u. S.

Department of Justice

Office of the Deputy Attorney General

The Deputy Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

August 3,2010

MEMORANDUM FOR KEN MELSON DEPUTY DIRECTOR

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES

FROM:

ROBERT S. MUELLER, III DIRECTOR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF r;JYlfJlft TION

GARY G. GRINDLER~ ACTING DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

SUBJECT:

PROTOCOL FOR ASSIGNING LEAD AGENCY JURISDICTION IN EXPLOSIVES INVESTIGATIONS

I. Background

The issue of defining lead-agency jurisdiction over explosives investigations has been a persistent problem for the Department and one that has led to some unfortunate confusion among federal, state and local law enforcement and duplication of effort between A TF and the FBI. While in most cases ATF and FBI have been able to work out any issues concerning lead-agency jurisdiction at the local level with no confusion or delay, there nonetheless have been disputes in some cases where both agencies have asserted lead jurisdiction.

The Office of Inspector General recently performed an audit of the Department's coordination in explosives investigations and found:

[T]hat the FBI and ATF are not adequately coordinating explosive-related operations and have developed similar technical abilities to respond to explosives incidents. Conflicts continue to occur throughout the country regarding which agency is the lead agency for federal explosives investigations and their differing explosives-handling techniques. These disputes can cause confusion for local first responders about the roles of the FBI and ATF during explosive-incident responses and delays in conducting investigations.

Memorandum for Ken Melson, Deputy Director, ATF Memorandum for Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI

Subject: Protocol for Assigning Lead Agency Jurisdiction in Explosives Investigations Page 2

Prior efforts to remedy this situation through protocols and Attorney General memoranda have failed to achieve sustainable, clearly-defined lines between ATF' s and FBI's jurisdiction. We cannot afford to let any uncertainty about roles and responsibilities interfere with a timely and effective response to explosives incidents.

The current situation is, in part, a product of the superb investigative and enforcement capabilities found at both agencies and their shared commitment to protecting the American public. Both agencies have a history of demonstrated excellence in investigating explosive incidents and both agencies have significant investigative as well as forensic expertise.

A TF has a long and distinguished record of excellence in handling a wide range of explosives investigations. They have been investigating and preventing violent crime related to explosives since the passage of the National Firearms Act of 1934, and that role was reaffirmed with the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Safe Explosives Act of 2002 which directed that ATF is responsible for investigating criminal and regulatory violations of the federal explosives laws. See 28 U.S.C. § 599A. ATF has 2,593 Special Agents trained in post-blast and fire scene investigation and 244 Certified Explosives Specialists who cover much of the country and respond to explosives incidents large and small. Moreover, ATF has strong relationships with the explosives industry, arising out of its unique regulatory authority, that provides extremely valuable sources of information in explosives investigations. ATF recognizes that its role is not to be the lead in cases involving international terrorism, but points out persuasively that the vast majority of explosives incidents that are investigated each year (over 90%) have no connection to international or domestic terrorism. A TF responds to the bulk of these explosives incidents and either supports state and local law enforcement or handles the investigations itself. One objective of the proposed protocol is to ensure that we continue to rely on ATF's expertise and preserve its role in handling these investigations.

The FBI has an equally distinguished record of investigating explosives incidents and protecting the American public. The FBI has substantial personnel assets with explosives expertise, including 143 Special Agent Bomb Technicians (SABTs), and a network of more than 100 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) around the country staffed by task force officers from federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies. Moreover, as the Department lead on national security matters and a member of the intelligence community, the FBI is able immediately to tap into intelligence information about the terrorist use of explosives and has developed particular expertise in terrorism investigations. For these reasons, the FBI has been designated to "[ e ]xercise lead agency responsibility in investigating all crimes for which it has

. primary or concurrent jurisdiction and which involve terrorist activities or acts in preparation of terrorist activities within the statutory jurisdiction of the United States." 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(1). Several Presidential Directives also give FBI the lead role in coordinating law enforcement

Memorandum for Ken Melson, Deputy Director, ATF Memorandum for Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI

Subject: Protocol for Assigning Lead Agency Jurisdiction in Explosives Investigations Page 3

efforts to detect, prevent, preempt and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States. For example, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), provides:

The Attorney General has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats by individuals or groups inside the United States .... Generally acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Attorney General, in cooperation with other Federal departments and agencies engaged in activities to protect our national security, shall also coordinate the activities of the other members of the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States.

See also NSPD-46 and HSPD-15. In addition, the FBI has been designated the lead agency to respond to, render safe, and investigate any weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, the FBI's network of JTTFs (some of which include ATF representatives) include broad representation frorri the federal, state and local law enforcement community and are the operational arm to respond to terrorism threats and to conduct terrorism investigations.

Despite the impressive records of both agencies in this mission space, the current situation - as chronicled by the Office of Inspector General - must be remedied. It is critically important that the Department of Justice have a clearly-defined, well-coordinated, and effective law enforcement response to explosives incidents. Equally important is the need to adequately train our personnel and ensure effective information sharing with all appropriate components and state and local law enforcement partners. In the interest of public safety and the efficient allocation of government resources, we must ensure that the problems identified by the Inspector General are resolved clearly and conclusively.

In response to the IG's report, I asked both agencies to prepare briefing papers on the lead-agency jurisdiction issue with any supporting materials. I then convened a meeting with both of you and the senior leadership from the FBI and A TF to consider various views on the appropriate approach to explosives jurisdiction. After the meeting, representatives from ODAG and OAG compiled a list of questions for ATF and FBI that further explored the makeup of the various explosives incidents that each agency investigates and their respective capabilities.

II. Protocol for Establishing Lead Agency Jurisdiction

After considering all input from ATF, FBI and the OIG, as well as the lessons learned from past attempts to resolve the issue, I have decided on a protocol for assigning lead-agency jurisdiction that I believe provides clear guidance to A TF, FBI, and state and local law enforcement. The division of authority set forth in the protocol is designed to address the priority mission of the Department - protecting against terrorism incidents - as well as to capitalize on the strengths of both agencies in terms of expertise and investigative assets.

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Memorandum for Ken Melson, Deputy Director, A TF Memorandum for Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI

Subject: Protocol for Assigning Lead Agency Jurisdiction in Explosives Investigations Page 4

It should be emphasized at the outset (as it is stated in the preface to the protocol), that nothing in this protocol is intended to interfere with or supplant the time-tested process of working out issues of lead-agency jurisdiction and information sharing at the Special Agent-inCharge level which has worked well in the vast majority of cases. In any case in which ATF and FBI leadership either locally or at their respective headquarters, in accordance with past operations, have agreed upon a way to proceed, that agreement should govern, so long as it does not result in any undue delay in the investigation. This approach takes advantage of the expertise needed to comprehensively address each explosives incident. The protocol is designed instead for that small category of cases where the issue of lead-agency jurisdiction may be unclear or where there may be disagreement among the relevant agencies about the appropriate way to staff

the investigation. \

The protocol seeks to build on each agency's expertise by using indicia of a nexus to terrorism as the dividing line for lead-agency jurisdiction. ATF has acknowledged, for example, that, based on its expertise and mission, the FBI should have lead-agency jurisdiction for explosives investigations with a link to international terrorism or WMDs. ATF argues, however, that it should have lead-agency jurisdiction for explosives investigations where the link is to domestic terrorism. It is clear that historically both ATF and FBI have been involved in many domestic terrorism investigations. Under the preface to the protocol, ATF and FBI should continue to work together to properly staff and investigate these cases. I have concluded, however, that the FBI should ultimately be considered the lead agency for domestic terrorism explosives investigations. In other words, unless the matter of lead agency has otherwise been addressed between the A TF and FB I in a particular matter, the A TF will be the lead agency for all explosives investigations where there is no credible nexus to international or domestic terrorism; in those instances where there is credible nexus to terrorism, the FBI has the lead jurisdiction,

Recognizing, however, that the presence or absence of a credible nexus to terrorism may not be readily apparent in some cases, the protocol addresses this issue in three ways:

1. The protocol sets forth a list of factors that are strong indicia of a nexus to terrorism - such as, an attack on a government building, mass transit, a power plant, or the use of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents - and assigns lead-agency jurisdiction based on those factors alone. This underscores the fact that a key purpose of the protocol is to provide as much clarity as possible at the outset as to which agency has lead jurisdiction with the recognition that the decision about lead-agency jurisdiction may need to be modified as new information comes to light during the course of an investigation.

Memorandum for Ken Melson, Deputy Director, ATF Memorandum for Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI

Subject: Protocol for Assigning Lead Agency Jurisdiction in Explosives Investigations Page 5

2. The protocol requires each agency to notify the other immediately when responding to an explosives incident and to share all relevant information that may serve to rule in or out a connection to terrorism.

3. It creates a process for the FBIIJTTF to identify an explosives incident as connected to terrorism when there is reliable evidence supporting that claim and establishes a process for shifting lead-agency jurisdiction to the JTTF until the issue is resolved.

Of paramount importance is the need for clearly defined roles and immediate, real-time sharing of information between all relevant law enforcement components so that there is never an incident where actionable intelligence does not get into the right hands because of concerns about which agency will be the lead. Similarly, while this protocol contemplates that there will be situations where lead-agency jurisdiction may shift during an investigation (and as a consequence that evidence may have to be transferred for analysis), the jurisdiction issue must never get in the way of properly preserving and analyzing evidence for the good of the investigation regardless of which agency ends up with the case. Moreover, the protocol makes clear that even in terrorism investigations, the FBI should look to A TF and its expertise as a resource in pursuing such investigations. To that end, ATF is hereby directed to develop a plan to increase staffing of A TF agents with explosives expertise on JTTFs that do not currently have A TF participation.

The protocol is effective immediately. In addition, I am establishing a single point of contact in ODAG who will meet with both agencies on a regular basis to monitor their progress in implementing the protocol and serve as a conduit for raising concerns about the protocol to the Department leadership. This ODAG representative will serve on a Explosives Coordination Committee to be established under the protocol to hear disputes and other issues that arise with respect to its implementation. In addition to the ODAG representative, this Committee will be made up of the Deputy Directors from both agencies and the Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Management Division.

OIG identified additional areas where duplication and redundant efforts need to be addressed. These are: training, utilization and population of explosives databases, and laboratory resources.

III. Coordinated Explosives Training

The IG report examined ATF's 'and FBI's explosives training facilities and found that there has been little progress since 2004 in consolidating those facilities. The report notes that in 2004, the FBI opened the Hazardous Devices School (HDS) at the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, to provide federal, state and local personnel at a 6-week basic bomb technician program, re-certification training, and a specialized course in executive management

Memorandum for Ken Melson, Deputy Director, A TF Memorandum for Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI

Subject: Protocol for Assigning Lead Agency Jurisdiction in Explosives Investigations Page 6

training for bomb squad managers. For many years ATF has had its own training facilities offering explosives training courses for federal, state, and local personnel at the National Center for Explosives Training and Research (NCETR) in Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia, and the Canine Training and Operations Support Center located in Front Royal, Virginia. While the FBI and ATF training facilities overlap in some of their missions and course offerings, they also offer some unique training programs - for example, on render-safe procedures and training of canines. Moreover, as the IG report notes, A TF is in the process of constructing a new NCETR facility at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, at the same location that currently houses HDS. The co-location of these training facilities in Huntsville provides opportunities for consolidating training programs and eliminating duplicative efforts. In addition to the facilities issue, the IG report also found that ATF's and FBI's post-blast training programs are not coordinated with each other and there are ongoing disagreements about training guidelines.

I am hereby directing ATF and FBI to develop ajoint plan for consolidated explosives training of ATF and FBI agents and technicians, and state and local law enforcement, that is consistent with the protocol. Both agencies should designate representatives who can devote a significant amount of time to this effort during the next three months. This joint training plan should maximize the technical and investigative expertise of both agencies while recognizing certain distinct roles, such as the FBI's unique role in handling render safe issues related to WMDs or ATF's unique role in examining the explosives industry. Moreover, the joint training plan should include a thorough assessment of existing training facilities and curricula with recommendations for consolidating and eliminating redundancies where appropriate. The working group tasked with developing this joint training plan should identify the cost savings that can be achieved by integration of training curricula and facilities. The joint training plan should be finalized by November 1,2010 and submitted to ODAG for review. Joint training should begin within 6 months of the date of this memo.

IV. Unified Explosives Incident Database

The IG Report found that ATF and FBI have not effectively consolidated and maintained one distinct explosives-reporting database. According to the IG report, FBI has not reported any additional explosives incident information into the Bombing and Arson Tracking System (BATS) even though it was previously designated as the single Department database for reporting and tracking explosives incidents. Moreover, the IG found that the FBI and ATF have not instituted sufficient processes to ensure that state and local agencies report explosives incident to BATS.

In 2004 the Attorney General mandated that "all of the Department's arson and explosives incident databases [be consolidated] into a single database" that "shall be maintained by ATF and shall be accessible to all Department law enforcement components." See Memorandum of Attorney General John Ashcroft, dated August 11,2004 (attached hereto at Tab

Memorandum for Ken Melson, Deputy Director, ATF Memorandum for Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI

Subject: Protocol for Assigning Lead Agency Jurisdiction in Explosives Investigations Page 7

A). Soon thereafter, ATF designated BATS as the consolidated database for tracking explosives investigations and FBI transferred its Automated Incident Reporting System (AIRS) date into BATS. As the OIG Report notes, "[fJederallaw mandates that all federal agencies report information concerning explosives incidents to DOl, and by extension to BATS." OIG Report at xii (citing 18 U.S.C. § 846(b)). This resolution was reached after a lengthy process during which an internal-DOl Explosives Review Group (ERG) comprised of senior officials from ATF, FBI, ODAG, OLP and CRM, surveyed the available explosives incident databases, gathered input from all the relevant components, and made recommendations that were adopted by the Attorney General.

Therefore, consistent with this prior decision, I am hereby directing the FBI to put all information relating to explosives incidents into the Bombing and Arson Tracking System (BATS) database effective immediately. To the extent that there are concerns about protecting classified information, I am directing FBI to work with A TF to develop a proposal for ensuring that classified information is adequately segmented and protected within BATS. In addition, I am directing FBI and ATF to work together to develop a plan by November 1,2010, to ensure that all state and local law enforcement that partners with FBI and A TF in explosives investigations put information about their explosives investigations into BATS. In order to be a truly effective tool for explosives investigations, that database must include a comprehensive set of information about explosives incidents including information from FBI, A TF and state and local led investigations. This plan should be submitted to ODAG for review.

v. Explosives Laboratories

Finally, with regard to laboratories, the IG report found that little progress has been made since 2004 in conducting a review of DOl explosives laboratory resources and workloads. A TF and FBI both have laboratories that perform similar forensic analysis of explosives devices.

A TF has three forensic laboratories in Maryland, Georgia and California that each support a specific geographic region and conduct forensic analysis of explosives, accelerants, destructive devices, and explosives debris, as well as providing lab support for ATF's regulatory functions over the explosives industry. FBI uses its laboratory at Quantico, Virginia to provide forensic support of explosives investigations. In addition, both agencies are active participants in the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC).

The 2004 Attorney General Memorandum (Tab A) stated that a Lab Board should be established and be comprised of DOl laboratory directors to examine DOl's available laboratory resources and workloads, analyze laboratory demands imposed by TEDAC, and make recommendations to the Deputy Attorney General on the most productive allocation of DOl laboratory resources. While a Lab Board was established, the IG found no record of a report or recommendations having been produced. As recommended by the OIG Report, we have reconvened the Lab Board to focus on coordination and resource issues in explosives

Memorandum for Ken Melson, Deputy Director, A TF Memorandum for Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI

Subject: Protocol for Assigning Lead Agency Jurisdiction in Explosives Investigations Page 8

investigations. I am hereby directing the Lab Board to convene within two weeks of the issuance of this memorandum to discuss how laboratory resources and training can be better coordinated and integrated in light of the new protocol. The Lab Board will provide bi-monthly status reports to ODAG and develop recommendations by November 1,2010, for further integration of DOJ's laboratory capabilities, reduction of turnaround times for forensic analysis, and areas for improvement in the use of the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC).

Attachment

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PROTOCOL FOR LEAD-AGENCY JURISDICTION IN EXPLOSIVES INVESTIGATIONS (August 3? 2010)1

Preface:

In the vast majority of a explosives investigations, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) work extremely well together to ensure that cases are being properly staffed and investigated, that information is shared quickly and appropriately, and that State and local law enforcement are receiving the training and investigative support that they need. Questions about lead-agency jurisdiction are routinely resolved at the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) level without any conflict or confusion and in the best interest of the Department of Justice, public safety, and national security. Nothing in this protocol is intended to interfere with or supplant that process. Indeed, in any case in which ATF and FBI, in accordance with past operations, have an agreed upon way to proceed, that agreement should govern so long as it does not result in any delay in or interference with the investigation. This protocol is instead designed for that small category of cases where the issue of lead-agency jurisdiction may be unclear or where there maybe disagreement between A TF and FBI about the appropriate way to staff an investigation.

A. The FBI, or relevant Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), will serve as the lead agency for investigation of explosives incidents in the following circumstances which create a presumptive nexus to international or domestic terrorism':

1 This protocol supersedes all prior guidance on ATF-FBI explosives coordination.

2 "International Terrorism" and "Domestic Terrorism" are defined in Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2331(1) and (5) as: "activities that-

(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation ofthe criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; and

(B) appear to be intended-

(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; ... "

These definitions are extremely broad and should not be used as a basis for asserting jurisdiction over every case that could conceivably have a link, however speculative, to international or domestic terrorism. Instead, the purpose of this protocol is to establish clear lines of lead jurisdiction in responding to explosives incidents and to allow that lead agency determination to be reevaluated if necessary based on new information that comes to light during the course of the investigation.

(1) where the incident or investigation indicates the use of explosives to target:

a) a mass transportation facility or infrastructure, including but not limited to, commercial aviation, railways, buses, subways, bridges, or tunnels, that are used in or for publicly available services for the transportation of persons or cargo;

b) the United States Government, a member of the uniformed services, or any official,officer, employee, or agent of the legislative, executive, or judicial branches, or of any department or agency, of the United States, or a state or government facility, including but not limited to, military bases, courthouses, schools, embassies or other diplomatic or consular premises, monuments, or United States Postal Service officesr'

c) a nuclear facility, hydroelectric dam, pipeline, communication line, station, or system, commercial port, or other critical infrastructure facilities providing or distributing services for the benefit of the public, such as water, sewage, energy, fuel, or communications;

d) densely-populated public areas, including but not limited to, tourist attractions, shopping malls, or sports stadiums;

(2) where the explosives incident involves chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents; or

(3) where, in the absence of any information about the intended target of an explosives incident or the particular explosives materials to be used, the investigation nonetheless reveals credible evidence of a link to international terrorism.

ATF will serve as the lead agency for investigation of all other explosives matters. Nothing in this memorandum is intended to change or reduce the authority exercised by the A TF in arson investigations. In addition, A TF will continue to exercise its regulatory authority pertaining to all explosives matters.

B. If at any point during the response to an explosives incident where A TF has assumed the lead investigative role, the FBIIJTTF believes there is reliable evidence of a nexus to international terrorism, or domestic terrorism, the JTTF has the option to claim lead-

3 "Government buildings or facilities" does not include United States Postal Service mail boxes.

agency jurisdiction over the investigation. Once this provision is invoked, the JTTF shall immediately assume lead-agency jurisdiction until a final determination as to lead responsibility has been made. Under these circumstances, the FBIIJTTF must be afforded complete access to the evidence and A TF files. The FBIIJTTF should also utilize the expertise developed by the ATF agent(s) during the course of the investigation and, to the extent feasible, include those A TF agents as a critical part of the investigative team.

C. In any case in which ATF or the FBIIJTTF responds to an explosives incident, that agency will immediately notify the other law enforcement agency that an explosives incident has occurred and share all relevant information for making a determination as to whether the incident falls into one of the categories listed in paragraph A, above, or has other indications of a possible link to international or domestic terrorism. The information must be provided in such a way that the other agency can run it against all relevant databases and should include information about the names and identifiers of any suspects and accomplices, any telephone numbers, license plates, addresses, bank accounts, travel documents, or businesses associated with the investigation. The obligation to share all relevant information is ongoing and must continue throughout the investigation until a final determination is made that a particular case either is linked to or has no link to terrorism.

D. The ATF and FBI will formally designate primary and secondary points of contact at the field office, resident agency, and JTTF level to facilitate this exchange of information immediately and disseminate that information within their respective agencies. These designations must be made within four weeks of the issuance of this protocol with a list of such designations provided to ODAG and the National Security Division.

E. If disputes arise relating to the operation of this protocol, the Deputy Directors from A TF and FBI shall meet in the first instance to resolve those disputes. If a matter cannot be resolved at the Deputy Director level, it should be brought to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General for resolution by the Explosives Coordination Committee.

DATED: August 3, 2010

Acting Deputy Attorney General

Attachment A

APPENDIX IV

2004 ATTORNEY GENERAL MEMORANDUM

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~l!bsllill~!OIl. ~.(L 20530

August II, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO. FIREARMS . AND EXPLOSIVES

ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

FROM: THE ATTORNEY GE~~

SUBJEC1:

Coordination of Explosives Investigations and Related Matters

To ensure effective coordination of explosives investigations by law enforcement components of the Department of Justice (the Department), I hereby direct as follows:

Jurisdiction

1. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco. Firearms and Explosives (A TF) shall control the investigation of all explosives incidents. except as follows:

a. In cases where a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JITF) determines that the explosives incident is related to terrorism. then the JTTF shall control the investigation; and

b. In cases where the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) traditionally has exercised jurisdiction (including but not limited to bank robberies, civil rights violations, and organized crime), then the FBI shall control the investigation.

2. The Deputy Attorney General shall resolve all issues relating to jurisdiction over explosives investigations.

Information Sharing

3. The Department's Chief Information Offieer (CIO) shall consolidate all of the Department's arson and explosives incident databases including. but not limited to, the FBI's Automated Incident Reporting System and ATF's Bomb and Arson Tracking System. into a single database.

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Memorandum (or the DAG, FBI. A TF, and DEA

Subject: Coordination of Explosives investigations and Related Matters

Page 2

4. Ail consolidated arson and explosives incident databases shall be maintained by ATF and shall be accessible to ail Department law enforcement components. No Department component may maintain any database that contains arson or explosives incident information that would otherwise be maintained in the consolidated database.

5. Within 90 days. the cro shall examine and report to the Deputy Attorney General on the feasibility of consolidating all of the Department's remaining arson and explosives databases.

6. The Deputy Attorney General shall resolve all issues relating to the consolidation of arson and explosives databases.

TEDAC

7, The CIO shall coordinate the development of a database for the Terrorist Explosives Device Analytical Center CTEDAC).

8. A senior FBI representative shall serve as Director ofTEDAC; a senior ATF representative shall serve as a Deputy Director ofTEDAC.

Laboratories

9. There shall be established a Laboratories Review Board (Lab Board). The Deputy Attorney General (or his designee) shall chair the Lab Board; representatives of ATF, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the FBI shall serve as members of the Lab Board.

]0. The Lab Board shall examine the Department's available resources and workloads and make recommendations to the Deputy Attorney General. Such recommendations shall include an analysis of laboratory demands imposed by TEDAC.

I I. The Deputy Attorney General (or his designee) shall, as appropriate, direct the allocation and use of the Department's laboratory resources.

Training

12. All budget, curricula, teaching and scheduling functions relating to post-blast explosives training within the Department shall be consolidated under A1F.

13. All agents, officers, technicians, and other personnel who engage in or are related to post-blast explosives training shall remain with their respective agencies and continue to provide training as they did prior to Consolidation .

. 14. The Deputy Attorney General shall resolve all issues relating to the consolidation of post-blast explosives training.

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Memorandum for the DAG, FBI, A TF, and DEA

Subject: Coordination of Explosives Investigations and Related Matters

Page 3

15. All explosives training provided by Department components shall be made available, when appropriate, to all federal law enforcement agencies.

16. There shall be established an Explosives Training Review Board (Explosi ves Board).

The Deputy Attorney General (or his designee) shall chair the Explosives Board; representatives of ATF and the FBI shall serve as members of the Explosives Board.

17. Within 90 days, the Explosives Board shall examine and report to the Deputy Attorney General on the feasibility of consolidating the Department's remaining explosives training programs and facilities.

Special Events

18. The recommendations of the Explosives Review Group (ERG) regarding Special Events, as set forth in the Memorandum for the Deputy Attorney General of May 3,

2004. Attachment 2, shall be adopted and implemented. .

19. No later than December I, 2004, the ERG Chair shall report to the Deputy Attorney General in writing on the implementation of the ERG's recommendations regarding Special Events.

20. As soon as practicable. all Department components that use explosives detection canines shall use only canines certified by A TF.

82