paper series

A Neighborhood Rediscovered
Turkey’s transatlantic value in the Middle East

By Kemal , Nathalie Tocci, and Joshua Walker

Transatlantic Academy
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 A Neighborhood Rediscovered
Turkey’s transatlantic value in the Middle East

Brussels Forum Paper Series

March 2010

By Kemal Kirişci, Nathalie Tocci, and Joshua Walker*

Transatlantic Academy

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Sea Change in Turkey’s Middle Eastern Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Conflicting Interpretations of the Sea Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Realizing Turkey’s Middle Eastern Potential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Kemal Kirişci is a fellow with the Transatlantic Academy. He is a professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at
*

Boğaziçi University, Istanbul and holds a Jean Monnet Chair in European Integration.

Nathalie

Tocci is a fellow with the Transatlantic Academy. She is a senior fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome; associate fellow at the
Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels; and associate editor of The International Spectator.

Joshua

Walker is a fellow with the Transatlantic Academy. He is a Ph.D. doctoral candidate in politics and public policy at Princeton University
focusing on international relations and security studies. Mr. Walker is also a fellow of the Pacific Council on International Policy, a former fellow
at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a graduate fellow at the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination and Bradley Foundation.

The

Transatlantic Academy is an initiative of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius of
Germany, the Robert Bosch Stiftung, and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. In addition, the Academy has received funding from the
Transatlantic Program of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany through funds of the European Recovery Program (ERP) of the
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. Additional support from the Compagnia di San Paolo is gratefully acknowledged.
1 Introduction
The recent activism in Turkish foreign policy has
caused political waves throughout Europe, the
Middle East, and the United States. In attempting
to decipher Turkey’s foreign policy trajectory,
many have focused on Turkey’s activism in the
Middle East. Yet this is not new. At different points
in time, Turkey opted to engage the Middle East.
However its interventions in the past played into
the balance of power logic of the Arab/Soviet versus
Israeli/American conflict, oscillating between one
side and the other, albeit more frequently on the
side of the latter. With the end of the Cold War,
Turkey’s activism translated into assertiveness and
confrontation. While Turkey’s military relationship
with Israel rallied favor in the West, Turkey made
the Middle East an even more unstable and crisis-
prone region through confrontational relations
with Iraq, Iran, and Syria.1 More widely, Turkey
believed it was “besieged by a veritable ring of
evil,”2 fueling counter-alliances between Syria, Iran,
Iraq, Greece, Russia, Serbia, and Armenia.3 Şükrü
Elekdağ, a retired ambassador and former deputy
undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry, advocated
in the mid 1990s that Turkey should prepare
to fight “two-and-a-half wars” simultaneously
against Greece, Syria, and the Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK).4
In sharp contrast, Turkey’s activism in the Middle
East in the 21st century has a distinctly different
Makovsky, Alan (1999).“The New Activism in Turkish Foreign
1 consistent pursuit of democratization at home and
Policy.” SAIS Review, Vol. 19, No.1, pp. 92–113.
2
Former Turkish Ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ in 1996 quoted
in Mufti, Malik (1998). “Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign
Policy.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 32–50, p. 34.
3
In the mid-1990s, Greece, Armenia, and Iran held annual
foreign ministers meetings, and Greece and Syria signed an
agreement in 1995 regarding Greek use of Syrian airbases.
4
Elekdağ, Şükrü (1996). “2 1/2 War Strategy.” Perceptions:
Journal of International Affairs (Ankara), Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 33–57.
Turkey’s transatlantic value in the Middle East
nature. Turkish foreign policy, particularly under
the influence of current Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ahmet Davutoğlu, conceptualizes Turkey as a
central country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia, which
attempts to pursue what it calls “zero problems”
with its neighbors. It encourages bilateral and
multilateral external relations, and it uses the
country’s Ottoman heritage as a foreign policy Turkey’s promise
asset. The stated goal of Turkish foreign policy is to in the region
transform Turkey into a strong regional, and even hinges on its
global, actor through the exercise of soft power.
consistent pursuit
To what extent is this truly occurring? How can of democratization
we interpret the transformation of Turkey’s policy at home and
toward the Middle East? Most importantly, under a norm-based
what conditions does Turkey’s new role represent foreign policy
an asset for Turkey, the Middle East, the United abroad.
States, and the European Union?
The traditional manner to study current
developments in Turkish foreign policy is to
assess the areas in which Turkey converges and
also where it diverges from the policies pursued
by the European Union and the United States.
Adopting an alternative and innovative approach
this paper does not view Turkey’s “distinctiveness”
in the Middle East as necessarily detrimental to
the West, but rather argues that it could represent
an important asset to its European and American
partners. Yet Turkey’s potential in the Middle East
does not automatically translate into practice.
Turkey’s promise in the region hinges on its
a norm-based foreign policy abroad. In addition,
Turkey’s transatlantic value in the Middle East
can only be fulfilled if the EU proceeds with
Turkey’s accession process in good faith and the
United States partners with Turkey in the region to
encourage Turkey’s EU prospects and reforms.
A Neighborhood Rediscovered 3
 2 The Sea Change in Turkey’s Middle
Eastern Policies
Turkish foreign policy today is undoubtedly far
more proactive and multi-dimensional than at any
period in Turkey’s republican history. This paper
begins by cursorily mapping the transformation
in Turkey’s Middle Eastern policies, focusing on
Turkey’s ties with Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Israel-
Palestine and its mediation initiatives in the region.
The fallout for
Turkey of an Israeli Improving relations with (almost) all
neighbors
nuclear attack on
Iran or an Iranian
Particularly since the 1979 Iranian revolution,
nuclear attack on
Turkish-Iranian relations have been marked by
Israel would be tension over cooperation. Tension never threatened
an outbreak of conflict, and the centuries-old
equally disastrous.
Turkish-Iranian border is often flagged as an
atypical instance of Middle Eastern stability.5 Yet
bilateral relations have been strained over the
two questions lying at the heart of republican
Turkey’s security dilemma—political Islam and the
Kurdish question. On both counts, the 1990s saw a
considerable aggravation of relations,6 with growing
Turkish sensitivity toward alleged Iranian attempts
to “export” the Islamic revolution, Turkish-
Iranian competition in the Caucasus, and Iranian
accusations against Turkey of inciting separatism
among its Azeri minority and harboring the
Mujahedeen al-Khalq.7 This is not to say Turkish-
Iranian relations ground to a standstill in those
years. Particularly in the energy realm, through
bilateral agreements in 1996 and 1997, Iran became
Turkey’s second largest supplier of gas after Russia.
Yet on a whole in the 1990s, Iran was portrayed as
Turkey’s feared and loathed “other.”
In the 21st century, this picture has visibly altered.
In the energy domain, relations developed further
The Turkish-Iranian border dates back to the 1639 Kars-I Sirin
5 Between Neo Ottomanism and Kemalism.” Carnegie Papers, No.
Treaty.
6
Aras, Bülent (2001). “Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Iran:
Ideology and Foreign Policy in Flux.” Journal of Third World
Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 105–124.
7
Mujahedeen al-Khalq is a violent opponent to the Iranian
regime.
4 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
through agreements in 2007 and 2008. Bilateral
trade has soared8 and Turkey has attempted to
penetrate the Iranian market through investments
in several sectors. Social contact has also deepened,
and Turkey’s liberal visa regime attracts more
than one million Iranian visitors per year. Yet the
most significant turn relates to the security and
political realms. Tensions have waned regarding
political Islam to the extent that in June 2002
the then-staunchly secularist Turkish President
Ahmet Necdet Sezer visited Iran and delivered
a lecture on Kemalism and Atatürk.9 More so,
the Kurdish question now represents an area of
convergent interests, triggering Turkish-Iranian
security cooperation. Improving Turkish-Iranian
ties explain Turkey’s distinctive position regarding
the Iranian nuclear question. Turkey, like European
Union countries and the United States, objects to a
nuclear Iran. Yet, unlike its Western allies, it does
not feel as threatened by Iran’s nuclear program
much in the same way that it has not felt directly
threatened by Israel’s nuclear arsenal. This lower
threat perception is shared by the public, which
disapproves of coercive measures on Iran and
a sizeable minority appears to accept more the
prospect of a nuclear Iran (29 percent) compared
to EU and U.S. publics (8 percent and 5 percent,
respectively).10 But Turkey does feel threatened
by a nuclear arms race between Israel and Iran,
let alone nuclear attacks, in the region. As Foreign
Minister Davutoğlu argued in December 2009, the
fallout for Turkey of an Israeli nuclear attack on
Iran or an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel would
be equally disastrous.11 Hence, Turkey’s repeated
8
See Table 1 below.
Taşpınar, Ömer (2008). “Turkey’s Middle East Policies:
9
10, Sep. 2008, p. 20.
Transatlantic Trends (2009). Topline Data, The German
10
Marshall Fund of the United States, www.transatlantictrends.org
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu’s speech, Dec. 8,
11
2009, SETA, Washington.
calls for a nuclear-free region and its objections
to sanctioning Iran—sanctions that would hinder
burgeoning commercial relations with its neighbor
without accomplishing its desiderata of a nuclear-
free Middle East.
There are at least three factors that shape Turkey’s
position on sanctions against Iran. First, Turkish
officials very quickly recall the manner in which
sanctions on Saddam Hussein’s regime deeply hurt
Turkish trade and its construction business in Iraq
as well as beyond it. Second, they recall that, in the
case of Iraq, sanctions failed to solve a problem
and led to a military intervention, which again
caused dire consequences for Turkey’s southeastern
economy and security. To make matters worse,
this disaster occurred at a time when—thanks
to EU engagement—the Turkish government
was attempting to pursue reforms to improve
the situation of Kurds who populate the region.
Third, the notion of addressing and attempting to
resolve longstanding conflicts through dialogue
with neighbors is a conspicuous characteristic of
the government in power in Turkey. This indeed
is in striking contrast with the Turkey of the 1990s
but very much explains Turkey’s U-turns on
Armenia, Cyprus, and Syria, not to mention the
complete overhaul of its relations with the Kurds of
Northern Iraq.
Indeed, Turkey’s relations with Iraq have also
undergone a dramatic improvement. During the
1991 Gulf War, Turkey, under the leadership of
President Turgut Özal, firmly allied with U.S.-led
forces by defensively securing its southeastern
border with Iraq and serving as a base from which
allied attacks were launched into Iraq. As part of
this conflict, the refugee crisis of April 1991 deeply
marked Turkey and forced the country to play an
inadvertently central role in supporting the “safe-
haven” in Northern Iraq, which eventually led to
Turkey’s transatlantic value in the Middle East
a more autonomous entity within the country.12
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey also
cut off trade and energy relations with Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq and, in view of its fight against the
PKK, conducted frequent military incursions into
Northern Iraq. Turkey’s driving rationale was and
remains its strong opposition to the creation of a
Kurdish state in Iraq because of fears this could fuel The notion of
secessionist trends in its own Kurdish-populated addressing
regions. Thus, its greatest fears came to pass in
and attempting
March 2003 as the United States declared war on
to resolve
Iraq. Largely in response to public opposition to the
longstanding
war in Turkey and the lack of a clear UN-mandate,
conflicts through
the Turkish parliament refused to approve U.S. use
of the country’s territory to invade Iraq. Turkey’s dialogue with
concerns with Iraq’s territorial integrity and its neighbors is a
ensuing souring of relations with the United States, conspicuous
while opening the way for greater cooperation with characteristic of
Syria and Iran, which also have sizable Kurdish the government in
populations, delayed cooperation with Iraq (and power in Turkey.
Northern Iraq in particular). In particular, Turkey
objected to the inclusion of the oil-rich city of
Kirkuk into Northern Iraq, accused the Kurdish
Regional Government (KRG) of not collaborating
in the fight against the PKK, and used to conduct
frequent military operations in Northern Iraq
against the PKK, leading one commentator to write
a book entitled “Unwelcome Neighbor.”13
Since 2007, however, there has been a marked
improvement in relations between Turkey and
Iraq, and in particular the KRG. This has followed
extensive intelligence sharing with the United States
since 2007 that has allowed Turkish special forces
to target the remnants of PKK training camps in
the Kandil mountains, including a large ground
operation in February 2008. The turn in Turkey’s
12
Kirişci, Kemal (1993). “Provide Comfort and Turkey: Decision
Making for Refugee Assistance.” Low Intensity Conflict and Law
Enforcement, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 227-253.
13
Lundgren, Asa (2007). Turkey’s Unwelcome Neighbour.
London, I.B. Tauris.
A Neighborhood Rediscovered 5
 battle against the PKK has facilitated Turkish
rapprochement with Northern Iraq. Since 2007-
2008 there have been key developments on both
the Turkish and Iraqi sides regarding the Kurdish
question, including greater Turkish acceptance of
Iraqi Kurdish autonomy, the opening of official
ties between Turkey and the KRG, and the KRG’s
Talking Turkish cooperation in the fight against the PKK.14 This
meant both has opened the space for a lively economic, social,
credible threats and political relationship, with soaring trade and
but also massive more than 90 percent of FDI in the construction
engagement sector coming from Turkey.15 In September 2009,
thereafter. Turkey and Iraq established a High-Level Strategic
Cooperation Council, which included the signing
of over 40 bilateral agreements.
Even starker has been the sea change in Turkey’s
relations with Syria. Syria has always represented
the prototypical hostile neighbor for Turkey. From
its creation in the wake of the Ottoman Empire’s
collapse, Syria has had historical grievances
against the Turkish Republic involving the
Turkish province of Hatay, the former Sanjak of
Alexandretta, which Syria was forced to cede to
Turkey by the French in 1939. This traditional
claim was compounded by Syrian alignment
with the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Most importantly, the Kurdish question has
historically plagued Turkish-Syrian relations.
Since the inception of violence in Turkey by the
PKK, Turkey had consistently argued that Syria
was the organization’s major backer. For much
of the 1990s, most of Turkey’s relations with
This was followed by key developments in 2009, including
14 The breakthrough came when former Turkish
a visit to Turkey by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, in which he
publicly opposed the creation of a Kurdish state, and a visit to
Baghdad by President Abdullah Gül, the first visit by a Turkish
president since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, in which he
also held direct talks with President of the Iraqi Kurdish region
Massoud Barzani.
Kirişci, Kemal (2009). “The Transformation of Turkish
15
Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State.” New Perspectives
on Turkey, No. 40, pp. 29–56, p. 47. For trade figures see Table 1
below.
6 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Syria were dominated by the issue of Damascus’
support for the PKK, particularly its involvement
in the harboring of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.
Another contentious (and related) issue is the long-
standing dispute over the Euphrates River. Syria,
as a downstream nation, has always claimed water
rights of the Euphrates, which flows from Turkey.
In response, Turkey accused Syria of backing the
PKK in order to leverage this “water controversy,”
while Syria accused Turkey of violating Syria’s
water rights with the dam development of the
Southeastern Anatolian Project. Deteriorating
relations throughout the 1990s prompted Turkey
to seek closer military ties with Israel in order to
coerce Syria into dropping its support of the PKK.
The full-scale mobilization of the Turkish military
along the Syrian border in 1998 forced Damascus
to change its strategy concerning the PKK and
take Ankara’s threats seriously. This led to the
expulsion of Öcalan from Syria in October 1998
and a subsequent reduction of violence in Turkey’s
Kurdish regions.
Syrian acquiescence to Turkish demands regarding
the PKK did not simply eliminate the prospect of
war between the two countries. Often overlooked
is the subsequent immediate development of
bilateral relations through the multifaceted “Adana
Process,”16 which included economic, military,
and intelligence cooperation. As one observer in
the region put it, “Talking Turkish meant both
credible threats but also massive engagement
thereafter.”17 This process led to the possibility of
improved bilateral relations at the political level.
President Sezer attended the funeral of former
Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in 2000. With
this gesture, followed by friendly overtures by the
Aykan, Mahmut B. (1999). “The Turkish-Syrian Crisis of
16
October 1998: a Turkish View.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 6. No. 4,
pp. 174–191.
17
Interview with expert on Syria, Damascus, Oct. 2009.
ensuing Justice and Development Party (AKP)
government, the scene was set for the historical visit
by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to Turkey in
January 2004, which was reciprocated in December
2004 when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan visited Damascus to sign a free trade
agreement. The invasion of Iraq, Turkey’s March
2003 vote, joint concerns over Iraq’s territorial
integrity, and Turkey’s defiance of American (and
EU) efforts to isolate Syria,18 served to further
foster positive relations. Since then, relations have
continued to strengthen, leading to the signing
of a bilateral visa-free agreement and, in October
2009, the establishment of a Strategic Cooperation
Council modeled on the High-Level Cooperation
Council created with Iraq.19
Equally significant is the transformation of Turkey’s
relations with Israel-Palestine. After years of
somewhat strained relations in the 1980s in the
context of former Turkish Prime Minister and
President Turgut Özal’s opening to the Middle
East, Turkish-Israeli relations dramatically
improved in the 1990s, as epitomized by a series
of bilateral agreements in the realms of tourism,
education, environment, trade, communications,
and above all in security and defense. In turn
bilateral trade boomed.20 Most significantly, from
a Turkish perspective, the 1996–1997 military
agreements in the fields of training, intelligence,
and defense-industrial cooperation were aimed
at flexing the Turkish muscle vis-à-vis Syria.
This raised eyebrows throughout the region and
Syria appreciated Turkey’s opening particularly at a time when
18
Damascus was facing increasing isolation from the United States
through the December 2003 Syria Accountability Act, followed
by broader American and European (and in particular French)
accusations of Syria’s involvement in the assassination of former
Lebanese Prime Minister Refik Hariri in February 2005.
The Strategic Cooperation Council covers culture, economics,
19
energy, transport, tourism, education, science, customs, defence,
water, and the environment. It is presided by the two heads of
state and government and includes regular ministerial meetings.
20
See Table 1.
Turkey’s transatlantic value in the Middle East
caused acute concern in Syria, Lebanon, and the
Occupied Palestinian Territory. In addition, Turkey
supported the Oslo process, participating in the
Arms Control and Regional Security Working
Group of the Madrid process in the early 1990s and
in the 1997 Temporary International Presence in
Hebron (TIPH).21
In the 21st century, Turkey’s relations with Israel
and the Palestinians have not been marked by
the sharp contrasts in Turkey’s external relations
highlighted above. Turkish-Israeli cooperation
has continued in the fields of intelligence-sharing,
defense, energy, and water.22 In November 2007,
Shimon Peres became the first Israeli president
to address the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
However, with the outbreak of the second intifada
and the aggravation of the Arab-Israeli conflict,
Turkish-Israeli political relations have deteriorated.
In 2002, then-Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit
described Israel’s attack on Jenin as “genocide.”23
In 2004, Prime Minister Erdoğan accused Israel
of “state terrorism,”24 and in 2006 he described
Israel’s war on Lebanon as “illegitimate.”25 Most
notoriously at the Davos World Economic Forum
in January 2009, Erdoğan accused Israel (and his
co-panelist Peres) of crimes against humanity in the
conduct of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. After the
Davos incident, attempts to restore relations in 2009
were thrown off course again with a renewed crisis
in October 2009 caused by Turkey’s withdrawal of
an invitation to Israel to participate in the military
Alongside Norway, Italy, Switzerland, Denmark, and Sweden.
21
Bengio, Ofra (2009). “Altercating Interests and Orientations
22
between Israel and Turkey: A View from Israel.” Insight Turkey,
Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 43-55.
Dymond, Jim (2002). “Turkey accuses Israel of genocide.” BBC
23
News, Apr. 4, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1911609.stm.
McGreal, Chris (2004). “Turkish PM accuses Israel of
24
practising state terrorism.” The Guardian, Jun. 4.
Turkish Daily News (2006). “Erdoğan: Unfair war in Lebanon
25
will have no winner.” Aug. 4.
A Neighborhood Rediscovered 7
exercise “Anatolian Eagle,”26 which happened at the
same time as Israel’s abhorrence at an episode of a
Turkish TV series (Ayrılık) showing Israeli forces
deliberately targeting Palestinian children. The
“TV series crisis” continues to threaten Turkish-
Israeli relations, with Israeli Minister of Foreign
Affairs Avigdor Lieberman stating that not even
an “enemy country” would dare act this way and
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Danny Ayalon
publicly humiliating Turkey’s Ambassador to Israel
in January 2010.27 Once again, Turkish (and Israeli)
diplomacy scrambled to avoid further escalation,
and it is noteworthy that tensions did not result
in a downgrading of diplomatic relations as had
occurred in the past.28 Nonetheless, the Turkish-
Israeli relationship, far from being the unbreakable
military alliance of the 1990s, has undergone an
underlying structural turn.
Consequently, Turkish-Palestinian relations have
also changed. Some Turkish actions have been
articulated within the broad contours of the (failed)
Oslo process, including former Turkish President
Süleyman Demirel’s participation in the 2000
Mitchell Commission; the growing aid delivery
by the Turkish International Cooperation and
Development Agency (TIKA) to the Occupied
Territory; the meeting in November 2007 between
Israeli President Peres and Palestinian Authority
(PA) President Mahmoud Abbas in Turkey; or the
“Industry for Peace” (Barış için Sanayi Girişimi)
project by the Turkish Chambers of Commerce
The exercise was cancelled after the United States (and Italy)
26
withdrew its participation.
Greenway, H.D.S. (2009). “It’s getting chilly between Turkey
27
and Israel.” GlobalPost, Oct. 21.
In 1980, Turkey closed its Jerusalem consulate and
28
downgraded diplomatic relations with Israel to the level of
second secretary in response to Israel’s declaration of Jerusalem
as its undivided capital.
8 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
(TOBB).29 More significantly, however, Turkey
has undertaken three initiatives that part from
the “Oslo logic” and whose repercussions are
arguably more important. First is the opening of
Ottoman archives regarding property certificates.
The opening of the archives represents a critical
asset in the Palestinian and international position
against Israeli house evictions and demolitions
in Jerusalem, a crucial question in view of the
international consensus on Jerusalem representing
the shared capital of Israel and Palestine. Second
is Turkey’s support for the report of the Human
Rights Council headed by Justice Richard
Goldstone. The report condemned Israel (and
Hamas) of war crimes in Gaza (and southern
Israel) and recommended measures to ensure
accountability. In doing so, the report can be viewed
as a milestone in the arduous task of reinserting
international humanitarian law back into the
international community’s approach to the conflict.
Third, Turkey, like other European countries such
as Norway and Switzerland, but unlike the EU and
United States, has maintained open channels with
Hamas. Upon Hamas’ electoral victory in January
2006, Turkey recognized the new PA government
and invited Hamas’s Damascus-based leader Khaled
Meshal to Ankara in February 2006.30 Given that
any Israeli-Palestinian agreement hinges, inter alia,
on Hamas’ acceptance, and given the movement’s
control of the Gaza Strip and its support amongst
the Palestinians, Turkey represents one of the few
Western channels to engage Hamas. The added
TOBB’s initiative consists of inviting Turkish, Israeli, and
29
Palestinian representatives of chambers of commerce to
the Ankara Forum. The goal is to develop joint commercial
projects. The Forum’s pet project was the development of
the Erez Industrial Zone in the aftermath of the 2005 Israeli
disengagement, which was meant to create 7,000 jobs in Gaza.
Yet like many of the Oslo (and Oslo-like) initiatives, the project
crumbled in the wake of the political separation between the
West Bank and Gaza in 2007 and Operation Cast Lead in 2008.
After much controversy surrounding the Hamas visit to
30
Ankara, Khaled Meshal met then-Minister of Foreign Affairs
Gül at the AKP headquarters rather than at the Foreign Ministry.
advantage of Turkey is that unlike many other
countries in the West, Turkey accepted the results
of the Palestinian elections, allowing it to enjoy at
least some credibility with Hamas.
Turkey as a mediator in the Middle East
To the extent that promoting peace and developing
ties with all parties have been two pillars of current
Turkish foreign policy,31 offering to mediate in the
conflict-ridden Middle East has been an important
outcome of Turkey’s transformation. In different
conflict hubs, Turkey’s supply of mediation has
been matched by demand in the region.
The most important case regards Turkey’s
mediation between Israel and Syria.32 The Turkish
initiative dates back to January 2004 in the context
of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s visit to
Turkey. At the time, however, not least because of
the U.S. strategy of isolating Syria, Israel rejected
the offer of an official re-start of negotiations. This
led to the launch of a track-two process instead.
By September 2004, the initiative developed into
a more structured process, which lasted until July
2006. The 2006 Lebanon War (and Israel’s ensuing
awareness of Hezbollah’s capabilities and its own
relative vulnerability) raised Israel’s perceived need
to move forward on the Syrian track, triggering
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s call for his Turkish
counterpart’s mediation in September 2006 at
track-one level. The process was delayed by Israel’s
bombing of Syria’s military installation near Dayr al
Zur in September 2007 (incidentally flying through
Turkish airspace), and official preparations took
place between March 2007 and May 2008. Between
May and December 2008, four rounds of official
indirect talks via Turkish shuttle diplomacy took
Speech by Ibrahim Kalın, Advisor to the Turkish Prime
31
Minister, Istanbul Forum, Istanbul, Oct. 2009.
This account was informed by interviews with Syrian, Israeli,
32
and Turkish negotiators in the process, Damascus, Jerusalem, Tel
Aviv, and Istanbul, Oct. 2009.
Turkey’s transatlantic value in the Middle East
place. According to both sides, greater progress
was achieved than originally expected. The parties
had entered the process for different reasons. For
President Assad, a prime aim was to break Syria’s
international isolation and show the West that it
was a serious partner for peace. For Prime Minister
Olmert,33 the aim was to negotiate with Syria in
order to weaken the Iranian-Syria-Hezbollah link. In different
Neither side expected a breakthrough. Yet more was conflict hubs,
achieved than ever before.34 The climax came at a Turkey’s supply
dinner between the Turkish Prime Minister and his of mediation has
Israeli counterpart on December 23, 2008, in which been matched
the launch of direct talks appeared to be in the by demand in
offing. Five days later, Israel launched Operation
the region.
Cast Lead and the process broke down.
In yet another case, Turkey has mediated between
Israel and Hamas. In view of Turkey’s open political
channels to Hamas (and in particular its political
bureau in Damascus), Ankara has offered to
mediate on two occasions. The first was in the
aftermath of Hamas’ capture of Israeli soldier
Gilad Shalit in June 2006. Ahmet Davutoğlu,
then-advisor to the Turkish Prime Minister,
travelled to Damascus several times to broker a
deal, attempting to persuade Hamas to release
Shalit in return for the release of a disputed group
of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. Following
the failure to yield a breakthrough, the potential
of Turkey’s efforts was recognized by UN Human
Rights Rapporteur in the Occupied Territories
Although reportedly far less for his coalition partners and the
33
Ministry of Foreign Affairs who were not fully involved in the
process.
34
Syria for the first time made a written territorial offer (six
reference points on the map) on the Golan Heights expecting an
Israeli response. In turn Israel asked a set of security questions
(related to Syria’s stance vis-à-vis Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran
following a deal) to which Syria responded in written form yet in
a manner deemed too vague by Israel. During his visit to Turkey
on Dec. 23, 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert was expected
to deliver written responses to the Syrian offer, which he did
not, primarily for domestic political reasons. The two prime
ministers allegedly had a five-hour-long dinner in telephone
conversation with Syrian President Assad.
A Neighborhood Rediscovered 9
 Richard Falk who argued that “[i]t is tragic that
this effort failed, and was at the time criticized.
In retrospect, both the wellbeing of the Gazan
civilian population and the security of Israel
would have greatly benefited by taking advantage
of the Turkish initiative.”35 The second instance
of Turkish mediation was during Operation Cast
Turkey is Lead in December 2008-January 2009. Given the
geographically, absence of official contact with Hamas, neither
historically, and the United States nor the European Union could
exert any influence on Hamas in order to secure
strategically
a ceasefire on its side.36 Egypt played a crucial
well-placed to
play a mediation role, yet the well-known difficulties between
Hamas and the Egyptian regime also opened a
role. They are
space for Turkey. Davutoğlu readily used it by
nonetheless
holding two meetings with Hamas leader Khaled
emblematic of Meshal and shuttling between Damascus and
a Turkish role in Cairo in order to persuade Hamas to agree to
the Arab world a ceasefire in return for an Israeli ceasefire and
that would have the lifting of Israel’s closure of Gaza. The effort
hitherto been failed as Israel refused to lift its closure of Gaza
unthinkable. without the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.
Turkey has also been drawn into a possible
mediation between the West and Iran. Given
Turkey’s opposition to further sanctions on Tehran
and its shared goal with the West of deterring
Iranian nuclear weapons, mediating on the Iranian
nuclear question in order to seek a diplomatic
solution to the problem has become a major part
of Turkish foreign policy. More broadly, as an
important regional power that has a long history of
pragmatic relations with Iran and as an important
member of the West, Turkey is geographically,
historically, and strategically well-placed to play
a mediating role. Turkey thus sought to facilitate
35
Falk, Richard (2009). “Understanding the Gaza catastrophe.”
Today’s Zaman, Jan. 4.
While choosing not to exert any influence on Israel to ensure a
36
ceasefire on its side.
10 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
5+137 talks in 2006, when then-Minister of Foreign
Affairs Abdullah Gül conducted shuttle diplomacy
between the principal actors of Condoleeza Rice,
Javier Solana, Mohammed el Baradei, and Ali
Larijani. Since then, Ankara has consistently
offered its good offices to mediate on the question
of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and continues to pass
messages from Washington to Tehran. However,
Turkey’s efforts have thus far yielded few results.
A final area of Turkey’s attempted mediation is
within the Arab world, a role unthinkable for
Turkey in any other period of its Republican
history. Three examples of this are Turkey’s
mediation efforts within Iraq, between Syria and
Iraq, and between Syria and Saudi Arabia. In the
first case, Turkey in 2005 successfully persuaded
Sunni leaders to participate in the national elections
in Iraq, helping to draw them into a new political
system led by the Shi’a. In the second case, Turkey
attempted to reconcile Syrians and Iraqis over the
latter’s accusation of the former for the August 2009
bombings in Baghdad. In the final case, Turkey
mediated a micro-crisis over the quasi-cancellation
of a state visit by the King of Saudi Arabia to
Syria in the fall of 2009 due to tensions between
Damascus and Riyadh. With the help of Turkey’s
last minute interventions, this visit was completed
in October 2009 and Syria’s rapprochement with
the Arab League was further facilitated.38 Whereas
these three examples represent Turkey’s role in
micro-crisis management, they are nonetheless
emblematic of a Turkish role in the Arab world that
would have hitherto been unthinkable.
The 5+1 contact group includes the five permanent members
37
of the UN Security Council plus Germany.
38
Interviews with Turkish diplomats, Ankara, Oct. 20, 2009.
3 Conflicting Interpretations of the
Sea Change
The shift in Turkey’s policies toward the Middle
East is stark and can be explained by a confluence
of international, regional, and domestic factors. At
the international and regional levels, these factors
range from the vacuum left by the 1991 Gulf War
and the 2003 Iraq War to the changing dynamics
in the Kurdish question and the deterioration
of the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly in the
aftermath of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. They
include the considerable influence that the EU has
had on Turkish foreign policy39 and by the United
States first aggravating Turkey’s sensitivities on the
Kurdish question in 2003-2007 and then diffusing
them by cooperating with Turkey in the fight
against the PKK.
Above all, however, the change in Turkish foreign
policy hinges on Turkey’s domestic transformation
and democratization, kick-started, inter alia, by
its EU accession process, and propelled by the
rise of the ruling AKP under the leadership of
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Turkish
foreign policy had traditionally been the exclusive
domain of the military and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. In the course of the last decade, these
institutions not only have been transformed but
others have acquired a growing role in crafting
foreign policy. These include state bodies such as
the ministries of energy, environment, interior,
and transportation, the under-secretariat for
foreign trade, and the development agency Turkish
International Cooperation and Development
Agency (TIKA). In addition, civil society, and
in particular businesses associations such as
the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board
Some of this literature includes Aydın, Mustafa and Sinem A.
39
Açıkmese (2007). “Europeanization through EU conditionality:
Understanding the new era in Turkish foreign policy.” Journal of
Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 263–74; Öniş,
Ziya (2003). “Turkey and the Middle East after September 11:
The Importance of the EU Dimension.” Turkish Policy Quarterly,
Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 84-95; and Akçapar, Burak (2007). Turkey’s
new European era: Foreign policy on the road to EU membership,
Lanham, MD: Toronto: Rowman & Littlefield.
Turkey’s transatlantic value in the Middle East
(DEIK), the Independent Industrialists and
Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD), the Turkish
Exporters Assembly (TIM), the Turkish Union of
Chambers (TOBB), the Turkish Industrialists’ and
Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD), and the
Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists
(TUSKON) constantly lobby the government on
foreign policy questions. It would be hard to make Without
sense of Turkish foreign policy toward countries democratization
such as Russia, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria it is doubtful
without taking into consideration these economic
that Erdoğan
interests.40 Similarly, economic interests played an
would have been
important role in efforts to improve relations with
as critical as
the KRG and with Armenia.
he has been of
Additionally, Turkish democratization has made Israel lately.
the government more accountable and sensitive
to public opinion. Whereas past governments
could easily ignore the public, the government
now feels obliged—for electoral as much as
populist reasons—to take public opinion into
account. Indeed, the backdrop to the March 2003
parliamentary vote not to allow the United States
to attack Iraq through Turkish territory was the
massive public mobilization against the looming
war. Similarly, without a more responsive public
and greater freedom of expression, it would have
been difficult to imagine the debates that made it
possible for Turkey to reverse its policies toward
Cyprus in 2004 and Armenia in 2008–2009. With
some irony, it could also be argued that without
democratization it is doubtful that Erdoğan would
have been as critical as he has been of Israel lately,
whereby the government and especially the prime
minister responds to the public outrage over
civilian casualties in the region.
Accounting for these domestic developments
is critical in order to understand the AKP
Kirişci, Kemal (2009). “The transformation of Turkish foreign
40
policy: The rise of the trading state.” New Perspectives on Turkey,
No. 40, pp. 29–57.
A Neighborhood Rediscovered 11
 government’s foreign policy orientation, marked
by the concepts of “zero problems” with neighbors
and “Strategic Depth,” elaborated by the current
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu.
“Strategic Depth” seeks to reposition Turkey from
the periphery of international relations to the
center as an actor sitting at the intersection of
The doctrine multiple regions. It does so by courting different
of Strategic alliances in order to maintain optimal regional and
Depth provides global independence and influence,41 by taking on
a normative a larger role in its former Ottoman territories, and
chapeau to the by prioritizing “dialogue and cooperation” over
plethora of state “coercion and confrontation.”42 The appeal of this
doctrine has allowed the AKP to work with many
and non-state
nationalists and ardent secularists in Turkey who
interests that
dislike the AKP’s conservative religious roots but
concomitantly agree on the need to make use of both Turkey’s
push Turkey to Ottoman past and former geopolitical space. It has
develop deeper also rallied favor with business and civil society,
and stronger ties which are eager to develop close ties with the
to its neighbors. neighbors in the economic and social domains.
In other words, the doctrine of “Strategic Depth”
provides a normative chapeau to the plethora of
state and non-state interests that concomitantly
push Turkey to develop deeper and stronger ties to
its neighbors. It also conceptualizes a foreign policy
trend that has been in the making since the days
of former Turkish Prime Minister and President
Turgut Özal in the late 1980s and early 1990s and
of former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem in
the late 1990s.43
For further discussion on this doctrine, see Walker, Joshua
41
(2007). “Learning Strategic Depth: Implications of Turkey’s new
foreign policy doctrine.” Insight Turkey, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 32–47.
Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2001). Startejik Derinlik Türkiye’nin
42
Uluslararası Konumu, Istanbul, Küre. For an elaboration see
Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2004). “Türkiye merkez ülke olmalı.”
Radikal, Feb. 26; and Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008). “Turkey’s
Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007.” Insight Turkey,
Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 77–96.
Altunışık-Benli, Meliha (2009). “Worldviews and Turkish
43
foreign policy in the Middle East.” New Perspectives on Turkey,
No. 40, pp. 171–194.
12 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
The upshot and irony of this increasingly
democratic Turkey is a growing readiness to
diverge and say “no” to the United States or the
European Union when their policies have been
perceived as countering Turkish interests. Unlike
during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath,
when Turkish army generals and diplomats could
be counted on to support the West even when
policies harmed Turkey’s national interest, Turkish
leaders are now being held accountable for their
foreign policy decisions, and at times they give
in to populism. In other words, like any other
democracy, Turkey today responds to the public,
including its nationalist segments, as well as to
powerful business interests. Toward this end, the
confidence exhibited by the prime minister in
his diplomatic dealings and political rhetoric has
rubbed off on Turkey as a whole and stems directly
from the political power accumulated by his party.
Given the AKP’s unrivalled position domestically,
its foreign policy doctrine of “Strategic Depth” has
also been hegemonic within the country. Turkey’s
new self-awareness as a regional power means that
rather than simply being able to rely on Turkey as
an instrument of Western power projection in the
Middle East, the West is now facing a stronger and
more assertive Turkey that can and will disagree on
key foreign policy issues.
What are the implications of this for the United
States and the EU? There are two possible readings
of Turkey’s Middle Eastern transformation. The
first and far more common explanation tends to
be a cautious—if not outright negative—view of an
increasingly “Islamic” Turkey inexorably drifting
toward the East. The second reading is more
positive, viewing Turkey’s increased activism and
independence in the Middle East as a potential
asset to the Western alliance, provided certain
conditions are met.
Turkey’s “drift to the east”
The traditional reading of Turkey’s Middle Eastern
policies adopts as an interpretative key the degree
to which Turkey’s policies “converge” or “diverge”
with those of the United States and the European
Union. On the upside, commentators point to the
improvement of Turkey’s relations with Iraq in
particular. In view of the continued withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Iraq, the United States has been
thoroughly supportive of Turkey’s efforts to fill the
vacuum, and both Americans and Europeans have
praised Turkey’s Kurdish and regional initiative.
The United States and the European Union have
also congratulated Turkey in its efforts to mediate
conflicts in the Middle East, in particular between
Israel and Syria, Israel and Hamas, and the United
States and Iran. Regarding Israel and Syria, U.S.
President Barack Obama praised Turkey’s efforts in
his December 2009 meeting with Prime Minister
Erdoğan. Regarding Iran, then-Secretary of State
Rice acknowledged Turkey’s efforts in July 2006,
and the current U.S. administration has repeatedly
mentioned Turkey’s role in delivering its messages
to Tehran. Regarding Israel and Hamas, in the
midst of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, French
President Nicolas Sarkozy, called for Turkey’s
mediation,44 and following the end of the Israeli
offensive, Turkey’s efforts were openly praised by
France and the European Union.45
Yet on those questions where Turkey’s policy has
diverged from that of the European Union and the
United States, Turkey’s overtures to the Middle
East, that includes its authoritarian regimes, have
been interpreted as symptomatic of the country’s
dangerous slide to the East. The cause of this slide is
“Turkish PM speaks Sarkozy on the phone,” Time Turk English,
44
Jan. 7, 2009.
“Turkey key to convincing Hamas on Gaza cease-fire,” Turkey
45
NY.com, http://www.turkishny.com/tr/ingilizce-haberler/1639-
turkey-key-to-convincing-hamas-on-gaza-cease-fire-.html
Turkey’s transatlantic value in the Middle East
unambiguously viewed as the rise of political Islam
in Turkey, embodied in the AKP. The consequence
is Turkey’s increasing warmth toward Muslim
countries of the likes of Iran and Syria, its open
political channels with Islamist movements such
as Hamas and Hezbollah, and its pro-Islam double
standards in denouncing genocide in Xinjiang
while denying it in Darfur.46 The implication drawn Some have
by several Turkey-watchers is that the United raised eyebrows
States and the European Union are “losing” Turkey
at Turkey’s
and its Western orientation.47 This debate took a
Middle Eastern
particularly strident tone in the fall of 2009 as the
policies, voicing
Turkish-Israeli military alliance faltered and the
growing concern
Turkish Prime Minister warmed to the Iranian
regime as and when Western diplomacy stepped that Turkey
up the pressure. This has led some to provocatively may be losing
question Turkey’s NATO membership tout court.48 its European
While voiced in a less strident manner, some vocation.
European observers have also raised eyebrows
at Turkey’s Middle Eastern policies, voicing a
growing concern that Turkey may be losing its
European vocation.49
While intuitively convincing, this argument does
not stand up to close scrutiny, especially when
Turkey’s foreign policy in general is taken into
consideration. The notion that Turkish foreign
policy is currently driven by religious and identity
considerations would fail to explain why the AKP
government has also pursued relations with Russia
See “Prime Minister Erdoğan reiterates ‘no genocide’ in
46
Darfur.” Today’s Zaman, Nov. 9, 2009; and “China tells PM
Erdoğan to withdraw Uighur genocide remark,” in Today’s
Zaman, Jul. 15, 2009.
Menon, R. and Winbush, S. E. (2007). Is the United States
47
‘Losing’ Turkey?, Mar. 25, Washington, The Hudson Institute;
Cagaptay, Soner (2005). Turkey at a Crossroads: Preserving
Ankara’s Western Orientation, Washington, Washington Institute
for Near East Policy.
Schenker, David (2009). “A NATO without Turkey.” The Wall
48
Street Journal, Nov. 5.
Kramer, Heinz (2009). “Turkey’s Accession Process to the EU:
49
The Agenda behind the Agenda.” SWP Comments, Oct. 2009,
Berlin, SWP, p. 4.
A Neighborhood Rediscovered 13
and rapprochement with Greece, overturned policy
on Cyprus by supporting reconciliation between its
“Muslim” and “Christian Orthodox” communities,
and attempted to improve relations with “Christian”
Armenia at the expense of “Muslim” Azerbaijan.
Moreover, and far from only improving relations
with authoritarian regimes, it is also critical to bear
in mind that it was during the AKP’s years in office
that EU-Turkey relations intensified and accession
talks started. Furthermore, Islam as an explanatory
parameter would fail to account for Erdoğan’s
close friendship with President Bashir al-Assad,
the symbol of secularism in Syria and otherwise
belonging to a minority heterodox sect in Islam.
Further facts question an “Islam-centered”
explanation of Turkish foreign policy. As discussed
below, the overwhelming majority of the millions of
people that enter visa-free Turkey each year come
from “Christian” countries,50 a reality that stands
in stark contrast to the EU’s Schengen regime that
forbids visa-free travel to all Muslim countries
except Brunei and Malaysia.51 An additional fact
contrasting a religion-based reading of Turkish
foreign policy regards development aid: the second
largest recipient of Turkish development assistance
after Afghanistan is Moldova, a “Christian” country.
In other words, religion, rather than representing
an overarching explanatory factor for Turkish
foreign policy appears to explain, at best, some
of the rhetoric of the Turkish prime minister.
Erdoğan’s outburst at the 2009 Davos World
Economic Forum, his defense of Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir, and his support for the
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are
examples of this, which many Turkish diplomats
50
See Table 2 below.
Council Regulation No 453/2003, Mar. 6, 2003 amending
51
Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001. Very recently citizens of
Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina, two partly Muslim countries,
have been promised visa-facilitation Council Regulation No.
266/2009, Jul. 15, 2009 amending Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001.
14 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
as well as the prime minister’s close associates
recognize as being a problem. These very people are
often the ones engaging in damage repair, picking
up the pieces broken by the prime minister’s
rhetorical outbursts. It should be noted, however,
that the prime minister has the reputation of
speaking brashly in domestic politics, too, on issues
as diverse (and not Islam-related) as the H1N1 flu
and the Kurdish question. This, of course, is not to
say that religious considerations do not play any
role in the AKP’s foreign policy at all. It is rather
to argue that religion, alongside conservatism
and nationalism, while certainly playing a role
in Turkey­—as in the United States, the European
Union, and the international system more
broadly—cannot explain alone the transformation
of Turkish foreign policy.52
Turkey as an independent actor: Asset for the
United States and Europe
In view of the limitations of this first interpretation
of Turkish foreign policy, others have adopted
a different reading of Turkey’s evolution and its
foreign policy implications. Turkey is viewed as
having embarked on an important path toward
democratization. It is seen as having abandoned the
gross human rights abuses of the 1990s and, while
no longer always supporting U.S. policy in the
Middle East, it no longer engages in brinkmanship
in its neighborhood. In this reading, Turkey’s
domestic reform efforts are emphasized, including
the momentous constitutional and legislative
reforms in 2001–2005 and the courageous “Kurdish
opening” in 2009.53 Openness at home has spilled-
52
For studies of the impact of the rise of conservatism and
nationalism in Turkey see Çarkoğlu, Ali and Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin
(2009). The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey, New York,
Palgrave/Macmillan; and Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. (2008). Trials
of Europeanization. Turkish Political Culture and the European
Union, London and New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
Cook, Steven (2009). “Turkey’s war at home.” Survival, Vol. 51,
53
No. 5, Oct.-Nov., pp. 105–120.
over into its policies abroad, including improved
and expanded relations with Iraq, Iran, and Syria,
and its attempted mediation across the Middle
East.54 As an American diplomat in the region put
it, “It is hard to take issue with Turkey’s approach
because it is principled, diplomatic, and it attempts
solving regional problems.”55
The image of Turkey as an actor in its own right
was conjured most eloquently by Barack Obama:
“I know there are those who like to debate Turkey’s
future. They see your country at the crossroads
of continents, and touched by the currents of
history. They know that this has been a place where
civilizations meet, and different peoples come
together. They wonder whether you will be pulled
in one direction or another. But I believe here is
what they don’t understand: Turkey’s greatness lies
in your ability to be at the center of things. This is
not where East and West divide—this is where they
come together.”56
For those espousing this line of thought, the
tone is concomitantly more upbeat and more
resigned to the fact that a more democratic and
independent Turkey may at times formulate its
policies differently from the United States.57 In
other words, as Turkey democratizes and gains
in self-confidence, it can no longer necessarily
be expected to act like Washington. Turkey can
no longer be taken for granted as its identity and
survival are not as self-evidently entirely bound
up in the West anymore. Today, Turkey has
become simultaneously more European, more
Abramowitz, Morton and Barkey, Henri. J. (2009). “Turkey’s
54 region. More specifically, Turkey’s role in the
Transformers. The AKP sees big,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 6,
Nov.-Dec., pp. 118–128.
55
Interview with American diplomat, Damascus, Oct. 2009.
Obama, Barack (2009). “Remarks by President Obama to
56
the Turkish Parliament.” Turkish Grand National Assembly
Complex, Ankara, Apr. 6.
Lesser, Ian. O. (2006). “Turkey, the United States and the
57
Delusion of Geopolitics.” Survival, Vol. 48, No.3, pp. 83–96.
Turkey’s transatlantic value in the Middle East
democratic, more conservative and Islam-friendly,
and, increasingly, more nationalist. Ankara finds
itself at the intersection of Asia, Europe, the
Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus as it
attempts to develop a new position for itself as a
transregional power not dependent on any one
of these regions exclusively. As a result, placing
Turkey in the modern international system presents Turkey can no
new challenges to policymakers in Washington. longer be taken
It becomes important to arrive at a better
for granted as
understanding of Turkey’s domestic realities and to
its identity and
recognize the manner in which this shapes Turkey’s
survival are not
relations with the geographies that surround it.
as self-evidently
Hence, Turkey has the potential to be either a
transregional power or an inward-focused regional entirely bound
state given that it is a perfect microcosm of the up in the West
various regions and communities of which it finds anymore. Turkey
itself a part. has become
simultaneously
Yet, precisely because of this, Turkey’s relations more European,
with both the United States and the European
more democratic,
Union hold the promise of becoming stronger and
more conservative
entering a phase of maturity.58 The United States
and Islam-friendly,
has learned to live with and perhaps even appreciate
differences with allies such as France and Germany, and, increasingly,
and the same holds true for Turkey. The country more nationalist.
resembles several European allies with which
Washington may respectfully differ, but not Middle
Eastern allies whose dependence on Washington
guarantees convergence with American policies.
Moreover, as far as foreign policy is concerned,
Turkey may represent an asset to the Western
alliance precisely because its policies in the Middle
East are distinct and not simply a replica of (often
unsuccessful) American and EU policies in the
Middle East can be viewed as complementary on
both the political and socio-economic levels.
Fuller, Graham. E. (2004). “Turkey’s Strategic Model: Myths
58
and Realities.” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.
51–64.
A Neighborhood Rediscovered 15
 Political complementarity
Politically, Turkey’s Middle Eastern policies can
be viewed as complementary to those of the
United States and the European Union in several
interrelated ways.
Today, Turkey represents a critical partner
Today, Turkey for the United States on its three most urgent
represents a
strategic issues—Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. On
critical partner Afghanistan, Turkey might be reluctant to commit
for the United more combat troops, but it recognizes the priority
States on its of extinguishing the Afghan-Pakistani fires before
three more urgent they spread. In 2008, more than 45 percent of
strategic issues— TIKA’s budget of $780 million was channeled
Afghanistan, to support the “reconstruction of Afghanistan
Iran, and Iraq. Program.”59 An important proportion of these
funds have gone to building and running schools,
including schools for girls, as well as hospitals and
health clinics for the general public. The personnel
are either Turkish-educated Afghans or assigned
from Turkey.
The Turks have taken command for the second
time of the International Security Assistance Forces
(ISAF) in Kabul and have doubled their troop
levels over the last year. Every place the Turks,
both civilian and military alike, have controlled
have resulted in considerable and consistent
improvements in ways that few other European
allies can claim. Considering the fact that Turkey
boasts the second-largest military in NATO and is
the only functioning Muslim-majority democracy
in the alliance, Turkey is well-placed to play a
leading role in Kabul. Ankara has close historic
ties to Afghanistan that date back to the 1920s,
when the founder of the modern Turkish Republic,
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, served as a model for
modernization that collapsed only after great
power interference in Kabul carved up the country.
Often referred to as Afghanistan’s “closest neighbor
59
TIKA (2009). 2008 Annual Report, Ankara, TIKA, p. 10.
16 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
without borders,” Turkey also shares considerable
cultural, ethnic, and linguistic links that make
it an important partner for President Obama in
Afghanistan.60
On Iraq, the imminent U.S. withdrawal is removing
a central point of tension in U.S.-Turkish relations.
As the United States withdraws, Turkish fears of
a U.S.-sponsored independent Kurdish region
have faded and been replaced by a new impetus to
resolve long-simmering Kurdish issues. Moreover,
U.S. cooperation with Turkey in the battle against
the PKK has facilitated Turkish rapprochement
with the KRG, which in turn has generated
economic interdependence along the border and
increased Turkish influence throughout Iraq. Short
of coercive action, Ankara is determined to prevent
nuclear Iran and will support Obama’s attempts to
resolve the standoff diplomatically in view of its
lack of confidence in the effectiveness of sanctions.
As far as the Arab-Israeli conflict is concerned,
Turkey can continue to play a useful role, yet its
efforts can bear fruit only if undertaken in tandem
with the United States. Turkey has demonstrated
its ability to mediate micro-crises (e.g. intra-Iraq,
Syria and Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia). Turkey can
also play a useful role as a go-between the West and
actors such as Hamas, Iran, or Syria, with whom
the United States and European Union either have
no relations or have problematic relations riddled
by mistrust. Yet as far as the macro-conflicts in the
region are concerned, Turkey’s potential is limited.
Turkey played an important role in moving the
Syrian-Israeli track forward. Turkey has also won
Syrian trust and desire to see Turkey involved in
The American emphasis on combat troop levels is not
60
shared in Turkey, where the fact that not a single Afghan
has died from a Turkish bullet is continually cited as a major
reason for the success of Turkish troops in the country.
For more on Turkey’s role in Afghanistan see Joshua W.
Walker, http://wonkroom.thinkprogress.org/2009/12/04/
turkey-obama%E2%80%99s-ideal-partner/.
future peace efforts.61 However, Turkey has gone as
far as it can go. This is not because the deterioration
of relations with Israel has seen Turkey losing
its role as an “honest broker.”62 The history of
mediation in the region suggests that neutrality has
hardly been a condition for success. The principal
reason why Turkey’s mediation potential is limited
is that Israel, Syria, and Turkey all know that a deal
will be sealed only when the United States steps
in.63 Israel will not budge unless it is induced by
Washington, while Syria will not grant Israel a
peace process that does not offer the prospect of a
peace deal, a deal that Turkey alone cannot deliver.
Only if and when the United States re-engages in an
Israeli-Syrian process, Turkey’s role will be value-
added. Likewise in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
Turkey’s relations with Hamas are important
because of the self-imposed lack of U.S./EU contact
with—and thus influence on­—the movement. Yet
the prime actor calling the shots in the conflict is
Israel, on which Turkey, irrespective of the state of
its bilateral relations, has little influence. It is only
if and when the United States and the EU choose
to exert their influence on Israel that Turkey’s ties
to and influence on Hamas can contribute to a
positive movement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process.
Turkey can also help insert the logic of conditionality64
in relations with Israel, which the United States and
the EU have persistently shied away from, reducing
the prospects of peace in the region. In view of
the Turkish public’s sensitivity to the Palestinian
Interviews with Syrian officials, diplomats and academics,
61
Washington and Damascus, Oct. 2009.
See “Netanyahu: Turkey can’t be an ‘honest broker’ in Syria
62 2008, TIKA channeled almost $800 million in
talks.” Ha’aretz, Oct. 18, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
spages/1121723.html. Retrieved 2009-10-18.
Interviews with Syrian and Israeli negotiators and Turkish
63
diplomats, Damascus, Jerusalem, and Istanbul, Oct. 2009.
By “conditionality” here, we do not mean either sanctions or
64
diplomatic boycotts. What we mean is engaging with both Israel
and Hamas according to their respective actions in the conflict.
Turkey’s transatlantic value in the Middle East
question, Turkey’s military relationship with Israel
in the 1990s had always been controversial and
was only possible in a domestic context in which
public opinion was conveniently set aside. Most
importantly, however, the military alliance was
possible in the context of the Oslo process, which
provided Turkey with the space and cover to pursue
its bilateral ties with Israel. With the outbreak of Considering the
the second intifada in 2000 and the diffusion of fact that Turkey
tensions between Turkey and the Arab world (and boasts the second-
Syria in particular) since 1998, Turkey’s relationship
largest military in
with Israel has become increasingly conditional on
NATO and is the
the evolution of Arab-Israeli relations. Whereas in
only functioning
the past the Turkish-Israeli relationship had been
shaped by two opposing forces—the Arab-Israeli Muslim-majority
conflict and the Arab-Turkish conflict—with the democracy in the
evaporation of the latter, Turkish-Israeli relations alliance, Turkey
have become increasingly conditional on Israel’s is well-placed to
conduct in the former.65 In this respect, we should play a leading
note that Turkish-Israeli relations were positive at role in Kabul.
the time when Israel negotiated with Syria in 2006–
2008 and when it agreed on a ceasefire with Hamas
between June and December 2008. Relations have
soured since Operation Cast Lead in December
2008–January 2009. Turkey’s “tough love” and
conditionality toward Israel if proportional (i.e.
not excessive) and consistent (i.e. toward all parties
based on similar grounds) would mark a welcome
difference from U.S. and EU policies in the region.
In the field of democracy promotion, Turkey, as a
democratizing state, can complement U.S. and EU
democracy assistance policies in the neighborhood,
policies that suffered a considerable reputational
blow during George W. Bush’s presidency and
that are now struggling to regain currency. In
development aid to 98 countries, many of them
in its neighborhood, a proportion of which was
directed to projects on “good governance” and
Interviews with former Israeli negotiator, Jerusalem, and
65
analyst, Tel Aviv, Oct. and Nov. 2009.
A Neighborhood Rediscovered 17
 “empowering women.” Since a Turkish national was
elected as secretary-general of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there have
been efforts to pursue similar projects among
the members. Turkey worked hard to include
“good governance” and “expansion of political
participation” in the OIC’s Ten Year Program of
Finally, Turkey, Action in 2005 and its Charter at the Dakar Summit
unlike the United in March 2008.66 There are also a growing number
States and of Turkish NGOs engaged in cultural, educational,
European Union, environmental, and women projects and of
is an actor “of” influential business organizations that interact with
and not simply “in” their counterparts abroad, promoting the diffusion
of liberal market values. The United States and the
the Middle East.
European Union ought to consider tapping into the
growing Turkish experience in development and
democracy assistance. Partnering with Turkey, at
the official and civil-society levels, could not only
enrich EU and U.S. democracy promotion policies
but also encourage positive transatlantic influences
on Turkey’s own democratizing efforts.
Finally, Turkey, unlike the United States and European
Union, is an actor “of ” and not simply “in” the Middle
East. As such, it offers the prospect to realign the
region by countering revisionist trends. In today’s
Middle East, states like Iran and Israel, while different
in many ways, raise suspicion and anxiety, triggering
an accelerated insecurity in the region. By contrast,
Turkey fosters relations with all parties irrespective
of their domestic political systems67 through bilateral
relations and regional integration. Syria sees this
potential. Prevalent in Syrian perceptions of Turkey
is Damascus’ double objective of strengthening its
hand vis-à-vis Israel68 while diversifying its alliance
with Iran. As a key Syrian interlocutor puts it, “When
66
Interview with an official from the OIC secretariat, Oct. 2009.
Like the EU and the United States, Turkey has not made its
67
foreign relations conditional on countries’ compliance with
democratic standards.
For example, by assuring that Israeli attacks, such as the one
68 Turkey’s relations with the former Soviet space. In
in 2007 through Turkish airspace, would no longer be possible.
Telephone conversation with expert on Syria, Paris, September
2009.
18 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Syria feels threatened, it turns to Iran; when it sees
opportunities, it turns to Turkey.”69 Indeed, Syria on
one hand has important areas of disagreements with
Tehran, particularly regarding the sectarianization
of Iraq, but on the other hand observes the disunity
of the Arab world, Turkey’s potential in providing
a route to the West, and an opportunity for an
economically integrated Middle East. Egypt and
Saudi Arabia, fearing a loss of primacy in certain
areas, have been less enthusiastic about Turkey’s role
in Palestine and intra-Arab affairs. Yet, on a whole,
the Turks have been accepted by Arab states that
welcome the pragmatic and business-savvy nature of
Turkish diplomacy. As a gateway to both Europe and
America, Turkey has become an important meeting
spot for the actors of the region. Turkey’s presence in
the Middle East thus offers the prospect to unsettle
and dislodge the dichotomies that have poisoned the
Middle East. In the West (yet partly also in the Middle
East), the region is often viewed in us/them terms, be
this moderate/radical, Western/anti-Western, Sunni/
Shi’ite, Israeli/Arab, or West/Islam. Turkey could
help move away from these dichotomies by being
“moderate,” “Muslim,” and “Western” yet enjoying
relations with “radicals” and “anti-Western” actors in
the “Muslim” Middle East; by being predominantly
“Sunni” while enjoying relations with “Shi’ite”
countries (e.g. Iran), movements (e.g. Hezbollah), and
regimes (e.g. the Alawite Syrian regime), as well as
enjoying the credibility to mediate between sectarian
groups in Iraq and Lebanon; by being neither Arab
nor Israeli while enjoying relations with both.
Socio-economic complementarity
At the socio-economic level, Turkey’s potential in
the Middle East lies in integrating the region into
the global system through increased economic and
social interaction with Turkey, and, via Turkey,
with the West. In order to appreciate this potential,
we need to contextualize it by referring back to
69
Interview, Damascus, Oct. 2009.
many ways, Turkey is currently extending its earlier
policies toward Eastern Europe to the Middle East.
With the end of the Cold War, Turkey played an
active role in integrating the ex-communist world
into the global economic system. This policy had
been the brainchild of former Prime Minister
and President Turgut Özal, who had overseen the
transformation of the Turkish economy from a
basically planned import-substitution economy to
an export-oriented liberal market economy in the
1980s. In a major break from traditional Turkish
foreign policy, Özal also advocated developing close
economic relations with neighboring countries,
believing that greater economic interdependence
would help resolve bilateral and regional conflicts.70
Hence, he lifted visa requirements for Greek
nationals in 1986 followed by visa facilitation
arrangements for the nationals of the Soviet Union
in 1990, and then for all citizens of the former Soviet
Bloc in Europe soon thereafter.71 This occurred at
a time when West Europeans were jubilant that the
“wall” separating two halves of Europe was coming
down but still had concerns and fears, aggravated
by the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the crisis in
Albania, about large refugee and labor migration
flows into Western Europe.72 Subsequently, the
strategy of the European Union at the time was
to build a “paper wall” between itself and Eastern
Europe and to reinforce the surveillance and
protection of its borders. This contributed to
the EU’s image as “Fortress Europe;” it became
For an extensive study of Turkish foreign policy during Özal’s
70
years see Sayarı, Sabri (1992). “Turkey: The changing European
Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis.” Middle East Journal,
Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 9–21; Özel, Soli (1995).“Of Not Being a Lone
Wolf: Geography, Domestic Plays, and Turkish Foreign Policy in
the Middle East.” in Geoffrey Kemp and Janice Gross Stein (eds)
Powder Keg in the Middle East: The Struggle for Gulf Security,
Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield.
71
Kirişci, Kemal (2005). “A friendlier Schengen visa system as a
tool of ‘soft power’: The experience of Turkey.” European Journal
of Migration and Law, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 343–367.
Collison, Sarah (1993). Beyond Borders: West European
72
Migration Policy Towards the 21st Century, London: Royal
Institute of International Affairs, pp. 39–50.
Turkey’s transatlantic value in the Middle East
frustratingly difficult for nationals of countries in
Europe outside the EU to obtain visas to enter the
Schengen zone for reasons of business, culture,
research, and tourism.
In contrast, as a result of Turkey’s openness to
its eastern neighbors, large numbers of nationals
from the former Soviet Bloc were able to travel to
Turkey relatively freely and engage in what came
to be known as “suitcase trade.”73 The initial low-
level commercial contacts between Turkey and the
ex-Soviet world74 evolved into massive economic
relations, as seen in Table 1. During this period,
it is also interesting to note that Turkey’s foreign
trade with the EU decreased from 50 percent in
1991 to 41 percent in 2008 while trade with the
ex-Soviet world increased from 6 percent in 1991
to 19 percent in 2008. These contacts were not
limited to trade, but opened the way to an ever-
growing number of joint ventures, Turkish foreign
and direct investment (FDI) around the Black
Sea, and student and labor migration into Turkey.
Interestingly, these developments received little
attention in Western media and scholarship at the
time. Unlike Turkey’s current policies toward the
Middle East that are attracting so much attention
and provoking such anxiety, there was little concern
being expressed at the time about the expansion of
Turkey’s relations with the ex-Soviet world.75
Eder, Mine et al. (2002). Redefining Contagion: The Political
73
Economy of the Suitcase Trade between Turkey and Russia,
International Research Exchange, Black and Caspian Sea
Research Program, final report, July; Aktar, Cengiz and
Ogelman, Nedim (1994). “Recent developments in East-
West Migration: Turkey and the Petty Traders.” International
Migration, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 343–353.
The term “ex-Soviet world” is used here to refer to both
74
successor states of the Soviet Union as well as those states that
were regarded as being part of the Soviet Bloc such as Bulgaria
and Romania.
The exception was Graham Fuller, who noted how Turkey
75
was developing new relations to the “south, east, and north” and
expressed concern that if accompanied with “chauvinist and anti-
Western positions” this may be “in no one’s interest.” See Fuller,
Graham (1992). Turkey Faces East: New Orientations Toward the
Middle East and the Old Soviet Union, Santa Monica, Rand, p. ix.
A Neighborhood Rediscovered 19
 Table 1: Foreign trade relations between Turkey and its neighbors
in million USD, 1991, 2000, and 2008
1991 2000 2008
Export Import TOTAL Export Import TOTAL Export Import TOTAL
Greece 144 77 221 438 431 869 2,430 1,151 3,581
Bulgaria 76 140 216 253 465 718 2,152 1,840 3,992
Romania 105 199 304 326 674 1,000 3,987 3,548 7,535
Moldova 0 0 0 26 7 33 198 70 268
Ukraine 0 0 0 2,188 6,106 8,294 2,188 6,106 8,294
Russia 611 1,097 1,708 644 3,887 4,531 6,483 31,364 37,847
Georgia 0 0 0 132 155 287 998 525 1,523
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 230 96 326 1,667 928 2,595
Iran 487 91 578 236 816 1052 2,030 8,200 10,230
Iraq 122 492 614 0 0 0 3,917 1,321 5,238
Syria 264 67 331 184 545 729 1,115 639 1,754
Egypt 169 48 217 376 141 517 1,426 943 2,369
Israel 79 78 157 650 505 1155 1,935 1,448 3,383
Total 2,057 2,289 4,346 5,683 13,828 19,511 30,526 58,083 88,609
EU 7,348 9,896 17,244 14,510 26,610 41,120 63,390 74,802 138,192
United States 913 2,255 3,168 3,135 3,911 7,046 4,300 11,976 16,276
Grand Total 13,593 21,047 34,640 27,775 54,503 82,278 132,027 201,964 333,991
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, Foreign Trade by Countries report, www.tuik.gov.tr.
Note 1: 2008 values are temporary.
Note 2: Réunion, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana are also added to the EU values for 1991.
Note 3: For 1991, the values for Russia are values for USSR. Therefore, separate data do not exist for Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan for 1991.
Note 4: For 2000, no data exist for Iraq.

This pattern of relations between Turkey and
the former Soviet space was in stark contrast to
Turkey’s relations with the Middle East at the time.
Despite Özal’s intention to develop closer relations
with Middle Eastern countries as well, the Arab
world remained lukewarm to his ideas. Trade
sanctions on Iraq, growing violence in Turkey’s
southeast, and souring relations with Egypt, Libya,
and Syria further hampered Özal’s ambitions.
Unlike in the ex-Soviet world, the nationals of Arab
countries throughout the 1990s were thus required
to obtain visas before coming to Turkey. The “paper
wall” between Turkey and the Arab Middle East
was reinforced when Turkey became a candidate
country for EU membership in 1999 and Ankara
enthusiastically committed itself to introducing the
terms of the Schengen visa regime in 2001–2005.
Therefore, as can be observed from Table 2, the
movement of people from the Middle East to
Turkey remained limited compared to the one
from the remaining regions surrounding Turkey.
From 1990 to 2009, the number of people entering
Turkey from the former Soviet Union increased
about 25-fold, from around 220,000 to over 5.4

20 The German Marshall Fund of the United States

 Table 2: Entry of persons from the neighborhood of Turkey
for 1980, 1990, 1996, 2005, and 2009
1980 1990 1996 2005 2009
Soviet Union 40,015 222,537 — — —
Russia — — 1,235,290 1,855,900 2,682,333
Rest of ex-Soviet countries except Baltic states 385,966 1,551,794 2,764,647
TOTAL for ex-Soviet Union except Baltic States 1,621,256 3,407,694 5,446,980
Balkan countries 59,817 854,521 597,359 2,760,694 2,578,590
Middle East 82,612 390,377 529,202 1,415,307 2,217,797
General TOTAL 1,057,364 2,301,250 8,538,864 20,275,213 25,529,375
Balkan countries included: Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Greece, Kosovo (only for 2009), Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia-Montenegro. The figures for
1980, 1990, and 1996 are for Yugoslavia only.
Middle East countries included: Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Gulf states.
Source: Complied from data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI and State Statistical Institute Annual Reports.

million. In contrast, the increase for the Middle
Eastern countries cited in Table 2 was only six-fold,
and almost two-thirds of the entries were from Iran
whose nationals have enjoyed visa-free travel to
Turkey since the early 1960s.
Recently, this picture has been changing fast.
Turkish trade with the Middle East has expanded
and diversified. Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and the
Gulf states are becoming important economic
partners like Israel has been since the mid 1990s.
Following the Turkey-Syria free trade agreement
in 2004, bilateral commerce has picked up,
more than doubling between 2000 and 2008
(see Table 1), and is expected to grow many fold
in the coming years. Erdoğan, during his visit
to Syria in December 2009 and his subsequent
address to the Foreign Economic Relations Board
(DEIK), said he expected Turkey to become
Syria’s economic gateway to Europe, and Syria
to become Turkey’s gateway to Arab markets.
He even foresaw free movements of goods,
(MENA) have boomed in recent years. In 1971,
THY flew to 17 destinations in 11 countries,
overwhelmingly in Western Europe. There were
no flights whatsoever to the former Soviet world
and one flight each to Lebanon and Israel. In
2009, this picture has altered dramatically with
a total of 113 routes in 70 countries, including
39 destinations in the former Soviet Bloc and
23 destinations to the MENA countries.76
Turkey’s opening to Syria took place amid
considerable American and EU resistance in
the mid 2000s. This resistance notwithstanding,
Erdoğan stood his ground and made clear that
Turkey would not support any efforts to isolate
Syria economically.77 The prime minister’s
position reflected the feeling among the business
community, especially in major cities along the
Syrian border and in the southeast. The business
community in Gaziantep, a major and growing
Nergiz, Abdullah (2008). Türkiye’de Sivil Havacılığın Gelişimi
76

services, and people between the two countries
and throughout the region. Indicative of these
developments is the way in which Turkish Airlines
ve THY (Master’s thesis, presented at Marmara University, Social
Science Institute, Istanbul) and data obtained from the head
offices of Turkish Airlines.
Interview broadcasted by TRT1 (2009). “Ankara Gündemi.”
77

(THY) flights to the Middle East and North Africa Jan. 26.

A Neighborhood Rediscovered 21
Turkey’s transatlantic value in the Middle East
commercial and industrial center of the region,
attributes great importance to relations with Syria
and has always been keen to revive a natural
economic zone that once included Aleppo and
Damascus. The frontier region between the two
countries has also had longstanding family and
social relations that have created a demand for
closer bilateral ties. This has been reinforced by the
recognition that cities further east of Gaziantep,
in the mostly Kurdish-populated southeast of
Turkey, suffer from high levels of unemployment,
which aggravate if not undermine efforts to tackle
Turkey’s Kurdish question.
Developments in the southeast and Turkey’s
“Kurdish opening” launched in July 2009 also
underpin burgeoning ties to Iraq, especially
Northern Iraq. Any explanation of improving
Turkish-Iraqi relations would be incomplete if
economic factors were not taken into account,
including the role of the Diyarbakır Chamber
of Commerce (DTO) and of Turkish businesses
operating in Northern Iraq. Movement of people
between Iraq and Turkey is expanding, too.
Currently, Iraqi nationals can travel by air to Istanbul
practically without visas, although visas at the
land crossing at Habur are still required. There is
considerable pressure to lift visas for Iraqi nationals,
not least because of pressure from Turkish business.
DTO has consistently called for this policy,78
and Erdoğan responded to these calls favorably
in October 2009 when he announced that his
government intends to lift visas for Iraqi nationals.79
Relations with Iran are also driven by economic
considerations. In contrast to most of Turkey’s
neighbors, Iran, together with Russia, is the only
country with which Turkey runs a major foreign
78
Interview with a representative of DTO, Oct. 2009.
Remarks made during the opening session of the “The Middle
79
East in World Politics: Searching for Security in a Troubled
Region,” Istanbul Forum, Oct. 19, 2009.
22 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
trade imbalance, as shown in Table 1. Turkey has
struggled to fill the gap considering the high levels
of protectionism of Iranian markets, as evidenced
by the travails of the Turkish airport construction
and management company TAV in running
Tehran’s new international airport.80 Hence, Turkey
values highly its recent deal with Iran that allows
for the possibility of developing Iranian natural
gas fields in cooperation with Turkish companies.
In this context, Ankara remains very keen to
support and see Iran, as well as Russia, join the
WTO. Turkey’s attempt to compensate for its trade
imbalance with Iran also explains why Ankara is
eager to retain visa-free travel with Iran. Turkey
continues to be the only country in the West that
Iranians can visit without visas. The visa-free policy
has enabled large numbers of regime opponents to
flee the country and enjoy temporary protection
in Turkey before settling elsewhere in the West.
More broadly, Turkey is one of the few countries
that the Iranian middle-class can visit freely and
in which they can enjoy the benefits of a liberal
economy and society. Not least because of this,
President Ahmadinejad, soon after he first came
to power, banned direct flights from Tehran to
the Mediterranean coastal city of Antalya on the
grounds that the values of Antalya and its beaches
were incompatible with those of the Islamic
revolution.81
In a major break from former practice, Turkey also has
begun to relax travel restrictions on people beyond its
immediate Middle Eastern neighbors. The nationals
of the Gulf states can travel to Turkey without visas,
TAV won the bid to manage the Tehran airport, but despite
80
considerable pressure from the Turkish government and a
favorably disposed Khatami administration, the Iranian Majlis
blocked the deal.
The president of the Iranian Trade and Industry Chamber said
81
in a meeting that although he was very supportive of Iranians
visiting Turkey, direct flights to Antalya and Bodrum would
not be looked upon favorably because of “topless beaches,” as
reported in Akşam, Feb. 7, 2007.
and in late 2009 and early 2010 a similar practice
was introduced for Jordanian, Lebanese, and Libyan
nationals. Erdoğan and Davutoğlu increasingly
see visa-free travel as a strategic tool to encourage
greater economic integration in the region. Both
have repeatedly pointed out how this would enable
economic interaction, and they have highlighted the
benefits for Turkish business. This is true particularly
in view of the EU’s visa policy toward Turkish citizens
(including students and business people), which has
undermined the proper functioning of the customs
union between Turkey and the EU.82
One last development worth highlighting is the
role of Turkish television in the Arab world. Arab
commentators have noted that the Turkish TV
series inadvertently constitutes a bridge between
the Arab world and a Western way of life, as
depicted in a Muslim but democratic, liberal, and
secular Turkey.83 This is also accompanied by
growing interest in Turkey’s political experience
as a model to extract lessons for political and
economic reform in the Arab world. A prominent
observer of Arab politics noted how Arabs of all
political inclinations “have come around to a new
and different look at present-day Turkey.”84 This
82
For study of the visa problem between Turkey and the EU,
see Doğan, Erhan (2009). Impact of Visa Regimes over Travel
Decisions and Patterns of Turkish Citizens, MireKoç Report,
Istanbul, Koç University.
Al Sharif, Yousef and Saha, Samir (2009). “Turkey’s European
83
Membership: The Arab perspective, Notes from the Arab
Media.” in Reflections of EU-Turkey Relations in the Muslim
World, Istanbul, Open Society Foundation, p. 25.
84
Al-Azm, Sadik J. (2005). “Islam and Secular Humanism.”
Islam and Secularism, Antwerpen, The Dialogue Series No. 2,
Universitair Centrum Saint-Ignatius, p. 48.
Turkey’s transatlantic value in the Middle East
point is supported by the results of a public opinion
survey, which revealed that 61 percent and 71
percent of respondents from seven Arab countries
believed that Turkey represents a potential model
and enjoys growing influence in the Arab world.85
Turkey’s relations with the Middle East are
belatedly catching up with what happened to
By indirectly
Turkey’s relations with the former Soviet space
mediating Western
following the end of the Cold War. The walls
between Turkey and its Middle East neighbors, influence in the
which had been constructed in the early 20th Middle East,
century and reinforced by the Cold War, are finally Turkey represents
coming down. Unlike the European Union and a potentially
despite its early promises under the European vital asset to the
Neighborhood Policy, Turkey has taken it upon accomplishment
itself to promote a “ring of friends” in the Middle of the declared
East through increased economic integration and aims of the
the freer movement of people. In many respects, United States
Turkey can be viewed as “doing the European and Europe.
Neighborhood Policy for the EU.”86 In doing so and
by indirectly mediating Western influence in the
Middle East, Turkey represents a potentially vital
asset to the accomplishment of the declared aims of
the United States and Europe.
85
Akgün, Mensur et al. (2009). Orta Doğu’da Türkiye Algısı,
Istanbul, TESEV Yayınları, pp. 21 and 23.
Aydın Düzgit, Senem and Tocci, Nathalie (2009).
86
“Transforming Turkish Foreign Policy: The Quest for Regional
Leadership and Europeanization.” Commentary, Brussels, CEPS,
November.
A Neighborhood Rediscovered 23
 4 Realizing Turkey’s Middle Eastern
Potential
The second interpretation of the transformation
in Turkey’s Middle Eastern policies is far more
promising for Turkey, the United States, EU, and,
above all, the Middle East. Yet this is not to say that
this explanation is always and necessarily correct.
Under what conditions does it apply, and what are
the policy implications for Turkey, the European
For Turkey’s Union, and the United States?
potential to be
The importance of consistent pursuit of
fulfilled, Ankara
international norms
cannot be viewed
as fueling an
First, in order for Turkey to fulfill its Middle
identity-driven Eastern promise, Turkey’s foreign policy must be
clash that it consistent. Denouncing Israeli policies in Gaza
supposedly while warmly welcoming the Sudanese President
attempts to al-Bashir, who faces an indictment for war crimes
transcend. at the International Criminal Court, rightly
opens Turkey up for criticism and accusations
of double standards. Beyond the Middle East,
signing protocols with Armenia while making
their parliamentary ratification dependent on the
solution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is another
case of inconsistency. Uttering the word “genocide”
for the Uighur minority in Xinjiang while the word
is still treated with severe caution regarding the
Armenian question could be mentioned as another
example. In order to disprove the interpretation of
Turkish foreign policy as sliding inexorably to the
east, it is essential for Turkey to correct and reverse
the above-mentioned contradictions.
Related to this, Turkish foreign policy must act in
the name of universal norms and not of ethnic or
religious affinities. Particularly in the Middle East,
sticking to universal norms is the only way to walk
the tightrope of the conflict-ridden region. To the
extent that the Middle East is conflict-ridden and
international norms are regularly flouted, Turkey
will not always be able to improve relations with
all actors. That said, Turkey does run the risk of
going beyond this, doing little more than “switching
alliances” from Israel to Syria, the Palestinians, and
Iran. Its fiery rhetoric toward Israel is an example
of this risk. While it is healthy for Turkey’s relations
24 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
with Israel to be dictated by conditionality and
“tough love” considering Israel’s violations of
international law, it is equally important for Turkey
not to fall in the opposing camp. Above all, it is
essential for Turkey’s actions in the Middle East not
be interpreted as driven by its “Muslim” identity,
but rather by international rights and law. For
Turkey’s potential to be fulfilled, Ankara cannot
be viewed as fueling an identity-driven clash that
it supposedly attempts to transcend. Ironically, the
significance of this was best captured by Syrian
President al-Assad, who unequivocally underlined
that Turkey must have good relations with Israel if
Turkey wants to support the peace process.87
Turkey’s democratic transformation as a
condition for a successful foreign policy
Turkey’s foreign policy is likely to succeed
in respecting the principles of consistency
and universality only if Turkey’s democratic
transformation continues apace. An increasingly
democratizing Turkey entails a reduced role for
the military and an increased role for the public,
business, and civil society in crafting foreign policy.
This raises Turkish stakes in promoting a stable,
peaceful, and cooperative Middle East, and it also
raises the likelihood that Turkey may explicitly or
otherwise be viewed as a source of inspiration by
its neighbors.
Since the early 1950s, Turkey has been a
parliamentary democracy, but for decades it
failed to consolidate pluralism and respect for
diversity. The EU’s decision in December 1999
to declare Turkey as a candidate for membership
eventually became an important agent behind
political reform in Turkey. The reform process
gathered momentum once the AKP government
came to power in November 2002 and adopted a
series of reform packages that extended rights and
freedoms and curtailed the weight of the military in
Turkish politics.
Interview with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad by Ertuğrul
87
Özkök, Hürriyet, Nov. 9, 2009.
Yet the launch of EU accession negotiations
in October 2005, preceded by acrimonious
debate in the EU over Turkey’s membership
and problematic terms of Turkey’s Accession
Negotiations Framework, triggered setbacks in
the reform process in 2006 and 2007. This period
was also marked by a rise in Turkish nationalism
and confrontation between the government and
the secular establishment.88 The AKP’s decisive
victory in the July 2007 national elections ushered
in expectations of a renewed period of reform.
However, the government’s enthusiasm to draft
a new constitution was cut short by resistance
from the opposition and the judiciary’s closure
case against the AKP. This resistance was partly
provoked when the government became distracted
from its constitutional reform agenda and instead
pushed through legislation to lift a ban on the use
of headscarves in universities. This period also
coincided with a resurgence of PKK violence,
which increased the tension between the military,
which demanded action against Northern Iraq, and
the government, which preferred dialogue with
the KRG.
In August 2008, Turkish democracy passed a
critical test when the Constitutional Court ruled
against the closure of AKP. This enabled the
government to adopt further reforms on the
Kurdish question, on the rights of the Alevis and
of non-Muslim minorities, and on the freedom
of expression. The most spectacular development
occurred in July 2009 when the Interior Minister,
Beşir Atalay, announced the determination to solve
the Kurdish problem in Turkey under the policy
heading of a “Kurdish opening.” However, by the
end of the year, this “opening” had degenerated
into considerable political instability that saw the
banning of the leading Kurdish political party, the
Democratic Society Party (DTP), from politics
On the rise of nationalism see Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. (2008).
88
Trials of Europeanization. Turkish Political Culture and the
European Union, London and New York, Palgrave Macmillan;
Uslu, Emrullah (2008). “Ulusalcılık: The Neo-nationalist
Resurgence in Turkey.” Turkish Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 73-97.
Turkey’s transatlantic value in the Middle East
and the parliament. This was accompanied by a
significant rise in protests and violence in Kurdish-
populated parts of Turkey. Nevertheless, these
domestic travails did not hinder the government’s
ability to pursue a relatively successful foreign
policy of reconciliation with its neighbors, an
incongruence that led one seasoned observer of
Turkish politics to describe the situation as “war at Turkish foreign
home, peace abroad,” instead of Atatürk’s famous policy today would
dictum “peace at home, peace abroad.”89 Does this not be what it
mean that Turkey’s foreign policy is detached from
is without the
its domestic evolution?
transformation
It is a delusion to believe that Turkey could that Turkey
continue to pursue a successful foreign policy experienced
and above all a foreign policy that represents an under the EU’s
asset to the United States and the European Union engagement
if the country were not to continue pursuing at the turn of
a democratic reform agenda. Turkish foreign the century.
policy today would not be what it is without the
transformation that Turkey experienced under the
EU’s engagement at the turn of the century.90 The
reforms considerably weakened the influence of
the military, an essential condition for the pursuit
of closer ties with its neighbors. The reforms
also contributed to the expansion of civil society
and business, which began enjoying greater say
in Turkey’s foreign policy making as well as in
Turkey’s external relations.91 As discussed above,
Turan, Ilter (2008). “War at home, Peace abroad.” PrivateView
89
(Autumn); and Idiz, Semih (2008). “Türkiye’nin dış politikasında
denge oyunu.” Milliyet, Dec. 6.
On the “Europeanization” of Turkish foreign policy, see
90
for example Aydın, Mustafa and Açıkmese, Sinem (2007).
“Europeanization through EU conditionality: Understanding
the new era in Turkish foreign policy.” Journal of Southern
Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 263–74; Akçapar,
Burak (2007). Turkey’s new European era: Foreign policy on the
road to EU membership, Toronto, Lanham MD; Tocci, Nathalie
(ed.) (2007). Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey
Relations, Rome, IAI Quaderni; and Özcan, Mesut (2008).
Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East,
Aldershot, Ashgate.
In this respect, see Mazlum, Semra Cerit and Doğan, Erhan
91
(eds) (2008). Sivil Toplum ve Dış Politika, Istanbul, Bağlam; Aras,
Bülent and Polat, Rabia Karakaya (2008). “From Conflict to
Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey’s Relations with Syria
and Iran.” Security Dialogue, Vol. 39, No. 5, pp. 495–505.
A Neighborhood Rediscovered 25
 taken together, these developments made foreign
policy overtures in the cases of Cyprus and
Armenia possible. In other words, the continued
pursuit of democracy on the inside remains the
quintessential condition for success outside.
EU accession as a guarantee for Turkey’s
Turkey’s accession democratic consolidation
process continues
This raises a few questions: How can Turkey
to represent the sustain its democratic reform momentum and can
best guarantee this momentum be detached from the EU? Some
that the country’s may believe that Turkey, having embarked upon
domestic an unprecedented path of domestic change, no
transformation longer needs the EU. Turkey’s reform momentum
will proceed has certainly acquired a life of its own. The 2009
toward higher “Kurdish Opening” is the best example of this, an
standards of initiative that has been clearly aimed at Turkey’s
democratization but that has not been spurred and
democracy.
ignited by the accession process. What is more
important for Turkey is the EU process rather than
the destination. Having pursued the process of EU
accession and accompanying domestic change, it
may well be that Ankara and Brussels mutually
concur at the end that membership is not the
desirable end point.
Nevertheless, Turkey’s accession process continues
to represent the best guarantee that the country’s
domestic transformation will proceed toward
higher standards of democracy. In order to fulfill
its Middle Eastern promise, Turkey’s domestic
commitment to the European Union should
thus remain firm. Without the EU as an anchor,
Turkey is unlikely to resemble Russia or Iran. Yet
similarly to most of its neighbors and not unlike
some EU member states, Turkey does run the
risk of succumbing to authoritarian and populist
tendencies. The EU, of course, is not and cannot be
the sole driver of reform. Yet the curtailments of the
freedom of press resulting from the Doğan Holding
fine, the shaky respect of the rule of law in the
conduct of the Ergenekon trial, and the closure of
DTP all suggest that the EU anchor is still strongly
26 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
needed. The EU anchor is needed to rebuild trust
within the country and reconstitute the pro-reform
grand coalition that the AKP had succeeded in
rallying in its first years in office. The EU anchor
is also needed to inject in the Turkish military
the necessary confidence to embark on and allow
reforms in the country.92
Rather than being blinded by ambitions of
grandeur, Turkey must realize that its value-added
in the neighborhood largely hinges on its ongoing
domestic transformation, which in turn is highly
dependent on its EU accession process. The link
between Turkey’s EU process and the success in its
foreign policy is best captured by Arab perceptions
of Turkey. A survey of Arab public opinion
that uncovered considerable positive attitudes
toward Turkey revealed that 64 percent of those
surveyed believed that Turkey’s EU membership
prospects made Turkey an attractive partner for the
Arab world.93
As for the EU, now that its constitutional travails
are over (for the time being), it should become
more aware that the world around it is changing
and that its influence in its neighborhood has
decreased over the last decade, not least in view of
its obstinate introspection. Whereas Turkey needs
the European Union for its own domestic and
foreign policy project to succeed, the EU needs
Turkey in order to meet the dramatic challenges
in their shared neighborhood. This should open
the space for a long-needed rational debate on
Turkey, which both accounts for the complex
92
At a conference in Ankara in September 2004, retired four-
star General Edip Başer remarked that he thought that EU
membership constituted an anchor for Turkey’s internal and
external security. Against the background of domestic instability,
the same retired general, on the sidelines of a 2008 conference,
remarked that “had the EU remained engaged it would be
unlikely that Turkey would be in a crisis now.” On the military’s
attitude toward the EU, see Aydınlı, Ersen, Özcan, Nihat Ali and
Akyaz, Doğan (2006). “The Turkish Military’s March Towards
Europe.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 1.
93
Akgün et al. (2009), p. 25.
interplay between identity and institutional,
political, economic, and social interests, but above
all a debate that confronts these questions in an
open and outward-looking manner. Mixed signals
from the Union have for a while exacerbated the
sluggishness of Turkey’s domestic reforms, to the
detriment of the EU as well as Turkey. Relations
need to resume, both for Turkey’s democratic
future and for increased EU chances to become an
effective global power in the 21st century.
U.S.-Turkish relations: Adapting to the
21st century
The United States, through its relationships with
Turkey, the European Union, and the Middle East
also plays a critical role in ensuring that Turkey’s
Middle Eastern promise is fulfilled. With the
advent of President Obama’s administration, the
power of U.S. policy to influence Turkey’s domestic
political behavior has reached a new high.94
Given the legitimacy and popularity of Obama
in comparison to the antipathy for the previous
administration, the new administration’s ability to
appeal directly to the Turkish people and combat
anti-Americanism has received a further boost.
Unlike the Bush administration’s reliance upon
Turkey’s powerful institutions and political elites,
President Obama has demonstrated an ability to
apply pressure on both Turkey’s elected leaders and
its undemocratic powerbrokers through his broad
based personal appeal and charisma. Moreover,
while the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq has created
positive momentum on the Kurdish issue and
regional cooperation, Turkey’s new self-confidence
and regional prominence has transformed a static
Cold-War bulwark into a potential catalyst for
regional stabilization.
The most recent indicator of this was the Transatlantic Trends
94
survey (http://www.transatlantictrends.org/) that showed a
considerable “Obama Bounce” throughout Europe, including
Turkey, which showed the most positive public opinion toward a
U.S. president in the last four years of polling in Turkey.
Turkey’s transatlantic value in the Middle East
However, the United States must continue to
support Turkey’s reforms and its EU accession
process if this change is to be a permanent and not
a fleeting one.95 The United States must dialogue
with Europeans behind closed doors on Turkey’s
foreign policy potential, and it must refrain from
the EU-bashing that plays well with Turkish
audiences but backfires in EU capitals. Working Turkey’s new
toward a permanent solution in Cyprus would self-confidence
alleviate the biggest thorn in the side of Turkish- and regional
EU relations and put increased pressure on the
prominence has
European Union to fulfill its accession process
transformed a
commitments to Turkey. Being Turkey and the
static Cold-War
EU’s leading strategic partner, the United States
bulwark into a
has the responsibility, but more importantly the
potential catalyst
opportunity, to deepen transatlantic relations by
highlighting the importance of keeping Turkey’s for regional
democratic reforms on track and waking Europeans stabilization.
up to the fast-changing nature of global trends that
demand further deepening and widening of the
integration process.
Focusing American attention on Ankara and its
region by seeking to depoliticize and support
Turkey’s various “democratic openings” is an
important first step. Given that the resolution
of the Kurdish issue is a key component toward
Turkey’s EU membership and that the United
States has a comparative advantage in this area in
terms of providing loans, security, and training,
it is a natural area for further cooperation. If U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President
Obama get involved even by simply acknowledging
the progress and opportunity that currently exists,
this would go a long way toward supporting the
process already underway.
Pope, Hugh (2009). “What Obama should say to
95
Erdoğan.” Washington, Transatlantic Academy, http://www.
transatlanticacademy.org/view/resources/uploaded/Hugh%20
Pope%20-%20What%20Obama%20should%20say%20to%20
Erdoğan.pdf.
A Neighborhood Rediscovered 27
 5 Conclusion
Turkey no longer represents a Cold War bulwark or
a bridge for the projection of Western interests. It is
increasingly a player in its own right in the Middle
East and beyond. This has caused consternation in
the United States and Europe, leading to the idea
that the West is “losing Turkey.” This paper has
argued instead that Turkey is belatedly engaging
By contributing to the Middle East by mediating conflicts, developing
the integration of economic relations, and liberalizing the movement
of people, all initiatives aimed at promoting peace,
the Middle East
prosperity, and openness. By contributing to the
into the global
integration of the Middle East into the global
system, Turkey’s
democracy and system, Turkey’s democracy and liberal market
economy are also having a demonstrative spillover
liberal market
on its southern neighbors, however modest.
economy are
Developing channels of cooperation with Turkey
also having a in order to tap into Turkey’s potential to contribute
demonstrative to regional peace and stability in the Middle East
spillover on is thus imperative for the United States and the
its southern European Union.
neighbors,
however modest. However, Turkish democracy itself is not
consolidated, a precondition for Turkey’s foreign
policy to represent an asset for the United States
and the EU. The EU-driven reforms have changed
the political landscape in Turkey dramatically, but
the transformation toward liberal democracy is far
from complete. Pending domestic shortcomings
and political polarization have fed the temptation
to drift away from a foreign policy driven by
universal values.
This is where the continued engagement by
Turkey’s transatlantic partners remains vital. The
Obama administration’s approach to Turkey at
the rhetorical level has been constructive. There
has also been effective practical cooperation
on the future of Iraq and Afghanistan, Arab-
Israeli relations, and Lebanon. Even on Iran, the
differences are more about means than objectives.
28 The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Turkey’s improved standing in the Middle East
can also help the United States with democracy
assistance in the region where the previous
administration failed. The United States could
consider entering into partnership with Turkish
civil society in this regard, serving the cause of
strengthening Turkish democracy and helping
democracy assistance in Turkey’s neighborhood.
The role of the European Union is even more
critical. Having engaged Turkey in the accession
process, the EU appears to have abandoned
Turkey, failing to live up to its commitments and
to its transformative potential within the remit
of enlargement. The Turkish political system
needs the sense of confidence that comes with EU
engagement and real prospects of membership.
It is the only way to reconstitute trust between
the government, the liberals, and the secular
establishment, and in turn reignite the reform
process in the country. If the accession process
resumes and its credibility is restored, it may well be
that at the end of the journey Ankara might opt for
an EU arrangement similar to that of Norway and
Switzerland. This would allow Turkey to continue
acting as an economic, cultural, political, and social
hub in its neighborhood, benefiting the European
Union, the neighborhood, and itself.
Turkey’s new regional prominence has transformed
a static Cold War barrier into a potential catalyst
for regional peace, prosperity, and stability.
However, this change cannot be taken for granted
and requires support from the EU and the United
States. The West has never owned Turkey, and it has
always been a willing member. Therefore it is time
to move beyond the “Who Lost Turkey?” debate
and act in order to fulfill the conditions that will
allow Turkey to fulfill its Middle Eastern promise.
 Offices
Washington • Berlin • Bratislava • Paris
Brussels • Belgrade • Ankara • Bucharest
www.gmfus.org