Continuum UK Continuum US The Tower Building 80 Maiden Lane . 11 York Road Suite 704 London SE1 7NX: New York, NY 10038 wwrw.continuumbooks.com Copyright © Frank Furedi 2007 All rights reserved. No part ofthis publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, elactronie or mechanical, including photocopying, recording oF any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission from the publishers. First published 2007 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data ‘A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN e7e0e26s90578 ‘Typeset by Ben Cracknell Studios | wwwebenstudios.co.uk Printed and bound by Cromwell Press Ltd, Trowbridge, Wiltshire Contents ‘Acknowledgements Preface Why Do They Hate Us? Introduction Beyond Comprehension Chapter 1 Perceptions of the Threat Chapter 2 New Terrorism: A Self-Fulfiling Prophecy Chapter 3 ‘The Expanding Empire of Unknown Dangers Chapter 4 A Threat Beyond Meaning Chapter 5 Enduring Vulnerability Chapter 6 Perceptions of Terror and a Clash of Cultural Attitudes towards Risk Chapter 7 ‘So What Is the Problem of Terrorism? Chapter 8 Refusing to be Terrorized Bibliography Index 7 105 127 181 m 187 199Acknowledgements During the course of working on this project I have incurred many intellectual debts, | am grateful to colleagues on both sides of the Atlantic for sharing their insights. This study has greatly benefited ftom my collaboration with Bill Durodie of Cranfield University. The research was made possible by a grant (L147251003) from the Economic and Social Research Council and from the British Academy. The book is dedicated to Jacob Laszlo. Preface Why Do They Hate Us? Americans are asking, ‘Why do they hate us? (George Bush, 20 Seperbee 2001) Just a week after the momentous events of September 11, President ‘Bush asked the question, ‘Why do they hate us?” He did not suggest an answer to this question, which he posed in his addtess to the Joint Session of Congress. Nor has he or any major Western public figure made a serious attempt to engage with this query. At the time many ‘writers interpreted this query far too narrowly, to mean ‘Why is there such a powerful mood of anti-Americanism throughout the world?” However, Western politicians on both sides of the Atlantic are still asking the same question: ‘Why do they hate us?” British officials, stunned by disturbing evidence of home-grown terrorism, have never stopped asking themselves the same question. Politicians in Holland are ‘equally alarmed and along with their EU colleagues are demanding to know ‘Why do they hate us? ‘Throughout Europe this conundrum is regularly repeated by opinion makers and commentators. As one populist British journalist states: Since 9/11, we haven't stopped asking ourselves: why do they hate tus? We've reached out more often than the Four Tops. We've picked enoigh fluf out of our navels to ll duvets for everyone in the Third World$ In its original inception, this book began as an attempt to engage with the question ‘Why do they hate us?” However, after inspecting official statements and publications on the subject it became evielent that it was far from clear who ‘they’ were. Even more unsettling was the realization vilPREFACE that from the available evidence it was not a all obvious who ‘us’ was. ‘Wars and conflicts can be confusing, since the main actors are by necessity secretive and duplicitous. However, despite the absence of transparency itis usually evident who are the main protagonists and what they are fighting about. Today we have a global conflict that appears so confusing that we are not even certain what to call it. The failure to conceptualize the issues at stake is demonstrated by the absence of consensus around ceven what words to use to describe the meaning of the present conflict and the enemy. Suddenly governments cease to speak about the War on Tenors and talk about the Long War. The shift in terminology often betrays confusion about the issues at stake. Lack of clvty about what this war is about, who are the protagonists, its scope and duration dominates discussions on this confic:* Meaningles tems often represent an attempt to evade. In this case they express confusion and the inability to make sense of lif in the ewenty-frst century. Afear that dare not speak its name ‘When one reads official statements about the terrorist threat, itis dificule to avoid the conclusion that their authors have been far too busy studying children's Harry Potter books. In these books Harry's nemesis, the evil wizard Lord Voldemort evokes so much fear that people dare not mention him by name. Consequently they refer to him as ‘He Who Must Not Be Named’ or ‘You Know Who'. No doubt there are some very real threats out there that are causing violence in many parts of the world, But at the moment officials appear to have a lot of difficuley in engaging in a grown-up discussion about "You Know What’ Commentators on terrorism constantly demand that we ‘mind our Janguage’. (We strongly urge the government to abandon talk ofa “War on Terror” demands a report on the issue of home-grown terrorisin in the UK. The British Broadcasting Corporation appeats to be continually at a loss to know when the usage of the word ‘terrorist of ‘terrorism’ is appropriate. “The value judgements frequently implicit in the use of the words “terrorist” or “terrorist groups” can create inconsistency in their use oF, to audiences, raise doubts about our impartiality,’ states the BBC’s editorial guidelines The imprecise and incoherent manner with which the narrative of terrorism is communicated often appears as a problem of language. Quetons have been mised sboutwhethe the tem ‘war onto is any precise meaning. Even supporters of the war on terror have reservations about using this term, A US senator, Rick Santorum, has PREFACE remarked that to say ‘we ate fighting a War on Terror" is ‘like saying World War Il was a war on blitekrieg’. He added that terror, like blitzkrieg, is a tactic used by our enemy, not the enemy itself” Occasionally even the architects of the war on terror concede that they got their lines mixed up. ‘We actually misnamed the war on terror,’ conceded President Bush in August 2004. Without a hint of irony he added that ‘it ought to be the struggle against ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies who happen to use terror as a weapon to try to shake the conscience of the free world’." In the very attempt to rectify the ‘misnaming’ of a war, Bush exposes the poverty of the intellectual resources with which the battle against terror is fought. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the confusion lies not just with the occasional word, but the entire script President Bush's acknowledgement that ‘we actually misnamed the war on terror’ should not be seen as proof of the White House's lack of rhetorical skills. Confusion about terminology expresses a wider mood of disorientation about the very meaning of the war. One of the clearest manifestations of this problem is the constant display of verbal acrobatics shown by officials in London and Washington in their attempt to explain the significance of this conflict. Sometimes they struggle to find the right words. At times they even attempt t0 distance themselves from the term ‘war on terror’ and give the impression that they are uncomfortable with the rhetorical idioms that they invented, In December 2006, it was reported that the Foreign Office had advised government ministers, ambassadors and officials to stop using the term ‘war on terror’ and similar provocative terms, as ‘they risk angering British Muslims and generating tensions in the wider Islamic world’,’ That the name designated to define this global conflict could be perceived as a liability and so easily dispensed with is symptomatic of a mood of uncase about progress in the war. It also indicates that for a significant section of the political elites the war on terror has little meaning. Not long after the Foreign Office issued its favoured speech code, some government minister fll in line. In April 2007, the Secretary of State for International Development, Hilary Benn asserted that the term “wae on terror’ was a xeally bad idea. ‘In the UK, we do not use the phiase “war om terror” because we can't win by military means alone,” hae stated." This less than accurate statement about the official rhetoric used during the first six years of the war seeks to evade the issues. As everyone knows, wars are rarely won by military means alone, but that