The Case of S.S.

“Lotus”
France v. Turkey
1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7)

On August 2, 1926, the S.S. Lotus, a French steamship, collided on the

high seas with the Boz-Kourt, a Turkish collier. The Boz-Kourt split in two and
sank, and eight of its crew members were killed. The Lotus remained to
assist the survivors of the Boz-Kourt, including its captain, Hassan Bey, and
then continued with the survivors to Constantinople. Turkish authorities
subsequently requested that Lieutenant Demons, the officer of the watch on
board the Lotus when the collision occurred, come ashore to give evidence.
At the conclusion of the questioning, Turkish authorities placed Demons and
Hassan Bey under arrest pending trial on charges of manslaughter. At trial,
Demons argued that the Turkish court lacked jurisdiction, but the court
convicted both Demons and Hassan Bey, sentencing each to a term of
imprisonment. The French government protested the arrest and the
conviction and requested that the case be transferred to a French court.
Turkey proposed, and France agreed, to pose the following question to the
PCIJ: “(1) Has Turkey . . . acted in
conflict with the principles of international law—and if so, what principles—by
instituting . . . criminal proceedings in pursuance of Turkish law against M.
Demons . . .?”

The French government invoked the 1923 Convention of Lausanne in

arguing against Turkish jurisdiction. Article 15 of the Convention indicated
that “all questions of jurisdiction shall, as between Turkey and the other
contracting Powers, be decided in accordance with the principles of
international law.” France maintained that such principles precluded criminal
jurisdiction in this case. The Court, somewhat significantly, condensed the
positions of the parties in the following way:

The French Government contends that the Turkish Courts, in order

to have jurisdiction, should be able to point to some title to
jurisdiction recognized by international law in favor of Turkey. On
the other hand, the Turkish Government takes the view that Article
15 allows Turkey jurisdiction whenever such jurisdiction does not
come into conflict with a principle of international law.

Having thus framed the question as one inquiring whether international

law is essentially permissive or prohibitive, the Court then issued its famous
dictum:

International law governs relations between independent States.

The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their
own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally
accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to
regulate the relations between these co-existing independent
communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims.
Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be
presumed.
 The Court ultimately ruled, in a six-six split with President Huber casting
the deciding vote, that trying Demons was not an exercise of power on the
territory of another State, that the Court could deduce no rule or principle of
international law preventing Turkey from exercising jurisdiction, and that
under the circumstances France and Turkey had concurrent jurisdiction.