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 These cases are consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity.

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The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in
connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base which
was won by a certain Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award to the bid winner because
they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and
subsequently, to conduct a rebidding.
   
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Genove, employed as a cook in the Main Club at John Hay Station, was dismissed after it had
been ascertained in an investigation that he poured urine in the soup stock. Genove filed a complaint
for damages against the club manager who was also an officer of USAF.
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?uis Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O͛Donnel, was arrested following a buy-bust operation
conducted by petitioners who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. A trial
ensued where petitioners testified against respondent Bautista. As a result of the charge, Bautista was
dismissed from his employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that because of
the latter͛s acts, he was removed from his job.
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Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against individual petitioners for
injuries allegedly sustained by handcuffing and unleashing dogs on them by the latter. The individual
petitioners, US military officers, deny this stressing that the private respondents were arrested for
theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries.
In all these cases, the individual petitioners claimed they were just exercising their official
functions. The USA was not impleaded in the complaints but has moved to dismiss on the ground that
they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.

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 &the doctrine of state immunity applicable in the cases at bar?

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 A state may not be sued without its consent. This doctrine is not absolute and does not say the
state may not be sued under any circumstance. The rule says that the state may not be sued without
its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents.
The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent
may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the sate enters into a
contract or it itself commences litigation. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to
have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested itself of its sovereign immunity
from suit with its implied consent. Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim.
The USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has
entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity.
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The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be
commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The petitioners cannot plead any immunity from
the complaint, the contract in question being decidedly commercial. Thus, the petition is DISMISSED
and the lower court directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of the case.
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The restaurant services offered at the John Hay Station operated for profit as a commercial and
not a government activity. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of self immunity to justify the
dismissal of the damage suit filed by Genove. Not even the US government can claim such immunity
because by entering into the employment contract with Geneove in the discharge of its proprietary
functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
Still, the court holds that the complaint against petitioners in the lower court be dismissed.
There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, the petitioner acted
quite properly in terminating the private respondent͛s employment for his unbelievably nauseating act
of polluting the soup stock with urine.
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It was clear that the individually-named petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official
functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified against the
complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, thay cannot be directly
impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. The
conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special counsel of Clark Air Base was a
submission of the US government to its jurisdiction is rejected. Express waiver cannot be made by a
mere counsel of the government but must be effected through a duly-enacted statute. Neither does it
come under the implied form of consent. Thus, the petition is granted and the civil case filed in the
lower court dismissed.
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The contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of what actually happened.
The record were too meager to indicate that the defendants were really discharging their official duties
or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident occurred. Only after the lower court shall
have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting will the court determine, if still
necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable.

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c)
 In a complaint for eminent domain filed by the NHA against the heirs of Guivelondo as owners
of lands that were within an urban center intended by the petitioner for socialized housing project, the
RTC, in an expropriation proceeding, fixed the just compensation for the lands.
Petitioner assailed the amount of compensation up to the SC but did not succeed. ?ater, it filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint for eminent domain alleging that the socialized housing project was
rendered impossible by the unconscionable value of the land sought to be expropriated. Meanwhile, a
notice of garnishment was issued against petitioner͛s ?and Bank deposits. Subsequently, a levy was
imposed on the funds and personal properties of NHA.

")
 Whether or not the funds and assets of the petitioner NHA are exempt from levy and
garnishment.

*" )
 Generally, funds and properties of the government cannot be object of garnishment
proceedings even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability
adjudged.
However, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a government ʹowned or controlled
corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of the
government, then the funds are not exempt from garnishment. This is so because when the
government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated
like any other corporation.
Petition for review is DENIED. Prayer for injunctive relief against the levy and garnishment is
DENIED.

 

   
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c)
(1983) The herein petitioners-contractors, under contracts with DPWH, constructed 145
housing units but coverage of construction and funding under the said contracts was only for 2/3 of
each housing unit. Through the verbal request and assurance of then DPWH Undersecretary Canlas,
they undertook additional constructions for the completion of the project, but said additional
constructions were not issued payment by DPWH.
With a favorable recommendation from the DPWH Asst. Secretary for ?egal Affairs, the
petitioners sent a demend letter to the DPWH Secretary. The DPWH Auditor did not object to the
payment subject to whatever action COA may adopt.
(1992) Through the request of then DPWH Secretary De Jesus, the DBM released the amount
for payment but (1996) respondent DPWH Secreatry Vigilar denied the money claims prompting
petitioners to file a petition for mandamus before the RTC which said trial court denied. Hence, this
petition.
Among others, respondent-secretary argues that the state may not be sued invoking the
constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State also known as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty.

")
Whether or not the Principle of State Immunity is applicable in the case at bar.

*" )
The principle of state immunity finds no application in this case. Under the circumstances,
respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and hide under the state͛s cloak
of invincibility against suit. Considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. The rule
is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. The
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen. It is just as important that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of
officialdom if the rule of law is to be maintained. The ends of justice would be subverted if we were to
uphold, in this instance, the state͛s immunity from suit.
This court - as the staunch guardian of the citizen͛s rights and welfare- cannot sanction an
injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument of perpetration thereof. Justice and
equity sternly demand that the state͛s cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular
instance and that petitioners-contractors be duly compensated , on the basis of quantum meruit, for
construction done on the public works housing project
Petition GRANTED.

 

   
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c)
The Bureau of Customs (BOC) seized and forfeited the shipment owned by UNIMEX Micro-
Electronics. When the latter filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), the forfeiture
decree was reversed and the court ordered the release of the goods. However, respondent͛s counsel
failed to secure a writ of execution to enforce the CTA decision. When respondent asked for release of
its shipment, BOC could no longer find subject shipment in its warehouses. The CTA ordered the BOC
to pay UNIMEX the commercial value of the goods with interest. The Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the BOC Commissioner, assailed the decision of the CTA in the SC. One of its grounds
was that the government funds cannot be charged with respondent͛s claim without a corresponding
appropriation and cannot be decreed by mere judicial order.

")
Can the government be held for actual damages?

*" )
Although the satisfaction of respondent͛s demand will ultimately fall on the government, and
that under the political doctrine of ͞state immunity,͟ it cannot be held liable for governmental acts (jus
imperil), the court still holds that petitioner cannot escape its liability. The circumstances of the case
warrant its exclusion from the purview of the state immunity doctrine. The court cannot turn a blind
eye to BOC͛s ineptitude and gross negligence in the safekeeping of respondent͛s goods. The situation
does not allow us to reject respondent͛s claim on the mere invocation of the doctrine of state
immunity. The doctrine must be fairly observed and the State should not avail itself of this prerogative
to take undue advantage of parties that may have legitimate claims against it.
The SC, as the staunch guardian of the people͛s rights and welfare, cannot sanction an injustice
so patent in its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Courts have
recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is inconvenient and contrary to reason is not
allowed in law. Justice and equity now demand that the State͛s cloak of invincibility against suit and
liability be shredded.
Assailed decision of the CTA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.