Wits Business School WBS-2004-4

Nando’s International:
Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

Josi McKenzie sat back and considered the development of Nando’s International since she had
joined the company in June 1992, when there were 12 stores in South Africa, and international
exposure was limited to Australia and the United Kingdom. Her role was then defined as
marketing, which in Nando’s came to mean an absolute understanding of most of the business
elements outside of finance. It was January 2004, and together with Robert Brozin, the chief
executive officer and co-founder of Nando’s, and Mike Denoon-Stevens, the international
development director, she had been strategising as to which global opportunities offered the
most promise in the New Year.

The company had performed extremely well once again in 2003, with the result that Nando’s
had more than trebled its number of stores over the 16 years since inception. By the end of
2003, there were a total of 450 stores throughout the world, 186 of them being in South Africa.
McKenzie felt good about this record, especially because the group had managed to improve
market share in an extremely competitive industry and a volatile global economy. However, she
felt that there was enough potential in the company to perform even better on a global basis in
2004. Since 1997, when 27% of Nando’s stores were located in international markets, that
figure had grown to almost 60% by the end of 2003. Nando’s ascribed this success to two
strategic approaches. Firstly, it had more recently focussed on a what it termed a hubbing
growth strategy as opposed to a shotgun strategy. This meant that the company had concentrated
on developing existing geographic regions, chiefly the Middle East and Asia, instead of taking
any opportunity that presented itself. Secondly, it had placed a greater emphasis on the correct
positioning of the Nando’s brand in each of its international markets.

The critical issue up for debate for 2004 was which hub should be developed next. Should it be
the United States, South America, the Eastern bloc, or the China/Japan axis? The team had
learned that there was no such thing as a one size fits all approach, and had to determine how to
best execute a branding strategy tailored to each country they entered. There were a number of
issues to consider. Amongst them was the question of how Nando’s could improve its service
delivery, recognising that customers rated the importance of service as 80% and that of product
as 20%. Furthermore, how could the group polish the brand in order to maintain its positioning?
The Nando’s International management team needed to make decisions quickly in order to
achieve the goal they had set of 15% store growth in 2004.

This case was prepared by research associate, Tamzyn Dorfling, with lecturer, Dr. Terry Berkow. The
case is not intended to demonstrate effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. It is
intended for classroom discussion only.

Copyright ©2004 Graduate School of Business Administration, University of the Witwatersrand. No part
of this publication may be reproduced in any format - electronic, photocopied, or otherwise - without
consent from Wits Business School. To request permission, apply to: The Case Centre, Wits Business
School, PO Box 98, Wits 2050, South Africa, or e-mail chetty.l@wbs.wits.ac.za.
Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

The Fast Food Industry

In the accelerated pace of the modern world, the fast food industry had grown on a continuous
basis. Changing eating patterns, especially the trends towards snacking and grazing, and eating
more meals outside the home, fuelled the growth in fast food outlets.

According to the Vegetarian Resource Group, the trend for healthier eating, which had brought
menu changes such as the introduction of vegetarian alternatives, did not seem to have affected
the demand for all types of fast food, but was expected to have a greater influence in the future.1
Overall, many chains were becoming more health conscious as low-fat or fat-free menu
offerings gained popularity. Many of these menu items were vegetarian or could be easily
modified to become vegetarian.2 And as described in a 2003 article in The Atlanta Journal
Constitution, “After years of searching for the Next Big Thing and struggling through a two-
year slump, the fast-food industry is hitting pay dirt with salads.”3 In fact, despite being
relatively pricey menu items, salad sales increased in the United States by 12% in 2003, and
overall salad consumption by 2%, with salads becoming meals rather than mere side orders.

Besides the emphasis on fresh healthy food as an enjoyable meal, emerging trends revealed by
the Mintel International Group showed that eating out had more to do with lifestyle than with
cuisine. Thus, eating out was growing faster as a casual pleasure rather than a formal recreation.
Furthermore, eating on-the-go and in public had come to be considered a necessity, with the
quality of the food not necessarily compromised. The casual nature of dining out had also led to
higher levels of integration of dining with other activities. For example, there had been
significant growth in the number of stores that offered food together with an entertainment
experience, either within the store or at the same location.4

Deloitte and Touche’s 2002 Food Service, Restaurants and Franchising survey showed that the
emergence and rapid growth of the fast-casual or quick-casual segment was largely ascribed to
the change in nutritional needs of the so-called baby-boom generation. This market segment
included those individuals born between 1946 and 1964, who had been the first generation to
grow up with fast food, and who had now reached their high income years. The fast casual
segment was characterised by upscale menus, with items such as gourmet soups, salads, and
sandwiches. In this segment customers paid for upgraded ingredients and atmosphere while
keeping an emphasis on fast service.

The same survey indicated that fast casual dining in the United States was growing at a rapid
rate of around 6-8% per year. In contrast the fast food segment was increasing at only 1-2% per
year.5 Other estimates from a 2003 CNCB website article suggested that the 7 000 stores falling
into this fast casual segment in the United States were experiencing double-digit growth, and
that this would continue for at least another 5-7 years from 2003.6 The fast casual segment was
attracting business away from fast-food chains, despite the average bill being more expensive.7
In fact, according to a 2003 article in The McKinsey Quarterly, fast-food chains such as
McDonald’s, were suffering because more consumers were demanding what neither could
profitably offer: fresh food served quickly in a distinctive, casual environment. The article noted

1
BT Connect, Fast Food Outlet, BOP085, April 1999, available www.btconnect.com, intelligence link (accessed on
11 February 2004).
2
J Bartas and the Vegetarian Resource Group, Vegetarian Menu Items at Restaurant and Quick Service Chains,
2000, available www.soundvision.com, information link (accessed on 11 February 2004).
3
L Stafford, ‘Restaurants see green’, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 1 August 2003, available www.ajc.com,
information link (accessed on 11 February 2004).
4
Mintel International Group Ltd, Emerging Catering Markets, July 2002, available www.marketresearch.com, search
link (accessed on 11 February 2004).
5
Deloitte and Touche, Food Service, Restaurants and Franchising, October 2002, available www.retail.ru, biblio link
(accessed on 11 February 2004).
6
P LeBeau, Fast food chains freshen their menus, 4 March 2003, available www.cncb.com, search link, (accessed on
11 February 2004).
7
Deloitte and Touche, Food Service, Restaurants and Franchising, op cit.

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Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

that for the burger joints, serving fresh food was an operational challenge, while traditional full-
service restaurants, which did have the fresh food consumers craved, lacked the operational
expertise to be efficient at scale.8

The McKinsey report9 also estimated that growth in the fast casual segment would be worth $35
billion annually by 2010 and could account for more than half of all food service growth over
the period. In order to maximize profits, the report suggested that operators should concentrate
on dinner, already the consumer’s favourite meal prepared outside the home. Market analysis
showed that time-strapped consumers valued control, personality, and choice when making their
dinner plans. Successful fast-casual restaurants offered broad menus and fresh salads. This was
in stark contrast to the burger chains’ margin-crushing value menus, which featured items priced
under a dollar.

Although fast-casual restaurants were clearly best positioned to meet the consumer’s dinner
needs, the report revealed that their challenge remained the bottom line - and profits were only
expected to come with scale. The payoff was estimated to be large, with operating margins of up
to 15 percent. One way to achieve scale was superior portfolio management. If fast casual
restaurants maximized consumer choice (and minimized operational overlap by consolidating
their supplier relationships), they could afford to take risks with new food concepts and thus
eventually serve even broader groups of customers.10

Nando’s Growth – 1987 to 2000

In 1987 Robert Brozin, then 27, and Fernando Duarte bought Chickenland, a small Portuguese
café in Rosettenville, Johannesburg. It was at this small eatery that Brozin was presented with
the best chicken he had ever tasted. With this traditional Portuguese style flame-grilled chicken,
he envisaged a brand which would not only be built on the most magnificent product in the
world, but which would capture a dream of pride, passion, courage, integrity, and family.11

The decision to buy the outlet and go into competition with fast food giants like Kentucky Fried
Chicken and Steers, he said, was “less an act of daring than a sign of extreme naivete”.12
Although the founders had not bargained on how demanding the food business would be, they
enjoyed it and soon realised they could make a big business out of it. Brozin, with his have-fun-
and-make-money philosophy, was particularly motivated by the drive to be the first South
African company to go truly global, and be successful in markets like the United Kingdom and
Australia.

From the beginning, Brozin recognised how important marketing was in Nando’s strategy. The
Nando’s website noted, “In our bid to change the way the world thinks about chicken, we make
marketing everything! From the product we sell to the packaging in which we sell it, from the
decor of our stores to our Patrãos13 who welcome you to their casas, from the way we advertise
to the way our promises are backed by our Escudo guarantee – there’s always an opportunity to
entice and enchant our customers and attract new devotees to the taste of Afro-Portugal”.14

Josi McKenzie joined his team in 1992 as marketing director. She had gained invaluable
experience in the management of international brands at McCann Erickson. After working on
the Nando’s account for two and a half years, Brozin asked her to join his team. After she came
on board, the company’s marketing efforts were focused on building brand equity through the

8
J. R. McPherson, A. V. Mitchell, and M. R. Mitten, ‘Fast Food Fight’, The McKinsey Quarterly, No. 2. 2003,
available www.mckinseyquarterly,com, search link (accessed on 28 January 2004).
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Nando’s International, About Robert Brozin, Founder and CEO of Nando’s Chickenland, November 2003.
12
R. Brozin, quoted in ‘Regular guys make it hot in business’, Financial Mail, Corporate Report, April 10, 1998.
13
Patrãos13 was the name given to Nando’s store managers, and casas was the name given to Nando’s stores.
14
Available www.nandos.co.za, introduction link (accessed 11 February 2004).

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Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

use of an irreverent style of advertising. This was based on acquiring an excellent understanding
of the local psyche, and then using a sense of humour that was specific to the country in
question (Exhibit 1 includes selected examples of Nando’s print advertising).15

In 1996, the Nando’s International team focused efforts on entering the Southeast Asia markets,
notably Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Despite the difficulty of accurately identifying the
tastes of foreign consumers, ten years after Nando’s inception it had outlets in eight countries
outside of South Africa. Initially, only one of the foreign markets was profitable. By 1997 South
African operations had grown substantially, to the extent that they were becoming difficult to
manage. At the same time, intense competition from international competitors in South Africa
led the company to consider expansion into other countries.

Brozin changed the group’s approach, establishing Nando’s International in 1995 in order to put
more emphasis on international markets. Mike Denoon-Stevens joined the firm in that year as
group development strategist. His chief role was to develop Nando’s infrastructure so that its
new international strategies would be effective. After two years of building models, writing
operational, training and marketing manuals, and developing a global information technology
system, Denoon-Stevens and the management team used these methodologies to restructure and
refocus the existing markets such as in Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Emphasis
was placed on the competent implementation of the group’s marketing and operational policies
and procedures in the actual stores, enabling the team to develop an understanding and thorough
knowledge of the market at the local level.

At the same time, the group realised that it had to reach a critical mass of stores in each country
in order to show a profit. This number differed from country to country, but was usually
between five and 15 stores depending on the ultimate country capacity. One of the key
determinants of successfully doing this was the selection of the international partners. Besides
this, the Nando’s International team believed that their competitive advantages lay in the fact
that they were selling an experience as opposed to a product, there was a focus on a single
business, they were flexible, they had an entrepreneurial culture, and perhaps most important,
they placed a high value on their people. This was because they believed that anybody can make
a chicken as good as the rest; the difference was going to be in the people doing it.16

By 2000, Nando’s International had expanded considerably, having 258 outlets, 147 of them
being in South Africa. (See Exhibit 2 for a list of when the first store was opened in each
country).17 Between 1997 and 2000, significant growth had been achieved in terms of increasing
the number of stores not only on the domestic front, but also in Australia and the United
Kingdom. Nando’s stores had also opened doors for the first time in a number of African
countries, including Malawi, Kenya, Zambia, Uganda, and Mozambique. By 2000, Nando’s
International had outlets in 15 countries.

International Strategy After 2000

The lessons learnt, particularly whilst opening and operating outlets in Malaysia, proved to be a
critical turning point for Nando’s International. In particular, the team realised that the criteria
for selecting a foreign partner needed to be stringent, as did the selection of target countries that
matched Nando’s offerings.

A good match between the franchisee and franchisor, based on trust, mutual respect and shared
values, was perhaps the most essential ingredient for global success. Local knowledge was
critical. Yet equally important was a feeling for the Nando’s brand. McKenzie elaborated, “The
shared value thing from a marketing perspective is a critical thing because if they don’t have the

15
E-mail correspondence from Josi McKenzie, 5 December 2003.
16
L Du Blois and S Klein, Nando’s International: Taking Chicken to the World, Wits Business School, 1999.
17
E-mail correspondence from Josi McKenzie, 5 December 2003.

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Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

same shared values, you can’t expect them to understand the brand and to keep the integrity of
the brand intact. They have to have genuine passion for it, so for me the value part of the
equation is fundamental.”18

By the turn of the millennium Nando’s International’s management team realised that one of the
worst mistakes it had made was to adopt an indiscriminate approach to expansion – to shotgun
the world, as they termed it – lured by requests from emigrating South Africans who wanted to
open franchises in their destination country. They now realised that the most strategic thing to
do would be to remain in their existing markets and to strengthen them, hubbing those regions
they considered to have potential.19

Marketing Strategy
In addition, between 1997 and 2003, the Nando’s management team placed a new emphasis on
how they positioned the brand in each country. This was the result of an ongoing process of
reflecting on, reviewing and analysing the performance of the brand in the various countries;
studying marketing and branding trends, as well as ongoing debate within the team.20

The team had learnt through bitter experience that global branding was a highly complex issue.
Furthermore, they had seen that in many countries big was not necessarily beautiful. Even when
the brand did become stronger, the team knew that, in these countries, it would be important not
to position Nando’s as a big company.

The Nando’s team had found that they required an individual marketing strategy for each
country that Nando’s entered, and that this strategy would continuously change with time.
Nando’s positioned itself in the fast casual segment, but the marketing strategy in each country
was dependent on a number of factors including the product life stage in the country, basic
socio-economics of the country, the competitive situation, and level of sophistication of the
customers. The team had also found that they had to deal with different branding issues
depending on the location of the store and the kind of market for which the company was
catering. The result was that positioning issues were highly complex, reaching far beyond
regional and cultural differences. (See Exhibit 3 for a list of the drivers of brand choice for
Nando’s users in South Africa and the most critical service issues).

The branding issues were closely aligned with the broader strategy of the company. Denoon-
Stevens explained that in the Nando’s strategy, the thrust in each country encompassed
marketing in its broadest context, while leveraging off the intrinsics of the brand. When the
group considered brand positioning, it took into account the location of the stores, the Nando’s
experience (which included food, service and décor), and the communication strategy. In
particular, Denoon-Stevens was concerned about how Nando’s managed the people aspect of
the business. He wanted to be able to “download the brand” to its employees and make sure that
they complemented the brand image.21

Polishing the Brand

McKenzie knew that it was up to the team to ascertain what dimensions consumers used to
evaluate product offerings in the fast casual market segment. Once these details had been
determined, the challenge was how to present Nando’s in each market. How could the group
remain true to each market’s peculiarities in terms of the positioning of the brand, yet retain
consistency in terms of Nando’s core brand strategy?

According to Denoon-Stevens, the greatest challenge that Nando’s faced was transferring an
understanding of the Nando’s brand to its people. “Nando’s is not a cookie cutter chain such as

18
Interview with Josi McKenzie, 17 November 2003.
19
Interview with Mike Denoon-Stevens, 17 November 2003.
20
E-mail correspondence from Mike Denoon-Stevens, 19 February 2004.
21
Ibid.

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Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonald’s who have an easier marketing job, relative to
Nando’s,” he said. “This is due to the flexibility we allow our partners in the adaptation of the
brand in countries while strictly adhering to the brand intrinsics.”22

Once the elements that determined the different positioning niches in Nando’s multi-unit
restaurant industry were identified, the team applied these to the practical aspects of their own
re-positioning in a Nando’s way. Denoon-Stevens explained, “We always try to zig when
others zag.”23 One of the benefits of Nando’s flexible, empowering management style was to
encourage innovation, and this philosophy led the management team to be highly creative in
many areas, particularly restaurant decor and design. Denoon-Stevens explained that elements
of this approach were utilised in the new countries, and the resulting success and change in
customer perceptions and feedback had encouraged the team to pay more attention to the
implementation of positioning as a formal part of entering any new country.24

80% Service, 20% Product. The core product offered by Nando’s was a marinated, flame
grilled peri-peri chicken. There were a variety of other menu offerings, some of the favourites
being filleted chicken breast burgers, prego steak rolls, chicken livers, Portuguese salads,
coleslaw salads and french fries. The chicken was grilled in front of customers on open-flame
grills and repeatedly basted in Nando’s sauces. However, the chicken was only part of a unique
experience, Nando’s also aimed to create a tradition, a culture and a way of life, a great eating
place where people can savour the experience as well as the food. It wanted customers to be
drawn to the magic and warm hospitality that was the Nando’s Way. In everything it did, it
wanted to create a sense of an older, less complicated and more personal world, where the spirit
of Afro-Portugal was able to thrive.25 Besides the Nando’s Experience, Nando’s manufactured
and distributed branded retail food products, which were available to consumers through a
network of supermarkets, delicatessens and other retail stores.26

McKenzie described the Nando’s Experience as “the way the outlets look and feel, how the
guys behind the counter respond to you, and the packaging".27 She identified five distinguishing
elements that made up the brand: an aspirational element, the delivery of consistent quality, the
irreverent personality, the peri-peri flavour, and the Nando’s creed – pride, passion, courage,
integrity, and most of all, family. She saw these to be what the customer was buying when they
buy Nando’s and believed that if Nando’s stores did not deliver in one area they would
disappoint in the others.28

The Nando’s experience was considered as 80% service, 20% product, which meant that a
whole range of different issues needed to be dealt with in order to determine how the product
would be positioned, including the friendliness of the store staff, the cleanliness and hygiene of
the store as perceived by customers, and the quality of the take-out packaging. Denoon-Stevens
added that the people dynamic was particularly important as a retailer, saying that the people in
a store can vary turnover by as much as 30%.29 The challenge was for Nando’s to identify those
out-of-the-ordinary elements that could enable the company to have more control over the
consumer’s eating experience.

Nando’s had learnt that it needed to adapt its menu offering and menu mix in each country. For
example, the company had found that in India, which was a spice eating country but not a meat
eating country, it would probably not need to change the spice, but would adapt the food

22
Interview with Mike Denoon-Stevens, op cit.
23
E-mail correspondence from Mike Denoon-Stevens, op cit.
24
Ibid.
25
Available www.nandos.co.za, introduction link (accessed on 11 February 2004).
26
Nando's Annual Report, 2002.
27
J. McKenzie, in Financial Mail, ‘Food is Just Part of the Experience’, Corporate Report, 10 April 1998, available
www.nandos.co.za, South Africa link (accessed 11 February 2004).
28
Ibid.
29
Interview with Mike Denoon-Stevens, op cit.

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Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

offering. In this instance, Nando’s would offer customers an exciting peri-peri vegetarian
selection in addition to their famous chicken. An international survey indicated that 80% of
American chain operators adjusted their menus to suit local tastes abroad. For example, Baskin-
Robbins in China offered flavours like green tea ice cream, while McDonald’s served lamb
burgers in India, and Subway added more fish products to the menu in Japan.30

Location the Most Critical Element. The Nando’s team realised that, being in the retail
business, location was perhaps the most critical element of the marketing mix. On entering a
new country, the operational team would need to know what kind of potential customers lived
there. It needed to find out about the flow of people, where stores should be positioned, and
what kind of service operation would be suitable. In many of the countries where Nando’s
operated, it had found itself having to deal with a multi-ethnic group. It was critical to find out
the eating habits and customs of these people. McKenzie knew that she had to determine
whether the Nando’s brand would fit the culture of each country they entered, or if it would
stretch a little to suit those particular demands. For example, food preparation in Islamic
countries was required to meet halal standards, which meant significant manufacturing
changes.31

Perhaps the chief lesson the Nando’s group had learnt about going global was that there was no
one-size-fits-all. The type of stores that it developed depended on the perception of fast casual
in each particular country. The team always asked itself whether the type of store would deliver
the Nando’s experience or destroy the customer’s perception of the Nando’s experience.

Wherever the store was located, and whatever type of store it turned out to be, the team realised
that they needed to differentiate the Nando’s brand by ensuring consistency in the elements
impacting on the Nando’s experience. What could they do to ensure that these elements were a
part of the eating experience, particularly in an uncontrolled environment such as a store located
in a food court? At the same time, the management team knew that they had to be in tune with
global retail trends if they were to make the right decisions. For instance, if closed-in malls –
and thus food courts – were becoming less important, and strip malls were becoming the order
of the day, there was no point in putting a huge amount of effort into food court solutions.

David rather than Goliath. According to Brozin there was often very little communication
about the brand. He said, for example, that in London Nando’s core communication related to
how its stores were designed, and how they aesthetically looked to a consumer walking in.
Brozin noted that the Nando’s management team did not actually want the brand to go
mainstream yet in most of their target countries, because they felt it was a bit sexier to be a
David as opposed to a Goliath.32

McKenzie had found that the degree of communication had to be tailored to suit the country. “In
certain countries – unless you do something that is bold and alive – you are not going to be
considered a brand,” she said. “South Africa was like that, and Australia to a certain extent.”33 In
these countries she had found it was necessary to run a television campaign in order to be
regarded as a brand. However, one of the questions she asked herself was at what point above-
the-line advertising stopped being of significance, even when a brand had been driven to a large
degree above-the-line advertising.34

For McKenzie, the most important aspect that had to remain intact when communicating the
brand was the defined personality of the Nando’s brand. Other than this, the communication

30
M Chapman, ‘Abroad Jump’, Special Report, May 2003, Chainleader Digital Edition, available
www.chainleader.com, archive link (accessed on 26 February 2004).
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Interview with Josi McKenzie, op cit.
34
Ibid.

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Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

strategy in any given country was flexible. It was largely based on the product life cycle in
that country and was usually rather low-key in the start-up phase. Of the 29 countries in which
Nando’s operated, above-the-line methods of communication were used in only four. These
were all countries where the company had reached a critical mass of stores – South Africa, the
United Kingdom, Malaysia, and Australia.

More Expensive, but Added Value. Nando’s pricing strategy was determined by the market,
the location, and the competitive activity. While the perception in South Africa was that it was a
bit more expensive than its competitors, the management team emphasised that consumers
experienced better quality for their money. In countries other than South Africa, the pricing
strategy could be different, because it was influenced by how the brand was positioned.
McKenzie pointed out that the competitive environment was changing continually, which also
impacted on the strategy. “If you take South Africa’s environment as a case in point,” she
explained, “Nando’s started up before McDonald’s. McDonald’s coming into the environment
changed the dynamics considerably in terms of people’s perceptions of where we sit.”35

In South Africa, McKenzie did not consider Nando’s to have one single major competitor.
Rather, it had more-or-less equal share a stomach with a number of players, including Kentucky
Fried Chicken, Wimpy, Spur, and Steers. McDonald’s was a particularly important competitor,
as this chain was believed to drive the value perception in the market. Brozin, however, believed
that the market almost set itself on what Nando’s was doing.36

After looking at the competitive set in a country, the Nando’s team would bear in mind the
brand positioning, consider prices from the supply side, and then decide how it should position
itself in the minds of consumers. Once the team entered a new country, it analysed the different
market segments including fast casual, fine dining, and quick service. It then varied the broad
positioning of the brand as determined by the overall fast casual strategy. This was sometimes
complicated by the fact that fast casual could mean different things in different countries. Once
the segments had been assessed, the associated lowest price that could be paid for a general
meal without any extras was considered.37

The Nando’s group had observed that – apart from finding the right partners – the next most
difficult thing in entering a new market was finding the right store locations. Store location had
financial implications that had impacted market positioning and pricing. Other pricing decisions
came into play because the team had found that in some instances it had to offer a more
competitively priced meal and make up margins in other ways.38

From the outset McKenzie had aimed to position Nando’s as good food fast and to set it apart
from the perception of fast food as junk food. The brand had historically been perceived to be
more expensive than its fast food competitors. This had established it as an aspirational brand,
something which was underpinned by the group’s location strategy, store decor and menu
offering.

This positioning was translated into action in a number of ways. The menu had to be focussed
on the chain’s core product, which was flame grilled chicken in lemon and herb, mild, hot or
extra hot peri-peri. Any new menu item had to enhance the Nando’s experience and be
congruent with the Nando’s core brand in every country. Nando’s promotions gave customers
added value rather than discounts. Everything about the store and the customer’s experience had
to add value. For example, Nando’s natural packaging enhanced the Nando’s experience, as it
was made of bio-degradable food quality paper and bore the Nando’s emblems, brand identity,
and Escudo promise. Advertising, store design, decor and staff uniforms also contributed to the

35
Interview with Josi McKenzie, op cit..
36
Interview with Robert Brozin, op cit.
37
Interview with Mike Denoon-Stevens, op cit.
38
Ibid.

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Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

aspirational image of the brand and had to conform to the Nando’s specifications. Stores were
located in convenient but upmarket premises. Finally, service levels had to be consistently high
and were measured through customer care and mystery shopper programmes.39

McKenzie was vehement in her assertion that, “You don’t want to be seen as playing in the fast
foods. And with that comes the other marketing thing which is that you don’t want to be seen as
playing the value game. We never want to become price competitive in terms of our
communication. That is a very difficult marketing perspective in a lot of countries to get
across.”40 This was especially tricky in some countries, such as Malaysia, where Nando’s had
found that there was a set of expectations if the company was a western group. While in other
markets there was a clearly differentiated market in the minds of consumers, there was a lack of
market segmentation in Malaysia. The result was that communication programmes had to be
based on the expectation of discounts and promotions, for example.

Results
The new approach worked. Between 1997 and 2002 the Nando’s group had more than doubled
turnover from over R218 million to over R458 million. Operating income before tax had also
increased substantially from just over R14 million to almost R46 million.41 As can be seen from
Exhibit 4, by 2002 headline earnings per share had increased to 6.34 from 2.86 in the previous
year. By this time Brozin felt that “the global expansion strategy adopted by Nando’s Group
Holdings has shown strong growth, confirming the sustainability of the business model and the
economic value of the brand.”42

From an operational point of view, the group had also performed well. By the end of 2003, the
group’s store base had grown to include 450 stores, 186 of them located in South Africa. (See
Exhibit 5 for a record of store growth from 1997 to 2003). The proportion of international
stores had doubled from just below 30% in 1997 to just over 60%. In 2002, international stores
had contributed 60% of the group’s net income before tax.43 (See Exhibit 6 for a segmental
analysis giving a breakdown of jurisdictional performance). A 2001 PriceWaterhouseCoopers
survey ranked the group as South Africa’s fourteenth most global company.44

The Nando’s team believed that between 2001 and 2003, the performance of the company in the
United Kingdom had been particularly good considering the high level of competition in that
country. Performance was satisfactory in Australia, and had improved in Canada, Malaysia, and
the Middle East. In 2003, Nando’s opened stores in ten new countries, including New Zealand,
Cyprus, Indonesia, and a couple of African countries. By late 2003, the core focus areas were
the Middle East and Asia, with expectations that there would soon be stores in every Middle
East country except Iraq for the time being.45

McKenzie felt that the considerable growth of Nando’s International had been influenced by
Brozin’s management style. The flat structure (see Exhibit 7 for an organogram of Nando’s
International) he had insisted on encouraged innovation. She felt that one of Brozin’s greatest
strengths was hiring the right people. He looked for the spark in people’s eyes when he talked
about what they were doing at Nando’s. The sense of family was something which the Nando’s
management team also worked hard to foster. One of the challenges faced by the group was
how to keep that feeling of closeness despite the exponential growth that had been experienced
on both a local and global level.46

39
E-mail correspondence from Josie McKenzie, 27 February 2004.
40
Interview with Josi McKenzie, op cit.
41
L Du Blois and S Klein, op cit; Nando’s Annual Report, 2002.
42
R Brozin in N Jenvey, ‘Nando’s Global Expansion Shows a Strong Increase’, Business Day, 2 December 2002,
available www.bday.co.za, content link (accessed 28 February 2004).
43
Nando's Annual Report 2002.
44
Ibid.
45
Interview with Mike Denoon-Stevens, op cit.
46
J Hume, in Financial Mail, ‘Nando’s Family Values Pack’, Corporate Report, 10 April 1998, available

9
Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

Where to Next?
For many years American chains had operated successfully in parts of Asia, Europe and Latin
America. But there were clear opportunities in emerging markets in Southeast Asia, China,
Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East.47 While the group was focusing on the development
of hubs in the Middle East and Southeast Asia in 2004, there needed to be a focus on new
markets, with a view to developing hubs in these regions. These hubs would be joint ventures,
or master franchises. The decision about which to choose would be based on the partner, the
political and business risk, and the size of the country. Denoon-Stevens explained, “It is not
productive or practical for our partner to have Nando’s as a minority shareholder in smaller
countries.”48

The hubbing strategy had proved particularly successful for Nando’s in South East Asia and the
Middle East. The key criteria the team had used for selecting markets in those countries
included that:
• chicken was an acceptable food;
• consumers liked spicy food;
• the Nando’s experience was acceptable to that country’s lifestyle;
• the country was English speaking, at least to the extent that Nando’s team members could
easily communicate with the partners and local management; and
• the right partners were available.49

The team had kept in mind that the more foreign the country and partner was, the more difficult
it became to enter that country. McKenzie considered how important each of the criteria would
be in the four chief hubs that, together with Brozin and Denoon-Stevens, had been identified:
the United States, South America, the Japan/China axis, as well as the Eastern bloc. The
challenge was to determine which of the hubs had the optimum growth potential.

The Eastern Bloc

As the industrial sector grew, as was happening in a number of the emerging Eastern European
markets, populations were shifting toward the larger cities to seek employment, opening up new
opportunities to feed those populations. While Eastern European countries like the Czech
Republic, Poland and Hungary were becoming more appealing as they took steps to join the
European Union, some countries in this region remained highly unattractive, such as Russia, for
example, where government and local nuances still hampered the free market.50 Overall, the
Eastern bloc was considered by the team to be difficult, and thus posed the highest risk.

Latin America
One of the most obvious problems in entering Latin America was the different language spoken
in these countries. McKenzie also knew that entry into this part of the world had been difficult
for many other fast food chains. Kentucky Fried Chicken, Domino’s and other American chains
tried to break into Brazil’s market in the 1990s only to find their efforts thwarted by the
country’s volatile economy and unpredictable Brazilian tastes. Many chains had to close down
while others sharply curtailed operations.51

Despite the existence of numerous eating out options such as the well-established local chains
and the popular pay-by-weight buffet restaurants, which were perceived as being cheaper and
healthier than fast food outlets, Brazilians were following the trend of other more developed

www.nandos.co.za, South Africa link (accessed 11 February 2004).

47
M Chapman, ‘Abroad Jump’, op cit.
48
Interview with Mike Denoon-Stevens, op cit.
49
L Du Blois and S Klein, op cit.
50
M Chapman, ‘Abroad Jump’, op cit.
51
C DeJuana and L Weber, Fast Food Chains Battle for the Bulge in Brazil, November, 2003, available
www.biz.yahoo.com, search link, (accessed on 11 February, 2004).

10
Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

markets of eating out more often. This trend, together with a population of 175 million made the
market an attractive one, and chains had realized the importance of catering to the particular
needs of each country. In the early 1990s, for example, when Kentucky Fried Chicken was
introduced into Brazil, customers were put off by having to eat greasy chicken with their hands.
In more recent times, the chain had been reintroduced as a joint venture with a local
businessman, and the food was presented on porcelain dishes with silverware, with the menu
being modified to include Brazilian staples such as rice and beans.

The potential for consumption at Brazilian restaurants rose 17 percent from 2000 to an
estimated $11.7 billion by 2003 and it was expected to keep climbing. Chains such as Domino’s
and KFC had made new attempts to expand into Brazil, and Burger King was also planning to
enter the country, challenging McDonald’s dominant position.52

China
In China there was a growing middle class which meant a growing customer base.53 Fast-food
restaurants with strong brand name images, such as McDonalds (560 outlets) and Kentucky
Fried Chicken (1 000 outlets)54, had become more popular than Chinese-style fast-foods because
they were known for quality control and good store management.55 In a 2004 Business Report
article, the popularity of KFC in China was ascribed to its identity as a quick-service location or
a grab-and-go sandwich-oriented operation that suited the needs of Chinese consumers – this
was in contrast to the family meals and take-home chicken in bucket needs of US consumers.56

Although, according to the China Economic Information Network (CEIN), most Chinese people
preferred traditional foods, they were not yet accustomed to it being served in a fast food
manner, as the numbers of Chinese fast food restaurants were greatly outnumbered by Western
ones. In the meanwhile, the Western restaurants were trying to win the hearts of more Chinese
customers with a Chinese look, taste, atmosphere, and even a Chinese way of eating.57 Market
research suggested that Western-style fast-food consumption would continue to grow in China
at an annual rate of more than 46% over the 2000-2002 period, while at the same time Chinese
fast-foods were projected to grow by only 15 percent.58

However attractive this market looked, McKenzie and Denoon-Stevens knew it was not without
its problems. China was a country in which foreign companies had to deal with constant
regulation changes, and it was governed by a relationship-oriented economy, with many
linkages that were invisible to the outsider.59 The Japanese market was also problematic in that
Nando’s had also been losing out to a host of emerging competitors during a period when prices
for eating out had dropped significantly.60 Furthermore, the different languages spoken in China
and Japan would also make it difficult to enter these countries.

The United States

The United States was a major challenge for Nando’s International. The team knew that in 1997
McDonald’s had been opening outlets at a rate of one every five hours, and to be noticed there

52
C DeJuana and L Weber, op cit.
53
M Chapman, ‘Abroad Jump’, op cit.
54
Sapa-AP, Yum! Targets juicy expansion in China and Tibet, available www.busrep.co.za, front page link (accessed
on 16 February 2004).
55
J Cee and S Theiler, U.S. French Fries Heat Up China’s Fast Food Industry, 1999, available www.fas.usda.gov,
information link (accessed on 11 February 2004).
56
Sapa-AP, Yum! Targets juicy expansion in China and Tibet, op cit.
57
Available www.ce.cei.gov.cn, Chinese Fast Food Chains Battle Foreign Competitors, China Economic
Information Network, February 2003, search link (accessed on 11 Februar 2004).
58
J Cee and S Theiler, U.S. French Fries Heat Up China’s Fast Food Industry, op cit.
59
M Chapman, ‘Abroad Jump’, op cit.
60
Y Kageyama, Losses Triple at McDonald’s Japanese Unit, 13 February 2003, available www.foodinstitute.com,
search link (accessed on 16 February 2004).

11
Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

they would have to roll out hundreds of outlets rapidly.61 Until 2004, Nando’s had treaded
warily. In 2001, the group had started to retail cooking sauces, not only in its key markets of the
United Kingdom, South Africa and Australia, but also in the United States, so that this market
would be exposed to the Nando’s brand.62

McKenzie had done her research. In the United States the quick-service restaurant industry,
which included limited-service and snack and non-alcoholic beverage bars, consisted of more
than 228,000 stores, generating sales of more than $131 billion in 2002.63 Historically this
industry had expanded at an average of 4% per year. Forecasts indicated that the intensity of
competition in the quick service restaurant business was expected to escalate significantly. In
the United States eating out was considered part of a routine, not necessarily a reward. This was
evidenced by the fact that meals eaten away from home commanded nearly half of the
household food dollar, and this trend was expected to continue.64

Some of the key market drivers in the States included changing lifestyles, with more women
working, time-challenged consumers who valued convenience, more time required for getting to
and from work, eating on the go, more Americans telecommuting, dining out becoming a habit,
and an indulgence trend exacerbated by the events of 11 September, 2001.65 Perhaps one of the
most important drivers was the rising average age of the US population. The baby boom
generation of individuals aged between 37 and 55 were faced with a paradox that had resulted in
important new consumer needs. While they were entering a life stage where there would usually
be more of a focus on nutrition, weight maintenance and quality of food, they also faced
escalating work and family responsibilities, reducing their time available for exercise just as
their metabolisms were slowing down.66

The US fast food market was crowded, forcing US chains to look abroad for growth
opportunities. The average amount spent per person on fast food in the United States was much
higher than in Europe and in Asia, and the underserved markets in other countries were
considered fertile ground for expansion by US chains. At the same time, many of these chains
were developing portfolios of restaurants for growth in the domestic market because they
believed it would improve sales and earnings, and because the industry was required to be
innovative to cater for an unpredictable consumer market whose tastes were trendy.67

A 2002 Deloitte and Touche Food Service, Restaurants and Franchising survey indicated that
one of the best ways to enhance pricing in the crowded marketplace was to develop strong
customer loyalty, typically through brand awareness.68 (Exhibit 8 lists the world’s 100 most
valued brands in 2003, with fast food groups featured by highest value first: McDonald’s, Pizza
Hut, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Burger King, and Starbucks).69 However, research indicated that
this would be more effective in the case of fast casual chains, as the shift from traditional quick
service restaurants to fast casual chains was evident in the higher consumer commitment to the
latter.70

61
Financial Mail, no author mentioned, ‘The Chicken Has Landed’, Corporate Report, 10 April 1998, available
www.nandos.co.za, South Africa link (accessed 11 February 2004).
62
N Jenvey, ‘Nando’s to implement a pan-African food service’, Business Day, 1st Edition, 7 November 2001,
available www.bday.co.za, content link (accessed on 28 February 2004).
63
National Restaurant Association, The Restaurant Industry 2000 Year in Review, available www.restaurant.org,
research link (accessed on 16 February 2004).
64
Mintel International Group Ltd, Dining Out Review Market: Volume 1 – QSR – US Report, March 2002, available
www.marketresearch.com, fast food research reports link (accessed on 16 February 2004).
65
Mintel International Group Ltd, op cit.
66
Deloitte and Touche, Food Service, Restaurants and Franchising, op cit.
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid.
69
J Sampson, The world's most valuable brands, July 2002. Interbrand Sampson SA, found on www.biz-
community.com, marketing link (accessed on 26 February, 2004).
70
TNS Intersearch, The Indifferent Nature of QSR Consumers – The 2003 QSR Consumer Commitment Study, 2003,
available www.tns.com, search link (accessed on 28 January 2004).

12
Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

The Challenges
McKenzie knew that selecting the global geographic areas that Nando’s should target would
enable her team to make decisions about customer targets and the needs of those customers.
This information, together with an analysis of competitors and the industry environment, would
enable the team to develop a core strategy tailored to each country. The particular concerns for
McKenzie were how to determine the appropriate marketing mix and implement a strategy that
had been customised for each target market. McKenzie and the international marketing team
referred to this as ‘polishing’ the brand. “What do we do to polish the brand? And how do we
polish the brand so that we make sure that our positioning is maintained?” she asked herself.71

McKenzie agreed with Brozin’s view that Nando’s International had retained its entrepreneurial
spirit despite significant growth. Clearly, the chief challenge for Nando’s International in 2004
was to decide which geographic area to develop next. In addition, the company needed to
maximise its opportunities in the countries in which it already had a presence if it was to reach a
critical mass of stores on the ground.

71
Interview with Josi McKenzie, op cit.

13
Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

Exhibit 1 Selected Nando’s Print Advertisements

Australia:

Australia :

14
Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

Exhibit 1 Continued

Australia:

Source: E-mail correspondence from Josi McKenzie, 5 December 2003.

15
Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

Exhibit 2 Country Details: Year First Opened and Number of Stores in 2003

1st Store No of
Country Opened Stores

South Africa 1987 186

Australia 1992 64
Zimbabwe 1993 18
United Kingdom 1993 73
Israel 1993 13
Canada 1993 13
Botswana 1993 8
Namibia 1995 8
Malaysia 1996 19
Malawi 1997 2
Kenya 1998 7
Zambia 1999 2
Uganda 1999 1
Saudi Arabia 1999 3
Mozambique 1999 2
New Zealand 2000 12
Tanzania 2000 1
Ghana 2001 2
Pakistan 2001 2
Qatar 2001 2
United Arab Emirates 2002 1
Indonesia 2002 4
Bahrain 2002 2
Swaziland 2003 1
Portugal 2003 2
Cyprus 2003 1
Angola 2003 1
450

Source: E-mail correspondence from Josi McKenzie, 5 December 2003.

16
Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

Exhibit 3 Drivers of Brand Choice for Nando’s Users and Most Critical Service Issues –
South Africa 2001

Drivers of Brand Choice for Nando’s Users

• Quality of food
• Freshness of food
• Menu variety
• Service
• Cleanliness
• Atmosphere
• Value for money
• Cater for the whole family
Most Critical Service Issues

• Fresh food
• Clean plates and cutlery
• Clean and tidy store
• Appearance of staff
• Clean and tidy sit-down area
• Quality food
• Clean floor and counter
• Receiving correct food order
• Clean toilets
• Clean sauce bottles
• First come, first served
• Value for money
• Litter free exterior
• Availability of staff at counter
• Treated as a valued customer
Source: Interview with Josi McKenzie, 17 November 2003, information based on a survey commissioned by Nando’s
South Africa, 2001.

Exhibit 4 Selected Financial Information for the Nando’s Group, 2001 and 2002

Amounts in ‘000 Year ended 28 Feb Year ended 28 Feb

2002 2001
ZAR ZAR

Turnover 458 140 471 907

Operating Income 42 419 33 015
Ordinary Shareholders’ Interest 89 621 46 131
Total Long-Term Liabilities 34 283 55 961
Non-current Assets 188 569 170 938
Earnings Per Share (ZARc) 6.34 2.37
Headline Earnings Per Share (ZARc) 6.34 2.86

Source: Nando’s Annual Report, 2002.

17
Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

Exhibit 5 Record of Nando’s International Store Growth - 1997 to 2003

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Country

South Africa 100 122 142 147 160 177 186

Australia 7 14 32 33 48 59 64
United Kingdom 7 7 15 23 30 47 73
Israel 4 6 9 9 10 11 13
Canada 3 4 7 6 7 8 13
Malaysia 0 0 3 6 10 13 19
Saudi Arabia 0 0 2 2 3 3 3
Pakistan 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Quatar 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Egypt 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Botswana 3 3 3 3 4 6 8
Ivory Coast 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Kenya 0 0 3 6 7 6 7
Malawi 0 0 0 1 1 1 2
Mocambique 0 0 0 1 1 1 2
Tanzania 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Uganda 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Zambia 0 0 0 1 2 2 2
Zimbabwe 13 13 18 18 18 18 18
Angola 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Bahrain 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Ghana 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Namibia 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Swaziland 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
137 169 234 258 304 357 450

Source: Nando’s Annual Report, 2002.

The figures for 2003 were obtained from e-mail correspondence from Josi McKenzie, 5 December 2003.

18
Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

Exhibit 6 Segmental Analysis which gives a Breakdown of Jurisdictional Performance

Middle
R’000 South Africa United Kingdom Australia East Canada Malaysia Africa USA Total
Revenues 303,192 Note 1 81,064 53,566 15,294 2,679 1,708 637 458,140
Operating income before taxation 18,161 13,409 5,848 5,212 1,442 2,679 1,708 -2,595 45,864
Note 1: Revenues exclude revenues from associate companies
Middle
South Africa Australia East Canada Total
Assets
non current 130,753 39,199 13,672 4,945 188,569
current 59,961 17,288 10,299 2,826 90,374
190,714 56,487 23,971 7,771 278,943
Liabilities
non current 49,197 6,039 975 36 56,247
current 87,232 20,831 20,331 4,681 133,075
136,429 26,870 21,306 4,717 189,322

There are no separately identifiable business units.

Reconciliation of operating income

before taxation per the segmental analysis to income
before taxation per the income statement:

Operating income before taxation 45,864

Associate companies taxation charge 12,436
Income before taxation 33,428

Source: Nando’s Annual Report, 2002

19
Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

Exhibit 7 Nando’s International Organogram, 2003

STRATEGY SPECIALISED DELIVERY OF GROCERY FACTORY

SUPPORT MEASURABLES

• Fast • Legal • Country • Manu- • Support

Casual Support – for facture, veins for all
• Financial franchised, marketing countries for
Positioning
joint and grocery and
• Marketing
•Business ventures and distribution restaurants
Strategy • NPD company- for joint
(Grocery/ owned • Focus on
• R&D ventures,
restaurant) jurisdictions bulk/large
franchised
volumes and
•Trends and
core lines
company-
•Communi- (peri-peri)
owned
cation jurisdictions • Export –
•Brand/ opportunity
culture for 2004

RB, JM, SB LP, MR, RB, FD, MJDS, FD, JP FD, EN

PA, RS RDL, MR

MJ

Source: E-mail correspondence from Josi McKenzie, 5 December 2003.

20
Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

Exhibit 8 Ranking of 100 of the World’s Most Valuable Brands, 2002

2002 Rank Brand 2002 Value % change Country of Origin

($ billions) from 2001
1 Coca-Cola 69,637 1% U.S.
2 Microsoft 64,091 -2% U.S.
3 IBM 51,188 -3% U.S.
4 GE 41,311 -3% U.S.
5 Intel 30,861 -11% U.S.
6 Nokia 29,970 -14% Finland
7 Disney 29,256 -10% U.S.
8 McDonald’s 26,375 4% U.S.
9 Marlboro 24,151 10% U.S.
10 Mercedes 21,010 -3% Germany
11 Ford 20,403 -32% U.S.
12 Toyota 19,448 5% Japan
13 Citibank 18,066 -5% U.S.
14 Hewlett-Packard 16,776 -7% U.S.
15 American Express 16,287 -4% U.S.
16 Cisco 16,222 -6% U.S.
17 AT&T 16,059 -30% U.S.
18 Honda 15,064 3% Japan
19 Gillette 14,959 -2% U.S.
20 BMW 14,425 4% Germany
21 Sony 13,899 -7% Japan
22 Nescafe 12,843 -3% Switzerland
23 Oracle 11,510 -6% U.S.
24 Budweiser 11,349 5% U.S.
25 Merrill Lynch 11,230 -25% U.S.
26 Morgan Stanley 11,205 N/A U.S.
27 Compaq 9,803 -21% U.S.
28 Pfizer 9,770 9% U.S.
29 JPMorgan 9,693 N/A U.S.
30 Kodak 9,671 -10% U.S.
31 Dell 9,237 12% U.S.
32 Nintendo 9,219 -3% Japan
33 Merck 9,138 -6% U.S.
34 Samsung 8,310 30% S. Korea
35 Nike 7,724 2% U.S.
36 Gap 7,406 -15% U.S.

21
Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

2002 Rank Brand 2002 Value % change Country of Origin

($ billions) from 2001
37 Heinz 7,347 4% U.S.
38 Volkswagen 7,209 -2% Germany
39 Goldman Sachs 7,194 -9% U.S.
40 Kellogg’s 7,191 3% U.S.
41 Louis Vuitton 7,054 0% France
42 SAP 6,775 7% Germany
43 Canon 6,721 2% Japan
44 IKEA 6,545 9% Sweden
45 Pepsi 6,394 3% U.S.
46 Harley-Davidson 6,266 13% U.S.
47 MTV 6,078 -8% U.S.
48 Pizza Hut 6,046 1% U.S.
49 KFC 5,346 2% U.S.
50 Apple 5,316 -3% U.S.
51 Xerox 5,308 -12% U.S.
52 Gucci 5,304 -1% Italy
53 Accenture 5,182 N/A U.S.
54 L’Oreal 5,079 N/A France
55 Kleenex 5,039 -1% U.S.
56 Sun 4,773 -7% U.S.
57 Wrigley’s 4,747 5% U.S.
58 Reuters 4,611 -12% Britain
59 Colgate 4,602 1% U.S.
60 Philips 4,561 -7% Netherlands
61 Nestle 4,430 N/A Switzerland
62 Avon 4,399 1% U.S.
63 AOL 4,326 -4% U.S.
64 Chanel 4,272 0% France
65 Kraft 4,079 1% U.S.
66 Danone 4,054 N/A France
67 Yahoo! 3,855 -12% U.S.
68 adidas 3,690 1% Germany
69 Rolex 3,686 0% Switzerland
70 Time 3,682 -1% U.S.
71 Ericsson 3,589 -49% Sweden
72 Tiffany 3,482 0% U.S.
73 Levi’s 3,454 -8% U.S.
74 Motorola 3,416 -9% U.S.
75 Duracell 3,409 -18% U.S.

22
Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand

2002 Rank Brand 2002 Value % change Country of Origin

($ billions) from 2001
76 BP 3,390 4% Britain
77 Hertz 3,362 -7% U.S.
78 Bacardi 3,341 4% Bermuda
79 Caterpillar 3,218 N/A U.S.
80 Amazon.com 3,175 1% U.S.
81 Panasonic 3,141 -10% Japan
82 Boeing 2,973 -27% U.S.
83 Shell 2,810 -1% Britain/Neth.
84 Smirnoff 2,723 5% Britain
85 Johnson & Johnson 2,509 N/A U.S.
86 Prada 2,489 N/A Italy
87 Moet & Chandon 2,445 -1% France
88 Heineken 2,396 6% Netherlands
89 Mobil 2,358 -2% U.S.
90 Burger King 2,163 -11% U.S.
91 Nivea 2,059 16% Germany
92 Wall Street Journal 1,961 -10 U.S.
93 Starbucks 1,961 12% U.S.
94 Barbie 1,937 -5% U.S.
95 Polo Ralph Lauren 1,928 1% U.S.
96 FedEx 1,919 2% U.S.
97 Johnnie Walker 1,654 0% Britain
98 Jack Daniel’s 1,580 0% U.S.
99 3M 1,579 N/A U.S.
100 Armani 1,509 1% Italy

Source: J. Sampson, The world’s most valuable brands, July 2002. Interbrand Sampson SA, found on www.biz-
community.com, marketing link (accessed on 26 February, 2004).

23