Case Digests on Property
COLLEGE OF LAW, NORSU
Tumalad vs Vicencio
41 SCRA 143
Facts:
On 1 September 1955 Vicencio and Simeon,
defendants-appellants, executed a chattel
mortgage in favor of the Tumalads, plaintiff-
appellees over their house of strong materials
over a lot in Quiapo, which were being rented
from Madrigal & Company, Inc. The mortgage
was executed to guarantee a loan of P4,800.00
received from the Tumalads, payable within one
year at 12% per annum. The mode of payment
was P150.00 monthly, It was also agreed that
default in the payment of any of the
amortizations would cause the remaining
unpaid balance to become immediately due and
payable, the Chattel Mortgage enforceable, and
the Sheriff of Manila authorized to sell the
Mortgagor’s property after necessary
publication. When Vicencio and Simeon
defaulted in paying, the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed, and on 27 March
1956, the house was sold at public auction
pursuant to the said contract. As highest
bidder, the Tumalads were issued the
corresponding certificate of sale.
On 18 April 1956, the Tumalads commenced
case in the municipal court of Manila, praying
that the house be vacated and its possession
surrendered to them, and for Vicencio and
Simeon to pay rent of P200.00 monthly up to
the time the possession is surrendered. The
municipal court rendered its decision in favor of
the Tumalads.
Defendant-appellants impugned the legality of
the chattel mortgage claiming that they are still
the owner of the house but waived their rights
to introduce evidence.
Nearly a year after the foreclosure sale the
mortgaged house had been demolished on 14
and 15 January 1957 by virtue of a decision
obtained by the lessor of the land on which the
house stood for non-payment of rentals.
Issues:
1. WON the subject matter of the mortgage
which is a house of strong material can
be subject of real estate mortgage or a
chattel mortgage.
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Johann Heinrich Malongo
2. Whether or not the defendants are
legally bound to pay rentals to the
plaintiffs during the period of 1 year
provided by law for the redemption of
the extrajudicially foreclosed house.
Held:
The inclusion of the building separate and
distinct from the land in the enumeration of
what may constitute real property, that the
building is by itself an immovable property.
However deviations have been allowed for
various reasons specially if it is stipulated in the
subject of contract. In the case at bar, although
there is no specific statement referring to the
subject house as a personal property, yet by
ceding, selling or transferring a property by way
of chattel mortgage, defendants-appellants
could only have meant to convey the house as
a chattel.
Hence if a house belonging to a person stands
on a rented land belonging to another person, it
may be mortgaged as a personal property as so
stipulated in the document of mortgage. It
should be noted that the principle is predicated
on statements by the owner declaring his house
to be chattel. Party in a chattel mortgage
cannot question the validity of the chattel
mortgage entered into. The doctrine of
estoppels therefore applies to the defendant-
appellants.
Since the defendant-appellants were occupying
the house at the time the auction of sale, they
are entitled to remain in possession during the
period of redemption or within one year from
the date of auction sale and to collect the rents
or profits during the said period.
And since the plaintiff-appellees right to posses
was not yet born at the filing of the complaint,
there could be no violation or breach thereof.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision
appealed from and entered another dismissing
the complaint, with costs against plaintiffs-
appellees.
Meralco vs CBAA
114 SCRA 273
Facts:

COLLEGE OF LAW, NORSU
Pursuant to a pipeline concession issued under
the Petroleum Act of 1949, Republic Act No.
387, Meralco Securities installed from Batangas
to Manila a pipeline system consisting of
cylindrical steel pipes joined together and
buried not less than one meter below the
surface along the shoulder of the public
highway.
The pipes are embedded in the soil while the
valves are welded to the pipes so as to make
the pipeline system one single piece of property
from end to end.
Pursuant to the Assessment Law,
Commonwealth Act No. 470, the provincial
assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real
property and issued Tax Declarations.
Issues:
Whether or not the Meralco Securities Pipeline
System in Laguna is a subject to a realty tax.
Held:
The Court ordered that CBAA did not with grave
abuse and discretion and acted within its
jurisdiction in sustaining the holding of the
provincial assessor that Meralco Securities
Pipeline System in Laguna is subject to a realty
tax for the following reasons that the pipes are
machinery or improvements and regarded as
realty because they are constructions adhered
to the soil. It is attached to the land in such a
way that it cannot be separated therefrom
without dismantling the steel pipes which are
welded to the pipeline. In so far as the pipeline
uses valves, pumps and control devices to
maintain the flow of the oil, it is in a sense a
machinery within the meaning of the Real
Property Tax Code.
Thus, the Court dismiss the petition and the
questioned decision and resolution of the lower
court is affirmed.
Meralco vs CBAA
114 SCRA 260
Facts:
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This case is about the imposition of the realty
tax on two oil storage tanks installed in 1969 by
Manila Electric Company on a lot in San
Pascual, Batangas which it leased in 1968 from
Caltex (Phil.), Inc.
The storage tanks are made of steel plates
welded and assembled on the spot. Their
bottoms rest on a foundation consisting of
compacted earth as the outermost layer. The
tank is not attached to its foundation. It is not
anchored or welded to the concrete circular
wall. Its bottom plate is not attached to any part
of the foundation by bolts, screws or similar
devices. The tank merely sits on its foundation.
Pipelines were installed on the sides of each
tank and are connected to the pipelines of the
Manila Enterprises Industrial Corporation.
The Board concludes that while the tanks rest
or sit on their foundation, the foundation itself
and the walls, dikes and steps, which are
integral parts of the tanks, are affixed to the
land while the pipelines are attached to the
tanks and required Meralco to pay realty taxes
on the two tanks.
Issue:
Whether or not the 2 oil tanks installed by
Meralco in Batangas is a subject to a realty tax.
Held:
The SC ruled that while the two storage tanks
are not embedded in the land, they may,
nevertheless, be considered as improvements
on the land, enhancing its utility and rendering
it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that
the two tanks have been installed with some
degree of permanence as receptacles for the
considerable quantities of oil needed by
Meralco for its operations.
Thus, the two tanks should be held subject to
realty tax because they were considered real
property.
Henceforth, the petition is dismissed. The
Board's questioned decision and resolution are
affirmed.
Board of Assessment vs Meralco
10 SCRA 68

COLLEGE OF LAW, NORSU
Facts:
The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 484
which authorized the Municipal Board of Manila
to grant a franchise to construct, maintain and
operate an electric street railway and electric
light, heat and power system in the City of
Manila.
Meralco's electric power is generated by its
hydro-electric plant located at Botocan Falls,
Laguna and is transmitted to the City of Manila
by means of electric transmission wires,
running from the province of Laguna to the said
City. These electric transmission wires which
carry high voltage current, are fastened to
insulators attached on steel towers constructed
by respondent at intervals, from its hydro-
electric plant in the province of Laguna to the
City of Manila. The respondent Meralco has
constructed 40 of these steel towers within
Quezon City, on land belonging to it.
The City Assessor of Quezon City declared the
aforesaid steel towers for real property tax
under Tax.
Respondent paid the amount under protest, and
filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax
Appeals
Issue:
Whether or not the Meralco poles constitute
real properties so as they can be subjected to a
real property tax.
Held:
The SC ruled that Meralco's steel towers were
considered poles within the meaning of
paragraph 9 of its franchise which exempts its
poles from taxation. The steel towers were
considered personalty because they were
removable and merely attached to square
metal frames by means of bolts and could be
moved from place to place when unscrewed
and dismantled. Furthermore, they are not
attached to an immovable in a fixed manner,
and they can be separated without breaking the
material or causing deterioration upon the
object to which they are attached.
Note:
Poles - was used to denote the steel towers of
an electric company engaged in the
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generation of hydro-electric power
generated from its plant.
Caltex vs CBAA
114 SCRA 296
Facts:
This case is about the realty tax on machinery
and equipment installed by Caltex (Philippines)
Inc. in its gas stations located on leased land.
The machines and equipment consists of
underground tanks, elevated tank, elevated
water tanks, water tanks, gasoline pumps,
computing pumps, water pumps, car washer,
car hoists, truck hoists, air compressors and
tireflators.
The building or shed, the elevated water tank,
the car hoist under a separate shed, the air
compressor, the underground gasoline tank,
neon lights signboard, concrete fence and
pavement and the lot where they are all placed
or erected, all of them used in the pursuance of
the gasoline service station business formed
the entire gasoline service-station.
The lessor of the land, where the gas station is
located, does not become the owner of the
machines and equipment installed therein.
Caltex retains the ownership thereof during the
term of the lease.
Issue:
Whether or not the pieces of gas station
equipment and machinery enumerated are
subject to realty tax.
Held:
The Assessment Law provides that the realty
tax is due "on real property, including land,
buildings, machinery, and other
improvements".
SC hold that the said equipment and
machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station
building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it
is subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are
necessary to the operation of the gas station,
for without them the gas station would be
useless, and which have been attached or

COLLEGE OF LAW, NORSU
affixed permanently to the gas station site or
embedded therein, are taxable improvements
and machinery within the meaning of the
Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax
Code.
Note:
Improvements — is a valuable addition made to
property or an amelioration in its
condition, amounting to more than
mere repairs or replacement of
waste, costing labor or capital and
intended to enhance its value,
beauty or utility or to adapt it for
new or further purposes.
Machinery — shall embrace machines,
mechanical contrivances,
instruments, appliances and
apparatus attached to the real
estate. It includes the physical
facilities available for production,
as well as the installations and
appurtenant service facilities,
together with all other equipment
designed for or essential to its
manufacturing, industrial or
agricultural purposes.
US vs Carlos
21 Phil 553
Facts:
Ignacio Carlos has been a consumer of
electricity furnished by the Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Company for a building
containing the residence of the accused and 3
other residences. Representatives of the
company believing that more light is consumed
than what is shown in the meter installed an
additional meter on the pole outside Carlos’
house to compare the actual consumption and
found out that the latter used a jumper. Further,
a jumper was found in a drawer of a small
cabinet in the room of the defendant’s house
were the meter was installed. In the absence of
any explanation for Carlos’ possession of said
device, the presumption raised was that Carlos
was the owner of the device whose only use
was to deflect the current from the meter. Thus
he was charged with the crime of theft
amounting to 2,273KW of electric power worth
909.20 pesos.
Issue:
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Whether or not the court erred in declaring that
the electrical energy may be stolen.
Held:
It is true that electricity is no longer, as
formerly, regarded by electricians as a fluid, but
its manifestation and effects, like those of gas,
may be seen and felt. The true test of what is a
proper subject of larceny seems to be not
whether the subject is corporeal, but whether it
is capable of appropriation by another than the
owner.
The court ruled that electricity, the same as
gas, is a valuable article of merchandise,
bought and sold like other personal property
and is capable of appropriation by another. It is
also susceptible of being severed from a mass
or larger quantity, and of being transported
from place to place. So no error was committed
by the trial court in holding that electricity is a
subject of larceny.
BH Berkenkotter vs Cu Unjieng
61 Phil 663
Facts:
The Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., owner of the
sugar central situated in Mabalacat, Pampanga,
obtained from Cu Unjieng e Hijos, a loan
secured by a first mortgage constituted on two
parcels and land "with all its buildings,
improvements, sugar-cane mill, steel railway,
telephone line, apparatus, utensils and
whatever forms part or is necessary
complement of said sugar-cane mill, steel
railway, telephone line, now existing or that
may in the future exist is said lots.
Shortly after said mortgage had been
constituted, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc.,
decided to increase the capacity of its sugar
central by buying additional machinery and
equipment, so that instead of milling 150 tons
daily, it could produce 250. The estimated cost
of said additional machinery and equipment
was approximately P100,000. In order to carry
out this plan, A. Green, president of said
corporation, proposed to the plaintiff, B.H.
Berkenkotter, to advance the necessary amount
for the purchase of said machinery and
equipment.

COLLEGE OF LAW, NORSU
The president of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc.,
applied to Cu Unjieng e Hijos for an additional
loan of P75,000 offering as security the
additional machinery and equipment acquired
by said B.A. Green and installed in the sugar
central after the execution of the original
mortgage deed, on April 27, 1927, together
with whatever additional equipment acquired
with said loan. B.A. Green failed to obtain said
loan.
Issues:
Whether or not, the lower court erred in
declaring that the additional machinery and
equipment as improvement can be
permanently attached to a mortgage of the
sugar central.
Held:
That the installation of a machinery and
equipment in a mortgaged sugar central, in lieu
of another of less capacity, for the purpose of
carrying out the industrial functions of the latter
and increasing production, constitutes a
permanent improvement on said sugar central
and subjects said machinery and equipment to
the mortgage constituted thereon.
Davao Saw Mill
61 Phil 709
Facts:
The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a
lumber concession from the Government of the
Philippine Islands. It has operated a sawmill in
the sitio of Maa, barrio of Tigatu, municipality of
Davao, Province of Davao. However, the land
upon which the business was conducted
belonged to another person. On the land the
sawmill company erected a building which
housed the machinery used by it.
In another action, wherein the Davao Light &
Power Co., Inc., was the plaintiff and the Davao,
Saw, Mill Co., Inc., was the defendant, a
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff
in that action against the defendant in that
action; a writ of execution issued thereon, and
the properties now in question were levied upon
as personalty by the sheriff. No third party
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claim was filed for such properties at the time
of the sales thereof as is borne out by the
record made by the plaintiff herein.
Issue:
Whether or not the machinery mounted on
foundations of cement and installed by the
lessee on a lease land be regarded as real
property.
Held:
The machinery which is movable in its nature
only becomes immobilized when placed in a
plant by the owner of the property or plant but
not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary,
or any person having only a temporary right,
unless such person acted as agent of the
owner.
Immobilization by destination or purpose
cannot generally be made by a person whose
possession of property is only TEPORARY,
otherwise we will be forced to presume that he
intended to give the property permanently
away in favor of the owner of the premises.
Government of the Phil Islands vs
Cabangis
53 Phil 112
Facts:
A certain lots were formerly a part of a large
parcel of land belonging to the predecessor of
the herein claimants and appellees. From the
year 1896 said land began to wear away, due to
the action of the waves of Manila Bay, until the
year 1901 when the said lots became
completely submerged in water in ordinary
tides, and remained in such a state until 1912
when the Government undertook the dredging
of Vitas Estuary in order to facilitate navigation,
depositing all the sand and silt taken from the
bed of the estuary on the low lands which were
completely covered with water, surrounding
that belonging to the Philippine Manufacturing
Company, thereby slowly and gradually forming
the lots, the subject matter of this proceeding.
Issue:

COLLEGE OF LAW, NORSU
Whether or not the lower court erred in not
holding that the lots in question are of the
public domain the same having been gained
from the sea by accession, by fillings made by
the Bureau of Public Works and by the
construction of the break-water.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the lots in
question having disappeared on account of the
gradual erosion due to the ebb and flow of the
tide, and having remained in such a state until
they were reclaimed from the sea by the filling
in done by the Government, they are public
land in the sense that neither the herein
claimants-appellees nor their predecessors did
anything to prevent their destruction.
By virtue whereof, the judgment appealed from
the lower court is reversed.
Cebu Oxygen vs Bercilles
66 SCRA 481
Facts:
This is a case on a petition for the review of the
order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
dismissing petitioner's application for
registration of title over a parcel of land
situated in the City of Cebu.
The parcel of land sought to be registered was
only a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu
City. On September 23, 1968, the City Council
of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193, approved
on October 3, 1968, declared the terminal
portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City,
as an abandoned road, the same not being
included in the City Development Plan.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion
to dismiss the application on the ground that
the property sought to be registered being a
public road intended for public use is
considered part of the public domain and
therefore outside the commerce of man.
Consequently, it cannot be subject to
registration by any private individual.
Issue:
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Whether or not the declaration of the road as
abandoned make it patrimonial property which
may be the object of a common contract.
Held:
Since that portion of the city street subject of
petitioner's application for registration of title
was withdrawn from public use, it follows that
such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial
property which can be the object of an ordinary
contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides
that "Property of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State."
Property thus withdrawn from public servitude
may be used or conveyed for any purpose for
which other real property belonging to the City
may be lawfully used or conveyed.
Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs
Zamboanga City
22 SCRA 1334
Facts:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the
Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the
provincial capital of the then Zamboanga
Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth
Act 39 was approved converting the
Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga
City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that —
Buildings and properties which the province
shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital
to another place will be acquired and paid for
by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed
by the Auditor General.
The properties and buildings referred to
consisted of 50 lots and some buildings
constructed thereon, located in the City of
Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens
certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga
Province.

COLLEGE OF LAW, NORSU
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was
approved dividing the province of Zamboanga
into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and
Zamboanga del Sur. Properties and the
obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall
be divided equitably between the Province of
Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of
Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the
Philippines, upon the recommendation of the
Auditor General.
However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039
was approved amending Sec. 50 of
Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that —All
buildings, properties and assets belonging to
the former province of Zamboanga and located
within the City of Zamboanga are hereby
transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said
City of Zamboanga.
Issue:
WON Zamboanga del Norte is deprived of its
private properties without due process and just
compensation.
Ruling:
The fact that the 26 lots are registered
strengthens the proposition that they are truly
private in nature. On the other hand, that the
24 lots used for governmental purposes are
also registered is of no significance since
registration cannot convert public property to
private.
Applying Art. 424 of NCC, all the properties in
question, except the two (2) lots used as High
School playgrounds, could be considered as
patrimonial properties of the former
Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the
hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school
sites will be considered patrimonial for they are
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not for public use. They would fall under the
phrase "public works for public service"
Salas vs Jarencio
46 SCRA 734
Facts:
Facts:
On February 24, 1919, the 4th Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, acting as a
land registration court, rendered judgment
declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee
simple of a parcel of land containing an area of
9,689.8 square meters, more or less. On various
dates in 1924, the City of Manila sold portions
of the aforementioned parcel of land in favor of
Pura Villanueva.
On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of
Manila, presided by then Vice-Mayor Antono J.
Villegas, adopted a resolution requesting His
Excellency, the President of the Philippines to
consider the feasibility of declaring the City
property bounded by Florida, San Andres, and
Nebraska Streets, containing a total area of
7,450 square meters as a patrimonial property
of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling
these lots to the actual occupants thereof.
There is therefore a precedent that this parcel
of land could be subdivided and sold to bona
fide occupants. The bill was passed by the
Senate and approved by the President and
became RA 4118.
Issue:
WON the property involved in RA 4118 is a
private or patrimonial property of the City of
Manila.
Ruling:
The conclusion of the respondent court that
Republic Act No. 4118 converted a patrimonial
property of the City of Manila into a parcel of

COLLEGE OF LAW, NORSU
disposable land of the State and took it away
from the City without compensation is,
therefore, unfounded. In the last analysis the
land in question pertains to the State and the
City of Manila merely acted as trustee for the
benefit of the people therein for whom the
State can legislate in the exercise of its
legitimate powers.
If it were its patrimonial property why should
the City of Manila be requesting the President
to make representation to the legislature to
declare it as such so it can be disposed of in
favor of the actual occupants? There could be
no more blatant recognition of the fact that said
land belongs to the State and was simply
granted in usufruct to the City of Manila for
municipal purposes.
Amunategui vs Director of Forestry
126 SCRA 69
Facts:
There were two petitions for review on certiorari
questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals
which declared the disputed property as forest
land, not subject to titling in favor of private
persons, Borre and Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial
Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the
application for registration of title claiming that
the land was mangrove swamp which was still
classified as forest land and part of the public
domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his
opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885
containing 117,956 square meters was
concerned and prayed that title to said portion
be confirmed and registered in his name.
Issue:
WON the lot in question can be subject of
registration and confirmation of title in the
name of the private person.
Held:
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The opposition of the Director of Forestry was
strengthened by the appellate court's finding
that timber licenses had to be issued to certain
licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself
took the trouble to ask for a license to cut
timber within the area. It was only sometime in
1950 that the property was converted into
fishpond but only after a previous warning from
the District Forester that the same could not be
done because it was classified as "public
forest”.
A forested area classified as forest land of the
public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. "Forest lands" do
not have to be on mountains or in out of the
way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The possession of
forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into private ownership. Therefore, the lot in
question never ceased to be classified as forest
land of public domain.
Lanzar vs Director of Lands
78 SCRA 134
Facts:
This is a petition to review on certiorari the
decision of the Court of Appeals declaring the
property sought to be registered as the
property of the public domain devoted to public
use not susceptible of private appropriation.
Petitioner, Ramon Lanzar, filed an application
for registration of title to a parcel of land
located in the District of Molo, Iloilo City in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo alleging that he
is the owner in fee simple of the land in
question and asking that the title thereto be
registered in his name. In August 1961, the
Director of Lands and the City of Iloilo filed an
opposition to the application on the ground that
the land in question a foreshore land which
forms part of the public domain and is needed
by the City of Iloilo as a road right of way of the
Molo Arevalo Boulevard, and that the applicant
had not possessed the property.

COLLEGE OF LAW, NORSU
The Director of Lands and the City of Iloilo
appealed to the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
and held that the land in question, being an
accretion formed by the action of the sea, is
property of the public domain and not
susceptible of private appropriation.
Issue:
WON the title to the land in question which was
formed by action of the sea as an accretion
may be registered on the basis of adverse
possession for over 30 years.
Held:
The occupation or material possession of any
land formed upon the shore by accretions and
alluvium deposits occasioned by the sea, where
the occupant or possessor is a private person
and holds without previous permission or
authorization from the Government, is illegal
possession on his part and amounts to nothing
more than a mere detainer of the land, which is
out of the sphere of the commerce of men, as
belonging to the public domain and being
allotted to public uses and for the use of all
persons who live at the place where it is
situated.
Lands added to the shores by accretion and
alluvial deposits caused by action of the sea,
form part of the public domain. When they are
no longer washed by the water of the sea and
are not necessary for purposes of public utility,
or for the establishment of special industries, or
for coast-guard service, the Government shall
declare them to be property of the owners of
the estates adjacent thereto and as increment
thereof.
Yap vs Grageda
121 SCRA 244
Facts:
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Maximino Rico executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of the petitioner Donato Reyes Yap
who was then a Chinese national. Respondent
Jose A. Rico is the eldest son of Maximino Rico,
one of the vendors.
After the lapse of nearly fifteen years from and
after the execution of the deed of absolute sale,
Donato Reyes Yap was admitted as a Filipino
citizen and allowed to take his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
On December 1, 1967, the petitioner ceded the
major portion of a lot which he acquired by
purchase under the deed of sale in favor of his
engineer son, Felix Yap, who was also a Filipino
citizen because of the Filipino citizenship of his
mother and the naturalization of his father
Donato Reyes Yap.
Subsequently, Lourdes Rico, aunt and co-heir of
respondent Jose A. Rico sold the remaining
portion of that lot to the petitioner who had his
rights. Donato Reyes Yap, has been in
possession of the lots in question since 1939,
openly, publicly, continuously, and adversely in
the concept of owner until the present time.
Issue:
WON the sale of residential lot in question to a
Chinese national is null and void in spite of the
fact that the vendee had been a naturalized
born Filipino citizen.
Held:
The litigated property is now in the hands of a
naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a
disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a
naturalized citizen, was constitutionally
qualified to own the subject property. There
would be no more public policy to be served in
allowing petitioner to recover the land as it is
already in the hands of a qualified person.
If the ban on aliens from acquiring not only
agricultural but also urban lands, is to preserve
the nation’s lands for future generations of
 Case Digests on Property
COLLEGE OF LAW, NORSU Law
Johann Heinrich Malongo

Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be

thwarted but achieved by making lawful the
acquisition of real estate by aliens who became
Filipino citizens by naturalization. Therefore, the
amended judgment of the respondent court is
reversed.

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