1

INTRODUCTION

Lahore Resolution 1940 gave the Indian Muslims a deep sense of

national identity and a vision of independent state. It was the Lahore
Resolution that transformed the Muslim minority into a Muslim nation
on a par with the Hindus. It embodied hopes and aspirations of the
Indian Muslims which were materialized and were translated into
reality by the determination and extraordinary vision of the Great
Leader of the Indian Muslims whom the world knows as Muhammad Ali
Jinnah.
Lahore Resolution was the prelude to the creation of Pakistan which is
unique achievement of one individual. As Sir Penderel Moon says: “
Wtihout him (Jinnah) therefore, Pakistan would never have existed.
There is, I believe, no historical parallel for a single individual affecting
such a political revolution and his achievement is a striking refutation of
the theory that in making of history, the individual is little or of no
significance. It was Mr. JInnah who created Pakistan and undoubtedly
mad history.”1

Wolpert in the preface to his study of Jinnah views the greatness of

Jinnah with similar admiration: “ Few individuals significantly alter the
course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly
anyone can be credited with a nation-state. Muhammad Ali JInnah did
all three.”2
 2

PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The great leader like Jinnah, whom Hegel calls heroes or world-
historical individuals exist in definite times and circumstances. It is
natural that they are sensitive to influence of ideals and deeply
perceptive of the changes taking place around them..
This term paper will examine the influence of the ideals and political
conditions on Jinnah’s personality particularly during 1930, which
brought about radical change in Jinnah’s ideological and political
beliefs.
This paper argues that Jinnah perfectly fits into the philosophical
framework constructed by George. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) to elucidate
the role of ‘world-historical’ individual in shaping the course of history.
Hegel in his famous Lectures on the Philosophy of the World-
History gives vivid description of the individuals of world-historical
significance, whom he also calls ‘heroes’ and tells how they differ from
the people whose destiny they change by influencing their thoughts and
actions. Hegel explains: “world-historical individuals or heroes are those
who have willed and accomplished not just the ends of their own
imagination or personal opinion, but only those which are appropriate
and timely, and have an inner vision of what it is. They are not
necessarily men of pure philosophy, as they are men of practice. They
do however know and will their own enterprise, because the time is ripe
for it….. . And other people flock to their standard, for it is these heroes
who express the necessity of their times and age. They are the most far-
sighted among their contemporaries. The heroes know best what issues
are involved and whatever they do is right. The others have to obey the,
and their words and deeds are the best that could be said and done in
their time…. . These world-historical individuals are those who were the
first to formulate the desires of their fellows explicitly. They know what
the people, who are following them, wanted for satisfaction.”3
Jinnah was the only leader in the whole of India towards whom
Muslims turned when the question of their ideological, constitutional
and political existence was to be debated or decided. Ideological and
 3

political developments during 1930s, coupled with Jinnah’s own

disillusionment with united Indian nationalism, led him to envision a
separate state for the millions of the Indian Muslims and to claim a
status for separate nation for them.
Influence of Iqbal’s thought and the Congress betrayal of its own
ideals, for which it was founded, during the Congress rule in seven
provinces from 1937 to 1939 paved the way for decision and choices
that Jinnah made in the 27th Session of All India Muslim League (AIML)
held in Lahore in March 1940 when the historic Lahore Resolution was
passed.
The first part of this term paper examines the influence of Iqbal’s
thought on Jinnah and surveys different partitions schemes brought
forward during 1930s; the second part discusses the Jinnah’s efforts to
reorganize the Muslim League with the unexampled use of his skill and
insight to realize his political goals and ideals and formal espousal of the
principle on the AIML platform that Muslims were a distinct nation and
the only solution to Indian problem lay in the partition of India.
while the third part deals with the atrocities inflicted on the Muslims
during Congress rule in eight provinces.The fourth and last part briefly
surveys the criticism and objections raised by different historians,
politicians an publicists against the 1940 Lahore Resolution.
As a whole, the purpose of this term paper is to give detailed and
rational analysis of interplay between various conflicting ideas and
political forces that prevailed in India at that time and the outcome of the
conflict. It unravels Jinnah’s role as a ‘midwife’, a Hegelian metaphor
for the heroes in history, to effect partitions which lay dormant in the
womb of time in the form of aspirations and dreams of the Indian
Muslims to see the light of the day.
Lahore Resolution being the rationale of independent homeland for
Indian Muslims can not be seen or viewed in isolation from Jinnah’s role
in bringing this movement to its logical end, that is, the creation of
Pakistan on August 14, 1947. The success of the Lahore Resolution
meant the realization of the principle of independence for Muslims that
the Quaid stood for.
 4

INFLUENCE OF IQBAL’S THOUGHT ON JINNAH’S

IDEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO INDIAN POLITICAL
PROBLEM

While writing a forward for the ‘ Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah, the Quaid
admitted to the influence of Iqbal on him in these words: “ His (Iqbal’s)
views were substantially in consocance with my own and had finally led
me to the same conclusion as a result of the careful examinatioin and
study of constitutional problem facing India, and found expression in
due course in the united will of Muslim India as admuberated in the
Lahore Resolution of All India Muslim League popularly known as the ‘
Pakistan Resolutiion’ passed on 23rd March, 1940.4

Different eminent political personalities and historical figures of India

had presented the concept of separate Muslim province or state from
1857 to 1940. John Bright, Jamalud din Afgahni, Kheri brothers, Lajpat
Rai, Rehmat Ali, Obaidullah Sindhi, Hasrat Mohani and Allama Iqbal
were the prominent among them. The ideal of a separate Muslim state is
spread over a period of 82 years and a total 236 schemes were presented
in this regard. Such schemes which proposed the establishment of
separate Muslim province and state were presented by the individuals in
their individual capacities without official signature of any organization
or political party. Besides, these schemes lacked clarity or organized
thought. Concept or ideal which lie dormant in the minds of the people
are articulated by men of philosophy and thinkers. Political leaders
select most suitable concept among the emerging idea of their times.
Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, articulated and explained the ideal of a
separate Muslim state within or without British Empire while delivering
the Presidential address at the 21st AIML session at Allahbad on
December 29-30, 1930.
The poet-philosopher, expressing his idea, said: “I would like to see the
Punjab, the Northwest Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan
 5

amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within British empire

or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North
Western Indian state appears to be final destiny of the Muslims at least
of North West India”. The letters written by Iqbal to Jinnah left lasting
influencing on Jinnah’s ideological approach to settle political problems
of Indian Muslims. “The critical situation in India converted the Quaid
to carry out the valuable advice of Allama Iqbal which he gave to him
soon before his death in 1938 that the Muslim League should struggle
for the division of India into Muslim majority and Hindu majority
states.”5

Partition Schemes during 1930s:

Within a few weeks of Iqbal’s Allahbad Address, Syed Tufail Ahmad,

who had graduated from the Aligarh Muslim College, proposed a
separate ‘zone; for Indian Muslims. According to him, the only solution
of Hindu-Muslim problem was the “division of India into tow
homogeneous provinces leading to the formation of predominantly
Hindu and Muslim zones”6
An Englishman, J.coatman came to the conclusion: “ It may be that no
united India as we understand it today will ever emerge. It may be that
Muslim Inida as we understand it today will emerge. It may be that
Moslem India in the north and north-west is destined to become a
separte Moslem state. In the following year, GT Garrat, former Indian
civilian commenting on the deliberations of the Third Session of the
Rooundtable Conference wrote in the Nineteenth Century (London)
that within a short period of time, the proposed federal govnment of
India would be faced with a strong separatist movement. 7
A young Muslim at Cambridge Ch. Rehmat Ali, after watching the
Roundtable Conference, voiced his views in 1933 in his pamphlet Now
or Never : “ Our religion , culture, history, tradition, , economic system,
laws of inheritance, succession and marriages are basically different
from those of the people living in the rest of India.” He ruled out the
possibility of peaceful co-existence between Muslims and Hindus in
Hindu-dominated Federation “where we can not be the masters of our
 6

destiny and captains of our soul.” As is wll-known the name of Muslim

State ‘ Pakistan’ which Rehmat Ali demanded was coined by him from
the first letters of the first four units of Muslim Federation Punjab (P),
North-western Frontier Province (which he called Afghania, Kashmir,
Sind and last three letters of Baluchistan.
Dr. Syed Abdul Latif of Osmania University Hyderabad published in
1938 a pamphlet The Cultural Future of India in which he suggested
that solution to Indian problem lay in the cultural autonomy for both
Hindus and Muslims. In 1939, his booklet entitled ‘the Muslim Problem
in India Together with an Alternative Constitution for India’ criticized
the 1935 Act as a danger to Muslim ‘individuality’ and mentioned the
loss of Muslims faith in Hindus. The alternative constitution suggested
by him was to divide India into four cultural zones for the Muslims
(Northwest. North-east. Delhi-Lucknow and Deccan ) and at least
eleven zones for Hindus. According to this alternative constitution, the
Federal Legislature would deal with only those subjects which relate to
political and economic interests of the country and there would be no
concurrent list.
In March, tow Muslim leaders, Chaudhary Khaliquzzan and Abdul
Rahim Siddiq met Secretary of State Lord Zetland and proposed the
setting up of three or four federations in India, to be controlled by a
small central body, not dominated either by Hindus or by the Muslims.
In the middle of 1939, Punjab Government employee, Mian Kifayat
Ali, writing under pseudonym ‘ A Punjab’ published his pamphlet ‘
Confederacy of India’. Like Latif, Kifayat Ali also emphasized that
Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations. He proposed five
federations for India, tow of which would have Muslim majorities, each
federation would have a governor-general responsible to the Central
Confederal Authority in respect of Confederal subjects. Sir Abdullah
Haroon put forward his own scheme “which envisaged the division of
India into two separate Federations, each drawing its major support from
one of the major communities. The Muslim Federation was to comprise
the North-Western part of India and Kashmir.” 8
About the same time, Sir Skindar Hayat Khan, Chief Minister of
Punjab, published his own proposal for partition entitled Outline of a
 7

Scheme of Indian Federation under which India was to be divided into

seven zones, two of which would have Muslim majorities. These zones
would have their own legislatures which collectively would constitue
the Central-Federal Assembly, one-third of its members being Muslims.
Syed Zafar ul Hasan andDr. Muhammad Afzal Hussain Qadri
published their schemes under the title of ‘The Problem of Indian
Muslims and Its Solution’. This scheme proposed the division of India
into three sovereign federations, tow of which would be Muslim
federations. It also proposed common defense of three federations

Hindu Partitions Schemes

Besides, there were also some definite views maintained by the

extremist Hindu politicians regarding partition. V.D. Savarkar
formulated the two-nation theory in his essay ‘Hindutva published in
1923.
Hindu Mahasabha leader Lala Lajpar Rai wrote in ‘The Tribune’ of
December 14,924: “ Under my scheme, the Muslims will have four
Muslim states 1) the Pathan Province or North-west Frontier 2)Western
Punjab 3)Sindh and 4) eastern Bengal. If there are compact Muslim
communities in any other part of India, sufficiently large to form a
province, they should be similarly constituted. But it should be distinctly
understood that this is not a United India”
Furthermore, in a letter to C.R.Das in 1925, Lala LajpatRai explained
that he had devoted the most of his time to the study of Muslim history
and Muslim Law and he was inclined to conclude that Hindu-Muslim
majaority was neither possible nor practicable for the religion provided
an effective barrier and that he was not afraid of seven crore of Indian
Muslims but crore plus the armed hosts of Afghanistan, Central Asia,
Arabia, Mesopotamia and Turkey would be irresistible. It was due to
these fears that Lala Lajpar Rai became powerful supporter of the
partition of the Punjab, the western Punjab would have Muslim majority
and eastern Punjab would have non-Muslim majority. Under the scheme
 8

Lajpat Rai proposed, the Muslim would have four Muslim States, the
Pathan Province, the western Punjab, sindh and the eastern Bengal. 9

Difference Between Lajpat Rai’s Scheme and Iqbal’s Thought of

Muslim Nation:
K.K.Aziz writes that in ‘in clarity, detail and firmness, this ( Lajpat’s)
proposal was landmark in the evolution of the idea of Pakistan’. 10
A Hindu historian, Tarachand writes: “ the partiion of India was not a
product of of fertile imagination of Muslim undergraduate of the
Cambridge University (Ch.Rehmat Ali) , nor evern poet Iqbal’s fantasy
but the brainchild of a hypersensitive Hindu stalwart Lala Lajpat Rai. 11
The great Muslim thinker, Allama Iqbal in his Allahbad’s address
explained raison d'etre of Muslims constituting a separate nation. The
tone and tenor of this address is positive and harmonious while Lala
Lajpat Rai’s concept of separatism is inspired negatively due to fear of
and hostility of ‘Muslim history’ and ‘ Muslim law’. Iqbal defined
Islam’s role the evolution of human civilization positively holding that
Islam as an ethical ideal and political legal value system has provided
generations of Indian Muslims with “those basic emotions and loyalties
which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups and finally
transform them into a well-organized people. 12
Dr. Kalb-i-Abid highlights the Iqbal’s generosity and large-heartedness
and quotes him as saying: “ I entertain the highest respect customs, laws
and religion and social institution of other communities. Yet I love the
communal groups which is the source of my life and my behaviour and
which has formed me by giving me its religion, its literature, its
thought, its culture and thereby creating its whole past as a living
operative factor in my present consciousness. A community that is
inspired by feelings of ill will towards other communities is low and
ignoble.” 13
Secondly, the Hindu political body, the Congress did not espouse or
won Lala Lajpat Rai’s ideas in its official meetings. Rather, the
Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha and other anti- Pakistan organizations
did all they could to prevent Pakistan scheme from taking roots. 14
 9

The Indian Muslims, taking inspiration from Iqbal’s thought, stood

behind the Muslim League which made Muslim independent homeland
the basis of its struggle after 1940. Moreover, Iqbal had unflinching faith
in Jinnah’s insight and leadership to realize his vision. He hoped that
Jinnah’ genius would disover some way out of our present difficulties.
Lala Lajpat Rai;s principle of partitioning India did not find a leader of
high caliber who could serve as instrument for its realization making it a
moment of truth in the history of Hindu India.
 10

JINNAH’S ROLE IN THE REORGANIZATION OF AIML

The reorganization of AIML began in 1934 when its two sections

merged under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah to make the
League the most representative political body of the Muslims. The
challenge that Jinnah faced came in the form of the British plan for new
constitution or Federal Scheme, the second part of which was
unacceptable to the Muslims. Jinnah called it a ‘treacherous scheme’ and
called for unity between Hindu and Muslims to avert it.15
Jinnah remaine for Hindu Muslim co-operation and in 1936, he
declared: “ I will not and cannot give it up. It may give me up,but I will
not.” 16
Jinnah in his talks with Rajendra Parsad about Congress–League
cooperation suggested that the Hindu Mahasabha should also agree to
the ‘compromise formula’ but it did not. 16
Unfortunately, the statements made by Jawarlal Nehre after assuming
the presidentship of the Congress in 1936, started widening the gap
between Hindu and Muslims. In his Presidential Address at the Lucknow
Session of the Congress, Nehru declared that the only key to the solution
to all the problems of India lies in Socialism and the communal issue is
after all a side issue and it can not have importance in the larger scheme
of things. Those who think of it as the major issue think in terms of the
British Imperialism continuing permanently in this country. REF: The
Evolution of the Demand of the Separate State. Dorothy Norman ed
Nehru, The First Sixty Years.
Even Rajendra Parsad disagreed with this simplistic analysis and said:
“ Is it practical politcs to say that all over communal and international
differences will vanish in no time if we concentrate our attention on
economic problems and solve them on socialistic lines.” 17
However, the Congress leaders saw the benefits of using socialism to
sideline Muslims’ demands for greater safeguards and found the 1935
Act to the advantage of Hindu community. In September, 1936, Nehru
went a step further and declared ‘the real contest is between tow
 11

forces---the Congress representing the will to freedom of the nation, and

the British government of India and its supporters.
Nehru continued to become more provocative and aggressive after his
reelection as the Congress President in Dec. 1936.
Early in January, 1937, when Jinnah inaugurated League’s Election
Campaign, he stated: “Mr. Nehru is reported to have said that there are
only two parties in India—the government and the Congress and other
must line up. I refuse to line up with the Congress. There is third party in
India and this Muslim India”. Jinnah also asked Nehru to leave the
Muslims alone.
Nehru ridiculed the Muslim League as representing a group of Muslims
functioning in the higher regions of the upper middle class and few even
with the Muslim lower middle class. He said, “ May I suggest to Mr
Jinnah that I came into greater touch with the Muslim masses than most
of the members of the Muslim League” 18
Nehru also remarked sarcastically about Jinnah saying: “ There was as
much difference between him and the Indian masses as between Savile
Row and Bond Street and the Indian village with ist mud huts.” 19
Wolpert commenting on this suggestion of Nehru to Jinnah says, “ It
would not be the last of Nehru’s political errors of judgement in his
dealings with Jinnah, but it was one of the most fatal mistakes he ever
made in moment of hubris” 20 He also appreciated Jinnah’s control of his
temper which he used for his ‘calculated political advantage’. About
Jinnah, he says: “ He used anger as a barrister or an acor would do to
sway his jury audience, never from an uncontrollable flaring of passion.
For personal passion had all but died in him and was never to be
rekindled.’ 21

Jinnah as the Leader of Muslim Masses

On Iqbal’s advice, Jinnah started turning the AIML into the party of
the masses. 22The Muslims started calling him ‘Quaid-i-Azam’ in 1937.
During 1938-39, the Quaid concerned himself with ‘building a mass
party’ and from 1937 to 1940, the Muslim League membership
multiplied from a few thousand to well over a half million. Jinnah had
 12

advised the Muslim masses to organize themselves at the Luknow

session: “ It is essential that the Muslim should organize themselves as
one party….. .They must realize that time has come when they should
concentrate and devoter energies to self-organization and full
development of their power to the exclusion o fevery other
consideration” 23
Under Jinnah’s advice, Lucknow Muslim Students League, All Bengal
Muslm Students League and Aligarh Univeristy Union were mereged to
from ‘All India Muslim Students Conference. The students were brought
under the League’s banner by Muhmmad Noman. Noman highlights
Jinnah’s deep commitment to and interest in students affairs by telling
that Jinnah decided to shift the venue of his Council April meeing from
Lahore to Culcatta within a minute of receiving an invitation to
prieseover over Federations first annual session. He recalls ‘from
Calcutta onwards, the Muslim students marched under his guidance. 24
The most memorable of his statements to that newly organized Muslim
conference was that “ we don’t want to be reduced to the position of the
negroes America’.In January, 1938, while delivering a speech before
students of Aligarh Muslim University, the ‘intellectual cradle of the
Muslim League, Jinnah began: “ You , Mr. President, have said the
Muslim is born free, when was he free? In his country an any rate we
have been slaves for one fifty years. This was the first time Jinnah used
the word ‘slave’ and he continued to publicize the plight of the Muslim
masses.
 13

THE CONGRESS RULE IN PROVINCES (1937-1939)

The elections were held in India in 1937 under the 1935 Act in
which the Indian National Congress (INC) formed its ministries in
eight out of eleven provinces of British India. The Congress after
winning such an impressive victory found the ‘intoxication of power a
bit too exhilarating. The Congress prevented the installation of Muslim
League ministry in any one of the four provinces where Muslims were in
majority. In the UP, the Congress meted out disdainful attitude toward
the Muslim League stalwarts like Liaqat Ali. The Congress demanded
from the Muslim League, as the price for its inclusion in the Congress
Ministry, the complete merger of the Muslim League Party in the
Congress Party. It also demanded the dissolution of the Muslim League
Parliamentary Board and pledge not to contest any by-elections.25
Mauland Abul Kalam Azad blamed Nehru for not being generous
towards the Muslim League, an attitude which was partly responsible for
the creation of Pakistan.26
As Sir Penderal Moon, a British administrator, says: : If the U.P. sample
was to be pattern of the Congress political conduct, then what would be
the position of Muslims when a federal government for all India came to
be formed. There would be no room, no throne for India save for
Congress and the Congress stooges.” Sir Harry Haig. Governor of the
United Provinces at that time, has recorded: “ The enthusiasm of the
masses for Congress Raj melted imperceptibly into ideas of Hindu Raj,
which were certainly prevalent throughout the Province. These ideas
were deeply resented by the Muslims who were invincibly determined
not be ruled by the Hindus.” 27
The policies and programmes which the Congress Ministries followed
clearly demonstrated that the Congress leadership was determined that
Muslim should give up their separate way of life and become an integral
 14

part of single Hindu-dominated Indian nation. Vidya Mandir and

Wardha schemes of educational reforms were launched to create
common Indian cultural sense in the innocent minds of Muslim children.
They were forced to sing Bande Matram with folded hands and offer
reverence and offer reverence before the Mahatam’s portrait. The
Congress ministries started flying the Congress flag on public buildings
so as to give impression that the Congress flag was the national flag. In
the provinces where Urdu was widely read and understood, the Congress
ministries took several steps to replace it with Hindu written in
Devanagri script. Bande Matram song began to be recited before
Assembly proceedings. This Hindu song was idolatrous with anti-
Muslim overtones and adored Kali, the Hindu goddess. It was taken
from Bankin chnadra Chaterjea’s novel ‘Anand Math’ in which hostility
was expressed against the Muslims.
Under the Congress Ministries, even Muslim lives and properties were
unsafe. According to government sources in two-year period from
October 1937, there were fifty seven serious communal riots in the
Congress-governed provinces leading to 1700 casualties and 130 deaths.
By the end of 1939, It was widely believed that if the Congress would
have lasted much longer, communal fighting have broken out on an
unprecedented scale.
Thus the Congress conduct and rule was greatly violative of minority
rights, civil society and of adequate, if not, good governance issues.
The catalogue of ill-treatment and persecution of Muslims in the
Congress-rule provinces as contained in Pirpur Committee Report and
advocate Sharif’s Report from Patna mirrored the style of the
government by the Congress and its Hindu methods to subject Muslims
to perpetual inferior position in relation to Hindus. If the Muslims had
allowed the Congress to continue with prevailing constitutional and
federal schemes as envisioned in the Govt. of India Act 1935, the
Congress would have destroyed the Muslim religious and cultural
identity.

The Congress rule showed its fascist and authoritarian face to Muslims
at this time. Naturally, Qauid-i-Azam was forced to counter it by
 15

enlarging the Muslim League’s base. While speaking at AIML annual

session in Patna in December, 1938, he said: “It is tragedy that high
command of the Congress is determined to crush all other communities
and cultures in this country and establish Hindu Raj”. He further said: “I
challenge anybody to deny that the Congress is not mainly a Hindu
body. I ask, does the Congress represent the Muslims? Whos is the
genius behind it? Mr.Gandhi. I have no hesitation in saying that it is
Mr.Gandhi who is destroying the ideal with which the Congress was
started. He is the one man responsible for turning the Congress into an
iinstrument for revival of Hinduism. His ideal is reviving the Hindu
religion and establish Hindu raj in this country. Today, the Hindu
mentality, Hindu outlook are being carefully nurtured, and Muslims are
being forced to accept new conditions to submit to the orders of the
Congress leaders”.
Despite Muslims’ rage against the atrocities of the Congress
Ministries, Gandhi made a claim in the newspaper ‘ Harijan’ that the
Congress was the only party capable of delivering goods to Indian
people, which Jinnah rejected as ‘preposterous’.
In Wolpert’s opinion, in the last part of 1930s,Jinnah’s strategy was to
teach the Congress ‘to respect and fear’ the Muslim League and to teach
his own followers to depend primarily on themselves and to mobilize
into ‘one solid people’.

Triangle of Forces:Jinnah, British and the Congress leadership in

1939

German Nazi dictator Hitler declared war in Europe in 1939. The

Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow issues proclamation on 3rd September 1939
that war had broken out between His majesty, Germany, and that a state
of war existed in India. For obvious reasons, the Viceroy was eager to
gain support of all major political parties of India in his war efforts. The
Congress ignored the British Government of having deliberately ignored
the wishes of Indian people on its entry into war and it demanded
independence for India as a condition for supporting war.
 16

Jinnah, as a seasoned tactician, followed a tactic which he often

repeated. ‘He waited for the Congress move before making his own if
they were bargaining so could he’.28
On 18th Septmeber, the Muslim League Working Committee offered
its ‘solid support’ to the British Indian government only on two
conditions , ‘Justice and fairplay’ for the Muslims in the Congress-ruled
provinces, and an assurance that no constitutional advance or declaration
would be made or constitution framed ‘without the consent and approval
of the League.
The Viceroy was anxious to get the AIML support for his war efforts
and he promised in October, 1939 that ‘rights of minority groups would
be safeguarded in any new constitution. The Congress demand for
‘independent status’ and Muslim League demand for ‘veto’ were
‘mutually exclusive and antagonistic’29
The ‘triangle of force’ was thus set up that was to continue ‘until
partition and the transfer of power.
Premier of the Punjab, Sir Skindar who was jealous of Jinnah’s rising
polularity sent a message to Lord Linlighgow which said. “Punjab and
Bengal were wholly behind the government in prosecution of war
whatever Jinnah and his friend might say”. He advised the Viceroy not
to ‘inflate’ Jinnah. Jinnah regretted this move by Skindar and told the
Viceroy that Skindar alone could not deliver goods. He appealed to him
for doing something ‘positive’ by turning out the Congress Ministries.
Jinnah also revealed to the Viceroy that ultimate political solution to
Indian problem lay in partition.
Gandhi who initially assured the Viceroy of his ‘full and
unconditional personal support’ for the war went through a change of
heart on September 25, 1939, he applied his creed of non-violence to the
conduct of war and asked the British “to lay down arms and die
unresisitingly and go down inot history as heroes of non-viiolence”. 30
On October 11, 1939, Nehru told the All India Congress Committee at
Wardha: : “ A slave India can not help Britian”. We want to assume
control of our government and when we are free we can help
democracies.” Next day, Gandhi issued his own statement from Wardha
finding the Viceroy’s non-committal declaration of Britain’s unchanged
 17

objectives towards India ‘profoundly disappointing’ accusing him

following ‘divide and rule’ policy. In the All India Congress Committee
on October 22, 1935, the Congress concurred that ‘it could not possibly
give any support to Great Britain for it would amount to endorsement of
the Imperialist policy which the Congress always opposed and sought to
end. As a first step, the Congress called upon the Congress Ministries to
tender their resignations. On 22nd October, 1939, the All India Muslim
League Working Committee again reiterated that it would not accept any
federal scheme unltess it completely scrapped the the 1935 federal
constitution. Towards the end of the years, Jinnah, in a press interview to
the Manchester Guardian , declared unequivocally that “ it is impossible
to work a democratic parliamentary government in India”and this belief
was expressed by him again in an article which contributed to Time and
Tide, an independent British weekly in which he said that democracy of
the usual Western variety was not suited to India.31
Jinnah then met Lord Linlithgow, Parsad and Gandhi. In New Delhi, on
November 1, 1939, Gandhi concluded after the meeting that “ Jinnah
Saheb looks to the British Power to safeguard the Muslim rights.
Nothing that the Congress can do or conceal will satisfy him.” On
November 5, the Viceroaya reported the ‘failure of talks’ as the
Congress ministries resigned one after another. Through his journal ‘
Harijan’, Gandhi appealed to Jinnah to fight for undivided India hoping
the League did not want to ‘vivisect India’.
But Jinnah had decided in favour of a separate and equal national
status for Muslims. He waited for ‘precise timing for announcing his
intentions’. As a negotiator of highest caliber, he knew how important
timing could be for political as well as for legal advantage. Jinnah had
the unique capacity to make the most every political option and
opportunity.
Jinnah reminded people and politicians in India of the power being
enjoying by AIML at that time of intense political wrangling. He
announced his choice of Friday, December 22, 1939 as a ‘Day of
Deliverance’ and Thanksgiving as a mark of relief at the departure of the
Congress ministries. Jinnah’s resolution stated: “ The Congress Ministry
has conclusively demonstrated and proved the falsehood of the Congress
 18

claim that it represents all interests justly and fairly, by it decidedly anti-
Muslim policy. The Congress Ministry both in the discharge of their
duties of administration and in the legislature have done their best to
flout the Muslim opinion to destroy the Muslim Culture and have
interfered with their religious and social life and trampled upon their
economic and political rights….that in matters of differences and
disputes the Congress…..invariably sided with and supported and
advocated the cause of Hindus in total disregard and to prejudice of the
Muslim interests. The Congress government constantly interfered with
the legitimate and routine duties of district officers even in the petty
matters to the serious detriment of the Musalmans, and thereby created
atmosphere which spread the belief amongst Hindu public that there was
established a Hindu Raj, and emboldened the Hindus. Mostly the
Congress men, to ill treat Muslims at various places, interfered with their
elementary rights of freedom”.

Gandhi and the Congress leadership felt that there was no prospect of
resolving the Hindu-Muslim problem by future talks,until in the words
of Jinnah “We reach an agreement with regard to the minority
problem”. Wolpert rightly says that Jinnah never lost his temperate
balance and never discarded the last life line of possible future contact
with the Congress and he was always ready to be ‘at disposal’ of the
Congress leaders, in case they ‘desired to discuss the matter with him’
In response, the Congress press started dubbing Jinnah “the Dictator of
Malabar Hills’.
 19

TOWARDS THE LAHORE RESOLUTION 1940

Another challenge which confronted Jinnah’s leadership and the

principle he espoused came from the Prime Minister of the Punjab, Sir
Skindar Hayat who was leader of the Unionist Party and had joined the
Muslim League seeing its popularity. Jinnah’s risinig popularity
threatened his political position in the Punjab.
Sindh presented a picture politically favourable for Jinnah and was
moving in the direction which was in harmony with Jinnah’s principle of
politics at that time.
Sind Muslim League Conference, held at Karachi in October 1938,
passed the resolution which expressed the League’s determination to rid
the Indian Muslims of the ‘caste-ridden mentality and anti-Muslim
policy of the Hindu majority’. The Conference regarded Hindus and
Muslim as ‘two nations ‘ and recommended to the Muslim League to
devise a scheme of Constitution under which Muslims may attain full
independence. It also disapproved emphatically All-India Federation as
embodied in the Government of India Act 1935.
AIML sub-committee formed in March 1939 was entrusted with the
task of considering various partition schemes for India’s political future
and it was to present its final scheme in the annual session of AIML
scheduled to be held in December, 1939. The commencement of War,
party’s ‘internal difficulties’ and Jinnah’s precarious health caused the
postponement of the annual session till March, 1940. Sir Skindar Hayat
presented his “Outline Of a Scheme of Indian Federation with the
support of the British government. The Prime Minister of Bengal Fazul
Haq followed him. They both were interested in forming coalition
Ministries with other parties including the Congress. The Viceroy had
observation that the Muslims in Bengal and Punjab had marginal
majority, and it was likely that they would not be able to govern with a
comfortable majority. Skindar and Fazal ul Haq were against the
‘Pakistan Demand’ which was being seriously considered by the AIML
sub-committee Jinnah and Skindar had differences on ths issue of
Federation and Hindu Muslim rapprochement. Federation could be
 20

implemented only after a compromise was reached between Hindus and

Muslim..32
In March, 1940, the Congress adopted Nehru’s motion as a resolution
in which it condemned the War for Imperialist ends and refused to
become party to it. It demanded a ‘Constituent Assembly’ elected on the
basis of adult franchise, safeguards for minorities by agreement or
arbitration and ruled out the role of Princely states and of British
community and the applicability of Dominion Status to India.
Prior to this Congress session of 1940, Mr Jinnah made a statement in
February 1940 announcing the League’s policy that India was not one
nation, but two, a stand which he elaborated in the 27th AIML session at
Lahore in March 1940. He also refused to accept the arbitrament of any
body, Indian or the British and said, “the Muslims would determine their
own destiny”.
In the middle of March 1940, the Police opened fire on the members of
Khaksar organization and there was law and order problem in the
Punjab. Skindar Hayat suggested that the League’s Lahore session
should be postponed but Jinnah did not agree with this. He arrived in
Lahore on March 22, saying that ‘Lahore session is going to be
landmark in the future history of Muslim India. Jinnah had sharp sense
of the politics of the Punjab; he went straight to Mayo Hospital to visit
the wounded activists of Khaksars organization. More than 60000
Muslims were present to welcome the Quaid in Lahore with shouts
‘Quaid-i-Azam Zindabad’ Jinnah inaugurated the AIML 27th Session in
Minto Park (now Iqbal Park) Lahore on 22nd March, 1940. In his
Presidential address, Jinnah highlighted the developments which had
dominated Indian political scene since Lucknow Pact 1916 to Congress
Ministries in 1939. He elaborated the two-nation theory, the rationale of
separate homeland for Indian Muslims. In this address, he spoke
extempore for more than two hours. He said: “The problem in India is
not of a inter-communal character but manifestly of international one
and it must be treated as such ------. They (Islam and Hinduism) are not
religions in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact different and
distinct social order and it is a dream that Hindus and Muslims can ever
evolve a common nationality. The Hindu and Muslims belong to two
 21

different religious philosophies, social customs and literature. They

neither intermarry nor interdine together and indeed they belong to two
different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and
conceptions. Hindus and Muslims derive their inspiration from different
source of history. They have different epics, different heroes and
different episodes. Very often the hero of one is the foe of the other, and
likewise their victories and defeats overlap ---- Musalmans are a nation
according to any definition and they must have their homelands, territory
and state.” 33
Jinnah also criticized the demand of introduction of British
parliamentary system and discussed its unsuitability in Indian situation.
He also pointed out the inherent flaws in the Congress demand for
immediate independence and Constituent assembly in the light of past
experiences. We naturally have our past experiences and particularly by
experiences of the past tow and half years of the provincial constitution
in the Congress-governed provinces, we have learnt many lessons. We
are now apprehensive and can trust nobody. We never thought that the
Congress High Command would have acted in the manner which they
actually did in the Congress-governed provinces. I never dreamt they
would ever come down as low as that.” He also said, “It is absured to
ask the ruling power to abdicate in favour of a constituent assembly..
Suppose we don’t agree to the franchise according to which the Central
Assembly is elected, or suppose we the only body of Muslim
representation does not agree with the non-Muslim majority in the
Constituent Assembly what will happen.” Jinnah insisted that he too
stood ‘unequivocally for the freedom of India. But it must be freedom
for all India and not freedom of one section, or worse still of the
Congress caucus and slavery of Musalmans and other minorities. He
therefore suggested that the only course open to us all is to allow the
major nations to have separate homelands by dividing Indiaa into
‘autonomous national states”. Towards the end of his speech, Jinnah
strongly refuted the view that India was ever united or or that it had ever
been a single nation. The only unity that had ever existed was imposed
by the British conquest and this artificial unity would collapse as soon as
they withdrew.
 22

On March, 23, Maulvi Fazlul Haq, the premier of the Bengal, moved a
resolution which was endorsed by the leading personalities of the
League which came from different provinces of India. The Lahore
Resolution was passed on 24th March, 1940. The Lahore Resolution
stated:

“ While approving and endorsing the action by the Council and the
Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, as indicated in
their resolution dated the 27th August, 17the and 18th of September and
22nd of October 1939, and 3rd of February, 1940 on the constitutional
issue. This session of the All-Inida Muslim League empathically
reiterates that the scheme of federation embodies in the Government of
India Act, 1935 is totally unsuited to and unworkable in the peculiar
conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim
India”
“It further records its empathic view that while the declaration dated
the 18the of October 1939 made by the Viceroy on behalf of his
majesty’s Government is reassuring in so far as it declares that the
policy and plan on which the Government of India Act is based will be
reconsidered in consultation with the various parties interest and
communities in India, Muslim India will not satisfied unless the whole
constitutional plan is reconsidered novo an no revised plan would be
acceptable to the Muslims unless it is framed with their approval.:
Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India
Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this
country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it designed to on the
following basic principles viz., that geographically contiguous units are
demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such
territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the
Muslim are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and
Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute Independent
States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.
“That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be
specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and
in the regions for the protection of their religions, cultural, economic,
 23

political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation

with them and in other parts of India where the Mussalmans are in a
minority adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be
specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities
for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political,
administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.”
The Resolution was seconded by Choudhary Khaliquzzaman, and
supported among others, by Maulan Zafar Ali Khan, Sardar Aurangzeb
Khan, Haji sir Abdullah Haroon, Nawab Ismail Khan,Qazi Muhmmad
Isa and I.I. Chundrigar.
After this meeting Jinnah said to Matlub Saiyid who was there and
said, “Iqbal is no more amongst us, but had he been alive he would have
been happy to know that we did exactly what he wanted us to do.”
The India newspapers coined the phrase, ‘Pakistan Resolution’ for their
headline next morning. Jinnah adopted it; and in a speech that he made
later in the year, he said, “No power on earth can prevent Pakistan.” 34
 24

CRITICISM OF LAHORE RESOLUTION: OBJECTIONS,

AMBIGUITIES AND OMISSIONS

Objections and Allegations against the Lahore Resolution:

The most serious criticism of Lahore Resolution is the allegation that
the British inspired this Resolution to promote their imperial ends as a
counterweight to the pressure tactics of the Congress. Tara Chand and
other official historian of freedom movement for India allege that
Pakistan demand was made effective by the ‘will of the British rulers’.
Ramji Lal has attributed the Resolution to the ‘role played by the British
as it was bent on thwarting the issue of Indian independence by
following policy of ‘divide and rule’. In a similar vein Uma Kaura
concludes her argument saying that:” Lintithgow was jubilcant at the
adoption of the Partition Resolution.” V.B.Kulkarni insists that Lahore
Resolution was the product of the British encouragement of separatist
politics. Ayesha Jalal supports this argument in her book The Sole
Spokesman:Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan.
She says that Lord Linlinthgow asked Jinnah to come up with some
‘constructive policy’ as a counterweight to the Congress demand for
Independence and a Constituent Assembly.35
This criticism loses weight if viewed in the context of long-term
political, economic and strategic interests of the British in India which
could be served best if India remained united. The very idea of the
partition stirred ‘distaste in the British governing circles’
In his letter of 18 April, 1940, Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State for
India, expressed his fear that separate Muslim states might join Islamic
commonwealth. Lord Linlithgow asked Jinnah to come up with a
‘constructive policy’ because he tried to convince Jinnah about the
usefulness of British parliamentary institutions and about talks with the
Congress leadership to settle the constitutional problem. But Jinnah was
not moved. Lord Linlithgow wrote to Zetland on 24 March, 1940 a letter
in which he criticized the Jinnah’s demand as ‘extreme’ and
preposterous’ which was meant as ‘an attempt on the part of Jinnah and
the League to free themselves from the damaging charge leveled against
them they had no constructive ideas of their own. Zetland agreed with
 25

these views and he also called it ‘silly scheme of partition’ and ‘counsel
of despair’. Both Linlithgow and Zetalnd thought of Skindar Hayat as a
‘man of such broad-minded views and so tolerant an outlook because he
was opposed to partition demand of the League.
So the demand for Pakistan was the logical outcome of the political
developments which had been taking place in India over the past half
century. V.P. Menon gives details of Jinnah’s interview with Lord
Linglithgow and he says: “ Jinnah also wished to make it clear that if
His Majesty’s Government could not improve on its present solution for
the India’s constitutional development, he and his friends would have no
option but to fall back on some form of partition of the country; that as a
result of this discussion they had decided first of all, that the Muslims
were not a minority but rather a nation; and secondly that democracy fo
all-India was impossible.” Menon at the end says that ‘throughout the
discussion the Viceroy remained non-commital..’36
The second criticism looks on the Resolution as a tactic or ‘bargaining
counter’. Ayesha Jalal advances this criticism in her book when she
says: “ By apparently repudiating the need for any Centre, and keeping
quiet about its shape, Jinnah calculated that when eventually the time
came to discuss an All-India Federation, British and the Congress alike
would be forced to negotiate with organized Muslim opinion and would
be ready to make substantial concession to create or retain that Centre.
The Lahore Resolution should therefore be seen as a bargaining counter
which had the merit of being acceptable to the majority-province
Muslims and of being totally unacceptable to the Congress and in the
last resort to the British also.” 37
Before Ayesha Jalal, Penderel Moon, Kanji Dwarkdas, and Durga Das
had suggested the similar criticism of the Resolution. Penderel Moon
points to the fact that Jinnah was ready to accept the Cabinet Mission
Plan in 1946 suggested that he was not really irrevocably committed to
Pakistan demand.
Ayesha Jalal’s criticism is based on absence of ‘connecting link
between the two zones’ and a clear cut ‘Centre’. She forgets that two
zones were ‘grouped together in the Madras session of AIML in 1941.
The phrase now used was: the North-Western and Eastern zones of India
 26

should be grouped together….” The absence of hint of any centre does

not mean that the Resolution was meant as ‘bargaining counter”. The
League deliberately avoided mentioning the ‘centre’ whether in the
context of Muslim India or India as a whole, whether in the sense of
Indian federation of All-India confederation as it might have
compromised the very idea of Pakistan. The League had ‘eliminated’
Skindar’s idea of centre and coordination of the activities of the various
units when the Resolution was drafted.
Jinnah himself categorical rejected the impression that the Resolution
was intended as the bargaining counter. While speaking the Pakistan
Session of the Punjab Muslim Students Federation on 2 March, 1941, he
said, “ The only solution for Muslims of India, which will stand the test
of trial and time, is that India should be partitioned so that both the
communities can develop freely and fully according to their own genius,
economically, socially, culturally and politically…. The vital contest in
which we are engaged is not only for the material gain but also the very
existence of the soul of a Muslim nation. Hence I have said often that it
is matter of life and death to the Musalmans and is not a counter for
bargaining.” 38
The charge of ‘bargaining counter’ is weakened by the fact that both the
British and Hindus accused Jinnah of intransigence and obstinacy on the
issue of Pakistan. Furthermore, bargaining was not Jinnah’s style of
politics.
As for his acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan in 1946, it must be
kept in mind that Jinnah did not fail to insist on tow separate constituent
assemblies and the right to secede from the Union after an initial period
of ten years. He accepted the plan for ‘tactical reasons than any
compromise on the fundamental principle of Pakisttan.

Ambiguities
 27

Two ambiguities are usually pointed out in the Lahore Resolution.

1) It was not clear whether the goal contemplated was one or more
sovereign states and if the idea was to attain one state, how could the
constituent units be ‘autonomous and sovereign’ at the same time. It
would be anomaly or self-contradictory. In the Resolution, the details
were left imprecise, but principle stood clear. The language used in the
Resolution was ‘loose’ which suggests something of a federation type.
The League’s Madras session made it clear.The Muslims dropped all
Idea of unity and stood for separate homeland. The confusion as to one
or more states was finally laid to rest in 1944 when Jinnah in his vital
talks with Gandhi emphatically stated what the League really sought for
the Indian Muslim in Lahore Resolution was the establishment of a
single Muslim state comprising both the North-Western and eastern
zones.
2). Lahore Resolution is allegedly in clear about the areas to be included
in the states.
In response to Beverly Nicholas’s question that why Pakistan has not
been defined in detail, Jinnah replied, “ All details were left to the future
and future is often an admirable arbitrator…. It is beyond the power of
any man to provide in advance a blue print in which every detail is
settled.” 39
The Resolution was deliberately kept vague to take full advantage of
element of uncertainty and the power of manipulability. It also
distracted the Congress from targeting a visible goal set by the League.
The League had purposely left this matter ambiguous to get as many
Muslim majority areas as possible, including some in the Muslim-
minority provinces.

Omissions:
4) The critics of the Resolution usually ask questions why the word
‘Pakistan’ was not mentioned in the Resolution and why there is no
reference to princely states like Kashmir.
As for reference to word Pakistan is concerned, the word ‘Pakistan’ as
coined by Chaudhary Rehmat Ali was used in specific context in which
he proposed the idea of Bengal and Assam to constitute a separate
 28

Muslim state of Bang-i-Islam’. The Lahore Resolution pointed to the

areas of both North-western and eastern India. The Resolution did not
favour the exchange of population. The word was not used as it could
give the impression of pan-Islamism and scare the British and provoke
Hindu propaganda. But when Hindu press regarded the Lahore
Resolution as the ‘Pakistan demand’, the Quaid owned it without
hesitation. Madras session of the League in April 1941 formally adopted
‘Pakistan demand’ as the goal of the Muslim League.
As for not making any reference to the ‘princely states’, they did not
lie within the constitutional jurisdiction of the British India and the
League’s interest was confined to Kashmir whose ultimate fate
depended on the League’s strength in the British India.
5) The critics of the Resolution are of the view that it had ignored the
Muslims of minority provinces and it did not solve the problem it
stood for.
The Resolution was directed more at the Muslim-majority provinces
and could offer no more than promise of “adequate, effective and
mandatory safeguards” to the minority-provinces. These safeguards
could be ensured reciprocally with the Hindus. The Muslim League
leadership was convinced that a separate Muslim state would better
protect the Muslim rights in Hindu India.
B.R. Ambedkar who had been an influential actor in the Indian political
drama brushes aside the main thrust of these criticisms in these words:
"It is doubtful if there is a politician in India to whom the adjective
incorruptible can be more fittingly applied. Any one who knows what
his relations with the British government have been, will admit that he
has always been their critic, if indeed, he has not been their adversary.
No one can buy him. For it must be said to his credit that he has never
been a soldier of fortune."40
 29

Conclusion

Quaid-i-Azam was the statesman and constitutionalist of the highest

stature. The constitutional process by its very nature progresses slowly.
Jinnah kept his hand on the pulse of the Muslim nation which was
waking up slowly from the slumbers of the past. The long journey of the
All India Muslim League from its inception in 1906 to the adoption of
the Lahore Resolution in 1940 is manifestation of this reality. Jinnah
demonstrated full control of his emotions when the Congress leadership
subjected him to the sarcasms and taunts.
Jinnah, in Hegel’s words, was concerned with ‘formulating the desires
of his fellows explcitly’ and he diverted his personal rage into the
creative process of fathering a separate state for them. Jinnah and Iqbal
both experienced the anguish of falsehood of ‘united’ Indian nationalism
and they both came to Muslim nationalism but by different routes. Sir
Syed Ahmad Khan and Allama Iqbal were not the inventors of two-
nation theory. It was implicit in the minds of the Muslims already. They
only realized this implicit principle.Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Sir
Muhmmad Iqbal espoused the nationalism which was ideological in
character but Jinnah’s nationalism had a territorial ring about it. The
adoption of Lahore Resolution and its materialization in the creation of
Pakistan proved beyond doubt that Jinnah played a role of ‘world-
historical’ significance.
 30

REFERENCES

1. Sir Edward Penderel Moon, “Mr. Jinnah’s Changing Attitude to

the Idea of Pakistan,” in World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Muhmmad
Ali Jinnah, ed. Ahmad Hasan Dani (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam
University, 1979) , 270.

2. Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University

Press, 1989) , .

3. G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of the World History

trans. H. B. Nisbet (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980) ,

4. Muhammad Ali Jinnah ford. Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah

(Faisalabad: Daira Ma aref-i-Iqbal, 2001) , 9-10

5. “Prelude to Pakistan,” Dawn, 23 March, 1940.

6. Latif Ahmad Sherwani, “ The Evolution of the Demand for

Separate State,” in Pakistan Resolution Revisited ed., Kaniz Yusuf
(Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1998)
, 28-29

7. Ibid., 29
 31

8. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948

(London: Oxford University Press, 1968) , 111.

9. S. Qalb-i-Abid, Jinnah, Second World War and the Pakistan

Movement
(Multan: Becon Books, 1999) ,

10. K.K. Aziz, History of Idea of Pakistan Vol 1 (Islamabad: National

Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1978) , 143-147

11. Ibid., 143-147

12. Anwar H. Syed, “Allama Iqbal and the Quaid-i-Azam On the Issue
of Nationhood and Nationalism,” in World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam
Muhmmad Ali Jinnah, ed. Ahmad Hasan Dani (Islamabad: Quaid-i-
Azam University, 1979) , 207
. 13. S. Qalb-i-Abid, 99

14. S.Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Struggle for Independence (Lahore:

Sange-e-Meel Purblications, 1997) , 98.

15. Sharif ud Din Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan Vol II (Karachi:

Quaid-i-Azam Acaemy, 1970) , 233

16. Z.H.Zaidi, “Aspects of the Development of Muslim League

Policy,” 1937-47, in The Partition of India , ed. C.H.Philips and M.D.
Wainwright ( London:George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1970) , 25.

17. Sherwani, 34
18. . Ibid., 35

19. Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography ( London: The Bodley

Head, 1958) , 68
 32

20. Wolpert, 148

21. Ibid.,

22. P.H.L. Eggermont, “The Pakistan Concept: Its Background,” in

World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Muhmmad Ali Jinnah, ed. Ahmad
Hasan Dani (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, 1979) , 236

23.Wolpert, 155

24. Mukhtar Zaman, Students’ Role in the Pakistan Movment

( Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Acadmey, 1978) , 25

25. Sayeed, 84-85

26. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (New York:
Longman, Green & Co., 1960) , 160-162
27. Sayeed, 85
28.H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britian, India and Pakistan
( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1969) , 77.
29. Ibid.,
30. Wolpert, 174

31. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan ( Karachi: Karachi
University Press, 1999 ) , 107-108
32. Muhammad Aslam Malik, The Making of the Pakistan Resolution
( London: Oxford University Press, 2001) , 109.

33. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Speeches and Writings of Mr.Jinnah, Vol I

(Lahore: Sheik Ashraf, 1960) ,, 159-163

34. Hector Bolitho, Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan (London: John

Murraay Allies Book Corporation) , 129
 33

35. Skindar Hayat, “Lahore Resolution: A Review of Major Criticisms,”

in Pakistan Resolution Revisited ed., Kaniz Yusuf (Islamabad: National
Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1998), 47

36. V. P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India (Bombay: Orient

Longman, 1957) , 81.

37. Ayeshaa Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnaha, the Muslim League
and the Demand for Pakistan (Lahore: Sange-e-Meel Publications,
1999) , 57.

38. Skindar Hayat, Aspects of the Pakistan Movement ( Islamabad:

National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1998) , 212..

39. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheem, “Quaid-i-Azam As A Strategist” in World

Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam ed. Ahmad Hasan Dani (Islamabad: Quaid-i-
Azam University, 1979) , 225.

40. B.R.Ambedkar, Pakistan And The Partition of India (Bombay:

Thacker & Co. 1946) , 323
 34

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