Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ISSUE: Whether Dr Acampado can be presented as expert witness in testifying schizophrenia in case
where petitioner is her client
HELD: In order for patient-doctor privilege can be claimed, the following requisites must concur:
1. Privilege claimed is in a civil case
2. The person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine
3. Such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity
4. The information was necessary for him to enable him to act in that capacity
These requisites must concur with the 4 fundamental conditions necessary for invoking doctor-
patient confidentiality:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed
2. Element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relation between the parties
3. The relation must be one which the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must
greater than the benefit thereby gain for correct disposal of litigation
Dr Acampado was only presented as an expert witness; she did not disclose anything obtained in the
course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner. There is nothing specific or
concrete offered to show that the information obtained from Dr Acampado would blacken the
petitioner’s reputation/character. Lastly, she makes no claim in any of her proceedings that her
counsel had objected to any questions asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited an answer
that would violate the confidentiality privilege.
HELD: YES. SC held that the bill of particulars filed by Erwin is sufficient to state a cause of action.
Private respondent already alleged that petitioner is unable to understand and accept the demands
made by his profession (upon his time and efforts). To demand more detail would be asking for
information on evidentiary facts.
SC sees no need to define or limit the scope of Art. 36 of the Family Code since the actual issue is
with the sufficiency of the bill of particulars. AFFIRMED CA DECISION.
ISSUE: Whether or not the confidential psychiatric report obtained by Edgar Krohn constitutes as
evidence in filing an annulment complaint on the account of psychological incapacity
HELD: NO. In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who
wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not
fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the
prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician
who examined the patient and executed the report. Such testimony then is considered nothing but
hearsay. PETITION DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT.
FACTS: Leouel Santos (petitioner) and Julia Rosario Bedia were married on September 20, 1986 in
Iloilo City
May 18, 1988 – Julia left for the US as a nurse. She did not disclose where she lived;
petitioner tried to locate her in the US but was unsuccessful. He then filed with RTC a
complaint for nullity of marriage
May 31, 1991 – Julia opposed complaint and alleged that the petitioner was the one who
had been irresponsible and incompetent
No collusion proven by the provincial prosecutor
November 6, 1991 – court dismissed the case for lack of merit. Petitioner appealed on the
basis that Julia’s failure to return and lack of communication proves she is psychologically
incapacitated
ISSUE: Whether Julia’s behavior (failure to return home and lack of intention of communicating with
Leouel) constitutes as psychological incapacity
Psychological incapacity does not cover all psychoses (extremely low intelligence, immaturity, etc)
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to
the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being
of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity. PETITION DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT
DISSENTING OPINIONS:
J. PADILLA – Julia appears to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential
marital obligation i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband. While it is true that vagueness
of psychological incapacity may allow easy escape for couples out of their marriage, there are
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enough safeguards in this contingency, i.e. intervention of the State through public prosecutor, to
guard against collusion.
The fact that Julia did not attempt to communicate with Santos for some time and did not even
divulge her address is a clear indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential
marital obligations although these indications were manifest AFTER the celebration of the marriage.
The court is limiting the interpretation of Art. 36 too much. VOTE TO NULLIFY MARRIAGE
HELD: One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. PETITION
DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT
HELD: In Santos v CA, psychological incapacity refers to not just mental or physical incapacity but
should be characterized by: a. gravity; b. juridical antecedence; c. incurability. In the present case,
there is no clear indication that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity but more of a
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difficulty or neglect in performing marital obligations. It is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities but they must show that they are incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological illness
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
J. PADILLA – Maintained position in Santos v CA. Each case must be judged based on its own facts.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual milieu and CA must avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trail court.
J. ROMERO – Psychological incapacity should not be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to
insanity or defects in the mental faculties (imbecility), there is a resultant defect of vice of consent,
thus rendering the marriage voidable under Art 45 of Family Code. Psychological incapacity does not
refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage
HELD: Respondent’s alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute grounds psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to perform
essential marital obligations.
As in Republic v CA, expert testimony should be presented to establish the precise cause of
respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity in order to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage rests on the petitioner. CA DECISION
AFFIRMED
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidences presented in the said case are substantive and sufficient in
ruling nullity of marriage; Whether the testimony of expert witness is required
HELD: Although the respondent failed to provide material support to the family, became abusive
and abandoned them, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the
time of the marriage or that it is incurable. His alleged psychological illness was only traced to the
time he lost his job and not at the inception of the marriage.
Art 36 of Family Code is not to be confused with divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a part at the
time of the marriage and is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond provided in Art 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of Family
Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At best, the
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evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a
marriage void. Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down
the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully
observed them. PETITION DENIED.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC and CA correctly declared the marriage as null and void under Art. 36 on
the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity as he is emotionally immature
and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic and fugitive from justice
HELD: Respondent failed to comply with guideline #2 of Molina case which requires that the root
cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by
experts. No psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of the
husband. The allegation that he is a fugitive was also not sufficiently proven. The Investigating
prosecutor also was not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since RTC rendered
decision prematurely.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in declaring
the nullity of her marriage with the respondent
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HELD: The SC reversed the decision and remanded it to the RTC for proper re-trial, providing
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family CodE (based on Molina
case):
1. The burden of proving the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubts should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage (semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio). This is rooted in the fact that both the Constitution and the Law cherish
the validity of the marriage and the unity of the family.
2. The root cause of psychological incapacity must be: a. medically or clinically identified; b.
alleged in the complaint; c. sufficiently proven by experts and; d. clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological —
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically (sic) ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
3. The incapacity was be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and is still existing
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations,
not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated
to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts."
There is no state participation in the instant case other than the manifestation filed with the RTC on
November 16, 1994. The state did not file any pleading, motion or position paper, at any stage of
the proceedings.
March 22, 1994 – respondent assaulted petitioner so petitioner decidedly to leave Zosimo.
Petitioner filed for annulment, invoking psychological incapacity as grounds
April 25, 1994 – summons were served on respondent but he failed to file an answer within
reglamentary period.
August 3, 1994 – prosecutor submitted report that no collusion exists between both parties
January 11, 1995 – respondent filed an answer denying psychological incapacity
November 15, 1995 – RTC granted nullity of marriage but CA reversed the decision on the
basis that petitioner has not sufficiently established the grounds for psychological incapacity:
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability
HELD: DENIED. Petitioner failed to establish proof that respondent showed signs of mental
incapacity that would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant provided in Art.
68 of the Family Code.
The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The
rule follows the settled legal maxim that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and
construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only
when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the
new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex
prospicit, non respicit."
The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in
our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has
escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to
the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts
and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity.
Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the
time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.
CA held that demurrer was not the correct procedure; proper remedy was for the defense to
present evidence and appeal there from. Petitioner also failed to show that the issues in the
court had been resolved arbitrarily without basis
ISSUES: Is certiorari available to correct an order denying a demurrer to evidence? In its denial, did
the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion by violating or ignoring the applicable law and
jurisprudence?
HELD: In general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings.
However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People, 21 this Court declared that appeal -- not
certiorari -- in due time was indeed the proper remedy, provided there was no grave abuse of
discretion or excess of jurisdiction or oppressive exercise of judicial authority. In fact, Rules 41 and
65 of the Rules of Court expressly recognize this exception and allow certiorari when the lower court
acts with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of an interlocutory order.
The evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any finding of
psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage. The
documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against
him. Sorely lacking in respondent’s evidence is proof that the psychological incapacity was grave
enough to bring about the disability of a party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In
Molina, we affirmed that "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological incapacity.
Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
ISSUE: Whether evidences presented are sufficient to invoke psychological incapacity in annulling
said marriage
HELD: A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection or exception by one of the parties in an
action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of
law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue." The demurrer challenges the
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing upon the sufficiency of the
evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent
or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.
The evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any finding of
psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not
get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence
or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union. Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to
identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Specifically, his testimony
did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither
did he testify that it was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
Medical examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so long as
the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately. Here, however,
the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.
PETITION GRANTED. ANNULMENT CASE WAS DISMISSED
At best, the circumstances described are grounds for legal separation under Art 55 of Family Code.
Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented
by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. PETITION
DENIED
HELD: The totality of evidence presented are insufficient to prove that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated following Santos and Mo.ina guidelines Mere abandonment is not tantamount to
psychological incapacity. No other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by
a psychological disorder. Although as a general rule, there is no need for medical exam, it would
have helped the petitioner to prove her case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified his illness.
In proving psychological incapacity, there is no distinction between a Filipino spouse and a foreign
spouse. Guidelines set cannot be bended on the account of nationality. The norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality. PETITION
GRANTED, RTC DECISION REVERSED.
failed to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to each other’s needs and
feelings
Based on the psychiatric report of Dr Eduardo Maaba, petitioner is psychologically
capacitated to comply with essential marital obligations
January 31, 2001 – RTC denied petition for nullity based on insufficient evidence
July 1, 2003 – CA reversed RTC decision based on psychiatric report of Dr Garcia that both
are psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v CA
ISSUE: Whether root cause of psychological incapacity was identified based on Molina guideline #2
HELD: Based on the report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the parties and their
witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to
fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity. Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that
respondent Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to
his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood.
Respondent failed to prove that his wife’s behavior and actions are grave psychological maladies
that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any
showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel,
reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential
obligations of marriage. Dr. Garcia’s report does not even mention that petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated. PETITION GRANTED. CA DECISION WAS REVERSED
ISSUE: Whether evidences presented by petitioner are sufficient to prove psychological incapacity of
respondent
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HELD: In understanding Art 36, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law."
Each case must be judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own facts. Petitioner was able to sufficiently prove the psychological incapacity
of his spouse (witnesses, experts, etc). The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has
been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and
clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from
the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating
ridiculous stories, etc.
Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and
even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious
characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her
natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after
their marriage. Also, The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her
disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the
marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. However, although Dr Abcede did not
comment on the incurability of respondent’s illness, the SC ruled that each case is to be tried based
on the merits of the facts presented and not just juridical precedence. PETITION GRANTED,
MARRIAGED NULL AND VOID
ISSUE: Whether abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity
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HELD: Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to
establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for
declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. He
submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register
of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being
celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest
son, in which Fely used her American husband’s surname. Even considering the admissions made by
Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not
enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from
assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a
Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and
literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and
his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the
RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United
States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she
alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was
still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status,
condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and
even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not
have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus. DECISION REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
MARRIAGE IS VALID AND SUBSISTING
Petitioner and respondent later filed on April 5, 2002 before the appellate court a Joint Motion to
Approve Interim Visitation Agreement which was, by Resolution of April 24, 2002, approved.
On April 18, 2002, respondent filed before the appellate court a Motion for the Modification of her
visiting rights under the Interim Visitation Agreement. To the Motion, petitioner filed an Opposition
with Motion to Cite Respondent for Contempt of Court in light of her filing of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC which, so he contended, constituted forum
shopping.
By Resolution of July 5, 2002, the appellate court ordered respondent and her counsel to make the
necessary amendment in her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig City RTC
in so far as the custody aspect is concerned, under pain of contempt.
In compliance with the appellate court’s Resolution of July 5, 2002, respondent filed a Motion to
Admit Amended Petition before the Pasig RTC. She, however, later filed in December 2002 a Motion
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to Dismiss her petition, without prejudice, on the ground that since she started residing and
conducting business at her new address at Pasay City, constraints on resources and her very busy
schedule rendered her unable to devote the necessary time and attention to the petition. The Pasig
RTC granted respondent’s motion and accordingly dismissed the petition without prejudice, by
Order of March 28, 2003.
On June 12, 2003, petitioner filed his own petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
dissolution of the absolute community of property before the Pasig RTC, docketed as JDRC Case No.
6190, with prayer for the award to him of the sole custody of Bianca, subject to the final resolution
by the appellate court of his petition for habeas corpus.
The appellate court eventually dismissed the habeas corpus petition, by Resolution of July 3, 2003,
for having become moot and academic, "the restraint on the liberty of the person alleged to be in
restraint [having been] lifted."
HELD: It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like
when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the
admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts, which are
unavailing in the instant case.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they
quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment
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and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are
not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes manifest themselves. Neither it is to be
equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity
but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. PETITION DENIED WITH FINALITY
ISSUE: should the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite
prescribed by article 4 of the family code be raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is
being impugned on the ground of a party’s psychological incapacity under article 36 of the family
code
HELD: The SC held that in civil case no. Sp 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the
marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by
this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have
been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as
regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any
other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters
that could have been adjudged in that case
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former
judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the
second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. All three requisites
are present in the instant case. If same facts or evidence would sustain both petitions, the two
actions are considered the same and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.
Petitioner has the same cause of action—nullity of said marriage—the grounds or basis are just
different. Petition denied due to lack of merit
1
A matter [already] judged", and may refer to two things: in both civil law and common law legal systems, a
case in which there has been a final judgment and is no longer subject to appeal
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deeply [immersed] within the system. It continues to influence the individual until the later
stage of life.
HELD: Petitioner’s portrayal of respondent as jobless and irresponsible is not enough. As the
Supreme Court said in the Molina case (supra), "(I)t is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
There is no showing that [Dr.] Tayag was able to interview the respondent or any of his relatives in
order to arrive at the above conclusion. Obviously, the data upon which the finding or conclusion
was based is inadequate. If being jobless (since the commencement of the marriage up to the filing
of the present petition) and worse, a gambler, can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically ill –
what then can We describe such acts? Are these normal manners of a married man?
Dr. Tayag had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely been relayed
to him by respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand information
fed to him by one side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.
Dr. Tayag’s Psychological Report does not even show that the alleged anti-social personality disorder
of Manolito was already present at the inception of the marriage or that it is incurable. Neither does
it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder nor identify its root cause.
The root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be
fully explained (Santos case)
ISSUE: Whether or not refusal to have children and abandonment constitutes psychological
incapacity; Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or psychiatrists is still desirable, if
evidence in this case already shows the psychological incapacity of private respondent
HELD: Molina and Santos cases did not mention the necessity of the presentation of expert opinion.
What is important, as in Marcos v Marcos, is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the condition of psychological incapacity.
20
Likewise, Section 2(d) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, states:
(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The rule is that the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented, considered in totality,
should be sufficient to convince the court of the psychological incapacity of the party concerned.
Petitioner, however, failed to substantiate his allegation that private respondent is psychologically
incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to bear a child was
strongly disputed. DENIED.
ISSUE: Whether or not Martini’s being a “mama’s boy” constitutes as a psychological incapacity
under Art. 36 of the Family Code
HELD: Art. 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the material bond at the time the
causes manifest themselves, nor with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
21
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain
quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders,
there is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [T]he root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness, and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained.
For psychological incapacity to render a marriage void ab initio it must be characterized by:
1. Gravity – must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage
2. Juridical antecedence – it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage
3. Incurability – must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved
In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proving the nullity of marriage
lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage, and against the dissolution and nullity (semper praesumitur pro matrimonio)
As seen in this case, Lynette failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove Martini’s psychological
incapacity. While the court sympathizes with her predication, its first and foremost duty is to apply
the law.
ISSUE: Whether Patalinhug’s behavior constitutes psychological incapacity pursuant to Art 36 of the
Family Code
22
HELD: Art. 36 of the Family Code states: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage; shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved. 7 The Court likewise laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of
Appeals.8 Relevant to this petition are the following:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage
Petitioner’s testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Patalinghug’s
condition. Even Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to show the root cause of her psychological incapacity. The
root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully established by the evidences presented