize that once a criminal complaint or information has been
filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by virtue of warrant of
arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the
arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge
(Section 3 and 4 Rule 113) and since the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any public officer or law
enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of
the offense for which he was charged. If nevertheless, he is subjected to such
investigation, then Section 12(1) Article III of the Constitution and the
jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with.
MUTUC VS CA
190 SCRA 43 (1990)
FACTS: The 4th division of the CA promulgated a resolution fixing the amount of
the bond for the provisional release of Fortunato Medina pending his appeal
before the said court. The appellee filed a MR. The Solicitor-General filed an
opposition in Manila which was actually received in Baguio City when the 4 th
division was holding session there. The MR was denied. But, before the CA
could act on his MR, a news article attributed to Atty Amelito Mutuc, counsel of
record of appellee, appeared in the Manila Times wherein Mutuc hit the Appeals
Court ruling in denying Medina’s release without posting bail since he is a
pauper and that his detention is illegal as found by the lower court. In the said
news item, Mutuc advised Medina to escape from confinement. The Solicitor-
General inquired if Mutuc did really made such advice and the latter affirmed
and further said that he is willing to be imprisoned and disbarred. The 4 th
division required Mutuc several times to show cause why he should not be
dealt with for contempt but to no avail. Mutuc sought the inhibition of the
members of the division but was denied. Hence, this petition.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
ISSUE: W/N petitioner was deprived of due process.
DECISION: Due process does not always and in all situations require a trial-
type proceeding. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of
his defense. “To be heard” does not only mean verbal agreements in court.
One may also be heard through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process. Hence, petitioner cannot allege lack of due process
since he was given ample time to explain why he should not be held in
contempt of court and suspended from the practice of law in all the four
questioned resolutions.
RULE 116
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
I. Provisions and Notes
Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. - (a) The accused must be
arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was
filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court
by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the
complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect
known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named
in the complaint or information.
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must
personally enter his plea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of
record, but failure to do so shall not affect the validity of the
proceedings.
(c) When the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea,
a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him.
(d) When the accused pleads guilty but presents exculpatory
evidence, his plea shall be deemed withdrawn and a plea of not guilty
shall be entered for him.
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(e) When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall
be raffled and its records transmitted to the judge to whom the case
was raffled within three (3) days from the filing of the information or
complaint. The accused shall be arraigned within ten (10) days from
the date of the raffle. The pre-trial conference of his case shall be held
within ten (10) days after arraignment.
(f) The private offended party shall be required to appear at the
arraignment for purposes of plea bargaining, determination of civil
liability, and other matters requiring his presence. In case of failure of
the offended party to appear despite due notice, the court may allow
the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged with the conformity of the
trial prosecutor alone.
(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme
Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days
from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to quash or for a bill or
particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment
shall be excluded in computing the period.
A. How and when arraignment is made
• The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint was
filed or assigned for trial.
• It is made:
1. in open court
2. by the judge or clerk
3. by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information
4. reading it in the language or dialect known to him, and
5. asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
• The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally
enter his plea.
• If the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, a plea of not
guilty shall be entered for him.
• If the accused pleads guilty and establishes self-defense, the court should
withdraw the plea and enter a plea of not guilty.
• The general rule is that the accused should be arraigned within 30 days
from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to quash or for a bill of
particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall
be excluded in computing the period.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
However, in the following cases, the accused should be arraigned with a
shorter period:
1. Where the complainant is about to depart from the Philippines with no
definite date of return, the accused should be arraigned without delay
and his trial should commence within 3 days from arraignment.
2. The trial of cases under the Child Abuse Act requires that the trial
should be commenced within 3 days from arraignment.
3. When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be
raffled and its records transmitted to the judge to whom the case was
raffled within 3 days from the filing of the information or complaint.
The accused shall be arraigned within 10 days from the date of the
raffle.
• The lawyer of the accused cannot enter a plea for him. The accused must
personally enter his plea.
B. Importance of arraignment:
Arraignment is the means for bringing the accused into court and informing
him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. During
arraignment, he is made fully aware of possible loss of freedom or life. He is
informed why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him. It is
necessary in order to fix the identity of the accused, to inform him of the
charge, and to give him an opportunity to plead.
C. Duplicitousness of information
The judge has no obligation to point out the duplicitousness or any other defect
in an information during arraignment. The obligation to move to quash a
defective information belongs to the accused, whose failure to do so
constitutes a waiver of the right to object.
D. Defects: when a person is tried without being arraigned first
The failure of the court to arraign a person before trial was conducted does not
prejudice his rights since he was able to present evidence and cross-examine
the witnesses of the prosecution during trial. The error was cured by the
subsequent arraignment.
E. Presumption that there was an arraignment
In view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, it
can be presumed that a person accused of a crime was arraigned, in the
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absence of proof to the contrary. However, the presumption of regularity is
not applied when the penalty imposed is death. When the life of a person is at
stake, the court cannot presume that there was an arraignment; it has to be
sure that there was one.
Note: The accused is not entitled to know in advance the names of all of the
prosecution witnesses. The success of the prosecution might be endangered if
this right were granted to the accused. The witnesses might be subjected to
pressure or coercion. The right time for the accused to know their identities is
when they take the witness stand. The prosecution may call at the trial
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.
F. When a person pleads guilty
When an accused pleads guilty, it does not necessarily follow that he will be
convicted. Additional evidence independent of the guilty plea may be
considered by the judge to ensure that the plea of guilt was intelligently made.
The totality of evidence should determine whether the accused should be
convicted or acquitted.
Question: X was charged with murder and entered a plea of guilty. He was
later allowed to testify in order to prove the mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense. At the trial, he presented evidence to prove that he
acted in complete self-defense. The court acquitted him. Later, X was again
charged with physical injuries. X invoked double jeopardy. Can X be
prosecuted again for physical injuries?
X can again be prosecuted for physical injuries. There was no double jeopardy.
In order for double jeopardy to attach, there must have been a valid plea to
the first offense. In this case, the presentation by X of evidence to prove
complete self-defense had the effect of vacating his plea of guilt. When the
plea of guilt was vacated, the court should have ordered him to plead again, or
at least should have directed that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him.
Because the court did not do this, at the time of the acquittal, there was
actually no standing plea for X. Since there was no valid plea, there can be no
double jeopardy.
Section 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. – At arraignment, the accused,
with the consent of the offended party and prosecutor, may be allowed by the
trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be
allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not
guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
A. Plead guilty to a lesser offense
At arraignment, the accused may plead guilty to a lesser offense, which is
necessarily included in the offense charged, provided that the offended party
and the prosecutor give their consent.
After arraignment BUT BEFORE TRIAL, the accused may still be allowed to
plead guilty to a lesser offense, after he withdraws his plea of not guilty. In
such a case, the complaint or information need not be amended.
When the penalty imposable for the offense is at least 6 years and 1 day or a
fine exceeding P12,000, the prosecutor must first submit his recommendation
to the City or Provincial Prosecutor or to the Chief State Prosecutor for
approval. If the recommendation is approved, the trial prosecutor may then
consent to the plea of guilty to a lesser offense.
Section 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. – When the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of
his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.
A. Court’s action when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense
The court should:
1. conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea.
2. require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt and the
precise degree of culpability of the accused for the purpose of
imposing the proper penalty.
3. ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and
allow him to do so if he desires.
Note: A plea of guilty results in the admission of all the material facts in the
complaint or information, including the aggravating circumstances. Because of
this, the court should only accept a clear, definite, and unconditional plea of
guilty.
Plea of guilty be considered a mitigating circumstance if made before the
prosecution starts to present evidence
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
B. Meaning of “Searching inquiry”
In all cases, the judge must convince himself: (1) that the accused is entering
the plea of guilty voluntarily and intelligently; and (2) that he is truly guilty
and that there exists a rational basis for a finding of guilt based on his
testimony.
In addition, the judge must inform the accused of the exact length of
imprisonment and the certainty that he will serve it at the national penitentiary
or a penal colony. The judge must dispel any false notion that the accused
may have that he will get off lightly because of his plea of guilt.
Questions:
A. Is it mandatory for the prosecution to present proof of aggravating
circumstances?
Yes. It is mandatory in order to establish the precise degree of culpability and
the imposable penalty. Otherwise, there is an improvident plea of guilty.
B. Can a court validly convict an accused based on an imprudent plea of
guilty?
Yes. If there is adequate evidence of the guilt of the accused independent of
the improvident plea of guilty, the court may still convict the accused. The
conviction will be set aside only if the plea of guilt is the sole basis of the
judgment.
Section 4. Plea of guilty to non-capital offense; reception of evidence,
discretionary. – When the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital
offense, the court may receive evidence from the parties to determine
the penalty to be imposed.
Note:
• Court’s action when the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense: The
court may receive evidence from the parties to determine the penalty to be
imposed. Unlike in a plea of guilty to a capital offense, the reception of
evidence in this case is not mandatory. It is merely discretionary on the
court.
• Generally, a plea of guilty cannot be attacked if it is made voluntarily and
intelligently. It can only be attacked if it was induced by threats,
misrepresentation, or bribes. When the consensual character of the plea is
called into question or when it is shown that the defendant was not fully
apprised of its consequences, the plea can be challenged.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
Section 5. Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty.– At any time before the
judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may permit an improvident
plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty.
Note:
• The withdrawal of the plea of guilty is not a matter of strict right to the
accused but is within the discretion of the court. The reason for this is that
trial has already commenced; withdrawal of the plea will change the theory
of the case and will put all of the past proceedings to waste. Therefore, it
may only be withdrawn with permission of the court.
• Moreover, there is a presumption that the plea was made voluntarily. The
court must decide whether the consent of the accused was, in fact, vitiated
when he entered his plea.
• A qualified plea (ex. the accuse says “hindi ko sinasadya”) is equivalent to
a plea of not guilty. In order to be valid, the plea of guilty must be
unconditional
Section 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. – Before
arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask
him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself
in person or has employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign a
counsel de officio to defend him.
A. Action of the court when a defendant appears without an attorney during
arraignment:
The court has a four-fold duty:
1. It must inform the defendant that he has a right to an attorney before
being arraigned;
2. After informing him, the court must ask the defendant if he desires to
have the aid of an attorney;
3. If he desires and is unable to employ an attorney, the court must
assign an attorney de oficio to defend him;
4. If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own, the court
must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
B. Reason for this four-fold duty: The right to be heard would be of little avail
if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel.
C. Effect of the failure of the court to comply with these duties: It is a
violation of due process.
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Section 7. Appointment of counsel de officio. – The court, considering
the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that may
arise, shall appoint as counsel de officio such members of the bar in
good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability, can
competently defend the accused. But in localities where such members
of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person,
resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to
defend the accused.
A. Definition of counsel de oficio
Counsel de oficio is counsel appointed by the court to represent and defend the
accused in case he cannot afford to employ one himself. The court,
considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that
may arise shall appoint as counsel de oficio:
1. such members of the bar in good standing
2. who by reason of their experience and ability, can competently defend
the accused.
But, in localities where such members of the bar are not available, the court
may appoint any person who is:
1. a resident of the province
2. and of good repute for probity and ability to defend the accused.
B. Difference between the duty of the court to appoint counsel de oficio
during arraignment and during trial
During arraignment, the court has the affirmative duty to inform the accused
of his right to counsel and to provide him with one in case he cannot afford it.
The court must act on its own volition, unless the right is waived by the
accused.
On the other hand, during trial, it is the accused who must assert his right to
counsel. The court will not act unless the accused invokes his rights.
Note:
• A non-lawyer cannot represent the accused during arraignment. During
arraignment, it is the obligation of the court to ensure that the accused is
represented by a lawyer because it is the first time when the accused is
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. This is a
task which only a lawyer can do.
Vena V. Verga
/vvverga 101005
But during trial, there is no such duty. The accused must ask for a lawyer,
or else, the right is deemed waived. He can even defend himself
personally.
• An accused be validly represented by a non-lawyer at the trial. If the
accused knowingly engaged the services of the non-lawyer, he is bound by
the non-lawyer’s actions. But if he did not know that he was being
represented by a non-lawyer, the judgment is void because of the
misrepresentation.
C. Duties of the pubic attorney if the accused assigned to him is imprisoned
1. He shall promptly undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for
trial, or cause a notice to be served on the person having custody of
the prisoner, requiring such person to advise the prisoner of his right
to demand trial.
2. Upon receipt of that notice, the person having custody of the prisoner
shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of his right to
demand trial. It at anytime thereafter, the prisoner informs his
custodian that he demands such trial, the latter shall cause notice to
that effect to be sent promptly to the public attorney.
3. Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to
obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial.
4. When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the
public attorney a properly supported request for the availability of the
prisoner for purposes of the trial, the prisoner shall be made available
accordingly.
Section 8. Time for counsel de officio to prepare for arraignment. – Whenever
a counsel de office is appointed by the court to defend the accused at the
arraignment, he shall be given a reasonable time to consult with the accused
as to his plea before proceeding with the arraignment.
Section 9. Bill of particulars. – The accused may, before arraignment, move for
a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The
motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the
details desired.
A. Definition of bill of particulars
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador) /vvverga 101005

• It is a more specific allegation. A defendant in a criminal case who him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his
believes or feels that he is not sufficiently informed of the crime with which mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose;
he is charged and not in a position to defend himself properly and
adequately could move for a bill or particulars or specifications. (b) There exists a prejudicial question; and

B. What it should contain and purpose

(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either
the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the
• Its purpose is to allow the accused to prepare for his defense.
period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of
• The accused must move for a bill of particulars before arraignment.
the petition with the reviewing office.
Otherwise, the right is deemed waived
• It should specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and
the details desired. A. Grounds for suspending arraignment

1. If the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental

Section 10. Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of
condition, which renders him unable to fully understand the charge
prosecution. – Upon motion of the accused showing good cause and with
against him and to plead intelligently thereto. The court should order
notice to the parties, the court, in order to prevent surprise, suppression, or
his mental examination and his confinement, if necessary.
alteration, may order the prosecution to produce and permit the inspection and
copying or photographing of any written statement given by the complainant
2. If there exists a prejudicial question.
and other witnesses in any investigation of the offense conducted by the
prosecution or other investigating officers, as well as any designated
3. If a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, object, or tangible
either at the DOJ or the Office of the President. However, the period
things not otherwise privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material
of suspension shall not exceed 60 days counted from the filing of the
to any matter involved in the case and which are in the possession or under
petition for review.
the control of the prosecution, police, or other law investigating agencies.
B. Test to determine whether the insanity of the accused should warrant the
A. Right to modes of discovery suspension of the proceedings

• It is the right of the accused to move for the production or inspection or The test is whether the accused will have a fair trial with the assistance of
material evidence in the possession of the prosecution. It authorizes the counsel, in spite of his insanity. Not every aberration of the mind or exhibition
defense to inspect, copy, or photograph any evidence of the prosecution in of mental deficiency is sufficient to justify suspension.
its possession after obtaining permission of the court.
• The purpose is to prevent surprise to the accused and the suppression or II. Cases
alteration of evidence.
• It is available during preliminary investigation in order to protect his
MAGSUCANG VS. BALGOS
constitutional right to life, liberty, and property. (Webb v. de Leon)
398 SCRA 158 (2003)

Section 11. Suspension of arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party,
the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition
which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against
Facts: Pepito Lim, owner of Ace Fishing Corporation, filed a complaint for
qualified theft against complainant’s daughter, Rosalie Magsucang, for
misappropriating P11,200 with grave abuse of confidence. The respondent
judge who conducted the PI issued a warrant of arrest and set the bail at
P30,000. Rosalie was arrested but complainant posted bail for his daughter.
Later, more cases for qualified theft were filed by Lim. After PI, warrants of

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arrest were issued and bail set at P24,000. Complainant had no money to post
bail.
Complainant faults judge for the irregularities in the PI when the judge
administered the oath to Lim and having sent Rosalie to prison without
hearing, and for requiring excessive bail. A letter-complaint was referred to the
Office of the Court Administrator. The judge maintained that he followed the
procedure in filing criminal complaints. He further said that he found probable
cause to hold her liable for 8 counts of qualified theft. The Court Administrator
found the judge innocent of the charges except as to the excessive bail.
Issue: W/N the judge abused his discretion in granting excessive bail.
Decision: The charges on bias and partiality were not substantiated by the
complainant. They were mere allegations, which were not supported by
evidence to prove that the judge overstepped the parameters of his
prerogative.
A judge enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his function
unless overcome by convincing evidence to the contrary.
The judge did grant excessive bail. The judge failed to consider that Rosalie is
illiterate, the daughter of a poor fisherman and has very limited financial ability
to post bail. In fixing bail at P24,000, it is clear that he disregarded the
guidelines provided in the Rules of Court. The excessive bail only means that
her provisional liberty would be beyond her reach.
PEOPLE vs. OSTIA
398 SCRA 132 (2003)
Facts: Roberto Ostia was convicted of murder for the slaying of a four-year-
old child. According to a witness, he saw Robert, with the victim Beverly,
perched on his right shoulder walking towards the direction of the poblacion.
When the child failed to return home, her parents asked the assistance of the
authorities. The body of Beverly was found in a grassy area. According to the
medico-legal report, the child was raped and that her death was due to
hemorrhage.
During the arraignment, Roberto pleaded not guilty to the charge of rape with
homicide. Upon talking to his counsel de officio, he agreed to plead guilty to
murder, which was a lesser offense. The accused was re-arraigned and
pleaded guilty to the crime of murder. He was assisted by his counsel and the
information was read and translated to him in the waray dialect. He was also
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informed that as a result of his plea of guilt, he admitted all the facts alleged in
the information which were already read and translated to him.
The judge rendered a decision finding Roberto guilty and sentencing the
penalty of death.
Roberto appealed the Supreme Court contending that the lower court erred in
convicting him of the crime of murder despite hi improvident plea of guilty, in
violation of Section 3, Rule 116 of the rules of court.
Issue: W/N the court erred in accepting the plea of guilty without conducting
searching inquiries as provided for in Section 3, Rule 116.
Decision: Section 3 of rule 116 provides that when the accused enters a plea
of guilty to a capital offense the trial court is mandated to: (1) conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntaries thereof; (2) require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of
his culpability and (3) ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his
behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. This procedure is mandatory and a
judge who fails to observe with fealty the said rule commits grave abuse of
discretion.
In the case at bar, it was proven that the accused did not even know how to
read or write. The trial court failed to explain to the accused the nature of the
crime of murder nor even asked his reasons for changing his plea. No
searching questions were asked, thus the judge abused his discretion.
Nonetheless, as held in the case of People vs. Jabien. Where the trial court
receives evidence to determine precisely whether or not the accused has erred
in admitting his guilt, such plea loses its significance. However, even without
considering the plea, he may still be convicted if there is adequate evidence on
record on which to predicate his conviction. Such is true in the case at bar.
Roberto was convicted by the SC but modified the penalty.
PEOPLE vs. SOLAMILLO
404 SCRA 210 (2003)
Facts: Solamillo and three others were convicted for the crime of robbery with
homicide for the slaying of Alexander Guiroy, the proprietor of Liberty Bakery
and Grocery, with whom the three worked as employees. The victim suffered
21 hack wounds. It was also found that around Php 20,000.00 was stolen by
the accused together with the victim’s wallet and watch.
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After the decision was rendered by the court convicting all the accused, Julian
Solamillo appealed to the court sating that the court erred in disregarding his
tacit withdrawal of his guilty plea during arraignment. He claims that
policeman Bayabos threatened to kill him if he will pleat not guilty.
Issue: W/N the plea should be disregarded.
Decision: No. Section 5 of rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that at nay time before the judgment of conviction becomes final;, the
court may permit an improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be
substituted by a plea of not guilty.
There is nothing in the records to show that Julian filed a motion to withdraw
his plea of guilty or that he, in any manner manifested unequivocally that he
was withdrawing his plea. His statement during the trial that he was
threatened by Bayabos, is not a positive and categorical declaration that
appellant Julian was withdrawing his plea of guilty. Without any unequivocal
act on his part, the trial court could not assume the he was withdrawing his
original plea.
Even assuming that Julian made an improvident plea of guilty and
subsequently withdrew it, such fact does not operate to automatically
exculpate him from criminal liability. Convictions based on an improvident plea
of guilty are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the
trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the
conviction must be sustained because then it is predicated not merely on the
guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the
offense charged.
Whether or not the plea of guilty was improvident. Is inconsequential for the
simple reason that his conviction was based on other evidence proving his
culpability for the offense charged.
PEOPLE VS. DY
395 SCRA 256 (2003)
Facts: The accused Bryan Dy and Giovani Bernardino filed separate motions
of reconsideration questioning the decision of the lower court finding them
guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness. Bernardino contends that they were
not accorded their right to a fair, unbiased resolution of the preliminary
investigation. He also questions the speedy manner by which the trial was
conducted and the lack of arraignment stating that the right to be arraigned is
not among the rights that are susceptible to waiver or estoppel. Thus the lack
of arraignment cannot be deemed cured by their participation in the trial.
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Issue: W/N there was violation of rights on the part of the appellants.
Decision: None: The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation may not be waived. However, it is a different matter when it was
the accused themselves who refused to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation. It was established that the accused refused to be arraigned,
thus, it was not the court’s fault that no arraignment was held.
The records show that the proceedings were not hastily conducted. While the
proceedings might have been of short duration than usual, they were
nevertheless conducted with due regard to the right of each party to due
process. The trial court should even be commended for conducting a speedy
trial, which should be the rule, rather than the exception.
What is the prime consideration is not the speed by which the trial was
conducted but the matter by which the procedural and substantial requirement
were complied with. The records show that these requirements were
adequately met.
PEOPLE vs. MAMARION
412 SCRA 438 (2003)
Facts: Mamarion and several others were convicted of kidnapping with ransom
for the kidnapping of Roberta Cokin, a wealthy business woman in Bacolod
city. Roberta was kidnapped by the group after she attended a cockfight. A
ransom of two-million was asked of her sister. However, the recovery
operation of the NBI failed. They were only able to recover the 2M but not
Roberta. Roberta was then found dead in a shallow grave.
One of the accused Gale became the state witness and was allowed to plea on
a lesser offense. The accused Mamarion questions the decision of the court
allowing Gale to plead guilty to a lesser offense (slight illegal detention) in
consideration of testifying as a prosecution witness.
Issue: W/N the court erred in allowing Gale plead to a lesser offense.
Decision: No. Gale was validly discharged as a state witness. Gale was allowed
to change his plea pursuant to the then prevailing Section 2 Rule 116 of the
Rules of court. As stated in the said rule, the accused with the consent of the
offended part and the fiscal may be allowed by the trail court to plead guilty to
a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the
crime charges or is cognizable by a curt of lesser jurisdiction.
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It is immaterial that said plea was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it
was made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses.
Plea-bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval. Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trail stage
of the criminal proceeding. However, the law still permits the accused
sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter.
Such a situation is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the court. The
court did not err in allowing Gale to plead to a lesser offense since his
testimony is crucial to the case at bar.
RULE 117
MOTION TO QUASH
I. Provisions and Notes
Section 1. Time to move to quash. – At any time before entering his
plea, the accused may move to quash the complaint or information.
Section. 2. Form and contents. – The motion to quash shall be in
writing, signed by the accused or his counsel and shall distinctly
specify its factual and legal grounds. The court shall consider no
ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
A. Form required for a motion to quash
1. It must be in writing.
2. It must be signed by the accused or his counsel.
3. It must specify its factual and legal grounds.
Note: A court generally, cannot dismiss the case based on grounds
that are not alleged in the motion to quash. The court cannot consider
any ground other than those stated in the motion to quash. The
exception is lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. If this is the
ground for dismissing the case, it need not be alleged in the motion to
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quash since it goes into the very competence of the court to pass upon
the case.
Section 3. Grounds. – The accused may move to quash the complaint
or information on any of the following grounds:
1. That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
2. That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged;
3. That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of
the accused;
4. That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
5. That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
6. That more than one offense is charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law (duplicitous);
7. That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
8. That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification;
9. That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. (double jeopardy)
Note:
• Matters of defense are generally not a ground for a motion to
quash. They should be presented at the trial.
• Denial of due process is not one of the grounds for a motion to
quash.
• A motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused must be based only on this ground. If other
grounds are included, there is a waiver, and the accused is deemed
to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
A. Meaning of the statement that “a motion to quash hypothetically
admits allegations of fact in the information”.
It means that the accused argues that assuming that the facts charged are
true, the information should still be dismissed based on the ground invoked by
the defendant. Therefore, since the defendant assumes that the facts in the
information are true, only these facts should be taken into account when the
court resolves the motion to quash. Other facts, such as matters of defense,
which are not in the information should not be considered. Exceptions to this
rule are when the grounds invoked to quash the information are extinction of
criminal liability, prescription, and former jeopardy. In these cases, additional
facts are allowed.
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B. Effect of an information that was signed by an unauthorized person

Question
It is a VALID information signed by a competent officer which, among other
requisites, confers jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject A. While the case for adultery was being tried, X died. What happens to the
matter of the accusation. Thus, an infirmity in the information such as lack of criminal liability of X and Y?
authority of the officer signing it cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence,
express consent, or even amendment. The criminal liability of X is extinguished. The criminal liability of Y
subsists. The death of one of several accused will not be a cause for
dismissal of the criminal action as against the other accused.
C. Defendant enters his plea before filing a motion to quash
B. What is the effect of the death of the offended party on the criminal liability
of the accused?
By entering his plea before filing the motion to quash, the defendant
waives FORMAL objections to the complaint or information. Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint or information is
one against the state, involving peace and order, the death of the
But if the ground for the motion is any of the following, there is no offended party before final conviction of the defendant will not abate
waiver. The ground may be raised at any stage of the proceeding: the prosecution. Neither does the death of the offended party in
private crimes abate the prosecution.
1. failure to charge an offense
2. lack of jurisdiction over the offense
3. extinction of criminal liability
4. double jeopardy F. Distinctions between pardon and amnesty

D. Extinction of criminal liability AMNESTY PARDON

TYPE OF OFFENSE Political offenses Infractions of the
Under Article 89 of the RPC, criminal liability is extinguished by: peace (common
crimes)
1. death of the convict, and as to pecuniary penalties, liability BENEFICIARY Classes of persons An individual
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender CONCURRENCE OF Necessary Not necessary
occurs before final judgment; CONGRESS
2. service of sentence; ACCEPTANCE Beneficiary need not Need for distinct acts
3. amnesty; accept of acceptance on the
4. absolute pardon; part of the pardonee
5. prescription of the crime; JUDICIAL NOTICE Courts take judicial Courts do not take
6. prescription of the penalty; notice because it is a judicial notice because
7. marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of public act it is a private act of
the RPC. the President.
Therefore, it must be
E. Partial extinction of criminal liability proved in court.
EFFECT Abolishes the offense Relieves the offender
1. Conditional pardon (looks backward) from the
2. Commutation of sentence consequences of the
3. For good conduct, allowances which the culprit may earn while offense (looks
he is serving his sentence forward)
WHEN IT MAY BE Before or after Only after conviction

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GRANTED prosecution by final judgment Punishable by arresto mayor 5 years

Libel or other similar offenses 2 years
G. Effect of absolute pardon upon criminal liability Oral defamation and slander 6 months
Absolute pardon blots out the crime. It removes all disabilities by deed
resulting from the conviction, such as the political rights of the Light offenses 2 months
accused.

H. Effect of pardon by the offended party upon criminal liability
As a general rule, pardon by the offended party does not extinguish
criminal liability. Only civil liability is extinguished by express waiver
of the offended party.
However, pardon granted before the institution of the criminal
proceedings in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction,
and acts of lasciviousness shall extinguish criminal liability.
I. Effect of marriage of the offender with the offended party in
private crimes
It shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already
imposed. This applies even to co-principals, accomplices, and
accessories.
However, where multiple rape is committed, marriage of the offended
party with one defendant extinguishes the latter’s liability and that of
his accessories or accomplices for a single crime of rape cannot extend
to the other acts of rape.
Note: The accused can still raise prescription as a defense even after
conviction. The defense cannot be waived. This is because the
criminal action is totally extinguished by the expiration of the
prescriptive period. The State thereby loses or waives its right to
prosecute and punish it.
The proper action for the court is to exercise its jurisdiction and to
decide the case upon the merits, holding the action to have prescribed
and absolving the defendant. The court should not inhibit itself
because it does not lose jurisdiction over the subject matter or the
person of the accused by prescription.
L. Effect of prescription of the offense on the civil liability of the
accused
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction
of the civil action to enforce civil liability arising from the offense
charged, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist.

Note: If the offender in rape is the legal husband of the offended party M. Courts action if the accused moves to quash the complaint or
the subsequent forgiveness by the wife shall extinguish the criminal information on grounds that can be cured by amendment
action or the penalty. But the penalty shall not be abated if the (duplicitous)
marriage is void ab initio.
The court should order that the amendment be made.
J. Prescription a ground for a motion to quash
This is meant to exhort the prosecution not to delay; otherwise, they N. Courts action if the accused moves to quash on the ground that the
will lose the right to prosecute. It is also meant to secure the best facts charged do not constitute an offense
evidence that can be obtained. The court should give the prosecution the opportunity to correct the
defect by amendment. If the prosecution fails to make the
K. Prescriptive periods of crimes amendment, or if, after it makes the amendment, the complaint or
information still suffers from the same defect, the court should
OFFENSE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD grant/sustain the motion to quash.
Punishable by death, 20 years
reclusion perpetua, or O. Effect if a motion to quash is sustained
reclusion temporal
Punishable by other afflictive 10 years
penalties
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The court may order that another complaint or information be filed
against the accused for the same offense, except if the ground for
sustaining the motion to quash is either:
1. extinguishment of the criminal liability of the accused, or
2. double jeopardy.
The grant of a motion to quash on these two grounds is a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense.
If the order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged
unless admitted to bail.
If no order is made, or if no new information was filed within the time
specified by the court, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged.
P. Remedy of the accused if the court denies his motion to quash
The accused cannot appeal an order overruling his motion to quash.
This is because an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory; it
does not dispose of the case upon its merits. The accused should go to
trial and raise it as an error on appeal later.
Q. Two kinds of jeopardy
1. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
2. When an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
• Requisites for the accused to raise the defense of double jeopardy
To raise the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must
be present:
1. a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
2. the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
3. the second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the first information, or is an attempt or a frustration thereof.
• Requisites for the first jeopardy to attach
1. Valid complaint or information
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2. Court of competent jurisdiction
3. Arraignment
4. Valid plea
5. The defendant was acquitted, convicted, or the case was
dismissed without his express consent.
Note: For purposes of double jeopardy, a complaint or information is
valid if it can support a judgment of conviction. It the complaint or
information is not valid, it would violate the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. If he
is convicted under this complaint or information, the conviction is null
and void. If the conviction is null and void, there can be no first
jeopardy.
Questions:
A. A crime was committed in Batangas but case was filed in Mindoro. When
the prosecution realized that the complaint should have been filed in
Batangas, it filed the case in Batangas. Can the accused invoke double
jeopardy?
No. The court in Mindoro had no jurisdiction; therefore, the accused
was in no danger of being placed in jeopardy. The first jeopardy did
not validly attach.
B. X was charged with theft. On the day of the trial, the prosecution could
not go to trial because important witnesses were unable to appear.
Counsel for the accused moved to dismiss the case. The court dismissed
the case provisionally. Subsequently, X was charged with theft again. Can
X invoke double jeopardy?
No. The case was dismissed upon motion of counsel for the accused,
so it was not dismissed without his express consent. Moreover, the
dismissal was only provisional, which is not a valid termination of the
first jeopardy. In order to validly terminate the first jeopardy, the
dismissal must have been unconditional.
C. X was charged with qualified theft. X moved to dismiss on the ground of
insufficiency of the information. The case was dismissed. Subsequently,
the prosecution filed a corrected information. Can X plead double
jeopardy?
No. The first jeopardy did not attach because the first information was
not valid.
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D. The estafa case against X was dismissed, but the dismissal contained a
reservation of the right to file another action. Can another estafa case be
filed against X without placing him in double jeopardy?
Yes. To raise the defense of double jeopardy, the firs jeopardy must
have been validly terminated. This means that there must have been
either a conviction or an acquittal, or an unconditional dismissal of the
case. A provisional dismissal, such as this one, does not validly
terminate the first jeopardy.
Note, however, that in the second kind of jeopardy (one act punished
by a law and an ordinance), the first jeopardy can only be terminated
either by conviction or acquittal, and not by dismissal of the case
without the express consent of the accused.
E. X was charged with theft. During the trial, the prosecution was able to
prove estafa. X was acquitted of theft. Can X be prosecuted for estafa
later without placing him in double jeopardy?
Yes. For jeopardy to attach, the basis is the crime charged in the
complaint or information, and not the one proved at the trial. In this
case, the crime charged in the first information was theft. X was
therefore placed in jeopardy of being convicted of theft. Since estafa
is not an offense which is included or necessarily includes theft, X can
still be prosecuted for estafa without placing him in double jeopardy.
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging
the proper offense.
H. X was charged with homicide. On the first day of trial, the prosecution
failed to appear. The court dismissed the case on the ground of violation
of the right of the accused to speedy trial. X was later charged with
murder. Can X invoke double jeopardy?
No. The first jeopardy was not validly terminated. The judge who
dismissed the case on the ground of violation of the right of X to
speedy trial committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
case after the prosecution failed to appear once. This is not a valid
dismissal because it deprives the prosecution of due process. When
the judge gravely abuses his discretion in dismissing a case, the
dismissal is not valid. Therefore, X cannot invoke double jeopardy.
R. Requisites for a valid substitution of a complaint or information
1. No judgment has been rendered;
2. The accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any
other offense necessarily included in the offense charged;
3. The accused will not be placed in double jeopardy.

S. Dismissal and acquittal.

F. X was charged with slight physical injuries. On his motion, the case was
dismissed during the trial. Another case for assault upon a person in Dismissal Acquittal
authority was filed against him. Can X invoke double jeopardy? Dismissal does not decide the case on the Acquittal is always based
merits, nor does it determine that the on the merits.
No. The first jeopardy was not terminated through either conviction, accused is not guilty
acquittal, or dismissal without the express consent of X. The first case Dismissals terminate the proceedings, The accused is acquitted
was dismissed upon motion of X himself. Therefore, he cannot invoke either because the court is not a court of because the evidence
double jeopardy. competent jurisdiction or the evidence does not show his guilt
does not show that the offense was beyond reasonable doubt.
G. X was charged with theft. During trial, the evidence showed that the committed within the territorial
offense committed was actually estafa. What should the judge do? jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint
or information is not valid or sufficient in
The judge should order the substitution of the complaint for theft with form and substance.
a new one charging estafa. Upon filing of the substituted complaint,
the judge should dismiss the original complaint.
T. When dismissal equivalent to acquittal
A dismissal upon motion of the accused or his counsel negates the
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
application of double jeopardy because the motion of the accused
made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the amounts to express consent, EXCEPT:
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
1. if the ground is insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution
(demurrer to evidence), or
2. denial of the right to speedy trial.
In these two cases, even upon motion of the accused, the dismissal
amounts to an acquittal and would bar a second jeopardy.
But if the accused moves to dismiss on the following grounds, he can
still be prosecuted for the same offense because he is deemed to have
waived his right against a second jeopardy:
1. Lack of jurisdiction (Because if you move to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, it means that you could not have
been validly convicted by that court. You are later estopped
from claiming that you were in danger of conviction).
2. Insufficiency of complaint or information (Same reason. You
could not have been validly convicted under that defective
information, so you are estopped from claiming that there was
a first jeopardy).
U. The conditions when dismissal or termination will not place the
accused in double jeopardy are:
1. The dismissal must be sought by the defendant personally or
through his counsel; and
2. Such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not
necessarily amount to an acquittal.
V. There was no double jeopardy in case before the prosecution could
finish presenting its evidence, the accused filed a demurrer to
evidence and the court granted the motion and dismissed the case
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution. The
reason for this is that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in
dismissing the case even before the prosecution could finish
presenting evidence. It denied the prosecution of its right to due
process. Because of this, the dismissal is null and void and cannot
constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.
Double Jeopardy Hypothetical Questions
A. The prosecutor filed an information against X for homicide. Before X could
be arraigned, the prosecutor withdrew the information, without notice to X.
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The prosecutor then filed an information against X for murder. Can X
invoke double jeopardy?
No. X has not yet been arraigned under the first information.
Therefore, the first jeopardy did not attach. A nolle prosequi or
dismissal entered before the accused is placed on trial and before he
pleads is not equivalent to an acquittal and does not bar a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense.
B. If the accused fails to object to the motion to dismiss the case filed by the
prosecution, is he deemed to have consented to the dismissal? Can he still
invoke double jeopardy?
No. Silence does not mean consent to the dismissal. If the accused
fails to object or acquiesces to the dismissal of the case, he can still
invoke double jeopardy, since the dismissal was still without his
express consent. He is deemed to have waived his right against
double jeopardy if he expressly consents to the dismissal.
C. X was charged with murder. The prosecution moved to dismiss the case.
Counsel for X wrote the words “No objection” at the bottom of the motion to
dismiss and signed it. Can X invoke double jeopardy later on?
No. X is deemed to have expressly consented to the dismissal of the
case when his counsel wrote “No objection at the bottom of the motion
to dismiss. Since the case was dismissed with his express consent, X
cannot invoke double jeopardy.
D. X was charged with murder. After the prosecution presented its evidence, X
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove
that the crime was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
The court dismissed the case. The prosecution appealed. Can X invoke double
jeopardy?
No. X cannot invoke double jeopardy. The dismissal was upon his own
motion, so it was with his express consent. Since the dismissal was
with his express consent, he is deemed to have waived his right
against double jeopardy. The only time when a dismissal, even upon
motion of the accuse, will bar a second jeopardy is if it is based either
on insufficiency of evidence or denial of the right of the accused to
speedy trial. These are not the grounds invoked by X, so he cannot
claim double jeopardy.
E. X was charged with homicide. X moved to dismiss on the ground that the
court had no jurisdiction. Believing that it had no jurisdiction, the judge
dismissed the case. Since the court, in fact, had jurisdiction over the case, the
prosecution filed another case in the same court. Can X invoke double
jeopardy?
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No. X is estopped from claiming that he was in danger of being
convicted during the first case, since he had himself earlier alleged
that the court had no jurisdiction.
F. X was charged with homicide. The court, believing that it had no
jurisdiction, motu propio dismissed the case. The prosecution appealed,
claiming that the court, in fact, had jurisdiction. Can X invoke double
jeopardy?
Yes. When the trial court has jurisdiction but mistakenly dismisses the
complaint or information on the ground of lack of it, and the dismissal
was not at the request of the accused, the dismissal is not appealable
because it will place the accused in double jeopardy.
G. X was charged with rape. X moved to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint was insufficient because it did not allege lewd designs. The court
dismissed the case. Later, another case for rape was filed against X. Can X
invoke double jeopardy?
No. Like the previous problem, X is estopped from claiming that he
could have been convicted under the first complaint. He himself
moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was insufficient.
He cannot change his position and now claim that he was in danger of
being convicted under that complaint.
H. X was charged with murder, along with three other people. X was
discharged as a state witness. Can X be prosecuted again for the same
offense?
It depends. As a general rule, an order discharging an accused as a
state witness amounts to an acquittal, and he is barred from being
prosecuted again for the same offense. However, if he fails or refuses
to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn
statement constituting the basis for the discharge, he can be
prosecuted again.
I. Can a person accused of estafa be charged with violation of BP22 without
placing him in double jeopardy?
Yes. Where two different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to
one of the is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other although both
offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other. Other
examples: Illegal recruitment and estafa, illegal fishing and illegal
possession of explosives, alarm and scandal and illegal discharge of
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firearms, brigandage and illegal possession of firearms, consented
abduction and qualified seduction.
But take note of the following:
Possession of a shotgun and a revolver by the same person at the
same time is only one act of possession, so there is only one violation
of the law.
Conviction for smoking opium bars prosecution for illegal possession of
the pipe. He cannot smoke the opium without the pipe.
Theft of 13 cows at the same time and in the same place is only one
act of theft.
Conviction for less serious physical injuries bars prosecution for
assault upon a person in authority.
Reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and serious or
less serious physical injuries is only one offense. If it is slight physical
injuries, it can be broken down into two offenses, since a light offense
cannot be complexed.
J. X installed a jumper cable which allowed him to reduce his electricity bill.
He was prosecuted for violating a municipal ordinance against
unauthorized installation of the device. He was convicted. Can he still be
prosecuted for theft?
No. Under the second type of jeopardy, when an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under once will bar a
prosecution under the other. (But remember, that there has to be
either conviction or acquittal. Dismissal without the express consent
of the accused is not sufficient).
W. Exceptions to double jeopardy
The conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution
for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the
former complaint or information under any of the following
circumstances:
1. the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising
from the same act or omission constituting the former charge;
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2. the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were
discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint
or information;
3. the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent
of the prosecutor and the offended party except if the offended
party fails to appear at the arraignment.
X. Doctrine of supervening fact
If, after the first prosecution, a new fact supervenes on which the
defendant may be held liable, altering the character of the crime and
giving rise to a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to
be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
Double Jeopardy Hypothetical questions
A. X was charged with frustrated homicide. There was nothing to indicated
that the victim was going to die. X was arraigned. Before trial, the victim
dies. Can X be charged with homicide?
It depends. If the death of the victim can be traced to the acts of X,
and the victim did not contribute to his death with his negligence, X
can be charged with homicide. This is a supervening fact. But if the
act of X was not the proximate cause of death, he cannot be charged
with homicide.
B. X was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and was
acquitted. The heirs of the victim appealed the civil aspect of the
judgment. X claims that the appeal will place him in double jeopardy. Is X
correct?
No. There was no second jeopardy. What was elevated on appeal was
the civil aspect of the case, not the criminal aspect. The extinction of
criminal liability whether by prescription or by the bar of double
jeopardy does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability arising
from the offense charged.
C. X was charged with murder and was acquitted. Can the prosecution
appeal the acquittal?
No. The prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal, since it would place
the accused in double jeopardy.
Even if the decision of acquittal was erroneous, the prosecution still
cannot appeal the decision. It would still place the accused in double
jeopardy.
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Note: As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after
arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information shall be a
bar to another prosecution for the same offense, an attempt or
frustration thereof, or one included or which includes the previous
offense. The exceptions are:
1. if the dismissal of the first case was made upon motion or with
the express consent of the defendant, unless the grounds are
insufficiency of evidence or denial of the right to speedy trial;
2. if the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration
of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and
3. the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely
legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case
would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Y. Effect of the appeal by the accused
If the accused appeals, he waives his right against double jeopardy.
The case is thrown wide open for review and a penalty higher than
that of the original conviction could be imposed upon him.
Z. Action of the accused do if the court denies the motion to quash on
the ground of double jeopardy
He should plead not guilty and reiterate his defense of former
jeopardy. In case of conviction, he should appeal from the judgment,
on the ground of double jeopardy.
Section 4. Amendment of complaint or information. – If the motion to
quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information
which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an
amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or
information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.
Section 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. – If the motion to
quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or
information be filed except as provided in section 6 of this rule. If the
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order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged
unless admitted to bail. If no order is made or if having been made, no
new information is filed within the time specified in the order or within
such further time as the court may allow for good cause, the accused,
if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in custody of
another charge.
Section 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another
prosecution; exception. – An order sustaining the motion to quash is
not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the
motion was based on the grounds specified in section 3 (g) and (i) of
this Rule.
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. – When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information
or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another
prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense
charged in the former complaint or information under any of the
following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from
the same act or omission constituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were
discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or
information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the
consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided
in section 1(f) of Rule 116.
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In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in
whole or in part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same in
the event of conviction for the graver offense.
Section 8. Provisional dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become
permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal
shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived.
Note:
• A case can only be dismissed provisionally if the accused expressly
consents, and with notice to the offended party. Provisional
dismissal does not place the accused in double jeopardy. But, ff
the accused objects to the provisional dismissal, a revival of the
case would place him in double jeopardy.
• The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment
exceeding 6 years or a fine of any amount shall become permanent
after 1 year without the case having been revived.
• For offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years, the
provisional dismissal shall become permanent after 2 years
without the case having been revived.
After the provisional dismissal becomes final, the accused cannot
be prosecuted anymore.
Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefore.
– The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash
before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did
not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of
this Rule.
II. Constitutional Law Notes
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SECTION 21 NO PERSON SHALL BE TWICE PUT IN JEOPARDY OR
PUNISHMENT FOR THE SAME OFFENSE. IF AN ACT IS PUNISHED BY
LAW AND AN ORDINANCE, CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL UNDER
EITHER SHALL CONSTITUTE A BAR TO ANOTHER PROSECUTION FOR
THE SAME ACT.
• Jeopardy means danger
• Requisites for a valid defense of double jeopardy:
1) FIRST JEOPARDY MUST ATTACHED PRIOR TO THE SECOND
(a) upon a valid information or indictment
(1) complaint
(2) information
Note: both substance and form must be valid:
(1) substance – when the complain adequately informed the
accused of the nature and cause of the accusations which
means that:
1.1 the essential facts are alleged
1.2 the legal description of the offense is alleged
1.3 in ordinary and concise language
(2) form
Note: if defective, the remedy is to quash the information
(b) there must be a competent court with jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case (geographical – proper place; and
jurisdictional – has jurisdiction over the crime aspects)
Note: if filed in improper court, remedy is dismissal
(c) After arraignment – without this, the court has no jurisdiction
over the body of the accused
(d) After a valid plea – there must be no withdrawal of original
plea.
(1) the accused must know enough about the
cause and nature of the offense charged
against him/her
(2) if the guilty plea is entered, the court cannot
summarily convict the accused on the basis of
evidence to prove mitigating circumstance, to
do so would deprive the state of due process –
first jeopardy does not attach.
2) FIRST JEOPARDY MUST HAVE TERMINATED
(a) upon acquittal
(1) failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt
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(2) erroneous judgment that has attained finality
(3) dismissed on prescription
(4) dismissal was due to violation o the
defendant’s right to speedy trial
Note: Acquittal, the case was decided based on merits but the
prosecution was not able to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Dismissal is based on the allegation of the court’s jurisdiction, or any
other ground that does not decide the merits of the issue.
(b) Final Conviction
(1) appeal period expires
(2) service of sentence has been totally or
partially served
(3) express waiver in writting
(4) applied for probation
(c) dismissal of the case based on the merits – lack of evidence
3) SECOND JEOPARDY MUST BE FOR THE SAME OFFENSE
(a) identical
(b) when it is an attempt or frustration of the other
(c) when it is necessarily included in the first offense or when it
includes the first offense
(d) subject to the doctrine of supervening fact/event
 One may be charged for the same act if it constitutes at least two
different offenses under two statutes or two ordinances as provided by
the elements of committing the crime. Conviction or acquittal in one
will serve as a bar to prosecution under the other. This does not apply
to continuing crimes.
 DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING FACT – where after the first prosecution,
a new fact supervenes, for which the defendant is responsible, which
together with the existing facts, changes the character of the offense,
such constitutes a new and distinct offense – and the accused cannot
be said to be in double jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
RATIONALE: the rule of identity of offense does not apply when the second
offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution –for the simple
reason that in such case, there is no possibility of convicting the accused
during the first prosecution for yet inexistent second offense.
A. ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY
PEOPLE vs. YLAGAN
Arraignment and plea constitute the final step in the commencement of
jeopardy. It is at the arraignment and plea that issues are joined. Jeopardy
attaches (a) upon a good indictment, (b) before competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) after plea.
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PEOPLE vs. BALISACAN
The nature of Balicasacan’s evidence amounted to withdrawal of his plea of
guilty, and since no new plea was entered, there was no jeopardy, which the
acquittal could terminate.
CINCO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Petitioners apprehension that they might be put in JEOPARDY of being charged
with informations or crimes other than the crime imputed is baseless. No
DOUBLE JEOPARDY as they have not yet pleaded to the offense. A preliminary
investigation is not a trial for which double jeopardy attaches. It is merely
inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may
be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information.
NAVALLO vs. SANDIGAN BAYAN
P.D. 1606 is explicit and clear. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
case of petitioner.
When all elements are present, a second prosecution for (a) same offense,
or (b) an attempt to commit the said offense, or (c) a frustration of the said
offense, or (d) any offense which necessarily includes, or is necessarily
included in the first offense charged, can rightly be barred.
In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted
an arraignment of the accused, which by then had already been conferred on
the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with
conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed.
CUNANAN vs. ARCEO
(murder; transfer to Sandiganbayan before RTC made a decision)
The dismissal of the Information by the RTC was not equivalent to, and
did not operate as an acquittal of petitioner of that offense. The
“dismissal” (later deleted by the RTC) had simply reflected the fact
that the proceedings before the RTC were terminated, the RTC having
ascertained that it had not jurisdiction to try the case at all. No double
jeopardy when case transferred to Sandiganbayan after trial but
before decision was rendered at the RTC. RTC had no jurisdiction,
therefore accused was not in jeopardy.
PEOPLE vs. MONTESA
Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition
(dismissal or conviction), rests in the sound discretion of the court. While the
prosecutor retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he
cannot impose his opinion on the court. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the
case filed by the prosecutor after a reinvestigation should be addressed to the
discretion of the court. The action of the court must not, however, impair the
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substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of
law.
The decision of the judge based on his belief that arraignment which was
immediately followed by the dismissal of the case would forever be foreclosed,
on the ground of double jeopardy, any reopening of the case, is void.
DELA ROSA vs. CA
Double jeopardy cannot apply in the instant case. The requisites that must
occur for legal jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b)
a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge;
and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or
terminated without the express consent of the accused. The fourth requisite is
lacking. The dismissal of the case was upon the motion of the petitioner as
shown by the records.
PEOPLE vs. CAWALINGAAppellants were never arraigned, they never
pleaded before the Judge Advocate General’s Office, there was no trial,
and no judgment on the merits had been rendered. Therefore, first
jeopardy never attached.
CUDIA vs. CA
(cure for defective jurisdiction and filing of info; valid complaint)
There is no breach of the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy for the reason that the absence of the authority of the city
prosecutor.
PEOPLE vs. MAQUILING
An appeal or a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal is barred
by the rule on double jeopardy.
B. TERMINATION OF JEOPARDY
BULALONG vs. PEOPLE
It is the conviction, acquittal of the accused or dismissal or termination of the
case that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
BUSTAMANTE vs. MACEREN
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As a general rule, where the defendant has executed or entered upon the
execution of a valid sentence, the court cannot, even during the 15-day period,
set aside and render a new sentence.
A judgment of conviction may only be modified or set aside before it has
become final or appeal has been perfected. A judgment becomes final when no
appeal is filed or the defendant has totally or partially satisfied the sentence.
PEOPLE vs. OBSTANSIA
The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine
qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the
defendant personally or through his counsel; and second, such dismissal must
not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal.
Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely within the periphery of the said
doctrines, which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our
jurisprudence. Hence, the accused cannot plead double jeopardy.
RIVERA vs. PEOPLE
Verbal dismissal is not final until written and signed by the judge
PEOPLE vs. BELLAFLOR
Protection against double jeopardy is not available where the dismissal of the
case was effected at the instance of the accused.
MERCIALES vs. CA
The acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done without due regard to
due process of law, the same is null and void. It is as if there is no acquittal at
all, and the same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy.
POSO vs. MEJIARES
Lowering of the penalty to qualify the accused for probation, the authorization
for temporary liberty on recognizance and finally the grant of probation, the
orders of the respondent judge arising from these proceedings do not
constitute res judicata or even double jeopardy.
PEOPLE vs. ALBERTO
No double jeopardy has attached when order made by the trial court was not
valid.
CONRADA vs. PEOPLE
General rule: following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to
attach:
1) a valid indictment
2) before a court of competent jurisdiction
3) the arraignment of the accused
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4) a valid plea entered by him
The acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of
the case against him without his express consent
Two exceptions to the foregoing rule:
1. insufficiency of charge against the accused
2. unreasonable delay in the proceedings (violation of rt. To speedy
disposition of trial)
PEOPLE vs. ROMERO
There can be no double jeopardy where dismissal was granted on the ground
of denial of the right to a speedy trial. The dismissal in this case was with the
consent of the accused.
PEOPLE vs. PABLO
When dismissal constitutes abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, the dismissal is invalid and is therefore no bat to reinstatement of
the case.
C. RULE ON SUPERVENING ACTS
MELO vs. PEOPLE
The rule for the identity if offenses do not apply when the second offense was
not in existence at the time of the first prosecution. Where after the fist
prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant for which the
defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and
together with the facts existing at the time, constitute a new and distinct
offense, the accused cannot be said to be in double jeopardy of indicted for the
new offense.
PEOPLE vs. BULING
Where the exact nature of the injury could have been discovered, but was not,
because of the incompetence of the physician, the subsequent discovery of the
real extent of the injury would not be supervening fact which could warrant the
Melo doctrine.
D. SAME OFFENSES
PEOPLE vs. TIOZON
Double jeopardy can be invoked only if the offenses committed are the same
and identical. Offenses committed arising from the same set of facts but
defined in 2 different laws or provisions of the same law, where the elements
of one of the offenses are not essential elements of the other, prior jeopardy as
to one of them does not bar the prosecution.
GONZALEZ vs. CA
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Rape and qualified seduction are not identical offenses. While the two felonies
have one common element, i.e. carnal knowledge of a woman, they
significantly vary in all other respects.
PEOPLE vs. MANUGAS
A person who violates any of the provisions under Article 13(b) and Article 34
of the Labor Code can be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment and estafa [RPC, Art 315, 2(a)] because illegal recruitment is a
malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
a conviction while estafa is a malum in se where criminal intent of the accused
is necessary for a conviction.
PEOPLE vs. QUIJADA
In the present case, they are separate offenses, the first punished under the
RPC and the second under a special law.
When the offenses charged are penalized by different sections of the same
statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of
offenses charged. The elements of illegal possession of firearm in its
aggravated form are different from the elements of homicide or murder; these
crimes are defined and penalized under different laws and the former is malum
prohibitum while the latter are mala in se. No violation of the constitutional bar
against double jeopardy
PEOPLE vs. BALLABARE
Homicide/murder committed through use of unlicensed firearm is punished in
the aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm under PD 1866 but
People v. Quijada states that the person can be guilty of 2 separate offenses
(under RPC and PD 1866 sec.1 par.2)
PEOPLE vs. SALEY
Conviction for various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the
punishment of the offender for estafa in RPC.
E. NO APPEAL FROM ACQUITTAL
SAN VICENTE vs. PEOPLE
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of
the trial court, and its ruling on the matter will be respected absent any grave
abuse of discretion. A grant of demurrer is effectively an acquittal and any
further prosecution of the accused would violate the Constitutional prohibition
on double jeopardy. This is an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a
criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own
motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. They call this the “Finality of Acquittal
Rule”.
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F. PARTIES
METROBANK vs. MERIDIANO
That there is no indication that the trial was a sham, a review and consequent
setting aside of TC’s decision amounts to double jeopardy
G. ORDINANCE AND STATUTE
PEOPLE vs. RELOVA
When the offenses charged are penalized either by different section of the
same statue or by different statutes the important inquiry relates to the
identity of the offenses charged. When the offense is charged under a
municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute. The critical
inquiry is to the identity f the acts which the accused is said to have
committed. If the acts are the same.
RULE 118
PRE-TRIAL
Section 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. – In all criminal
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial
Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after
arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter
period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court,
order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge
but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the
criminal and civil aspects of the case.
Note:
• Pre-trial is mandatory in all criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, RTC, MTCs and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
• It should be conducted after arraignment and within 30 days from the date
the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
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• The following things are considered during a pre-trial:

1. plea bargaining
2. stipulation of facts
3. marking for identification of evidence of the parties
4. waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence
5. modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the
charge but interposes a lawful defense
6. other matters that will promote a fair and expeditious trial of
the criminal and civil aspects of the case
Section 2. Pre-trial agreement. – All agreements or admissions made
or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing
and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be
used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters
referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court.
The pre-trial order binds the parties, limits the trial to matters not
disposed of, and controls the course of the action during the trial,
unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
Definition of Plea Bargaining
It is the disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the
prosecution and the accused. It is encouraged because it leads to
prompt and final disposition of most criminal cases. It shortens the
time between charge and disposition and enhances whatever may be
the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately
imprisoned.
It is not allowed under the Dangerous Drugs Act where the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.

Note: Any agreement or admission entered into during the pre-trial

conference should be:
1. in writing
2. Signed by the accused
3. Signed by counsel
4. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the accused.
Section 3. Non-appearance at pre-trial conference. – If the counsel for
the accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial
conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his lack of
cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties.
Section 4. Pre-trial order. – After the pre-trial conference, the court
shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and
evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to
matters not disposed of, and control the course f the action during the
trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
A. Definition of a pre-trial order
It is an order issued by the court after the pre-trial conference
containing:
FULE VS CA
162 SCRA 446 (1988)
FACTS: The accused Manolo Fule was an agent of the Towers Assurance
Corporation on or before 21 January 1981 drawn in favor of Roy Nadera in
remittance of collection but the same was dishonored because the account was
already closed. At the hearing, petitioner waived the right to present evidence
and in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum affirming the stipulated facts.
The trial court convicted him of violation of the BP22 on the basis of the facts
stipulated by both parties in the pre-trial conference. The CA affirmed the
decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the lack of signature of the accused and his counsel in the
stipulation of facts during the pre-trial conference is admissible in evidence.
DECISION: Rule 118, Section 4 is mandatory because of the use of the word
“shall.” The omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel renders
the Stipulation of facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer
confirmed the stipulation of facts in the memorandum did not cure the defect
because Rule 118 requires the signature of both the accused and his counsel.
What the prosecution should have done was to present evidence to prove the
crime. Without said evidences, the guilt f the accused cannot be established.
Hence, the CA decision is set aside and the case remanded for further trial.

1. a recital of the actions taken, PEOPLE VS HERNANDEZ

2. the facts stipulated, and 260 SCRA 25 (1996)
3. the evidence marked.
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FACTS: The accused Cristina Hernandez, the general manager of the Phil-Thai
Association, Inc. in Ermita, Manila, recruited 14 people to work in Taipeh
without the required license or authority from the POEA. She asked for
placement and passport fees which the complainants gave in installments.
After receiving the full amount, they were not able to leave for Taipeh despite
the assurance of the accused. They demanded the return of their money but to
no avail. The accused was then charged with the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale. She pleaded not guilty in the arraignment and trial on the merits
endued. The trial court found her guilty of the said crime. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the agreement or admission during the trial should be reduced
into writing and signed by the accused and his counsel, and should be allowed
in the trial.
DECISION: No, the admission during the trial need not be in writing and
signed. A stipulation of facts in criminal cases is now expressly sanctioned by
law pursuant to Rule 118. A stipulation of facts by the prosecution and defense
counsel during trial in open court is automatically reduced into writing in the
transcript of proceedings of the court. The signature of the accused is
unnecessary because his lawyer has authority to make admissions by
pleadings, whether oral or written, and such are conclusive unless withdrawn.
For this purpose, the counsel acts as agent of the accused and the acts of the
former binds the latter. The stipulation of facts should be allowed during the
trial to expedite the trial by dispensing with the presentation of evidence on
matters that the accused is willing to admit.
It is evident in the case that the prosecution and the defense counsel
stipulated that the accused is neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to
recruit overseas workers and that this fact may be confirmed by the
representative of the POEA should he take the witness stand.
PEOPLE VS TAC-AN
398 SCRA 373 (2003)
FACTS: The accused Mario Austria was the OIC Provincial Warden of the
Batangas Provincial Jail when he took advantage of his position in falsifying a
Memorandum Receipt for Equipment Semi-Expendable and Non-Expendable
Property, a public document of the said office, by stating that a Colt pistol with
40 rounds of ammunitions is a provincial government property issued to a
civilian agent in connection with the performance of his official duties.
Only three of the 14 witnesses were notified of the arraignment and pre-trial
but none of them appeared. Upon motion of the accused and objection of the
public prosecutor, the trial court dismissed the case on the ground that
witnesses should be present during the trial to participate in the plea
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bargaining and stipulation of facts. The CA dismissed the MR on the ground
that the reinstatement of the case will place the accused in double jeopardy.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the absence of the witnesses in the pre-trial is a ground for
dismissal.
DECISION: The absence during pre-trial of any witnesses for the prosecution
listed in the information, whether or not said witnesses is the offended party or
the complaining witness, is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a criminal
case. Even the presence of the accused is not required unless directed by the
trial court. It is enough that the accused is represented by his counsel.
Even if none of the witnesses appeared, the trial should proceed since the
public prosecutor appeared for the State. Hence, the trial court acted without
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case. However, the witnesses may be cited in
contempt of court if their absence was unjustified.
RULE 119
CASES
PEOPLE VS CHAVES
397 SCRA 228 (2003)
FACTS: Informations for Multiple Murder for the killing of the Bucag family
were filed against eight accused. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and convicted.
Two years later, an amended information was filed impleading Felizardo Roxas
as a co-accused. He engaged the services of Atty Miguel Paderanga. In the
preliminary investigation, he implicated the lawyer as the mastermind. An
amended information was again filed. In the trial, the prosecution presented
Roxas as its first witness which Paderanga objected to. The court sustained the
objection in a hearing for the discharge as a state witness on the ground that it
will violate his right to self-incrimination and that Roxas must first be
discharged as a state witness. Further, only the sworn statement of Roxas may
be admitted as evidence. The OSG filed a petition or certiorari which was
denied by the CA. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: W/N the prosecution may present the testimony of Roxas as a hostile
witness.
DECISION: The accused cannot be made a hostile witness for the prosecution,
for to do so would compel him to be a witness against himself. However, he
may testify against a co-defendant where he has agreed to do so, with full
knowledge of his right and the consequences of his acts. It is not necessary
that the court discharges him first as state witness. According to Rule 119,
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Section 17, the trial court may direct the accused to be discharged with their
consent after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge. There is no distinction as to what evidence the prosecution may
present. In addition to the sworn statement, other evidences may be presented
to determine the existence of the conditions of the discharge. There is no
indication that the testimony of the accused may be excluded. However, it is
still premature for private respondent to raise this question in the instant
petition. Hence, the petition is granted.
SANTOS VS PEOPLE
395 SCRA 507 (2003)
FACTS: Complainant 18 year old Transuelo de Jesus was about to buy a
mosquito coil in the store of Marina Ablaza when she was grabbed by the
accused Virgilio Santos and pulled her to a vacant lot. He covered her mouth,
embraced, kissed, touched her private parts and poked the victim’s vagina with
his penis while holding a bladed weapon and threatening to kill her. The
accused left when her mother called her. The next morning, she told the
incident to her mother. They then filed a complaint with the barangay
chairman, MTC and the Provincial Prosecutor but the same was dismissed.
They appealed to the Justice Secretary who ordered the prosecutor to file a
criminal complaint against the accused for attempted rape. The trial court
found the accused guilty. Later, the accused filed a motion for new trial or
reconsideration attaching sworn statements of desistance of Transuelo and
witness Emeteria de Jesus. However, the court still found him guilty, which
decision was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the affidavit of desistance by a witness after conviction of the
accused may be a ground for the dismissal of the case.
DECISION: An affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the
accused is not reliable and deserves only scant attention. The affidavits of
desistance filed by the private complainant and her witnesses were executed
12 days after the promulgation of judgment of conviction and are clearly mere
afterthoughts. Hence, they cannot have the effect of negating a previous
credible declaration.
Not all kinds of discrepancies and inconsistencies in testimonies have the effect
of discrediting a witness. In the case at bar, the discrepancies and
inconsistencies refer to the time and place when the private complainant met
and told her mother-in-law about the incident. These are mere collateral
matters inconsequential in the determination of the criminal liability of the
accused. More important is the spontaneous, categorical and straightforward
testimony of the private complainant on the violation against her person. She
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never faltered in her narration of the essential elements of the subject offense,
whether before the investigating judge or prosecutor, or the trial judge.
LUCES VS PEOPLE
395 SCRA 524 (2003)
FACTS: Dante Reginio, Nelson Magbanua and Clemente dela Gracia were on
their way to the house of Didoy Elican when the accused Joel Luces collared
Dela Gracia and stabbed him in the chest which caused his death shortly
thereafter. The place was illuminated by a street light. Reginio and Magbanua
executed sworn statements identifying the accused as the culprit. In the cross
examination, an affidavit of desistance of Reginio was submitted but its
existence was denied by him. Meanwhile, Magbanua was presented as hostile
witness for the defense and executed an affidavit of desistance stating that the
culprit was not Luces and might be other persons. The accused pleaded not
guilty in the arraignment. However, the trial court still found the accused guilty
of homicide, which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: W/N the affidavits of desistance should be considered by the court.
DECISION: The affidavits of desistance relied upon by the petitioner as a
means to exculpate himself from criminal liability was sufficiently impeached by
the testimonial evidence of the very same persons who allegedly executed the
same. Reginio declared that the signature found therein was not his, while
Magbanua merely signed it out of pity for petitioner’s wife. As between the
affidavits of desistance and the sworn testimonies of the witnesses before the
court, the latter should prevail. An affidavit of desistance obtained as an
afterthought and through intimidation or undue pressure attains no probative
value in light of the affiant’s testimony to the contrary.
Further, the testimony of the notary public whose only participation was to
administer the oath to the persons who signed the affidavits and who did not
ascertain if the persons who appeared before her and represented themselves
as the affiants were indeed the same persons cannot outweigh the testimony
of said persons denying the veracity of said affidavit.
SALAZAR VS PEOPLE
411 SCRA 598 (2003)
FACTS: An information for estafa was filed against Anamer Salazar and Nena
Jaucian Timario with the Legazpi RTC which alleged that the two conspired in
that the latter issued a check in favor of J. Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation
and the former endorsed and negotiated it as payment for the 300 cavans of
rice obtained from the J. Y Brothers knowing that the same had no sufficient
funds. The check was dishonored and the accused refused to pay despite
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demands to the prejudice of J. Y Brothers. After the prosecutor rested its case,
petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court on the ground that
she could not be charged since she is merely an indorser and only the issuer is
punished by the law; that there was no evidence of conspiracy; and that the
dishonored check was replaced by a second one, which is a novation of the first
transaction. Moreover, the dishonor of the second check was a result of Drawn
against uncollected deposit which means that there are sufficient funds but is
restricted since the check was not yet cleared. The trial court acquitted
petitioner of the crime but ordered her to remit the amount to the complainant.
Conspiracy was also not proved. Petitioner then filed a MR of the civil aspect
with a plea that he be allowed to present evidence that she was not civilly
liable.
ISSUE: W/N the Demurrer to Evidence may be granted.
DECISION: If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court,
the accused has the right to adduce evidence in the civil aspect of the case
unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist.
In the case, petitioner was charged with estafa. The civil action arising from
the delict was impliedly instituted since there was no waiver by the private
offended party of the civil liability nor a reservation of the criminal action. The
petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer on its finding that the
liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only civil. However, the court
rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordered the petitioner to
pay for her purchases from the complainant even before the petitioner could
adduce evidence thereon. Patently, therefore, the petitioner was denied her
right to due process.
PEOPLE VS TAC-AN
398 SCRA 373 (2003)
FACTS: The accused Mario Austria was the OIC Provincial Warden of the
Batangas Provincial Jail when he took advantage of his position in falsifying a
Memorandum Receipt for Equipment Semi-Expendable and Non-Expendable
Property, a public document of the said office, by stating that a Colt pistol with
40 rounds of ammunitions is a provincial government property issued to a
civilian agent in connection with the performance of his official duties.
Only three of the 14 witnesses were notified of the arraignment and pre-trial
but none of them appeared. Upon motion of the accused and objection of the
public prosecutor, the trial court dismissed the case on the ground that
witnesses should be present during the trial to participate in the plea
bargaining and stipulation of facts. The CA dismissed the MR on the ground
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that the reinstatement of the case will place the accused in double jeopardy.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the trial of the case should continue.
DECISION: The accused is entitled to a speedy trial. The accused cannot use
the absence of the witnesses as a ground for violation of his right to a speedy
trial. Even if none of the witnesses appeared, the trial should proceed since the
public prosecutor appeared for the State and the case may not be dismissed on
the ground that no witnesses appeared before the court.
PEOPLE VS TEE
395 SCRA 419 (2003)
FACTS: Prosecution witness Danilo Abratique, a taxi driver, was hired by
appellant Modesto Tee to transport boxes of blue seal cigarettes which were in
fact marijuana to the rented house owned by Albert Ballesteros. Ballesteros
asked for its removal. Abratique was again hired to transport the contraband to
a room in his grandmother’s house which was managed by his aunt. Bothered
by the nature of the goods, Abratique’s aunt, Nazarea Abreau, confided the
matter to her daughter Alice who disclosed the same to his brother-in-law who
was an NBI agent. The NBI and PNP NARCOM conducted a joint operation. With
permission of Nazarea, they entered the room, searched the premises and
found therein 4 boxes and 13 sacks of marijuana totaling 336.93 kilograms.
Later in the evening, the NBI special agent and Abratique as witness applied
for a search warrant from Judge Reyes at his residence. When the Clerk of
Court arrived, the judge questioned them and then issued a warrant to search
the house of appellant for marijuana in Baguio. The agents served the warrant
to the appellant himself. They were able to seize 26 boxes and a sack of dried
marijuana in the water tank, garage, and store room of the residence with the
presence of appellant, members of his family, barangay officials and the
media. Appellant alleged that the evidences were illegally acquired, hence,
inadmissible. Further, the search warrant was too general and did not follow
the constitutional requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. The trial
court held that the evidence was illegally obtained hence, inadmissible. The TC
acquitted him of the charge but convicted him illegal possession of marijuana.
Hence, this automatic review.
ISSUE: W/N the absence of the prosecution witness violated appellant’s right
to a speedy trial.
DECISION: There is no showing that the prosecution capriciously caused the
absences of the prosecution witness Abratique which totaled 20 hearing days
so as to vex or oppress appellant and deny him his rights. Abratique repeatedly
failed to show up for the taking of his testimony. The prosecution even prayed
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for the court’s order for Abratique’s arrest to compel his attendance. The
prosecution tried to get the NBI to produce him but to no avail. Eventually, the
trial court ordered the prosecution to waive its right to present Abratique and
rest its case. The delay of 20 hearing days is not an unreasonable length of
time. Further, Modesto Tee did not object to the inability of the prosecution to
produce its witnesses. Appellant could have moved to require the witness to
post bail, or to hold him in contempt. It is too late for the appellant to invoke
now his right to a speedy trial. In the absence of a showing that delays were
unreasonable and capricious, the State should not be deprived of a reasonable
opportunity of prosecuting an accused. Hence, appellant’s right to a speedy
trial was not violated.
PEOPLE VS GAVINO
399 SCRA 285 (2003)
FACTS: Wenna Gavino, a nine- year old minor, was ordered by appellant to
sleep beside him. Her brothers slept in the living room while her mother was
out on a teaching job. At about midnight, appellant hit her thrice and made her
lie on the bed with her back against him. He inserted his fingers into her organ
before penetrating her. Appellant left her in pain and threatened to kill her if
she disclosed the same. The sexual assaults continued until Wenna was 15.
She was again raped. She then decided to tell her science teacher that
appellant was beating her up but did not disclosed the sexual abuses. She was
brought to the DSWD where she finally disclosed her ordeal. She executed a
statement to the police and had a medical examination. After the filing of the
rape charges, Wenna’s mother and two others fetched her and proceeded to
Atty Demecillo where she signed a document which was an affidavit of
desistance. She was prevented to read its contents. Later, she went to the NBI
and executed an affidavit of retraction deposing that she signed the desistance
under duress. The defense presented several witnesses. After trial, the court
found him guilty of qualified rape and sentenced him to death. Hence, this
automatic review.
ISSUE: W/N the affidavit of desistance was valid.
DECISION: The prosecution duly established that Wenna signed Affidavit of
retraction under duress. Her relatives accosted her in school while she was
under the custody of the DSWD and took her to Agusan to sign the said
affidavit. Its content was not explained to Wenna nor was she given a chance
to read it. She was forced to sign the affidavit as she was threatened that she
could not return to Cagayan de Oro city if she refused.
RULE 120
CASES
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PEOPLE VS BON
396 SCRA 506 (2003)
FACTS: Maricris Bonode, then 6 years old, is staying at their house along with
the accused Nemesio Bon, a brother of her mother Violeta. One afternoon,
Violeta saw the accused lying on top of her daughter. The accused was wearing
pants while Maricris was wearing sando and shorts. Violeta inquired but
Maricris cried. She learned from her youngest daughter that accused sexually
abused Maricris by poking her private part. Instead of confronting the accused,
they transferred to Quezon Province. When Violeta learned that the accused
was in jail for acts of lasciviousness, she revealed to her husband that the
accused molested their daughter. The PNP Medico-Legal Officer examined the
victim and found that she is not anymore a virgin but there were no external
signs of violence. An information for rape was then filed against the accused.
Trial on the merits ensued. The trial court found the accused guilty of rape and
sentenced him to death. Hence, this automatic review.
ISSUE: W/N the accused could be convicted of acts of lasciviousness on an
information charging rape.
DECISION: Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, interpreting the
insertion of one’s finger into the genitals of another as rape through sexual
assault does not apply at the case at bar. The governing law during the
commission of the crime was Article 335 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659,
where insertion of one’s finger into the genitals of another does not amount to
rape. Nevertheless, the accused is not completely without liability. Although
the information charged the crime of rape, the accused can be convicted of
acts of lasciviousness because it is included in rape and all the elements for the
said crime were established. The judgment is then modified such that the
accused is found guilty of acts of lasciviousness.
PEOPLE VS HAMTON
395 SCRA 156 (2003)
FACTS: Spouses Teofilo and Leonida Garcia were the sole distributors of Singer
Sewing Machines under the business name Garmer Industrial Machines. One
morning, Jun Notarte and Reynold Yambot, both armed entered their office and
announced a hold-up. After emptying the drawer of cash, they took Teofilo into
a light gray Mitsubishi Lancer where Arnold Lopez and Arthur Pangilinan were
waiting. Teofilo was blindfolded in the back seat. His abductors took his gold
ring, bracelet necklace, and cash. When he was led out of the office, Leonida
arrived and saw her husband. He approached the car and asked the abductors.
The appellant hit her instead on the nose with a gun. The car sped away. He
was transferred into a trimobile where he was taken into room with no
windows and his left wrist chained into an iron grill. The appellant Adan Manalo
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called Leonida asking for 10 million pesos as ransom. After several calls and
negotiations, the abductors agreed to a P1,200,000 ransom. They told her to
bring the money at the Magallanes flyover before 4pm, open the hood to make
it appear that the pajero has engine trouble. Appellant would then stop beside
her car and after identifying himself as Adan, she should hand over the ransom
to him. However, she coordinated with the PACC under Col. Michael Ray
Aquino who instructed her to go on with the pay-off and wear a green dress.
The pay-off took place. After assuring that they would drop him and give him
P300 for his taxi fare, they noticed a white Nissan Sentra pursuing them. When
they reached the intersection of Guadix and ADB Avenues, the abductors fired
at the PACC agents. Notarte escaped but Pangilinan and Yambot were
captured. Teofilo was rescued and the ransom money and the unlicensed
firearms were recovered. Antonio Hamton was separately apprehended
because he negotiated with Leonida for the ransom at the same time with the
true abductors. He was able to extort P50,000 from her.
An information for kidnapping and ransom was filed against the abductors.
Later, a second information for illegal possession of firearms was filed. They
pleaded not guilty but the court found them guilty of kidnapping for ransom
and serious illegal detention and illegal possession of firearms. Hamton was
found guilty of robbery. The appellants appealed alleging that the prosecution
failed to established conspiracy and that they were in physical and constructive
possession of the firearms.
ISSUE: W/N the judgment was valid.
DECISION: The fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the same
one who had heard the testimonies of all the witnesses is not a compelling
reason to jettison the findings of the court a quo. This circumstance does not
ipso facto render the judgment erroneous, more so when it appears to be fully
supported by the evidence on record. While a judge in such a situation has no
way to test the credibility of all the witnesses, since he did not have the unique
opportunity of observing their demeanor and behavior under oath, the trail
court’s findings are nonetheless binding on this court when these are ably
supported by the evidence on record. Unless there is a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion, the validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the
fact that its ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided
at the trial.
UNIDAD VS CA
399 SCRA 27 (2003)
FACTS: Petitioner Reynaldo Criste Unidad, the Chief Operations Officer of the
WPD was charged with homicide in an information filed before the court.
Testimonies and evidences revealed that the victim was kneeling or sitting in
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front of the accused who was then standing when the latter shot the former.
The trial court promulgated its decision on 31 August 1994, but amended the
same on 5 September 1994. Both contained the same dispositive portion.
Petitioner claimed that the amended decision was promulgated on 16
September 1994 after he had perfected his appeal. The CA affirmed the lower
court’s amended decision. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the amended decision was validly done by the trial court.
DECISION: A comparison of the decision and amended decision of the trial
court readily shows that no substantial variance exists. The trial court merely
made more clear which side presented which witness, but the contents of their
testimonies remained the same. As stated, the dispositive portions are
identical, and the same is consistent with the rest of both the decision and the
amended decision. It can, therefore, be concluded that no prejudice resulted to
any party from the amendment, and that it referred only to insubstantial
matters. The same is clearly well within the inherent powers of courts to
amend and control their processes and orders to make them conformable to
law and justice. Furthermore, there is no showing that the records had been
forwarded to the CA at the time said amendment was effected.
PEOPLE VS ROMERO
399 SCRA 386 (2003)
FACTS: After drinking tuba in his house, Rodolfo Moreno and Augusto Ruba
went to the house of the brother of the appellant to drink beer and gin. Later,
the two left and while in the national road, they saw appellant Paquito Romero
in a squatting position because the place was illuminated by a fluorescent light
two meters away. As Ruba passed, appellant stood and struck him with an air
pump at the back of the head. Moreno ran. He related the incident to Ruba’s
father. When they returned to the scene and brought him to the hospital, the
victim’s sister Corazon Junsay said the name of Paquito with whom the victim
replied with a clenched fist. The investigating officer went to the hospital and
asked the victim the identity of the appellant. The victim replied that it was
Paquito Romero. The questions and answers were reduced into writing and was
thumbmarked by the victim and signed by the doctor and the victim’s sister as
witnesses. An information for murder was then filed against the appellant. The
parties agreed that the appellant would enter a plea of guilty to a lesser
offense of homicide. The court issued an order that the prosecution accepted
the plea under the conditions that there would be no modifying circumstances,
reimbursement of expenses and civil indemnity and recommendation of the
penalty of prision mayor. Before the court rendered a decision, the prosecution
moved for the re-opening of the case on the ground that appellant violated the
conditions when he refused to pay the victim’s father. The court granted it and
commenced with the trial. Appellant however filed a motion to dismiss on the
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ground of double jeopardy which was denied and later convicted the accused of
murder. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N there was already a judgment when the court issued the order
granting the lesser plea.
DECISION: The trial court was correct in holding that there was no double
jeopardy in the case considering that it was terminated as a result of
appellant’s acquittal, conviction or dismissal. The order approving the guilty
plea to homicide, with conditions, was not a judgment of conviction. The
dispositive portion of the said order which in part reads “Wherefore, in view of
the foregoing, this case is deemed submitted for decision” clearly shows that
the trial court still had to render a decision on the criminal and civil liabilities of
the appellant. The said order merely approved the agreement between the
parties on the new plea to a lesser offense by the appellant and the conditions
attached to it. The trial court neither sentenced the accused nor made any
ruling on the civil indemnity in favor of the heirs of the victim.
RULE 121
CASES
AMARILLO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
396 SCRA 434 (2003)
FACTS: Petitioners who are all officials of the DPWH Aurora Engineering District
together with Carolina Querijero, a private contractor were charged with
falsification of public documents. They simulated a contract for the repair of the
Pugo and Dyos bridges which were damaged by flashfloods. In the preliminary
investigation, the investigator considered the certifications of the Bgy
chairperson and kagawad, social welfare officer and the Municipal agriculturist.
The certificates in effect averred that no repair was made and that the
flashfloods occurred on Dec. 24, 1995. Petitioner Querijero submitted a
photocopy of the letter of the request of the mayor to utilize the crane and
boom of Industrial Development Corporation and a letter of the IDC General
Manager granting the said request. Finding sufficient ground, an information
for estafa through falsification of official documents was filed with the
Sandiganbayan. The information was amended to cure some defects such as
the non-inclusion of the phrase “committing the offense in relation to office.
Petitioners filed a motion for leave of court to file a motion for reinvestigation
on the ground of newly discovered evidence consisting of an affidavit of the
administrative officer of IDC that the mayor requested IDC for the utilization of
its equipments for the repair of the bridges. The Sandiganbayan denied the
motion. Hence, this petition.
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ISSUE: W/N the motion for reinvestigation may be granted on the ground of
newly discovered evidence.
DECISION: Taduyo’s affidavit is not newly discovered evidence. It could have
easily been produced during the investigation of the case. There was no
showing of Taduyo’s non-availability at the time of the investigation or the
absence of the correspondence between the Mayor and IDC. Also, assuming
that said affidavit could not have been reasonably produced during the
investigation still it can not qualify as newly discovered evidence because it
was not material to the issue. It merely stated the letter request. There was no
allegation that he actually saw or had personal knowledge of the repairs by
petitioners through Caroline Construction. Hence, the Sandiganbayan correctly
dismissed the motion for reinvestigation.
PEOPLE VS DATU
397 SCRA 695 (2003)
FACTS: Appellant Romeo Datu is engaged in selling hardware and construction
materials in Aurora, Isabela which is also the line of business of the victim
Antonio Chan in Burgos, Isabela. Datu sold an Isuzu dump truck to Chan for
P480,000, the latter issuing 4 postdated checks as payment. Three of the
checks were encashed but Chan stopped payment for the fourth check to
accommodate Amadeo Yap for unpaid lumber which Datu bought from Yap.
Datu confronted Chan about the dishonored check and refused to entertain
Chan’s explanation. He hurled threats against Chan’s employees. He employed
several persons including Batuelo and witness Madayag whom he promised to
pay P10,000. The assailants boarded a white Mitsubishi L-300 van, went to
Chan’s compound and hid. When Chan came out, they rushed to him. Chan
was able to struck Madayag with a wood in the forehead. Batuelo sprayed tear
gas on Chan until he was finally subdued. One of the assailants tied a rope
around the victim’s neck and hung him in the basement of the house. Susan,
the victim’s wife, stood up from her sleep, saw the appellants and her
husband, shouted for help and then collapsed. The appellants left. After his
wound healed, Madayag returned to Datu to collect the balance of P9,000 but
his sister told him that 3 men were looking for him. He then decided to disclose
the crime to his wife and then to his wife’s second cousin, Sgt. Flordelito
Sabuyas who arranged a meeting with his camp’s provost marshal, Col.
Hernani Acosta. Madayag agreed to execute a statement implicating the
appellants in exchange for the forgiveness of Susan. The appellants raised the
defense of denial and alibi. An information for murder was then filed. As
directed by the court, the information was amended to include Madayag as one
of the accused. Later, Madayag was discharged as a state witness. The
appellants were convicted as charged. The appellants filed a motion for new
trial/mistrial on the ground that witness Sgt. Sabuyas executed an affidavit of
retraction that Susan and Madayag framed up the appellants which motion was
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denied. Another motion for new trial was filed in light of an affidavit by
Roosevelt Salvador that Madayag was physically manhandled to testify for the
prosecution, which motion was again denied. Hence, this automatic review.
ISSUE: W/N the motion for new trial may be granted on the ground of newly
discovered evidence.
DECISION: The affidavit of Salvador declaring that he and other military men
including Sabuyas abducted, manhandled and physically abused Madayag to
admit complicity in the killing of Chan, and as a state witness, to implicate
appellant Datu. Salvador further said that Madayag agreed to cooperate after
Susan offered him a reasonable financial package for his testimony. Such
statement after the trial was finished is evidence which appellants could not
have secured during the trial such that it must be considered as newly
discovered evidence that may be presented in a new trial. As a rule,
recantations are regarded with disfavor as it can be easily secured from a poor
and ignorant witness for monetary consideration. However, since the penalty
imposed is death, the testimony of Sabuyas is worthy of note and key to the
solution of the case. There should be no of shadow of doubt in the case that
may vitiate the result. Every piece of pertinent evidence must be adduced
before the trial court. Hence, the new trial may be granted and the case
remanded for further proceedings.
RULE 122
CASES
PEOPLE VS PINUELA
396 SCRA 561 (2003)
FACTS: One morning, Salvador Galvez was talking to Henry Hualde in front of
his store. David Galvez and Rodney Albito were cleaning their trisikad while
Victor Penasales was a nearby water vendor. Suddenly, the accused alighted
from a trisikad and shot David at the head. He then fired 5 times at Salvador
hitting him in the abdomen and right thigh. Salvador fired back but missed.
Both were taken to the hospital but only Salvador survived. Two informations
for frustrated murder and murder were filed against the accused. The two
cases were jointly tried. The trial court convicted him of murder and frustrated
homicide. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the appellate court may correct errors in the judgment of the
lower court on appeal.
DECISION: When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he
waives his constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the
whole case open for to the review of the appellate court, which is then called
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upon to render such judgment as the law and justice dictate whether favorable
or unfavorable to him, and whether they are assigned as errors or not. Such an
appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction and renders it
competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
The identity of the accused was clearly and positively established not only by
Salvador Galvez, Jr., who knew the accused for many years, but also by the
prosecution witness Rodney Albito, who was not known to have any
misunderstanding or grudge against him. This finding of the trial court is
binding and conclusive on the appellate court unless some facts of weight and
substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.
The Court agrees with the trial court that the killing of David Galvez was
attended by treachery because it was established that there was a sudden
attack without provocation on Galvez who was squatting on one side of the
road with his head bent down. Galvez was not in a position to defend himself.
On the other hand, the trial court erred in finding that the attack on Salvador
was not treacherous. The sudden and unexpected attack without provocation
on Salvador, who was just talking to Henry Hualde in front of his store, showed
that treachery attended the shooting. He could not defend himself from such
assault. True, the victim was able to fire back at his assailant. However, he
was able to do so only after he was mortally wounded by the treacherous
attack made by the accused. His recovery due to the timely medical
intervention does not diminish the treacherous character of the attack. Hence,
the accused is guilty of murder, qualified by treachery, for the killing of David
Galvez. He also guilty of frustrated murder for the near fatal shooting of
Salvador Galvez, considering that the same was attended by treachery.
PEOPLE VS MANLUCTAO
404 SCRA 580 (2003)
FACTS: Marcelina Manluctao was then 13 years old when she was first raped
by her father, Romeo Manluctao. The rape took place when the appellant
ordered her siblings to go out and told her to go to her room. In her room, the
appellant kissed her, touched her private parts, inserted his penis and did a
push and pull movements. She cried and resisted but she could not do
anything because she was threatened by a knife. This was repeated three more
times but Marcelina did not give any details or particulars on the third incident.
Appellant was charged with 4 counts of rape in separate charge sheets. He
pleaded guilty to all 4 charges with the assistance of a counsel de officio. The
defense admitted the minority of the victim, the child of the victim, his
paternity and his identity. Only the prosecution presented its evidences. The
trial court convicted the appellant in all four cases with death as penalty in
each of them. Hence, this automatic review.
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ISSUE: W/N the appellate court may correct errors in the judgment of the
lower court on appeal.
DECISION: An appeal or automatic appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the
whole case open for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing court to correct
errors as it may find in the lower court’s judgment, regardless of whether it is
assigned as an error or not.
The Court agrees with the trial court that complainant’s testimony alone is
sufficient in the conviction of appellant. The crying of the victim on the witness
stand is evidence of the truth of the rape charges, for the display of such
emotions indicates the pain that she feels as she recounts the details of her
sordid experience.
In the third incident of rape, the victim did not provide details, but the
elements of rape on that incident have been sufficiently established. However,
both the qualifying circumstances of age of the victim and her relationship with
the accused were not alleged in the information. Such failure is fatal and bars
conviction of the accused in its qualified form which is punishable by death.
Hence, he could only be convicted of simple rape with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, not death.
PEOPLE VS PARADEZA
397 SCRA 151 (2003)
FACTS: One evening, Lailani Gayas was at their house in Zambales with her
younger brother who was watching TV. She was about to go out of their house
when she was grabbed by Romeo Paradeza back into the house. He laid her in
a bamboo bed, undressed her, took out a knife, fondled her breasts, and had
carnal knowledge with her while covering her mouth. After satiating his lust, he
went home. Gayas, who was 26 years old but has the mental ability of a 6 or 7
year old child, told her mother and grandmother about the incident. She was
examined and was found to be mentally retarded. He was then charged with
rape. He pleaded not guilty with the assistance of a counsel de parte. The trial
court convicted him of the crime charged. Appellant filed a notice of appeal.
Both the appellant and appellee filed their briefs. However, the Public
Attorney’s Office filed a motion to withdraw appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the court may grant the motion to withdraw the appeal filed by
the appellant.
DECISION: The withdrawal of an appeal is a matter of right before the filing of
the appellee’s brief. After that, withdrawal may be allowed in the discretion of
the court. The appellant’s motion to withdraw his appeal was made only after
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the OSG had filed the Brief for appellee. However, the Court had required
appellant to file his reply brief. It could therefore be said that the appellant had
not yet completed the process of filing briefs when he moved to withdraw his
appeal, a situation which may call for a more liberal rule. Appellant is a hardly
illiterate functionally and of very low socio-economic standing as a mere
bangus fry catcher. In making his appeal, he is actually wagering his life as
against his sentence below. Regardless of his reasons, it is within his rights to
seek such withdrawal. Hence, in the interest of justice and in the exercise of
sound discretion of the court, the withdrawal of the appeal may be granted. He
will thus remain in custody and serve the sentence imposed upon him by the
lower court.
NAYA VS ABING
398 SCRA 364 (2003)
FACTS: Orlando Naya, as seller, and Abraham and Guillerma Abing, as buyers,
entered into a contract to sell two parcels of land for P60,000 payable in
monthly installments of P1,015.74 for five years after paying a downpayment
of P20,000. Naya bound himself to execute a deed of sale and deliver the title
free from encumbrances and liens upon full payment of the price. Naya paid
P2,000 a month even in excess of the amount agreed upon. Unknown to Abing,
Naya sold his lots including the disputed lots to William Po for P200,000, Naya
represented that he is the owner of the same. Abing continued remitting
payments to which Naya issued the corresponding receipts until the spouses
had paid P54,000. Naya consented to the construction of a fence and a house
or warehouse by Abing. The spouses bought hollow blocks worth P40,000.
However, hey were evicted from the property by Po and the hollow blocks
remained unused. Subsequently, the spouse learned of the second sale. An
information for estafa was then filed against Naya after a preliminary
investigation. After the prosecution had presented its evidence, the court set
the case for continuation for Naya to present its evidence. However, his
counsel failed to appear. The court then issued an order that the accused had
waived his right to adduce evidences. The court convicted him of estafa which
was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the appellate court may correct errors in judgment whether
assigned or not.
DECISION: An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for
review and the appellate court is mandated to correct any error in the appealed
judgment whether this is assigned as an error or has not assigned as error the
issue of whether or not under the information petitioner was charged with and
may be convicted of estafa under Article 316(2) of the RPC.
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There was no allegation in the information that petitioner expressly
represented in the sale of the subject property to Po that the said property was
free from any encumbrance. Irrefragably, petitioner was not charged with
estafa under Art 316(2). Hence, the trial court committed error in finding him
guilty of estafa and the CA likewise erred in affirming the same.
Notwithstanding his acquittal, he is nevertheless liable to the spouses Abing to
return the purchase price and reimburse the amount of the hollow blocks.
PEOPLE VS SUBE
401 SCRA 169 (2003)
FACTS: Julio Solis and his brother Nicanor were resting inside their house
which was illuminated by a double rechargeable lamp. Later, Julio heard shouts
that Bobot, also Julio, will be killed. He saw Lastide Sube, Rolando Menzon,
Felizardo Ontog, Benedicto Acala and Dino Ayala outside carrying flashlights
and bladed weapons. He tried to rouse Nicanor but the latter was ill and could
not get up. He ran out and hid behind some trees 5 meters away from the
house. He saw the five accused enter the house and hit his brother with his
father’s airgun. Then, he saw the five accused came out with Nicanor’s hands
bound with a nylon cord. Thereafter, he reported the incident to his father and
to the police. They went to the house of Sube but they were refused. They
returned to the crime scene but found no body. A few days later, Sube was
turned over by Col Obillo to the Antipolo Police HQ. Sube disclosed the incident
and where Nicanor was buried. Menzon was also arrested. An information was
then filed against Sube and Menzon and the other accused. The trial court
convicted Sube, Menzon and Ontog for the murder of Nicanor and archived
with respect to Ayala and Acala. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the accused Ontog may withdraw his appeal and thereafter be
benefited from the modification of the trial court’s judgment.
W/N the findings of the trial court are binding on the appellate court.
DECISION: Ontog indicated his desire to withdraw his appeal. The request was
treated as a motion to the same effect and granted. Hence, Ontog’s appeal was
dismissed in a Resolution. However, in light of the fact that we have seen fit to
modify the trial court’s judgment in a manner that is favorable to the accused-
appellants, then such modification should apply to Ontog as well.
As a general rule, the findings of the trial court on matters of credibility are
binding and conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted. In the case at bar, the trial court gave
more credence to the testimony of Julio over the combined testimonies of the
appellants. Julio’s testimony was straightforward and convincing. He gave a
chilling account of the incident and positively identified the five accused. He
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maintained his story and did not waiver even when he was subjected to
rigorous probing during the cross-examination.
RULE 124
CASES
VITTO VS CA
404 SCRA 307 (2003)
FACTS: Fredelito Vitto, Vic Pizarro and Danilo Pajaron were charged with
homicide under an information filed with the RTC. The court convicted all the
accused. They appealed to the CA but remained at large for failure to post bail
on appeal. The CA required them to explain why their appeal should not be
abandoned in view of their failure to submit themselves to the proper
authorities. Petitioner, through counsel, explained that he was not aware that
he should surrender. His counsel requested an additional period to contact the
accused in Mindoro, to submit him to the jurisdiction of the CA and to file the
appellant’s brief. However, the accused did not appear and the brief was not
filed. The court then dismissed the appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for leave of
court to file appellant’s brief, which motion was denied on the ground that the
dismissal of the appeal has already become final and executory. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N the CA may dismiss the appeal for abandonment, failure to
prosecute and failure to file appellant’s brief.
DECISION: Petitioner, through counsel, asked for an extension within which to
submit himself and to file the appellant’s brief. However, petitioner failed to
comply which is fatal to his appeal. The CA considered his appeal as having
been abandoned and consequently dismissed the same. The motion for leave
to file appellant’s brief filed two months after the finality of the dismissal of the
appeal was correctly denied. His insolent refusal to submit himself to the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be countenanced.
He should have informed his lawyer of his whereabouts and in the same
manner, his lawyer should have acquainted him regarding the proceedings in
the CA.
RULE 126
CASES
PEOPLE VS SARAP
399 SCRA 503 (2003)
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Criminal Procedure Notes and Cases (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
FACTS: SPO4 Guarino and PO2 Navida, armed with a search warrant, raided
the house of Conrado Ricaforte at Rizal St, Poblacion, Banga, Aklan due to the
reported sale of marijuana by its occupants. The occupants were apprehended
for illegal possession of marijuana and were detained in Banga police station.
In the investigation, the police learned that a certain Melly and Roger were the
suppliers and will be back later. One day, the caretaker of the house told the
police that two strangers were looking for the occupants of the house. The
police arrived and saw Melly Sarap and Roger Amar. Upon seeing them, Sarap
threw her black canvass bag which Roger picked up. Guarino seized Sarap and
grabbed her green plastic bag which upon inspection, contained 2 blocks of
marijuana. Navida pursued and arrested Amar. An information was filed
charging the appellants with sale of prohibited drugs. The court acquitted Amar
and convicted Sarap of the crime charged. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.
DECISION: The Banga police officers were not armed with a warrant of arrest.
Sarap cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to
commit one nor had she just committed a crime. She was merely walking in
the alley near the house of Ricaforte. Guarino would not have apprehended her
were it not for Iguiz’s identification. The Banga police could have secured a
search warrant when the house occupants disclosed that a certain Melly and
Roger would be back. The persons intended to be searched were particularized
and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also ascertained although it
was uncertain when they would arrive. These particulars would have provided
sufficient grounds to secure a search warrant. Instead, the police acted only
upon the information of the caretaker. They cannot dispense with a warrant on
the basis of urgency since they have 24 hours to do so. They had prior
knowledge of Sarap’s alleged activities. Hence, the police could not effect a
warrantless search and seizure since there was no probable cause and Sarap
was not lawfully arrested.
The instant case does not also fall within the purview of the plain view doctrine
because the marijuana contained in the green plastic bag was not visible and
not apparent. That the search disclosed marijuana confirming the police’s initial
information and suspicion did not cure its patent illegality. Thus, Sarap is
acquitted.
PEOPLE VS SIMBAHON
401 SCRA 94 (2003)
FACTS: One early morning, the police, with the bgy chairman and the media,
served a search warrant upon Danilo Simbahon, Maricar Morgia and Charito
Mangulabnan at their residence in Sampaloc, Manila. With slight resistance, the
police gained entry. Their search yielded a brick of dried flowering tops
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wrapped in a newspaper and placed in a plastic bag and a black bullet pouch
containing 6 ammunition, al of which were found under the bed of Simbahon
and Mangulabnan. The police found a pencil case containing shabu and
ammunition in the room of Morgia. They also found a red and black synthetic
case containing shabu, sniffing paraphernalias such as improvised burner,
tooter, scissors, aluminum foil, plastic sachets with residue, and empty plastic
sachets in the living room. An inventory receipt was issued and signed by
Simbahon. The three were arrested and brought to the precinct for
investigation. Separate informations were filed against against the three for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act and illegal possession of firearms. The
charges against Mangulabnan were dismissed upon motion of the prosecution.
The court acquitted Morgia but convicted Simbahon.
ISSUE: W/N the search conducted prior to the arraignment of the appellant
was valid.
DECISION: The case should be dismissed on the ground of manifest violations
of the constitutional right of the accused against illegal search and seizure.
While appellant may be deemed to have waived his right to question the
legality of the search warrant and the admissibility of the evidence seized for
failure to raise his objections at the opportune time, however, the record
shows serious defects in the search warrant itself which rend the same null and
void. The caption, as well as the body of the search warrant, shows that it was
issued for more than one offense, for violation of the DDA and illegal
possession of firearms. Further, the warrant failed to describe the place to be
searched with sufficient particularity. The search warrant issued by the court
merely referred to appellant’s residence as premises without specifying its
address. Furthermore, the seized marijuana was not mentioned in the search
warrant. The seizure by the police conducting the search of articles not
described therein was beyond the parameters of their authority under the
search warrant. Hence, the search was illegal and Simbahon should be
acquitted of the crime charged.
PEOPLE VS TEE
395 SCRA 419 (2003)
FACTS: see rule 119
ISSUE: W/N the search warrant satisfied the constitutional requirement.
DECISION: The thing sized is a property of a specific character, marijuana, an
illicit drug. A further description would be unnecessary and ordinarily
impossible, except as to such character, the place, and circumstances. The
description “illegally n possession of undetermined quantity of dried marijuana
leaves and shabu and sets of paraphernalia” particularizes the things to be
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seized. The search warrant has satisfied the constitutional requirements on The NBI submitted a detailed sketch of the premises prepared by Abratique
particularity of description. ensuring that there would be no mistake. The executing officer, can with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it
Further, it was not disputed that Judge Reyes personally examined NBI Special from other places in the community. Hence, the description of the place was
Agent Investigator II Lising, the applicant for the search warrant as well as his sufficient.
witness, Danilo Abratique, who personally saw and handled the marijuana. The
non-attachment of the depositions of the two is not fatally defective as long as Hence, the search warrant complied with the constitutional requirements.
there is evidence on record showing what testimony was presented and that
such was never raised by appellant.

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