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June 22, 2010Leslie C. DyLeave a commentGo to comments
Here are selected May 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on labor law and procedure:

  
Illegal dismissal; backwages. The basis for the payment of backwages is
different from that for the award of separation pay. Separation pay is
granted where reinstatement is no longer advisable because of strained
relations between the employee and the employer. Backwages represent
compensation that should have been earned but were not collected because
of the unjust dismissal. The basis for computing backwages is usually the
length of the employee¶s service while that for separation pay is the actual
period when the employee was unlawfully prevented from working.
As to how both awards should be computed, c
 
  
 
  
 !"""#$instructs that the
award of separation pay is inconsistent with a finding that there was no
illegal dismissal, for under Article 279 of the Labor Code and as held in a
catena of cases, an employee who is dismissed without just cause and
without due process is entitled to backwages and reinstatement or payment
of separation pay in lieu thereof. Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is
entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs
provided are separate and distinct.  %
&
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Illegal dismissal; doctrine of strained relations. Under the 
 *
    , the payment of separation pay is considered an
acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer
desirable or viable. On one hand, such payment liberates the employee
from what could be a highly oppressive work environment. On the other
hand, it releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable obligation of
maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust.
Strained relations must be demonstrated as a fact, however, to be
adequately supported by evidence² substantial evidence to show that the
relationship between the employer and the employee is indeed   as a
necessary consequence of the judicial controversy.
In the present case, the Labor Arbiter found that actual animosity existed
between petitioner Azul and respondent as a result of the filing of the illegal
dismissal case. Such finding, especially when affirmed by the appellate
court as in the case at bar, is binding upon the Court, consistent with the
prevailing rules that the Court will not try facts anew and that findings of
facts of quasi-judicial bodies are accorded great respect, even
finality.  %
&
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%) 
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Illegal dismissal; separation pay. In instances where reinstatement is no
longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the
employer, separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed
employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if
reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages. The normal consequences
of respondents¶ illegal dismissal, then, are reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights, and payment of backwages computed from the time
compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where
reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an
alternative. The payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of
backwages.
The accepted doctrine is that separation pay may avail in lieu of
reinstatement if reinstatement is no longer practical or in the best interest of
the parties. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement may likewise be awarded
if the employee decides not to be reinstated.  %
&

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Judgment; final and executory. The Labor Arbiter¶s decision has long become
final and executory and it can no longer be reversed or modified. Nothing is
more settled in law than when a final judgment becomes executory, it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what
is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of law or fact, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it
or by the highest court of the land. The only recognized exception are the
correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called



entries
which cause no injury to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is
void.
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party should
not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the
losing party. Final and executory judgments can neither be amended nor
altered except for correction of clerical errors, even if the purpose is to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or of law. Trial and execution
proceedings constitute one whole action or suit such that a case in which
execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings
in the execution are proceedings in the suit.

It is no longer legally feasible to modify the final ruling in this case through
the expediency of a petition questioning the order of execution. Judgments
of courts should attain finality at some point lest there be no end in
litigation. The final judgment in this case may no longer be reviewed, or in
any way modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the
Supreme Court. The reason for this is that, litigation must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard
against any scheme calculated to bring about that result and must frown
upon any attempt to prolong controversies. c + )  ,
 
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June 21, 2010Dominador Maphilindo O. CarrilloLeave a commentGo to comments
Here are selected May 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on criminal law and procedure

Anti-Graft; causing undue injury. The elements of the offense of causing

undue injury under R.A. 3019, Sec. 3(e) are as follows: (1) that the accused
are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2)
that said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance
of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they
caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private
party; (4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officers
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. In this case, only the first element was proven. The other
elements were not. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the performance
of one¶s function remains unrebutted and enjoyed by petitioners. %

.
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Arrest; estoppel. An accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his
arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground, which should be made before
arraignment. In this case, the irregularity of the accused¶s arrest was raised
only in his appeal before the Court of Appeals. This is not allowed
considering that he was already properly arraigned and even actively
participated in the proceedings. He is therefore deemed to have
waived this alleged defect when he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court. * %+  
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Arrest; posting of bail. The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of
bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of
arrest has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rule of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from
questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if he
voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial without previously
invoking his objections thereto. Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings of this
Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused
shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for
his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon. The new rule has
reverted to the ruling of this Court in . The new rule is curative
in nature because, precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils
in procedural rules. Thus, petitioners¶ posting of bail bond should not be
deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest. ).
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Dangerous Drugs; admissibility of evidence. Non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 will not necessarily
render the items seized or confiscated in a buy-bust operation inadmissible.
Strict compliance with the letter of Section 21 is not required if there is a
clear showing that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
have been preserved, , the items being offered in court as exhibits are,
without a specter of doubt, the very same ones recovered in the buy-bust
operation. Hence, once the possibility of substitution has been negated by
evidence of an unbroken and cohesive chain of custody over the contraband,
such contraband may be admitted and stand as proof of the



notwithstanding the fact that it was never made the subject of an
inventory or was photographed pursuant to Section 21(1) of Republic Act
No. 9165. *   - 
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Dangerous drugs; chain of custody. The chain of custody requirement is
necessary in order to remove doubts as to the identity of the evidence, by
monitoring and tracking custody of the seized drugs from the accused until
they reach the court. The procedure and statutory safeguards prescribed for
compliance by drug enforcement agencies have not been followed in this
case. Failure to comply with the aforequoted Sec. 21(1) of RA 9165 implies a
concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of
the seized illegal items as part of the


. Although the
nonpresentation of some of the witnesses who can attest to an unbroken
chain of custody of evidence may, in some instances, be excused, there
should be a justifying factor for the prosecution to dispense with their
testimonies. The saving mechanism provided by Sec. 21(a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 ensures that not every case
of non-compliance will permanently prejudice the prosecution¶s case. The
saving mechanism applies when the prosecution recognizes and explains the
lapse or lapses in the prescribed procedures. In this case, the prosecution
did not even acknowledge and discuss the reasons for the missing links in
the chain. Taken with the uncorroborated testimony of the policemen
involved in the buy-bust operation, these lapses create a reasonable doubt
as to guilt of the accused. * +  
 
 +
& , 12
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Evidence; conspiracy. An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the
accused, by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part
and another performing another so as to complete it, with a view to the
attainment of the same object. As testified by the police officers, it was
Joseph who negotiated with the poseur-buyer, received the buy-bust money
and handed the same to Anthony, his brother. Anthony, after receiving the
money from Joseph handed the latter the sachet of shabu to be given to PO1
Familara. It was Joseph who delivered the drug to PO1 Familara. Clearly,
there was concerted action between the brothers before, during, and after
the offense which ably demonstrated their unity of design and objective to
sell the dangerous drug. *    
%    #"!c /""
Illegal possession of firearms; constructive possession. Evangelista was
arrested in Dubai for Illegal Possession of Firearms. In order to secure his
release, the firearms as well as the person of Evangelista was surrendered
to Capt. Nadurata, the PAL pilot of Flight No. PR 657 from Dubai to Manila on
January 30, 1996. Upon arrival in the Philippines, he was arrested and
charged with violation of PD 1866, Sec. 1, or illegal possession of firearms.
Evangelista, in his petition for certiorari, contends that he is not guilty of
illegal possession of firearms considering that from Brunei to Manila, he was
never in physical possession of the guns. The Supreme Court ruled that
Capt. Nadurata¶s possession of the firearm during the flight from Dubait
to Manila was for and in behalf of Evangelista. Consequently, Evangelista
was in constructive possession of the subject firearms. The kind of
possession punishable under PD 1866 is one where the accused possessed a
firearm either physically or constructively with +
  or
intention to possess the same. % +
  is a state of mind which
the Court found to be present in the instant case. )*4 , 
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Probable cause; determination. When confronted with a motion to withdraw
an Information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a
resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the bounden duty of the trial court is to
make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having
acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such
resolution, but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the
trial and should embody such assessment in the order disposing the motion
5,   6&
 2+ ,7 #"
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Rape; evidence. The fact that AAA did not immediately reveal that she was
raped by appellant does not necessarily impair AAA¶s credibility. It is settled
that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation
and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. Death threats
cannot be taken against the victim. The charge of rape is rendered doubtful
only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained. In this case, the delay
in reporting the sexual assault was reasonable and explained: AAA explained
that she did not immediately inform anyone of her ordeal because she was
ashamed and afraid because appellant had threatened to kill her. Thus, her
reluctance that caused the delay should not be taken against her. Neither
can it be used to diminish her credibility nor undermine the charge of
rape. )* 5c
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Venue; internet libel. Gimenez, in behalf of the Yuchengco family, instituted
before the Makati Prosecutors¶ Office, a criminal complaint for libel against
the accused for providing a public forum in the internet, as well as a yahoo
e-groups by which the disgruntled plan holders of Pacific Plans Inc.
could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their (plan holders¶)
policies. The website contained defamatory remarks against the Yuchengco
family. Finding probable cause, an information for libel was filed before the
Makati Regional Trial Court (³RTC´). The information failed to state the
particular place within the RTC¶s jurisdiction where the subject article was
printed and first published, or that the offended parties resided in Makati at
the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published,
instead the information alleged where the offended party first accessed the
internet-published material. 9  c& *
 , ) 
.
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Venue; internet libel. The Supreme Court in ruling that the RTC had not
acquired jurisdiction over the case stated that venue is jurisdictional in
criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential
element of jurisdiction. The venue of libel cases where the complainant is a
private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where
the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first
published. The [Amended] Information in the present case opted to lay the
venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article
³was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City.´
In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite
allegation of printing and first publication. 9  c& *
 
, ) .
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Venue; internet libel. If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed
and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in
the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the
defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or
supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices
in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This
precondition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to
harass. 9  c& *
 , ) .
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Venue; internet libel. The same measure cannot be reasonably expected
when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the
internet as there would be no way of determining the 
 of its printing and
first publication. To credit Gimenez¶s premise of equating his first

 to
the defamatory article on petitioners¶ website in Makati with ³printing and
first publication´ would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article
360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much
imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the
website¶s author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein
could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private
complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website. 9  c
& *
 , ) .
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Venue; internet libel. For the Supreme Court to hold that the Amended
Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply
because the defamatory article was accessedtherein would open the
floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where
the 
  website is likewise accessed or capable of being
accessed. 9  c& *
 , ) .
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June 11, 2010Vicente D. Gerochi IV
Here are selected May 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on political law:

Agrarian reform; coverage. Lands acquired by the National Housing

Authority for resettlement purposes or housing development are exempt
from the coverage of agrarian reform laws. Such acquisition converts the
land by operation of law from agricultural to residential. The National
Housing Authority is not bound to pay disturbance compensation to any
tenant in possession of the purchased land.   ;
 ,%
 
2 + *%,  *+%8

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Agrarian reform; just compensation. In computing just compensation for
rice lands tenanted as of October 21, 1972, the grant of 6% yearly interest
under DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994, as amended, must
be reckoned from October 21, 1972 up to the time of actual payment of the
compensation, and not only up to the time the Land Bank of the Philippines
approves payment of the compensation and deposits the amount in the
name of the landowner, considering that release of such deposit is still
subject to compliance with documentary requirements. The concept of just
compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to
be paid to the owner of the land, but also payment within a reasonable time
from its taking. 5 & :* 2+ , c +
 "<"/c /""
Commission on Elections; registration of party coalition. Comelec may not,
through a resolution setting the deadline for registration of political parties,
differentiate between political parties, on the one hand, and political
organizations and coalitions, on the other. There is no substantial distinction
among these entities germane to the act of registration that would justify
creating distinctions among them in terms of deadlines. Thus, Comelec
Resolution No. 8646, dated July 14, 2009, which sets August 17, 2009 as
the deadline for filing petitions for registration of political parties, without
mentioning political organizations and coalitions, should be understood as
covering the latter entities as well. A petition for registration as a political
coalition filed beyond that deadline is time-barred, and the Comelec
resolution granting that petition constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Political coalitions, even if composed of registered political parties, need to
register separately in accordance with established norms and procedures, if
they are to be recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law
to registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a different legal
personality from that of the coalition they may wish to establish with other
registered parties. If parties want to coalesce with one another without the
formal registration of their coalition, they can do so on their own in the
exercise of their and their members¶ democratic freedom of choice, but they
cannot receive official recognition for their coalition. 56   
 
.++  4
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Electoral tribunals; grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court¶s
jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised
only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal;
otherwise, the Court will not interfere with the tribunal¶s exercise of its
discretion and jurisdiction. There was no grave abuse of discretion when the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ordered to continue the revision
and appreciation of ballots after the case had been submitted for
resolution and when it issued its decisions without the participation of any
of the Justices of the Court who were members of that tribunal. ;  =
>
2
0 ;
*  4
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Province; requirements for creation. Section 10 of Article X of the
Constitution mandates that the criteria in the Local Government Code must
be followed in the creation of a province. Any derogation of or deviation
from those criteria violates the Constitution. Thus, a law creating a
province, which failed to comply with either the population or territorial
requirement of the Local Government Code, is unconstitutional. The Court
can pass upon the validity of such law even if the province it created has
begun its existence. *   4?

 
  
4
4+  """c "".
Right to information; duty to disclose. Comelec has the duty and can be
compelled to explain fully its preparations for the May 10, 2010 elections
under Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution on the people¶s right to
information and Section 28 of Article II on the State¶s corresponding duty of
full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. Any citizen
can file a petition for mandamus if the same is anchored on the people¶s
right to information. )*
 ,  .++  
4
  #/c /"".
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Backwages. The Court agrees with the NLRC¶s conclusion that petitioner is
not entitled to backwages. He never bothered to redeem his driver¶s license
at the soonest possible time when there was no showing that he was
unlawfully prevented by respondent from doing so. Thus, petitioner should
not be paid for the time he was not working. The Court has held that where
the failure of employees to work was not due to the employer¶s fault, the
burden of economic loss suffered by the employees should not be shifted to
the employer. Each party must bear his own loss. It would be unfair to allow
petitioner to recover something he has not earned and could not have
earned, since he could not discharge his work as a driver without his driver¶s
license. Respondent should be exempted from the burden of paying
backwages. &  -  - 8 5  5.G.R.
No. 164681, April 24, 2009.
Breach of trust. The documentary evidence of petitioner indubitably
establishes that respondent committed payroll padding, sold canepoints
without the knowledge and consent of management and misappropriated the
proceeds thereof, and rented tractor to another farm and misappropriated
the rental payments therefor. These acts constitute willful breach by the
employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer ± a ground for
termination of employment. &
@)     2+ .
 +2 .
(, G.R. No. 179563, April 30, 2009.
CBA. Just like any other contract, a CBA is the law between the contracting
parties and compliance therewith in good faith is required by law. ;A 
 

6 )2  'c c ,+ 
   , G.R. No. 168716, April 16, 2009.
Due process. The Court of Appeals correctly held that petitioners did not
comply with the proper procedure in dismissing respondent. In other words,
petitioners failed to afford respondent due process by failing to comply with
the twin notice requirement in dismissing him, (B11) a first notice to
apprise him of his fault, and (2) a second notice to him that his employment
is being terminated. The letter dated June 3, 1997 sent to respondent was
a letter of suspension. It did not comply with the required first notice, the
purpose of which is to apprise the employee of the cause for termination and
to give him rasonable opportunity to explain his side. The confrontation
before the 6  , council did not constitute the first notice ± to give the
employee ample opportunity to be heard with the assistance of counsel, if he
so desires. Hearings before the6  , council do not afford the employee
ample opportunity to be represented by counsel if he so desires because
Section 415 of the Local Government Code mandates that ³[i]n
all :  
, , +6  , proceedings, the parties must appear in
person without the assistance of counsel or his representatives, except for
minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are
not lawyers.´ The requirement of giving respondent the first notice not
having been complied with, discussions of whether the second notice was
complied with is rendered unnecessary. &
@)     
2+ . +2 .
(, G.R. No. 179563, April 30,
2009.
Due process; lack of jurisdiction. The proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
deprived David of due process. MACLU and NAFLU filed their complaint
against MAC on 12 August 1993. Arbiter Ortiguerra¶s decision shows that
MACLU, NAFLU, and MAC were the only parties summoned to a conference
for a possible settlement. Because of MAC¶s failure to appear, Arbiter
Ortiguerra deemed the case submitted for resolution. David¶s resignation
from MAC took effect on 15 October 1993. NAFLU and MACLU moved to
implead Carag and David for the first time only in their position paper dated
3 January 1994. David did not receive any summons and had no knowledge
of the decision against him. The records of the present case fail to show any
order from Arbiter Ortiguerra summoning David to attend the preliminary
conference. Despite this lack of summons, in her Decision dated 17 June
1994, Arbiter Ortiguerra not only granted MACLU and NAFLU¶s motion to
implead Carag and David, she also held Carag and David solidarily liable with
MAC. %+ 2   A  *5 6'    G.R. No.
148263 and 148271-72, April 21, 2009.
Hearing. The guiding principles in connection with the hearing requirement
in dismissal cases are:
(a) ³ample opportunity to be heard´ means any meaningful opportunity
(verbal or written) given to the employee to answer the charges against him
and submit evidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing,
conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way;

(b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when

requested by the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes
exist or a company rule or practice requires it, or when similar
circumstances justify it;

(c) the ³ample opportunity to be heard´ standard in the Labor Code

prevails over the ³hearing or conference´ requirement in the implementing
rules and regulations. A?&( - ),  
) .+ G.R. No. 152048, April 7, 2009.
Illegal dismissal; abandonment. Petitioner insists that there cannot be any
illegal dismissal because in the first place, there was no dismissal to speak
of, as it was respondent who abandoned his work, after finding out that he
was being investigated for theft. It is a basic principle that in the dismissal
of employees, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the
dismissal is for a just cause and failure to do so would necessarily mean that
the dismissal is not justified. Petitioner failed to discharge the burden of
proof that complainant was guilty of abandonment. It did not adduce any
proof to show that petitioner clearly and unequivocally intended to abandon
his job. It has been repeatedly stressed that for abandonment to be a valid
cause for dismissal there must be a concurrence of intention to abandon and
some overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee had no
more interest to continue working in his job. An employee who forthwith
takes steps to protest his layoff cannot by any logic be said to have
abandoned his work. Otherwise stated, one could not possibly abandon his
work and shortly thereafter vigorously pursue his complaint for illegal
dismissal. In the instant case, save for the allegation that respondent did not
submit him to the investigation and the latter¶s failure to return to work as
instructed in the 8 February 1999 letter, petitioner was unable to present
any evidence which tend to show respondent¶s intent to abandon his work.
Neither is the Court convinced that the filing of the illegal dismissal case was
respondent¶s way to avoid the charge of theft. On the contrary, the filing of
the complaint a few days after his alleged dismissal signified respondent¶s
desire to return to work, a factor which further militates against petitioner¶s
theory of abandonment. ; 6-C
  5 6, G.R.
No. 168273, April 30, 2009.
Illegal dismissal; burden of proof. Under the Labor Code, as amended, the
requirements for the lawful dismissal of an employee are two-fold, the
substantive and the procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a valid or
authorized cause, the rudimentary requirements of due process ± notice and
hearing ± must, likewise, be observed before an employee may be
dismissed. One does not suffice; without their concurrence, the termination
would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal.
As the employer, petitioner has the burden of proving that the dismissal of
petitioner was for a cause allowed under the law and that petitioner was
afforded procedural due process. Petitioner failed to discharge this burden.
Indeed, it failed to show any valid or authorized cause under the Labor Code
which allowed it to terminate the services of individual respondents. Neither
did petitioner show that individual respondents were given ample
opportunity to contest the legality of their dismissal. No notice of such
impending termination was ever given to them. Individual respondents were
definitely denied due process. Having failed to establish compliance with the
requirements on termination of employment under the Labor Code, the
dismissal of individual respondents was tainted with illegality. , .+ 
.   
4+  9:'  @ 
  
A  *5 6 G.R. No. 158956, April 24, 2009.
Illegal dismissal; penalty. The worst that respondent committed was an
inadvertent infraction. For that, the extreme penalty of dismissal imposed
on him by petitioners was grossly disproportionate. Taking into account the
managerial position he held and the prior warning issued to him for failing to
communicate with his superiors, the penalty commensurate to the violation
he committed should be suspension for three months. 
*% +; 
%6
  5. OG.R. No. 159687, April 24, 2009.
Intra-union dispute. Pending the final resolution of the intra-union dispute,
respondent¶s officers remained duly authorized to conduct union affairs. 2
5  '   25  '  4+ %
  
125 '4%@%A)4'3G.R. No. 177283, April 7, 2009.
Labor only contracting. We are not convinced that Vedali is an independent
contractor. Petitioner failed to present any service contract with Vedali in the
proceedings with the Labor Arbiter. There is nothing on record that Vedali
has a substantial capital or investment to actually perform the service under
its own account and responsibility. Petitioner is a mere labor-only contractor
because it only supplied workers to petitioner to work at its pier. In a labor-
only contract, there are three parties involved: (1) the ³labor-only´
contractor; (2) the employee who is ostensibly under the employ of the
³labor-only´ contractor; and (3) the principal who is deemed the real
employer. Under this scheme, the ³labor-only´ contractor is the agent of the
principal, .+ .   
4+  9:
'  @ 
  A  *5 6 G.R. No. 158956,
April 24, 2009.
Liability of corporate officers. Article 212(e) of the Labor Code, by itself,
does not make a corporate officer personally liable for the debts of the
corporation because Section 31 of the Corporation Code is still the governing
law on personal liability of officers for the debts of the corporation. There
was no showing of David willingly and knowingly voting for or assenting to
patently unlawful acts of the corporation, or that David was guilty of gross
negligence or bad faith. %+ 2   A  *5 6
'    G.R. No. 148263 and 148271-72, April 21, 2009.
Loss of confidence. Loss of trust and confidence, as a valid ground for
dismissal, must be based on willful breach of the trust reposed in the
employee by his employer. Such breach is willful if it is done intentionally,
knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from
an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. Elsewise
stated, it must be based on substantial evidence and not on the employer¶s
whims or caprices or suspicions; otherwise, the employee would eternally
remain at the mercy of the employer. A condemnation of dishonesty and
disloyalty cannot arise from suspicion spawned by speculative
inferences. % +& 
 5.1 
 2 35, (7
.+ 
+Ac
 
D

, OG.R. No. 172854, April
16, 2009.
Loss of Confidence. Without undermining the importance of a shipping order
or request, the respondents¶ evidence is insufficient to clearly and
convincingly establish the facts from which the loss of confidence resulted.
Other than their bare allegations and the fact that such documents came
into petitioners¶ hands at some point, respondents should have provided
evidence of petitioners¶ functions, the extent of their duties, the procedure in
the handling and approval of shipping requests and the fact that no
personnel other than petitioners were involved. There was, therefore, a
patent paucity of proof connecting petitioners to the alleged tampering of
shipping documents. The alterations on the shipping documents could not
reasonably be attributed to petitioners because it was never proven that
petitioners alone had control of or access to these documents. Unless duly
proved or sufficiently substantiated otherwise, impartial tribunals should not
rely only on the statement of the employer that it has lost confidence in its
employee. A?&(  ),  ) 
.+ G.R. No. 152048, April 7, 2009.
Prescription. Articles 1139 to 1155 of the Civil Code provide the general law
on prescription of actions. Under Article 1139, actions prescribe by the mere
lapse of time prescribed by law. That law may either be the Civil Code or
special laws as specifically mandated by Article 1148. In labor cases, the
special law on prescription is Article 291 of the Labor Code. The Labor Code
has no specific provision on when a monetary claim accrues. Thus, again
the general law on prescription applies ± Article 1150 of the Civil
Code. 
 % ' 5 6 
G.R. No. 155639,
April 22, 2009.
Resignation. Resignation is defined as the voluntary act of an employee
who finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons
cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and he has no
other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment. Respondent¶s
resignation can be gleaned from the unambiguous terms of his letter to
Captain Cristino. Respondent¶s bare claim that he was forced to execute his
resignation letter deserves no merit. Bare allegations of threat or force do
not constitute substantial evidence to support a finding of forced
resignation. That such claim was proferred a year later all the more renders
his contention bereft of merit. -,   ,.   

&&  E
G.R. No. 178127, April 16, 2009.
Resignation. Petitioner voluntarily resigned. Her employer cannot be held
liable for constructive dismissal.  % ,  + '   
+ '  c
. G.R. No. 178453, April 16, 2009.
Security of Tenure. Security of tenure in the career executive service, which
presupposes a permanent appointment, takes place upon passing the CES
examinations administered by the CES Board. It is that which entitles the
examinee to conferment of CES eligibility and the inclusion of his name in
the roster of CES eligibles. Under the rules and regulations promulgated by
the CES Board, conferment of the CES eligibility is done by the CES Board
through a formal board resolution after an evaluation has been done of the
examinee¶s performance in the four stages of the CES eligibility
examinations. Upon conferment of CES eligibility and compliance with the
other requirements prescribed by the Board, an incumbent of a CES position
may qualify for appointment to a CES rank. Appointment to a CES rank is
made by the President upon the Board¶s recommendation. It is this process
which completes the official¶s membership in the CES and confers on him
security of tenure in the CES. Petitioner does not seem to have gone through
this definitive process.
At this juncture, what comes unmistakably clear is the fact that because
petitioner lacked the proper CES eligibility and therefore had not held the
subject office in a permanent capacity, there could not have been any
violation of petitioner¶s supposed right to security of tenure inasmuch as he
had never been in possession of the said right at least during his tenure as
Deputy Director for Hospital Support Services. Hence, no challenge may be
offered against his separation from office even if it be for no cause and at a
moment¶s notice. Not even his own self-serving claim that he was competent
to continue serving as Deputy Director may actually and legally give even
the slightest semblance of authority to his thesis that he should remain in
office. Be that as it may, it bears emphasis that, in any case, the mere fact
that an employee is a CES eligible does not automatically operate to vest
security of tenure on the appointee inasmuch as the security of tenure of
employees in the career executive service, except first and second-level
employees, pertains only to rank and not to the office or position to which
they may be appointed. c%+c2. 

.++ & *)
*5
,. *  
 6 ; c
c2  A %c 
c2""#!%#""#
SSS. The claim for funeral benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, which
was filed after the lapse of 10 years by the therein petitioner who had earlier
filed a claim for death benefits, had prescribed. S c
0c 

  

  + G.R. No. 160467, April 7, 2009.
Transfer. Jurisprudence recognizes the exercise of management prerogative
to transfer or assign employees from one office or area of operation to
another, provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary,
benefits, and other privileges, and the action is not motivated by
discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or
demotion without sufficient cause. To determine the validity of the transfer
of employees, the employer must show that the transfer is not
unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it
involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and
other benefits. Should the employer fail to overcome this burden of proof,
the employee¶s transfer shall be tantamount to constructive dismissal.
We have long stated that the objection to the transfer being grounded solely
upon the personal inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the
employee by reason of the transfer is not a valid reason to disobey an order
of transfer. Such being the case, petitioner cannot adamantly refuse to
abide by the order of transfer without exposing herself to the risk of being
dismissed. Hence, her dismissal was for just cause in accordance with
Article 282(a) of the Labor Code. % ; A. C  
C  Fc 
 AG.R. No. 172601, April 16, 2009.
Unfair labor practice; burden of proof. Petitioner makes several allegations
that UST committed ULP. The 
6  falls on the shoulders of
petitioner to establish or substantiate such claims by the requisite quantum
of evidence. In labor cases as in other administrative proceedings,
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required. In the petition at bar,
petitioner miserably failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the
grant of relief. ' )A

 '  '  * )+ A
 2  A%, 2+ ,5,  
c
;  G.R. No. 180892, April 7, 2009.
Ê

ü 
   

Ä  
March 21, 2009Hector M. de Leon Jr
Here are some of the decisions promulgated by the Supreme Court in
February 2009 on constitutional law and administrative law.

Ä  

1. Administrative liability. It is a fundamental principle in the law on public
officers that administrative liability is separate from and independent of
criminal liability. A simple act or omission can give rise to criminal, civil or
administrative liability, each independently of the others. This is known as
the ³threefold liability rule.´ Thus, absolution from a criminal charge is not a
bar to an administrative prosecution, and vice-versa. The dismissal of the
administrative cases against the petitioners will not necessarily result in the
dismissal of the criminal complaints filed against them. 4 ),
 -* s, et al. G.R. No. 166086-92, February
13, 2009.
2. Reorganization. A reorganization ³involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions.´ It alters the existing structure of government
offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them to make the bureaucracy more responsive to
the needs of the public clientele as authorized by law. It could result in the
loss of one¶s position through removal or abolition of an office. For a
reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more
efficient to be valid, however, it must pass the test of good faith, otherwise
it is void ab initio. In the case at bar, petitioner claims that there has been a
drastic reduction of plantilla positions in the new staffing pattern in order to
address the local government unit¶s gaping budgetary deficit. Thus, he
states that in the municipal treasurer¶s office and waterworks operations unit
where respondents were previously assigned, only 11 new positions were
created out of the previous 35 which had been abolished; and that the new
staffing pattern had 98 positions only, as compared with the old which had
129. The CSC, however, highlighted the recreation of six (6) casual positions
for clerk II and utility worker I, which positions were previously held by
respondents Marivic, Cantor, Asor and Enciso. Petitioner inexplicably never
disputed this finding nor proferred any proof that the new positions do not
perform the same or substantially the same functions as those of the
abolished. Nowhere in the records does it appear that these recreated
positions were first offered to respondents. The appointment of casuals to
these recreated positions violates R.A. 6656.   , G.R. No.
174244, February 13, 2009.
  
1. Expropriation. The National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a complaint for
the acquisition of easement right of way over lots of Co in connection with
the construction of NPC¶s transmission lines. The Supreme Court held that:
(a) Republic Act No. 8974 applies applies to properties expropriated for the
installation of NPC¶s power transmission lines; (b) NPC is liable to pay the
full amount of the fair market value and not merely a 10 percent easement
fee for the expropriated property; (c) the value of the property should be
reckoned as of 27 June 2001, the date of the filing of the complaint in
compliance with Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.   C.  
., GR No. 166973, February 10, 2009.
2. Political question. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee to hear the so called Moscow incident effectively asks
the Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of the
Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question that, in
Tañada v. Cuenco, was characterized as a question which, under the
Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. Pursuant to this
constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own
rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it
may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and
publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to intervene in what is clearly a
question of policy, an issue dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of
the Senate¶s action. 2
422  ( -  
.++., G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009.
3. Dual citizenship. Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from
running for any elective local position. . .+
, et al..R. No.
176947, February 19, 2009.
Ê