Persons and Family Relations
Conjugal Partnership on Gains
Castillo v. Pasco (1964)
Facts:
 The legitimate children and descendants of the late Marcelo Castillo, Sr. pray for the
review and reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the
decision of the CFI declaring that the fishpond was the exclusive paraphernal
property of respondent Macaria Pasco, surviving spouse of the deceased Marcelo
Castillo, Sr
 October 1931 Marcelo Castillo, Sr., being a widower, married Macaria Pasco, a
widow who had survived two previous husbands.
 Gonzales, as co-owners of the litigated fishpond, executed a deed of sale conveying
said property to the spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco for the sum of
P6,000.00, payable in three installments
 Petitioners were children and grandchildren (representing their deceased parents) of
Marcelo Castillo, Sr. by his previous marriage. On April 3, 1933, Marcelo Castillo, Sr.
died, and his widow married her fourth husband, on 1934.
 Court of Appeals declared it to be paraphernalia because it was purchased with
exclusive funds of the wife, Macaria Pasco
Issue(s):
 Whether or not the fish pond was a paraphernal property of the surving spouse
Held:
 Legitimate children are entitled to the liquidation
Ratio Decidendi:
 loans were made by Gonzales to both spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria
Pasco as joint borrowers. The loans thus became obligations of the conjugal
partnership of both debtor spouses, and the money loaned is logically
conjugal property. While the securing mortgage is on the wife's
paraphernalia the mortgage is a purely accessory obligation that the lenders
could, waive if they so chose, without affecting the principal debt which was
owned by the conjugal partnership, and which the creditors could enforce
exclusively against the latter it they so desired
 As the litigated fishpond was purchased partly with paraphernal funds and
partly with money of the conjugal partnership, justice requires that the
property be held to belong to both patrimonies in common, in proportion to
the contributions of each to the total purchase price of P6,000. An undivided
one-sixth (1/6) should be deemed paraphernalia and the remaining five-
sixths (5/6) held property of the conjugal partnership of spouses Marcelo
Castillo and Macaria Pasco
Prepared by Romalino E. Caraig
Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun (1984)
Facts:
 Mercedes (P) and Fernando were married 1962
 1978, Fernando abandoned the family and lived with Corazon (R)
 Fernando sold the house to Corazon
 RTC declared Corazon as the lawful owner of the land in question as well as the 1/2
of the house erected on said land
 .
Issue(s):
 Whether or not the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the
husband ipso facto gave the land the character of conjugal property
 whether or not the sale of the lot together with the house and improvements
thereon was valid
Held:
 Yes
 contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. The
sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his
family; moreover, donation between couple living as husband and wife without
benefit of marriage is void
Ratio Decidendi:
 Art. 158 Civil Code: Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during
the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership,
but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
 pursuant to the foregoing provision both the land and the building belong to the
conjugal partnership but the conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the
value of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal
partnership for the value of the lot, 1 which value would be reimbursed at the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
 JBL Reyes, in another case: their conversion from paraphernal to conjugal assets
should be deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal buildings were first
constructed thereon or at the very latest, to the time immediately before the death
of xxx that ended the conjugal partnership. They cannot be considered to have
become conjugal property only as of the time their values were paid to the estate
of the widow xxx because by that time the conjugal partnership no longer existed
and it could not acquire the ownership of said properties. The acquisition by the
partnership of these properties was subject to the suspensive condition that their
values would be reimbursed to the widow at the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership; once paid, the effects of the fulfillment of the condition should be
deemed to retroact to the date the obligation was constituted
 it follows that Fernando could not have alienated the house and lot to Corazon since
Mercedes had not given her consent to said sale
Charges on CPG
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 Persons and Family Relations
Conjugal Partnership on Gains
Francisco v. Spouses Gonzales (2008)
Facts:
 In their desire to manifest their genuine concern for their children, Cleodia and
Ceamantha (P), Cleodualdo and Michele have voluntarily agreed to herein set forth
their obligations, rights and responsibilities on matters relating to their children's
support, custody, visitation, as well as to the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
of gains
 ownership of the conjugal property consisting of a house and lot shall be transferred
by way of a deed of donation to Cleodia and Ceamantha, as co-owners, when they
reach nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) years old with the following condition:
Cleodualdo shall retain usufructuary rights over the property until he reaches the age
of 65 years old, with the following rights and responsibilities
 Respondendt ordered Matrai and Michele to vacate the premises leased to them
and to pay back rentals, unpaid telephone bill, and attorney's fees
 Real property donated to Cleodia and Ceamantha were used as payment
 CA ruled that since Michele's obligation was not proven to be a personal debt, it
must be inferred that it is conjugal and redounded to the benefit of the family, and
hence, the property may be held answerable for it
Issue(s):
 Whether or not the fact that the spouses waived their right of ownership in favor of
their children is valid
Held:
 Yes
Ratio Decidendi:
 RTC should not have ignored that TCT No. 167907 is in the name of "Cleodualdo M.
Francisco, married to Michele U. Francisco." Cleodualdo and Michele were married
on June 12, 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. As
such, their property relations are governed by the Civil Code on conjugal partnership
of gains
 it is clear that both Michele and Cleodualdo have waived their title to and
ownership of the house and lot in Taal St. in favor of petitioners. The property
should not have been levied and sold at execution sale
 Respondents' bare allegation that petitioners lived with Michele on the leased
property is not sufficient to support the conclusion that the judgment debt against
Michele and Matrai in the ejectment suit redounded to the benefit of the family of
Michele and Cleodualdo and petitioners
 A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things
necessary for the support of the family, or when she borrows money for that
purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver the needed sum; when
administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts
or by the husband; or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity.
Considering that the foregoing circumstances are evidently not present in this case
Prepared by Romalino E. Caraig
as the liability incurred by Michele arose from a judgment rendered in an unlawful
detainer case against her and her partner Matrai.
Spouses Onesefiro Alinas v. Spouses Victor Alinas (2008)
Facts:
 Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas (petitioners) separated sometime in 1982
 They left behind two lots, lot A with a bodega standing on it and lot B with
petitioners' house
 Petitioner Onesiforo and respondent Victor are brothers. Petitioners allege that they
entrusted their properties to Victor and Elena Alinas (respondent spouses) with the
agreement that any income from rentals of the properties should be remitted to the
Social Security System (SSS) and to the Rural Bank of Oroquieta City (RBO), as such
rentals were believed sufficient to pay off petitioners' loans with said institutions.
 Lot A with the bodega was mortgaged as security for the loan obtained from the
RBO, while Lot B with the house was mortgaged to the SSS.
 Sometime in 1993, petitioners discovered that their two lots were already titled in
the name of respondent spouses.
Issue(s):
 Whether or not the sale of Lot B to the respondent spouses is valid, considering that
the petitioner-husband executed the sale w/o the consent of his wife
Held:
 Sale of Lot B to respondent spouses is void
Ratio Decidendi:
 Although petitioners were married before the enactment of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, the sale in question occurred in 1989. Thus, their property relations
are governed by Chapter IV on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code.
 Thus, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale of
petitioners' conjugal property made by petitioner Onesiforo without the consent of
his wife is void
 respondent spouses were well aware that Lot B is a conjugal property of petitioners.
They also knew that the disposition being made by Onesiforo is without the consent
of his wife, as they knew that petitioners had separated, and, the sale documents do
not bear the signature of petitioner Rosario
 the bodega was leased out by respondent spouses only beginning January of 1990
when ownership had been transferred to them.26 Hence, any rentals earned from
the lease of said bodega rightfully belongs to respondent spouses
 Respondent spouses, having knowledge of the flaw in their mode of acquisition, are
deemed to be possessors in bad faith under Article 52628 of the Civil Code.
However, they have a right to be refunded for necessary expenses on the property
(e.g. repairs)
Ravina v. Villa Abrille (2009)
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 Persons and Family Relations
Conjugal Partnership on Gains
Facts:
 Mary Ann (R) and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four children
(R).
 spouses acquired a lot in Davao; Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro
acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name
 T hrough their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan, the spouses built a house on
Lot 7 and Pedro’s lot. The house was finished in the early 1980’s but the spouses
continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex.
 1991, Pedro got a mistress;
 Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family and
the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two
lots to the petitioners (P).
 Pedro sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann’s consent
 1991, while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school,
Pedro together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU) and acting in connivance with petitioners began transferring all their
belongings from the house to an apartment.
 When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped
from entering it.
 RTC ruled in favor of Mary Ann; CA affirmed RTC decision with modifications
Issue(s):
 whether the property is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property
 whether its sale by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Ann’s consent.
Held:
 Sale was null and void
 Ruled in favor of Mary Ann
Ratio Decidendi:
 There is no issue with regard to the lot which was an exclusive property of Pedro,
having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the 2 nd land
was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann.
 The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to
prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro
 Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed
through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to
construct the house
 In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of
the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
Prepared by Romalino E. Caraig
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
 if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal
property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the
approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at
the instance of the wife who is given 5 years from the date the contract
implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.
 Even assuming that petitioners believed in good faith that the subject property is the
exclusive property of Pedro, they were apprised by Mary Ann’s lawyer of her
objection to the sale and yet they still proceeded to purchase the property without
Mary Ann’s written consent. Thus, at the time of sale, petitioners knew that Mary
Ann has a right to or interest in the properties and yet they failed to obtain her
conformity to the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke the protection
accorded to purchasers in good faith.
 petitioners cannot claim reimbursements for improvements they introduced after
their good faith had ceased. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner
made improvements and renovations on the house and lot at the time when the
complaint against them was filed.
In Re - Voluntary Dissolution of CPG of Spouses Bermas (1965)
Facts:
 liquidation of CPG for the 2nd marriage
 although petitioner Jose Bermas, Sr. admittedly has children by a previous marriage,
their names have not been given in either Exhibit Q or the petition for the approval
thereof, despite the fact that his children with his co-petitioner have been named
in both. Consequently, said children by first marriage of petitioner Jose Bermas, Sr.
do not appear to have been notified personally of the filing of the petition and of the
date of the hearing thereof. In fact, no similar notice appears to have been given to
the children of the petitioners herein, although the danger of substantial injury to
rights would seem to be remote
Issue(s):
 Whether or not the dissolution of CPG for the second marriage can be instituted
Held:
 Yes, subject to the rights of the children of the first marriage
 Case remanded to lower court
Ratio Decidendi:
 The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the
husband and of the wife as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of
any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
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 Persons and Family Relations
Conjugal Partnership on Gains
partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his
interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third
persons.
 this liquidation should not and cannot be effected without a liquidation of the
conjugal partnership between Jose Bermas, Sr. and his first wife, in which the
children by first marriage certainly have an interest
 any rate, said Exhibit Q could adversely affect the rights of said children by first
marriage, for, "in case of doubt, the partnership property shall be divided between
the different (conjugal) partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to
the property belonging to the respective spouses,"
 it is essential that said children by previous marriage be personally notified of the
instant proceedings, and that, for this purpose, their names and addresses, as well as
the addresses of the children of herein petitioners, be furnished by them
Mercado-Fehr v. Fehr (2003)
Facts:
 Married 1985; declared void ab initio 1997
 Wife (P) vs. Husband (R) regarding the ownership of a condo unit
 in March 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, petitioner left Cebu City
and moved in with respondent in the latter’s residence in Metro Manila; got married
on March 14, 1985; purchased on installment a condominium unit, July 26, 1983
Issue(s):
 Whether or not properties purchased at the time the parties are living together are
considered common property
Held:
 Yes; petition granted
 The disputed property was purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983 at the
time when petitioner and respondent were already living together. Hence, it
should be considered as common property of petitioner and respondent.
Ratio Decidendi:
 Condo unit was acquired during the parties’ cohabitation
 Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have
been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares.
 Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred
by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,
Prepared by Romalino E. Caraig
as in the case at bar. This provision creates a co-ownership with respect to the
properties they acquire during their cohabitation.
 for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to
marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3)
their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these
elements are present in the case at bar. It has not been shown that petitioner and
respondent suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively
with each other as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in
his residence and were later united in marriage. Their marriage, however, was
found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code because of respondent’s
psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations.
Cariño v. Cariño (2001)
Facts:
 Death benefits
 During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages,
the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter
referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and
Sandee Cariño; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan
Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in
their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982
 Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during
the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the
marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had
no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the
funeral of the deceased
Issue(s):
 Whether or not properties purchased at the time the parties are living together are
considered common property
Held:
 Property regime applicable for bigamous marriage.
Ratio Decidendi:
 for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto
 1st marriage void: first marriage lacked marriage license; therefore, void ab initio
 It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death
benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To
reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there
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 Persons and Family Relations
Conjugal Partnership on Gains
must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.
 2nd marriage void: The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
likewise, void ab initio
 One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the
property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering
that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not
be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed
by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148
 Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages; the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each
party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care
of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded
in this regime
 For 1st marriage: Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to
unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like
the absence of a marriage license.
 For 2nd marriage: Article 148 applies. Article 147 of the Family Code governs . This
article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other
reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. wages and salaries earned by either
party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and
will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages
and the other did not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed
“death benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee,
Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to
share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case,
both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of
the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in
the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao

Saguid v. CA (2003)
Facts:

Prepared by Romalino E. Caraig Page 5 of 6

 Persons and Family Relations
Conjugal Partnership on Gains
 both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed personal  Santos and Aldegonda (P) Ramones are the registered owners of a 358-square meter
properties came partly from their joint account with First Allied Development Bank. lot
While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account  1979, Santos Ramones, without the knowledge of his wife, Aldegonda, sold to
deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their Aurora (R) a 100-square meter portion of the lot
respective shares therein  1980, Santos died
 Jacinto (P) and Gina (R); met in 1987 Issue(s):
 Lot owned by Jacinto’s father; 9-year cohabitation  Whether or not the sale of real property belonging to the conjugal partnership by
Issue(s): the husband without his wife’s consent is void
 Whether or not properties purchased at the time the parties are living together are Held:
considered common property  Petition denied
Held:  her right to bring an action to invalidate the contract has prescribed
 Gina was declared co-owner of Jacinto in the controverted house Ratio Decidendi:
 in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’ respective contribution, their share  Civil Code, not the Family Code, apply to the present case
shall be presumed to be equal.  Article 166 of the Civil Code: unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis
Ratio Decidendi: or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the
 it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership
because Gina was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation without the wife’s consent
with the Jacinto.  Article 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the
 Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 FC, which applies to transaction questioned, ask the courts xxx
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of  the lack of consent on her part will not make the husband’s alienation or
concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other encumbrance of real property of the conjugal partnership void, but merely voidable
persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man.
 Under this regime, “…only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...” Proof of actual
contribution is required.
 although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987, which is
before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148
thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in
Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted,
there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of
adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
 Gina claims: she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However,
nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What
appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction
materials.

Ramones v. Agbayani (2005)

Facts:

Prepared by Romalino E. Caraig Page 6 of 6