Leibniz's First Theodicy

Author(s): R. C. Sleigh, Jr.

Source: Noûs, Vol. 30, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, 10, Metaphysics, 1996 (1996),
pp. 481-499
Published by: Blackwell Publishing
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2216258
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PhilosophicalPerspectives,10, Metaphysics,1996

LEIBNIZ'S FIRST THEODICY

R. C. Sleigh, Jr.
Universityof Massachusettsat Amherst

In 1710 the Amsterdampublisher,Isaac Troyel, broughtout anony-

mously a work entitled Essais de Theodiceesur la Bonte de Dieu, la
Liberte de l'Homme et 1' Origin du Mal.1 Subsequent editions of the
Theodicy (as it shall be called hereafter) identified the author. The
Theodicyis the only philosophicalbook that Leibnizhad publishedin his
lifetime. It is ostensibly aimed at defending Christianorthodoxy against
presumed assaults thereon contained in the writings of Pierre Bayle-
assaults centered around the problem of evil. Actually, it goes well be-
yond what that endeavor would require; it presents Leibniz's mature
thought on all aspects of the problem of evil, althoughnot always at the
deepest level.2
Leibniz cogitated upon, and wrote about, aspects of the problem of
evil throughouthis entire philosophicalcareer.There was a flurryof early
activity,commencingwith "DemonstrationumCatholicarumConspectus"
("Sketchof Catholic Demonstrations")writtenin 1668 or 1669 (or both)
and culminatingin the Confessio Philosophi (the Confessio, hereafter)
writtenin 1672or 1673 (or both). Between these two Leibnizcomposedan
importantwork on the relevant topic under the title "Von der Allmacht
und AllwissenheitGottes und der Freiheitdes Menschen,"("On the Om-
nipotenceand Omniscienceof God andHumanFreedom,"hereafter)writ-
ten in 1670 or 1671 (or both).3The point of this paper is to analyzeLeib-
niz's thinking, as presented in the Confessio, about one central aspect of
the problemof evil-what I call "the authorof sin" problem.The central
thesis of the paperis that Leibnizformulateda solutionto the authorof sin
problemin the Confessiothat he came to believe to be inadequateand that
recouping his losses subsequentlyinvolved him in tangled metaphysical
considerations.I have no more than moderateconfidencein this thesis. My
main interest is in puttingthe problemsof interpretationfront and center
for investigation.The thesis facilitatesthat project,and, althoughmy confi-
dence in it is moderate, still, I currentlythinkit is true.
I begin with some generalbackground.
 482 / Robert C. Sleigh

In its most elemental form, the problem of evil revolves around the
claim that the mere existence of evil is inconsistent with the existence of a
being that is omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, and creator of the
world-features usually ascribed to God. This is the general form in which
the problem of evil is typically discussed today, although recent discussion
has also focussed on the claim that even if the general consistency problem
can be resolved, the amount and nature of evil that actually occurs in the
world make it impossible, or at any rate, improbable that there is a being
having the features Christians usually ascribe to God. The consistency
problem was noted by Leibniz's Christian predecessors, but it was given
short shrift, basically because it was regarded as so easy to resolve. St.
Thomas provided a standard resolution in S.T.IaQ 2, a.3.4 Therein St.
Thomas considered this objection:

... if God existed, no evil would be found. However, evil is found in the
world. ThereforeGod does not exist.

Thomas's response refers with approval to St. Augustine:

As St. Augustinesaid: "SinceGod is the highestgood, in no way would He

permitanyevil in His works,unlessHis omnipotenceandgoodnessweresuchas
to bringgood even out of evil."This,therefore,belongsto the infinitegoodness
of God that He permitsevils to exist and from them producesgood things.

This is a rudimentary form of what we might call the greater good defense,
which utilizes the following presupposition: it is morally acceptable for an
agent to permit, and, in some cases, even to cause, an evil state of affairs to
obtain, provided that there is some good state of affairs such that the agent
cannot bring about the obtaining of the good state of affairs without the
obtaining of the evil state of affairs and provided further that it is better for
both states of affairs to obtain than neither. When this presupposition is
combined with the thesis that every evil state of affairs that obtains is such
that there is some good state of affairs such that it is impossible for the
latter to obtain unless the former obtains and such that it is better for both
states of affairs to obtain than neither, then we have the makings of a
defense relative to the general consistency problem.
But this was not the end of the problem of evil for Leibniz's Christian
predecessors; it was more like the beginning. Thus Scholastic philosophers
were inclined to think that a specific aspect of God's goodness, i.e., his
holiness, would be compromised, were God causally implicated in unaccept-
able ways in creaturely sin, whatever valuable consequences were to ensue in
virtue of the sinning. Indeed, were God causally implicated in unacceptable
 Leibniz'sFirstTheodicy/ 483

ways in creaturelysin he would therebybe an authorof that sin. At least

since the Councilof Orange(529), it has been de fidefor CatholicsthatGod
is not an authorof sin. LutheranLeibnizneverwaveredfromacceptanceof
the doctrinethatGod is not the authorof sin. It is mucheasierto fixon where
Scholasticphilosophers,Leibniz,andvariousof hiscontemporariesstoodon
the doctrinein questionthan it is to locate its content. Roughlyspeaking,a
free agentS is saidto be an authorof some sinfulactionA in case S is morally
responsiblewith respect to sinful action A in virtue of the free exerciseor
free non-exerciseof some causalpowerof S relativeto the occurrenceof A.
There are a variety of ways in which an agent S becomes a candidatefor
bearingmoralresponsibilitywithrespectto an actionA in virtueof relevant
free exercisesor free non-exercisesof S's causalpowers,e.g., by performing
A, by causingA's performance,andby permittingA's performance,i.e., by
not causallypreventingits performancein circumstancesin whichS knows
thatA will occurunlesshe preventsits occurrenceandin whichS knowsthat
he can preventits occurrence.
There is a standardScholasticframeworkwithrespectto sin, whichwe
need to note. Creaturelysins result from free exercises of the will; the
resultingbodily action, e.g., those associatedwith an act of adultery,to
pick the most prominent,standardexample, are sinful, but derivatelyso.
Fundamentally,the sin is associated with the free choice to commit the
adultery.The relevantbodilymovementsare the act saidto be commanded
by the agent; the choice to committhe adulteryis an act said to be elicited
by the agent. Given this way of thinkingabout sin there are three basic
waysin whichGod mightbe construedas an authorof some sin: i) by freely
eliciting a sinful choice; ii) by causally contributingto some creature's
freely elicitingsome sinfulchoice; and iii) by freelychoosingnot to prevent
some creaturefrom freely elicitingsome sinfulchoice.
It was commonamongScholasticsto supposethat a sin ariseswhen an
agent freely chooses to performan action that is prohibitedby divinelaw,
and the God can not author sin in this fashion. Hence the action with
respect to the author of sin problemtended to focus on the possibilityof
divine involvementin categoriesii) and iii). Leibniz'sChristianpredeces-
sors held that God causallycontributesin some fashionto everycreaturely
action, and that each elicitingof a sinfulchoice that occursis suchthat God
could have preventedit from occurring,had he so chosen. So defenseswith
respectto categoriesii) and iii) focussedon providingan accountof God's
causalcontributionsand permissionsthat explainedhow God could act in
the ways specifiedin the accountwithouttherebybeing besmirchedby the
resultingsinful choices. Leibniz'sScholasticpredecessorshad formulated
elaboratetheories of divine and humanaction in an effort to satisfythese
requirements.The main point of the Confessiowas to formulatea simple,
unifiedtheorythat filledthe bill, withoutinvolvingwhatLeibniz(andmany
of his contemporaries)took to be Scholasticexcesses.
 484 / Robert C. Sleigh

II

In "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and Human Free-

dom" Leibniz presented the author of sin problem as a combination of
category ii) and category iii) problems in the usual way-category ii) prob-
lems are alleged to arise because of God's providing circumstances that
causally contribute to human sin; and, category iii) problems are alleged to
arise because of God's failure to prevent human sin. Leibniz closed para-
graph 15 by claiming that neither category had received a satisfactory
resolution. In particular, he noted two solution that he attributed to the
Scholastics, which he regarded as unsatisfactory. I consider them in the
reverse of the order in which Leibniz presented them.#
In section 19 Leibniz considered the prospects of solving category ii)
aspects of the author of sin problem by accepting a libertarian account
of human free choice of the sort he usually attributed to Molina. Leibniz
therein rejected this solution for three reasons, the first two of which
were standard fare among Molina's Scholastic critics, the third of which
was not. First, Leibniz argued that the very strategy, central to a libertar-
ian theory in this context, of attenuating God's causal involvement in
creaturely free choice, yielded an unacceptably tepid notion of divine
providence. Second, Leibniz argued that a libertarian theory generates
serious difficulties in accounting for God's certain and infallible knowl-
edge of true counterfactuals of freedom, i.e., true propositions stating
what an agent would have freely chosen in circumstances that do not
obtain. And, third, in paragraph 17 Leibniz clearly committed himself to
a theory of causal determinism and compatibilism that he took to be
inconsistent with incompatibilist libertarianism of the sort he attributed
to Molina.
In section 18 Leibniz considered critically another Scholastic strategy
for solving category ii) problems. The basic idea of the strategy is to treat
evil as a privation-a lack of a feature that is natural to a thing, and to
claim that God is the ultimate cause of the positive features of each crea-
ture, but not necessarily of the creature's privations.
My interest is in a variant of this theory that was scorned by some
early modern philosophers, e.g., Hobbes as well as Leibniz. It was com-
mon to suppose that this variant was contained in the works of St.
Thomas. In De Potentia Q3, a.6, ad 20 Thomas considered the objection
that if God operates as a first cause with respect to a creature's will, then
the defects (sin included) of voluntary actions must be ascribed to God.
Thomas replied:

... in a sinfulaction, whateverthere is of entity . is reducedto God as its

first cause, but what there is therein of deformityis reducedto [creaturely]
free choice as its cause.
 Leibniz'sFirstTheodicy/ 485

An elaboration of this account may be found in S.T. IaIIaeQ79,a.2, ad 2.

Thomas held the view that God causally contributes to each and every
sinful action, but without contributing to the defect accompanying the
action in virtue of which it is sinful. He considered this objection: Since a
creature causes sin. to obtain by causing a sinful act to obtain, therefore,
were God to causally contribute to a sinful act's obtaining, He would
thereby cause sin to obtain. Thomas responded that the creature causally
contributes to the obtaining of both that act that is sinful and the sinfulness
of the act. But not so, God; Thomas concluded:

... manis the cause of sin. But God is a causeof the act in sucha mannerthat
He is in no way the cause of the defect accompanyingthe act; and, hence, He
is not the cause of the sin.

What we might call the "anomie" version of this theory was a subject
of ridicule by Hobbes and the young Leibniz. In section 22 of chapter 46 of
the Latin edition of Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes outlined the anomie
theory,.which he attributed to the Scholastics, this way: Sin, in itself, is
anomie, i.e., the failure of some act to be in accord with some relevant law;
this failure is a negation and ". . . not a deed or any sort of action."
Hobbes formulated how this theory is supposed to work and his criticism of
it, as follows:

Recognizing . . . that God is the cause of every act and every law, they deny
that He is the cause of the inconsistency,as if someone were to say when he
drewtwo lines, one straightand the other curved,he made both of them, but
that someone else made theirlack of congruity.6

In section 18 Leibniz characterized the anomie theory in much the same

way and formulated a counterexample, strikingly similar to that provided
by Hobbes. Leibniz's full scorn for the anomie theory is contained in a
paper entitled "L'Auteur du Peche" (The Author of Sin), written at about
the same time as the Confessio. Therein Leibniz referred to the anomie
theory by name and formulated it as follows:

Touchingthis greatquestionof the authorof sin, it is commonlybelievedthat

the difficultyis avoided by claimingthat sin in its essence is only a pure
privationwithout any reality, and that God is not the authorof privations.
Towardthat end, the famousdistinctionbetweenthe physicalaspect and the
moralaspect of sin was introduced.

Leibniz, then, considered an example of a sinful act, i.e., a robbery,

noting that on the Scholastic account the "physical" aspects included not
only the physical actions of the thief, but the intentions and choices of
the thief as well, i.e., what we might call the natural properties of the
486 / Robert C. Sleigh

agent and act. He concluded in a criticism as biting as is to be found in

Leibniz:

Wherethen is this moralaspectof sin of whichso muchis said?Perhapsit will

be said that it consistsin anomie, as Holy Scripturecalls it, i.e., in the lack of
conformityof the action with respectto the law, which is a pure privation.I
agree with that, but I do not see what that contributesto the clarificationof
our question.For to say that God is not the authorof sin becauseHe is not the
authorof a privation,althoughHe can be calledthe authorof everythingthat
is real and positivein sin-that is a manifestillusion.It is a left-overfromthe
visionaryphilosophyof the past; it is a subterfugewith which a reasonable
personwill not be satisfied.7

Leibniz went on to provide another counter-example, once again strikingly

similar to that provided by Hobbes. Leibniz did not ridicule, or even deny,
the distinction between the natural components of an action and its moral
aspect. What he ridiculed was the use to which Scholastics put it. The idea
of the criticism seems to be that if you admit that God causally contributes
to every natural component of an action then it is too late in the game to
absolve God from causally contributing to its moral aspect, hence, in rele-
vant cases, to its sinfulness.
By the close of paragraph 19 of "On the Omnipotence and Omni-
science of God and Human Freedom" Leibniz believed that he had dis-
pensed with the leading moves of his predecessors concerning the problem
of the author of sin. We might expect Leibniz's positive contribution to be
located in section 20, the last section of the work. Here is that section in its
entirety:

20. Damit wir aber ...

(But in orderfor us ...

The positive solution was the work of the Confessio; we turn to it.

III

Consider the following passage from the Confessio:

... although God is the ground [ratio] of sins, neverthelessHe is not the
author of sins, and if I may be permittedto speak in the manner of the
Scholastics,the ultimatephysicalcause of sins, as of all createdthings, is in
God; but the moralcause is in the sinner.I supposethat this is whatis meant
by those who have saidthatthe substanceof the actis fromGod, but neverthe-
less not the evil aspect, althoughthey have been unable to explainhow it is
that the evil aspectdoes not resultfromthe act. [Confessio121]
 Leibniz'sFirstTheodicy/ 487

Given the context in which this passage occurs in the Confessio, it is clear
that Leibniz intended therein to assert that God makes a causal contribution
to sinful actions, indeed, that God is the unique ultimate cause of sinful
actions but that God is not morally responsible for sinful actions-the sinner
is. This latter point is, of course, exactly the bottom line outcome that
Scholastics wanted; a decent question is-how did Leibniz aim to achieve
this result? Leibniz's solution is contained in the continuation of the passage:

They [the Scholastics]have said more correctlythat God contributesevery-

thing to sin except will, and, accordingly,He does not sin. I think, therefore,
that sins are not due to the divinewill, but ratherto the divineunderstanding,
or, what amountsto the same thing, to the eternalideas, i.e., the natureof
things.

This alleged solution to the author of sin problem requires some un-
packing. Consider the following pair of propositions:

(1) For any state of affairs a, if a obtains then God is the ultimate
ground (ratio) of a's obtaining.
(2) For any state of affairs a and agent S, S is an author of a's obtain-
ing if, and only if, S causes a to obtain by willing that a obtain.

Textual support for (1) may be found at Confessio 125; for (2), at Confessio
127. Being an author of the obtaining of a state of affairs is one way in
which God is an ultimate ground. But, since God is not an author of sin,
there must be another way. According to Leibniz in the Confessio 123 there
is. At Confessio 121-22 Leibniz wrote the following about states of affairs
that he took to obtain of necessity, e.g., that three times three equals nine:

God bringsthese thingsaboutnot by willingthem, but by understandingthem

and He understands them by existing .... Therefore, you see that there is
somethingof which God is the cause, not by His will, but by His existence.

What Leibniz needed, of course, is the claim that sins fall in the category of
things God causes to exist by understanding them. And at Confessio 123
Leibniz asserted what is needed:

Sins occur because the universal harmony of things . . . brings them forth this
way. However,the universalharmonyis not a resultof the will of God, but of
idea or intellect,i.e., the natureof things.Therefore,sinsare to be ascribedto
the same thing; accordingly,sins are a consequenceof the existenceof God,
not the will of God.

In virtue of these texts, and passages in their vicinity, we may be tempted to

ascribe the following propositions to Leibniz:
488 / Robert C. Sleigh

(3) For any state of affairs a, God causes a to obtain by understand-

ing a, if and only if it is not possible that God exists and a does
not obtain.
(4) For any state of affairs a, if a obtains then either God causes a to
obtain by willing that a obtains or God causes a to obtain by
existing, i.e., it is not possible that God exists and a does not
obtain.
(5) For any sinful state of affairs a, if a obtains then it is not the case
that God causes a to obtain by willing that a obtains.
(6) For any sinful state of affairs a, if a obtains then God causes a to
obtain by existing, i.e., it is not possible that God exists and a
does not obtain.

The texts indicate that (4) provides the content for (1) and that the two
mechanisms of divine causation noted in (4) were construed by Leibniz to
be jointly exhaustive. Given this result, and given Leibniz's commitment to
the thesis that God is not the author of sin, Leibniz had no choice but to
affirm (6). But surely if (6) takes us out of the author of sin frying pan, it
lands us in a theodicean fire.
At this point the interlocutor in the dialogue that constitutes the Con-
fessio has his best lines:

... but see whetherit does not follow,first,that in additionall the remaining
things, even good things, as well as sins, resultnot from God's will, but from
his nature, or what is the same, are to be ascribedto the nature of things;
second, that sins are necessary.(Confessio124)

In Section IV I concentrate on Leibniz's response to the first of the

interlocutor's objections, and in section V, his response to the second.

IV

Some of Leibniz's remarks appended in the margins of the Confessio

manuscript may suggest that the interlocutor's first criticism is based on a
serious misreading of Leibniz's position. So I begin with some textual
matters that bear on that suggestion.
As noted, the best estimate is that Leibniz first drafted the Confessio
in 1672-73. Like many of Leibniz's philosophical writings, the manuscript
was altered at various times by its author. From 1677 until 1680 Niels
Stensen served as apostolic vicar to the Court of Hanover, working on
various church reunion projects. During this period Leibniz presented
Stensen with the manuscript of the Confessio; Stensen appended critical
comments in the margin, to which Leibniz responded in the margins.
Stensen and Leibniz discussed the topics of the Confessio in December
 Leibniz'sFirstTheodicy/ 489

1677; Leibniz's record of the outcome, "Conversaton with Stensen," may

be found in Grua 268-73. Leibniz's responses to some of Stensen's criti-
cisms may suggest that I (in common with Stensen) have misconstrued the
theory of the original Confessio. I concentrate on one case.
In a marginal comment to Confessio 123 Stensen argued as follows.
Leibniz's argument for the thesis that sins depend for their existence on the
divine understanding and not the divine will may be extended to reach the
conclusion that the entire series of created entities depends on the divine
understanding, not the divine will. But this is unacceptable. Leibniz re-
sponded as follows:

The series of things is not posited because God is posited, but only because
God, who is the most wise being, wills nothingbut the best ... (Confessio
123)

Let 'W' designate the actual world. Consider the following:

(1) If God exists, then W obtains.

(2) If God wills nothing but the best, then W obtains.
(3) God exists if and only if God wills nothing but the best.

On the basis of the original Confessio texts Stensen attributed (1) to Leib-
niz. In his response Leibniz denied accepting (1), but affirmed (2). My view
is this. Stensen's interpretation of the original Confessio looks like a fair
reading. Moreover, if Leibniz accepted the necessity of (3) then (1) and (2)
are equivalent. But a close reading of the original Confessio suggests that
Leibniz then did accept the necessity of (3). My diagnosis is this. By 1677-
78, when he responded in the margin to Stensen's criticisms, Leibniz real-
ized that crucial aspects of the Confessio solution to the problem of the
author of sin were not viable. He was then confronting the major problems
involved in his mature treatment of the problem of evil, e.g., the modal
status of (3) and the modal status of 'W is the best possible world.' Leib-
niz's response presupposed a hybrid position, combining his then current
position with what he then took to be salvageable from the original Con-
fessio. I think there is something to be gained from studying his original
defense in the original Confessio.
We may formulate the interlocutor's first objection as follows. Ac-
cording to Leibniz, the features in virtue of which one state of affairs is
more valuable than another are such that judgments of relative merit are
either necessarily true or necessarily false. And the judgment that a given
state of affairs is sinful has the same modal character. This is Leibniz's
basis for claiming that sins are to be attributed to God's existence, not his
will. But, the interlocutor argued, good states of affairs are in the same
boat. Hence, they ought to be attributed to God's existence, not his
490 / Robert C. Sleigh

will-contrary to Leibniz's position.8 Leibniz's response is exiguous. He

reiterated his assertion that God wills those things that are good in them-
selves, but not sins, and that, hence, the required asymmetry is preserved.
The interlocutor's initial response is lethargic. "Your doctrine is im-
mensely pleasing." (Confessio 125). But, as is typical in this surprisingly
forthcoming dialogue, he returned to the fray, attempting to show that
Leibniz's own principles lead to the conclusion that God wills sins. The
interlocutor argued as follows:

On the contrary,it seems that God willsthem [sins].For the harmonyof things
is pleasingto God, and the existenceof sins arisesfromthe harmonyof things.
Moreover, accordingto your definition,we will the existence of that which
delightsus. Therefore,God mustbe said to will sins. (Confessio130)

Leibniz responded as follows.

That is an illusionof reasoning:even if harmonyis pleasing,neverthelessit is

not an immediate consequence that whatever arises from this harmonyis
pleasing. Given that the whole is pleasingit does not follow that each part is
pleasing. Even if the entire harmonyis pleasing,the discordantaspectsof it
neverthelessare not pleasingin themselves...

In this passage Leibniz was attempting to firm up the position he

staked out in his original (exiguous) response to the interlocutor's objec-
tion. Leibniz wrote:

Sins are not among the things that God wills . .. , because these are things
that, taken one by one, or per se, he does not find good.... However, he
must be said to will the entire series, not just permit it ... (Confessio
124).

So Leibniz was firmly committed to the idea that God wills the obtaining of
that maximally consistent state of affairs that is the actual world. The
interlocutor's argument may be put this way: Let W be the actual world and
a, any sinful state of affairs that obtains in W. W's obtaining entails that a
obtains. According to Leibniz's position God wills that W obtain, hence,
God wills that a obtain, contrary to Leibniz's claim. Leibniz's response is
this: The interlocutor's argument presupposes that the willings of a rational
agent are closed under entailment (or, perhaps, known and cogitated upon
entailments). But this presupposition is false.
Here is my diagnosis. It is natural to suppose at this point that in the
original Confessio Leibniz ran together varieties of willing, which, in his
mature work, were assiduously kept apart. There is, first, the notion of
antecedent willing, which is concisely formulated by Leibniz in a letter to
Naude (Grua 502):
 Leibniz'sFirstTheodicy/ 491

Every wise personhas a real inclinationtowardeach good that is an object of

his cognitionand his power,with the resultthathe wouldproduceit if he were
not preventedfrom doing so by other, more powerful,considerations.This is
what is called antecedentwill.

Assuming that we restrict consideration to possible states of affairs and that

God is essentially omnipotent and omniscient, we reach the conclusion that
God antecedently wills the obtaining of all and only those states of affairs
good in themselves.
Assuming that not all states of affairs good in themselves are com-
possible, God's antecedently willing that a obtain does not entail that a
obtains. By contrast, what God wills consequently is what is best, all things
considered. Moreover, consequent willing produces its objective, if the
agent has the requisite power. Hence, if God consequently wills that a
obtain, then a obtains.9
With these distinctions and attendant theses in mind, let's return to the
Confessio. At Confessio 127 Leibniz formulated some characterizations
that border on definitions. He wrote:

To will in favor (velle) is to be delightedby the existenceof something;to will

against [nolle] is to be sad concerningthe existence of something,or to be
delightedby its non-existence.To permitis neitherto will in favornor to will
against,but neverthelessto know. To be the authorof somethingis by one's
own will to be the ground[rationem]of another.

I think that velle and nolle here are cases of antecedent willing, while the
notion of being the author of is intended to do duty for consequent willing.
Now consider this passage from the Confessio (133):

... havingpositedthatwe believe somethinggood, it is impossiblethatwe do

not will it, and havingposited that we will it and at the same time know that
the externalaids are available,it is impossiblethat we do not act.

In this passage Leibniz seems to run together an idea that applies only to
antecedent willing, i.e., that we will (antecedently) whatever we believe to
be good in itself, and an idea that applies only to consequent willing, i.e.,
that if we will (consequently) something that we then know to be in our
power to bring about, we then do bring it about.
I think that the interlocutor has provided considerable evidence that
Leibniz has only shown that God does not antecedently will the obtaining
of sinful states of affairs, and that he has not shown that God's consequent
will does not involve God in the causation of sin in ways inconsistent with
the claim that God is not the author of sin. Or, perhaps more accurately,
the interlocutor has provided evidence that Leibniz's account in the origi-
492 / Robert C. Sleigh

nal Confessio has the following, surely unacceptable, consequence: Every

state of affairs that obtains is caused to obtain by God's understanding,
and, hence, that there really is no such thing as God's authorship because
his willings are an expression of his causally idle preferences.
A not all together implausible interpretive strategy at this point would
be to claim this as the theory Leibniz really wanted to hold. True, some of
Leibniz's remarks suggest that he viewed the divine understanding and the
divine will as not only jointly exhaustive sources of divine causation, but
mutually exclusive sources as well-each with it own non-empty domain.
But that, according to the interpretation being considered, is not really
Leibniz's opinion. In fact, the divine understanding is the ultimate divine
cause (and, hence, ultimate cause) of every state of affairs that obtains.
God's "authorship," on this account, amounts to his causally idle delight in
some, but not all, of those states of affairs whose obtaining he causes,
namely, those good in themselves. This interpretation may be presented as
a natural extension of Leibniz's idea, articulated in the Confessio, that no
exercise of the will is an ens a se, i.e., that every exercise of a will, the
divine will included, is the result of factors exterior to the will.10
By my lights, this is not an account that Leibniz would have accepted
at the time of the composition of the Confessio; it is too close to the views
of the dreaded Spinoza. And, as a solution to the traditional problem of the
author of sin, there is little to be said for it. In any case, it is clearly
inconsistent with views that Leibniz expressed subsequently concerning
divine freedom and the role of the divine will in creation.

The interlocutor formulated his second objection as follows:

What is your response going to be to the argumentproposed above. The

existence of God is necessary;the sins includedin the series of thingsfollow
from this. Whatever follows from something necessary is itself necessary.
Thereforesins are necessary.(Confessio127)

Leibniz initially responded as follows:

I reply that it is false that whatever follows from somethingnecessaryais

itself necessarya.... Why not a propositionthat is contingent froma propo-
sition that is necessary.aBut I will establish this from the very notion of
necessity. Now I have defined the necessaryas that the contraryof which
cannot be conceived;therefore, the necessityand impossibilityof thingsare
to be sought in the ideas of the things themselves, and not outside those
things, by examiningwhetherthey can be conceivedor whetherthey implya
contradiciton.cTherefore, if the essence of a thing can be conceived, pro-
vided that it is conceived clearly and distinctly . . . then surely it must be
 Leibniz'sFirstTheodicy/ 493

held to be possible, and its contrarywill not be necessary,even if perhapsits

existence is contraryto the harmonyof thingsand the existenceof God
(Confessio127-28)

Subsequently, Leibniz altered the manuscript by making insertions as fol-

lows:

a. 'per se'

b. 'or necessaryon the hypothesisof another'

c. 'For in this place we call necessaryonly what is necessaryper se; namely,

that whichhas the reasonfor its existenceand truthin itself. The truthsof
geometry are of this sort. But among existingthings, only God is of this
sort; all the rest, followingfromthe presupposedseriesof things,i.e., from
the harmonyof things or the existenceof God, are contingentper se and
only hypotheticallynecessary...

In the remainder of this paper I offer an interpretation of what is going

on in these passages.11 The interpretation offered is substantially un-
derdetermined by the evidence supplied by the relevant texts. Still, I think
that it is on target. I refer to the draft without the insertions as the original
version, and the draft with the insertions as the emended version.
In an important text dated December 1675, hence, quite likely be-
tween the original and emended versions of the Confessio, Leibniz formu-
lated a distinction between two types of metaphysical modality as follows:

Impossibilityis a two-foldconcept:that whichdoes not have an essence,and

that whichdoes not have existence,i.e., thatwhichneitherwas nor is nor will
be, becauseit is incompatiblewith God.... 12

This same distinction, presumably from the same time period, explained in
much the same way, but formulated with unusual terminology, may be
found written and then struck from the margins of the Confessio:

The impossibleis that whose essenceis incompatiblewithitself. The incongru-

ous or rejected(suchas whatwas not, is not, nor will be) is thatwhose essence
is incompatiblewith existence,that is, with the Existentthing,i.e., the firstof
existent things, i.e., that whichitself exists per se, i.e., God. (Confessio128)

In these texts Leibniz intended to distinguish two varieties of metaphysical

modality, not two distinct styles of characterizingthe same notion. Let us call
the second of these the unqualified modality (so, we may speak of unquali-
fied necessity, unqualified possibility, etc.) and the first, the per se modality
(so, we may speak of per se necessity, per se possibility, etc.). Since the
494 / Robert C. Sleigh

expression 'unqualified' does not add much qualification, usually I will de-
lete it. Still, the term matters. We need a metalanguage of our own in which
to treat Leibniz's modal object language. Otherwise we run serious risks.
The distinction between the unqualified and the per se modalities is
important for Leibniz. Here is an effort to gain some clarity with respect to
it. Let us say that a sentence S expresses a proposition that is per se possible
just in case there is no set of sentences K (in a sufficiently rich language)
such that:

(i) every sentence in K expresses a proposition that is metaphysi-

cally necessary; and
(ii) no sentence in K contains a device of singular reference refer-
ring to some individual not referred to by the devices of singular
reference in S; and
(iii) The conjunction of S with the elements of K formally implies a
formal contradiction.

By contrast, we obtain a characterization of unqualified possibility by delet-

ing (ii) from our characterization. Note that whereas possibility implies per
se possibility, the converse fails, and that while per se necessity implies
necessity, its converse fails. The following points prove to be relevant to the
development of our topic. The inference from the conjunction of 'it is
necessary that if p then q' and 'it is necessary that p' to 'it is necessary that
q' is a good one; it is a case where necessity of the consequence yields
necessity of the consequent. But the inference from the conjunction of 'it is
necessary that if p then q' and 'it is per se necessary that p' to 'it is per se
necessary that q' is not a good one. Its failure is a key to one of Leibniz's
uses of the distinction between per se and unqualified modality.
In a letter to Wedderkopf, written in 1671 Leibniz wrote:

. . . whateverhas happened,is happening,or will happenis best and there-

fore necessary. . .13

From this we may extract the following:

(1) For any proposition p, if p is true then p is necessarily true.

We know that Leibniz came to reject this necessitarian position. He wrote a

note on his copy of the letter saying so.
What about the Confessio? I recommend the following interpreta-
tion. In the original Confessio Leibniz did not work with a distinction
between per se and unqualified modalities. In fact, he is best understood
as therein purporting to utilize the standard, unqualified modalities,
which he therein characterized in the terms we have employed to charac-
 Leibniz'sFirstTheodicy/ 495

terize the per se modalities. So, according to my interpretation, although

the 'per se' terminology is not therein employed, this is, in a sense, the
purest use of the per se modalities you will find in Leibniz; in the
original Confessio Leibniz took them to be the unqualified modalities.
So, unlike the emended Confessio, in the early Confessio Leibniz af-
firmed the following:

(2) There is some proposition p such that p is true and p is contin-

gent, and hence, p is not necessary.

The textual evidence for this reading is not overwhelming, I admit. In the
passage from Confessio 127-28, which appears at the beginning of this
section of the paper, where I claim that Leibniz identifies the per se modali-
ties with the unqualified modalities the Latin verb in the passage translated
" . I have defined the necessary . . 99is the formal 'definivi'. My claim is
that in the emended Confessio Leibniz cam to the conclusion that this
identification is a mistake. In the added passage c., then, he was calling
attention to the fact that throughout this section of the text 'necessary'
must be taken to refer to one variety of metaphysical necessity, namely, per
se necessity. The main verb in the passage translated. ". . . . In this place
we call necesary only what is necessary per se . .. 9"is 'appellatur'. Hence a
meaning is being stipulated.
Consider the following modal principles:

(3) If p is necessary and it is necessary that if p then q, then it is

necessary that q.
(4) If p is per se necessary and it is necessary that if p then q then it
per se necessary the q.

Leibniz sharply distinguished 3) from 4) in the emended Confessio and

then denied 4). I take it that part of his point in distinguishing 3) from 4)
resulted from his coming to the conclusion that 3) must not be denied. I am
placing a lot of importance on the passage, written in December, 1675 (i.e.,
probably between the two versions of the Confessio) in which Leibniz
wrote that "there are two notions of impossibility," i.e., the per se notion
and the unqualified notion. The passage contains this remark:

Whateveris incompatiblewith whatis necessary,is impossible.14

Utilizing the usual notation this amounts to:

(5) If it is not possible that both p and q, and it is necessary that p,

then it is not possible that q.
496 / Robert C. Sleigh

But 5) is equivalent to 3). So my diagnosis is this. By 1675 Leibniz realized

that it is a mistake to deny 3); still, he saw that if the unqualified modalities
are identical with the per se modalities, then 3) would be equivalent to 4),
which is worthy of denial. His solution consisted in a careful distinction of
the unqualified modalities from the per se modalities. Prior to a clear
formulation of the distinction Leibniz may have taken the per se modalities
to be the unqualified modalities, and, hence, believed that the per se
modalities provided an escape from necessitarianism. But once the distinc-
tion is made, then the claim that some propositions are per se contingent is
consistent with 1). Supposing that I am on the right track, it will be evident
that unpacking various of Leibniz's pronouncements in the emended
Confessio-where a distinction between the per se versus unqualified mo-
dalities is operative-is delicate work. Here is an instance, along with a
proposed unpacking.
In the emended Confessio, in the process of denying 4), Leibniz asked
(rhetorically):

Why can't somethingcontingent,i.e., necessaryon the hypothesisof another

[ex alteriushypothesinecessarium],follow from somethingper se necessary.
[Confessio127-28]

It becomes clear from the text that the "alter" that interested Leibniz here
is God.
We might characterize the matter as follows:

(6) p is necessary ex alterius hypothesi if and only if p is not per se

necessary, but the proposition rif God exists then p' is necessar-
ily true.

But now we may twist the knife on behalf of the interlocutor. In the
ConfessionLeibniz seems committed to the following:

(7) For any proposition p, if p is true then either p is per se necessary

or the proposition rif God exists then p' is necessarily true.

That is, to:

(8) For any proposition p, if p is true then either p is per se necessary

or p is necessary ex alterius hypothesi.

But since Leibniz regarded the proposition that God exists as necessarily
true, we reach (1) again.
The terminology 'necessarium ex alterius hypothesi' is a forthcoming
aberration in Leibniz's terminology. Thereafter what is here called neces-
 Leibniz'sFirstTheodicy/ 497

saryon the hypothesisof another,came to be includedwithinwhatLeibniz

called necessaryex hypothesi,i.e., hypotheticallynecessary.Leibnizoften
distinguishedbetween a propositionp that he termedabsolutelynecessary
from another,say q, that he termed absolutelycontingent,and only hypo-
theticallynecessary.We must be on our guardfor the possibilitythat what
this amountsto is the claim that whereasp is necessaryper se, q is contin-
gent per se, althoughq is necessaryin the unqualifiedsense. In otherwords
we must be on our guardfor the possibilitythat necessitarianismis alive
and well behindLeibnizianassertionsthat sound otherwise.15
We have examinedin some detail two of the interlocutor'sobjections
to Leibniz'stheory, as expressedin the originalConfessio.The viable idea
of the first objection is that Leibniz's theory reduces the divine will to
God's causallyidle preferences;the idea of the second objectionmight be
put this way on the interlocutor'sbehalf-for all the complexityintroduced
by such terms as 'per se' and 'ex alteriushypothesis'Leibniz'stheory still
entails necessitarianism.
I believe that Leibnizcame to see the inadequacyof the Confessioin
the areasjust noted. In particular,he struggledthereafterwith majorprob-
lems that the Confessiopurportedto resolve: i) how to apportioncausal
activity betwixt God and creatureso as to absolve God of unacceptable
complicityin sin; and ii) how to make room for real contingencywhile
respectingthe divine natureand the universalapplicabilityof the principle
of sufficientreason. Craftingan acceptableanswerto i) led Leibniz quite
close to the Scholasticswhomhe ridiculedin "TheAuthorof Sin,"and also
closer to Occasionalismthan most commentatorshave realized.16 Leibniz's
struggles with ii), i.e., with necessitarianism,have been the subject of
much scholarlystudy.Sufficeit to say here that in the periodjust afterthe
conversation with Stensen concerningthe Confessio his problems were
exacerbatedby commitmentto the concept containmentaccountof truth.
Then, accordingto Leibniz;

A new and unexpectedlight finallyarosein a quarterwhereI least hoped for

it-namely out of mathematicalconsiderationsof the infinite.17

The "unexpectedlight"based on "mathematicalconsiderationsof the infi-

nite" was the doctrineof infiniteanalysis.18

Notes

1. The followingabbreviationsare used in citations:

A = German Academy of Science, ed. Gottfried Wilheim Leibniz:
Sdmtliche Shriften und Briefe. Darmstadt, Leipzig, and Berlin,
1923-. Cited by series and volume.
A+G = G. W. Leibniz-Philosophical Essays. Edited and translated by
498 / Robert C. Sleigh

Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber.Indianapolisand Cambridge.

HackettPublishingCompany,1989.
FC = G. W. Leibniz. Nouvelles lettres et opuscules inedits. Edited by
Louis AlexandreFoucherde Careil.Paris, 1857.Reprint.
Hildesheim:Georg Olms, 1971.
G = Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz. Edited by C.
J. Gerhardt.7 volumes.Berlin, 1875-1890.Reprint.
Hildesheim:Georg Olms, 1965. Citedby-volume.
Grua = G. W. Leibniz-Textes inedits. Edited by Gaston Grua. 2 vol-
umes. Paris, 1948.Reprint.New York and London:Garland,
1985.
L = G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters. Edited and
translatedby Leroy Loemker.2d ed. Dordrecht:D. Reidel,
1969.
Summa = G. W. Leibniz. De Summa Rerum: Metaphysical Papers, 1675-
Rerum 1676. Translatedwith introductionand notes by G. H. R. Parkin-
son. New Haven and London:Yale UniversityPress, 1992.
T = G. W. Leibniz. Theodicy.Citedby sectionnumberas in G/6.
Translatedby E. M. Huggard,Theodicy.New Haven:Yale Uni-
versityPress, 1952. Reprint.Lasalle,Ill.: Open Court, 1985.

Each citationincludesa referenceto a sourcecontainingthe cited passagein

the originallanguage,followedby a citationin parenthesescontaininga pub-
lished translationof the passage into English, where such a translationis
available.In the case of quotedpassagesthe Englishtranslationcited may not
matchthe translationdisplayed.
2. On the subjectof the depthof Leibniz'streatmentin the Theodicysee section
four, "OnLeibniz'sSincerity,"in the firstchapterof RobertAdam'sLeibniz-
Determinist,Theist,Idealist(OxfordUniversityPress, New Yorkand Oxford,
1994).
3. "DemonstrationumCatholicarumConspectus,"A/6/1/494-500 and A/6/2/
571-72; ConfessioPhilosophi,A/6/3/115-149;"Vonder Allmachtund Allwis-
senheit Gottes und der Freiheit des Menschen"- A/6/1/537-546 and A/6/2/
579-580.
4. I referto St. Thomas'sworkin the usualway.Thus "S. T. la Q2, a.3" refersto
articlethreeof questiontwo of the firstpartof the SummaTheologica.And the
designation'S.T.I.aIIaeQ79, a.2, ad2, 'whichoccurslaterin the paper,refersto
Thomas'sreply to the second objectionconsideredin articletwo of question
seventy-nineof the firstpart of the secondpartof the SummaTheologica.
5. WhenLeibnizreferredto the Scholasticshe sometimesused the expressionas
we tend to use it and he sometimesused the expressionto referto those who
taughtin the universitiesof his time.
6. Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan.Edited with introduction,notes, and selected
variantsfrom the 1668 Latin edition by Edwin Curley.Indianapolis,Hackett
PublishingCo., Inc., 1994:475-476.
7. A/6/3/150-151.
8. With some plausibility,the interlocutor'sargumentmay be generalizedto
 Leibniz's First Theodicy / 499

reach the same conclusionthat Stensen reachedin the marginof Confessio

123; namely, that on Leibniz'sview, the entire series of created entities de-
pends for its existence on the divine understanding,not the divine will. The
interlocutorneed only assumethat each state of affairsthat obtainsis either
good, bad, or indifferent.
9. See, for example,T ?22 and ?282, and Grua287.
10. See Confessio 120.
11. Like anyone who deals with these questionsnow, I am much in the debt of
Robert Adams'spioneeringresearch.See chapterone, "Leibniz'sTheoriesof
Contingency,"of his book cited in footnote two.
12. A1613/463(SummaRerum7)
13. A/2/1/117(L147)
14. A1613/464(SummaRerum7)
15. For a discussionof related matters see FabrizioMondadori,"Necessityex
Hypothesi,"in The LeibnizRenaissance,publishedby the CentroFiorentino
Di Storiae FilosofiaDella Scienza, 1989:191-222.
16. On Leibniz'sscrapewith Occasionalismsee the sectionentitled"DivineCon-
currence," in my book, Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on their Corre-
spondence,(Yale UniversityPress, New Haven and London, 1990): 183-185;
and pages 94 through99 of RobertAdam'sbook cited in footnote 2.
17. FC 179-180 (A+ G 95)
18. Variouspieces of early versionsof this paperwere presentedto departmental
colloquia at the Universityof Connecticut,and the GraduateCenter of the
City Universityof New York;and to meetingsof the LeibnizSocietyof North
America, and the MassachusettsSociety for the study of Early ModernPhi-
losophy; and to the followingconferences:The VirginiaPolytechnicInstitute
Conferenceon Leibnizin the 90's; the Stanfordconferenceon EarlyModern
Philosophy;and the DartmouthEarlyModernPhilosophyConferencehonor-
ing WillisDoney. I thankall those who were willingto bearwith me on those
occasions.I am indebtedto the followingfor help on particularpoints:Robert
Adams, David Blumenfeld,John Carriero,Daniel Garber,Michael Griffin,
ChristiaMercer,MichaelMurray,Alan Nelson, Eileen O'Neill and Margaret
Wilson.
Some of the researchfor this paper was accomplishedwhile I was sup-
ported by a NationalEndowmentfor the HumanitiesFellowshipfor Univer-
sity Teachers.This seems like an especiallyappropriatetime to expressthanks
to the Endowment;I do so.