Commandant's Paper Capt Dela Cruz

ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
Command and General Staff College

Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION: A FRAMEWORK IN

ADDRESSING MARITIME SECURITY THREATS
CDR REY T DELA CRUZ PN

AFPCGSC CLASS 48
JULY 2007
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION: A FRAMEWORK IN

ADDRESSING MARITIME SECURITY THREATS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COURSE CLASS # 48
BY
CDR REY T DELA CRUZ PN
JULY 2007
DISCLAIMER
This is an official document of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Command
and General Staff College.
Quotations from, contractions, and reproduction of all or any part of this
document are not authorized without the specific permission from the Commandant,
Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and General Staff College.
The opinions, ideas, and proposals expressed herein are those of the student-
author and do not necessarily express the official views of the College or any other
government agency.
Reference to this work includes the foregoing statement.
Armed Forces of the Philippines

Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo
Quezon City
ii
ENDORSEMENT
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Command and General Staff Course Class Number 48, this
study entitled, “INTERAGENCY COOPERATION: A FRAMEWORK IN
ADDRESSING MARITIME SECURITY THREATS” has been prepared and
submitted by CDR REY T DELA CRUZ PN, the acceptance of which is hereby
endorsed.
LTC MARTIN G VILLASAN PN(M), MM

Adviser
iii
APPROVAL SHEET
This Commandant’s Paper hereto attached, entitled “INTERAGENCY
COOPERATION: A FRAMEWORK IN ADDRESSING MARITIME SECURITY
THREATS,” prepared and submitted by CDR REY T DELA CRUZ PN in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the AFP Command and General Staff Course # 48,
is hereby accepted.
LTC RONILO C GAMUETA PA(GSC) LTC FILEMON D MAMARIL JR PA(GSC)

Member Member
Date Signed : __________________ Date Signed: ____________________
COL ORLANDO E ASTRERO PA(GSC)

Chairman
Date Signed: _____________________
Accepted as fulfillment of the requirements for graduation of the Armed

Forces of the Philippines Command and General Staff Course Class Number 48.
BGEN SALVADOR S COLLANTES JR AFP

Commandant
Date Signed:___________________
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I wish to express my gratitude to the following who, in one way or the
other have been instrumental in the completion of this paper:
To the Lord Almighty for His eternal blessings and Divine Guidance;
To Mr Jessie Pascasio, Senior Researcher, Office of the Strategic
Studies, Philippine Navy for his insights and invaluable inputs towards the
development of this study and to LTJG FLORISSA G HERNANDEZ PN and the
staff of OSS, PN for their invaluable support and assistance;
To LTC MARTIN G VILLASAN PN(M), my adviser and my colleague at the
UNSW @ ADFA, Canberra when we took up our masteral studies and provided
insights to this study;
To the Philippine Fleet Staff, HPN Central Staff, BFAR MCS Division,
PNP-MARIG Operations Division and officers of PN Units Afloat at Sangley Point,
Cavite City for their active participation without which, the desired outcome of the
study would not have been possibly reached.
To my wife, Euvin, my children, Patrick Reyvin and Alecx Yeuvnrei, who
have been my inspiration and whose forbearance and patience get me through
the course.
REY T DELA CRUZ

CDR PN
v
ABSTRACT
CDR REY T DELA CRUZ PN, July 2007. Interagency Cooperation: A

Framework in Addressing Maritime Security Threats. AFP Command and
General Staff College, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City.
Adviser: LTC MARTIN G VILLASAN PN(M), Masters in Management, UNSW

@ ADFA, Canberra.
The Philippines, as a maritime nation, is endowed with a very rich
marine resource and vast maritime area. It is also a host to a myriad of
concerns that threatens its maritime security. Unfortunately, the present
capacity of the government to protect, secure, and preserve the country’s
maritime domain is wanting. While several initiatives were already undertaken
to coordinate the efforts of all agencies with maritime functions in addressing
maritime security threats, the solution is far from over.
This study was conducted to assess the concept of interagency
cooperation as a framework in addressing the country’s maritime security
threats. More specifically, it aims: to analyze the threats to our maritime
security; to assess the capabilities of government agencies directly involved in
maritime security operations; to examine the existing linkages, agreements and
coordinating mechanisms between these agencies; to determine ways of
overcoming the problems of interagency cooperation; and lastly, to propose a
framework for inter-agency cooperation to address the different maritime
security threats. The study focused on the agencies with seaborne assets who
have the capability to enforce applicable laws of the country in all Philippine
waters such as the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR),
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police - Maritime Group
(PNP-MARIG), and the Philippine Navy (PN).
vi
The descriptive method of research was used in studying the concept
of interagency cooperation in the context of maritime security along with other
research instruments such as structured interviews, document analysis, and
survey questionnaire. Respondents were purposively and randomly selected
from across the strategic, operational and tactical levels of PN, BFAR, PCG,
and PNP-MARIG. Statistical tools like simple frequency count and total
weighted mean were also used to measure the data obtained from the surveys.
The target agencies have a clear understanding of the country’s
maritime security threats such as transnational crimes, illegal fishing, foreign
intrusions, maritime terrorism, marine pollution, and maritime disasters.
However, the combined capabilities of these agencies are inadequate to
address the maritime security threats to the country. Moreover, the existing
linkages between these agencies need to be strengthened at all levels of
maritime security operations. Nevertheless, a lot of support from the legislative
and political leadership is needed to improve interagency cooperation between
the agencies concerned. Several ways were recommended to improve
interagency cooperation between the BFAR, PCG, PNP-MARIG, and PN.
An improved interagency cooperation is anchored on enhancing the
understanding and awareness of the threats to our maritime security by the
agencies at all levels through information sharing, workshops, and informal
dialogues between them. Enhancing their capabilities also require the
upgrading or modernization of their equipment, acquisition of additional
seaborne assets, joint training and exercises, formulation of joint doctrines and
procedures including the development of an integrated national monitoring,
vii
control, and surveillance (MCS) system. The linkages between these agencies
could be enhanced through the “one lead agency” concept and the coordination
mechanism under the authority of the lead agency should be duplicated at the
operational and tactical levels where the existing working relationship between
the agencies is further strengthened. Overcoming the issues and concerns to
interagency cooperation however, depends to a very large extent on the
government’s political and legislative support. On the strategic level, it includes
efforts such as the revision and updating of the National Marine Policy,
designation of a lead agency in maritime and ocean affairs under the Office of
the President, promulgation of an Executive Order for interagency cooperation
among agencies with maritime functions, consolidation of all civilian agencies
with maritime functions under one executive department, formulation of a
National Maritime Strategy, and a national interagency maritime security
operations doctrine. At the operational and tactical levels, the interagency
cooperation problems could be improved by implementing the joint/interagency
maritime security operations doctrine; information sharing mechanism such as
the provision of liaison officers or agency desks at the coordinating office of the
lead agency; conduct of joint exercises and maritime security operations; joint
Techniques, Tactics and Procedures (TTPs); and the creation of joint task
forces or task groups. Last but not least, is the creation of an interagency
cooperation framework to synchronize, coordinate and optimize the efforts of
the above agencies in addressing the maritime security threats of the country.
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Title Page ........................ i
Disclaimer ........................ ii
Endorsement ........................ iii
Approval Sheet ........................ iv
Acknowledgment ........................ v
Abstract ........................ vi
Table of Contents ........................ ix
List of Tables ........................ xi
List of Figures ........................ xii
CHAPTER I - THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING
Background of the Study 1
Geographical Setting of the Philippines 2
Economic Potential 3
Protecting Our Maritime Interests 3
Statement of the Problem 7
Objectives of the Study 8
Conceptual Framework 9
Significance of the Study 10
Scope and Delimitation 12
Definition of Terms 13
CHAPTER II – REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

AND STUDIES
Related Literature and Studies 15
x
ix
Synthesis of Related Literature and Studies 49
Gaps to be Filled by the Study 52
CHAPTER III - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Method of Research 53
Locale of the Study 54
Respondents (or Unit Analysis) 54
Research Instruments 56
Data Gathering Procedures 57
Statistical Treatment of Data 58
CHAPTER IV - PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND

INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS
Maritime Security Threats 61
Capabilities of Agencies 69
Existing Linkages Between Agencies 75
Issues and Concerns to Interagency Cooperation 80
Ways to Improve Interagency Cooperation 84
CHAPTER V - SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND

RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary 91
Conclusion 98
Recommendations 99
BIBLIOGRAPHY 103
APPENDICES :
Survey Questionnaire 105
Structured Interview 109
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 112
x
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE Page
1 Agencies with Maritime Functions 6
2 NMP Policy Statements and Goals 29

3 Respondents from Different Agencies 55
4 Rank Distribution of Respondents 55
5 Length of Service of Respondents 56
6 Range and Descriptive Evaluation Used 59
7 Summary of Design and Methodology Used 60
8 Perception on Maritime Security Threats 62
9 Data on Goods Smuggling 64
10 Data on Illegal Fishing 66
11 Data on Foreign Intrusions 66
12 Maritime Terrorism Incidents 67
13 Piracy Incidents 67
14 Maritime Disaster Incidents 68
15 BFAR Assets 70
16 PCG Assets 71
17 PN Assets 72
18 PNP-MARIG Assets 73
19 Philippine Marine Resources 74

20 Existing Linkage Between Agencies 76
21 Perception on Existing Linkages 78
22 Perception on Issues and Concerns 81
23 Perceptions on Ways to Improve Interagency Cooperation 86
24 Summary of Ways to Improve Interagency Cooperation 101
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE Page
1 National Marine Interests and Key Policy Actors 4
2 Conceptual Framework 10
3 MOAC Organizational Structure 28
4 CABCOM-MOA Based Decision Making Model 30
5 LEDAC Based Decision Making Model 31
6 NEDA Based Interagency Council Model 31
7 ARCDEV Model Based on PCSD Structure 38
8 ARCDEV Model Based on Expanded PCSD Structure 39
9 ARCDEV Model with Independent Management Board 40
10 Coastwatch South Conceptual Framework 43
11 Coastwatch South Functional Structure 44
12 Drug Smuggling Landing Points 65
13 Interagency Cooperation Framework 102
xii
CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING
A. Background of the Study
“Security is every state’s first and foremost national interest” 1
Maritime security in the Philippines forms a part of the broader and
complex dimension of national security. The 1994 National Marine Policy of the
Philippines defined maritime security “as a state wherein the country’s marine
assets, maritime practices, territorial integrity and coastal peace and order are
protected, conserved and enhanced.” 2 It is subordinated to the broader definition
of national security where it is defined as “a state or condition wherein the
people’s way of life and institutions, their integrity and sovereignty including their
well-being are protected and enhanced.” 3
A comprehensive Philippine maritime security viewpoint therefore
considers the military, economic, environmental, and political concerns that affect
the country’s maritime domain. Maritime security is however, threatened by
transnational crimes, maritime terrorism, piracy and armed robbery against ships.
Other concerns that we could consider as within the scope of the broad maritime
security definition that the country adopted also include fishery and marine
environmental protection concerns such as poaching, illegal fishing, marine
pollution, and maritime disasters. In addressing these maritime security threats,
only four (4) government agencies have the capability to conduct law
1
Almonte, J.T. , The Philippines as a Maritime Country: Challenges to National Security, Statement at the
PN Maritime Symposium 2005, 16-17 May 2005
2
Department of Foreign Affairs. National Marine Policy. Manila: Foreign Service Institute, 1995.
3
J5 Briefing on National Military Strategy to AFPCGSC. 2007
2
enforcement at sea and enforce them in all Philippine waters namely: Philippine
Navy (PN), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police-Maritime
Group (PNP-MARIG), and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR).
1. Geographical Setting of the Philippines
The geographic configuration and characteristics of the Philippines
as a maritime country are fairly obvious. It is an archipelago composed of more
than seven thousand (7,000) islets and islands. It has a coastline of 36,289
kilometers, a territorial sea of 679,800 square km and an Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) of 2.2 million square kilometers. As of 2002, its population in the
coastal areas is 39 million with sixty two (62) of its seventy nine (79) provinces
and of the 1,496 municipalities, 832 or fifty six percent (56%) are situated in the
coastal areas. 4 It is bounded on the east by the Philippine Sea, on the south by
the Sulu and Celebes Sea, on the west by the South China Sea, and on the north
by the Luzon strait. On the whole, the Philippines, is 4/5 waters and 1/5 land. 5
The Philippines is also strategically positioned in the region. It has
the privileged of being situated where two great oceans meet - the Pacific Ocean
in the East and the South China Sea in the West where links the economies of
major powers in the region. Furthermore, the Philippine archipelago straddles the
main maritime highways of the world where more than fifty percent (50%) of
commercial maritime passes its maritime jurisdiction. 6 In the words of General
4
Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Marine Environment and Resources Foundation,
Inc. ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable Philippine Archipelagic Development. Manila., p. 10
5
Shahani, L.R., The Philippines as a Maritime Country: The Requirements to Fulfill its Potential,
Statement at the PN Maritime Symposium 2005, 16-17 May 2005
6
N5 Briefing to CGSC Cl 48 2007.
3
Almonte, the former National Security Adviser and Director-General of the
National Security Council (NSC), “we are located in Southeast Asia’s maritime
heartland.” 7
2. Economic Potential
As a maritime country, the Philippines derived enormous uses and
benefits from its resources in the maritime domain. In 2000, the coastal areas
made an economic estimated contribution of 60% of the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). There are about 800 fishing firms in the country with a recorded net
revenue of P1.9B. In 2000, the Philippines ranked third in the ASEAN region
fisheries international trade, with an estimated value of P20.4 billion. The
maritime transport sector is also a major maritime growing industry wherein the
country has 1,250 ports and 30,000 domestic vessels plying the different sea
routes of the archipelago contributing 7.1% of the GDP. Owing to the long
coastline of the country, coastal tourism is one of the major growth sectors where
18 of the top 25 tourist destinations are situated. In general, tourism is
contributing an annual average income of P81.5 billion from 1990 to 2000.
Moreover, minerals found in the seabed and in coastal areas of the country
contributed P17.65 billion in earnings from 1990 to 2000. 8
3. Protecting Our Maritime Interests
The fundamental basis in protecting the nation’s marine resources
is enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides that: “The State
7
Almonte, J.T. , The Philippines as a Maritime Country: Challenges to National Security, Statement at the
PN Maritime Symposium 2005, 16-17 May 2005
8
Inc. ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable Philippine Archipelagic Development. Manila., pp. 13-14.
4
shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea,
and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.” 9 The country’s marine interests and concerns
could be classified into five (5) major functional areas namely: “(1) socio-
economic uses; (2) environmental concerns; (3) maritime safety and security
interests; (4) territorial and jurisdictional concerns; and (5) scientific, educational,
and cultural uses of the oceans.” 10 Figure 1 shows the country’s maritime
interests and the key agencies of government tasked with protecting these
interests.
NATIONAL MARINE INTERESTS and KEY POLICY ACTORS
Socio-Economic Uses Environmental Uses Maritime Safety and Security Territory and Science, Education
Jurisdiction & Culture
Fisheries Conservation of Regulation of Marine Boundary Delimitation

(BFAR, DENR, Biodiversity Transport (DFA, DND/AFP, DOJ, Marine Scientific
MARINA, PCG, (DENR, BFAR, DOT, (DOTC, PPA, PCG) NAMRIA, LGU) Research
DFA, LGU) LGU, NGOs) (DOST, DENR-
PCMARRD, LGU,
NSC, BFAR)
Marine Pollution/ Siltation Military/ Defense Uses Territorial Defense
Transportation & (DENR, BFAR, PCG, (DND/AFP, PCG, PNP, (DFA, DND/AFP,
Communications LGU, NGOs) NSC) NSC, PNP) Marine Anthropology
(DOTC, PPA, LGU) & Archeology
Coastal Land Use Hazard Mitigation Search & Rescue Maritime Law Maritime Training
(DPWH, DOT, DTI, (DENR, PCG, NDCC, (DND/AFP, PCG, PNP) Enforcement (DOTC)
DENR, PCG, LGU) DSWD, DOH) (DND/AFP, PCG,
PNP, LGU)
Tourism Management of
( DOT, DTI, DENR, Disputed Areas
LGU) (DFA, DND/AFP,
DOJ, NSC, LGU)
Energy Exploration
( DOE, DOJ, DENR-
MGB)
Seabed Mining
(DOE)
SOURCE: ARCDEV
Figure 1
Philippine Marine Interests and Key Policy Actors
9
Par. 2, Sec. 2. Art. XII, Id., 1987 Philippine Constitution.
10
Department of Foreign Affairs. National Marine Policy. Manila: Foreign Service Institute, 1995. p. 11
5
Figure 1 clearly shows the magnitude and multitude of tasks to be
undertaken in pursuing our equally multifaceted maritime interests. This is all the
more made complex with the numerous government agencies involved in
addressing these myriad of maritime concerns. One could only surmise the need
for an integrated and coordinated approach in the management of our maritime
domain. Conspicuously lacking however, is the means to coordinate the efforts of
the concerned agencies and the absence of overall designated department or
agency as orchestrator of this endeavor to synchronize government efforts.
One concrete initiative towards an integrated approach to protecting
our maritime interests was the formulation of the 1994 National Marine Policy
(NMP) of the Philippines. In the NMP, the government already recognized the
magnitude of tasks of the government as far as ensuring maritime security is
concerned. Following the formulation of the NMP, the Cabinet Committee on
Maritime and Ocean Affairs (CABCOM-MOA) was organized and in accordance
with the intention of the formulation of the NMP which is “to create a venue for
better coordination and integration among agencies with maritime-related
functions.” 11 Table 1 shows the agencies with such functions. It consists of ten
(10) departments and twenty (20) agencies and bureaus:
11
Garcia, M. (2005). Progress in the Implementation of the Philippine National Marine Policy: Issues and
Options. UN – The Nippon Foundation Fellow, New York, Retrieved on May 3, 2007 at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/garcia_0506__
philippines.pdf. pp. 64-65.
6
Table 1
Agencies with Maritime Functions
Department Implementing Bureaus & Agencies

Department of National Mapping and Resource Information Agency
Environment and Natural (NAMRIA)
Resources (DENR) Coastal Marine Management Office (CMMO)
Department of Agriculture Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR)
(DA) Philippine Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA)
Department of Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
Transportation and Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)
Communications (DOTC) Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA)
Office of Transportation Security (OTS)
Department of National Philippine Navy (PN)
Defense (DND) Philippine Air Force (PAF)
Department of Foreign Maritime and Ocean Affairs Center (MOAC)
Affairs (DFA)
Department of Interior Philippine National Police-Maritime Group (PNP-
and Local Government MARIG)
(DILG)
Department of Finance Bureau of Customs (BoC)
(DOF)
Department of Health Bureau of Quarantine and International Health
(DOH) Services (BQIHS)
Department of Justice National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
(DOJ) Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID)
Department of Tourism Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA)
(DoT)
Office of the President National Security Council (NSC)
(OP) Philippine Center on Transnational Crime (PCTC)
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
Source: OSS, HPN Briefing (2005)
The NMP should have filled the gap of providing a “framework of
decisions that seeks to achieve the integrated management of marine resources
and ocean space, with a view to avoiding or minimizing conflicts and competing
uses of the ocean, and protecting the long-term values and benefits presented by
the extension of marine areas under national jurisdiction.” 12 However, the NMP
was never implemented in its totality and failed to achieve its vision, when the
12
Department of Environment and Natural resources and Marine Environment and Resources Foundation,
Inc. ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable Philippine Archipelagic Development. Manila. pp. 25.
7
Committee was abolished in 2001. The Maritime and Ocean Affairs Center, an
attached agency under the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) took its place,
but it “neither has a clear authority nor the resources needed” 13 to coordinate the
efforts of other agencies in addressing the country’s maritime affairs, interests
and concerns. Since then, government agencies with maritime-related functions
“have been coordinating only loosely, and on an ad hoc basis under the auspices
of MOAC.” 14 Hence, this study aims to look at the problems on interagency
cooperation in addressing the country’s maritime security threats with the end in
view of proposing ways to improve interagency cooperation.
B. Statement of the Problem
Given the above situation, addressing the different maritime security
threats and challenges is beyond the capability of any single agency of the
government to effectively address. Hence, this study is conducted to assess the
concept of interagency cooperation as a framework in addressing the country’s
maritime security threats. More specifically, this study focused on the agencies
with seaborne assets who have the capability to enforce applicable laws of the
country at sea and in all Philippine waters such as the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources (BFAR), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National
Police - Maritime Group (PNP-MARIG), and the Philippine Navy (PN). These
agencies form the backbone of enforcing our maritime laws at sea and are
directly involved in maritime security operations. Other agencies with maritime-
related functions rely much on the capabilities of these agencies to perform their
respective functions as well through coordination.

13
Inc. ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable Philippine Archipelagic Development. Manila., p. 29.
14
Ibid, p. 29
8
More specifically, this study endeavors to answer the following research
questions:
1. What are the threats to our maritime security the country is
facing today?
2. What are the capabilities of the agencies directly involved in
addressing these maritime security threats?
3. What are the existing linkages, agreements, coordination
mechanisms or frameworks in which these agencies are coordinating their
efforts?
4. What are the issues and concerns to interagency
cooperation particularly in the conduct of maritime security operations?
5. What are the ways or options to improve inter-agency
cooperation between and among the focused agencies in addressing maritime
security threats?
C. Objectives of the Study
This study has the following objectives:
1. To analyze the threats to our maritime security and their
implications in the conduct of maritime security operations.

9
2. To assess the capabilities of the agencies directly involved in
maritime security operations.
3. To examine the existing linkages, agreements and coordinating
mechanisms between the agencies directly involved in maritime security
operations.
4. To determine issues and concerns that hinders interagency
cooperation between these agencies in addressing our maritime security
concerns and ways to overcome them.
5. To propose a framework for interagency cooperation for the
agencies directly involved in addressing the different maritime security threats.
D. Conceptual Framework
This study was developed through the use of systems approach of
analysis which has three (3) components namely: the Inputs, the Process, and
the Output (IPO). The Inputs include all relevant variables bearing on the study
such as maritime security threats; capabilities of agencies with sea-going assets;
existing coordination mechanism/frameworks or agreements/MOAs/MOUs
between these agencies, national marine policies, local and other country’s
interagency models and studies, and perception of the respondents. The Process
involves the analysis and assessment of current interagency
coordination/cooperation mechanism or framework. The Output will be a
proposed interagency coordination/cooperation framework or model to achieve

10
an improved maritime security situation for the country. The Feedback Loop
serves as an indicator mechanism whether the desired outcome is attained
through the desired Output. The schematic diagram is presented in Figure 2.
OUTPUT
PROCESS
Interagency
INPUTS Coordination/
Cooperation
Analyze and Assess Framework l
• Maritime Security
Current
Concerns
Interagency
• Capabilities of PN, Coordination/
PCG, PNP-MARIG Cooperation
Framework and
• Existing
other Models
Coordination
Mechanism/
Framework/
Agreements/MOAs/
MOUs
• National Marine
Policies
• Interagency
Models/Studies
• Perception of
Respondents
FEEDBACK
Figure 2
Conceptual Framework of Analysis
E. Hypotheses:
This study assumes that:
1. The agencies with maritime-related functions are willing to
cooperate in an interagency arrangement.
2. The issues and problems that hinder interagency cooperation
could be overcome.
F. Significance of the Study
This study is significant in the following aspect:

11
1. It will benefit the primary agencies of government with seaborne
assets (BFAR, PNP-MARIG, PCG, PN) as this study would provide them insights
on how to best coordinate, synchronize, and optimize their efforts in addressing
the maritime security threats of the country through interagency cooperation.
2. An integrated approach to maritime security is beneficial to all
stakeholders (government, people, local governments, local government units,
people’s organizations, communities) and the country in general if the concerned
government agencies are able to protect, preserve and develop our maritime
resources for future generations.
3. This study will provide policy makers and government authorities
some insights to consider an interagency approach in addressing maritime
security concerns for sustainable development to take its course. As such, it
could serve as a reference for a bigger scope and participation of other agencies
for interagency cooperation.
4. It will create awareness among the agencies of the government,
both military and civilian on the benefits of interagency cooperation in protecting
our marine interests including presenting ways of overcoming the problems of an
interagency approach in their conduct of maritime security operations.
5. It gives the reader awareness that the host of maritime security
concerns could not be effectively addressed by any single agency of government.
It requires the unselfish cooperation of all agencies involved in maritime security.

12
As such, it provides challenge to the readers to think of better set-ups and
relevant measures to adopt inter-agency cooperation as a framework in
improving the country’s maritime security.
G. Scope and Delimitation
In consideration of the vast magnitude, the multifaceted aspects of
maritime concerns besetting the country, and the number of agencies involved in
maritime security operations, notwithstanding time constraint, this study is limited
in its scope on interagency cooperation between agencies with assets operating
at sea and tasked to enforce all applicable laws of the country at sea and in all
Philippine waters like the PN, PCG, BFAR and the PNP-MARIG. Being at the
forefront of maritime security operations, these agencies form the backbone of
our maritime security initiatives. The roles and relationships of other involved
agencies which impact on the conduct of maritime security operations are not
extensively discussed since they rely much on the aforementioned agencies in
addressing their respective maritime concerns through the conduct of joint or
coordinated maritime operations.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the effectiveness or
appropriateness of the interagency mechanism or framework to be proposed as a
result of this study. This could be a subject of succeeding researches or studies.

13
H. Definition of Terms
Address – attend to or direct one’s attention to.
Agency of the Government (1987 Admin Code) - refers to any of the

various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local
government or a distinct unit therein.
Challenges - a demanding or difficult tasks.
Coastal Area - that area within a landmark limit of one (1) kilometer from
shoreline at high tide.
Coordination - is the orderly and harmonized implementation of policies

and programs by concerned institutions with the objective of minimizing conflicts
among them.
Executive Orders (1987 Admin Code) - Acts of the President providing for
rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of
constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) - is the area beyond and adjacent to the
territorial waters, not exceeding 200 nautical miles from the low water mark.
Framework - an essential supporting structure or a basic system.
Institutional Structure - consists of government and non-government

organizations with defined roles and responsibilities for planning and
implementing ocean sector programs and plans and mechanisms for coordination
among those organizational units.
Integration - refers to the process of balancing and prioritization of

competing ocean uses.
Interagency Coordination (US DoD) - the coordination that occurs between

elements of Department of Defense, and engaged government agencies, non-
governmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the
purpose of accomplishing an objective.
Marine Area - refers to the area of the ocean beyond the outer limit of the
coastal area within the Exclusive Economic Zone.
Maritime – an adjective which means “of, on, connected with, or bordering

of the sea.
Maritime Awareness - consciousness or, or connected with or bordering of

the sea. It encompasses the understanding of the important role of the sea in the
political, economic, social and cultural developments of a particular society.
14
Maritime Domain - means all areas and things of, on, under, relating to,
adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including
all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other
conveyances.
Maritime Security - as a state wherein the country’s marine assets,

maritime practices, territorial integrity and coastal peace and order are protected,
conserved and enhanced.
Threats - an indication of something undesirable coming such as a

person or thing as likely cause of harm, damage, injury, destruction, etc.
Ocean Governance - the process of optimizing for present and future

generations benefits from the resources in the coastal and marine areas through
a set of laws, rules, customs, and organizational and management strategies.
Ocean Policy - a framework of decisions that represents a plan for

achieving integrated management of marine resources and ocean space, with a
view to avoiding or minimizing conflicts and competing uses of the ocean, and
protecting the long-term values and benefits presented by the extension of
marine areas under national jurisdiction.
15
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND STUDIES
In the course of the research, the proponent was not able to come
across a sizeable number of published materials exclusively dealing on the
subject of interagency cooperation between the military and civilian agencies with
law enforcement functions and capabilities as sea in the context of addressing
the country’s maritime security threats. However, a number of related concepts,
principles and ideas on interagency cooperation in the context of ocean
governance and development of a country’s maritime areas as a whole was
found in other writings. These are briefly summarized in the succeeding
discussion:
A. Related Literature and Studies
1. Foreign Literature and Studies
a. Interdepartmental Coordination: The Canadian Experience
Rear Admiral Fred Crickard (Ret), in an article entitled Inter-
Departmental Coordination: The Canadian Experience, reviewed “the
development of interdepartmental coordination in maritime enforcement between
federal departments with regulatory responsibilities for effective oceans
management and Canada’s maritime forces.” 15
15
Crickard, F. (1995). Interdepartmental Coordination: The Canadian Experience In J. McCaffrie (Ed.),
Managing and Protecting the Offshore Estate (pp. 103-114). Australia: Australian Defence Studies Centre.
16
Canada’s policy in protecting its maritime interests is anchored on
the implementation of its law, and use of force and diplomacy. Corollary, its
maritime strategy follows the concept of surveillance, monitoring and
enforcement, strategically meaning naval presence and sea control. 16 The
maritime force structure of the federal government’s fleet include the Canadian
Royal Navy and its air assets, Canadian Coast Guard, and the Fisheries and
Oceans Fleet. These fleets are mandated to support five (5) federal departments
namely: National Defence; Fisheries and Oceans; Transport Canada; Solicitor-
General; and Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The DND has no “statutory
responsibilities for the protection and preservation of Canada’s coastal zones” 17
because of its blue-water capability. Moreover, DND does not have authority for
maritime enforcement but contributes to the surveillance and monitoring of
Canada’s coastal zones to support maritime activities of the other departments
as required. 18
As for the other departments, below are their respective
functions: 19
i. Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) – lead
department in oceans matters as well as being responsible for policies and
programs in support of Canada’s economic, ecological, and scientific interests in
the oceans and inland waters. DFO is mandated to coordinate the ocean policies
and programs of the Federal Government.
16
Ibid., p. 103
17
Ibid., p. 104
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid. pp. 105-107.
17
ii. Transport Canada’s Maritime Branch controls the
Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) which is responsible for marine navigation
systems, ice breaking and Arctic operations, marine regulations and standards,
search and rescue, public harbors and ports and the Canadian pilotage
authorities. It is the lead agency for ship source oil spills and maintains pollution
response centers with spill response equipment.
iii. The Ministry of the Solicitor-General – lead federal law
enforcement agency and coordinates counter-terrorism policy and response to
terrorists incidents. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is its
enforcement agency within the 12-nm territorial limit.
iv. The Department of Foreign affairs and International
Trade provides policy and legal advice on the international aspects of maritime
affairs and exercises consultative role in marine context.
Crickard, noted that as early as the 1960’s, there were
already attempts of the Canadian Federal Government at establishing an
interdepartmental coordination. However, it was only in the early 90s that the
interdepartmental coordination mechanism took place after a series of study and
lessons learned from past incidents at sea.
The first crucial step was the creation of the
Interdepartmental Program Coordination and Review Committee (IPCRC)
composed of the governments three operating fleet namely: National Defence-

18
Maritime Command; Transport Canada-Canadian Coast Guard; and Fisheries
and Oceans. IPCRC’s tasked is “to match marine enforcement and scientific
research requirements vis-à-vis available ship capacity with Fisheries and
Oceans as principal beneficiary. 20” Thus, the Navy and Coast Guard were
required to do multi-tasking functions for fisheries patrol. Consequently, DND’s
role was revised to include “support of sovereignty, fisheries management,
search and rescue, environmental surveillance including assisting RCMP in
patrolling inshore waters and ports. 21” With the establishment of IPCRC, Crickard
asserted that “interdepartmental procedures and operations are becoming
formalised and more closely coordinated. 22”
The second crucial factor to the successful interdepartmental
coordination in the Canadian experience is the promulgation at the national level
of a “joint naval and civilian doctrine in an Interdepartmental Concept of Maritime
Operations (ICMO). 23” The document laid down the “current departmental
mandates; command, control and communication arrangements; a summary of
the various Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) governing bilateral or
multilateral department operations in normal as well as national or war
emergency situations, the levels of force in support of other government
departments during operations at sea, and the various operations required or
anticipated. 24”
20
Ibid., pp. 108-109.
21
Ibid., p. 109
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid., pp. 109-110
19
Last but not least, there is an Interdepartmental Coordination
of Vessel Utilization (ICVU) which coordinates the availability of assets for
patrolling the sea. In this interdepartmental coordination concept, the Navy is
designated as lead agency as far as policy direction is concerned based on the
Government’s defense policy. The primary consideration is that of “naval
presence entailing capability for surveillance, patrol and response in Canadian
maritime areas, and assistance to other Government departments, either in
support or direct armed assistance. 25”
b. Inter-Departmental Coordination: The Australian Experience
Despite having a vast maritime area to protect, Dr Anthony
Bergin noted that Australia “did not really provide a complete framework for a
coordinated Australian ocean policy neither did it define any overall strategy or
vision for coordinated ocean management. 26” Ocean matters were approached
on a sectoral basis. Accordingly, Australia’s attempts at having a coordinated
ocean policy were hindered by sectoral groups dominance and single issues;
differing perspectives of the conflicting local, federal and state governments; and
a question whether a better coordination system would effectively solve ocean-
related matters. Dr Bergin pointed out however, that the absence of a mechanism
for coordinated efforts in ocean management has resulted to inadequate
coordination of efforts among government agencies, fragmentation of
responsibilities, lost opportunities, confusion, policy conflicts, jurisdictional gaps,
charges of management inefficiencies and overlaps, command and control
among others. Thus, the need for an integrated approach to solve the above
25
Ibid., p. 110
26
Bergin, A. (1995). Interdepartmental Coordination: The Australian Experience In J. McCaffrie (Ed.),
Managing and Protecting the Offshore Estate (pp. 115-132). Australia: Australian Defence Studies Centre.
20
problems was recognized. 27 As a consequence, eight (8) Commonwealth reviews
on civil coastal surveillance since 1968 were conducted whose recommendations
evolved to Australia’s current maritime security arrangements.
Coastwatch, an autonomous entity and independently
funded to provide and coordinate national civil coastal surveillance to at least
eight (8) government agencies referred to as user-clients, was established in
1988 within the Australian Customs Service (ACS). It is contracted to provide
visual surveillance, inshore electronic surveillance and support, and offshore
electronic all weather surveillance through a specified number of flying hours of
its air assets way out to 300 miles offshore. It role was also expanded to include
both coordination and control of marine operations with the placement of ACS’ 14
vessels under the organization. Because of the magnitude of task in case of sea
response enforcement, patrol and intelligence gathering, solutions were proposed
in three (3) phases as follows: 28
i. Integrate into the management and control of one
organization, a Civil Coastal Control Agency (CCCA), the functions and
responsibilities of Coastwatch and ACS’ sea-going fleet;
ii. To integrate the sea-going vessels of other
Commonwealth agencies into the CCCA; and
iii. To arrange the mechanism to coordinate, within the
same control and tasking structure, the activities of state-owned and operated
sea-going vessels.
27
Ibid., p. 118
28
Ibid., p. 124.
21
Accordingly, the main reason for integrating only the sea-
going elements of Australia’s marine resources is based on experience of other
nations where it was shown that “combined organizations have not been able to
perform efficiently the individual agency-specific tasks…” 29
With Australia’s current civil coastal surveillance set up,
Defense provides certain levels of offshore surveillance, response assistance,
intelligence, and associated data in support of operations. The Navy provides a
number of patrol boats while the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) provides PC3
Orion patrol efforts. Defense is represented in the Operations and Program
Advisory Committee in the development of all surveillance planning. Bergin
asserted that, while command and control arrangements between Coastwatch
and Defense has been in working, command of Royal Australian Navy (RAN)
and RAAF assets remain with Defense. Coastwatch can coordinate for defense
assistance while Defense supports Coastwatch operations as the overall national

30
coordinator of civil surveillance program.
Finally, Bergin argued that given Coastwatch’s high level of
success in coordinating the national program, “the idea that one can seek a
perfect national coordinated oceans policy in the sense of one that is integrated,
rational, and comprehensive is not realistic.” 31 He added that centralization in a
federal system may not be the best course of action and that “it may be better to
focus on particular oceans policy problems. The ‘big fix’ should be treated very
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid., p. 125
31
Ibid.,p. 127
22
cautiously.” 32 He is quick to add however, that Australia has yet to have “a good
grasp on what coordinating mechanisms currently exist and how well they work
and why, how serious the problems are and why, the costs and outcomes of
different agencies approaches to oceans matters and how better integration
among laws and agencies should be achieved.” 33
c. Maritime Nexus: Bridging Awareness and Capacity-Building in

the Philippine Maritime Viewpoint
Pascasio, a senior researcher of the Office of Strategic
Studies (OSS), Philippine Navy made a case study of the Philippines as a
landlock archipelago citing at the first instance the richness in maritime heritage
and characteristics of the Philippines. He discussed the contradictions of this
maritime nature against the lack of maritime awareness of the Filipinos brought
about by factors such as historical and political developments; misdirected
national policies; unresponsive maritime governance; and the country’s
educational system. 34
Pascasio pointed out that as early as 1898, government
policies have focused towards land reform and agricultural development in
disregard of the country’s archipelagic nature. Furthermore, the author claimed
that reliance on the US for the country’s security umbrella has led to the neglect
of the development of the country’s maritime security capabilities. While the
Philippines was one of the first signatory to the UNCLOS in 1982, it did not, up
32
Ibid., p. 128
33
Ibid.
34
Pascasio, J. (2005). Maritime Nexus: Bridging Awareness and Capacity-Building in the Philippine
Maritime Viewpoint In Maritime Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1 Winter 2005. (pp. 106-126). National Maritime
Foundation, India, pp. 113-118.
23
until the present, complied with the provisions of UNCLOS particularly on the
delimitation of its baselines to define the extent of our national territory. Moreover,
the archipelagic development concept which was supposed to be implemented
through the 1994 National Marine Policy, was never implemented due to the
abolition of the CABCOM-MOA which is tasked to coordinate the efforts of all
agencies with maritime-related functions at the national level. 35 Pascasio also
noted that in 1960s, only the Bureau of Customs was the one supervising the
country’s maritime industry. At present however, he noted that “there are 12
departments, 18 line agencies and attached bureaus, 5 statutory bodies, and 4
other agencies and bodies created for specific maritime concern.” 36 He argued
that the proliferation of agencies with maritime-related functions has created mini-
empires, resulted to spreading of scarce resources, duplication or overlapping of
functions, uncoordinated efforts, and sectoral approach in addressing maritime
concerns. He further averred that “the lack of central authority for the
management and administration of the country’s maritime affairs leaves the
departments with no effective coordinating mechanism.” 37
The last part of Pascasio’s discussion dealt on the
implications of the foregoing to the country’s maritime security and state capacity.
He enumerated the costs and effects of the present state of maritime governance
in the Philippines. Among these are the losses incurred in the fishery sector, the
P12 billion annual amount spent to support the operations of agencies and
departments concerned, and their adverse effects on national security, economic
35
Ibid. p. 116.
36
Ibid., p. 117.
37
Ibid., p. 118
24
growth, environmental degradation, sustainable development, and global

38
competitiveness.
On the aspect of maritime security, Pascasio also
mentioned the challenges and threats the country has to address in the maritime
domain. This include piracy incidents, maritime terrorism, maritime disasters, and
other transnational crimes. Pascasio noted that from 1989 to 2003, there were
1,292 piracy incidents in the country involving 1,838 vessels and 4,489 people
victimized with 581 killed, 230 wounded, and 449 missing. He also stressed the
threat of maritime terrorism posed by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Their
activities include the bombing of M/V Doulous in 1999; kidnapping of 21 persons
in Sipadan, Malaysia in 2000; kidnapping of 3 Americans and 17 Filipinos in Dos
Palmas, Palawan and claiming responsibility of the Superferry 14 bombing. 39 He
concludes by saying that there are only two choices for the Filipinos: “either to do
something now and enjoy the benefits later or do nothing and suffer the
40
irreplaceable loss of our maritime treasures.”
d. Achieving Unity of Effort: A Call for Legislation to Improve the

Interagency Process and Continue Enhancing Interservice Interoperability
Birmingham, Barndt, and Salo of the US Joint Forces Staff
College citing the US Defense Secretary propounded that “Interagency and inter-
Service integration and interoperability are critical to bring the nation’s full
capabilities and resources to bear on the national security challenges of today
38
Ibid., p. 119
39
Ibid., pp. 119-120
40
Ibid., p. 124
25
and tomorrow. 41” Together, they advocated the need for an interagency approach
to have unity of efforts among and between government agencies in meeting
various security challenges to the US. The authors noted that while the
Goldwater-Nichols Act “prescribed a hierarchical process for strategic direction,
strategic planning, and contingency planning for the U.S. Armed Forces, 42” there
is no similar legislation in place for interagency coordination.
They also claim that the following current challenges must be
overcome for an interagency process to be successful: balance of power,
personnel qualification, authority commensurate with responsibilities, chain of
command, and strategic planning capability. They have recognized further that
the primary challenge to interagency process is ensuring unity of effort despite
diverse organizational cultures, differing priorities and perspectives, competing

43
interests, varied approaches, and personal differences.
Despite all the challenges and difficulties that interagency
coordination pose, Birmingham, Barndt, and Salo maintained that a Goldwater-
Nichols Act -like legislation is the solution for the interagency process to work and
for all agencies to work as one. Finally, they contend that “the nation must
establish a common national interagency framework to promote interoperability at
all levels of government. 44”
41
Birmingham, Barndt, and Salo. (2003). Achieving Unity of Effort: A Call for Legislation to Improve the
Interagency Process and Continue Enhancing Interservice Interoperability. Retrieved February 13, 2007
from http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/current_students/documents_policies/documents/jca_cca_awsp/Achieving_
Unity _of_Effort.doc. p. 1.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid., p. 7
44
Ibid., p. 15
26
e. Rethinking the Interagency System
Donley, of Hicks and Assocites, Inc., in his Occasional Paper
# 05-01, propose for the re-evaluation of the US interagency system wherein the
National Security Council (NSC) always play the lead role in view of “the new
challenges brought on by lessons learned in interagency operations and a
dramatically changing security environment “ 45 particularly after the 9/11 terrorist
attack. Accordingly, “the US needs new ways of coordinating, overseeing, and
implementing policies and operations in the national security community across
individual departments and agencies. 46”
Donley found out that the integration of effort remain as the
overarching problem in an interagency system in the face of a new security
environment. He also noted from recommendations of various studies like the
Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), 9/11 Commission, and Defense
Science Board (DSB) that integration of efforts should not only take place on the
strategic or departmental levels but more importantly, down to all levels of
government especially to those on the frontlines who executes national policy on
the ground. This recommendation is effectively seen as moving away from the
NSC model of interagency system which in the mind of Donley, is lacking as an
overarching framework. This is aimed at improving effectiveness at the
operational levels. He concluded that the new framework should “define the
relationship of new interagency elements to the NSC, to determine department
45
Donley, M. (2005, March). Rethinking the Interagency System. Retrieved February 17, 2007 from
http://www.hicksandassociates.com/reports/HAI-occasional-paper.pdf .p.1.
46
Ibid.
27
and agency responsibilities for interagency matters, and especially to determine
the NSC’s future roles and responsibilities in a new interagency system.” 47
f. Progress in the Implementation of the Philippine National Marine

Policy: Issues and Options
Garcia (2005), a United Nations (UN) Fellow of the Nippon
Foundation of Japan, studied the progress in the implementation of the NMP
through the defunct CABCOM-MOA including the attendant issues to its
implementation and the available options that could be considered for the NMP’s
implementation. Essentially, Garcia noted that the NMP through the CABCOM-
MOA, supposedly has had provided the first great stride of the government in
achieving an integrated oceans management for the Philippines. Accordingly, the
purpose of establishing a national ocean policy is “for the state to exercise its
stewardship responsibilities, harmonize existing laws and ocean uses, promote
coordination among government agencies concerned with the use of maritime
space and resources, and maximize benefits from utilization of ocean resources
within sustainable limits.” 48 Unfortunately, this was not to be the case since the
CABCOM-MOA was abolished in 2001. The Maritime and Ocean Affairs Center,
an attached agency under the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) took its place,
but it “neither has a clear authority nor the resources needed” 49 to coordinate the
efforts of other agencies in addressing the country’s maritime affairs, interests
and concerns. Since then, government agencies with maritime-related functions
47
Ibid., pp. 10-11
48
philippines.pdf. p.9.
49
Inc. ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable Philippine Archipelagic Development. Manila., p. 29.
28
“have been coordinating only loosely, and on an ad hoc basis under the auspices
of MOAC.” 50 The table below shows the organizational structure of MOAC.
Secretary-General
Executive Director
Division 1 Division 2 Division 3 Division 4 Division 5
Territorial and International Fisheries, International Law of the

other Maritime Seabed Marine Dispute Sea Library,
Jurisdiction, Authority Environmental Procedures, Information
Archipelagic (ISA), Protection, Other Law of Dissemination,
Sealanes, Continental Marine the Sea Conference &
Cartography Shelf and Scientific Issues, Piracy Secretariat
Resources Research & Sea Robbery Services
Figure 3
MOAC Organizational Structure
Accordingly, the reason behind this policy change was based
on the premise that the Cabinet Secretaries “should do less cluster and inter-
agency committee work so that they can concentrate on running their
department.” 51 As such the intention of the formulation of the NMP “to create a
venue for better coordination and integration among agencies with marine-related
functions” 52 was negated. As a result, the coordination and consultations are
done on an ad hoc basis which made the cooperation of other agencies difficult. 53
50
Ibid, p. 29
51
philippines.pdf. pp. 64-65.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid., p. 65
29
The succeeding table shows the Policy Statements and Goals of the
54
NMP:
Table 2
Policy Statements and Goals of the NMP

National Territory Marine Ecology Marine Economy Maritime Security
and Technology
Philippine Territory is defined Explore, develop, and Promotion of a Enhance maritime
and delineated, under existing manage viable security – a state
laws, none of which is offshore/ocean marine fisheries wherein the country’s
invalidated by the LOSC. resources based on management marine assets, maritime
the principle of program practices, territorial
sustainable integrity and coastal
development peace and order are
protected, conserved
and enhanced
There is no obligation Develop and manage Provision of Promote and enhance
under the LOSC to redraw coastal resources continuous and maritime security as a
existing baselines. within an integrated adequate supply of key component of
coastal zone energy national security
management
framework
While the int’l Develop and enhance Development of Provide a stable and
recognition of the TOP limits national marine technological peaceful socio-political
remains an issue, the consciousness capabilities in and administrative
extended maritime through a the maritime sector environment in the
jurisdictions of the Philippines comprehensive country that fosters
(i.e. territorial sea, contiguous information program sustained profitability
zone and continental shelf) and growth for maritime
are well established under industries
existing Philippine laws and
customary int’l law.
Encourage the Promoting Protect and defend the
development of a investments in integrity of the
marine research marine areas Philippines’ marine
Program resources
Adopt the “polluters- Harnessing Ensured preparedness
pay” principle in information for and effective
ensuring the technology to serve response to natural
protection of the NMP goals calamities and
marine environment manmade disasters
Ensure the high Enhancing regional Provide leadership and
quality of maritime economic and guidance in the proper
professional schools technical and effective collection,
and other such cooperation in processing and
institutions for marine and ocean distribution of strategic
training experts in affairs information supportive
maritime-related of the NMP
issues
Strengthening trade
policies supportive
of maritime issues
Source: Compiled from the National Marine Policy , 1994
54
philippines.pdf. p. 57
30
Aside from providing insights on what had happened and the
experience gained of the government from the derailed implementation of the
NMP through the CABCOM-MOA, Garcia also offered some institutional structure
options to enhance interagency coordination and integrate oceans policy. He
pointed out the problems and issues encountered in the process of
implementation and discussed ways of overcoming them. He also delved in part
the significance of defining the extent of our national territory and the need of
harmonizing our domestic laws with that of UNCLOS. Finally, the paper
concludes that “ocean policy coordination through an inter-ministerial body
augurs well for integrated ocean management.” 55 It also recommended for the
reestablishment of an inter-agency coordinative mechanism and asserts the need
to address the following: 56 (1) the integration and defining of roles of the sub-
national development planning bodies in the national ocean policy planning; and
(2) the integration of ocean planning process into the national development
planning. The institutional structures options presented are as follows: 57
a. Option 1. CABCOM-MOA Based Decision Making
President Congress
Senate House of Representatives

CABCOM-MOA
Committee on Rules Committee on Rules

Presidential Task Force on Ocean Affairs
Chair: DND Vice-Chair: DA Ocean Affairs Caucus/ Ocean Affairs Caucus/

Ocean Affairs Committee Ocean Affairs Committee
Environment Protection Economy Management Maritime Security

Team Team Team
(DENR) (DOTC) (DILG)
Figure 4
CABCOM-MOA Based Decision Making
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.,p.86-80.
31
b. Option 2: LEDAC –Based Decision-Making System
President Congress
LEDAC Secretariat
Ocean Affairs Sub-Committee Desk
LEDAC
Sub-Committee on Ocean Affairs
NEDA OARS Netwrok

NSC NGO Coalition on Ocean Affairs
DENR Council of Coastal Towns & Cities
DFA Senate Committee on Environment, Natural
DOTC Resources, Energy, Foreign Relations
DND House Committee on Appropriations,
DILG Economic Affairs, Transportation &
DOT Communications, Agriculture &
DOST Tourism
Figure 5
LEDAC –Based Decision-Making System
c. Option 3. NEDA-Based Inter-Agency Council
Office of the President Congress
ARCDEV COUNCIL
Cabinet level + NGO + LGU
i
ARCDEV Secretariat
(IEC, Policy Review ,
Coastal/Marine Socio-Economic Maritime Safety Territory and

Environment Cluster and Security Foreign Affairs Special Projects
Cluster Cluster Cluster
Regional Development Councils
Provincial/City/
Municipal/
Barangay Development Councils
Figure 6
NEDA-Based Inter-Agency Council

32
g. New Zealand (NZ) Government Interagency Support
New Zealand’s interagency set-up for maritime security could
be considered as very simple and practical in nature. A National Maritime
Coordination Center (NMCC) is co-located with the Headquarters of Joint Force
New Zealand (HQ JFNZ) and co-ordinates New Zealand Defense Force (NZDF)
support to other government agencies. The headquarters is a joint (tri-Service),
operational-level organization instead of the three Service operational command
headquarters. All staff in the headquarters supports both COMJFNZ and the
three component commanders. This integrated structure also allows the
headquarters to function as a single point of contact for HQNZDF, other
government departments and agencies, and allied and other foreign operational-
level joint headquarters as well. HQ JFNZ is structured as an integrated
headquarters organized on functional rather than Service environment lines. 58
On the other hand, the NMCC although co-located with HQ
JFNZ is an independent agency that helps ensure that aircraft and ships
available to the New Zealand Government, including the NZDF are put to best
use to keep New Zealand safe from maritime threats ranging from terrorism, drug
trafficking to illegal fishing. It coordinates civilian use of maritime patrol and
surveillance assets, including information. The NMCC is jointly manned by civilian
and military personnel, including liaison officers from the New Zealand Customs
Service, the Ministry of Fisheries and the New Zealand Defence Force. This set
up ensures a coordinated and optimized effectiveness of New Zealand's maritime
58
NZ Government Inter-agency Support. Retrieved from http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/govt-inter-
agency-support.htm and http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/structure.htm on February 2, 2007.
33
surveillance, maritime resource management, barrier law enforcement and

59
barrier control activities.
The NMCC has three key purposes: 60
i. To contribute to maritime domain awareness (MDA)
in relation to risks in the marine environment that could impact on
the sovereignty, security, safety, economy, environment or foreign policy interests
of New Zealand.
ii. To support the effective and efficient use of New
Zealand's maritime patrol and surveillance assets.
iii. To support and facilitate the effective use and
accessibility of maritime-related information from multiple sources that supports
the core business of government agencies.
2. Local Literature and Studies
a. National Marine Policy (NMP)
The NMP of the Philippines was signed as Executive Order
Nr 86 by then President Fidel V. Ramos on July 12, 1994 creating the Cabinet
Committee on Maritime and Ocean Affairs (CABCOM-MOA). It is chaired by the
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs with thirteen (13) other
departments under the Committee. The primary function of the Committee is “to
formulate practical and viable policies and addressing the various concerns which
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
34
affect the implementation of UNCLOS and other marine-related matters.” 61
CABCOM-MOA is composed of the secretaries of the DFA as chair, and
Executive Secretary, NEDA, DND, DENR, NSC, DA, DOST, DOTC, DOE, DTI,
DOJ, DOF, DBM, DILG, DOLE, and DOT as members.
The NMP advocates the establishment of a development
model in consonance with the Philippines’ status as an archipelagic nation. Thus,
the salient provisions of the NMP which the country adopt as national policy
include the following: 62
i. Emphasize the archipelagic nature of the
Philippines in development planning;
ii. View coastal marine areas as a locus of
community, ecology and resources;
iii. Implement UNCLOS within the framework of
the NMP;
iv. Coordinate and consult with concerned and
affected sectors through the CABCOM-MOA, and;
v. Address the following priority concerns: extent
of the national territory, protection of the marine ecology, management of the
marine economy and technology, and maritime security.
61
Department of Foreign Affairs. National Marine Policy. Manila: Foreign Service Institute, 1995.p.16.
62
Ibid., p.7.
35
The NMP should have provided an integrated policy planning
and management framework in addressing the entire range of the country’s
marine, coastal, and ocean-related interests. However, it is clear from the policy
that as far as interagency coordination is concerned, CABCOM-MOA exercises
only coordinative and consultative functions over other agencies. It does not have
the authority needed for the management and administration of our country’s
maritime affairs. Furthermore, it could be noted that maritime security is given
less priority.
The following form part of the security aspect of the NMP: 63
i. Promote and enhance maritime security as a key
component of national security;
ii. Provide a stable and peaceful socio-political
and administrative environment in the country that fosters sustained profitability
and growth for maritime industries;
Iii. Protect and defend the integrity of the Philippines’
marine resources;
iv. Ensure preparedness for and effective response to
natural calamities and man-made disasters;
63
Ibid. pp. 11-12.
36
v. Provide leadership and guidance in the proper and
effective collection, processing and distribution of strategic information supportive
of the NMP. 64
It is worth mentioning here that the NMP’s goals require “the
concerted effort of government agencies, through the Cabinet Committee on
Maritime and Ocean Affairs (CABCOM-MOA), to consult all concerned and
affected sectors.” 65 It further mandated the Committee to “continually update the
NMP and make it more responsive to the national interests.” 66 According to
Ambassador Alberto Encomienda, Secretary-General of the defunct CABCOM-
MOA, the NMP envisions for the Philippines “the development of comprehensive
and coordinated national oceans policy” 67 with the concept of archipelagic
development as its core “requiring a paradigm shift in national development
thinking to sustainable economic development.” 68 Unfortunately, Encomienda
laments that “the concept still needs to catch the attention of policy makers and
that lack of material time and resources did not allow the full flowering of a
visionary policy for Philippine ocean spaces.” 69
b. ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable Philippine Archipelagic

Development, Revaluing our Maritime heritage and Affirming the Unity of Land
and Sea
ArcDev is a study funded by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) and jointly conducted by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Marine Environment and
64
Ibid, p.6
65
Department of Foreign Affairs. National Marine Policy. Manila: Foreign Service Institute, 1995. p. 12.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid, p. 6
68
Ibid.
69
Encomienda. A.A., The National Marine and Oceans Policy: Challenges and Opportunities, Statement
at the PN Maritime Symposium 2005, 16-17 May 2005
37
Resources Foundation, Inc. (MERFI). ArcDev aims to establish a Sustainable
Archipelagic Development Framework that would serve as an implementing
mechanism and in harmonizing development efforts of government agencies
though an integrated coastal and marine policy.
The in-depth study noted that national management policies
in the coastal and marine areas of the Philippines are characterized by lack of
coordination; jurisdictional confusion and conflicts; sectoral fragmentation; gaps,
contradictions, and overlaps in laws and policies; confusion over National and
Local Government responsibilities for marine-related management; proliferation
of agencies tasked with law enforcement; ineffective system of sanctions for
policy violations; structural obstacles: culture, power, and governance practices;

70
and lack of public awareness and participation in marine concerns. ArcDev
seeks to find an acceptable institutional mechanism for coordinating and
implementing the proposed framework.
There were three (3) options presented as follows:
70
Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Marine Environment and Resources
Foundation, Inc. ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable Philippine Archipelagic Development. Manila., pp.
30-31
38
Option 1. ArcDev established on the basis of Philippine Council for

Sustainable Development (PCSD) structure, as one of the sub-committees. 71
Office of the President
PCSD
Secretariat
Committee on Committee on the Committee on Committee on the

Social and Conservation and Strengthening Means of Implementing
Economic Management of Resources the Role of Agenda 21
Dimensions for Development Major Groups
Sub-Committee on
Sub- committee on Financing
Bio-Diversity A t
Sub-committee on Sub-Committee on
the Atmosphere Science&Technolo
Sub-Committee on Sub-Committee on
Water Resources Information &
Education
Sub-Committee on Regional
Land Resources Development Sub-Committee on
Councils Legal &
Sub-Committee on Institutional
Marine and Ocean
Resources
Provincial/City/Munici
pal/
Barangay
Development Councils
Figure 7
ArcDev Established on the Basis of PCSD Structure
Since ArcDev is a planning framework that encourages multi-stakeholder,
consensus-building process, this model may fit into the existing structure of the
PCSD, the agency mandated to mainstream Sustainable Development (SD)
thinking into the national and local development and decision-making processes.
ArcDev can either be subsumed under the Committee on the Conservation and
Management of Resources for Development (CCMRD), as a Sub-committee on
71
Ibid., p. 53
39
Marine and Oceans Resources, or PCSD itself can be expanded to become a
Philippine Council for Sustainable Archipelagic Development. 72
Option2. ARCDEV Council Based on Expanded PCSD Structure
Office of the President
Phil Council for

SustainableArchipelagic
Devt. (PCSAD)
Secretariat
Committee on Committee on Committee on Committee on Committee on Committee on

Coastal and the Conservation Maritime Safety Territorial and Means of Strengthening
Marine Socio- & Management and Security Jurisdictional Implementing the Role of
Econ Concerns of Resources Concerns Agenda 21 and Major Groups
ArcDev
Agenda
Sub-committee Sub-committee Sub-Committee

on Population on on Financing
Bio-Diversity Arrangements
Sub-committee Sub-committee
on Livelihood on the
Atmosphere Sub-Committee
on Science &
Sub-committee Sub-Committee Technology
on on Internal
Infrastructure Waters
Sub-Committee
on Info and
Sub-committee Sub-Committee
Education
on Energy on Land
Resources Regional Development
Councils Sub-Committee
Sub-committee Sub-Committee on Legal and
on Industry on Coastal, Institutional
Marine and Arrangements
Ocean Provincial/City
Resources Municipal/
Barangay Development
Councils
Figure 8
ARCDEV Council Based on Expanded PCSD Structure
72
Jacinto, G.S. , ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable Archipelagic Development, Statement at the PN
Maritime Symposium 2005, 16-17 May 2005
40
This model however, has several disadvantages. Since ArcDev shall be
sharing with the resources of PCSD, it may have to compete with other equally
critical issues handled by PCSD. The current PCSD structure does not
encompass certain identified ArcDev concerns such as maritime safety and
security, and territorial issues and foreign affairs, therefore an expansion of
PCSD itself may be required. 73
Option 3:ArcDev Council with independent Regional Management Board

Office of the President Congress
ARCDEV COUNCIL
(Cabinet Level + LGU)
ARCDEV CSO/Private ARCDEV Secretariat

Sector Secretariat
Coastal/Marine Maritime Safety Territory and

Environment Socio-Economic and Security Foreign Affairs Special Projects
Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
Regional ArcDev Management Board
Regional Provincial/City/Municipal/ People’s Other Local

Development Barangay Development Councils Organizations Stakeholders
Councils
Figure 9
ArcDev Council with Independent Regional Management Board
The proposed structure would have the same features as Option 1 up to
the Advisory committee level. The difference lies in the operational structure.
73
Ibid.
41
While Option 1 makes use of existing administrative regional clusters, Option 3
proposes the establishment of a regional ArcDev management body based on
the six marine ecosystems. 74
ArcDev is convinced that it is the way forward towards sustainable
development. Government however, has still to act on any of the options
presented. Whatever mechanism would be implemented, ArcDev posit that such
a mechanism must encompass the following, namely: “the design and
implementation of an integrated archipelagic development plan (as part of the
MTPDP); the harmonization and monitoring of sectoral plans and programs; the
synchronization of, and resolution of conflicts among the various agencies and
different levels of government involved; and the promotion of various programs,
including multi-sectoral (GO-NGO-Private sector) partnership programs. 75
c. The Coastwatch South Initiative: A proposed Framework for

Maritime Security Cooperation in the Sulu and Celebes Seas
Coaswatch South is a Philippine Navy (PN) concept as a
mechanism for regulating the use of the sea in Southern Philippines in pursuit of
the country’s maritime interests. Its mission is “to provide centralized maritime
surveillance and response in the waters of Southern Philippines in order to
facilitate the movement of desirable people and goods and prevent the entry and
exit of dangerous goods and lawless elements. 76”
74
Ibid.
75
Ibid., p. 48
76
Philippine Navy Concept Paper on Coastwatch South Initiative
42
The concept recognizes that the foundation of maritime
security is situational awareness. Situational awareness in our maritime domain
can be achieved through the gathering of timely and relevant information and the
establishment of a reliable database. An important information source is
surveillance.
An essential feature of this architecture is the fusion, sharing,
and analysis of information, cueing or prioritization, the location and assessment
of the threats, and the determination and implementation of appropriate response
that result in successful interdictions. Successful interdictions then lead to the
apprehension of security threats and their eventual prosecution.
In operationalizing the above concept, the PN will establish
strong links with other government agencies involved in providing maritime patrol.
These agencies include the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Bureau of Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), and the Philippine National Police-Maritime
Group (PNP-MARIG). Inter-agency maritime patrol operations with these
agencies will be forged to have unity of effort in safeguarding the country’s waters
from acts of terrorism, piracy, smuggling and other transnational crimes. Pooling
of existing capabilities and integrating capability development plans among these
agencies are therefore necessary. The conceptual framework of Coaswatch
South is shown in the next page:

43
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Legal Authority and Jurisdiction
Situational Awareness
Information Territorial Security
Surveillance
Responsive Decision-Making Architecture
Fusion & Cueing Locate / Assess Interdiction

Sharing
Inter-agency and Apprehend

International
Cooperation
Interdiction
Prosecute
Capabilities
Figure 10
Coastwatch South Conceptual Framework
Due to the expected involvement of several players from
different departments, the organization of Coast Watch South envisions a
centralized command and control facility which shall serve as the hub for
coordinating maritime surveillance and response operations. Embedded within
the central command and control facility is a unified information sharing and
coordinating center manned by personnel from participating agencies with the
primary task of developing a common operating picture and with the capability of
providing information that meets the specific requirements of various maritime
security agencies.
At the strategic level, an interagency threat assessment
coordinating group shall be established which shall be tasked to provide the
Coast Watch South operational commander the specific tasking based on a

44
common risk assessment methodology that will be developed. The result of the
risk assessment methodology shall be the basis for the prioritization of threats
subject to surveillance and response operations.
The Coast Watch South operational commander reports
regularly to a high-level committee to provide the strategic leadership a visibility
of the conduct and results of maritime operations in the Southern Philippines.
This high-level committee could be the existing National Security Core Group
chaired by the National Security Adviser. Shown below is the proposed
organizational structure of Coastwatch South: 77
High-Level Committee
(National Security Core Group)
ITACG
CWS Command
(Composite Manning from all agencies)
AFP BoC
Maritime Information-Sharing
PCG and Coordinating Center MARINA
(Composite Manning from all agencies)
PNP-MG PPA
BFAR BIQHS
BID OTHER AGENCIES
Figure 11
Coastwatch South Functional Structure
d. The AFP’s Integrated Maritime Watch: An Assessment
Samaco, a Regular Class 38 of NDCP in 2003, assessed in
his study the readiness of the AFP’s Integrated Maritime Watch (AFPIMW) to
77
Ibid.
45
effectively negate security threats to Philippine territorial integrity within the
municipal waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). His findings revealed
the following:
i. There is inadequate equipage for maritime
defense of air, land, and sea surveillance system of the AFPIMW from the
municipal waters to the country’s EEZ.
ii. There is ineffective existing equipage for
maritime defense of air, land, and sea surveillance system of the AFPIMW within
the municipal waters and EEZ.
iii. There is significant difference in the perception
of the six groups of respondents as regards adequacy and effectiveness of the
AFPIMW within the EEZ and municipal waters.
iv. The interagency linkages are not coordinated

78
with each other.
e. Problems and Solutions to Inter-agency Cooperation Identified

and Proposed by Three Groups of Stakeholders in Curbing Criminality At-Sea in
Manila Bay and Surrounding Coastal Areas
Corpus’ study focused on identifying the problems
encountered in inter-agency cooperation in curbing criminality at Manila Bay
which covers the National Capital Region (NCR) and the surrounding coastal
areas of Bulacan, Bataan, Cavite and Pampanga. His study revealed
78
Samaco, R.L. G. (2003). The AFP’s Integrated Maritime Watch: An Assessment (Unpiblished Thesis,
National Defense College of the Philippines: Quezon City
46
interagency collaboration problems such as uncoordinated policy implementation
and operations, inadequate funds or logistics, and organizational, management
and administrative matters. The proposed solutions to the problems identified as
a result of the study include extensive information campaign as regards
implementation of laws and interagency cooperation; integration of the
coastwatch system with other maritime activities of government agencies; and
strengthening the integration, coordination, and surveillance activities of

79
government agencies.
f. Designing an Institutional Structure for Ocean Governance:

Options for the Philippines
In this study, Aguilos examined how can ocean management
and development may be enhanced through reforms in the current institutional
framework with the end in view of achieving sustainable development. She also
explored organizational design options for ocean governance that may lead to an
integrated national policy making, planning and implementation. The focus
therefore of the study is on the aspects of organizational structure that are likely
to promote comprehensiveness, aggregation, and consistency in national oceans
policy. She is quick to add however, that reforms in governance and
improvements in ocean management are difficult in the Philippine setting. She
conceded that the issues and concerns of ocean governance is “far more
complex to be addressed solely by institutional structure solutions.” 80
79
Corpus Jr, N.M.M. (2001). Problems and Solutions to Inter-agency Cooperation Identified and Proposed
by Three Groups of Stakeholders (Unpublished Thesis), National Defense College of the Philippines.
Quezon City
80
Aguilos, M. (1998). Designing an Institutional Structure for Ocean Governance: Options for the
Philippines In M. Aguilos (Ed.), Ocean Law and Policy Series (pp. 67-122). Manila: Institute of
International Legal Studies: University of the Philippines Law Center. p. 68.
47
In analyzing the government’s system in relation to ocean
resources and environment she offered an operational framework for study based
on the NMP’s governance objectives of marine ecology protection; marine
economy and technology management; maritime security; and determination of
the national territory. The analysis was discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of her
study. Chapter 2 is basically an overview of the country’s state of ecology,
economy, and security. Chapter 3, enumerated the institutions relevant to ocean
management and development based on their administrative and legal
mandates. Three institutional levels are discussed which include those in the
general system level or (strategic level); those in the program level or
(operational); and those in the coastal and marine areas or (tactical level).
Chapter 4 presents some institutional structure options that can be adopted for
the country taking into consideration the state of ocean governance in the
country and its capability to respond to the country’s demand for ocean structure.
Aguilos proposed seven (7) strategies for ocean policy

81
making which are:
i. Review goals, objectives and strategies.
ii. Realign institutional structure according to clear goals
and objectives.
iii. Improve executive-legislative linkages.
iv. Install mechanisms for better communication among
institutions at all levels.
v. Address need for greater flexibility for activities
beyond sectoral interests.
81
Ibid., pp.95-97
48
vi. Synchronize activities of government agencies for
common objectives.
vii. Improve national-local government coordination in
policy development.
In order to implement the ocean policies, Aguilos likewise
offered the following strategies: 82
i. Task forces as control mechanisms for uniform
interpretation of policies.
ii. National government – local government relations:
coordination not imposition.
iii. Provide evaluation and feedback mechanism.
Finally, Aguilos offered three (3) institutional design options
for the country: “One is the CABCOM-MOA Based Decision-making System
based on a situation where the creation of new structures is not feasible in both
legislative and executive branches for national policy making and planning. This
is to be complemented by a presidential Task Force on Coastal and Marine
Affairs to coordinate planning and implementation in all levels of government. The
second option is to harness the LEDAC System for ocean governance by
creating a Sub-Committee for Ocean Affairs as the primary body to recommend
and coordinate national policies and plans for the oceans. This is to be
complemented at the planning and implementation levels by a network of Ocean
Affairs Committees nationwide. The third option is a “Legislative-Executive
82
Ibid., pp.97-98
49
Council for Ocean Affairs” policy making system based on a scenario where
existing institutions can be open to more innovations. This is to be complemented
by a tri-task force planning and implementing and coordination framework that
will be coordinated at the national level by a National Secretariat for Ocean
Affairs headed by a Secretary –General for Ocean Affairs.” 83
The study concluded that, “ultimately, it will be up to the
decision-makers to determine the shape of the institutional framework that will be
considered appropriate for ocean governance in the Philippines.” 84
B. Synthesis of Related Literatures and Studies
The reviewed literatures and studies both foreign and local are definitely
related to the conduct of this study of interagency cooperation in the context of
maritime security. Undoubtedly, they provided invaluable insights to the
researcher in the development of a possible mechanism or framework for
interagency cooperation between the PCG, PNP-MARIG, BFAR, and PN suited
for Philippine setting in addressing the different maritime security threats.
The foreign sources revealed that there is indeed a growing recognition of
the need for interagency cooperation or coordination in addressing varied threats
in the maritime environment. It also showed the increasing role of civilian
government agencies have to perform alongside the armed services in ensuring
the security of the state. This is so because of the broader concept of maritime
security today than it was before the 9/11 incident. The interagency concept
83
Ibid., p. 111
84
Ibid.
50
presented enormous challenges to be successful but it is one thing governments
cannot do without. The Canadian experience provides a good model while the
Australian experience worked but in a different coordinative arrangement.
Meantime, the US is continuously improving from its present interagency set up.
Although several models are proposed, the Philippines has yet to adopt a
mechanism or framework for interagency cooperation for maritime security. A
common factor in interagency arrangement noted is the presence of a body,
committee or agency that provides the direction of other agencies in addressing
different maritime security threats. In sum, the foreign literatures advocated
interagency coordination or cooperation in maritime security context as the way
to move forward which a government cannot just ignore.
Below is summary of the essential elements of an interagency cooperation
as proposed from the foreign literature:
1. One lead/coordinating agency at the ministerial level should be
designated in addressing varied threats in the maritime environment.
2. Need for maritime strategy and national ocean’s policy.
3. Improve maritime awareness and capacity.
4. Interagency cooperation should filter down to operational and
tactical levels.
51
5. The need for a joint national civil – military doctrine for interagency
operation for maritime operations
On the local sources, there were already some proposals but the
appropriate model has yet to be selected and implemented. It only shows that
there is already an increasing awareness of the importance of interagency
cooperation to address more effectively our maritime security concerns. The
interagency problems such as lack of coordination, overlapping of functions and
jurisdictions, uncoordinated plans and programs, fragmented approach to
maritime security, and spreading of scarce resources were pointed out as a result
of an integrated framework for interagency cooperation which as discussed,
could be avoided if the concerned agencies are going to work as one in an
integrated and coordinated manner.
Below is a summary of the recommendations from the above literature to
make interagency cooperation work:
1. The promulgation of an overarching national ocean’s policy.
2. Designation of one lead agency at the ministerial level.
3. The need for a mechanism or framework for interagency
cooperation to integrate government agencies’ efforts.
4. Jointness in information sharing, patrols, exercises, use of
assets, liaison officers.

52
5. Need for executive-legislative support and linkage.
6. Adequate funds and logistics support including additional
assets are needed.
7. The need for coordinated policy implementation.
C. Gaps to Filled by the Study
Owing to the presence of several proposals or models already presented
for interagency cooperation in addressing the maritime security concerns of the
country, this study aims to further fill in the gaps between the strategic level and
the operational and tactical levels of interagency cooperation. It was noted in the
review of related literature that the interagency cooperation between agencies at
the strategic level seemed to be adequate. However, in the process of
implementation or execution, the desired outcome falls short of what is expected.
There were difficulties encountered in achieving a truly integrated interagency
effort at the operational and tactical levels to include factors such as absence of
lead agency and clear policy, lack of coordination mechanisms, inadequate
equipage and resources, lack of jointness, civil-military relations and perceptions
between the agencies directly involved in maritime security operations like the
BFAR, PCG, PNP-MARIG, and PN. This is one focus of this study in the hope of
filling in the said gaps by surveying the perceptions of the personnel of the above
agencies at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Further, this study also
endeavors to look at the ways that facilitate the making of a framework for
interagency cooperation to work in addressing the varied maritime security
threats of the country.

53
CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter presents the procedures to find answers to the research
problem and specific questions to reinforce the outcome of the study. It consist of
six (6) component parts namely: the Research Design; Data Collection
Techniques; Data Gathering Instruments; Respondents/Unit Analysis; Locale of
the Study; and Statistical Treatment of Data. These components are discussed in
the following sections:
A. Method of Research
The descriptive method of research is used in studying the concept of
interagency cooperation in the context of maritime security. It is used to analyze
current conditions, practices and situations in addressing maritime security
concerns such as maritime terrorism, piracy, transnational threats, foreign
intrusions, illegal fishing, maritime disasters and marine pollution. In addition, the
present capabilities of government agencies with sea-going assets, coordinating
mechanisms or agreements are also analyzed using the same method. Lastly,
this research method is also applied in examining the proposed interagency
models of some policy experts including that of other countries to determine their
viability to Philippine setting. Since this study is concerned with the present
conditions or status of interagency arrangements between agencies concerned,
the descriptive method of research is the most appropriate method to use.

54
B. Locale of the Study
The study is limited within the geographical area of the National Capital
Region and Cavite. These places host the national headquarters of the different
maritime security agencies (BFAR, PCG, PNP-MARIG, PN) as well as their main
operating units. Likewise, the personnel of the agencies in these areas are
expected to be well-trained and well versed in the issues and challenges of inter-
agency coordination as they deal both with policy and operational concerns. In
many ways, they have experienced being deployed at the tactical level of
maritime operations prior to their shore assignments.
C. Respondents (or Unit Analysis)
In conducting the survey, the purposive random sampling procedure was
used. This is to be able to get the perceptions on interagency cooperation of
those in the policy/strategic, operational and tactical levels of maritime security
operations. The universe of the survey is concentrated on the agencies
concerned which are the PN, PCG, BFAR, and PNP-MARIG. The distribution of
the survey participants are shown on Table 3.
The respondents for the survey included officers from the Headquarters,
Philippine Navy (HPN), Philippine Fleet (PF), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG),
Philippine National Police-Maritime Group (PNP-MARIG) and the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR). As can be shown on Table 3, the
combined number of respondents from the HPN and the Philippine Fleet
comprise the majority of the respondents followed by the respondents from the
PCG, PNP-MARIG and BFAR.

55
Table 3
Number of Respondents from Different Agencies
Agency / Unit No. of Percentage Rank

Respondents
HPN 35 25% 2
Philippine Fleet 60 43% 1
PCG 25 18% 3
PNP-MG 15 11% 4
BFAR 5 4% 5
TOTAL 140 100%
The distribution of respondents is representative of the size of each of the
maritime security agencies considered for the study. Since the distribution
reflects the size of the organization of each surveyed agency, it can then be
concluded that the responses of the sample can be used as basis of information
to meet the objectives of this study.
The respondents were also distributed according to the rank of the
samples. Table 4 shows the distribution of respondents according to their rank.
Half of the sampled individuals belong to the rank of Lieutenant Junior Grade and
Lieutenant Senior Grade followed by Lieutenant Commanders and Commanders.
A section of the senior officers and civilians were also sampled by the survey.
Table 4
Rank Distribution of Respondents
Unit O2-O3 O4-O5 O6-O7 Others Total

HPN 18 10 2 5 35
Philippine
35 19 6 0 60
Fleet
PCG 10 12 3 0 25
PNP-MG 7 6 2 0 15
BFAR 0 0 0 5 5
TOTAL 70 47 13 10 140
Percentage 50% 34% 9% 7% 100%
56
The distribution of sampled individuals for this study is also representative
of the normal situation within each organization where there are more junior
officers and lesser number of officers as the rank goes higher. It is also indicative
of the extent or variety of experience that the sample has in maritime security
operations. With an even distribution of junior and more senior officers, the
perceptions of the respondents can then be used as an input for this study.
Moreover, the variety of experience that the sample can contribute to this
study is also evident on the distribution of respondents according to their length
of service shown in Table 5. A great majority of the respondents has experience
ranging from six (6) to twenty (20) years. This means that the many of the
respondents are experienced in maritime security operations.
Table 5
Length of Service Profile
Length Agency / Unit Total Percentage

of HPN PHILFLT PCG PNP- BFAR
Service MG
5 yrs
4 25 8 1 0 38 27%
below
6-10 7 22 14 2 2 47 34%
11-15 7 6 3 2 2 20 14%
16-20 11 4 0 6 1 22 16%
21-25 4 3 0 1 0 8 6%
26-30 2 0 0 3 0 5 4%
Total 35 60 25 15 5 140 100%
D. Research Instruments
The following data gathering instruments are used for this study:
1. Survey Questionnaire. The survey questionnaires are structured
with a four-point scale to allow the respondents four (4) choices in expressing
57
their perceptions. The questionnaire was developed based on the identified gaps
and the objectives of this study. A draft of the survey questionnaire was
distributed initially among the navy student officers of CGSC Class 48 in order to
test the clarity of the questionnaire. The comments and recommendations of the
test sample for the questionnaire were noted by the researcher and the required
changes were made.
The questionnaire was distributed to the officers assigned at the
following locations:
a. Headquarters Philippine Navy
b. Headquarters Philippine Fleet
c. Headquarters, Philippine Coast Guard
d. Headquarters, Philippine National Police - Maritime Group
e. Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources MCS Division
2. Structured Interview. This is to elicit information, ideas and
insights from respondents. Relevant questions to the study are prepared
beforehand.
3. Document Analysis. This involves the thorough examination and
analysis of relevant documents, records, and information on the subject of study.
E. Data Gathering Procedure
The method of data collection used is the normative survey. It is used to
collect data about the opinions, attitudes, perceptions, and the like of people in
58
the targeted concerned agencies with sea-going assets like the Philippine Navy
(PN), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR) and Philippine National Police-Maritime Group (PNP-MARIG). The
results are analyzed, organized and interpreted. Since the present research is a
status study, the normative survey is the most appropriate method in gathering
the data.
F. Statistical Treatment of Data
The perceptions of the respondents as a result of the survey are carefully
recorded, tabulated, and summarized for analysis and interpretation and
presented in Chapter IV of this paper. The following statistical tools are used to
measure the data obtained from the surveys:
1. Simple Frequency Count. Used to determine the number of
respondents in each stratification level and establish the homogeneity of the
population groups (e.g., major service, ranks, length of service).
2. Total Weighted Mean (TWM). This is used to measure the level
of perceptions of the respondents on the concept of interagency cooperation in
addressing maritime security concerns. Where TWM is:
TWM = ∑ (fs)
n
Where:
f = frequency of response
s = scale of response
n = total number of respondents
59
The TWM obtained by the survey was arranged based on its range
and a descriptive evaluation was assigned in each range. The obtained TWM is
provided with the following descriptive value for purposes of evaluation and
interpretation as shown in table below:
Table 6
Range and Descriptive Evaluation (DE) Used
TWM Range Descriptive Evaluation (DE)

1.00 - 1.74 Strongly Agree (SA)
1.75 - 2.49 Agree (A)
2.50 - 3.24 Disagree (D)
3.25 -4.00 Strongly Disagree (SD)
60
In summary, the table below depicts the methodology used in this study.
Table 7
Summary of Research Design and Methodology Used for the Study

Research Problems Design Used Data Gathering Research Instruments
Technique Used
Used
What are the threats Descriptive Documentary Reports and journals
to our maritime Design Analysis
security that the Survey Questionnaire
country is facing Purposive
today? Sampling Structured Interview
Survey
What are the Descriptive Documentary Official documents,
capabilities of the Design Analysis laws and other
agencies directly issuances
involved in addressing Historical
these maritime Design Structured Interview
security concerns?
What are the existing Descriptive Documentary Official documents,
linkages, agreements, Design Analysis laws and other
or frameworks in issuances
which these agencies
are coordinating their Structured Interview
efforts?
What are the issues Descriptive Documentary Structured Interview
and concerns to inter- Design Analysis
agency cooperation Survey Questionnaire
particularly in the Purposive
conduct of maritime Sampling
security operations? Survey Descriptive Statistics
(TWM)
Focused
Interview
What options are Descriptive Documentary Structured Interview
available that can be Design Analysis
adopted for inter- Survey Questionnaire
agency cooperation Quantitative
between and among Analysis Descriptive Statistics
the agencies involved (TWM)
in addressing Focused
maritime security Interview
threats?
Purposive
Random
Sampling
61
CHAPTER IV
PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS and INTERPRETATION OF

FINDINGS
A. Maritime Security Threats
While the Philippines, as a maritime nation, is naturally endowed with rich
marine resources, it is equally faced with a myriad of maritime security threats.
This include transnational crimes, illegal fishing, foreign intrusion, piracy or
armed robbery against ships, maritime terrorism, marine pollution, and maritime
disasters.
The result of survey (Table 8) conducted was used to determine
whether maritime agencies have a clear understanding of the maritime security
threats. The questionnaire delved into the level of understanding of maritime
security threats. Generally, the respondents strongly agree (TWM of 1.29) that
the Philippines confronts maritime security threats and that maritime security is a
significant component of national security (TWM of 1.18). However, some
differences on the level of perception can be found on whether the government
has a clear understanding of the threats to maritime security. While the PNP-
MARIG and the PCG strongly agreed that the government has a clear
understanding of the threats to maritime security (WM of 1.67 and 1.68) the PN
and BFAR respondents simply agreed to the statement (WM of 2.21 and 2.25
respectively).
62
Table 8
Perception on Maritime Security Threats
Maritime Security Threats HPN PNP-MG PCG PHILFLT BFAR TWM DE

1. The country is beset with maritime
security threats today that need to be
addressed. 1.15 1.56 1.44 1.30 1.00 1.29 SA
2. Maritime security is a significant
component of our national security. 1.15 1.22 1.12 1.17 1.25 1.18 SA
3. The government has a clear
understanding of the threats to our maritime
security. 2.21 1.67 1.68 1.87 2.25 1.93 A
4. The government is taking necessary steps
to adequately address our maritime security
threats. 2.44 1.78 1.84 1.95 1.50 1.90 A
5. The following are the maritime security
threats:
a. Maritime Terrorism 1.35 1.22 1.20 1.57 1.75 1.42 SA
b. Transnational Crimes (arms/goods
smuggling, drug/human trafficking)
1.24 1.22 1.16 1.30 1.25 1.23 SA
c. Foreign intrusions (poaching) 1.24 1.33 1.16 1.92 1.00 1.33 SA
d. Illegal Fishing (blast fishing, muro-ami,
trawling) 1.26 1.33 1.40 1.40 1.00 1.28 SA
e. Marine Pollution 1.35 1.44 1.52 1.50 1.25 1.41 SA
f. Piracy/Armed Robbery Against Ships 1.38 1.44 1.44 1.45 1.75 1.49 SA
g. Maritime Disasters 1.47 1.44 1.56 1.63 1.50 1.52 SA
63
The difference can be explained by the nature of the tasks and exposure of
the PNP-MARIG and the PCG with respect to maritime security operations as
against the two other agencies. The PCG and PNP-MARIG both have adequate
presence in both the land-based component of maritime security (ports) and the
offshore areas. Both agencies are also regarded as the main maritime law
enforcement agencies in the Philippines. BFAR relies mainly on the PNP-MARIG
and PCG as its enforcement arm and the PN do not have a significant presence
in the other aspects of maritime security such as ports and harbor security or
marine environmental protection. Thus, it can be said that the PNP-MARIG and
the PCG are directly performing more maritime security tasks than the two other
agencies. This difference in exposure and extent of tasks may cause the
agencies to differ on perception as to what level of understanding the government
has with respect to the threats of maritime security.
However, while the agencies may differ in perception on how much
government understands the threats to maritime security, the respondents all
agree that the government is taking the necessary steps to address maritime
security threats (TWM 1.90). Interestingly, the respondents from the PN have the
highest computed weighted means (WM 2.44 and 1.95) among the agencies
sampled. This can be explained by the unique experience of the PN as a
maritime force within a larger organization with priority on internal security
operations (ISO). Since maritime concerns are overshadowed by the priority in

64
internal security operations, it is normal for the PN respondents to view
government action on maritime security to be inadequate.
Among the identified maritime security threats, the respondents also are
unanimous in strongly agreeing that transnational crimes (TWM of 1.23), illegal
fishing (TWM of 1.28), foreign intrusions (TWM of 1.33), marine pollution (TWM of
1.41), Maritime terrorism (TWM of 1.42), piracy and armed robbery against ships
(TWM of 1.49) and maritime disasters (TWM of 1.52) composed the significant
maritime security threats the country is facing today. Corollary, the findings of the
survey are corroborated by the data on maritime security threats obtained from
various documents and sources. These are shown in the succeeding tables:
1. Transnational Crimes
Table 9
Goods Smuggling Incidents (01 Jan – 31 Dec 2006)
Month No. of Inc Pers Ves Total Value

Involved Involved
Jan 20 46 25 P94.495M
Feb 24 51 36 83.76
Mar 28 48 38 81.588
Apr 33 41 39 60.906
May 39 56 49 92.008
Jun 24 52 47 38.362
Jul 41 66 59 102.56
Aug 42 50 48 223.956
Sep 51 80 69 126.09
Oct 45 60 48 163.689
Nov 26 38 31 86.114
Dec 22 41 40 119.02
Total 395 629 529 P1,272.548M
Source: ON2 Yearend Report (2006)
65
On drugs smuggling incidents along the shorelines of the
archipelago, the most prominent incidents were the seizure of 503 kgs of shabu in
Real, Quezon and 350 kgs of shabu in San Narciso Zambales in recent years. 85
Figure 12 below shows the drug smuggling landing points and suspected landing
points in the country.
Figure 12
Drug Smuggling Landing Points in the Country
Landing Points
Batanes
Cagayan
Ilocos Sur
Pangasinan
Zambales
Aurora
Quezon
Mindoro
Suspected Landing
Points
Masbate
Palawan
Sorsogon
South Cotabato
Davao
Sulu
Tawi Tawi
Source: PDEA Briefing (2005)
85
PDEA Briefing (2005)
66
2. Illegal Fishing
Table 10
Reported Illegal Fishing Incidents for CY 2000 - 2003
Year No. of Inc. Illegally Caught Fish

Value (in Tons
Million pesos)
2000 509 9.30 132.90
2001 595 12.26 175.00
2002 2,681 268.00 3,828.50
2003 1,416 9,775.81 139.65
TOTAL 5,201 10,065.37 4,276.05
Source: ON2 Briefing (2004)
3. Foreign Intrusion
Table 11
Incidents of Foreign Intrusions (Poaching)
Year Nr of No. of PN Apprehensions

Inc. Vessels No. of No. of Vessels No. of
Apprehensions Apprehended Persons
Apprehended
2000 489 862 10 14 86
2001 56 133 6 10 91
2002 104 221 7 16 234
2003 87 272 10 14 103
2004 68 262 10 20 142
TOTAL 804 1,750 43 74 656
67
4. Maritime Terrorism
Table 12
Maritime Terrorism Incidents
Year Incidents Location
2002 Bombing of Our Lady of Misamis

Mediatrix Occidental
Sasa Wharf Bombing Davao
2003 Bombing of Superferry 14 Manila Bay
2005 Bombing of MV Dona Ramona Lamitan,

Basilan
Source: OSS, PN Briefing (2005)
5. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
Table 13
Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
Nr of Estimated
YEAR Nr of Inc Killed Wounded Missing
Victims Value
2000 46 217 214,000.00 5 2 25
2001 40 193 1,500,000.00 13 8 20
2002 51 227 15,000.00 20 14 44
2003 33 213 6,010,000.00 15 7 4
TOTAL 120 850 7,739, 000.00 53 31 93
68
6. Maritime Disasters
Table 14
Maritime Accident Report
Type of Accident 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Aground 104 27 26 26 23 58 19
Drifted/Engine Trouble 61 29 30 27 24 13 9
Fire 10 10 16 11 18 23 6
Collision 27 5 13 12 13 17 5
Capsized 87 39 44 41 37 33 32
Sank 117 28 51 45 35 37 35
Missing 50 17 16 11 13 0 0
Rammed 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Flooding 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
TOTAL 456 155 196 173 163 181 119
Source: MARINA, 1990 -1996
On the result of perception surveyed from the respondents, the weighted
mean obtained by each of these threats are also indicative of their likelihood of
occurrence. Thus, transnational crimes and illegal fishing got the highest weighted
means (TWM 1.23 and 1.28), compared with the threats of maritime terrorism,
piracy and maritime disaster.
The survey results on the maritime threats can have the following
interpretations:
a. The threats to the country’s maritime security are real and far
reaching. The perception of the respondents points to the fact that threats are
69
prevalent and that the government is viewed as the primary institution that has to
address this concern.
b. The more prevalent and persistent threats remain those that
have the highest percentage of occurrences within the country’s maritime territory
and jurisdiction such as illegal fishing and transnational crimes.
B. Capabilities of Agencies Directly Involved in Maritime Security
Altogether, there are only four (4) agencies that have the capability to
enforce applicable laws of the country at sea and in all Philippine waters. These
are the only agencies with floating assets namely: Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources (BFAR), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine Navy (PN)
and the Philippine National Police-Maritime Group (PNP-MARIG).
The following are their capabilities:
1. Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR)
BFAR has fourteen (14) Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS)
vessels deployed throughout the archipelago as shown in Table 15. These
vessels are also augmented by several indigenous watercraft through their
“Bantay-Dagat” Program composed of the local fisherfolks. However, the MCS
vessels of BFAR are operated by the local governments or the PNP-MARIG as
they lack personnel from their office to man these vessels. They provide BFAR
personnel onboard these vessels though when operations at sea are conducted.
70
Table 15
BFAR Assets
Vessel Home Port Areas of Responsibility

Name
MCS 3001 Cagayan River, Babuyan Channel, Balintang Channel, Luzon Strait,
Aparri Divilican Bay, Palanan Bay, Bashi Channel and EEZ
MCS 3002 Palawan Honday Bay, Green Island Bay, Island Bay, Dumaran
Channel, Tubbataha Reef, San Antonio Bay, Cavili
Island, Cuyo West Pass, Cagayan Island, Linapacan
Strait, Coron Bay, Mindoro Strait and EEZ
MCS 3003 Tacloban Eastern Samar seaboard, Leyte Gulf, Surigao Strait,
Helm Bay, Matarinao Bay, Dinagat Sound and EEZ
MCS 3004 Davao, Dalia Fish Davao Gulf, Cape San Jose, Mayo Bay, Baculin Bay,
Port Complex Cateel Bay, Bislig Bay, Lianga Bay, Sarangani Bay and
EEZ
MCS 3005 San Fernando Lingayen Gulf, Dasol Bay, Scarborough Shoal,
City, Poro point, Narvacan, Currimao, Laoag, Bangui Bay, Pasaleng Bay
La Union Sual and EEZ
Port, Sual
Pangasinan
MCS 3006 Basco, Batanes Bashi Channel, Balintang Channel, Babuyan Channel,
Luzon Strait, Philippine Sea and EEZ
MCS 3007 Tilik Port, Lubang Municipalities of Mamburao, San Jose, Paluan, Lubang
Mindoro Waters, Busuanga Water, Palawan Passage, Occidental
Mindoro, Apo West Pass, Mindoro Strait and EEZ
MCS 3008 Cavite City Cavite, Manila Bay, Subic Bay, Zambales Area,
Batangas, and EEZ
MCS 3009 Zamboanga City Zamboanga Vicinities, all coastal waters of Zamboanga
Port Peninsula, Basilan Strait, Subuguey Bay, Moro Gulf,
Tawi-tawi Bay, Tapiantana Group, Pangutanan Group,
Sibutu Group,Sulu Sea, East Sulu Sea, and South China
Sea
MCS 3010 Port of Baler Baler Bay, Casiguran Sound, Polilio Strait, Burdeous
Aurora Bay, Lamon Bay, Lagonoy Gulf, Albay Gulf, Cabugao
Bay, Masbate Pass, Burias Pass, Ragay Gulf and EEZ
MCS 1011 Tacloban City San Pedro Bay, Cariaga Bay, Calbayog Waters, Samar
Sea and Sogod Bay
MCS 1102 Cebu Cebu Strait, Camotes Sea, Bohol Sea, Visayan Sea,
Tanon Strait and Guimaras Strait
MCS 1103 Liminangcong Malampaya Sound, Bacuit Bay, Inner Sound, Imuruan
and Taytay, Bay and Taytay Bay
Palawan
71
MCS 1104 Davao City Fish Davao Gulf, Samal Island, Pujuda Bay, Mayo Bay,
Port Daliao, Toril Baculin Bay and Cateel Bay
Source: BFAR Briefing (2006)
2. Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)
The mission of the Philippine Coast Guard is to promote safety of
life and property at sea; safeguard the marine environment and resources;
enforce all applicable maritime laws; and undertake other activities in support of
the mission of the DOTC. PCG has 3,849 uniformed and civilian personnel
manning Coast Guard offices. At present, there are fifty four (54) Coast Guard
Stations and 195 Coast Guard Detachments operating in various ports
nationwide. Operating Units are deployed in ten (10) Coast Guard Districts along
with their respective stations and detachments. Its floating assets are shown in
Table 16.
Table 16
Status of PCG Assets

TYPE OPNL LOPNL NOPNL TOTAL
SAR Vessel 4 - - 4
35-Meter Patrol 3 - 1 4
Vessel
30-Meter 6 - 4 10
Surveillance
vessels
7-Meter 4 - - 4
Surveillance
Vessel
Small 21 - 10 31
Watercraft
Total 39 0 15 53
Source: PCG Briefing (2006)
3. Philippine Navy (PN)

72
The mission of the PN is “to organize, train, equip, deploy and
sustain naval and marine forces to defeat the CTM by 2010, destroy the ASG
and contain the SPSG in order to establish a physically and psychologically
secured environment conducive to national development.” It has the following
roles: a) to provide surface, air and ground forces for internal security, territorial
defense and maritime law enforcement; b) to assist in disaster response; c) to
assist in international defense and security engagements, humanitarian
assistance/ and peacekeeping operations; d) to assist in national development,
and; e) to pursue the PN’s capability development program.
To carry out the said roles, the PN has six (6) naval forces scattered
in the country. This is to ensure that corresponding naval assets will be able to
sustain naval operations under the different unified commands. The seagoing
assets of the navy are shown in the table below:
Table 17
Status of Philippine Navy Assets
Type Not Operational Total Operational

Operational Rate
DE/MSF 1 2 3 66%
PCE 4 4 8 50
JCPV 2 1 3 33
LSV 1 1 2 50
LST 3 2 5 40
CYCLONE 1 1 100
AW/AF/AM/AT 5 5 10 50
CPIC/PKM/FACP 11 2 13 15
LCU/LCM/TB 9 5 14 35
65 ftr PCF 5 15 20 75
36 ft RUC 6 3 9 33
73
PG 11 13 24 54
AGG TOTAL 59 53 112 47%
Source: Philippine Navy Briefing (2007)
4. Philippine National Police-Maritime Group (PNP-MARIG)
The mission of PNP-MARIG is to enforce the law, maintain peace
and order, and ensure public safety over Philippine Territorial Waters, lakes, and
rivers, along coastal areas to include ports and harbors, and small islands for the
security and sustainable development of the Maritime environment. It has about
1,500 personnel scattered throughout the country in its Regional Maritime Offices
(RMOs). The floating assets of the Group are shown in Table 18.
Table 18
Status of PNP-MARIG Assets
TYPE OPNL LOPNL NOPNL TOTAL

Police Patrol 5 2 17 24
Boat (PPB)
Police Coastal 16 - 9 25
Craft (PCC)
Police Speed 4 - 4 8
Boat (PSB)
Police Rubber 2 - 3 5
Boat (PRB)
Total 27 2 33 62
Source: PNP-MARIG Briefing (2006)
Using the given combined operational vessels of these agencies of
133 regardless of their size, one vessel is charged to patrol an approximately
4,908 square nautical miles of sea space out of the total 652,800 square nautical
miles of our country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), territorial and internal
waters combined. This is practically a next to impossible task that they are
74
required to do. Conversely, as shown in Table 19, we have about 220M hectares
of total marine waters area including the EEZ. Comparing it with the combined
available assets of the four (4) agencies, each vessel would have to patrol an
area of 1,654,135.34 hectares of water. Based from this data, it is obvious that
these agencies have to optimize the utilization of these assets given their very
limited number. Alternatively, these agencies should coordinate their efforts in
order to effectively protect our maritime areas from the previously discussed
maritime threats.
Table 19
Philippine Marine Resources, 2003
1. Total Marine Waters Area (including the EEZ) 220,000,000 ha.

a. Coastal 26,600,000 ha.
b. Oceanic 193,400,000 ha.
2. Shelf Area (Depth 200m.) 18,460,000 ha.
3. Coral Reef Area 27,000 sq.km.
4. Coastline (Length) 17,460 km
Source: Fisheries Statistics of the Philippines (2001-2003, DA-BAS)
Based from the result of structured interview conducted, each agency claim
that they do not have enough assets to perform their respective functions. They
all clamor for more assets especially the PN despite having the most number of
sea assets and being the most capable agency in securing the maritime areas of
the country. Their capabilities are also adversely affected by logistics and budget
for repair and maintenance including lack of personnel, training, and technical
expertise on maritime matters. This unfortunate situation has also denied these
agencies the capability to conduct joint exercises, patrols, and maritime security
75
operations to improve their inter-operability. Moreover, the need for the
formulation of joint doctrine for interagency operations is likewise viewed as
important element in enhancing their capabilities.
C. Existing linkages between agencies
The linkage between the PNP-MARIG, PCG, BFAR, and the PN at the
strategic level is represented through their respective departments under the
MOAC, DFA coordinative and consultative mechanism. These departments
include DFA, DENR, DOF, DOJ, DA, DND, DTI, DOTC, DBM, NEDA, DOST,
DILG, DOE, and NSC. However, MOAC does not exercise authority over them
but only presides in a coordinative manner and meetings are done in an ad hoc
basis.
The more formal basis for BFAR, PCG, PNP-MARIG, and PN to work
together is defined under the Fisheries Code of the Philippines or RA 8550 where
fishery enforcement powers were granted to them and the law enforcement
officers of the LGUs. There was also a MOA entered into by and between the
BFAR, PCG, PNP-MARIG and other agencies like the BuCUS, PPA, EMB
National Prosecution Service (NPS) of the Department of Justice on September
11, 1995 to coordinate their operations in the enforcement of fishery laws through
the National Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee (NALECC) situated at
Headquarters PNP. Unfortunately, NALECC stops at the department level and is
not duplicated at the lower echelons. The PN however, was excluded despite its
mandate to enforce fishery laws as stipulated under RA 8550 as deputized. The

76
PN is likewise mandated to enforce all applicable laws of the country at sea and in
all Philippine waters pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987.
On the other hand, in October 1996, the Maritime Industry Authority
(MARINA), PCG, and PNP-MARIG entered into a MOA forming themselves into a
“Tripartite Committee on Maritime Safety” in order to establish cooperation,
coordination, and complementation between and among themselves to attain
their respective objectives towards the promotion of maritime safety. The areas of
cooperation enumerated include vessel safety; search and rescue (SAR); marine
environmental protection; law enforcement at sea; and creation of info net for
database. Later, the PN and PCG also entered into a MOA in 1998 when the
PCG was separated from the Navy regarding the continuation of the conduct of
joint maritime law enforcement (MARLEN) operations where the PCG would act
as lead agency in such cases. Below is a summary of the existing linkages
between these agencies:
Table 20
Existing Linkages Between Agencies
Linkage Members Excluded Nature

MOAC 10 Depts, 20 - Coordinative and consultative
under DFA Agencies Mechanism
PNP-MARIG, fishery law enforcement
RA 8550 BFAR, PCG, PN -
NALECC PNP-MARIG, PN law enforcement
BFAR, PCG
MOA MARINA, PCG, PN vessel safety; search and rescue
and PNP-MARIG (SAR); marine environmental
protection; law enforcement at sea
MOA PN, PCG BFAR, PNP- maritime law enforcement
MARIG
77
Based from the above existing linkages between these agencies, most are
done at the strategic level where they understood each other. However, the
MOAC coordinative function does not filter down to the operational and tactical
levels as it does not have the resources and capability to do so. Similarly, while
RA 8550 mandated these agencies to enforce fishery laws, it did not provide for a
framework where these agencies should coordinate their efforts together on the
ground. As a result, separate MOA’s are entered into between agencies because
of the absence of an overall coordinating mechanism for them to avoid duplication
and overlapping of functions.
While the respondents for the survey (Table 21) generally agree that
existing linkages at the strategic level (TWM of 2.46) is adequate, it is interesting
to note that the PN respondents disagreed with the statement (WM of 2.82). This
can be explained by the limited involvement of the PN in existing maritime
security linkages especially with the civilian agencies. The PNP-MARIG, PCG,
and BFAR are members of existing maritime security arrangement for law
enforcement like the National Law Enforcement Coordination Committee
(NALECC). In most cases, the PN being a military organization is not part of these
existing linkages at the strategic level for law enforcement although
operationally, it performs law enforcement functions but only as a deputized
agency and as its secondary mission.

78
Table 21
Perception on Existing Linkages between Agencies
Linkages Between Government Agencies HPN PNP-MG PCG PHILFLT BFAR TWM DE
1. The existing linkages or coordination
mechanism between agencies are adequate
and effective at the strategic level. 2.82 2.33 2.20 2.72 2.25 2.46 A
and effective at the operational level. 2.88 2.44 2.24 2.73 2.50 2.56 D
and effective at the tactical level. 2.76 2.44 2.52 2.77 2.75 2.65 D
4. The following factors enable inter-agency
cooperation:
a. Habitual Relationship 2.09 2.11 1.88 1.80 2.00 1.98 A
b. Agency Organizational Set-up 2.00 1.89 1.76 1.85 2.00 1.90 A
c. Civil-military relationship 2.09 2.00 1.72 2.00 2.25 2.01 A
d. Organizational Culture 2.15 1.89 1.80 2.03 2.00 1.97 A
e. Interoperability of equipment, skills,
and procedures 2.00 2.11 1.68 1.92 2.00 1.94 A
79
It is also evident from the results of the survey that the inter-agency
linkages at the operational and tactical levels are not adequate as viewed by the
respondents (TWM of 2.56 and 2.65 respectively). This finding is also validated
by the findings based on existing linkages of these agencies to engage in inter-
agency operations.
On the other hand, the survey also found that the following factors
promotes interagency cooperation to develop:
a. Habitual Relationship (TWM of 1.98)
b. Agency Organizational Set-up (TWM of 1.90)
c. Civil-military relations (TWM of 2.01)
d. Organizational culture (TWM of 1.97)
e. Interoperability of equipment, skills and procedures (TWM of
1.94)
This result can be interpreted as providing the requirements for inter-
agency operations. At the very least, the agencies must develop organizational
set-up that can both fulfill their respective mandates and at the same time have
the capability to operate in an integrated manner with the different agencies.
Likewise, interpersonal relationship is also important in establishing an effective
mechanism for interagency operations. What is significant in the results of the
survey is the general agreement that civil-military relationships are an important
requirement of interagency operations. The existing informal relations between

80
these agencies at the operational and tactical levels could be the take off point to
enhance interagency cooperation. This further validates the need for the PN
and civil agencies to enhance their interaction through appropriate linkages and
address the inadequacy of the present system.
D. Issues and concerns to inter-agency cooperation
The most prominent concern identified by the survey results in Table 22
where the respondents strongly agree, is the need for a central coordinating body
for inter-agency operation with a TWM of 1.51. This is corroborated by the
findings of the survey discussed earlier on the inadequacy of existing linkages at
the operational and tactical levels. Furthermore, the need for a centralized
authority to coordinate maritime security operations is further validated by the
existence of competing priorities of each agency as well as the overlapping
mandates between agencies (TWM of 1.67 and 1.72 respectively).
However, a difference in the perception between the military and civilian
respondents of the survey was also noted by the study. While the PCG and
PNP-MARIG agree that government personnel are aware of existing national
rules, regulations and procedures on inter-agency coordination (TWM of 2.16
and 2.00), respondents from the PN and the BFAR disagree with the statement
(TWM of 2.56 and 3.00 respectively). On the adequacy of activities like
workshops, seminars, and meetings that promote interagency cooperation, it is
interesting to note that while BFAR, PNP-MARIG and PCG agree (TWM of 2.00,
81
Table 22
Perceptions on Issues and Concerns to Interagency Cooperation
Issues and Concerns to Interagency HPN PNP-MG PCG PHILFLT BFAR TWM DE
Cooperation
1. A central coordinating body is required to
develop inter-agency coordination at the
national level.
1.47 1.78 1.56 1.47 1.25 1.51 SA
2. Existing agency organization is suited for
inter-agency cooperation.
2.35 2.00 1.88 2.23 2.25 2.14 A
3. Existing laws, rules and regulations are
adequate to institute inter-agency
operations. 2.29 1.89 1.96 2.37 2.25 2.15 A
4. Government personnel are aware of
existing national rules, regulations, and
procedures on inter-agency coordination.
2.56 2.00 2.16 2.57 3.00 2.46 A
5. There are competing priorities among
agencies that affect inter-agency
coordination. 1.85 1.89 1.60 1.75 1.25 1.67 SA
6. There are adequate activities (e.g.
exercises, meetings, workshops, seminars,
etc.) that promote inter-agency cooperation.
2.74 1.89 2.04 2.38 2.00 2.21 A
7. There are overlapping mandates between
agencies that affect the ability to cooperate
at an inter-agency level. 1.94 2.00 1.56 1.83 1.25 1.72 A
82
1.89, and 2.04 respectively) with this statement, only the PN disagrees (TWM of
2.74). This can be explained again by the differences on the level of involvement
of the respondents on maritime interagency operations. The PCG and PNP-
MARIG are both heavily involved in maritime law enforcement and have
presence on the same areas with each other. Thus, it can be expected that the
respondents from these agencies will at least, have the same level of knowledge
when it comes to government regulations on maritime security matters. Such
exposure may be limited for the PN and BFAR.
This survey result as validated by the other findings on the perception of
the respondents in the other parts of the survey clearly point to the need of
retooling the PN for interagency operations. With the preponderance of
capability, the PN can definitely augment the capabilities of the different agencies
in addressing maritime security concerns. However, the PN as an organization
still needs to acquaint itself of the realities and intricacies of civil maritime
operations and the various regulations and limitations that come with it. It is not
enough that the PN has the capability; it must also have the requisite knowledge,
understanding and skills to operate together with other civilian maritime security
agencies of the government.
Moreover, the result of survey on the issues and concerns that hinder
interagency cooperation were also found out in previous studies. The following is
a summary of the factors cited that hinders an integrated interagency approach in
addressing the maritime security concerns of the country.

83
1. Absence of an overarching ocean policy framework.
2. Absence of a lead coordinating agency.
3. Lack of coordination and consultation mechanisms.
4. Absence of operational procedures for monitoring and review
mechanisms
5. Resource and technical capacity limitations.
6. Ambiguous policy-making linkages.
7. Lack of support from the legislative and political leadership.
In addition, based from the structured interview conducted with selected
senior officers from the PN, BFAR, PNP-MARIG, and PCG, the following were
pointed out as issues and concerns for interagency cooperation:
1. Lack of resources, personnel and platforms.
2. Personality conflict between heads of agencies.
3. Professional jealousy, credit grabbing and “turf war.”
4. Lack of interoperability of forces at sea.
5. Lack of trust between agencies.
6. Differing orientation and interpretation of functions, responsibility and
jurisdiction.
7. Conflicting and competing agency priorities.
8. Duplication and overlapping of functions.
9. Lack of cooperation at the agency’s lower level of echelon.
10. No strong overall lead or coordinating agency above these agencies.

84
11. Organizational culture and immaturity of organizations.
12. No sharing of information, meetings, workshops, seminars, dialogues.
This result can be interpreted as a result of not only the lack of
interagency cooperation activities conducted between these agencies but by the
nature of existing linkages identified earlier as well. The present set-up is
confined to addressing a specific agency’s concern and do not address the whole
maritime security situation holistically. The findings also validated the results of
earlier researches and by the agreement of the respondents on the continued
presence of these issues and concerns in the present situation.
E. Ways to improve interagency cooperation
While there are several issues and concerns raised that hinder
interagency cooperation as far as addressing maritime security is concerned,
recommendations to improve same also abound. The result of survey in Table
23 shows that the respondents strongly agree that the following factors are some
of the ways to improve interagency cooperation:
1. Enhancing the capability of the PN, PNP-MARIG and PCG for
maritime law enforcement (TWM of 1.36).
2. Conduct of information and education activities to orient and
familiarize government agencies on inter-agency rules, procedures and
requirements (TWM of 1.43).

85
3. Development of an integrated national monitoring, control, and
surveillance (MCS) system (TWM of 1.46).
4. Formulation of a coordination framework to enhance maritime security
(TWM of 1.50).
5. The review and revision of the National Marine Policy (TWM of 1.54)
6. Formulation of a National Maritime Strategy (TWM 1.54).
7. Foreign assistance and support to enhance inter-agency cooperation in
areas such as capacity and capability-building (TWM of 1.58).
8. Reorganization of the existing maritime agencies to enable coordination
at all levels (TWM of 1.60).
9. Consolidation of all civilian maritime agencies under one executive
department (TWM of 1.71).

86
Table 23
Perceptions on Ways to Improve Interagency Cooperation
E. Ways to Improve Interagency HPN PNP-MG PCG PHILFLT BFAR TWM DE

Cooperation
1. There is a need for the conduct of
information and education activities to
familiarize government agencies on inter-
agency rules, procedures and requirements. 1.35 1.67 1.28 1.33 1.50 1.43 SA
2. Existing maritime agencies need to be
reorganized to enable coordination at all
levels. 1.74 1.89 1.48 1.63 1.25 1.60 SA
3. All maritime security activities must be
coordinated by the National Security Council. 1.68 2.00 1.76 2.05 1.50 1.80 A
4. All civilian maritime agencies must be
consolidated under one executive department. 1.74 2.11 1.80 1.65 1.25 1.71 SA
5. Foreign assistance and support can be
utilized to enhance inter-agency cooperation in
areas such as capacity and capability-building. 1.74 2.00 1.28 1.62 1.25 1.58 SA
6. Review and revise the National Marine
Policy. 1.56 1.67 1.52 1.70 1.25 1.54 SA
7. Formulate a National Maritime Strategy. 1.44 1.89 1.32 1.53 1.50 1.54 SA
8. Formulate a coordination framework to
enhance maritime security. 1.38 1.89 1.48 1.48 1.25 1.50 SA
9. Develop an integrated national monitoring,
control, and surveillance (MCS) system. 1.41 1.78 1.44 1.43 1.25 1.46 SA
10. Enhance the capability of the PN, PNP-
MG and PCG for maritime law enforcement. 1.44 1.44 1.24 1.40 1.25 1.36 SA
The respondents however, agree that the National Security Council (NSC)
should be the lead agency in coordinating all maritime security activities of these
agencies (TWM 1.80). This is reinforced in the finding that maritime security is a
significant component of national security.
The survey result is indicative of the preponderance of the strong need to
enhance the capability of BFAR, PCG, PNP-MARIG, and the PN for maritime
security operations as manifested by its TWM of 1.36. The need to enhance their
capabilities is corroborated by the findings on their capabilities and the issues
and concerns to interagency cooperation. Capability enhancement is also an
outcome of the need for these agencies to address the various maritime security
threats besetting the country and the vast maritime expanse of the country that
these agencies have to secure.
The next two factors, interagency activities and the need for an integrated
Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) system (TWM of 1.43 and 1.46)
affirmed that there is indeed a lack of interagency activities conducted between
these agencies. On the other hand, the clamor for a national integrated MCS
system confirmed the lack of coordination of efforts, information sharing, and
delineation of functions among them in the present situation. It can be noted that
the first three factors are activities that are supposed to be taking place at the
operational and tactical levels which, as found out, is not the case. This is due to
absence of an effective linkage between the agencies and the absence of an
overall coordinating agency. The result could be brought about by the majority of
88
respondents who are junior officers and consequently, are in the tactical level of
The other succeeding factors which can contribute in enhancing
interagency cooperation are more of strategic concerns like the formulation of
national ocean policies, coordination frameworks, reorganization, strategies, and
capacity building. These concerns depend to a great extent on the legislative and
political leadership support. The results also show the awareness of the
respondents on the elements that an interagency framework must consider from
the strategic to operational and tactical levels points of view.
The survey result is also corroborated by the recommendations from the
related literature by maritime experts on the subject of an integrated and
coordinated approach to ocean governance or interagency cooperation which
include the following:
1. There should be an overarching national ocean policy framework.
2. Designation of only one lead coordinating agency.
3. The need for a policy framework to provide the coordination and
consultation mechanisms between agencies concerned.
4. Development of operational procedures for monitoring and review
mechanisms.
89
5. Inasmuch as the national interest on maritime domain transcends
national boundaries and sectoral interests, there should be coordination and
support of policy from the legislature and political leadership.
Corollary, the points of view gathered from the structured interview
conducted with selected senior officers from the PN, BFAR, PNP-MARIG, and
PCG, supports the survey findings with the following proposals improve inter-
agency cooperation:
1. Additional resources, personnel, platforms and sharing of
information.
2. Conduct of joint exercises, CPX, seminars, dialogues, workshops,
conferences to improve interoperability and develop mutual respect and trust.
3. One overall coordinating agency supported by other agencies with
specific authority and own budget under the Office of the President or on a
ministerial level.
4. Punishment of errant government agency personnel.
5. Creation of interagency task forces/task groups at the tactical level.
6. Solicitation of foreign assistance to improve capability.
7. Continuous orientation and education.
8. All civilian agencies with maritime functions should be placed under
one department.
90
The findings above are also validated through the result of the survey
conducted where most of the respondents strongly agree on the above proposals
as shown in Table 23. The results only show that there is already an awareness
of the problem at hand and a clamor for solutions to these problems of
interagency cooperation. It expressed the open mindedness and willingness of
the respondents to accept change, subordinate their parochial organizational
interests to cooperate to better address the maritime security threats. The result
shows that the issues and concerns to interagency cooperation could be
overcome. However, the more challenging recommendations lie on the decisions
and actions of the political leadership and the legislative support to be realized.
91
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Summary
This study was conducted to assess the concept of interagency
cooperation as a framework in addressing the country’s maritime security threats.
It is premised on the fact that the Philippines is a maritime nation endowed with
rich marine resources but is also confronted with a myriad of maritime security
threats against the very limited capabilities of the agencies directly involved in
maritime security operations. Given situation, this study propounded that these
agencies should work in an integrated and coordinated manner to protect and
preserve our marine resources for sustainable development. While interagency
cooperation poses some problems, they are not insurmountable as manifested by
the findings of the study. In fact, several ways or options to enhance interagency
cooperation were proposed.
This study has the following objectives:
1. To analyze the threats to our maritime security.
2. To assess the capabilities of agencies directly involved in
3. To examine the existing linkages between and among these
agencies.
4. To determine the issues and concerns that hinders interagency
cooperation.
5. To propose a framework for inter-agency cooperation.

92
The descriptive method of research was used in studying the concept of
interagency cooperation in the context of maritime security along with other
methodologies such as structured interviews, document analysis, and survey
questionnaire. Respondents were purposively and randomly selected from across
the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the agencies enforcing all
applicable laws of the land at sea and in all Philippine waters like the PN, BFAR,
PCG, and PNP-MARIG.
The findings of this study are as follows:
1. Maritime Security Threats
In general, the significant threats to our maritime security include
transnational crimes, illegal fishing, foreign intrusions, piracy or armed robbery
against ships, maritime terrorism, marine pollution, and maritime disasters. There
was a strong recognition that maritime security is a significant component of
national security.
The agencies sampled (PCG, PNP-MARIG, BFAR, and PN) have a
clear understanding of the threats to our maritime security. However, a slight
difference is noted as to their perception of the government’s understanding of
these threats. The difference may be due to the exposure and extent of tasks
these agencies have to perform as PCG and PNP-MARIG have significant
presence and exposure to maritime threats at sea and ashore unlike the PN and
BFAR.
Likewise, the perceptions on maritime security threats are based on

93
their indicative likelihood of occurrence. Thus, transnational crimes and illegal
fishing got the highest weighted means compared with the threats of foreign
intrusions, piracy, maritime terrorism, and maritime disaster in that order.
2. Government Agencies Directly Involved in Maritime Security
Altogether, there only four (4) agencies that have floating assets
and the capability to enforce applicable laws of the country at sea and in all
Philippine waters namely: the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine Navy (PN) and the Philippine
National Police-Maritime Group (PNP-MARIG).
Nevertheless, even with the combined number of operational
vessels of these agencies of 133 regardless of size, one vessel is charged to
patrol an approximately 4,908 square nautical miles of sea space out of the total
652,800 square nautical miles of our country’s EEZ, territorial and internal waters.
Conversely, of the 220M hectares of total marine waters of the country including
the EEZ, and comparing it with the combined available assets of the four (4)
agencies, each vessel would have to patrol an area of 1,654,135.34 hectares of
water.
Simply put, there is a very limited number of available seagoing
assets for these agencies to perform their functions and to effectively protect our
maritime areas from the previously discussed maritime threats to the country.
Their capabilities are also adversely affected by logistics and budget for repair
and maintenance including lack of personnel, training, and technical expertise on
maritime matters. This situation has also denied these agencies to conduct joint
94
exercises to improve their interoperability and enhance their capabilities for the
conduct of interagency operations.
3. Existing linkages between agencies
The existing linkages between PCG, PNP-MARIG, BFAR, and the
PN are mostly understood at the strategic level. However, these linkages did not
provide for a framework where these agencies could coordinate their efforts
together on the ground. There was a noted gap in these existing linkages from
the strategic to operational and tactical levels of maritime security operations. As
a result, separate MOA’s are entered into between these agencies because of
the absence of an overall coordinating mechanism for them to minimize
duplication and overlapping of functions.
It is also noted that the PN, being a military organization, is
sometimes not part of existing linkages at the strategic level for law enforcement
among civilian agencies. Although operationally, the PN performs law
enforcement functions but only as a deputized agency and as its secondary
mission. In part, the linkages and cooperation of these agencies are also
affected by their limited resources, equipment, budget, personnel, and training
capabilities to engage in interagency operations, joint exercises, CPX, and so on.
Likewise, interpersonal relationship is also recognized as an important factor in
establishing an effective mechanism for inter-agency operations. There was also
a general agreement that civil-military relations are an important requirement of
interagency operations.
95
4. Issues and concerns to inter-agency cooperation
The most prominent concern for interagency cooperation is the
need for one strong central coordinating body. This is to ensure the adequacy of
existing linkages at the operational and tactical levels. Moreover, it was found
out that the existing linkages are confined to a specific sector’s concern and do
not address the whole maritime security at a holistic level.
At the strategic level, the following were considered as major
causes that hinders an integrated interagency approach to maritime security:
a. Absence of an overarching ocean policy framework.
b. Absence of only one lead coordinating agency.
c. Lack of coordination and consultation mechanisms.
d. Absence of operational procedures for monitoring and
review mechanisms
e. Lack of coordination of policy reforms with the legislature.
f. Resource and technical capacity limitations.
g. Ambiguous policy-making linkages.
h. Lack of support from the legislative and political
leadership.
At the operational and tactical levels, the following were pointed out
as issues and concerns for interagency cooperation:
a. Lack of resources, personnel and platforms.
b. Personality conflict between heads of agencies.
c. Professional jealousy, credit grabbing and “turf war.”
d. Lack of interoperability of forces at sea.
e. Lack of trust between agencies.

96
f. Differing orientation and interpretation of functions,
responsibility and jurisdiction.
g. Conflicting agency priorities.
h. Duplication and overlapping of functions.
i. Lack of cooperation at the lower level of echelon.
j. No overall lead or coordinating agency structure at
operational and tactical levels.
k. No sharing of information mechanism including lack of
interagency meetings, workshops, seminars, dialogues.
5. Ways to improve interagency cooperation
While there are a lot of issues and concerns raised to achieve
interagency cooperation, it was also found out that several way and options are
available to enhance or improve interagency cooperation between the agencies
concerned. The following were recommended to improve interagency
cooperation:
a. Enhancing the capability of the PN, PNP-MARIG and
PCG for maritime law enforcement.
b. Conduct of information and education activities to
familiarize concerned agencies on interagency rules, procedures and
requirements.
97
c. Development of an integrated national monitoring, control,
and surveillance (MCS) system.
d. Formulation of an interagency coordination framework to
enhance maritime security.
e. The review and revision of the National Marine Policy.
f. Formulation of a National Maritime Strategy.
g. Foreign assistance and support to enhance inter-agency
cooperation in areas such as capacity and capability-building.
h. Consolidation of all civilian maritime agencies under one
executive department.
i. Designation of one lead coordinating agency at the
ministerial level under the Office of the President for all maritime security
activities.
j. Legislative and political support.
Corollary, from the lower levels point of view, the following were proposed
to improve inter-agency cooperation:
a. Additional resources, personnel and platforms.

98
b. Conduct of joint exercises, CPX, seminars, dialogues,
workshops, conferences to improve interoperability and develop mutual respect
and trust.
c. Sharing of information, communications system.
d. Punishment of errant government agency personnel.
e. Dedication, honesty.
f. Creation of interagency task forces/ task groups.
B. Conclusion
Based from the findings of this study the following are deduced:
1. The agencies (BFAR, PCG, PNP-MARIG, PN) have a clear
understanding of the country’s maritime security threats such as transnational
crimes, illegal fishing, foreign intrusions, maritime terrorism, marine pollution, and
maritime disasters.
2. The combined capabilities of these agencies involved in
maritime security operations are inadequate to address the maritime security
threats to the country.
3. The existing linkages between and among these agencies need
to be improved at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of maritime
security operations.
99
4. The issues and concerns that hinder interagency cooperation
between these agencies are not insurmountable and could be overcome but
needs a lot of support from the legislative and political leadership.
5. There are several ways to improve interagency cooperation
between the BFAR, PCG, PNP-MARIG, and PN at all levels of maritime security
operations but again, a lot of support is needed from the legislative and political
leadership.
C. Recommendations
With the findings and conclusion made above, the following are
recommended:
1. Continue to enhance understanding and awareness of the
threats to our maritime security at all levels of the PN, PCG, PNP-MARIG, and
BFAR through information sharing, joint simulation exercises, symposium,
workshops, and informal dialogues between these agencies.
2. Improve the capabilities of these agencies through the upgrading
or modernization of their equipment, provision of additional assets, joint training,
formulation of joint doctrines and procedures, and increasing their budget
including the development of an integrated national monitoring, control, and
surveillance (MCS) system for these agencies.

100
3. Improve linkages between and among these agencies through
the “one lead agency” concept and the coordination mechanism under the
authority of the lead agency should be duplicated at the operational and tactical
levels. Another way to improve linkages is to consolidate all civilian maritime
security agencies (PCG, PNP-MARIG, BFAR) under one executive department.
4. Overcoming the issues and concerns to interagency cooperation
depends to a very large extent on the government’s political and legislative
support. On the strategic level, it includes efforts such as the revision and
updating of the National Marine Policy, designation of a lead agency in maritime
and ocean affairs under the Office of the President, promulgation of an
Executive Order for interagency cooperation among agencies with maritime
functions, including the reorganization of civilian agencies with maritime functions
under one executive department for better coordination. At the operational level
and tactical levels, the interagency cooperation problems could be improved by
having a joint interagency maritime security operations doctrine; information
sharing mechanism such as interagency symposium, workshops, meetings, and
dialogues, provision of liaison officers or agency desks at the designated
coordinating office of the lead agency; conduct of joint exercises and maritime
security operations, Techniques, Tactics and Procedures (TTPs); and the
creation of joint task forces or task groups.
5. The succeeding table shows the summary of the recommended
ways to improve interagency cooperation between PCG, PNP-MARIG, BFAR,
and PN which is also applicable to the other agencies:

101
Table 24
Summary of Ways to Improve Interagency Cooperation
Strategic • Legislative and executive support.

Level • Executive Order for Maritime Interagency Cooperation.
• The review and updating of the National Marine Policy.
• Formulation of a National Maritime Strategy.
• Consolidation of all civilian maritime agencies under one
executive department.
• Designation of a maritime lead agency.
• Formulation of a national interagency joint maritime
security operations doctrine.
• Policy framework to provide the coordination and
consultation mechanisms between agencies.
• Development of an integrated national monitoring, control, and
surveillance (MCS) system.
• Foreign assistance and support to enhance interagency
cooperation in areas such as capacity and capability-
building.
Operational • Lead agency operational level coordinating structure.

Level • Formulation of a coordination framework to enhance maritime
security.
• Development of joint operational procedures for monitoring and
review mechanisms.
• Joint maritime security operations doctrine.
• information sharing mechanism such as interagency
symposium, workshops, meetings, and dialogues.
• Information and data collection system.
• Provision of liaison officers or agency desks at the designated
coordinating office of the lead agency.
• Conduct of joint exercises and maritime security operations.
Tactical • Upgrading the capability of the PN, PNP-MARIG and PCG

Level through additional resources, personnel and platforms..
• Conduct of information and education activities to familiarize
these agencies on inter-agency rules, procedures and
requirements.
• Conduct of joint exercises, CPX, seminars, dialogues,
workshops, conferences to improve interoperability and
develop mutual respect and trust.
• Sharing of information.
• Punishment of errant government agency personnel.
• Creation of interagency task forces/task groups.
• Joint Exercises, maritime security operations, joint TTPs.
102
6. Based on the above ways to improve interagency cooperation,
the interagency cooperation framework/structure below (Figure 13) is likewise
recommended where the PCG, PNP-MARIG, BFAR, and PN provides the
backbone for maritime security cooperation as they are the only agencies with
seaborne assets. The PN in particular, being the best-equipped and best-situated
compared to the other agencies, is chosen as the focal point for all maritime
security operations at the operational level. Through this structure, other
agencies with maritime concerns could also coordinate their requirements for
joint maritime security operations.
Figure 13
Interagency Cooperation Framework
STRATEGIC Office of the President Congress

LEVEL
Maritime & Ocean Affairs

Commission (MOAC)
MOAC Secretariat
Coastal/ Socio- Maritime Territory &

Marine Foreign Science,
Economi Security and
Environment Affairs Educ &
c Cluster Safety Cluster
Cluster Cluster Culture
DND/AFP:
Lead Agency
OPERATIONAL
Area MOAC Regional
LEVEL Command Information Sharing &
Naval Forces Coordinating Office
Naval Forces Operations Center

(Composite Liaisons/desks from PCG, BFAR,
PNP-MARIG & other agencies)
TACTICAL
MOAC Provincial/City/
LEVEL Interagency Task Groups Municipal Information &
(Joint Maritime Opns, Exercises, TTPs) Coordinating Office
103
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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BERGIN, A. (1995). Interdepartmental Coordination: The Australian Experience

In J. McCaffrie (Ed.), Managing and Protecting the Offshore Estate (pp.
115-132). Australia: Australian Defence Studies Centre
BRODIE, B. (1958). A Guide to Naval Strategy (4th Ed). Naval War College
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CRICKARD, F. (1995). Interdepartmental Coordination: The Canadian

Experience In J. McCaffrie (Ed.), Managing and Protecting the Offshore
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Resources Foundation, Inc. ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable
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Institute, 1995.
GULLION, E.A. (1968). Uses of the Sea. The American Assembly. Columbia
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Corpus Jr, N.M.M. (2001). Problems and Solutions to Inter-agency Cooperation

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(Unpublished Thesis, National Defense College of the Philippines: Quezon
City
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ca_cca_awsp/Achieving_ Unity _of_Effort.doc
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105
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A 106
HEADQUARTERS
08 June 2007
Dear Respondent:
Greetings! The undersigned is presently taking up the AFP Command and

General Staff Course (AFPCGSC) Class 48.
One of the requirements of the course is a research paper concerning

current issues relevant to the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Hence, I chose to
make a study that aims to assess the concept of interagency cooperation as a
framework or mechanism in addressing the maritime security challenges in the
country. The title of my research is “Interagency Cooperation: A Framework in
Addressing Maritime Security Threats.”
The undersigned intends to assess the present state of interagency

cooperation between and among agencies with maritime functions particularly
those with assets at sea like the PN, PCG, PNP-MARIG and BFAR. I feel that
there is the need for a framework or mechanism for interagency cooperation for
these agencies in order to achieve unity of effort and for them to work as one in
addressing our maritime security concerns.
In this regard, may I solicit your indulgence to kindly answer the attached
questionnaire by providing the information asked or by checking your preferred
choice. Rest assured that your answers will be treated with utmost confidentiality
and no reference to your person or identity will be made without your explicit
consent.
I am looking forward to your most favorable participation for without it, this
study will not be as complete as it should be. I will personally collect them back or
my representative will do the rounds after three days. Alternatively, I could be
reached at this contact number: 09184153400
Thank you for your time and cooperation.
Sincerely yours,
REY T DELA CRUZ

CDR PN
AFPCGSC Class 48
107
APPENDIX A
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
Respondent No. _______ (leave it blank)
I. Personal Data of Respondent:
A. Name___________________________________________ (optional)
B. Rank/Grade:
( ) O2-O3 ( ) O4-O5 ( ) O6-O7 Others_________________
C. Length of Service:
( ) 5 yrs below ( ) 6 -10 yrs ( ) 11-15 yrs
( ) 16 - 20 years ( ) 21-25 yrs ( ) 26 - 30 yrs
D. Unit/Office:
________________________________________________________
E. Present Position or designation: ______________________________
II. Instructions: Please check the appropriate box which best represents your
opinion with regard to the question or statement provided on the left:
SA - Strongly Agree D- Disagree

A- Agree SD - Strongly Disagree
A. Maritime Security Threats SA A D SD

1. The country is beset with maritime security threats
today that need to be addressed.
2. Maritime security is a significant component of our
national security.
3. The government has a clear understanding of the
threats to our maritime security.
4. The government is taking necessary steps to
adequately address our maritime security threats.
5. The following are the maritime security threats:
a. Maritime Terrorism
b. Transnational Crimes (arms/goods smuggling,
drug/human trafficking)
c. Foreign intrusions (poaching)
d. Illegal Fishing (blast fishing, muro-ami, trawling)
e. Marine Pollution
f. Piracy/Armed Robbery Against Ships
g. Maritime Disasters
108
APPENDIX A
B. Linkages Between Government Agencies SA A D SD

1. The existing linkages or coordination mechanism
between agencies are adequate and effective at the
strategic level.
operational level.
tactical level.
4. The following factors enable inter-agency
cooperation:
a. Habitual Relationship
b. Agency Organizational Set-up
c. Civil-military relationship
d. Organizational culture
e. Interoperability of equipment, skills, and
procedures
C. Challenges to Interagency Cooperation SA A D SD
1. A central coordinating body is required to develop
inter-agency coordination at the national level.
2. Existing agency organization is suited for inter-
agency cooperation.
3. Existing laws, rules and regulations are adequate
to institute inter-agency operations.
4. Government personnel are aware of existing
national rules, regulations, and procedures on inter-
agency coordination.
5. There are competing priorities among agencies that
affect inter-agency coordination.
6. There are adequate activities (e.g. exercises,
meetings, workshops, seminars, etc.) that promote
inter-agency cooperation.
7. There are overlapping mandates between agencies
that affect the ability to cooperate at an inter-agency
level.
D. Ways to Improve Interagency Cooperation SA A D SD
1. There is a need for the conduct of information and
education activities to familiarize government agencies
on inter-agency rules, procedures and requirements.
2. Existing maritime agencies need to be reorganized
to enable coordination at all levels.
3. All maritime security activities must be coordinated
by the National Security Council.
4. All civilian maritime agencies must be consolidated
under one executive department.
5. Foreign assistance and support can be utilized to
enhance inter-agency cooperation in areas such as
capacity and capability-building.
109
APPENDIX A
6. Review and revise the National Marine Policy.

7. Formulate a National Maritime Strategy.
8. Formulate a coordination framework to enhance
maritime security.
9. Develop an integrated national monitoring, control,
and surveillance (MCS) system.
10. Enhance the capability of the PN, PNP-MARIG,
PCG and BFAR for maritime law enforcement.
III. Other Comments and Recommendations. Please write your other comments
and recommendations on how to improve interagency cooperation between
agencies of government with maritime-related functions specifically between PN,
PCG, PNP-MARIG and BFAR.
Thank you very much for your time.

110
APPENDIX B
HEADQUARTERS
12 June 2007
CAPT MARIO C ROYENA PN(MNSA)

Director, Naval Safety Office
Headquarters Philippine Navy
Roxas Boulevard, Manila
Sir:
Greetings! The undersigned is presently taking up the AFP Command and

General Staff Course (AFPCGSC) Class 48.
One of the requirements of the course is a research paper concerning

current issues relevant to the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Hence, I opted to
make a study that aims to assess the concept of interagency cooperation as a
framework or mechanism in addressing the maritime security challenges in the
country. The title of my research is “Interagency Cooperation: A Framework in
Addressing Maritime Security Threats.”
The undersigned intends to assess the present state of interagency

cooperation between and among agencies with maritime functions particularly
those with assets at sea (PN, PCG, BFAR, PNP-MARIG). I feel that there is the
need for a framework or mechanism for interagency cooperation in order to
achieve unity of effort and for them to work as one.
In this regard, may I solicit your indulgence to kindly answer the attached
questionnaire by providing the information asked. Rest assured that your
answers will be treated with utmost confidentiality and no reference to your
person or identity will be made without your explicit consent.
I am looking forward to your most favorable participation for without it, this
study will not be as complete as it should be. I will personally collect them back or
my representative will do the rounds after three days. Alternatively, I could be
reached at this contact number: 09184153400
Thank you for your time and cooperation.
Very truly yours,
REY T DELA CRUZ

CDR PN
AFPCGSC Class 48
111
APPENDIX B
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW
Name of Respondent: ____________________________________________

Rank: ___________________
Present Position/Unit Assignment:_________________________________
1. What would you consider as the more significant maritime security

threats the country is facing today?
2. How would you assess the capabilities of government agencies

specifically PN, PCG, BFAR, and PNP-MARIG in addressing these maritime
security concerns at sea?
3. How would you assess the effectiveness of existing linkages,

agreements, coordination mechanisms or frameworks in which these
agencies are coordinating their efforts?
112
APPENDIX B
4. What do you think are the issues and concerns that hinder inter-agency
cooperation in the conduct of maritime security operations?
5. Alternatively, what would you recommend to improve the interagency

cooperation between the above agencies?
6. Other comments:
113
APPENDIX C
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
CDR REY TOPINIO DELA CRUZ O-9747 PN was born on 01 January
1965 in Jones, Isabela. He is the eldest of the five siblings of Domingo dela Cruz
and Florasol Topinio. He finished his elementary education at the Jones North
Central School (JNCS) in 1978 and his secondary education at the Jones Rural
School (JRS) in 1982. He took up the Philippine Military Academy entrance
examination and joined the PMA “Hinirang” Class of 1987.
Upon graduation from PMA, he was commissioned as Ensign with the
Philippine Navy. After completing the 116th Naval Officer’s Qualification Course
(NOQC) “A,” he was assigned onboard LT-507, LT-516, AW-33, PS-21, PS-36,
and PS-70 until the completion of his junior billets aboardship. As Operations and
Executive Officer, he was assigned aboard PS-35, PS-37 and PS-38
respectively.
To further enhance his education and learning, he took up the Naval
Intelligence Officers Course (NIOC) Class 52, the Naval Command and Staff
Course (NCSC) Class 44, Ship Executive Officer Course Nr 02-03,
Peacekeeping Force Staff Seminar Class Nr 07-04, Command at Sea Course
Class 06, and the International Strategic & Security Issues Course at the Foreign
Service Institute, DFA. He earned his Masters in Management (Project
Management) at the University of New South Wales (UNSW), Australian
Defense Force Academy (ADFA), Canberra, Australian Capital Territory (ACT) in
2002.
114
APPENDIX C
CDR DELA CRUZ PN was also assigned in various positions at the
General Headquarters, AFP at the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, AFP and
the Office of the Secretary Joint Staff, AFP. At Headquarters Philippine Navy, he
assumed various positions at the Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for
Education and Training, N8; Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Plans,
N5; and as the Deputy Chief of the Office of Strategic Studies, PN. He was also
once the Deputy Commander of the Fleet Training Group, Philippine Fleet in
Sangley Point Cavite City.
He is married to the former Euvin Viola Ponce from Basco, Batanes with
whom he has one son and a daughter: Patrick Reyvin (8) and Alecx Yeuvnrei (7).
CDR DELA CRUZ PN now looks forward to assuming his first Command
at Sea tour after having hurdled the PN Command at Sea Board (CASB) just
prior to taking up the AFP Command and General Staff Course Class 48 in
October 2006.

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ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

Command and General Staff College

INTERAGENCY COOPERATION: A FRAMEWORK IN

CDR REY T DELA CRUZ PN

INTERAGENCY COOPERATION: A FRAMEWORK IN

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

CDR REY T DELA CRUZ PN

This is an official document of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Command

and General Staff College.

Quotations from, contractions, and reproduction of all or any part of this

Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and General Staff College.

Reference to this work includes the foregoing statement.

Armed Forces of the Philippines

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation in the Armed Forces

study entitled, “INTERAGENCY COOPERATION: A FRAMEWORK IN

ADDRESSING MARITIME SECURITY THREATS” has been prepared and

LTC MARTIN G VILLASAN PN(M), MM

This Commandant’s Paper hereto attached, entitled “INTERAGENCY

COOPERATION: A FRAMEWORK IN ADDRESSING MARITIME SECURITY

THREATS,” prepared and submitted by CDR REY T DELA CRUZ PN in partial

LTC RONILO C GAMUETA PA(GSC) LTC FILEMON D MAMARIL JR PA(GSC)

COL ORLANDO E ASTRERO PA(GSC)

Accepted as fulfillment of the requirements for graduation of the Armed

BGEN SALVADOR S COLLANTES JR AFP

I wish to express my gratitude to the following who, in one way or the

other have been instrumental in the completion of this paper:

To Mr Jessie Pascasio, Senior Researcher, Office of the Strategic

development of this study and to LTJG FLORISSA G HERNANDEZ PN and the

staff of OSS, PN for their invaluable support and assistance;

To LTC MARTIN G VILLASAN PN(M), my adviser and my colleague at the

insights to this study;

PNP-MARIG Operations Division and officers of PN Units Afloat at Sangley Point,

study would not have been possibly reached.

To my wife, Euvin, my children, Patrick Reyvin and Alecx Yeuvnrei, who

REY T DELA CRUZ

CDR REY T DELA CRUZ PN, July 2007. Interagency Cooperation: A

Adviser: LTC MARTIN G VILLASAN PN(M), Masters in Management, UNSW

The Philippines, as a maritime nation, is endowed with a very rich

marine resource and vast maritime area. It is also a host to a myriad of

concerns that threatens its maritime security. Unfortunately, the present

capacity of the government to protect, secure, and preserve the country’s

maritime domain is wanting. While several initiatives were already undertaken

to coordinate the efforts of all agencies with maritime functions in addressing

maritime security threats, the solution is far from over.

This study was conducted to assess the concept of interagency

cooperation as a framework in addressing the country’s maritime security

threats. More specifically, it aims: to analyze the threats to our maritime

security; to assess the capabilities of government agencies directly involved in

maritime security operations; to examine the existing linkages, agreements and

coordinating mechanisms between these agencies; to determine ways of

overcoming the problems of interagency cooperation; and lastly, to propose a

framework for inter-agency cooperation to address the different maritime

waters such as the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR),

Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police - Maritime Group

(PNP-MARIG), and the Philippine Navy (PN).

of interagency cooperation in the context of maritime security along with other

research instruments such as structured interviews, document analysis, and

survey questionnaire. Respondents were purposively and randomly selected

The target agencies have a clear understanding of the country’s

maritime security threats such as transnational crimes, illegal fishing, foreign

intrusions, maritime terrorism, marine pollution, and maritime disasters.

However, the combined capabilities of these agencies are inadequate to

linkages between these agencies need to be strengthened at all levels of

Commandant's Paper Capt Dela Cruz

Commandant's Paper Capt Dela Cruz