LONZANIDA VS COMELEC

FACTS: Lonzanida was elected as mayor and served two consecutive terms from 1988 to 1995. He
then ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as
mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an election protest before the RTC,
which ruled that there was a failure of elections and declared the position of mayor vacant. The
COMELEC affirmed this decision and petitioner acceded to the order to vacate his post. In the 1998
elections, Lonzanida again filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor but was protested against due to
the reason that he allegedly had served 3 consecutive terms already.

ISSUE: Whether or not it may be considered that petitioner had served 3 consecutive terms, granting
that he did not finish his term in 1995.

HELD: Negative. By reason of his involuntary relinquishment of office, petitioner did not fully serve
the 1995-1998 mayoral term and became a private citizen.

ADORMEO VS COMELEC

FACTS: Ramon Talaga was elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor. He then ran for a third
term but lost to his opponent. In June 1998, his then opponent faced recall proceedings and in the recall
elections of May 2000, Talaga won and served for the unexpired term. For the May 2001 elections,
private respondent filed his COC for the mayoralty post. This was questioned on the ground that he had
already served as mayor for 3 consecutive terms.

ISSUE: Whether or not an assumption to office through recall election should be considered as one
term in applying the three-term limit rule.

HELD: Negative. The court held that Talaga cannot be construed as having beenelected and served for
three consecutive terms. His loss in the 1998 elections was considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service as mayor. For nearly two years, Talaga lived as a private citizen.

SOCRATES VS COMELEC

FACTS: Edward Hagedorn had already served for 3 consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001.
He did not run in the immediately following regular elections. One July 2, 2002, the incumbent mayor,
Socrates, faced a recall proceeding and was asked to step down from office. On August 23 of the same
year, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election. A petition for his disqualification was
filed by Socrates on the ground that he cannot run for the said post for his 4th consecutive term.

ISSUE: Whether or not Hagedorn was qualified to run for the 2003 recall election.

HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The court ruled that the rationale behind the 3-term rule was to prevent
consecutiveness in holding office. In the case of Edward Hagedorn, there was a break after the end of
his third term and before the recall election.

BORJA VS COMELEC

FACTS: Jose Capco was first elected as vice mayor but upon the death of the then incumbent mayor, he
occupied the latter’s post for the unexpired term. He was, thereafter, elected for 2 more terms as mayor.
He again filed his candidacy for mayor for the succeeding election but was protested against.

ISSUE: Whether or not a person who served in a position by operation of law could be considered as
having served that term for the purpose of the three-term limit under the constitution.
HELD: Negative. The court held that when Capco occupied the post of the mayor upon the incumbent’s
death and served for remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having served a full term as

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contemplated under the three term limit. The term he served must be one for which he was elected.
Furthermore, before assuming the position of mayor, he served first as a vice mayor and the duties and
responsibilities of the two positions are wholly different from each other.

LATASA VS COMELEC

FACTS: Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos in the elections of 1992, 1995
and 1998. During his third term, the municipality was declared as a component city. This event marked
the end of petitioner’s tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However, since the post is vacant,
Latasa was mandated to serve a hold-over capacity 1 as mayor of the new City of Digos. Latasa filed his
COC for the 2001 elections but was protested against by Sunga, saying that Latasa is not eligible to run
for mayor since he already served for three consecutive terms from 1992-2001.

ISSUE: Whether or not Latasa is disqualified from running again for mayor, but this time, for the CITY
OF DIGOS.

HELD: Affirmative. Upon ratification of the law converting the municipality to a city, Latasa continued
to hold office as chief executive of the same territorial jurisdiction. There may be some changes in the
political and economic rights of Digos as an LGU but no substantial changes occurred as to petitioner’s
authority as chief executive over the inhabitants of Digos.

LABO VS COMELEC

FACTS: Ramon Labo Jr. is a person granted Australian citizenship in 1976 although this fact is still
questionable since no direct evidence was presented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance 2 as a
naturalized Australian citizen. Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980 and in 1988, Labo ran and won
as mayor of Baguio City but was protested against by Luis Lardizabal, alleging that Labo is an alien
and therefore, disqualified to run for office. Lardizabal asked for Labo’s proclamation as mayor be
annulled and as the person who got the second highest number of votes in the previously held election,
he be declared as the new mayor of Baguio City.

ISSUE: Whether or not a runner up in the elections can replace an ousted official.

HELD: Negative. Lardizabal can not assume the position of mayor because he has not been duly
elected by the people of Baguio. Labo’s disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office.
Instead, the vice mayor shall replace Labo.

ONG VS ALEGRE

FACTS: Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course
and Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Francis Ong. The petition to disqualify was predicated on
the three-consecutive term rule. Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, 1998, and
May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as Mayor and discharged the duties thereof for
three consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.

The First Division of COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution dismissing the said petition
of Alegre, rationalizing that Francis might have indeed fully served the mayoral terms of 1995 to 1998;
1998 to 2001 and 2001 to 2004 but the mayoral term however, from 1998 to 2001 cannot be considered
his because he was not duly elected thereto. The RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte Branch 41 has voided
1
It is a general rule of law that an incumbent of an office will hold over after the conclusion or expiration of his term until the
appointment of his successor
2
The laws of Australia at that time required any person over the age of 16 who is granted citizenship to take an oath of allegiance

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his election for the 1998 term when it held, in its decision that Alegre was the "legally elected Mayor in
the 1998 mayoralty election in San Vicente, Camarines Norte."

ISSUE: Whether or not Ong’s assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the
mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.

HELD: Affirmative. Ong is disqualified as even if the COMELEC had declared Alegre to be the legally
elected mayor in the 1998 elections, it was without effect as the declaration only took place AFTER the
expiration of the contested office.

MERCADO VS MANZANO

Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner
of the said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril
regarding the citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the
private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that
persons who possess dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. Petitioner
sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision and declared
private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board
of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the
resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the
vice mayor of Makati.

Issue: Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

Held: Dual citizenship3 is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered
a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are
citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino
parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to
the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.

By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of
candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
might have as a dual citizen.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation,
private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand,
private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has

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. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to
posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those
born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are
deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship

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spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken
part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

DUMPIT-MICHELENA VS. BOADO

FACTS: Dumpit-Michelena is running for mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union. Her
disqualification was sought on the claim that she is a resident and was a registered voter of Naguilian
and not Agoo, La Union. Dumpit-Michelena countered that she already acquired a new domicile in
Agoo when she purchased a residential lot there, designating a caretaker of her house.

ISSUE: Whether or not Michelena has met the residency requirement 4for running for mayor.

HELD: Supreme Court held that Dumpit-Michelena failed to comply with the 1-yr. residency
requirement in the place where she intends to be elected.

Dumpit-Michelena failed to establish that she has abandoned her former domicile. Evidence shows that
her house in Agoo is beach house and a beach house is at most a place of temporary relaxation. It can
hardly be considered a place of residence. Moreover, her designation of a caretaker only shows that she
does not regularly reside in the place.

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REQUIREMENTS FOR A CHANGE OF DOMICILE:(1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;(2) a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one(3) acts which correspond with the purpose