deliberative
According to Robert’s Rules of
Order, parliamentary
procedure is based on the
consideration of the rights: of
the majority, of the minority
(especially a large minority
greater than one-third), of
individual members, of
absentee members, of all of
these groups taken together.
"The application of
parliamentary law is the best
method yet devised to enable
assemblies of any size, with
due regard for every
member’s opinion, to arrive at
the general will on the
maximum number of
questions of varying
complexity in a minimum
amount of time and under all
kinds of internal climate
ranging from total harmony to
hardened or impassioned
division of opinion."
Robert's Rules of Order Newly
Revised [RONR (10th ed.),
Introduction, p. xlviii]
Although the copyright on the
original Fourth Edition
of Robert's Rules of Order
Revised has expired, it
remains an important
work. RulesOnline.com cont
ains the full text of this book,
including lesson outlines and
Plan for Study of
Parliamentary Law, along with
the added convenience and
functionality of index and
keyword search. This handy
online reference tool is useful
to students of parliamentary
procedure and
parliamentarians alike.
parliamentary proceduren.
1. order,parliamentary law,
parliamentary procedure,r
ules of ordera body of rules
followed by an
assembly.~ prescript, rulepres
cribed guide for conduct or
action.~ interpellation(parliam
ent) a parliamentary
procedure of demanding that
a government official explain
some act or
policy.~ standing ordera rule
of order permanently in
force.~ cloture, gag law, gag r
ule,closurea rule for limiting or
ending debate in a
deliberative
body.~ point of ordera
question as to whether the
current proceedings are
allowed by parliamentary
procedure.~ previous question
a motion calling for an
immediate vote on the main
question under discussion by a
assembly.~ mover, proposer(p
arliamentary procedure)
someone who makes a formal
motion.~ robert's rules of orde
ra book of rules for presiding
over a meeting; written by
Henry M. Martin in 1876 and
subsequently updated through
many editions.
A parliamentary system is a
system of government in
which theministers of
the executive branch are
drawn from the legislature and
are accountable to that body,
such that the executive
and legislative branches are
intertwined. In such a system,
the head of governmentis
both de facto chief
executive and chief legislator.
[citation needed]
Parliamentary systems are
characterized by no clear-
cut separation of
powers between the executive
and legislative branches,
leading to a different set
of checks and
balances compared to those
found inpresidential systems.
Parliamentary systems usually
have a clear differentiation
between the head of
government and the head of
state, with the head of
government being the prime
minister or premier, and the
head of state often being
a figurehead, often either
a president(elected either
popularly or by the
parliament) or a hereditary systems (See Lijphart 1999 for
monarch(often in this section).[citation needed]
a constitutional monarchy).
[citation needed]
Contents
[hide]
• 1 Background
• 2 Criticisms of
parliamentarianism
• 3 Countries with a
The Palace of
parliamentary system Westminster inLondon, United
of government Kingdom. TheWestminster
○ 3.1 Unicamer system originates from
theBritish Houses of
al system
Parliament.
○ 3.2 Bicameral
system  The Westminster
system is usually found
• 4 See also
in Commonwealth of
• 5 References
Nations countries,
[edit]Background
although it is not
universal within nor
Parliamentarianism may also
exclusive to
be for governance in local
Commonwealth countries.
governments. An example is
These parliaments tend to
the city of Oslo, which has an
have a more adversarial
executive council as a part of
style of debate and the
the parliamentary system.
plenary session of
The council-manager system
parliament is more
of municipal government used
important than
in some African towns bears
committees. Some
many similarities to a
parliaments in this model
parliamentary system.[citation
are elected using
needed]
a plurality voting
Students of democracy such
system (first past the
as Arend Lijphart divide
post), such as the United
parliamentary democracies
Kingdom, Canada,
into two different systems, the
and India, while others
Westminster and Consensus
useproportional
 representation, such systems are identified
as Ireland and New by proportional
Zealand. TheAustralian representation, where
House of there is more of a
Representatives is elected tendency to use party
using instant-runoff list systems than the
voting while the Senate is Westminster Model
elected using proportional legislatures. The
representation committees of these
through single Parliaments tend to be
transferable vote. Even more important than the
when proportional plenary chamber. This
representation systems model is sometimes called
are used, the voting the West German Model
systems tend to allow the since its earliest exemplar
voter to vote for a named in its final form was in
candidate rather than the Bundestag of West
a party list. This model Germany (which became
does allow for a greater the Bundestag of
separation of powers than Germany upon
the Western European the absorption of the GDR
model, since the by the FRG). Unlike in
governing party will often Germany however, some
not have a majority in the West European countries'
upper house. However, parliaments (e.g.,
parliamentary systems the Netherlands, Sweden,
still feature a lesser Switzerland) implement
separation of powers than the principle ofdualism as
is found in a form of separation of
democratic presidential powers. In countries using
systems.[citation needed] this system, Members of
Parliament have to resign
 Western European
their place in Parliament
parliamentary
upon being appointed (or
model (e.g., Spain, Germa
elected) minister.
ny) tend to have a more
However, ministers in
consensual debating
those countries usually
system, and usually have
actively participate in
semi-cyclical debating
parliamentary debates -
chambers. Consensus
the main difference being
their inability to one house are known
vote. Switzerland is as unicameral system.[citation
considered one the purest needed]
examples of a consensus
One of the commonly
system.[citation needed]
attributed advantages to
There also exists a Hybrid parliamentary systems is that
Model, the semi-presidential it's faster and easier to
system, drawing on both pass legislation[1].This is
presidential systems and because the executive branch
parliamentary systems, for is dependent upon the direct
example the French Fifth or indirect support of the
Republic. Much of Eastern legislative branch and often
Europe has adopted this includes members of
model since the early 1990s. the legislature. Thus, this
[citation needed]
would amount to the
executive (as the majority
Implementations of the
party or coalition of parties in
parliamentary system can also
the legislature) possessing
differ on whether the
more votes in order to pass
government needs the explicit
legislation. In a presidential
approval of the parliament to
system, the executive is often
form, rather than just the
chosen independently from
absence of its disapproval,
the legislature. If the
and under what conditions (if
executive and legislature in
any) the government has the
such a system include
right to dissolve the
members entirely or
parliament, like Jamaica and
predominantly from
many others.[citation needed]
different political parties, then
A Parliamentary system may
stalemate can occur.
consist of two styles
Former US President Bill
of Chambers of Parliament one
Clintonoften faced problems in
with two chambers (or
this regard, since
houses): an elected lower
the Republicans controlled Co
house, and an upper house or
ngress for much of his tenure.
Senate which may be
Accordingly, the executive
appointed or elected by a
within a presidential system
different mechanism from the
might not be able to properly
lower house. This style of two
implement his or her
houses is calledbicameral
platform/manifesto. Evidently,
system. Legislatures with only
an executive in any system
(be it parliamentary,
presidential or semi-
presidential) is chiefly voted
into office on the basis of his
or her party's
platform/manifesto. It could be
said then that the will of the
people is more easily
instituted within a
parliamentary system.[citation
needed]
In addition to quicker
legislative action,
Parliamentarianism has
attractive features for nations
that are ethnically, racially,
or ideologically divided. In a
unipersonal presidential
system, all executive power is
concentrated in the president.
In a parliamentary system,
with a collegial executive,
power is more divided. In the
1989 Lebanese Taif
Agreement, in order to
give Muslims greater political
power, Lebanon moved from
a semi-presidential
system with a strong president
to a system more structurally
similar to classical
parliamentarianism. Iraq simil
arly disdained a presidential
system out of fears that such
a system would be
tantamount
to Shiite domination; Afghanist
an's minorities refused to go
along with a presidency as
strong as
the Pashtuns desired.[citation
needed]
It can also be argued that
power is more evenly spread
out in the power structure of
parliamentarianism. The prime
minister seldom tends to have
as high importance as a ruling
president, and there tends to
be a higher focus on voting for
a party and its political ideas
than voting for an actual
person. [citation needed]
In The English
Constitution, Walter
Bagehot praised
parliamentarianism for
producing serious debates, for
allowing the change in power
without an election, and for
allowing elections at any time.
Bagehot considered the four-
year election rule of the
United States to be unnatural.
[citation needed]
There is also a body of
scholarship, associated
with Juan Linz, Fred
Riggs, Bruce Ackerman,
and Robert Dahl that claims
that parliamentarianism is less
prone
to authoritarian collapse.
These scholars point out that
since World War II, two-thirds
of Third World countries
establishing parliamentary
governments successfully
made the transition to
democracy. By contrast, no
Third World presidential
system successfully made the
transition to democracy
without
experiencing coups and other
constitutional breakdowns.
[citation needed]
A recent World Bank study
found that parliamentary
systems are associated with
lower corruption.[2]
[edit]Criticisms of
parliamentarianism
One of the main criticisms of
many parliamentary systems
is that the head of
government is in almost all
cases not directly elected. In a
presidential system, the
president is usually chosen
directly by the electorate, or
by a set of electors directly
chosen by the people,
separate from the legislature.
However, in a parliamentary
system the prime minister is
elected by the legislature,
often under the strong
influence of the party
leadership. Thus, a party's
candidate for the head of
government is usually known
before the election, possibly
making the election as much
about the person as the party
behind him or her.[citation needed]
Some constituencies may
have a popular local candidate
under an unpopular leader (or
the reverse), forcing a difficult
choice on the electorate.Mixed
member proportional
representation (where voters
cast two ballots) can make
this choice easier.[citation needed]
Although Walter
Bagehot praised
parliamentarianism for
allowing an election to take
place at any time, the lack of a
definite election calendar can
be abused. In some systems,
such as the British, a ruling
party can schedule elections
when it feels that it is likely to
do well, and so avoid elections
at times of unpopularity. Thus,
by wise timing of elections, in
a parliamentary system a
party can extend its rule for
longer than is feasible in a
functioning presidential
system. This problem can be
alleviated somewhat by
setting fixed dates for
parliamentary elections, as is
the case in several of
Australia's state parliaments.
In other systems, such as the
Dutch and the Belgian, the
ruling party or coalition has
some flexibility in determining
the election date. Conversely,
flexibility in the timing of
parliamentary elections avoids

having periods of legislative
gridlock that can occur in a
fixed period presidential
system. [citation needed]
Critics of parliamentary
systems point out that people
with significant popular
support in the community are
prevented from becoming
prime minister if they cannot
get elected to parliament
since there is no option to "run
for prime minister" like one
can run for president under a
presidential system.
Additionally, prime ministers
may lose their positions solely
because they lose their seats
in parliament, even though
they may still be popular
nationally. Supporters of
parliamentarianism can
respond by saying that as
members of parliament, prime
ministers are elected firstly to
represent their electoral
constituents and if they lose
their support then
consequently they are no
longer entitled to be prime
minister. In parliamentary
systems, the role of the
statesman who represents the
country as a whole goes to the
separate position of head of
state, which is generally non-
executive and non-partisan.
Promising politicians in
parliamentary systems
likewise are normally
preselected for safe seats -
ones that are unlikely to be
lost at the next election -
which allows them to focus
instead on their political
career.[
Best Answer - Chosen by
Asker
No. The problem is not the
system of government that
the Philippines has, but the
politicians who occupy
positions in the government. It
is because of all politicians'
lack of accountability for their
actions.
The Philippine system of
government was exactly
patterned after that of the
American political structure.
But ever wonder why there is
much less degree of
corruption in the US?. This is
in spite of the fact that the two
countries have identical
political systems.
A parliamentary form of
government is not the solution
to the Philippine's political
problems. Thailand has a
parliamentary system of
government, but still its prime
minister was corrupt and had
to be ousted by a military
coup. Japan also has a
parliamentary system of
government, but a couple of
months ago, its prime minister
was forced to resign in
disgrace because of corruption
charges. The Czech Republic is
yet another example. There
are daily bloody street • 3 years ago
protests calling for its prime •
minister to resign because of
lying to the people about the
true state of the Czech
economy. As of yet, the prime
minister has not yielded to
pressure and the protests go
on. Indonesia is another
country with a parliamentary
system. It's former prime
• Action Bar:
minister (Suharto) was
embroiled in massive
• 1stars - mark this
corruption scandals involving
embezzlement of billions of
dollars. Pakistan is another 1.
country with a parliamentary •
system that is ruled by a • Comment (0)
dictator (Pervez Musharaf), • Save
who is also currently mired in ○
corruption charges. The ○
country is in turmoil at the ○
moment. ○
You see, there are just few
examples of nations with
parliamentary governments.
The fact of the problem is the
horrible and rampant
corruption in Philippine
politics. It is very clear that
every Philippine politician's
intention of running for any
government seat is to use his
position to enrich himself once
elected to office. It is ironic
that every politician spends
massively for his political
campaigns (that runs in
millions upon millions of
pesos), just to get elected to a
government post that offers
only so many thousands of
pesos in monthly salary.
Why?. The answer is very
obvious.
Unless every Philippine
politician gets rid of this
corrupt and selfish mindset,
and the lack of accountability
and transparency for his
actions, then the Philippines
will continue to go down the
abyss. And no system of
government, no matter what
form this system would be, will
ever work for the benefit of
every Filipino.
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• Bryan
There are a lot of things to
consider,especially here in the
Philippines. If you would try to
study the structures of both
form of governments
(parliamentary and
presidential, which is what we
have now), they both have
advantages and
disadvantages of their own. So
basically, either can be a good
form, but it depends mainly on
the leaders and the people
itself. But just to give you an
idea of how the two forms of
government works, i included
here some advantages and
disadvantages of both.
A parliamentary system, is
distinguished by the executive
branch of government being
dependent on the direct or
indirect support of the
parliament, often expressed
through a vote of confidence.
Hence, there is no clear-cut
separation of powers between
the executive and legislative
branches, leading to a
differing set of checks and
balances compared to those
found in a presidential system.
Some believe that it's easier
to pass legislation within a
parliamentary system. This is
because the executive branch
is dependent upon the direct
or indirect support of the
legislative branch and often
includes members of the
legislature. In a presidential
system, the executive is often
chosen independently from
the legislature. If the
executive and legislature in
such a system include
members entirely or
predominantly from different
political parties, then
stalemate can occur. In
addition to quicker legislative
action, Parliamentarianism has
attractive features for nations
that are ethnically, racially, or
ideologically divided. In a
unipersonal presidential
system, all executive power is
concentrated in the president.
In a parliamentary system,
with a collegial executive,
power is more divided.
It can also be argued that
power is more evenly spread
out in the power structure of
parliamentarianism. The
premier seldom tends to have
as high importance as a ruling
president, and there tends to
be a higher focus on voting for
a party and its political ideas
than voting for an actual
person.
One main criticism of many
parliamentary systems is that
the head of government is in
almost all cases not directly
elected. In a presidential
system, the president is
usually chosen directly by the
electorate, or by a set of
electors directly chosen by the
people, separate from the
legislature. However, in a
parliamentary system the
prime minister is elected by
the legislature, often under
the strong influence of the
party leadership. Thus, a
party's candidate for the head
of government is usually
known before the election,
possibly making the election
as much about the person as
the party behind him or her.
Another major criticism of the
parliamentary system lies
precisely in its purported
advantage: that there is no
truly independent body to
oppose and veto legislation
passed by the parliament, and
therefore no substantial check
on legislative power.
Conversely, because of the
lack of inherent separation of
powers, some believe that a
parliamentary system can
place too much power in the
executive entity, leading to
the feeling that the legislature
or judiciary have little scope to
administer checks or balances
on the executive. However,
most parliamentary systems
are bicameral, with an upper
house designed to check the
power of the lower (from
which the executive comes).
Although it is possible to have
a powerful prime minister, as
Britain has, or even a
dominant party system, as
Japan has, parliamentary
systems are also sometimes
unstable. Parliamentary
instability is the result of
proportional representation,
political culture, and highly
polarised electorates.
As a conclusion, some argued
for elections at set intervals as
a means of insulating the
government from the transient
passions of the people, and
thereby giving reason the
advantage over passion in the
accountability of the
government to the people.
Source(s):
Discussed at Political Science
Class =p
Should the Philippines
Turn
Parliamentary?
By Rep. Florencio B. Abad
It is unfortunate that
enlightened debate about the
proposed shift in the form of
government has
been hampered by allegations
of hidden motives by Senate
leaders and by a public
suspicious of an
unspoken agenda of certain
politicians. The senators fear
that the proposal is a means
to cut short
their political careers. The
public, in turn, suspects that
the plan has been advanced to
secure the
political futures of those who
hold higher political ambitions,
as well as to prolong the
careers of
those affected by the term
limits set by the Constitution.
These reservations are not
baseless nor unfair, given the
embarrassing way patronage,
narrow and
self-interested politics have
dominated the political way of
life of the country. And while
President
Ramos has openly declared
that any consideration of a
change in government should
not result in
an extension of his term of
office, his assurances have not
prevented influential sectors
of society,
prominently the media and
the business sectors, from
calling for the abandonment of
the effort.
They instead urge more
attention to the critical task of
economic recovery and
development.
For a populace tired of the
wrangling and positioning of
politicians, the call to focus on
pressing
economic problems is
widespread. Unfortunately, the
appeal is premised on the
erroneous
assumption that rebuilding the
economy can proceed without
reforming political institutions
and
political markets.
The premise here is that the
genuine democracy is founded
not only on social and
economic
conditions, but also on the
design of political institutions.
The Philippines, or any other
country
similarly going through a
difficult phase of transition,
will be unable to cope without
effective
political institutions.
Strong political institutions
make for effective
governance. They do not
guarantee the best policies,
but they do ensure that the
government will be able to
make policies of some kind
and that it will
not be mired in endless
standoffs. Research on the
relationship between
economic reform and
democracy has shown that the
strong political institutions are
vital to accomplishing
economic
reform. While the socio-
cultural and economic policy
challenges faced by new
democracies are
important, these challenges
cannot be met without strong
political institutions.
For these reasons, informed
debate and research on
constitutional reforms is
important.
The principal question that will
be addressed is this: “Why is a
parliamentary system a more
appropriate framework of
government, compared to a
presidential system, in
improving the
capacity of government to
function more effectively and
in facilitating the consolidation
of
democracy in the Philippines?”
Three important assumptions
in this question ought to be
clarified:
First, despite the proliferation
of non-governmental
development institutions and
the insistence of
the business sector on a
market-determined growth
strategy, government will
continue to play a
central and dominant role in
the development of the
country.
With an underdeveloped
legislature, the initiative for
policymaking will have to
emanate from the
executive. With a limited
manufacturing and industrial
base, government will have to
provide the
infrastructure, the
environment, and the push for
economic recovery and
growth.
In our fractured and divided
society, government must play
a delicate mediating role in
forging
compromise and peace in the
country.
Second, the government will
have to function effectively to
carry out these crucial roles. In
the past,
successive governments have
been criticized -- with good
reason—for inefficiency, for
lacking both
economic an political
competency, and, more
importantly, for being unable
to govern outside
narrow political and economic
interests.
Effectiveness can refer to a
range of competencies. These
capabilities will be defined and
limited in
the context of institutional
reforms necessary to
strengthen and consolidate
our fragile democracy.
Consolidation refers to the
process by which democracy
becomes so broadly and
profoundly
legitimate among its citizens
that it is unlikely to break
down. It involves behavioral
and institutional
changes that normalize
democratic politics and narrow
its uncertainty (even to the
point of
rendering it rather boring).
Consolidation involves the
development of appropriate
institutions so
that democratic norms and
practices take hold in the
country.
Other questions also come to
mind about the relationship
between government
structure and
effective governance: Will the
change in the system of
government instantly bring
about the
capabilities that will enhance
government effectiveness? If
not, what other factors or
influences will
have to be considered?
This chapter has benefited
immensely from a growing
literature on the impact of
institutions on
promoting democratic
consolidation and in
enhancing effective
governance. Interest has been
focused particularly on the
growing debate about the
appropriateness of a
presidential or a
parliamentary system -- or a
hybrid of either – in new
democracies.
The writer has studied the
experience of Latin American
presidential democracies to
prove a
hypothesis: that the basic
deficiencies of the presidential
system that are not culture-
bound and
peculiar to the Philippines are,
in fact, inherent in the system
of government itself.
These are three reasons for
focusing on Latin America
first, countries in that region
have had a long
experience with democratic
presidential systems. This is
particularly true for those,
which obtained
their independence from Spain
and Portugal early in the
nineteenth century. In fact, in
Latin
America one finds the greatest
concentration of US-style
presidential democracies.
Second, having been a colony
of Spain for almost 400 yea rs,
the Philippines and Latin
American
countries share a number of
similarities in temperament,
culture, history, religious
orientation,
economic condition, and
political institutions.
Finally, and most important,
there has been a similar
process of debat e has taken
place in the region
about the wisdom of shifting
to a parliamentary system or
adopting applicable features
of it within
a semi-presidential
framework.
The writer has also looked into
the performance of
democratic parliamentary
regimes in Western
Europe, particularly Britain,
France, and Germany, where
the parliamentary tradition is
deeply
rooted. To eliminate the
possibility that economic
growth and development
would independently
influence political stability, the
writer has also looked into the
experience of parliamentary
systems
in certain developing countries
in the Caribbean and in Africa.
Before proceeding further,
there is a need to briefly
establish the debate in the
context of the
history of constitutional reform
in the Philippines.
I. Historical Context of the
Debate
Many of the proponents of the
presidential system argue as if
the system of parliamentary
government is totally alien to
the process of constitutional
formation and the reform in
the
Philippines. Far from it.
In fact, in past exercises in
constitution making -- the
Constitution of Biak-na-Bato of
1897, the
Constitution of Makabulos, the
Malolos Constitution, the
Commonwealth Constitution of
1935 and
the martial law -disrupted
Constitutional Convention of
1971 -- the issue of a
parliamentary versus
presidential structure of
government has been at the
heart of the deliberations.
The 1898 Philippine
Revolution
At the turn of the century,
Filipino revolutionaries were at
the point of driving the
Spanish
colonizers out of the islands
and establishing an
independent republic. At that
stage, the
revolutionaries were
contemplating the adoption of
a constitution that had the
main features of a
parliamentary form of
government. They drew their
ideas of government from
English and
Eur opean sources, the
Malolos Constitution, the
Constitutions of Biak-na-bato
and Makabulos, as
well as the constitutional plans
prepared by Apolinario Mabini
and Mariano Ponce.
The Revolutionaries
envisioned a constitution that
made the legislature the
dominant department
of government, with the
executive powers vested in a
President elected by a
majority of the
assembly of representatives.
Along with the revolutionaries’
struggle for genuine
independence, this desire for a
parliamentary
structure of government
ended in December 1898
when the Philippines was
formally ceded by
Spain to the United States. To
justify its colonization of the
islands, the US government
issued the
“Proclamation of Benevolent
Assimilation” after a bloody
“pacification” campaign. This
began the
process of implanting
American political institutions
in its new colony.
THE 1935 CONSTITUTION
Even then, until the adoption
of the 1935 Constitution,
features of parliamentary
system were
incorporated into a civil
government, called the
Philippine Commission, which
had been
established by the US. The
Commission exercised both
legislative and executive
functions, as a
result, were also legislators in
a unicameral law-making
assembly.
After the passage of the
Philippine Bill of 1902,
however, a bicameral
legislature was created, with
the Commission as the upper
chamber and a newly-
instituted Philippine Assembly
as the lower
chamber. The Jones Law of
1916 put an end to this
arrangement and vested
legislative power in an
all-Filipino bicameral
legislature with the Senate as
the upper chamber and the
House of
Representatives as the lower
chamber. But the members of
the legislature continued to be
appointed as heads of
executive departments and
sat in the Cabinet.
The semi-parliamentary
features of government
persisted until 1935, when, by
virtue of the
Tydings-McDuffie Law, also
called the Philippine
Independence Act, a new
constitution was
adopted. The 1935
Constitution was patterned
after the US system and
created a powerful
executive, the presidency, in
which executive power was
solely vested. The President
served for a
fixed term of four years with
only one reelection.
THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION
The presidential system
characterized the system of
government until 1972. A year
later ea rlier, in
1971, amidst a climate of
protest and political instability,
an elected Constitutional
Convention
convened to draw up a new
constitution. Once again, a re-
examination of governmental
structure
was in the agenda of the
Convention.
On September 21, 1972,
however, before the
Convention could complete its
task, President
Ferdinand Marcos declared
martial law, assumed
extraordinary powers and
began 14 years of
profligate and repressive
dictatorial rule. Despite the
tense atmosphere and volatile
political
situation, the Convention
continued with its
deliberations.
To circumvent a constitutional
ban on a second reelection,
Marcos and his followers --
employing a
combination of bribes,
intimidation and arrests –
manipulated the Convention
to scrap presidential
system and replace it with a
French-inspired semi-
parliamentary government.
But it was only in
1978 when Marcos was finally
able to convene an interim
Batasang Pambansa (National
Assembly).
After the 1984 legislative
elections, the Assembly
attained regular status. The
Assembly was
generally perceived as a
rubberstamp and a farce, as
Marcos continued to exercise
legislative
powers under Amendment No.
6 of the 1973 Constitution. In
fact, during martial rule,
Marcos issued
more decrees that the
Assembly passed laws.
Proponents of presidentialism
who refer to this
anomalous and undemocratic
period of governance “as our
bad experience in
parliamentary
government” to discredit the
parliamentary system are
grossly mistaken.
After a decade-and-a-half of
forced rule, Filipinos finally
mustered enough collective
courage to
shout, “Tama Na! Sobra Na!”
(“Stop! Enough”) and marched
in the millions in a non-violent
show of
defiance against the Marcos
regime.
The People Power
Revolution of 1986
The unprecedented People
Power Revolution in February
1986 ousted Marcos and
installed
Corazon C. Aquino in power, it
also created another
opportunity for constitutional
innovations and
reforms. On May 1987,
President Corazon Aquino
convened an appointed
Constitutional
Commission to draft a new
constitution to replace her
“Freedom Constitution” under
which she
ruled with an extraordinary
powers.
But as the eminent
constitutionalist and
Commissioner member, Rev.
Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.,
observed. “The year 1986,
when emotions were high and
a major preoccupation was
how to ensure
in the speediest way possible
the restoration of the
democratic processes, was not
the best time to
engage in protracted debates,
especially about fundamental
government structure.”
Seven years af ter the 1987
Constitution was ratified,
formal structures of
democracy have been
restored and the highly
unstable political situation has
settled down considerably.
Filipinos have
had enough experience with,
and learned enough lessons
from, the new constitution. For
many, it is
time to take a second look at
the fundamental law of the
land. The initiation of debates
on the
appropriate governmental
structure is an important
phase of this process.
Before comparing the two
systems according to their
capacity t o promote effective
governance and
to facilitate the consolidation
of democracy, a review of the
basic characteristics of the
two systems
is in order.
II. Presidential vs.
Parliamentary: Essential
Differences
The central difference
between a parliamentary an d
a presidential system lies in
the relationship
between the executive and
legislative branches.
Principal Difference
In a presidential or separation
of powers system, the chief
executive, or the president, is
elected for
a fixed, constitutionally
prescribed term. He or she
cannot be forced by the
legislature to resign,
except for cause through the
highly unusual and
exceptional process of
impeachment.
Being directly elected by the
people, the president has full
claim to democratic
legitimacy. The
legislature is an assembly of
elected representatives
similarly enjoying fixed and
constitutionally
prescribed terms. As such, it
cannot be dissolved by the
president and possesses as
much
democratic legitimacy as the
executive.
Because of this essential
characteristics, Linz has
described the presidential
regime as a system of
“Dual democratic legitimacy”
to emphasize the autonomy
and co -equal position of the
executive
and legislative branches of
government. Similarly, Stepan
and Skach have called the
presidential
regime a system of “mutual
independence”.
In a parliamentary system, the
head of government, the
prime minister, is chosen from
within the
ranks of the legislature. He or
she must, therefore, be
supported by, and is
dependent upon, the
confidence of the legislature.
The prime minister can fall
and be dismissed from office
by the
legislature’s vote of no-
confidence. On the other
hand, he or she (normally in
conjunction with the
head of state) has the power
to dissolve the legislature and
call for new elections.
Because of the need for close
collaboration between the
executive and the legislature
for their
mutual survival, Stepan and
Skach have referred to
parliamentary democracy as a
system of “mutual
dependence”.
Other Basic Differences
Apart from this basic
difference in the relationship
between the executive and
the legislature, there
are other important
differences:
1. In a parliamentary system,
the executive is divided into a
prime minister, who is the
head of government, and a
monarch or president , who
acts as head of state. Unlike a
prime minister, a president or
monarch has fewer powers
and plays an important role
as an “above-politics” leader.
He or she also plays a
stabilizing and mediating role,
especially in times of crisis. In
a presidential system, on the
other hand, the executive is
undivided: the head of the
government is also the head
of the state.
2. In a parliamentary
government, the prime
minister appoints the
ministers, but because
the government is a collegial
body, he or she is merely
primus inter pares or is
regarded
as a “first among equals.” In a
presidential government, on
the other hand, the
president is one-person
executive. He or she also
appoints the heads of
departments,
but they are his or her
subordinates or alter egos.
3. While ministers are drawn
from the elected members of
the legislature in a
parliamentary system,
department heads in a
presidential system are
constitutionally
banned from becoming
members of the legislature
and vice versa.
4. The president, unlike a
prime minister, is not
responsible to the assembly;
instead, he is
ultimately responsible to the
constitution by the process of
impeachment.
5. The legislature, in a
presidential government, is
ultimately supreme over the
other
branches of government. It
approves the appropriation of
government, may impeach
the president if the latter
behaves unconstitutionally
and, in the event of conflict
with
the judiciary, may assert its
will since it has the right to
amend the constitution.
In a parliamentary system, the
government and the assembly
cannot dominate each
other. The government
depends upon the support of
the assembly to stay in power,
but if the government
chooses, it may dissolve the
parliament.
6. The presidential executive,
being directly elected by the
whole body of electors, is
directly responsible to the
electorate. The parliamentary
government, while being
directly responsible to the
assembly, is only indirectly
responsible to the electorate.
7. Finally in a parliamentary
system, the focus of power in
the political system is the
parliament. In a presidential
government, there is no focus
of power since power is
diffused in the three co-equal
and coordinate branches of
government: the executive,
the legislative and the
judiciary.
It is important to remember
that these basic features are
more than categories. They
are also
defining and constraining
conditions within which the
vast majority of developing
democracies
must somehow work out
substantial socio-economic
reforms and develop their
democratic
institutions.
Parliament ary vs.
Presidential: Comparative
Analysis
In attempting to answer the
question, “Why is a
parliamentary system a more
appropriate
framework of government,
compared to a presidential
system, in improving the
capacity of
government to function more
effectively and in facilitating
the consolidation of
democracy?” As
bases for comparison, five
capacities that are necessary
for effective governance in the
Philippines
will be used. These are the
capacities to: (1) prevent
gridlock and promote
consensus in
gover nance, (2) ensure
stability and continuity in
governance, (3) strengthen
accountability in
governance, (4) promote
cohesive and disciplined
political parties, and (5)
promote a broaderbased
and inclusive politics through
a multi-party system.
For sure, this is not an
exhaustive list of capabilities.
Limitations of time and space
only permit a
selection from a broad range
of possible capabilities, which
are critical at this stage of the
country’s
development. Considerable
weight is placed on the values
and capabilities that Filipinos
would like
to see characterize their
government and which lie at
the heart of their
dissatisfaction with the
presidential system. The most
bewailed feature of the
presidential system is a good
starting point.
1. Capacity to Prevent
Gridlock and Promote
Consensus
The chronic problem of
gridlock that has afflicted the
Philippine presidential system
with its
cumbersome process of
checks and balances has
earned a bad name for
politicians and political
institutions. Evidence of this
poor credibility is the
consistently low ratings that
political
personalities and institutions,
like Congress and political
parties, register in surveys.
Respondents
invariably point to their
frustration over the seemingly
endless political squabbling
among
legislators and between
government and Congress on
almost any major policy issue
that comes up
for deliberation.
Proponents of the shift to a
parliamentary system have
repeatedly hammered on this
problem of
“wasteful and time
consuming” stalemates to
justify the change. Validly they
point out that these
crippling standoffs have
prevented the country from
responding in an efficient and
timely manner
to the many challenges and
opportunities it faces as it
struggles to catch up with the
rest of the
advancing economies in
Southeast Asia. The criticism
hits an issue that
fundamentally distinguishes
the parliamentary and the
presidential systems: the
relationship between the
executive and the
legislature.
Linz attributes this problem to
an inherent structural
weakness in a presidential
system: the tenure
of the president is fixed
independent of the legislature
and the legislature can survive
without fear
of the dissolution by the
executive. This feature derives
from the separate but co-
existing
democratic legitimacy enjoyed
by the executive and the
legislative branches, being
both directly
and popularly elected.
Lijphart goes along with this
view, but at the same time
holds that this is only part of
the
explanation. For him, “the real
problem is … that everyone --
including the president, the
public at
large, and even political
scientists – feels that the
president’s claim (to
legitimacy) is much stronger
than the legislature’s.
Consequently, … the feeling of
superior democratic legitimacy
may make the
president righteously unwilling
and psychologically unable to
compromise.”
This problem is aggravated by
the inability of presidential
democracies to obtain strong
congressional cooperation
through majority control of the
legislature. As a result, the
legislature
rests in the control of
politicians who represent a
constituency with a different
political choice from
that of the constituency that
supports the president.
Stepan and Skach confirm this
propensity of presidential
governments to rule with
legislative
minorities in a study of all non
-Organization of Economic
Cooperation and development
(ORCD)
countries that qualified as
democracies for at least one
year during the 1973 -1987
period. The OECD
countries were excluded to
neutralize the effect of
economic development as an
intervening
variable that might
independently influence
political stability. The findings
show that in presidential
democracies, the executive’s
party enjoyed a legislative
majority less than half of the
time (48% of
the democratic years), while in
parliamentary democracies –
in sharp contrast – the
government
was in control of the
legislature at 83% of the
time.” (See Table 1)
TABLE 1. REGIME TYPE IN
NON-OECD COUNTRIES,
1973-1982
AND YEARS IN WHICH
EXECUTIVE’S PARTY HAD A
LEGISLATIVE MAJORITY
YEARS IN WHICH EXECUTIVE
HAD A LEGISLATIVE MAJORITY
YEARS OF DEMOCRACY TOTAL
PERCENTAGE
Parliamentary years 208 173
83
Presidential years 172 58 48
Source: Alfred Stepan & Cindy
Skach, “Constitutional
frameworks and Democratic
Consolidation
The in ability of the executive,
in a presidential system, to
gain congressional control has
often led to
basic differences in policy
positions. These conflicts then
degenerate into a prolonged
and
unproductive impasse. In such
a situation, the inevitable
question arises: Who, on the
basis of
democratic principle to resolve
this question.
Repeatedly faced with these
stalemates and the
expectation of their
inevitability, presidents have
learned to cope with them and
have accepted that it is to
their interest – and perhaps
survival – to
adopt “anti-party” practices to
secure approval of their
policies. In the Philippines, this
practice has
institutionalized the much
detested, yet enduring
practice of “pork barrel”
politics and the ritual of
party-raiding and party-
switching that predictably
follows every presidential
elections.
David Wurfel blames this
habitual practice of
“turncoatism” to the primary
preoccupation of
legislators with their re-
election. Recognizing the
president’s almost absolute
discretion in the
release and transfer of funds
to build schools, bridges,
roads and other
infrastructures, legislators
find various ways – including
changing party loyalties – to
endear themselves to the
president.
The case of the 1992
Philippine Congress is no
exception. At the time of the
proclamation of
congressional winners in 1992,
the party of the
administration, Lakas-NUCD,
was a minority in the
House of Representatives with
only 39 out of 200 seats, or
around 20%. The rest of the
seats were
spread out to seven other
parties, with the Laban ng
Demaokratikong Pilipino (LDP),
the National
People’s Coalition (NPC) and
the Liberal Party controlling
the majority of the seats with
87, 39 and
13 members respectively.
After a year of intensive
recruitment by the
administration, Lakas-NUCD
gained 69 more seats to
control the lower house with
108 seats, while the LDP was
reduced to less than a third
with only 25
seats. The ordinary voter has
come to accept the
proliferation of "political
butterflies” as a justifiable
act of political survival in a
system that rewards, not party
loyalty, but a politician’s
ability to
ingratiate himself to an all-
powerful, spoils-dispensing
president.
In a number of developing
countries, when the legislature
is intransigent and refuses to
comprom ise or bow down to
political pressure and a
serious crisis threatens to
embroil the country,
the administration –
stalemated, powerless and
deeply frustrated – is often left
with no other choice
but to resort to extra-
constitutional measures.
Martial law, or rule by decree,
becomes an option.
The case of Alberto Fujimori in
Peru comes to mind. Fujimori,
to justify martial rule and
ruling by
decree on April 1992, blamed
the lack of progress in Peru
squarely on uncooperative
congress. In
1972, Marcos used the same
excuse for closing down
Congress and imposing
“constitutional
authoritarianism” in the
Philippines.
The reverse may also be the
case. When an unpopular and
discredited president refuses
to resign
and civilian authorities are
unable to resolve the standoff,
the military exploits the
situation and
takes over from the civilian
authorities. The two coup
attempts in 1992 that
ultimately led to the
ouster of President Carlos
Andres Valdez of Venezuela
prove this point.
In the same manner, in 1986,
the attempted coup by the
Reform the Armed Forces
Movement
(RAM) ignited the popular
uprising that eventually
ousted Marcos. But perhaps
nowhere was this
more flagrant than in the case
of Ecuador. In the period
1931-1988, 13 presidential
governments
were forced to resign, seven
were overthrown, one was
impeached, while only 12
completed their
terms.
Under the parliamentary
system, the powerlessness
and deep frustration that
generally characterize
presidential government is
more exception than the rule.
The difference lies in the
ability of the
parliamentary government to
muster a majority in the
legislature and command
support and
cooperation from it. More
important, the mutual
dependency relation in
parliamentarism creates
effective constitutional
devices to break deadlocks or
remove inefficient
governments. Frustrating,
unproductive and long
impasses are thus avoided.
Thus, as a system that can
better avoid
deadlocks, discourage coup
attempts and promote better
cooperation in policymaking, a
parliamentary democracy is
superior and should be
preferred over a presidential
system.
2. Capacity to Ensure
Stability and Continuity in
Governance
In arguing for the stability of
the presidential system, critics
of parliamentary democracy
point to
the frequent crises and
changes in the prime ministers
in parliamentary democracies,
such as the
French Third and Fourth
Republic, the frequent
government turnovers in Italy
and India today, and
more recently, in Portugal.
While accepting the rigidity
that presidentialism
introduces into the political
process, its
proponents view this more as
an advantage than a liability.
This feature, they contend,
reduces the
uncertainties inherent in
parliamentary democracies,
where multiple political
players can, at
anytime between elections,
effect basic changes, bring
about realignment of forces
and, above all,
change the executive, the
prime minister. Thus, in the
critics’ view, the pinning for
stability and
predictability that normally
accompany periods of
transition and uncertainty
seem to favor a
presidential system.
But again it must be
emphasized that presidents
are elected for a period of
time that, under normal
circumstances cannot be
modified: not shortened and
sometimes, due to ban on
reelections, not
prolonged. The political
process then becomes broken
into discontinuous, rigidly
determined
periods without the possibility
of continuous readjustments
as political, social and
economic events
may require.
Thus, unexpected events may
intervene, like fundamental
flaws in judgment or political
process.
Does the system adjust better
to crises? Most likely not,
especially when the president
is unyielding.
There is the option of
voluntary resignation through
pressure from party leaders,
the media and
public opinion. But given the
psychology of politicians,
resignation is highly unlikely
to happen.
Moreover, the move will
encounter opposition from the
constituency that brought the
discredited
president to power.
Then there is the extreme
measure of impeachment,
which is difficult and complica
ted to execute
successfully. Apart from the
heavy burden of establishing
sufficient evidence of
misconduct, it also
seems implausible that a
legislative majority will
support these proceedings,
since members of the
president’s party would have
to go along with the
impeachment process. Thus, it
is almost
impracticable to remove even
the most corrupt and
inefficient president from
office.
The cases of Brazilian
President Collor’s
impeachment in 1992 on
charges of widespread
corruption
in his government of the late
U.S. President Richard Nixon’s
resignation under threat of
impeachment in 1973 in
connection with the infamous
Watergate wiretapping may
defy this
assertion, but these are
clearly more the exception
than the rule.
In sharp contrast, a
parliamentary government –
because of the mutual
dependency between the
executive and the legislature
inherent in the system –
permits flexibility in
responding to changing
situations and unexpected
events. Proponents of
presidentialism, in their
critique of
parliamentarism, overlook the
“continuity of parties in power,
the reshuffling of cabinet
members,
the continuation of a coalition
under the same premier, and
the frequent continuity of
ministers in
key ministries in spite of
cabinet crises.
Moreover, it is also forgotten
that the parliamentary system
permits the removal of a
prime minister
who has lost party support or
has been discredited and
whose continuance in office
may lead to
serious political conflicts.
Without engendering a serious
constitutional crisis, the prime
minister can
be replaced in a variety of
ways – by his or her party, by
the formation of a new
coalition, or by
coalition partners withdrawing
support of parties tolerating
the minority government.
Through
these means, a new prime
minister is bound to surface,
perhaps with some difficulty
and delay, but
definitely with much greater
certainty than had the crises
taken place in a presidential
democracy.
Thus, the problem that arises
as a result of the so-called
instability of parliamentary
democracie s are
simply “crises of government,
not regime.” The availability of
deadlock-breaking devices and
decision mechanisms in a
parliamentary regime help
ensure that issues of
government do not
deteriorate into crises of the
regime.
The absence of these self-
correcting devices in the
presidential regime leads to a
paralyzing
stalemate that ensures that
nothing substantial gets done
until new government is
elected to
replace the previous one, that
is, if the people are patient
enough to wait until the next
election
cycle. In many instances, most
notably in Latin America,
either the president bypasses
the
legislature and the rules by
decree or a military coup
overthrows the government. In
both
situations, the institutional
framework collapses and
those who take power rule
extraconstitutionally.
The Stepan and Skach study
covering 53 non-OECD
countries, which they had
classified as having
been democracies for at least
a year between 1973 and
1989, confirm these
tendencies. Of the 53
countries, 28 were pure
parliamentary, 25 were pure
presidential and none,
surprisingly, were either
semi-presidential or mixed.
Only five of the 25 presidential
democracies, or 20% were
democratic for any 10
consecutive years
in the 1973-1989 period, but
17 of the 28 parliamentary
democracies, or 61% were
democratic for a
consecutive 10-year span in
the same period. (See Table 2)
TABLE 2. REGIME TYPE OF
53 NON- OECD COUNTRIES
THAT EXPERIMENTED WIT
H DEMOCRACY BETWEEN
1973 & 1989
REGIME TYPE DURING
DEMOCRACY
Regime Type during
Democracy
Pure Parliamentary Pure
Presidential Semi-presidential
or
mixed
Parliamentary years
Presidential years
Democratic survival rate
28
17
61%
28
5 The same study presents
20%
00
NA
Source: Stepan & Skach,
p.11.According to Stepan and
Skach, criteria for inclusion in
this universe of countries is
based on the Gastil
Democracy scale and the
Coppedge Remnicke
Polyarchy Scale. This scale is
their attempt to operationalize
the eight institutional
guarantees for a polyarchy as
defined by Robert Dahl, based
on their assessment of
political conditions as of mid-
1985.
Clearly, parliamentary
democracies, with a rate of
survival more than three times
higher than
presidential democracies,
demonstrate greater capacity
for ensuring continuous
democratic
governance. in the same study
, presidential democracies
were twice as prone to
breaking down
through military takeover than
parliamentary democracies.
(See Table 3) This difference
points to a
greater ability of
parliamentary regimes to
accommodate conflicts and
crises in government
without leading to a rejection
of the regime.
TABLE 3. REGIME TYPE OF
NON-OECD COUNTRIES
THAT EXPERIENCED
MILITARY COUPS
DURING DEMOCRACIES,
1973-1989
REGIME TYPE AT TIME OF
COUP
Pure Parliamentary Pure
Presidential Semi-presidential
Or
Mixed
Countries that were
democratic for at least
one year during 1973 -1989
Countries that experienced
military coups
while democracies
Military coup susceptibility
rate
28
5 Jamaica Suriname
18%
25
10
40%
0 Malta Tuvalu
0 Mauritius Uganda
NA
Source: Stepan & Skach, p.
12. A military coup is defined
as an unconstitutional
removal of the executive by or
with the aid of active
duty members of the domestic
armed forces.
further evidence of the
durability of the parliamentary
system in a survey
of 93 countries that became
independent between 1945
and 1979 and that were
continuous
democracies from 1980 to
1989. Forty-one countries
functioned as parliamentary
systems in their
first year of independence, 36
were presidential systems,
three semi-presidential
systems and 13
ruling monarchies. During the
10-year period between 1980
and 1989, only 15 countries
were able
to develop as continuous
democracies and all of them
were countries that functioned
as
parliamentary systems in their
first year of independence. Not
one of the 52 countri es that
was not a
parliamentary government
evolved into a continuous
democracy. (See Table 4)
TABLE 4. REGIME TYPE OF
THE 93 COUNTRIES THAT
BECAME INDEPENDENT
BETWEEN 1945
AND 1979 AND THE
COUNTRIES FROM THIS SET
THAT WERE CONTINUOUS
DEMOCRACIES
BETWEEN 1980 AND 1989
Parliamentary
(N=41)
Presidential
(N=36)
Semipresidential
(N=3)
Ruling
Monarchy
(N=13)
Bahamas Nigeria
Bangladesh Pakistan
Barbados Papua New
Botswana Guinea
Burma St. Lucia
Chad St. Vincent
Dominica Sierra Leone
Fiji Singapore
Gambia Solomon
Guyana Islands
India Somalia
Indonesia Sri Lanka
Israel Sudan
probably not exceptional in
Kenya Swaziland presidential
Kiribati Tanzania systems. Since 1945 – except
Laos Trinidad & in the case of Johnson’s
Malaysia Tobago retention of the cabinet after
the assassination
of Kennedy – only two cabinet
Nauru W. Samoa members served under
Algeria Malawi different presidents. This
Angola Mali results from the
Benin Mauritania almost total revamping of the
B. Fasso Mozambique bureaucracy that normally
Cameroon Niger follows when a new
Cape Verde Philippines presidential
Comoros Rwanda administration takes over.
Congo Sao Tome Second, the average length of
Cyprus Seychelles service of a minister in anyone
Djibouti Syria appointment is almost twice
Equatorial Taiwan as long in
Guinea Togo parliamentary systems. The
Gabon Tunisia findings hold even if the study
Guinea Vietnam (N) was limited to countries with
Guinea Bissau Vietnam (S) more than
Ivory Coast Zambia 25 years experience in
Korea (N) uninterrupted democracy.
Madagascar (See Table 5)
Lebanon The evident conclusion is that
Senegal ministers in presidential
Zaire democracies have far less
Bahrain experience than
Burundi their counterparts in
Cambodia parliamentary democracies. As
Jordan a result, every presidential
Kuwait administration
Lesotho brings with it a contingent of
Libya “amateurs” with little
Maldives experience in managing the
Oman bureaucracy and in
Qatar dealing with politicians. This
Tonga inadequacy is felt most in
United Arab areas such as foreign policy
Emirates and
CONTINUES DEMOCRACIES, macroeconomic policy
1980-1989 management, as well as in
(N = 15/41) (N = 0/36) (N = every weak ties to the
0/3) (N = 0/13) legislature, whose support
Bahamas Nauru they cannot do without. In
Barbados Papua New addition, the valuable wisdom
Botswana Guinea that the new acquire on the
Dominica St. Lucia job is not
India St. Vincent available to their successors.
Israel Solomon Islands Such is not the case in a
Jamaica Trinidad & parliamentary system, where
Kiribati Tobago a large pool of potential
Tuvalu leaders is available.
Source: Stepan & Skach, pp. The reasonable chance of
14-15 becoming prime minister or a
Stepan and Skach examined key cabinet official among
all ministerial appointments leaders of all
during the years of democratic major parties, particularly in a
rule in multi-party setting,
Latin America, Western Europe encourages a greater number
and the United States between of aspirants for
1950 and 1980. The result was leadership positions to enter
two parliament. Moreover, even
major findings. between elections, unless the
First, the percentage of government
ministers who serve more has a tight hold on the media,
than once in their careers, or the parliamentary process –
what they term the such as debates, motions of
“return ratio” of ministers, is censorship,
almost three times higher in votes of no confidence, and
parliamentary than in other public actions – provides
presidential potential leaders with
democracies. The case of the numerous
U.S. is most striking, although opportunities to gain visibility
and practice.
Parliamentary Semi- are practically always often do not have any prior a parliamentary election are
Presidential Presidential assigned seats in the record as well aware that eventual
> 3.0 parties < 3.0 parties legislature and sometimes political leaders. This has winners will be drawn from the
>3.0 parties < 3.0 parties have the status of “leader of given rise to the phenomenon party. Usually,
>3.0parties < 3.0 parties the loyal opposition.” In of “presidential outsiders,” the cabinet members are
Kiribati presidential elections, defined by Linz already established leaders of
Nauru defeated candidates, as candidates not identified the party with vast experience
Tuvalu regardless of the number of with or supported by any in politics
Botswana 1.3 votes they garnered, are likely political party, sometimes and government.
St. Vincent 1.4 to be considered unattractive without any The contention that the voter
Dominica 1.5 candidates for the next governmental or even political in a parliamentary election will
Jamaica 1.5 election and experience, and who ran for be hard put to determine who
Bahamas 1.6 thereby lose their leadership office simply on the basis of a will
Trinidad position in the party. If they populist eventually govern is
& Tobago 1.6 desire to continue with their appeal. contradicted by the fact that
Barbados 1.7 political To a great extent, former parties are usually identified
St. Lucia 1.7 career, they will have to wait Presidents Aquino and Ramos with highly visible
New Zealand 2.0 for the next cycle of election fall in this category, not political leaders. Elections are
Canada 2.0 without any access to having been increasingly focused on the
United Kingdom 2.1 executive power members of any political party leader aspiring to be prime
India 2.1 and to patronage. before running for office. minister. So a
Greece 2.2 3. Capacity to Strengthen Similarly, the two presidential vote for British Conservatives
Austria 2.4 Accountability in aspirants is a vote for Mrs. Thatcher,
Australia 2.5 Governance who figured in a tight race SAP for Willy Brandt of
Solomon Islands2.5 In calling for the retention of with Ramos, Miriam Santiago, Germany, PSOE for
Mauritius 2.5 the presidential system, and Eduardo Cojuangco, were, Felipe Gonzales of Spain, or
Spain 2.7 respected constitutionalist and in this Labor Party for Gro Brundtland
Ireland 2.7 Senator Arturo sense, also “outsiders”. of Norway.
West Germany 3.2 Japan 2.9 M. Tolentino argues that, in a Often, presidential candidates While in this sense,
Norway 3.2 presidential system, are elected on the basis of personalization of leadership is
Sweden 3.4 accountability is easier to opinion about them or their not exclusive to presidential
Luxembourg 3.4 locate. The chief promises or politics, the big
Israel 3.6 executive, the president, is about the image that they difference is that leaders of
Netherlands 3.8 directly elected by the people project. The latter is parliamentary governments
Italy 3.9 and singularly represents the increasingly true in the age of have to be loyal party
Papua New Guinea 4.0 government. The voter is thus what Sartori calls the members in good
Iceland 4.3 in a position to know whom he “new politics” of standing. It may be argued
Denmark 5.2 is voting for and who will “videoploitics” as a result of that such choice may be
Belgium 7.0 govern in which a presidential election is ignored by the party choosing
France 3.2 case his candidate wins. reduced to a video another leader.
Portugal 3.6 Moreover, the functions of the match eminently decided by This may happen but normally
USA 1.9 government are neatly divided good looks and “soundbytes” the party will not invest so
Columbia 2.1 among its lasting a few seconds. much to build up the stature
Dominican Rep 2.3 three branches: the legislature “Outsiders” of a party
Costa Rica 2.3 sets down policy, the Fujimori of Peru and Collor of leader only to replace him or
Venezuela 2.6 executive implements it and Brazil benefited immensely her subsequently unless the
Source: Stepan & Skach, pp. the judiciary from the use of video leader has proven ineffective.
8-9 interprets it. So responsibility technology in their And even
a. Switzerland and Finland are is easier to pinpoint. political campaigns. then, the party and its leaders
mixed systems. By implication, in a The problem with such can be ultimately held
b. According to Stepan and parliamentary system, candidates, according to Linz, accountable to the voters for
Skach, Austria, Ireland and presumably the voter electing is that they have “no support such action.
Iceland are parliamentary representatives of a party in the congress As to the difficulty in
rather than presidential will, in no way, know who the and no permanent parliamentary systems of
regimes because party will select as prime institutionalized continuity determining who will govern in
parliamentary is the political minister. And in a multi-party (due to the principle of no re- the coalition, again
practice. system, where election) and therefore this contention is not generally
c. Traditionally in Kiribati, all the party is not expected to find it difficult to create a true. Before the election,
candidates for the unicameral obtain a clear majority, the party organization. They tend parties commit themselves to
legislature – the Maneaba – voter is not in a position to to organize their party around a coalition
have fought as independents. determine which themselves and the voter of the parties
In 1985, parties will ultimately coalesce such that when they leave the knows who the chancellor will
various Maneaba members to choose the prime minister political scene, so does the be. The voter is also aware
who were dissatisfied with the and to govern the country. party. that unless a
government policies formed a Furthermore, since the On the other hand, leaders in party establishes an absolute
Christian Democratic executive and the legislature parliamentary democracies majority, all the parties in the
opposition are fused in the parliament, have to struggle to take hold alliance will have
grouping. The government the lines of of, and representatives in the
grouping then is generally responsibility are blurred and retain over many years, government.
known as the National Party accountability for performance leadership over their parties. In a parliamentary system,
although it does not constitute is difficult to locate. They, therefore, truly government formation takes a
a formal While these arguments may, represent Not just short time because of the
political party. in theory, be correct, reality themselves but, more presence of a
Even leaders who have lost negates most, if not all, of importantly, their parties, well-known shadow cabinet. In
power do not end up with them. In which precede and survive a presidential system, the
nothing, unlike in a presidential elections, the them, also, the voters in organization of a new
presidential system. They candidates do not need and government takes
longer as the president-elect
begins his or her search for,
and formation of, a cabinet
and key
officials only after the
elections. And add to this
delay the confirmation
hearings – which can be
protected and humiliating –
that all major appointments go
through.
Linz summaries the above
points aptly: : “The
identifiability in
presidentialism is of one
person; in
parliamentary government,
most of the time it is of a pool
of people and often a number
of wellknown
sub-leaders.”
Finally, presidentialists argue
that accountability in a
presidential system is greatly
enhanced by the
fact that a president – not the
cabinet, not a coalition, and
not the leaders of the party –
is directly
and solely responsible for
governance during his tenure
in office.
In response, a president who
cannot run for reelection will
be difficult to hold
accountable.
(Generally, in presidential
democracies, including the
Philippines, presidents cannot
run for
reelection). He or she no
longer fears punishment by
election defeat nor looks
forward to the
reward of reelection for good
performance. And because the
executive branch is intimately
identified with the person of
the president, even the party’s
new presidential candidate or
the party
that supported the incumbent
cannot be called to account.
Even when reelection is
allowed, the
incumbent can always
conveniently pass the blame
to congress – regardless as to
whether congress
is dominated by his or her
party or by an opposition
majority,
In a parliamentary democracy,
because of strong party
discipline and clear lines of
responsibility,
passing the blame somewhere
else or avoiding accountability
cannot be done. While
accountability
is hard to pinpoint in case of
unstable governments or
frequently shifting alliances,
and no party is
clearly on top of the coalition
formation process, this
situation is more the
exception than the rule.
Even if presidents are not
barred from reelection, voters
can only wait until his or her
term ends
before they could demand for
an accounting, unlike a prime
minister, who at any time, can
be made
accountable to his or her own
party and the parliament by
the vote of no confidence.
Finally, the separation of
powers among the three
branches of government in a
presidential system
is also the very cause of
diffusion of responsibilities
that makes it often difficult for
voters to identify
whom to hold accountable for
particular decision or actions.
This process has led one
political
scientist to refer to it as the
“institutionalization of buck
-passing.”
4. Capacity to Promote
Cohesive and Discipline
Parties.
Philippine scholar Carl Lande,
commenting on the immature
state of the Philippine party
system,
wrote: “The absence of a
strong, responsive and
responsible party system is o
ne of the major flaws
of the Philippine democracy.”
Indeed, what dominates in the
country is a system of loose,
fractious,
clientelistic or personalistic
parties. These formations are
in reality political clans,
factions, cliques
and alliances that are
distinguished not by any
coherent ideology and
program of government, but
by political personalities who
lead them.
Political representatives often
behave not on the basis of any
issue-oriented platform but in
pursuit
of parochial and self-
interested objectives. The
history of democratization has
shown that the
development of political
parties and their legitimation
are necessary for democracy
to take root. For
in stable democracies, political
parties are the viable and
meaningful channels that
closely link the
state and society. This is
certainly not the direction to
which Philippine political
parties are headed.
Those who oppose the shift to
a parliamentary system have
invariably pointed to this
condition as
justifiable reason to insist on
the status quo. Correctly, they
have pointed out that the
strength and
viability of a parliamentary
regime rests on mature and
disciplined political parties.
Without
genuine parties, the
parliamentary system will be a
sham and will only lead to
greater concentration
of political power in the hands
of the already too powerful
political elite, they would add.
The logical prescription then is
for institutional reformers to
postpone any change and to
concentrate instead on
political and institutional
reforms to strengthen the
party system. The
assumption of this proposition,
of course, is that a mature
party system can be nurtured
within a
presidential system of
government. But is this
possible? Does the framework
of government have
an important bearing on the
quality of the party system?
Linz asserts that more
disciplined and cohesive
political parties are
structurally compatible with
the
parliamentary systems, but
would be in conflict with
presidentialism. They are
essential in the
formation and maintenance of
a syetm of independence and
cooperation that is the
hallmark of
parliamentarism. Without this
condition, the executive
constantly faces a threat from
being
removed from office.
In Satori’s words: what a
parliamentary democracy
needs is to be serve by
“parliamentary fit parties,
that is to say, parties that
have been socialized (by
failure, duration and
appropriate incentives) into
being relatively cohesive or
disciplined, into behaving, in
opposition, as responsible
opposition, and
into playing, to some extent, a
rule-guided fair game.”
According to Weaver and
Rockman, “party cohesion in
parliamentary systems is no
happy accident.”
These they attribute to greater
mechanisms of control over
legislators. In proportional
systems, for
example, legislators are
usually chosen from a party
list generated by the central
party
organizations. Those who did
not tow the party line in
crucial votes in the legislature
may find
themselves removed from the
party line-up in the next
elections.
In the case of single-member
constituency system,
legislators usually rely
extensive on the central
party organization for the
ratification and financing of
their campaigns. In practically
all
parliamentary systems, a
legislator cannot advance in
his political career without the
support of his
party leaders. So for both his
survival and advancement in
his career, a legislator
depends heavily on
his party, in the same manner
that his party cannot govern
or perform its role in
government
without his cooperation and
support.
In a presidential system, or
the system of separation of
powers, it is not necessary for
the president
to prevail in Congress on all
critical votes to be able to stay
in power. Consequently,
control over
individual legislators is not as
critical, and legislators have
more leeway to vote for their
own
benefits or the interest of their
own constituencies.
In addition, Weaver and
Rockman found that central
party organizations in
presidential systems
play a weaker role in the
recruitment of candidates and
in financing their campaigns.
Legislators,
therefore, have much more
leeway to build a “personal
vote” for themselves through
constituency
service and by voting the
interest of their district or their
economic class over that of
the party. The
job security and career
advancement of legislators
(both within the legislature
and outside in
seeking other offices) also
depend much less on
cooperation with party
leaders. As a result,
incentives to cooperate are
much less.
As a consequence, even in a
situation where the
president’s party or coalition
has majority control
over the legislature, this
advantage is no guarantee
that the legislature will
automatically cooperate
to pass administration
measures.
In the Philippines, nowhere
was this more pronounced
than during the term of
President Aquino. In
1987, an overwhelming
majority of legislators from
both chambers of congress
ran and won under
President Aquino’s coalition,
Lakas ng Bayan or Laban! ; in
fact, a significant number of
them could
not have won without Aquino’s
personal endorsement. But
despite this enormous edge,
Aquino
drew more opposition than
support for her measures in
Congress.
Many of her major policy
proposals, like the
comprehensive agrarian
reform; economic
liberalization; recognition of
and support for NGOs; and the
ratification of the Philippines-
Us bases
treaty, never got past the
legislature, and even if some
did, they were severely
watered down.
Frustrated but determined to
assert her leadership, in early
1990, she brought together
key leaders
from the bureaucracy, local
governments, NGOs, churches
and business community and
organized
a political movement called
Kabisig as counterforce
against Congress.
But before Kabisig could even
take off, the more politically
sophisticated legislators
scuttled it by
subtle warnings to Aquino’s
advisers that the move would
be counter-productive and
would only
aggravate the already sour
relationship between the
president and Congress.
The situation is worse when
the president has to govern
with a legislative minority, As
earlier
pointed out, this is, in fact, the
situation in minority of the
times: that presidents usually
have to face
an opposition legislature.
Confronted with an adversarial
congress, presidents would
see it to their
interest to have to deal with
weak parties.
And if the parties are stubborn
and refuse to cooperate, it is
not uncommon for presidents
to
employ “anti-party” tactics to
bend their will. The tactics
include distributing or
withholding “pork
barrel” funds, dispensing
political appointments,
provoking schism s and
factions within parties, or
doing openly hostile acts such
as outright raiding of party
membership. For this reason,
Linz has
concluded that: “The
weakness of parties in many
Latin American democracies,
therefore, is not
unrelated to the presidential
regime but, rather, a
consequence of the system. In
so concluding, he
may well have spoken of the
party system, too.
Presidentialist asserts that the
Philippine political terrain is
not totally bereft of relatively
more
disciplined and cohesive
parties, as evidenced by the
emergence of parties like the
revitalized
Liberal Party (LP), the Partido
Demokratiko ng Pilipinas-
Laban (PDP-Laban) and the
Partido ng Bayan
(PnB). These parties posses
defined ideological and
political programs and
positions on social,
economic and political issues.
Rejecting the traditional brand
of “guns-goons-and gold”
politics, they have been key in
promoting
a “new kind of politics,” one
that elevates the level of
political debate beyond
Vague, populist rhetoric and
political praxis away from
patronage and opportunism.
Unfortunately,
the prevailing political culture
and institutional environment
have worked against their
transformative style of politics.
As a result, except for the LP,
these “alternative” parties
have been
relegated to the periphery of
the political arena.
Beyond a change in political
personalities and political
thinking, it will take
institutional reforms to
enable emerging parties to
play more substantial roles in
Philippine politics. As pointed
out, the
constraining structures of a
presidential system may not
provide the environment for
this necessary
change. The parliamentary
system of government has
more promise in bringing this
about.
5. Capacity to Promote a
Multi-party System.
Political stability is key to
democratic consolidation. The
ability of a political society to
achieve this
condition rest on the existence
of political vehicles that
enable significant political
forces to be
represented in the
mainstream of political and
economic decision-making. In
the formal democratic
arena, this means the
presence of vibrant political
parties. It is difficult to govern
democratically
unless these forces are
recognized and meaningfully
represented in the party
system.
Peace and stability has eluded
the Philippines for close to half
a century already because of
an
exclusionary brand of politics
that few elite families fight to
maintain. This has effectively
shut off
the greater part of the
population from the political
process. With no stake in the
system,
disenfran chised groups have
turned to armed struggle as a
means of getting heard and of
achieving justice. Thus from
the 50’s to the present, a
Maoist-inspired communist
insurgency
movement – the only surviving
one is Southeast Asia – has
thrived in the country sid e.
In the late 60’s, the much
neglected and exploited
Muslims in southern
Philippines, in Mindanao
island, also turned to armed
confrontation to press for
secession. Since formal
independence in
1946, the elite controlled and
dominated two-party system
has effectively closed the door
to other
social classes in the country.
Elections have been reduced
to intra-elite competitions.
The framers of the 1978
Constitution tried to address
this problem by providing,
among others, for
multipartism within a
presidential system. This
arrangement similarly exist in
most presidential
democracies in Latin America.
From a cursory observation, it
would seem that, based on the
outcome of the 1978
congressional and 1992
presidential elections, that
multipartism has been
successfully instituted in the
country.
But a closer look reveals that
the change has been more a
quantitative increase in the
number of
parties than a development of
real, multi-dimensional and
ideologically distinct parties.
True, more
program-oriented and
ideologically cohesive parties
have emerge in the political
arena. But they
represent more the exception
than the rule. In fact, the
Liberal Party, since
independence, had been
one of two premier parties in
the country. But when its
party leaders begun to
practice seriously its
call fro alternative ways of
doing politic – principled
position on issues and
rejection of the politics
of “guns-goons-and-gold” – it
begun ironically to lose
considerable support.
In addition, as has been
observed in Latin American
presidential democracies, a
minority
government tends to be the
inevitable result of a situation
characterized by the presence
of weak
and undisciplined parties in a
multi-party setting within a
presidential system.
The case of 1992 presidential
elections in the Philippines is a
case in point: President
Ramos,
running against five other
major presidential aspirants,
won with only 24% of actual
votes cast. This
means his constituency in the
electorate was much less at
the time of his victory.
Conscious of his
narrow political base, he had
to devote practically his first
year in office to expand his
political base
of support.
So a question arises: Is a
presidential system of
government compatible with a
multi-party system?
Can it create a political
atmosphere conductive to the
growth of distinct and genuine
political
parties?
Studies indicate that the two-
party system is congruent with
a presidential government,
while a
multi-party system is more
associated with a
parliamentary government.
This is borne out again in
the Stepan and Skach on the
relationship of party systems
and consolidated democracies.
The study covered
consolidated democracies in
the world between 1979 and
1989, of which there
were 34 parliamentary
democracies, five presidential
and two semi-presidential. The
study found
that of the 34 parliamentary
democracies, 11 has between
three and seven effective
political
parties. None of the
presidential democracies had
more than 2.6 effective
political parties, while
both the semi-presidential
system had between three
and four effective political
parties.
The absence of any long-
standing presidential
democracy with three or more
effective political
parties may explain why
continuous presidential
democracies are so few. This
empirical study
confirms the earlier finding
that parliamentary
democracies are more
associated with a large
number of parties than
presidential democracies.
According to Lijphart, this
tendency is due to the “zero-
sum, winner-take-all” nature
of presidential
elections where the
presidency is the biggest
political prize to be won. Only
the largest parties have
a chance to win it. This
creates an impulse towards a
two-party system and away
from a multi-party
system.
This evidence is not conclusive
though. The case of Finland
and Chile prove otherwise. But
then in
both countries, the party
system is well-structured and
institutionalized. This cannot
be said of most
Latin American countries and
the Philippines where the
party system is loose and
weak.
III. Conclusion
Political institutions are critical
in strengthening governmental
effectiveness, particularly in
developing countries like the
Philippines. For this reason
political institutional reforms
cannot be,
and should not be taken for
granted, but must be made
part and parcel of a
comprehensive set of
social, economic and political
reform program.
A strong case can be made
that a parliamentary form of
government is a more
supportive
evolutionary framework for
developing effectiveness in
governance and for
consolidating
democracy. From both the
standpoints of theoretical
predictability and empirical
evidence, the
parliamentary form of
government has shown:
(1) Better ability to prevent
gridlock and promote a
cooperative relationship
Between the executive and
legislature in policy -making
(2) greater capacity to ensure
stability and continuity in
governance and prevent
military
coups and extra constitutional
action by the executive.
(3) better capacity to ensure
accountability in governance;
(4) greater propensity to
create a political environment
conductive to the growth of
coherent, disciplined and
strong political parties, and
(5) greater ability to
encourage a multi-party
setting and promote a more
open and plural
politics.
While the distinct advantages
of the parliamentary over the
presidential system have been
presented, the writer is
inclined to look beyond a pure
model of the parliamentary
towards what
Maurice Duvergere calls “a
new political system model:
semi-presidential system
government.”
According to Duvergere, a
political regime may be
dominated as such if the
constitution which
establishes it combines three
elements: “(1) the president of
the republic is popularly and
directly
elected by the people, (2) he
wields substantial power, and
(3) there is instituted a dual
executive
system, where opposite the
president there is a prime
minister and ministers who
exercise
executive and government
powers and remain in office
only with the continuing
approval of the
parliament.”
The most prominent
representative of this model,
of course, is France, although
the historical
precursor of the French
system was Germany under
the Weimar Republic. Other
outstanding
examples of this model are
Finland, Austria, Iceland and
Ireland. More recently,
Portugal, inspired by
the French model, adopted
this system.
In Latin America, while
variances of this system have
figured seriously in
discussions about
constitutional reform, no
country has so far adopted the
model. Should shifts in
government
structure take place in Latin
American presidential
democracies. The movement
would not be
towards a pure parliamentary
form but, most likely, towards
a semi-presidential model,
with a dual
executive system.
And the reason will be mainly
pragmatic: the long tradition
and intense desire of the
ordinary voter
to elect personally and directly
his or her president. Peruvians
expressed it best when they
called
“the principle of popular
election of the president…
sacred” and the sine qua non
of the
presidentialist system and the
basis for governmental
authority… election by the
congress (of the
president) would divert from
the people what they consider
their principal form of political
participation.
Until the recent 1993
plebiscite in Brazil where
people were asked to choose
from a presidential,
parliamentary or monarchial
system, the Brazilian elite did
not fully appreciate the
importance of
this sentiment. In surveys
conducted over a three-year
period from 1989 to 1991,
Brazilian
businessmen, labor leaders,
journalist, intellectuals, public
sector managers, politicians,
navy and air
force officers voted
overwhelmingly (more than 3
to 1) for parliamentarism over
presidentialism.
Yet in the 1993 national
plebiscite, the result was
completely the opposite: 55%
chose
presidentialism while only
23% went for parliamentarism.
Analyst widely attribute this
result to a
perception by the voters. –
depicted and encourage
aggressively by the
presidentialist – that the
parliamentary proposal was an
attempt to deprive them their
basic right to vote directly for
the
head of stat e.
Similarly in the Philippines,
without the benefit of a
survey, a similar preference
by the social,
economic, and political elites
for the parliamentary system
is apparent, for the same
bases argued in
this paper. But for reasons
akin to the Brazilian plebiscite
experience, the average
Filipino voter will
most likely opt for the
retention of the presidential
system.
Another important point to
consider is that this chapter
focused mainly on the issue of
governmental structure, that
is presidential versus
parliamentary debate. Being
the focus of the
debate on institutional reform
in the Philippines, this issue is
a good starting point for
further
inquiry into more complex, but
clearly related influences on
governmental performance.
For this
reason, weaver and Rockman
have called the presidential
vs. parliamentary debate the
“first tier” of
the inquiry about the nature
and effect of institutions and
their impact on effective
governance.
But Weaver and Rockman also
refer to second and third
levels or tiers of influence that
also impact
on governmental capabilities.
The second tier refers to
variations within
parliamentary and
presidential systems. They are
different ways in the modal
pattern of government
formation, or
regime type, which tends to
be durable over time, but is
not unchangeable.
A parliamentary regime, for
example, may come about
through a multi-party
coalition, party
government or a single-party
dominant government. Within
each regime, there may be
alternation
over time among several
government types, by which
government is formed. This
may be through
two or more parties governing
in minimum winning coalitions
(e.g., Germany), or two major
parties
alternating majority control of
government. (e.g.,Britain or
the Philippines during the
glory days of
the Liberal Party and
Nacionalista Party), or a
dominant party rulling alone
or as a dominant
coalition partner For prolonged
periods (e.g., PRI in Mexico, or
the LPD in Japan before its
recent
breakup) correspondingly.
The important point to
remember is that both modal
regime type and
parliamentary type
prevailing at any particular
period may have substantial
influences on a country’s
decision-making
structures, processes and
capabilities.
The third tier or level of
influences refers to broader
institutional and non-
institutional factors. The
former pertains to broad
framework institutions, such
as judicial review, federalism,
unicameralism
and similar institutions, while
the latter relates to factors
such as political context and
policymaker’s
goals, socio-economic and
demographic conditions, and
past policy choices.
What these three-tiered
influences on government
capacity imply is that effective
institutional
reform requires a more
comprehensive and complex
approach. It necessarily
involves a caref ul
matching of a particular
country’s priorities, policy
problems and the societal
conditions that
influence how institutions will
function, and the institutions
themselves.
In this light, the two-step
process adopted by the
proponents of a French-style
parliamentary
system in the House of
Representatives—first, from
bicameral, then, from
presidential to
parliamentary – may be too
simplistic a response to a
complex situation. That is why
the campaign
for parliamentarism has been
more notable for exposing the
deficiencies of the presidential
system
than for presenting a well-
designed and clearly focused
parliamentary alternative.
A final point: the route to
reform. Constitutional change,
in any setting and however
beneficial,
always invites controversy and
enormous problems.
Reformers need a strong case
to justify any
alteration to the fundamental
law of the land.
For example, the 1986 People
Power Revolution, because of
massive failure in the
government,
enable President Aquino to
discard Marcos’ 1973 Cons
titution and rule under a
decreed “Freedom
Constitution.” The latter was
subsequently replaced by the
1987 Constitution drafted by a
Commission of appointed
delegates.
The euphoria and sense of
urgency that surrounded these
exercises in constitutional
reform and
formation no longer exist. A
strong case for a new round of
constitutional amendments
needs to be
presented. Whether the
current situation in the
Philippines presents such a
case is debatable.
But proponents of either a
parliamentary or semi-
presidential system do not
have to wait for such a
situation to ripen, if, indeed, it
does not exist yet. They can
begin the process of
institutional reforms
through legislative initiatives,
such as reform of the
campaign finance rules,
simplification of the
election process,
institutionalization of the party
list system, amendments of
party formation and
affiliation rules, among other
enactments.
Apart from living the
institutional foundation for
amendments in the
constitution, legislative
reforms will also address the
reservations of those
suspicious of the changes.
Most important, the
reform will demonstrate the
will, commitment and
sincerely of the reformers.
1 by a public officer or officer of
AOA Fact Sheet
Parliamentary Commissioner
for Administration, SriLanka
APRIL 8, 2010 INSTITUTIONAL
OVERVIEW NUMBER 1
Legal
Framework
Article 156 (Chapter XIX) of
the Constitution of the
Democratic Socialist
Republic of Sri-Lanka, which
was introduced in 1978,
provides for a
Parliamentary Commissioner
for Administration, who is also
designated
as the Ombudsman.
The first parliamentary
commissioner for
administration was appointed
in
1982.
Jurisdiction/
Functions
Although a wide range of
subjects is under the
jurisdiction of
Parliamentary Commissioner
for Administration, yet
investigation cannot
be initiated in to certain
subjects. For example power
or function of the
legislator governing public
security, appointments of
public officer’s etc.
Legal Powers
The Constitution of the
Democratic Socialist Republic
of Sri Lanka of
1978 in its chapter XIX Article
156 stipulates that Parliament
shall by law
provide for the establishment
of the Office of the
Parliamentary
commissioner for
Administration (Ombudsman)
The Parliamentary
Commissioner for
Administration Act. No 17 of
1981
enacted by Parliament
provided for the establishment
of the Office of the
Parliamentary Commissioner
for Administration
(Ombudsman) in terms
of Article of the Constitution.
Act No: 17 of 1981 defines the
powers, duties and functions
and provides
for matters connected with
and incidental to the exercise
of the powers,
duties and functions of the
Ombudsman.
Section 10 of the Act provides
for the Public petitions
Committee of
Parliament to refer any
petition presented by a
Member of Parliament,
which discloses an
infringement of a fundamental
right or other injustice
a public corporation, local
authority or
other like institution to the
Ombudsman for investigation
and report.
The Parliamentary
Commissioner for
Administration (Amendment)
Act.
No: 16 of 1991 permitted any
person subject to a violation of
a in private No.
2 person is entitled as of right to
fundamental right or injustice
at the hands of a public officer
or officer
mentioned in the main Act to
make a complaint directly to
the
Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman has the
discretion in investigate and
report on such a
complaint, if he is of the view
that a breach of a
fundamental right or
injustice is disclosed.
Upon the conclusion of the
investigation, the Ombudsman
is obliged to
determine whether there has
in fact been or likely to be any
infringement
of a fundamental right or
injustice and make a report
giving reasons
therefore and make a
recommendation he thinks fit
to the head of the
institution concerned and the
Minister to whom the
department, public
corporation, local authority or
other institution has been
assigned and also
to the Public Petitions
Committee of Parliament.
Organizational
Structure
Implementation
Arrangements
Section 17 of the Act enables
the Ombudsman to require the
head of the
institution to notify within a
specified time the steps which
he proposes to
take to give effect to his
recommendation if no action is
taken by the head
of the Institution, the
Ombudsman shall make a
report on such failure to
the President and Parliament
for necessary action.
Addressing
Systemic Issues
The Ombudsman is bound by
law, at least once every
calendar year to
send to the President and to
Parliament a report containing
an analysis of
the work done during the
preceding year in the exercise,
performance and
discharge of his powers, duties
and Functions and suggestions
for the
improvement where
weaknesses in the existing
administrative procedures
are detected.
3
Investigative
Techniques
Every investigation done by
the Ombudsman is conducted
be present at an investigation.
Nor shall he
be represented by any other
person. The Ombudsman is
not obliged to
hold any hearing but may
make such inquiries as he
considers necessary.
He may hear evidence, obtain
information or entertain
representation from
such persons he deems fit.
However, the head of the
institution the officer
against whom a complaint has
been lodged shall be entitled
to make
representations either orally
or in writing to the
Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman may regulate the
inquiry procedure as he
deems fit.
Public
Grievances &
Redress (PGR)
Rules &
Standards
The Ombudsman may
investigate and report on any
matter which
discloses an infringement of a
fundamental right or other
injustice by a
public officer not withstanding
anything in any other written
law, which
provides that any decision,
recommendation, act or
omission shall not be
called in question in any court
or other tribunal by way of writ
or
otherwise.
No suit or prosecution shall lie
against the Ombudsman for
any act which
in good faith is done of
purported to be done by the
Ombudsman. Nor
shall any action., prosecution,
or other proceeding civil or
criminal, be
instituted in any court or
tribunal against the
Ombudsman in respect of
any report made by the
Ombudsman or against any
other person in respect
of the publication by such
person of a substantially true
account of such
report.
Freedom of
Information
(FOI) Standards
The Ombudsman has the
power for the purposes of any
investigation to
procure and receive all such
evidence written or oral ad
examine all such
persons as witnesses as he
may think necessary, except
in cases where the
provisions of any special law
to maintain secrecy applies.
The
Ombudsman may for the
purposes of investigation
enter and inspect any
premises or place, other than
a prohibited place within the
meaning of the
official secrets Act, after
notifying the head of the
institution concerned.
Use of
Technology
The Office of the Ombudsman
has provision for the receipt of
complaints
by E-mail and Fax. However,
the majority of the complaints
received are
in the form of letters sent
through the post. All
correspondence with the
relevant institutions also is in
the same form.
Public
Awareness &
Outreach
The Office of the Ombudsman
is located in the Capital
Colombo. With
the intention of causing least
disruption to the functioning of
the
respondent institutions and
lowering the expense involved
in
4 As matter of policy the
complainants and officers
from the outlying districts
raveling to Colombo
the Ombudsman holds
inquiries in the districts. This
has the added benefit
of creating a greater
awareness of the Ombudsman
amongst the people in
those districts.
This office has distributed
pamphlets describing the
functions of the
Ombudsman to schools
throughout the island.
The Ombudsman has been
invited by the Ministry of
Constitutional
Affairs to address public
officers at conferences
organized at provincial
level.
Linkages with
Civil Society
Not infrequently, the
Ombudsman participates at
seminars and workshops
arranged by nongovernmental
organizations to train
personnel on human
rights. And it’s also a member
of the Asian Ombudsman
Association.
Parallel
Complaint
Redress
Systems
Human Rights Commission of
Sri Lanka established by Act.
No. 21 of
1996. Commission to
Investigate Allegations of
Bribery or Corruption
established by Act No 19 of
1994.
Administrative Appeals
Tribunal established by the
17th amendment to the
Constitution in 2001. National
Police Commission established
by the 17th
amendment to the
Constitution in 2001.
University Services Appeals
Board established under the
provisions of the University french parliament, the action
Act No 16 of
1978. of parler (to speak) in
Tax Ombudsman ___ ad-hoc
appointed by the Minister of parliament is a talk, a
Finance.
Finance Ombudsman discussion, hence a meeting
appointed by a board of
directors of a consortium of where people discuss matters
banks.
Insurance Ombudsman of parliamentary government.
appointed by a board of
The authority is vested in a
directors of a consortium
of insurance companies.
parliament and there is no
Police Ombudsman appointed
by the Inspector General of clear cut in separation of
Police to
inquire into grievances of powers between the executive
police officers.
and legislative branches,
Ombudsman discontinues any
investigation into a leading to a lack of the checks
complaint where the
complainant had had recourse and balances found in a
to an alternative
presidential republic. In a
redress system.
parliamentary system, people
Presidential and
Parliamentary system: vote the members of the
a comparison
parliament and from the
{ November 23, 2006 @ 7:57
members of the parliament
pm } · { Political and
they will vote for their prime
Government Systems }
minister and the vote of no
Presidential and Parliamentary confidence can be done by the
system: a comparison members of the parliament if
they thought that the prime
by: Karla Katigbak minister is not capable enough
to lead. There are many
Philippines is now facing
advantages of a parliamentary
challenges on what system of
systyem. First is that it is
government can make a
easierand quicker to to pass
proggressive country. For you,
legislation with in a
is it a Parliamentary or a
parliamentary system. This is
Presidential system?
because the executive branch
Parliamentary system is
is dependent upon the direct
distinguished by the executive
or indirect support of the
branch of government being
legislative branch and often
dependent on the direct or
includes members of the
indirect support of the
legislative. Second, the World
parliament often expressed
bank study found that
through a vote of confidence.
parliamentary systems are
A parliament is a legislative.
associated with lower
The name is derived from the
corruptions. Lastly, parties in
parliamentary system have
had much tighter idelogy than
in presidential system.There
are also criticism of
parliamentarism and the main
criticism of many
parliamentary system is that
the head of the government
cannot be directly voted by
the people. In presidential
system, the presidents is
directly chosen by the people ,
or by a set of electors directly
chosen by the people but in a
parliamentary system the
prime minister is elected by
the party leadership. There
are also many kinds of
parliamentary system like the
British Parliament which is
often referred to as the ”
Mother of Parliaments”. It is
from England and it is the
model form of other
paraliamentary system.
Presidential system,
also called a congresional
system, is a system of
government where the
executive branch exists and
presides supports from the
legislative. There are many
characteristics of a
presidential system of
goverment. One is that the
president is both the head of
state and the government and
he/she has a fixed term of
office. The president has also
the power to pardon or
commute sentences of
convicted criminals and he/she
is directly elected by the
people. The president can be
removed from office through
the process of impeachment.
There are also criticism in a
presidential system like it is
not constitutionally stable
that’s why it has tendency
towards authoritarianism. It is
also difficult to remove an
unsuitable president from
office before his/her term has
expired. In a presidential
system, the president usually
has special privileges in the
enactment of legislation,
namely the possession of a
power of veto over legislation
of bills. In the enactment of
legislation, the president has
the power to directly propose 2.
laws or cast or vote on
legislation. The central
principle in presidential
system is that the difference
between legislative and
executive branches of
government. The executive,
legislative and judiciary are
performing their own duty and
this is the separation of power
but they must check each
other to make sure if the other
branches is performing their
job properly and this is the
check and balance.
There are many
difference between
parliamentary and presidential ○ The basic element is
that we have a Parl and
system and they have their
the Monarch is the Head
own disadvantages and
of State.
advantages. Some of our
4.
government officials are
○ Representative
pursuing for presidential to
Government: this refers
parliament and others are to??
contented. But still the
○ Govt that represents the
question is what is the best for
views of the majority of
our country and for the people.
people? For me, any system
○ The govt is chosen by
will do as long as it will benefit
the people
the people. Any system can
○ Regular election are
make our life better , the real
held, so people can vote.
problem is the character of
○ It the govt does not
our government officials.
represent the people it
will be voted out at the
The Australian
next election
Parliamentary System -
Presentation Transcript 5.
○ Responsible
1. Principles of the Australian
Government: this refer
Parliamentary system
to??
○ This refers to the govt
○ In England from the 14
responsibility to the
th century through to
people.
the 16 th century much
debate took place and ○ They are answerable
the Kings and Queens and accountable to the
were forced to give over people
much of their absolute
○ Ministers are appointed
power to the parliament.
and are answerable for
3. their actions.
○ The Australian system is
6.
based on the
○ Ministers are responsible
WESTMINISTER SYSTEM.
and must explain actions
(named after the British
in Parl ( ministerial
Parl)
accountability)
○ This basic system was
○ Ministers responsible for
adopted by Australia via
actions of their dept
the Commonwealth of
Australia Constitution
Act 1900 (UK).
 ○ Other MP’s can question
the Minister and depts.
actions
○ Minister must have
integrity etc or resign
○ If the Minister loses
support of lower house
then must resign-
therefore responsible to
the people.
7.
○ Separation of Powers 10.
refers to ???
○ This principle underpins
our parliamentary
system.
○ It refers to 3 separate
powers, each power is to
be held by a separate
body, to ensure no body
has absolute power. 11.
8.
○ 3 aspects of the
separation of powers:
○ 1. Legislative Power: the
power to make laws, this
power is held by the
parl.
○ 2. Executive Power : the
power given to the govt
( they use this to
administer laws and go
about the business of
governing the country / 12.
state).
9.
○ Under the constitution
the executive powers
are given to the
Governor- General, in
practice it is carried out
by the government.
○ The executive is ( the theory has the GG state (except QLD) have
accountable to the has the Head). 2 houses of Parl.
legislative body.
○ All laws must receive ○ Many argue that Aust is
○ 3. Judicial power: this Royal Assent (given by over governed, that is
power is given to the GG) we have too many
courts and tribunals to parliaments and there
○ So the 2 powers are very
settle dispute. have been suggestions
closely linked. The lines
that we should abolish
○ The first 2 powers are are quite blurred in
the States and have
linked but the Judicial practice.
regional govts.
power is separate and
13.
independent. 17.
○ The Legislative and
○ The role of the Crown:
Judicial powers must be
○ In 1748 Montesquieu ( a kept separate. ○ What/ who is the
French philosopher) Crown??
○ The courts must remain
thought that this
free from political ○ GG at Commonwealth
separation was
influence to ensure level and Gov at State.
important.
corruption is not part of
○ Queen or Monarch rep
○ If one body had all the the system.
powers then abuse could ○ Hold the Executive
○ Diagram pg 13.
occur. power
14.
○ Appointed by Queen
○ To ensure checks and
○ The powers of the ( advice of PM)
balances.
legislature and
○ What are their
executive in theory are ○ Independence in the
responsibilities? Take
separate but in practice system
notes pg 16-17.
they are combined.
○ Protects stability of govt
18.
○ The GG is part of
○ Body who make the laws ○ Royal assent and
executive and part of
and enforces the law are withholding Royal
the structure of Parl
separate assent:
(legislative).
○ Checks on Parl to ensure ○ GG (Gov) give Royal
○ PM and cabinet are part
they don’t go beyond Assent ( make bills into
of executive and also
their power law). Normally it is just
legislative ( Parl).
given, But sometimes
15.
○ Structure of State and ○ Royal Assent is withheld.
○ So in practice the
Commonwealth
cabinet has the power to ○ The GG has the power to
Parliaments:
administer the law withhold assent
(theory it is the ○ Handout and summary
○ The Governor's of the
executive) notes to be completed.
State’s no long have this
○ PM (not the GG ) is the
16. power due to the
head of the Executive ○ Each of the Australia Act 1986 (Cth).
Commonwealth and
19.
 ○ Reserve powers are
powers that dated back
to when the Monarch
had many powers.
○ It gives them the power
to dismiss a government
etc, but are rarely
exercised.
○ In 1975 the GG
dismissed the Whitlam
govt.
○ Executive council: the
GG is responsible for
making delegated 22.
legislation. They do this
whilst acting in council
with the relevant
ministers.
20.
○ The GG or Gov is
responsible for making
Delegated legislation.
○ Delegated legis
( subordinate legis) is
when rules and
regulations are made by 23.
govt depts and other
govt bodies. EG: Vic
Roads.
○ Some Acts of parl give
power to other bodies to
make rules and
regulations to Executive
council.
21. 24. The roles and functions of the
○ The role played by the
Houses of Parliament.
○ Cabinet, Parliament and
Government- What are
the differences?
○ Prime Minister, Premier, 25. The roles and functions of the 33. 17.) Ms. Altamera suggested
ministers – what are the Crown. Crown Crown ’ s that before theplanning
differences? Representative Executive assembly the executive
function Royal Assent Reserve committeemembers and the ad
○ Cabinet – PM, senior
powers hoc committee heads
ministers decide on govt beelected/chosen. Mr. Valdez
policy. This is how 26. said that such electionbe done
proposed laws –bills are ○ Queens rep after the oath taking, after the
formulated. officershave assumed their
○ Executive
offices.
○ Cabinet is not 34. Having no other matters to
○ Royal Assent discuss, the
mentioned in the 35. meeting adjourned at 7:15 PM.
Constitution (see page ○ Reserve powers 36. (SGD.) DONN MC ANGELO T.
VALDEZ
18 for other 37. Councilor and Interim Secretary
○ Summon and dissolve
conventions)
Parliament
○ Non- legislative or
○ Parliament- the law-
ceremonial
making, all members are
part of this body. This
27.
also includes the Crown. 28. 26
29. 8:00 AM to 8:00 PM on April 16
and 8:00 AM to
○ Government- the 30. 12:00 PM on April 17.
political party that has 31. 15.) The discussion of the
the majority of members details of the NSTP-USC
in the lower house. The Volunteer Corps was deferred.
party that loses the Pertinentissues raised for
election is the consideration on the
Opposition. nextmeeting included the
grading, the handling,
anddistribution of volunteers
○ What are the features of among the USCcommittees and
each? the objectives, goals
andpurposes of such program.
○ What are the roles of
Ms. Abarquezsuggested that the
each?
USC take notice of thedisparity
○ How effective are each? in the NSTP implementation. Mr.
Mandalasked why the NSTP
○ Take notes on each of letter was sent to theChancellor.
these. (page 19- 26) Mr. Domingo said that the letter
wassent to expedite the
proposed NSTP-USCVolunteer
Upper and Lower Houses.
Corps program, a core
Roles and functions of Upper
administrativematter in having a
and Lower houses Senate: role
stronger USC.
as States House: Senate: role 32. 16.) Mr. Villena was appointed
as a House of Review Role of
the interimtreasurer and
House of Reps as “ people ’ s business manager of the USC
house ” - Role of House of forthe purpose of collecting the
Reps as a law maker: USC Fund thissummer.
 66. 239.00
67. Freshmen Night
68. 16,414.00
69. 1st semester planning/Office
rehabilitation
70. 1,292.20
71. National Youth and Students
Summit
72. 20.00
73. SONA campaign
74. 2,113.00
75. Charter campaign: CN Convocation
76. 486.00
77. CAS Convocation
78. 526.25
79. Budget Cut campaign
(1st Semester)
80. 489.00
81. KASAMA sa UP Congress/Oct.
GASC
82. 4,156.50
83. 2nd semester planning
84. 672.10
85. Budget Cut Campaign (November)
86. 3,610.50
87. SHS Bookdrive
88. 120.00
89. USC Newsletter
90. 3,188.00
91. Campus Idol
92. 55.00
93. HLI Exhibit
94. 412.00
95. NUSP Convention
96. 2,000.00
97. KASAMA sa UP SGA/Dec. GASC
98. 4,346.50
99. Bakbakan
100. 9,459.35
101. VAT & Budget Forum
102. 1,000.75
103. HALALAN 2005
104. 5,943.75
105. Solicitation for Medicines
106. 190.25
107. TOTAL
108. PhP 57,834.15
109. TOTAL MONEY IN
110. PhP 57, 868.00
111. TOTAL MONEY OUT
112. 57, 834.15
113. FUNDS REMAINING
114. 33.85
38. 115. * The remittances of CN and CPH
for the 2nd semester have yet to be
turned in.P3500 will also be
collected from Mr.
116. Brain Arda of the outgoing CAS-
SC as payment for the subsidy
given to him.
117. Prepared by:
118. Certified:
119. (Sgd.) Ken Leonard Ramos
120. (Sgd.) Rizzalyn Ramirez
121. Finance Officer
122. Chairperson