Constitutional Law 2 Collated Digests

San Beda College of Law – Alabang
Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests
INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 2
THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND ITS RELATION WITH THE COURTS
FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

[415 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 160261; 10 Nov 2003]
Facts:
Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The
justiciable controversy poised in front of the Court was the constitutionality of the subsequent
filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law.
Issue:
Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political
crisis.
Held:
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the
issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first
instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary
nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to,
not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive
or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the
discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully
calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be
given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional
basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would
upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole
and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the
calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute
must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government
act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a
wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he
can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.
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Section 1-C, SY ’06-‘07
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained. This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that
any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of
the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he
claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested
by the Constitution in his office.83
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a
proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to
delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding
but rather the filing of a complaint does.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment
proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary
to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment
proceeding."
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of
the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-
third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a
one year period.
The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only
the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about
assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of
decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great branches of the government.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which
recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of
its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other
government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal
equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications
through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this
Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law
than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in
life.
Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House
of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5,
section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

[267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156; 3 Feb 1997]
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50
dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Page 2
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the
execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
Renong Berhad.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of
the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits
that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud
legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all
intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that
since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel
which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel
business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the
national economy.
Issue:
Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional
provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void.
Held:
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the
highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to
play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and
culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine
Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of
being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the
Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA
PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do
such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
PEOPLE VS. POMAR

[46 Phil 126; G.R. No. L-22008; 3 Nov 1924]
Facts:
Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la Isabela, a Tobacco factory. She was granted
a vacation leave, by reason of her pregnancy, which commenced on the 16th of July 1923.
According to Fajardo, during that time, she was not given the salary due her in violation of the
provisions of Act No. 3071. Fajardo filed a criminal complaint based on Section 13 and 15 of said
Act against the manager of the tobacco Factory, Julio Pomar, herein defendant. The latter, on the
other hand, claims that the facts in the complaint did not constitute an offense and further alleges
that the aforementioned provisions of Act No. 3071 was unconstitutional. Section 13, Act No.
3071 provides that, “Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or
place of labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as laborer
who may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before and another thirty days after
confinement: Provided, That the employer shall not discharge such laborer without just cause,
under the penalty of being required to pay to her wages equivalent to the total of two months
counting from the day of her discharge.” Section 15 of the same Act provides for the penalty of
any violation of section 13. The latter was enacted by the legislature in the exercise of its
supposed Police Power with the purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers
in "factory, shop or place of labor of any description," and of insuring to them, to a certain extent,
reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery. The trial court
rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, sentencing the defendant to pay the fine of fifty pesos and
in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment. Hence, the case was raised to the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the former decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional.
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Whether or not the promulgation of the questioned provision was a valid exercise of Police
Power.
Held:
The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of Act No. 3071 to be unconstitutional for being violative
or restrictive of the right of the people to freely enter into contracts for their affairs. It has been
decided several times, that the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the
individual, protected by the "due process of law" clause of the constitution. The contracting
parties may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem advisable, provided
they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy
The police power of the state is a very broad and expanding power. The police power may
encompass every law for the restraint and punishment of crimes, for the preservation of the public
peace, health, and morals. But that power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the
state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the constitution. The Police Power is
subject to and is controlled by the paramount authority of the constitution of the state, and will not
be permitted to violate rights secured or guaranteed by the latter.
LAMBINO VS. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 174153; 25 Oct 2006]
Facts:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change
the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of
6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the
1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art
18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to
unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing
initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to
implement the initiative petitions.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group’s petition.
Held:
According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of
discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time
of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which
renders the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and
“revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may
propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is
a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
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Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present
petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution
before complying with RA 6735
Petition is dismissed.
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC

[270 SCRA 106; G.R. No.127325; 19 Mar 1997]
Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization
and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits
of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing
the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing.
At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public
Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.
Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is
cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and
Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against
COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The
constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented
by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The people’s initiative is
limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits
constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative. The Supreme Court
granted the Motions for Intervention.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions
on the conduct of such initiative.
Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment
of the Constitution.
Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the
same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people
cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.
The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule
that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The
delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules
and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative.
The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of
the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal
access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be
done by initiative. However, considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issue of
whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.
GONZALES VS. COMELEC

[21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967]
Facts:
The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the following resolutions:
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1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum
of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the
number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1)
member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the

convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be
"elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so
as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to
the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in
Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967,
became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in
the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the
general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
Issue:
Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the

Constitution.
Held:
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B.
H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they
are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be
questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1)
it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if
within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned.
"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine
the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof."
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the

Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately,
may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification.
From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the
electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators,
even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.
SANIDAD VS. COMELEC

[78 SCRA 333; G.R. No. 90878; 29 Jan 1990]
Facts:
Page 6
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution
No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression
and of the press. On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING
FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into
law. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera
Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act originally
scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 by virtue of
Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989. The Commission on Elections, by
virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said
R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the
conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a
petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a
newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly
newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. — During

the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no
mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his
column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite Issue.
It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it

violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press
enshrined in the Constitution. Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who
merely reports the news, petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously
and necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or
subject about which he writes. Petitioner likewise maintains that if media practitioners
were to express their views, beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted to a plebiscite, it
would in fact help in the government drive and desire to disseminate information, and
hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional. It
is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the
power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants
issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or
information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates
are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise
holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or
radio or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from
his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid
that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to
the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence.
However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be
construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate
the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite
periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are
neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a
plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.
Plebiscite Issue are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed
and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an
unabridged discussion of the Issue, including the forum. The people affected by the Issue
presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the
right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a
forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public
concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio
or television times.
Page 7
The instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null
and void and unconstitutional.
BONDOC VS. PINEDA

[201 SCRA 792; G.R. No. 97710; 26 Sep 1991]
Facts:
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the
NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga.
Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the
remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1
member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over
Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman
Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura

received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to
organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in
Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the
Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the
LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election
of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.
Issue:
Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party
therein, may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a
decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein
Held:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their
functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the
political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are
not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman
Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly
on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by
the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice
and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is,
therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole
judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the
Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET
may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s
congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he
represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid
cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty,
short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another
MIRASOL VS CA
[351 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 128448; 1 Feb 2001]
Facts:
The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the
Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The
Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate
Page 8
Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the
latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc.
(PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's
purchases. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to
the government. Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations,
petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued
to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said
bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result,
petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid
amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a
deficiency claim.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if
properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its
stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings
from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government.
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages
against PNB.
Issue:
Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice
to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of
the Trial Court.
Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.
Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.

Held:
It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the
power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court,
but in all Regional Trial Courts.
The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to
decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is
necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his
day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement
is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides
that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where
there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all
actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice
to the Solicitor General is mandatory.
Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating the
due process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private property without just
compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial review.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there
must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the
question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity
of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have
been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case.
DUMLAO VS. COMELEC

[95 SCRA 392; G.R. No.L-52245; 22 Jan 1980]
Facts:
Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52 as

discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
Sec. 4 provides that any retired elective provincial or municipal official who has received
Page 9
payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of
the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same
elective local office from which he has retired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to
class legislation. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg 52, which states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the
State, including those amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes,
shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan
activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive
evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil
court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
Issue:
Whether or Not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and thus, should
be declared null and void
Whether or not the requisites of judicial review are complied with
Held:
No constitutional question will be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with
the requisites of a judicial inquiry, which are: 1) There must be an actual case or controversy; 2)
The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; 3) The constitutional question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and 4) The decision of the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
As to (1), Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of the provision. His
question is posed merely in the abstract, and without the benefit of a detailed factual record. As to
(2), neither Igot nor Salapantan has been charged with acts of loyalty to the State, nor disqualified
from being candidates for local elective positions. They have no personal nor substantial interest
at stake. Igot and Salapantan have institute the case as a taxpayer’s suit, but the institution of a
taxpayer’s suit per se is no assurance of judicial review. As to (4), there is no cause of action in
this particular case. Therefore, the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent.
In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains constitutional

and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification. One class can be treated differently from another class. In this case, employees 65
years of age are classified differently from younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to
satisfy the “need for new blood” in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it
should be declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
guaranteed to an accused.
LACSON VS. PEREZ

[357 SCRA 756; G.R. No. 147780 ;10 May 2001]
Facts:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001
as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the
NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were
thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with
an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by
virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information
against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved.
They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful
restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold
departure orders allegedly effected by the same.
Held:
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the
instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the
Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the
Page 10
courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of
rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests
are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at
this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper
judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of
the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with
arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they
expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure
orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose.
Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature
being that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of
habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners
are not subjected to.
Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier
adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are
hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts
committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.
SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

[421 SCRA 656; G.R. No. 159085; 3 Feb 2004]
Facts:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of
the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have
seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP
and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the
President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4,
the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the
officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the
Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation
of the State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII
of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and
that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive
Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report
requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report
to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the
presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress
has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President
Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was
usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4)
Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the
door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?
Held:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The
President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed
forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may
examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
Page 11
assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the
report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or
that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of
the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of
rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the
President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since
any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable
under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen.
Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It
sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the
powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office
confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
JOYA VS. PCGG

[225 SCRA 568; G.R. No. 96541; 24 Aug 1993]
Facts:
On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President Corazon
C. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between
the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc
concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two) Old Masters Paintings and
antique silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be
part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. On 14 August
1990, then President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr.,
authorized Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New
York to auction off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. On
15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, representing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie's of New York.
According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the
eighty-two Old Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the
silverware contained in seventy-one cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines,
and such other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted by
CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the agreement.
On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit through then Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo
submitted to President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the Consignment
Agreement of 15 August 1990 to the effect that: the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas
to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality; the contract was highly
disadvantageous to the government; PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction
in the U.S.; and, the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance,
hence, their disposal was prohibited by law.
After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued immediately our resolution
denying the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on
the ground that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and that
proper parties had not been impleaded.
On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of
$13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
Whether or not the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in the phrase
"cultural treasure of the nation".
Page 12
Whether or not the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion on which can be
disposed of through the joint concurrence of the President and Congress.
Whether or not PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other statutory
requirements for the exportation and sale of the subject items.
Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic, and if so, whether the above Issue
warrant resolution from this Court.
Held:
This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must
be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having
interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as
plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by
a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing"
means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term
"interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover,
the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the
constitutional right of some third and related party.
There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal
standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public
duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer
questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. The ownership of
these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although
the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were
placed on exhibit.
The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be
understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the
government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and
just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any
constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be
raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates
from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to
show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become
publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their
alleged unauthorized disposition.
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging
any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public
properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware
were acquired from private sources and not with public money.
Anent the second requisite of actual controversy, petitioners argue that this case should be
resolved by this Court as an exception to the rule on moot and academic cases; that although the
sale of the paintings and silver has long been consummated and the possibility of retrieving the
treasure trove is nil, yet the novelty and importance of the Issue raised by the petition deserve
this Court's attention. They submit that the resolution by the Court of the Issue in this case will
establish future guiding principles and doctrines on the preservation of the nation's priceless
artistic and cultural possessions for the benefit of the public as a whole.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy —
one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its
purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for
prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on
a particular date — 11 January 1991 — which is long past, the Issue raised in the petition have
become moot and academic.
The cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the protection of the state are classified
as the "important cultural properties" and the "national cultural treasures." On the other hand, a
"national cultural treasures" is a unique object found locally, possessing outstanding historical,
Page 13
cultural, artistic and/or scientific value which is highly significant and important to this country and
nation. This Court takes note of the certification issued by the Director of the Museum that the
Italian paintings and silverware subject of this petition do not constitute protected cultural
properties and are not among those listed in the Cultural Properties Register of the National
Museum.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR.

[224 SCRA 792; G.R. No. 101083; 30 Jul 1993]
Facts:
Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic,
non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in
concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original
defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new
Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs
"are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The
same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of
said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and,
the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that, the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion is
dilatory and the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss. In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause
of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge
further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts
which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of
the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19,
20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural
law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No.
192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion
in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is
available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well
settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
Page 14
Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit.
Whether or not the TLA’s can be out rightly cancelled.
Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.
Held:
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be
done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain
period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be
revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have
violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition
to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of
the requirements of due process.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to
all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffs therein
are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests.
Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being
but an incident to the former.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is concerned. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Every generation has a responsibility
to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. The minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time,
the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to
a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing
but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health,
as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources,
including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as
the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to
ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and
future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.
Page 15
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152 were issued. Thus, the right of
the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its
mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect
or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the
TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced
and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be
renewed or granted.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action; the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or
legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable
obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does
not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of
existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.
This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply
with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract
would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder
is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their
complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.
AGAN JR. VS. PIATCO

[402 SCRA 612; G.R. No. 155001; 5 May 2003]
Facts:
Some time in 1993, six business leaders, explored the possibility of investing in the new NAIA
airport terminal, so they formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corp. They submitted proposals to the
government for the development of NAIA Intl. Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). The NEDA
approved the NAIA IPT III project. Bidders were invited, and among the proposal Peoples Air
Cargo (Paircargo) was chosen. AEDC protested alleging that preference was given to Paircargo,
but still the project was awarded to Paircargo. Because of that, it incorporated into, Phil. Intl.
Airport Terminals Co. (PIATCO). The DOTC and PIATCO entered into a concession agreement
in 1997 to franchise and operate the said terminal for 21years. In Nov. 1998 it was amended in
the matters of pertaining to the definition of the obligations given to the concessionaire,
development of facilities and proceeds, fees and charges, and the termination of contract. Since
MIAA is charged with the maintenance and operations of NAIA terminals I and II, it has a contract
with several service providers. The workers filed the petition for prohibition claiming that they
would lose their job, and the service providers joined them, filed a motion for intervention.
Likewise several employees of the MIAA filed a petition assailing the legality of arrangements. A
group of congressmen filed similar petitions. Pres. Arroyo declared in her speech that she will not
honor PIATCO contracts which the Exec. Branch's legal office concluded null and void.
Issue:
Page 16
Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement is void, together with its amendments for being
contrary to the constitution.
Held:
The 1997 concession agreement is void for being contrary to public policy. The amendments
have the effect of changing it into and entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon.
The amendments present new terms and conditions which provide financial benefit to PIATCO
which may have the altered the technical and financial parameters of other bidders had they
know that such terms were available. The 1997 concession agreement, the amendments and
supplements thereto are set aside for being null and void.
The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced by the concession agreement as their
livelihood is to be taken away from them.
UMALI VS. GUINGONA

[305 SCRA 533; G.R. No. 131124; 21 Mar 1999]
Facts:
Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 29, 1993 to March 15,
1994 and Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994. On August 1, 1994, President Ramos
received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal
revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director, more
particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. upon receipt of the said
confidential memorandum, former President authorized the issuance of an Order for the
preventive suspension of the petitioner and immediately referred the Complaint against the latter
to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation.
Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And was directed him to send in his
answer, copies of his Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for the past three years (3), and
Personal Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC
Office. On August 23, the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the evidence on
record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima facie evidence
to support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting upon
the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152
dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.
Issue:
Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security of Tenure.
Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law
Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency and whether the
petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of the
trial courts decision.
Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges against the petitioner is still
basis for the petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No. 152
Held:
Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only be removed for cause
and under the Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of confidence is not one of the legal causes or
grounds for removal. Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground of loss confidence
violated his right to security of tenure, petitioner theorized. After a careful study, we are of the
irresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three Issue. To be sure,
petitioner was not denied the right to due process before the PCAGC. Records show that the
petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of internal
revenue laws and regulations, and he attended the hearings before the investigatory body. It is
thus decisively clear that his protestation of non-observance of due process is devoid of any
factual or legal basis. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as
his security of tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal
Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure. However, petitioner's claim of CESO
eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO
eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the matter. His failure to do
so is fatal. As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner
Page 17
in his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late
to raise for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings. As to last issue, It is worthy to note
that in the case under consideration, the administrative action against the petitioner was taken
prior to the institution of the criminal case. The charges included in Administrative Order No. 152
were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal
charges before the Ombudsman. In sum, the petition is dismissable on the ground that the Issue
posited by the petitioner do not constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding and
conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals. However, taking into account the antecedent facts
and circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, has decided to
consider the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct and
unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue that his
office is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the position taken by the Solicitor General,
that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and substantive
supervening events that cannot be overlooked.
IN RE CUNANAN
[94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]
Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.”
In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those
candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to
the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers
were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are
also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however,
invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed
the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No.
972.
Issue:
Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.
Held:
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have
been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system
from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.
REPUBLIC ACT 6735, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT
R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to
the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The
former was prepared by the committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of Representatives on
the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, which dealt with the
initiative and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b)
House Bill No. 988, which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with
initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17
solely, dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local
government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and
Page 18
House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the
Senate and by the House of Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
Page 19
THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF

THE STATE
THE POLICE POWER
AGUSTIN VS. EDU

[88 SCRA 195; G.R. No. L-49112; 2 Feb 1979]
Facts:
President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which states that all owners, users or
drivers shall have at all times one pair of early warning devise (EWD) in their cars acquire from
any source depending on the owner’s choice. The Letter of Instruction was assailed by petitioner
Leovillo Agustin to have violated the constitution guarantee of due process against Hon Edu,
Land Transportation Commissioner, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of national Defense, Hon.
Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communication and Hon. Aquino, Minister of
Public Highways. Because of such contentions, the Implementing Rules and Regulation was
ordered to be suspended for a period of 6 months. Petitioner alleges that EWD are not necessary
because vehicles already have hazard lights (blinking lights) that can be use as a warning device.
Also petitioner contest that the letter of instruction violates the delegation of police power because
it is deemed harsh, oppressive and unreasonable for the motorists and those dealers of EWD will
become instant millionaires because of such law.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner’s contentions possess merit.
Held:
Petitioner’s contentions are without merit because the exercise of police power may interfere with
personal liberty or property to ensure and promote the safety, health and prosperity of the State.
Also, such letter of instruction is intended to promote public safety and it is indeed a rare
occurrence that such contention was alleged in a instruction with such noble purpose. Petitioner
also failed to present the factual foundation that is necessary to invalidate the said letter of
instruction. In cases where there is absence in the factual foundation, it should be presumed that
constitutionality shall prevail. Pres. Marcos on the other hand possesses vital statistics that will
justify the need for the implementation of this instruction. As signatory to the 1968 Vienna
Conventions on Road Signs and Signals, our country must abide with the standards given as
stated in our Constitution that “the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
International Law as part of the law of the land. In the case at bar, the Vienna Convention also
requires the use of EWD. Vehicle owners are not obliged to buy an EDW. They can personally
create a EWD provided that it is in accordance to the specifications provided by law. Petitioner’s
allegation against the manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is deemed to be an unfounded
speculation. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. The restraining order regarding the
implementation of the Reflector Law is lifted making the said law immediately executory.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ

[101 Phil 1117; G.R. No. L-7995; 31 May 1957]
Facts:
Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” was passed.
The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by
foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in
this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines
therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China
was violated according to him.
Issue:
Page 20
Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.
Held:
According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that
police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court
also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is
always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never
curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.
LUTZ VS. ARANETA

[98 Phil 148; G.R. No. L-7859; 22 Dec 1955]
Facts:
Walter Lutz, as the Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma,
seeks to recover from J. Antonio Araneta, the Collector of Internal Revenue, the sum of money
paid by the estate as taxes, pursuant to the Sugar Adjustment Act. Under Section 3 of said Act,
taxes are levied on the owners or persons in control of the lands devoted to the cultivation of
sugar cane. Furthermore, Section 6 states all the collections made under said Act shall be for aid
and support of the sugar industry exclusively. Lutz contends that such purpose is not a matter of
public concern hence making the tax levied for that cause unconstitutional and void. The Court of
First Instance dismissed his petition, thus this appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act ( Commonwealth Act 567) is
unconstitutional.
Held:
The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional. The tax under said Act is levied
with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the
threatened sugar industry. Since sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, its
promotion, protection, and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare.
Hence, said objectives of the Act is a public concern and is therefore constitutional. It follows that
the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and
expedient for its promotion. If objectives and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is
seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment.
Taxation may be made with the implement of the state’s police power. In addition, it is only
rational that the taxes be obtained from those that will directly benefit from it. Therefore, the tax
levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional.
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

[151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987]
Facts:
The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by
Presidential Decree No. 1987, “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad
powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National
Internal Revenue Code provided that:
"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed

video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of
five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes
shall be subject to sales tax."
"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. —

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a
tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may
Page 21
be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction

of any motion picture or audiovisual program.”
“Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the
province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where
the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be
shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission.”
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of
videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement
or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such
unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty
percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement
and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in
government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales
and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby
depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the
movie industry.
Issue:
Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.
Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional .
Held:
Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for
a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights,
and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the
DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential
Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is
to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its
enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the
moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed
video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in
government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the
activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and
municipal license fees are required to engage in business."
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
ASSO. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SEC. OF DAR

[175 SCRA 343; G.R. NO. L-78742; 14 JUL 1989]
Facts:
Several petitions are the root of the case:
a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657.
Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four
tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD
27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature’s
power.
b. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental
against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian
Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.
c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer.
Page 22
d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands
not exceeding seven hectares.
Issue:
Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s, PD, and RA were constitutional.
Held:
The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and
eminent domain.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized
under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise
of Police Power and Eminent Domain.
RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to
deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer.
A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful
subject and the method.
Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the
method employed to achieve it.
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ

[146 SCRA 323; G.R. No. L-63419; 18 Dec 1986]
Facts:
A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made,
contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was
denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The
Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme
Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable
to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.
Issue:
Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State.
Held:
The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong,
hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be
outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of
its police power.
KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA

[41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct 1920]
Facts:
Page 23
Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same
interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of
enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receipt
be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles
delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. The permanent injunction was
denied by the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class
legislation; putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between
persons in similar circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property
rights. They also contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of
their police power. In view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power
Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights.
Held:
Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police
power. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section
2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744,
authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the city:
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx
xxxxxlaundries xxxx.
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation
and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality,
peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants.
The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between
laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher
Chinese characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila
are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no
fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an
attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory
nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they
belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each
every one of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The obvious objection for
the implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code.
Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the
ordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but
mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are
cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, and
even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient
ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of the police
power is the control of private interests for the public welfare.
Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary
injunction is denied, with costs against the appellants.
TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ

[152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987]
Facts:
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of
Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and
(f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23
Page 24
August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the
NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The
trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as
previously scheduled.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical
Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
"SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the
standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for
registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the
practice of medicine in the Philippines."
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified
in Section 5 of the statute include the following:
"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a

recognized college of medicine;
x x x
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school
and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said
applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the
operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;”
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:
"Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who
has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense
involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a
bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a
medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good
moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and
(d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of
medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance
requirements that may be deemed admissible.”
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and
dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for
admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This
Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument
toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its
calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the
successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the
Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges.
The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently
called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate
of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.
52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
Held:
Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a
condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and
authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a
word, the public order — of the general community. An important component of that public order
is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one
Page 25
can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue
that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand,
and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of
medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement
of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by
selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting
admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high
standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current
stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the
government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its
stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the
NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this
area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly
effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and
minds for disease or trauma.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial
court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS. ERICTA

[122 SCRA 759; G.R. No. L-34915; 24 Jun 1983]
Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating The Establishment,
Maintenance And Operation Of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within The
Jurisdiction Of Quezon City And Providing Penalties For The Violation Thereof" provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery
shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be
determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall
immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six
months from the date of approval of the application.
For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced but seven years
after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution to request the
City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in
Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for
paupers burial.
The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that
Section 9 of the ordinance would be enforced.
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question.
Respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the
Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.
Issue:
Whether or Not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power.
Held:
Section 9 of the City ordinance in question is not a valid exercise of police power. Section 9
cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and
Page 26
regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practiced in the
City.
Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three
inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1)
police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation.
The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 that reads
as follows:
“To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by
this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health
and safety, …, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience
thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe
under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.”
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to regulate does not
include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits
the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance,
'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon
conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or
cancelled’. The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a
memorial park cemetery.
Moreover, police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely
regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright,
it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a
mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property
without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.
MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village

[328 SCRA 836; G.R. No. 135962; 27 Mar 2000]
Facts:
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency

tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA),
respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-
Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and
convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was
pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was
appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished.
The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a
preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had
no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed
the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to
public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice police power in the delivery of
basic services in Metro Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to
its regulatory and police powers.
Held:
The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power
is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to
government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government
unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them.
Page 27
It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA
to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power.
It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various
national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and the
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area.
TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC

[207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992]
Facts:
Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac.
Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the
operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioner’s warehouse. A committee was then
appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an
accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties
of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council
declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil
Code. According to respondent municipal officials, petitioner’s warehouse was constructed in
violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a
block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of
200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On
the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil
Code
Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional
and void.
Held:
The storage of abaca and copra in petitioner’s warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of
Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal
Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a
valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be
unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The
purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one
of the primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.
Page 28
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
REPUBLIC VS. TAGLE

[299 SCRA 549; G.R. No. 129079; 2 Dec 1998]
Facts:
Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land located in
Barangay Salawag, Dasmariñas, Cavite containing an area of 483,331 square meters more or
less.
The Philippine Government, through the Philippine Human Resources Development Center
(PHRDC), negotiated with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Survey Team
on the technicalities of the establishment of the ASEAN Human Resources Development Project
in the Philippines. Among the five (5) main programs of the proposed project was Program III
(Construction Manpower Development) which involved the establishment of a Construction
Manpower Development Center (CMDC). PHRDC and private respondent Helena Z. Benitez,
signed a Memorandum of Agreement which provides, among others, that Benitez undertakes to
lease within the period of twenty (20) years and/or sell a portion of that property (which is no less
than ten-hectares) in favor of PHRDC which likewise agrees to lease within a period of twenty
(20) years and/or buy said property site.
The Philippine Women’s University (PWU) and Benitez granted a permit to PHRDC to occupy
and use the land in question and to undertake land development, electrical and road network
installations and other related works necessary to attain its objectives. Pursuant thereto, the
CMDC took possession of the property and erected buildings and other related facilities
necessary for its operations. A deposit made by the plaintiff with the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) in the amount of P708,490.00 which is equivalent to the assessed value of the property
subject matter hereof based on defendant’s 1990 tax declaration, was made.
In view of the agreement on the sale of the land in question, PHRDC prepared a Deed of
Absolute Sale with Benitez, as vendor, and PHRDC and CMDC, as vendees, duly represented by
then Undersecretary Gloria M. Arroyo, for the signature of Benitez. Benitez in her own capacity
did not sign the deed of absolute sale.
Failing to acquire the property involved through negotiated sale, petitioner, through the
Department of Trade and Industry, to which CMDC is attached, instituted a complaint for Eminent
Domain, pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 1035, dated June 25, 1985.
A Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession was granted by the court but quashed it
subsequently.
Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent judge may quash a writ of possession on the ground that the
expropriating government agency is already occupying the property sought to be expropriated.
Held:
No. Under Section 7 of EO 1035, when the government or its authorized agent
makes the required deposit, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of
possession. The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical
entry or occupation of land. Although eminent domain usually involves a taking
of title, there may also be compensable taking of only some, not all, of the
property interests in the bundle of rights that constitute ownership.
In the instant case, it is manifest that the petitioner, in pursuit of an objective beneficial to public
interest, seeks to realize the same through its power of eminent domain. In exercising this power,
petitioner intended to acquire not only physical possession but also the legal right to possess and
ultimately to own the subject property. Hence, its mere physical entry and occupation of the
property fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an
owner over the subject property.
Page 29
CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY

[40 Phil 349; No. 14355; 31 Oct 1919]
Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private
cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary
that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the
said lands are within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes
were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create
irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves
and monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip
of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of
eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the
expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.
Held:
The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable
necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the
conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a
municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the
legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a
particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the
courts have the right to inquire to.
REPUBLIC VS. PLDT

[26 SCRA 320; G.R. No. L-18841; 27 Jan 1969]
Facts:
The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political entity exercising government powers through
one of its branches, the Bureau of Telecommunication. Herein defendant, PLDT is a public
service corporation holding a franchise to install operates and maintains a telephone system.
After its creation, the BOT set up its own government telephone system by utilizing its own
appropriations and other equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable the govt
offices to call privately. BOT entered into an agreement with the RCA communications for joint
overseas telephone service whereby BOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local
residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it was a violation of the condition of their agreement
since the BOT had used trunk lines only for the use of government offices but even to serve
private persons or the general public in competition with the business of PLDT. Subsequently, the
plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT asking the court judgment be rendered ordering the PLDT
to execute a contract with the plaintiff, through the BOT for the use of the facilities of PLDT's
telephone system throughout the country under such conditions as the court may consider
reasonable. The CFI rendered judgment stating that it could not compel PLDT to enter into such
agreement. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or Not PLDT may be compelled to enter into such agreement.
Held:
Yes, the state, may, in the interest of national welfare transfer utilities to public ownership upon
payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the state ma not require a public utility to
render services in the general interest provided just compensation is paid.
PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO
Page 30
[104 Phil 443; G.R. No. L-12172; 29 Aug 1958]
Facts:
The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others that construction of a
building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed
at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request with
the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline
station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and
separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others
that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants
reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request.
Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because
they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a
typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were
charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.
Held:
No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in
that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it
oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellant’s property without just
compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of
neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents.
As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its
own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with
the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to
let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being
urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just
compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
CITY OF BAGUIO V. NAWASA

[106 Phil; G.R. No. L-12032; 31 Aug 1959]
Facts:
Plaintiff a municipal corporation filed a complaint against defendant a public corporation, created
under Act.1383. It contends that the said act does not include within its purview the Baguio Water
Works system, assuming that it does, is unconstitutional because it deprives the plaintiff
ownership, control and operation of said water works without just compensation and due process
of law. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss ion the ground that it is not a proper exercise of
police power and eminent domain. The court denied the motion and ordered the defendants to file
an answer. The court holds that the water works system of Baguio belongs to private property
and cannot be expropriated without just compensation. Sec. 8 of R.A.1383 provides for the
exchange of the NAWASA assets for the value of the water works system of Baguio is
unconstitutional for this is not just compensation. Defendants motion for reconsideration was
denied hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not there is a valid exercise of police power of eminent domain.
Held:
R.A. 1383 does not constitute a valid exercise of police power. The act does not confiscate,
destroy or appropriate property belonging to a municipal corporation. It merely directs that all
water works belonging to cities, municipalities and municipal districts in the Philippines to be
transferred to the NAWASA. The purpose is placing them under the control and supervision of an
agency with a view to promoting their efficient management, but in so doing does not confiscate
them because it directs that they be paid with equal value of the assets of NAWASA.
The Baguio water works system is not like a public road, the park, street other public property
held in trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit of the public. But it is a property of a
Page 31
municipal corporation, water works cannot be taken away except for public use and upon
payment of just compensation. Judgment affirmed.
NATIONAL POWER CORP. VS. GUTIERREZ

[193 SCRA 1; G.R. No. 60077; 18 Jan 1991]
Facts:
Petitioner filed an action to acquire a right of way over the land of Respondents for the
construction of transmission lines. Petitioner was adjudged to pay the full market value of land
traversed by the transmission lines. Petitioner argued that it was only asking for a right of way.
Issue:
Whether or Not the acquisition of the right of way constitutes "taking" and such the case will be
entitled just compensation.
Held:
The acquisition of the right of way constitutes taking. It perpetually deprives Respondents of their
proprietary rights. No plant higher than three meters is allowed below the transmission lines.
Because of high tension current conveyed through the transmission lines, danger to life and limbs
cannot be discounted. The owner of the property is entitled to just compensation.
REPUBLIC VS. CASTELVI

[58 SCRA 336; G.R. No. L-20620; 15 Aug 1974]
Facts:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease
agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the
lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In
1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question.
Issue:
Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the “taking” should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just
compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.
The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must
be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the
property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The
Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides
with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing
of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in
possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the
Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must,
therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.
There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give
rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate time,
as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of
a demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of
the New Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or
deflation because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law independent of
contract.
EPZA VS. DULAY

[148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]
Page 32
Facts:
The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing
Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio
Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under,
claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement
as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the
commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the
government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter
contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the
fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the
assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed
this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.
Issue:
Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533
is unconstitutional.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial

prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is
reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding
principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the
court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.
The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the
legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee
in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination
shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the
justness of the decreed compensation.
AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA

[43 SCRA 360; G.R. No. L-26400; 29 Feb. 1972]
Facts:
Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate
of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the
property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot
for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigable’s counsel wrote the
President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed
by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint
against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of
Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the
defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor
General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already
prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no
cause of action against the defendants.
Issue:
Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government.
Held:
In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government
takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal
process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit
against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without
its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the
Page 33
back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion
of the lot to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an
action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of
ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for
other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensation—price or
value of the lot at the time of the taking.
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC

[244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995]
Facts:
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free
Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and
candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all
candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and
their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for
dissemination of vital election information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and
magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution
upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the
Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec
over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard
and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.
Held:
The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media
companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property without
payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of
necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the
newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public
use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also
Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the
case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property
of newspaper or magazine publishers.
REYES VS. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

[395 SCRA 494; GR NO. 147511; 20 JAN 2003]
Facts:
Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane
lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the
expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were
relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the
expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment of the lower court.
A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the stated public purpose
for the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the squatters
from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court
which showed that most of the expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners likewise
question the public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the
construction of low cost housing units, which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose
in the expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights
Page 34
and interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment and the expropriated properties should now
be returned to herein petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the failure of respondent
NHA to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.
Held:
The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on
a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the
contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine
that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use"
has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and
"public convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use."
In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a
public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms,
entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution
itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private
sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost
decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for
the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social justice.
MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE VS. VM REALTY CORPORATION

[292 SCRA 676; G. R. NO. 127820; 20 JUL 1998]
Facts:
Petitioner sought to exercise its power of eminent domain based on a resolution by the municipal
council. Petitioner cites a previous case wherein a resolution gave authority to exercise eminent
domain. Petitioner also relies on the Implementing Rules, which provides that a resolution
authorizes a Local Government Unit to exercise eminent domain.
Issue:
Whether or Not an LGU can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its
law-making body.
Held:
Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first
requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by
its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the
former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner
involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer
in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the
latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.
ASLP VS. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM

[175 SCRA 343; G.R. NO. 78742; 14 JUL 1989]
Facts:
Several petitions are the root of the case:
e. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657.
Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four
tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD
27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature’s
power.
Page 35
f. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental

against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian
Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.
g. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer.
h. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands
not exceeding seven hectares.
Issue:
Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s, PD, and RA were constitutional.
Held:
The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and
eminent domain.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized
under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise
of Police Power and Eminent Domain.
RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to
deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer.
A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful
subject and the method.
Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the
method employed to achieve it.
ESLABAN VS. ONORIO

[360 SCRA 230; G.R. NO. 146062; 28 JUN 2001]
Facts:
Clarita Vda. De Onorio is the owner of the land in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South
Cotabato. Such land is the subject for the construction of an irrigation canal of the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA). Mr. Santiago Eslaban Jr. is the project manager of NIA. The
parties agreed to the construction of the canal provided that the government will pay for the area
that has been taken. A right-of-way agreement was entered into by the parties in which
respondent was paid the amount of P4, 180.00 as right of way damages. Subsequently,
respondent executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees which waives her rights for the
damage to the crops due to construction of the right of way. After which, respondent demands
that petitioner pay P111, 299.55 for taking her property but the petitioner refused. Petitioner
states that the government had not consented to be sued and that the respondent is not entitled
for compensation by virtue of the homestead patent under CA no. 141. The RTC held that the
NIA should pay respondent the amount of P107, 517.60 as just compensation for the 24,660 sq
meters that have been used for the construction of the canal. The Court of Appeals also affirmed
the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or Not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC.
Held:
The CA is correct in affirming the decision of the RTC but modifications shall be made regarding
the value of the just compensation. The following are the points to be considered in arriving in this
decision.
First, Rule 7 par 5 of the Rule of Civil Procedure provides that the certification against forum
shopping should only be executed by the plaintiff or the principal. The petition for review was filed
by Mr. Eslaban jr. while the verification or certification were signed by Mr. Cesar Gonzales, an
Page 36
administrator of the agency. Neither of the two has the authority to sign such certificate for they
are not the plaintiff or principal. Such case is a sufficient ground for dismissing this petition.
Second, PD NO. 1529 provides that the owner is required to recognize in favor of the government
the easement of a “public highway, way, private way established by law, or any government canal
where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined.
In the case at bar, the irrigation canal was constructed on Oct 1981 after the property had been
registered in May of 1976. In this case, prior expropriation proceedings must be filed and just
compensation shall be paid to the owner before the land could be taken for public use.
Third, In this case, just compensation is defined as not only the correct amount to be paid but the
reasonable time for the Government to pay the owner. The CA erred in this point by stating that
the market value (just compensation) of the land is determined in the filing of the complaint in
1991.The determination of such value should be from the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981.
Lastly, the petitioner cannot argue that the Affidavit of waiver of rights and fees executed by the
respondent pertains to the payment of the value of the land therefore exempting NIA to pay the
value of the land taken. Such waiver pertains only to the crops and improvements that were
damage due to the construction of the right-of-way not the value of the land.
Wherefore, decision of CA affirmed with modification regarding the just compensation in the
amount of P16, 047.61 per hectare.
KNECHT VS. COURT OF APPEALS

[290 SCRA 223; G.R. NO. 108015, 20 MAY 1998]
Facts:
The instant case is an unending sequel to several suits commenced almost twenty years ago
involving a parcel of land located at the corner of the south end of EDSA and F.B. Harrison in
Pasay City. The land was owned by petitioners Cristina de Knecht and her son, Rene Knecht.
On the land, the Knechts constructed eight houses, leased out the seven and occupied one of
them as their residence. In 1979, the government filed for the expropriation of Knechts’ property.
The government wanted to use the land for the completion of the Manila Flood Control and
Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA towards Roxas Boulevard. In 1982, the City
Treasurer of Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay real estate taxes on the property
from 1980 to 1982. As a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer sold the property at
public auction for the same amount of their deficiency taxes. The highest bidders were
respondent Spouses Anastacio and Felisa Babiera (the Babieras) and respondent Spouses
Alejandro and Flor Sangalang (the Sangalangs). Subsequently, Sangalang and Babiera sold the
land to respondent Salem Investment Corporation. On February 17, 1983, the Batasang
Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the national government to expropriate certain
properties in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension. The property of the Knechts was part of those
expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. The government gave out just compensation for the lands
expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. Salem was included and received partial payment. Seven of
the eight houses of the Knechts were demolished and the government took possession of the
portion of land on which the houses stood. Since the Knechts refused to vacate their one
remaining house, Salem filed a case against them for unlawful detainer. As defense, the Knechts
claimed ownership of the land and building. The Municipal Trial Court however ordered the
Knechts' ejectment thus their residence was demolished.
The Knechts continuously claimed ownership of the property and allege that they must be given
just compensation.
Issue:
Whether or not Knechts are the lawful owners of the land at subject.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the Knechts were not the owners anymore of the said land. The
Knechts' right to the land had been foreclosed after they failed to redeem it one year after the sale
at public auction. Since the petitions questioning the order of dismissal were likewise dismissed
by the Court of Appeals and this Court, the order of dismissal became final and res judicata on
the issue of ownership of the land. Petitioners contended that they did not receive notice of their
tax delinquency. Neither did they receive notice of the auction sale. However, this question has
been previously raised in the cases which have been already set aside. The court is not a trier of
Page 37
facts. Res judicata has already set it. The Knechts therefore are not the lawful owners of the land
and are not any longer accountable for just compensation given by the government.
Note: Res judicata is a ground for dismissal of an action. It is a rule that precludes parties from
relitigating Issue actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. It pervades every
well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is based upon two grounds embodied in various
maxims of the common law — one, public policy and necessity, that there should be a limit to
litigation; and another, the individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause. When a right
of fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
To follow a contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition of the parties to the preservation
of the public tranquility.
Res judicata applies when: (1) the former judgment or order is final; (2) the judgment or order is
one on the merits; (3) it was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (4) there is between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter
and of cause of action.
REPUBLIC VS. KER

[383 SCRA 584; G.R. NO. 136171, 2 JULY 2002]
Facts:
Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City a petition for expropriation of
portions of two parcels of land owned by respondent. Petitioner needed the parcels of land for the
widening of the road component of J.P. Laurel-Buhangin Interchange in Davao City. The
Regional trial court rendered decision of a fair just compensation for defendant Ker Corporation.
However, it was challenged by Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Department of Public Works and Highways alleging that just compensation for site must be
reduced. Petitioner alleged that when the petition for expropriation was filed, the tax declaration of
the property indicated its assessed value at a lower price.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Ker Company was given a decision for fair just compensation.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the valuation for the lot Sites are excessive and unreasonable. Just
compensation cannot be measured by the assessed value of the property as stated in the tax
declaration and schedule of market values. For the purpose of appraisal, the fair market value of
the property is taken into account and such value refers to the highest price in terms of money
which a property will bring if exposed for sale in the public market.
In computing just compensation for expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the land at the
time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint not at the time of the rendition of
judgment which should be taken into consideration. 4 Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking or
the filing of the complaint whichever came first. On this matter, the appellate court is correct in
disregarding petitioner's claim.
MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

[252 SCRA 412; G.R. NO. 106440, 29 JAN. 1996]
Facts:
The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of land owned by Petitioners as a national
historical landmark, because it was the site of the birth of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni
Cristo. The Republic of the Philippines filed an action to appropriate the land. Petitioners argued
that the expropriation was not for a public purpose.
Issue:
Whether or Not the taking or exercise of eminent domain may be granted.
Page 38
Held:
Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking is for a public use because
of the contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture and history of the Philippines.
Page 39
THE POWER OF TAXATION
PASCUAL VS. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS

[110 PHIL 331; G.R. NO.L-10405; 29 DEC 1960]
Facts:
Petitioner, the governor of the Province of Rizal, filed an action for declaratory relief with
injunction on the ground that RA 920, Act appropriating funds for public works, providing P85,000
for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road
terminals, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads within Antonio Subdivision.
Antonio Subdivision is owned by the respondent, Jose Zulueta, a member of the Senate of the
Philippines. Respondent offered to donate the said feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig and
the offer was accepted by the council, subject to a condition that the donor would submit plan of
the roads and an agreement to change the names of two of the street. However, the donation
was not executed, which prompted Zuleta to write a letter to the district engineer calling attention
the approval of RA 920. The district engineer, on the other hand, did not endorse the letter that
inasmuch the feeder roads in question were private property at the time of passage and approval
of RA 920, the appropriation for the construction was illegal and therefore, void ab initio.
Petitioner, prayed for RA 920 be declared null and void and the alleged deed of donation be
declared unconstitutional. Lower court dismissed the case and dissolved the writ of preliminary
injunction.
Issue:
Whether or Not the deed of donation and the appropriation of funds stipulated in RA 920 are
constitutional.
Held:
The ruling case law rules that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for
anything but public purpose. The taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only and
the money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the
advantage of private individuals.
In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the feeder roads depend upon whether the
said roads were public or private property when the bill was passed by congress or when it
became effective. The land which was owned by Zulueta, the appropriation sought a private
purpose and hence, null and void. The donation did not cure the nullity of the appropriation;
therefore a judicial nullification of a said donation need not precede the declaration of
unconstitutionality of the said appropriation.
The decision appealed from is reversed.
PUNSALAN VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA

[95 PHIL 46; NO.L-4817; 26 MAY 1954]
Facts:
Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398 together with the law
authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The ordinance imposes a
municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-
payment of the same. The law authorizing said ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of the
city to impose a municipal occupation tax on persons engaged in various professions.
Petitioners, having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, paid the tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The lower court
declared the ordinance invalid and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it.
Issue:
Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation, and authorize
what amounts to double taxation.
Held:
Page 40
The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in its discretion
may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed. It is not for
the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation
taxes aside from that imposed by the National Government. That matter is within the domain of
political departments. The argument against double taxation may not be invoked if one tax is
imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city. It is widely recognized that there is
nothing inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same
occupation by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower court is
reversed with regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.
OSMEÑA VS. ORBOS

[220 SCRA 703; G.R. NO. 99886; 31 MAR 1993]
Facts:
On October 10, 1984, Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General
Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed to
reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting
from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude oil.
Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O. 1024, and
ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy.
Pres. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137 on February 27,
1987, expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost underrecovery
incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the amount of the
underrecovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance.
The petition avers that the creation of the trust fund violates
29(3), Article VI of the Constitution, reading as follows:
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as
a special fund and paid out for such purposes only. If the purpose for which a
special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any,
shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as amended, must be
treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is
collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special
fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government
objective." Petitioner further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected
through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof
is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created."
He also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority" to the ERB violates 28 (2). Article VI
of the Constitution, viz.:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix, within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government;
and, inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the power of taxation, "the limits,
limitations and restrictions must be quantitative, that is, the law must not only specify how to tax,
who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for, but also impose a specific limit on how much to
tax." 12
Issue:
Whether or Not the invalidity of the "TRUST ACCOUNT" in the books of account of the Ministry of
Energy (now, the Office of Energy Affairs), created pursuant to § 8, paragraph 1, of P.D. No.
1956, as amended, "said creation of a trust fund being contrary to Section 29 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution.
Page 41
Whether or Not the unconstitutionality of 8, paragraph 1 (c) of P.D. No. 1956, as amended by
Executive Order No. 137, for "being an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to the
Energy Regulatory Board.
Held:
The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established "for the purpose of minimizing the frequent
price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustment and/or changes in world market prices
of crude oil and imported petroleum products." Under P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive
Order No. 137 dated 27 February 1987, this Trust Account may be funded from any of the
following sources:
a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on
petroleum products subject to tax under this Decree arising from exchange rate
adjustment, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the
Board of Energy;
b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of
government corporations, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in
consultation with the Board of Energy;
c) Any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources

of the Fund through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board of Energy
requiring payment of persons or companies engaged in the business of importing,
manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products;
d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil
companies in the importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso
costs computed using the reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of
Energy.
Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted
in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain
from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while
it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains
subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply
with the constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without
precedent.
With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision
conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products
provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general
policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump
rates, § 8(c) of P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment
the resources of the Fund.
What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or "a specific limit
on how much to tax." The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the premise that
what is involved here is the power of taxation; but as already discussed, this is not the case. What
is here involved is not so much the power of taxation as police power. Although the provision
authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to the power of
taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the delegate to act
with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced by the police power
of the State.
The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors involved in the determination of the
price of oil and petroleum products, and the frequently shifting need to either augment or exhaust
the Fund, do not conveniently permit the setting of fixed or rigid parameters in the law as
proposed by the petitioner. To do so would render the ERB unable to respond effectively so as to
mitigate or avoid the undesirable consequences of such fluidity. As such, the standard as it is
expressed suffices to guide the delegate in the exercise of the delegated power, taking account of
the circumstances under which it is to be exercised.
LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

[14 SCRA 292; NO.L-19201; 16 JUN 1965]
Page 42
Facts:
Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr.
Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Lladoc, for
the construction of a new Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was spent for such
purpose.
On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29,
1960. Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against
the Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest.
Issue:
Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish priest at
the time of donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have juridical personality as the
constitutional exemption for religious purpose is valid.
Held:
Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section 22(3) Article VI of the Constitution
contemplates exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as Property
taxes contra distinguished from Excise taxes The imposition of the gift tax on the property used
for religious purpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a property by way of gift
inter vivos.
The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the imposition of
the donee's tax on the property donated to the church for religious purpose.
CASSANOVAS VS. HORD

[8 Phil 125; No. 3473; 22 Mar 1907]
Facts:
The Spanish Govt. by virtue of a royal decree granted the plaintiff certain mines. The plaintiff is
now the owner of those mines. The Collector of Internal Revenue imposed tax on the properties,
contending that they were valid perfected mine concessions and it falls within the provisions of
sec.134 of Act No. 1189 known as Internal Revenue Act. The plaintiff paid under protest. He
brought an action against the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue to recover the sum of Php.
9, 600 paid by him as taxes. Judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant, so the plaintiff
appealed.
Issue:
Whether or Not Sec. 164 is void or valid.
Held:
The deed constituted a contract between the Spanish Government and the plaintiff. The
obligation of which contract was impaired by the enactment of sec. 134 of the Internal Revenue
Law infringing sec. 5 of the Act of Congress which provides that “no law impairing the obligation
of contracts shall be enacted”. Sec. 134 of the Internal Revenue Law of 1904 is void because it
impairs the obligation of contracts contained in the concessions of mine made by the Spanish
Government. Judgment reversed.
Page 43
THE BILL
OF RIGHTS
Page 44
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Art 3, Sec. 1. “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law…”
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSO. VS. MAYOR OF MANILA

[20 SCRA 849; G.R. NO.L-24693; 31 JULY 1967]
Facts:
Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of its members, Hotel
del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the president and general manager of the second petitioner, filed a
petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the City of
Manila who was sued in his capacity as such charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the execution and
enforcement of such ordinances. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is
dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen members operating hotels
and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city
authorities and regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board
of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then acting
City Mayor, Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged grievances against the
ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it regulate motels, on the ground that in
the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels. it
also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly
authorized representatives. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction
ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July
8, 1963.
Issue:
Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional, therefore, null and
void.
Held:
A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have

admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance.
Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has been the accepted standards
of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed
categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of
the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the
very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all
the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise
of police regulation.
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not
the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. where the American Supreme Court through
Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned
deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void
on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence
deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in
the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual
foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings
and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the
ordinance set aside.
Page 45
VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG

[86 SCRA 270; NO.L-29646; 10 NOV 1978]
Facts:
The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February
22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a
citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any
kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an employment
permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes.
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.
Issue:
Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.
Held:
It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens
generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation.
While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from
the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or
disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment
of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.
Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human
right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the
Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted
he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance
or denial of an alien employment permit fee.
NAMIL VS. COMELEC

[414 SCRA 553; G.R. NO. 150540; 28 OCT 2003]
Facts:
On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat proclaimed
the petitioners as winning candidates for their Sangguniang Bayan. The following day, herein
private respondents were proclaimed winners as well. Private respondents claimed that they
should be recognized as the winners, and not the petitioners. Upon receipt of such letter, the
Commissioner-in-charge for Region XII asked the Law Department, the Regional Election
Registrar and the Provincial Elections Supervisor to submit their reports on the matter. All of
them found the second proclamation valid. Hence, the COMELEC issued a Resolution ordering
the immediate installation of the private respondents as the newly elected members of the
Sangguniang Bayan, even though petitioners herein have already taken their oath and have
assumed office. Petitioners contend that such Resolution is null and void because they were not
accorded due notice and hearing, hence constituting a violation of the due process principle.
Issue:
Whether or Not due the COMELEC has the power to suspend a proclamation or the effects
thereof without notice and hearing.
Held:
No. The COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the
effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing. The proclamation on May 20, 2001 enjoys
the presumption of regularity and validity since no contest or protest was even filed assailing the
same. The petitioners cannot be removed from office without due process of law. Due process
in quasi-judicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires due notice and hearing.
Furthermore, the proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been
notified of any motion to set aside his proclamation. Hence, as ruled in Fariñas vs. COMELEC,
Page 46
Reyes vs. COMELEC and Gallardo vs. COMELEC, the COMELEC is without power to partially or
totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
[101 PHIL 1155; L-7995; 31 MAY 1957]
Facts:
Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” was passed.
The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by
foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in
this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines
therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China
was violated according to him.
Issue:
Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.
Held:
According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that
police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court
also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is
always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never
curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.
PHIL. PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. VS. TORRES

[231 SCRA 335; G.R. NO.98050; 17 MAR 1994]
Facts:
Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner,
alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate
Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of
a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the
superintendents and the professional and technical employees. However, the PMPI filed an
amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory
employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and confidential employees. The
parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the amended
petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents. Mediator-Arbiter
Milado issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a certification election
among the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics, accountants, nurses,
midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed the order to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido
Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied; hence, the instant petition alleging denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to
which the mediator-arbiter was under.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was denial of due process.
Held:
There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS
agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for
decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance
with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present
its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and
examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted to submit its position
paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its
arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
Page 47
RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO

[39 PHIL 660; G.R. NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]
Facts:
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro.
The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which states that “provincial governor
of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) are found is authorized,
when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
and approved by the provincial board”. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative
Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for
the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit
homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously
recommended by the provincial governor.
Thereafter, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2, which says that the
provincial governor has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised
Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans
east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan,
were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any
Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not
exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they
roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the
custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
Issue:
Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty without
due process of law.
Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Held:
The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his
liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and
that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and
involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative
Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the
United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao
reservation, it will be read, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of
former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only
successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent
settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4)
the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized
customs among the Manguianes.
Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power.
But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy. One cannot hold that the liberty of the
citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
Page 48
considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
can one say that due process of law has not been followed.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. To constitute
"due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In
some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where
much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular
cases.
The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may
approach the highest conception of nationality. The public policy of the Government of the
Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The
Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have
said, for their own good and the good of the country.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus
can, therefore, not issue.
KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA

[41 PHIL 103; G.R. NO. 15972; 11 OCT 1920]
Facts:
Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same
interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of
enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receipt
be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles
delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. The permanent injunction was
denied by the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class
legislation; putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between
persons in similar circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property
rights. They also contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of
their police power. In view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power
Whether or not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights.
Held:
Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police
power. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section
2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744,
authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the city:
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx
xxxxxlaundries xxxx.
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good
order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.
The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between
laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher
Chinese characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila
are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no
fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an
attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory
nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they
belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each
every one of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The obvious objection for
the implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code.
Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the
ordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but
mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are
Page 49
cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, and
even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient
ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of the police
power is the control of private interests for the public welfare.
Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary
injunction is denied, with costs against the appellants.
YU CONG ENG VS. TRINIDAD

[47 PHIL 385; G.R. NO. 20479; 6 FEB 1925]
Facts:
The petitioner, Yu Cong Eng, was charged by information in the court of first instance of Manila,
with a violation of Act 2972, which provides that (Section 1) it shall be unlawful for any person,
company, or partnership or corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any other activity for
the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with existing law, to keep its account
books in any language other than English, Spanish or any local dialect. He was arrested, his
books were seized, and the trial was about to proceed, when he and the other petitioner, Co
Liam, on their own behalf, and on behalf of all the other Chinese merchants in the Philippines,
filed the petition against the fiscal, or prosecuting attorney of Manila, and the collector of internal
revenue engaged in the prosecution, and against the judge presiding.
Issue:
Whether or Not Act 2972 is unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes. The Philippine government may make every reasonable requirement of its taxpayers to keep
proper records of their business transactions in English or Spanish or Filipino dialect by which an
adequate measure of what is due from them in meeting the cost of government can be had. But
we are clearly of opinion that it is not within the police power of the Philippine Legislature,
because it would be oppressive and arbitrary, to prohibit all Chinese merchants from maintaining
a set of books in the Chinese language, and in the Chinese characters, and thus prevent them
from keeping advised of the status of their business and directing its conduct.
ANIAG VS. COMELEC

[237 SCRA 194; G.R. NO. 104961; 7 OCT 1994]
Facts:
In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 2323, “Gun Ban”, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of
firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by
members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of
reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing
for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of
firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the “Gun
Ban”, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner
for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner then
instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner’s house and return them to
Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano approached the
checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and
detained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano was
only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later,
COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and
Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he
should not be disqualified from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the
constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that “gunrunning, using or transporting
firearms or similar weapons” and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is
unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was
rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections.
Issue:
Page 50
Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the firearms
issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car
Held:
A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority.

However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle
is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellano’s
waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a
bag at the back of the car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly
searched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction.
Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and
Arellano, the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the
warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in
the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint.
Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election
Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary
investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be
contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he
was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search
conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be
used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is
unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.
JAVIER VS. COMELEC

[144 SCRA 194; G.R. NOS. L-68379-81; 22 SEPT 1986]
Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang
Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but
the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On
May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when
several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven
suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Owing to what
he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to
the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were
dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said
body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void
because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by
the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his
oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its
decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election.
Held:
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge"
as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that
the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance
to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They
should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them
justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his
sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there
would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal
Page 51
justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a
judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone
the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not
orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the
denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge
will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the
basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
YNOT VS. IAC

[148 SCRA 659; G.R. NO. 74457; 20 MAR 1987]
Facts:
Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one
province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order
No 626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive Order No.
626-A was issued in the exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for
farm work or breeding.
Issue:
Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process.
Held:
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonably
necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting
the transfer of carabaos from one province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing.
Retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the
transfer of carabeef, after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either.
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ

[180 SCRA 218; G.R. NO.84818; 18 DEC 1989]
Facts:
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging

rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz
Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be
reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the
power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.
Issue:
Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by
administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. But respondent’s contention
that notice and hearing are not required since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire
proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act,
providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing, dictates that a
Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to the
exceptions, limitations or saving provisions.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order
without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is
immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the
commission's own motion as in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is hereby SET
ASIDE.
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V. DANS JR.
Page 52
[137 SCRA 628; L-59329; 19 JUL 1985]
Facts:
A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was “summarily closed” on
grounds of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition.
Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were denied due process. There was no hearing to
establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station violates
freedom of expression. Before the court could even promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised,
Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The
rights of the station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in
pursuing the case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic, (because there are no longer
interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still finds that there is need
to pass a “RESOLUTION” for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in
matters as this case.
Issue:
Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.
Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom of
Expression.
Held:
The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The absence of a
hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in administrative
proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635).
The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast station may be closed. The
Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements:
(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present one’s case and submit
evidence presented.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
(3) The decision must have something to support itself.
(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to
support conclusion)
(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and
facts and not simply accept subordinate’s views
(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know
the various issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered.
The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it gives
an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty and property is valid.
The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of
speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast
are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government still has the right to be protected
against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of
freedom of expression is the “clear and present danger” rule. If in the circumstances that the
media is used in such nature as to create this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has
the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or
signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to
the vitality of a representative democracy. The people continues to have the right to be informed
on public affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive influence to the people
being the most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the the special
protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of
the Constitution.
ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR)

[69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940]
Facts:
There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU
alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
Page 53
adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is
desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a
company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an
illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for
new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.
Issue:
Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.
Held:
To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court
whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act
No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the
nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice
which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases
that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal
of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-
judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or
disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords
and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is
not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules
of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations
of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and
submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties
adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same
is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with
instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG

[222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993]
Facts:
Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries
at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was
also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious
Page 54
physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo
created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to
investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of
Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements
within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the
written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive
suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the
written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case
against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled
"Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal
charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent
students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law
School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of
the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left
the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the
penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a
TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining
petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary
restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing
against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the
respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the
original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the
students was ordered.
Issue:
Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.
Held:
There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the
Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement
on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel,
copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in
petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under
Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court,
thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law,
as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded
procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic

institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the
assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
US GOVERNMENT VS. JUDGE PURUNGAN

[389 SCRA 623; G.R. NO. 148571, 24 SEPT 2002]
Facts:
The United States of America, pursuant to the existing RP-US extradition treaty, requested the
extradition of Mark B. Jimenez. Upon receipt of the request, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA)
transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action. In such event, the RTC
held that Jimenez shell be deprived of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the extradition process. Thereafter the US government, through DOJ, filed Petition for
Extradition and Jimenez’s immediate arrest, to avoid flight. Before the RTC could render its
decision, Jimenez filed an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," praying that his application for
Page 55
an arrest warrant be set for hearing, which was granted. During which, the lower court issued its
questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for
his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After Jimenez had surrendered his passport
and posted the required cash bond, he was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order
dated July 4, 2001. Thus, Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the
bond, and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody.
Issue:
Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be
issued.
Whether or not he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are
pending.
Held:
By nature, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or
innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional
rights of the accused are necessarily available. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the
requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would escape again if
given the opportunity. Hence, if the judge is convinced that a prima facie case exists, he
immediately Issue a warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to
answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition. Potential extraditees are entitled to
the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due process does not always call for a
prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved.
Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard
and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have
a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no
danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances.
In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of
the peculiar facts of each case.
Page 56
EQUAL PROTECTION
Art 3, Sec. 1. “…nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
PEOPLE VS. CAYAT

[68 PHIL 12; G.R. NO. 45987; 5 MAY 1939]
Facts:
“Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or
drink, any intoxicating liquors of any kind.” The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so-called
native wines or liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take.
Issue:
Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of
said law.
Held:
No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification
under the law must rest on real or substantial distinctions.
The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the non- Christian and
the members of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the
degree of civilization and culture. The term ‘non-Christian tribes’ refers to a geographical area
and more directly to natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities. The distinction is reasonable for the Act was
intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non- Christian tribes”
The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in
and among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby
hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is
not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to
apply for all times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of
the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non- Christians by
reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect
the reasonableness of the classification thus established.
PASEI VS. DRILON

[163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988]
Facts:
Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of
Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional
validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary
Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such
order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino
workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of
the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI
invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent
have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the
Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
protection of the Filipino workers.
Issue:
Page 57
Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1.
Held:
SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female
domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which
their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract
workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat
equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all
men and women. It admits of classification, provided that:
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions

2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class
In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.
Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban
has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other
things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of
female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the
state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule
making powers.
DUMLAO VS. COMELEC

[95 SCRA 392; L-52245; 22 JAN 1980]
Facts:
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory

and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or provincial city official that already received
retirement benefits and is 65 years of age shall not be qualified to run for the same local elective
office from which he has retired.
Issue:
Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the equal protection and due
process rights.
Held:
No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification based on reasonable
and real differentiations. In the present case, employees 65 years of age have been classified
differently from younger employees. The former are subject to compulsory retirement while the
latter are not.
Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials because there can be
retirees who are even younger and a 65 year old retiree could be as good as a 65 year old official
who is not a retiree. But there is reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to
run for office because there is the “need for new blood to assume relevance”. When an official
has retired he has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work.
WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared
valid.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILS. VS. COMELEC

[289 SCRA 337; G.R. NO. 132922; 21 APR 1998]
Facts:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an

organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be
Page 58
without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it
was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA
Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge.
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the
enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:
“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be
known as the “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially
among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television
stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television
stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of
charge, during the period of campaign.”
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print
space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be
procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and
television stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC
Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it
stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that
the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to
advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of
private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time
for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of
COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.
Issue:
Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the
equal protection of the laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of
law and without just compensation.
Held:
Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is
licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more
individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television
broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate
broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable
public funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time
as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print
space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires
spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast
industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken
by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.
LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

[301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 128096; 20 JAN 1999]
Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime
syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and
petitioner-intervenors.
Page 59
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation
Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between
the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a
panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a
legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including
herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories.
After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan,
where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting
that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal accused” are government
officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their
motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the
word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which
provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not
begun as of the approval hereof.
Issue:
Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for
the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.
Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the
determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s
jurisdiction.
Held:
Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing
argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is
presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.
The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which
are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials
and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to
petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the
Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive
effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is
not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts
and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their
punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and
other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a
procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all
kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A.
8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to
the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was
in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the
information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However,
upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the
shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their
Page 60
official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the
said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office
was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
INT'L. SCHOOL ALLIANCE VS. QUISUMBING

[333 SCRA 13; G.R. NO. 128845; 1 JUN 2000]
Facts:
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent
School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than
their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees
should be given equal pay for work of equal value.
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential
Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign
diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying
out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same
decree authorizes the School to
employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from
Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and
regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the
protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also
paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the
difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a)
the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure.
Issue:
Whether or Not the grants provided by the school to foreign hires and not to local hires
discriminative of their constitutional right to the equal protection clause.
Held:
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal
truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications,
skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule
applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work
equal to that of foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer
accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform
equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one
employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the
others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated
against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as
an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as
foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the
"dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the
distinction in salary rates.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," "to
afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations
between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with
Page 61
public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the
common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts
will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There
is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
Wherefore, the petition is given due course. The petition is hereby granted in part. The orders of
the secretary of labor and employment dated June 10, 1996 and march 19, 1997, are hereby
reversed and set aside insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent school of according
foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY VS. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY

[22 SCRA 603; L-23794; 17 FEB 1968]
Facts:
On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of
1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale
to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Payments for said tax were made,
under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7, 087.50 and on April 20,
1964 for P5, 000, or a total of P12, 087.50.
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as
its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution)
and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution).
Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to
enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited
constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of
First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the
ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local
Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.
Issue:
Whether or Not the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause
under Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution.
Whether or not it was violative of the rule of uniformity of taxation under the Bill of Rights, Sec.
22[1], Art. VI, Constitution.
Held:
The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal protection
clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based
on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions
which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those
who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for
it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and
none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is
true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable,
should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be
singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same
class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up,
it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar
Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
Page 62
Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily
collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the ordinance
provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional
until declared otherwise.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared
unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50
plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered.
PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSO. VS. PRADO
[227 SCRA 703; G.R. NO. 105371; 11 NOV 1993]
Facts:
The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354
withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration
Commission and with certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is
discriminatory becasue while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it retains the same
for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of
Representatives, COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The
respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid
classification in accordance with the equal protection clause.
Issue:
Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
Held:
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been
embodied in a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore
specific guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to
cut it down is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set aside
insofar
Page 63
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Art 3, Sec. 2. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
Art 3, Sec. 3. “(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by
law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.”
PEOPLE VS. MARTI

[193 SCRA 57; G.R. NO. 81561; 18 JAN 1991]
Facts:
Accused-appellant went to a forwarding agency to send four packages to a friend in Zurich.

Initially, the accused was asked by the proprietress if the packages can be examined. However,
he refused. Before delivering said packages to the Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of Posts,
the husband of the proprietress opened said boxes for final inspection. From that inspection,
included in the standard operating procedure and out of curiosity, he took several grams of its
contents.
He brought a letter and the said sample to the National Bureau of Investigation. When the NBI
was informed that the rest of the shipment was still in his office, three agents went back with him.
In their presence, the husband totally opened the packages. Afterwards, the NBI took custody of
said packages. The contents , after examination by forensic chemists, were found to be
marijuana flowering tops.
The appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the agents for
questioning. Later on, the trial court found him guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Issue:
Whether or Not the items admitted in the searched illegally searched and seized.
Whether or Not custodial investigation properly applied.
Whether or Not the trial court not give credence to the explanation of the appellant on how said
packages came to his possession.
Held:
No. “The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the
intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can
accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizure has been violated. Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in
violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State. In the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against
the State. It was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating
procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to
the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts. Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did
not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure
proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid
thereof, is not search.”
No. “The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It
is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their
testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary.”
Page 64
No. “Appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the
presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are
owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim
otherwise.”
WATEROUS DRUG VS. NLRC

[280 SCRA 735 ; G.R.NO. 113271; 16 OCT 1997]
Facts:
Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation on 15 August 1988.
On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum from WATEROUS Vice President-General
Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the
latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued
another memorandum to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without
consulting the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the company's control of purchases
and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.
As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her
act was "due to negligence," since fellow employee Irene Soliven "obtained the medicines in bad
faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the
Admitting Dept." Catolico then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of Soliven.
In a memorandum dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro

warned Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents." On 29
January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an
irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Forthwith, in her memorandum dated 37 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within
twenty-four hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give
her explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. However,
on 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she
would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company.
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice
No. 266 for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested
Saldaña's invasion of her privacy when Saldaña opened an envelope addressed to Catolico.
In a letter to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check
she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred
that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her
and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven.
On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying

Catolico of her termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a
complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. In his decision of 10
May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against
petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove
what alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any investigation was conducted.
Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal
and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement.
Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because
the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just
cause to terminate her services.
In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the
ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her
employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by
YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope.
But, it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and
2) of Article III of the Constitution. It concluded:
With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, by

virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants, respondents' case falls
apart as it is bereft of evidence which cannot be used as a legal basis for
complainant's dismissal.
Page 65
The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the
appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was already included
in the computation of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86.
Issue:
Whether or Not the dismissal of the private respondent is in violation of the Constitution, under
the Bill of Rights.
Held:
As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving
"commissions" from YSP, or probably from other suppliers, and that the check issued to her on 9
November 1989 was not the first or the last. They also maintained that Catolico occupied a
confidential position and that Catolico's receipt of YSP's check, aggravated by her "propensity to
violate company rules," constituted breach of confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC,
Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain her side of the controversy.
In her Comment, Catolico asserts that petitioners' evidence is too "flimsy" to justify her dismissal.
The check in issue was given to her, and she had no duty to turn it over to her employer.
Company rules do not prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from clients, and there is no
indication in the contentious check that it was meant as a refund for overpriced medicines.
Besides, the check was discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on the right to
privacy and communication; hence, as correctly held by the NLRC, it was inadmissible in
evidence.
Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised
of the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample
opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so
desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. In
the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was
dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after
receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after the issues were
joined through said letters.
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just
and valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result
in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was
based on hearsay information. Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere
suspicion, which in no case can justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid
causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of employment; and even the dismissal of
an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the
employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion. Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a
managerial employee, to which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted.
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, that the Bill of
Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private
individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse
against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise
to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not
be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for every year of service. In this
case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half month's salary for
every year of service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the
award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and
resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2
December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its
reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against private
respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of
privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures which is hereby set
aside.
STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO
Page 66
[20 SCRA 383; L-19550; 19 JUN 1967]
Facts:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred
to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-
Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4
and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search
the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences,
and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or
"used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the
applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioners contentions are:

(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in
deportation cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued
the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law —
Respondents-prosecutors contentions
(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law;
(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and
(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,
regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question
may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.
Issue:
Whether or not those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations are
obtained legally.
Whether or not those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein are obtained
legally.
Held:
The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the
seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations,
and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties.
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein,
the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously
issued by this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using
them in evidence against petitioners herein.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
Page 67
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications
involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be
the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in
the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
__________________________
1
Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his capacity as
Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I.
Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Maneses G. Reyes, City of Manila.
2
Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman Cansino,
Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, Hon. Eulogio Mencias, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, and Hon. Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City)
Court of Quezon City.
3
Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.
4
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.
5
U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation, Far East
Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business Management
Corporation, General Agricultural Corporation, American Asiatic Oil Corporation, Investment
Management Corporation, Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and
Business Management Corporation, United Housing Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco-Flue-
Curing and Redrying Corporation, Republic Real Estate Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.
BURGOS, SR. V. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP

[133 SCRA 800; G.R. NO. 64261; 26 DEC 1984]
Facts:
Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent
Judge Cruz-Pano of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, under which the premises known as
No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers,
respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor
vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said
newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged
to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We
Forum" newspaper, were seized. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises
were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said
newspapers were discontinued. Respondents contend that petitioners should have filed a motion
to quash said warrants in the court that issued them before impugning the validity of the same
before this Court. Respondents also assail the petition on ground of laches (Failure or
negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it). Respondents further state that since petitioner had
already used as evidence some of the documents seized in a prior criminal case, he is stopped
from challenging the validity of the search warrants.
Petitioners submit the following reasons to nullify the questioned warrants:

1. Respondent Judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision
as well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
2. The search warrants pinpointed only one address which would be the former
abovementioned address.
3. Articles belonging to his co-petitioners were also seized although the warrants were only
directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.
4. Real properties were seized.
5. The application along with a joint affidavit, upon which the warrants were issued, from the
Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group could not have provided sufficient basis for the
finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may be validly issued in accordance
with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
Page 68
Respondents justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have
been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which
authorizes sequestration of the property of any person engaged in subversive activities against
the government in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the
Secretary of National Defense.
Issue:
Whether or Not the 2 search warrants were validly issued and executed.
Held:
In regard to the quashal of warrants that petitioners should have initially filed to the lower court,
this Court takes cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional Issue raised, not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We
Forum" offices which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies.
The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to
suspend its rules. With the contention pertaining to laches, the petitioners gave an explanation
evidencing that they have exhausted other extra-judicial efforts to remedy the situation, negating
the presumption that they have abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property.
On the enumerated reasons:

1. This objection may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners
themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had
indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants
were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct
premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two
warrants intended for one and the same place.
3. Section 2, Rule 126, of the Rules of Court, does not require that the property to be seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or
may not be owned by him.
4. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact
bolted to the ground, remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.
5. The broad statements in the application and joint affidavit are mere conclusions of law
and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Deficient of such particulars as
would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as
basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge
to have done so. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner
or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate,
not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause." Another factor which makes the search warrants under
consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general
warrants. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants
in question are too general.
With regard to the respondents invoking PD 885, there is an absence of any implementing rules
and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense. Furthermore, President Marcos
himself denies the request of military authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners.
The closure of the premises subjected to search and seizure is contrary to the freedom of the
press as guaranteed in our fundamental law. The search warrants are declared null and void.
TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE

[246 SCRA 184; G.R. NO. 89103; 14 JUL 1995]
Facts:
In August 1988, P/Sgt. Natuel applied for issuance of search warrant alleging that he received
information that Petitioner had in his possession at his house “M-16 Armalite rifles, hand
grenades, .45 Cal. pistols, dynamite sticks and subversive documents”, which were “used or
intended to be used” for illegal purposes. The application was granted.
In September, a police team, searched the house of petitioner and seized “2 envelopes
containing P14000, handset with antennae, transceiver with antennae, regulator supply, academy
Page 69
notebook and assorted papers and handset battery pack”. In October, petitioner moved that the
search and seizure be declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. In
December, MTCC, in its order, directed Lt. Col. Torres to return the money seized to petitioner
ruling that any seizure should be limited to the specified items covered thereby. SolGen
petitioned with the RTC for the annulment of the order of MTCC citing that pending the
determination of legality of seizure of the articles, they should remain in custogia legis. RTC
granted the petition.
Issue:
Whether or Not the seizure of the articles which were not mentioned in the search warrant was
legal.
Held:
Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly
describe the things to be seized. The police acts beyond the parameters of their authority if they
seize articles not described in the search warrants. The evident purpose and intent of the
requirement is to limit the things to be seized, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion;
that unreasonable search and seizure may not be made and that abuses may not be committed.
Petition granted. People of the Philippines is ordered to return the money seized.
PLACER VS. JUDGE VILLANUEVA

[126 SCRA 463; G.R. NOS. L-60349-62; 29 DEC 1983]
Facts:
Petitioners filed informations in the city court and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and
Examination had been conducted and that prima facie cases have been found. Upon receipt of
said informations, respondent judge set the hearing of the criminal cases to determine propriety
of issuance of warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent issued an order requiring
petitioners to submit to the court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary
evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of
the findings of probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus
to compel respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They contended that the fiscal’s certification in
the informations of the existence of probable cause constitutes sufficient justification for the judge
to issue warrants of arrest.
Issue:
Whether or Not respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel
the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation.
Held:
Judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification for the existence of probable cause and on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the judge to come out with
the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise
of judicial discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant
of arrest. If on the face of the information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard
the fiscal’s certification and require submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving
at the conclusion as to existence of probable cause.
Petition dismissed.
SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR

[167 SCRA 393; G.R. NO. 82585; 14 NOV 1988]
Facts:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners
were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding
of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and,
subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
Page 70
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining
the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have
rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice
sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988.
On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been
denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against
them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President.
Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge
issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if
any, to determine probable cause
Held:
With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary
investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a
"Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing
counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case
actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All
that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is
so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires
the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that respondent judge
has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of
arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be
sustained. The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts,
gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari
and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
Page 71
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on

the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos.
82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the
Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is
LIFTED.
SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO

[183 SCRA 145; G.R. NO. 81510; 14 MAR 1990]
Facts:
Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with
illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram
directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after
knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It
stated that there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be
used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has— (1) No
valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy
workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34
of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to
implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen,
went to petitioner’s residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let
them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting
for the return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The
said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and
the properties were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and
intimidation.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor)
can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code
Held:
Under the new Constitution, “. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized”. Mayors and prosecuting officers
cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article
38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, “We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not
being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go
through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor
Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect… The power of the President to order the arrest
of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made
to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the
courts.” Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The
court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically the things to be
seized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials
seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
MORANO VS. VIVO

[20 SCRA 562; G.R. L-22196; 30 JUN 1967]
Facts:
Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China arrived in the Philippines on November
1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left China and her children by a first marriage:
Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China. Chan Sau
Page 72
wah arrived in the Philippines with Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage. Chan
Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a
temporary visitor's visa for two months and after they posted a cash bond of 4,000 pesos. On
January 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to
this union on September 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr. To prolong their stay in the Philippines,
Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on
September 10, 1962. In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered
Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962
with a warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the
confiscation of their bond.
Issue:
Whether or Not the issuance of the warrant of arrest is unconstitutional.
Held:
Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary visitor's visa. She is a non-
immigrant. Under Section 13 just quoted, she may therefore be admitted if she were a qualified
and desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 9. Therefore,
first, she must depart voluntarily to some foreign country; second, she must procure from the
appropriate consul the proper visa; and third, she must thereafter undergo examination by the
officials of the Bureau of Immigration at the port of entry for determination of her admissibility in
accordance with the requirements of the immigration Act. This Court in a number of cases has
ruled, and consistently too, that an alien admitted as a temporary visitor cannot change his or her
status without first departing from the country and complying with the requirements of Section 9 of
the Immigration Act. The gravamen of petitioners' argument is that Chan Sau Wah has, since her
entry, married in Manila a native-born Filipino, Esteban Morano. It will not particularly help
analysis for petitioners to appeal to family solidarity in an effort to thwart her deportation. Chan
Sau Wah, seemingly is not one who has a high regard for such solidarity. Proof: She left two of
her children by the first marriage, both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China.Then, the
wording of the statute heretofore adverted to is a forbidding obstacle which will prevent this Court
from writing into the law an additional provision that marriage of a temporary alien visitor to a
Filipino would ipso facto make her a permanent resident in his country. This is a field closed to
judicial action. No breadth of discretion is allowed. We cannot insulate her from the State's power
of deportation. it would be an easy matter for an alien woman to enter the Philippines as a
temporary visitor, go through a mock marriage, but actually live with another man as husband and
wife, and thereby skirt the provisions of our immigration law. Also, a woman of undesirable
character may enter this country, ply a pernicious trade, marry a Filipino, and again throw
overboard Sections 9 and 13 of the Act. Such a flanking movement, we are confident, is
impermissible.Recently we confirmed the rule that an alien wife of a Filipino may not stay
permanently without first departing from the Philippines. Reason: Discourage entry under false
pretenses.
HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
[162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988]
Facts:
This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew
Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at
Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders
to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their
residences. The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two
young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den
Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his
care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime now.
Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of
suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex.
Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17
February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the
arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not
for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings.
On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable
aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code.
Page 73
Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46
of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special
Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not
granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending
determination of existence of probable cause.
Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents.
Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.
Held:
While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of
the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth.
The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of
3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to
the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are
admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).
The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an
absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the
arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the
foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest.
The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their
arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and
the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a
fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become
legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with
Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised
Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board
of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation
proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a
preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary
Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien
intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a
counsel if desired.
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the
sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence
in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people.
SALES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

[369 SCRA 293 G.R. NO. 143802; 16 NOV 2001]
Facts:
The petitioner, the incumbent mayor of Pagudpud Ilocos Norte, shot the former mayor and his
political rival Atty. Benemerito. After the shooting, he surrendered himself and hence the police
inspector and wife of the victim filed a criminal complaint for murder against him. The judge after
conducting the preliminary examination (p.e. for brevity) found probable cause and issued a
warrant of arrest. Also after conducting the preliminary investigation (p.i. for brevity), he issued a
resolution forwarding the case to the prosecutor for appropriate action. Petitioner received a
subpoena directing him to file his counter affidavit, affidavit of witnesses and other supporting
documents. He did it the following day. While proceedings are ongoing, he filed a petition for
Page 74
habeas corpus with the C.A alleging that: the warrant was null and void because the judge who
issued it was a relative by affinity of the private respondent and the p.e. and the p.i. were illegal
and irregular as the judge doesn’t have jurisdiction on the case. The C.A. granted the petition
holding that the judge was a relative by affinity by 3rd degree to the private respondent and the p.i.
he conducted has 2 stages, the p.e. and the p.i. proper. The proceeding now consists only of one
stage. He conducted the requisite investigation prior to the issuance of warrant of arrest.
Moreover he did not complete it. He only examined the witness of the complainant. But the
prosecution instead of conducting p.i. of his own forwarded the records to the Ombudsman (OMB
for brevity) for the latter to conduct the same. The OMB directed the petitioner to submit his
counter affidavit, but he did not comply with it finding the same superfluous. The graft investigator
recommended the filing of information for murder which the OMB approved. Petitioner received a
copy of the resolution but prevented seeking reconsideration thereof he filed a motion to defer
issuance of warrant of arrest pending the determination of probable cause. The Sandiganbayan
denied the motion. This is now a petition for review on the decision of the Sandiganbayan,
Issue:
Whether or Not the OMB followed the procedure in conducting preliminary investigation.
Whether or Not petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard and to submit controverting
evidence.
Held:
The proper procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation was not followed because of the
following reasons. Firstly, the preliminary investigation was conducted by 3 different investigators,
none of whom completed the preliminary investigation There was not one continuous proceeding
but rather, cases of passing the buck, the last one being the OMB throwing the buck to the
Sandiganbayan. Secondly, the charge of murder is a non bailable offense. The gravity of the
offense alone should have merited a deeper and more thorough preliminary investigation. The
OMB did nothing of the sort but wallowed the resolution of the graft investigator. He did a worse
job than the judge, by actually adopting the resolution of the graft investigator without doing
anything and threw everything to the Sandiganbayan for evaluation. Thirdly, a person under
preliminary investigation by the OMB is entitled to a motion for reconsideration, as maintained by
the Rules of Procedure by the OMB. The filing of the motion for reconsideration is an integral part
of the preliminary investigation proper. The denial thereof is tantamount to the denial of the right
itself to a preliminary investigation. This fact alone renders preliminary investigation conducted in
this case incomplete. And lastly, it was patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely
on the OMB’s certification of probable cause given the prevailing facts of the case much more so
in the face of the latter’s flawed report and one side factual findings.
The court cannot accept the Sandiganbayan’s assertion of having found probable cause on its
own, considering the OMB’s defective report and findings, which merely rekied on the testimonies
of the witnesses for the prosecution and disregarded the evidence for the defense.
Judgment is rendered setting aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan, ordering the
Sandiganbayan to quash the warrant of arrest and remanding the OMB for completion of the
preliminary investigation.
SILVA VS. PRESIDING JUDGE

[203 SCRA 140; G.R. No. 81756; 21 Oct 1991]
Facts:
Sgt. Villamor, chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City filed an "application for
search warrant" and "Deposition of witness" against petitioner Nicomedes Silva and Martin Silva.
Judge Nickarter Ontal, then the presiding judge of RTC of Dumaguete issued Search Warrant
No.1 pursuant to the said applications for violation of RA 6425 Dangerous Drugs ACT of 1972.
Such warrant states that there is a probable cause to believe that Mr. Tama Silva has the
possession and control of marijuana dried leaves, cigarette and joint. The warrant authorizes Sgt.
Villamor to make an immediate search at any time of the room of Mr. Tama Silva at the residence
of his father Comedes Silva and to open aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartons and containers to
look for said illegal drugs. In the course of the search, the officers seized money belonging to
Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1,231.40. Petitioner filed a motion to quash Search Warrant
No.1 on the ground that 1) it was issued on the sole basis of mimeographed 2) the judge failed to
personally examine the complainant and witness by searching questions and answers.
Issue:
Page 75
Whether or Not Search Warrant No.1 is invalid. WON the officers abused their authority in seizing
the money of Antonieta Silva.
Held:
Search Warrant No. 1 is invalid due to the failure of the judge to examine the witness in the form
of searching questions and answers. The questions asked were leading as they are answerable
by mere yes or no. Such questions are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The
questions were already mimeographed and all the witness had to do was fill in their answers on
the blanks provided. Judge Ontal is guilty of grave abuse of discretion when he rejected the
motion of Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her money.
The officers who implemented the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized
the money of Antonieta Silva. The warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only for
marijuana leaves, cigarettes..etc. Search Warrant No. 1 is declared null and void.
*** Sec 4 Rule 126 Rules of Court

Examination of the complainant, record -the judge before issuing the warrant, personally examine
in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and
any witness he may produce the facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements together with their affidavits.
VEROY VS. LAYAGUE

[210 SCRA 97; G.R. No. 95630; 18 Jun 1992]
Facts:
Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at No. 13 Isidro St., Skyline
Village. Catalunan Grande, Davao City. When petitioner Leopoldo Veroy was promoted to the
position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System sometime in June, 1988, he and
his family transferred to 130 K-8th St., East Kamias, Quezon City, where they are presently
residing. The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to two (2) houseboys,
Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. The
Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna Soguilon for the salary of the said houseboys
and other expenses for the upkeep of their house. While the Veroys had the keys to the interior of
the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the circuit breakers were located, was entrusted to
Edna Soguilon to give her access in case of an emergency. Hence, since 1988, the key to the
master's bedroom as well as the keys to the children's rooms were retained by herein Petitioners
so that neither Edna Soguilon nor the caretakers could enter the house.
Police Officers had an information that the petitioner’s residence was being used as a safehouse
of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter
the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. Petitioner
Ma. Luisa was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by Capt. Obrero to ask
permission to search the house in Davao City as it was reportedly being used as a hideout and
recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to
Davao City to witness the search but relented if the search would not be conducted in the
presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP, Davao City and a long time family
friend of the Veroys.
The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the house of herein petitioners in
Skyline Village to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa
Veroy. The caretakers facilitated their entry into the yard, and using the key entrusted to Edna
Soguilon, they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen. However, a locksmith by the name of
George Badiang had to be employed to open the padlock of the door leading to the children's
room. Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the children's room and conducted the
search. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing seven (7) live
bullets in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer. Three (3) half-full jute sacks containing
printed materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the children's room. A search of the children's
recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted polo shirts, men's
brief, two (2) pieces polo barong and short sleeve striped gray polo. sweat shirt, two (2) pairs
men's socks, a towel made in U.S.A., one blanket, a small black bag, Gandhi brand, containing a
book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a
telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was found in the
master's bedroom. Sgt. Leo Justalero was instructed by Capt. Obrero to make an inventory and
receipt of the articles seized, in the house.
Page 76
The case was referred for preliminary investigation to Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor Rodolfo
Ponferrada who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City. In a resolution
dated August 6, 1990, Fiscal Ponferrada recommended the filing of an information against herein
petitioners for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion). No bail was recommended.
Issue:
Whether or Not Presidential Decree No. 1866, or at least the third paragraph of Section 1 thereof,
is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.
Held:
The issue of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been laid to rest in the case of
Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990 (181 SCRA 648), where this Court held that
the declaration of unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866 is wanting in legal basis since it is neither a bill of attainder nor does it provide a
possibility of a double jeopardy.
Petitioners' contention that Republic Act 6968 has repealed Presidential Decree No. 1866 is
bereft of merit. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a
statute are not obscure or ambiguous. its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be
determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is
no room for construction. Petitioners contend that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is
couched in general or vague terms. The terms "deal in", "acquire", "dispose" or "possess" are
capable of various interpretations such that there is no definiteness as to whether or not the
definition includes "constructive possession" or how the concept of constructive possession
should be applied. Petitioners were not found in actual possession of the firearm and
ammunitions. They were in Quezon City while the prohibited articles were found in Davao City.
Yet they were being charged under Presidential Decree No. 1866 upon the sole circumstance
that the house wherein the items were found belongs to them.
Petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Petitioners aver that while they
concede that Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their
residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged
"rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search
once inside the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of
their constitutional rights As such, they are inadmissible in evidence against them.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant
is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to
an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Lo
Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 [193 SCRA 122]).
None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house of
herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for
rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house
because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he
himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house
but rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed
granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel
soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to
procure a search warrant but did not.
Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not
follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita
but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are
prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no
exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore
protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners
in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145
SCRA 689-690 [1986]). Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala
Page 77
prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same
existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition as granted and the criminal case against the petitioners
for illegal possession of firearms is DISMISSED.
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO

[234 SCRA 246; G.R. NO. 109633; 20 JUL 1994]
Facts:
Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms and illegal
possession and sale of drugs, particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the
search warrant, which authorized the search and seizure of an undetermined quantity of
methamphetamine and its paraphernalia’s, an entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of
del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalia’s and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3
live ammunition.
Issue:
Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper.
Held:
No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must particularly
describe the things to be seized. In herein case, the only objects to be seized that the warrant
determined was the methamphetamine and the paraphernalia’s therein. The seizure of the
firearms was unconstitutional.
Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted.
PEOPLE VS. GESMUNDO

[219 SCRA 743; G.R. NO. 89373; 19 MAR 1993]
Facts:
According to the prosecution, in the morning of Nov. 17, 1986, PO Jose Luciano gave money and
instructed his civilian informer to buy marijuana from the accused at the Cocoland Hotel. He
actually saw the accused selling marijuana to his civilian informer and that same day Luciano
applied for a search warrant.
About 2pm that day, a police raiding team armed with a search warrant went to the Brgy captain
for them to be accompanied in serving the said warrant at the residence of the accused. The
police was allowed to enter the house upon the strength of the warrant shown to the accused.
The accused begged the police not to search and to leave the house. The police still searched
the house and was led to the kitchen. She pointed a metal basin on top of a table as the hiding
place of died marijuana flowering tops contained in a plastic bag marked ISETANN. The police
also recovered from a native “uway” cabinet dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in 3 pieces
of komiks paper.
According to the accused, when the police arrived at her house, she saw Sgt. Yte and PFC Jose
Luciano. She invited Sgt. Yte to enter her house while Luciano was left in the jeep that was
parked near the house. While inside the house Yte showed the accused something he claimed as
a search warrant, when someone coming from the kitchen uttered “eto na” They proceeded to the
kitchen and saw Luciano holding a plastic bag with four other companions. They confronted the
accused and insisted that the bags belonged to her. Accused denied the accusation and told
them that she doesn’t know anything about it. She was made to sign a prepared document. She
was brought to the police station and was detained.
The court renders judgment finding the accused guilty.
Issue:
Page 78
Whether or Not the evidence was properly obtained by the police.
Held:
In the investigation report prepared by Luciano stated that during the search they discovered a
hole at the backyard of the house of the suspect, there was a big biscuit can inside the hole and
on top of the cover a flower pot was placed wherein the marijuana was kept. However, there was
no mention of any marijuana obtained from a flower pot in any of their testimonies. There were
inconsistencies insofar the prosecution is concerned, as to what was recovered and where, the
trial court concluded that these inconsistencies are trivial. There must sufficient evidence that the
marijuana was actually surrendered by the accused. As held in PP vs. Remorosa, Irreconcilable
and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the
guilt of appellant and his culpability to the crime charged.
The claim that the marijuana was planted was strengthen as the police violated sec 7, rule 126
rules of the court provides no search of a house, room or any other premise shall be made except
in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of
the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality. This requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search
warrant. Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code.
The document (PAGPAPATUNAY) was inadmissible to the court as the accused was not
informed of her right not to sign the document neither was she informed that she has the right to
the assistance of a counsel and the fact that it may be used as evidence against her. It was not
proved that the marijuana belonged to her. Not only does the law require the presence of
witnesses when the search is conducted, but it also imposes upon the person making the search
the duty to issue a detailed receipt for the property seized. He is likewise required to deliver the
property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true and accurate inventory
thereof duly verified under oath. Again, these duties are mandatory and are required to preclude
substitution of the items seized by interested parties.
The guilt of the accused was has not been established. Judgment is reversed.
UMIL VS. RAMOS

[187 SCRA 311; G.R. NO. 81567; 3 OCT 1991]
Facts:
On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about
a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot
wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who
murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00
o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The
wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two
(22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna however it was disclosed
later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification,
Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security
reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who
murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.
Issue:
Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.
Held:
Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it
can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
therefore in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature
of continuing crimes.
Page 79
PEOPLE VS. SUCRO

[195 SCRA 388; G.R. No. 93239; 18 Mar 1991]
Facts:
Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison
SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from
Regalado’s house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times.
These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with
appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment,
P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in
Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and
Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea
bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of
the chapel.
The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans.
Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another
teabag from Macabante.
Issue:
Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful.
Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible.
Held:
Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec
12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.(People v. Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a
warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was insufficient to
fulfill requirements for its issuance. However, warantless search and seizures are legal as long
as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual
commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers
were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance
of their duties.
PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZA
[205 SCRA 791; G.R. No. 95902; 4 Feb 1992]
Facts:
NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining information that there was an
ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents were given
money treated with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said location, asked for a
certain Don. Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him and “a certain object wrapped in
a plastic” later identified as marijuana was given in exchange for P200. The agent went back to
headquarters and made a report, based on which, a team was subsequently organized and a raid
was conducted in the house of the father of the accused. During the raid, the NARCOM agents
were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe among others. There was
no authorization by any search warrant. The accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder.
The lower court, considering the evidences obtained and testimonies from the prosecution, found
him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
Whether or Not the lower court was correct in its judgment.
Held:
The NARCOM agents’ procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the qualification
that the suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a
Page 80
person posing as a buyer, since the operation was conducted after the actual exchange. Said
raid also violated accused’ right against unreasonable search and seizure, as the situation did not
fall in the circumstances wherein a search may be validly made even without a search warrant,
i.e. when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it involves prohibited articles in plain
view. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and
necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the
place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to
conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant
during that time. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the
confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence
against appellant:
CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been
advanced therefor, what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and thereafter utilized as
evidence against the appellant were the following items:
One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:
Exh. "A"—Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained
inside a transparent plastic bag.
Exh. "B"— Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds
contained inside a white colored plastic labelled "Robertson".
Exh. "C"— Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana
fruiting tops having a total weight of seven grams then further wrapped
with a piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D"— Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected
dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seventeen grams.
Exh. "E"— One plastic syringe.
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up
raid in the house of Rodrigueza’s father. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity
of the marijuana leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this
Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained
therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the existence thereof must be proved
with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
Conviction is reversed and set aside and accused is acquitted.
PEOPLE VS. SY CHUA

[396 SCRA 657; G.R. No.136066-67; 4 Feb 2003]
Facts:
Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A.
6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal
Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations.
SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accused-
appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City.
So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group positioned themselves across
McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as their
back up.
Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and
parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a
sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced
themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent
plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2
Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm
bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box,
he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small
transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets
and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived
at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters
in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.
Page 81
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version
of the incident.
Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son to
Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped
in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store,
he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside of his car. When he called the attention of
the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with
raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest,
the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the
policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officer’s
companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled
him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car.
Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen
minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of
reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while
pictures were being taken.
The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him
for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and (2) WON the search of his person
and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were conducted in a lawful and
valid manner.
Held:
The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will distribute
illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act
quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to
a “stop and frisk”.
The trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful
arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof
before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used
as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest
before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this exception to
apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant did not
act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that
accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
“Reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable
cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
With regard to the concept of “stop-and frisk”: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop-
and-frisk”. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer
to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized that a
search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The foregoing
circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested
before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The
Page 82
apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellant’s business
in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police
officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant.
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is applicable to
justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives
on accused-appellant.
Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby Acquitted.
GO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

[206 SCRA 138; G.R. NO. 101837; 11 FEB 1992]
Facts:
Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with
another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and
drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioner’s plate number and
reported the same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after
the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the
police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted
bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without
preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to
preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been
arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of
The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to
situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such
procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation.
Issue:
Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.
Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.
Held:
Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the
warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which
however constituted “continuing crimes,” i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed
organization, etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is
because the arresting officers were not actually there during the incident, thus they had no
personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources.
Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.
Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed
surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was
filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine
probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary
investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat.
Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal
case is suspended pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released
upon posting a bail bond.
CALLANTA VS. VILLANUEVA

[77 SCRA 377; G.R. NOS. 24646 & L-24674; 20 JUN 1977]
Facts:
Two complaints for grave oral defamation were filed against Faustina Callanta. The City Judge of
Dagupan City, Felipe Villanueva, denied the motions to quash the complaints. Thus, petitioner
Callanta brought the suits for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Petitioner questions the validity of
the issuance of warrant of arrest by respondent, arguing that the City Fiscal should have
conducted the preliminary investigation. According to petitioner’s counsel, there was jurisdictional
infirmity. After the issuance of the warrants of arrest and the bail fixed at P600, petitioner posted
Page 83
the bail bond, thus obtaining her provisional liberty. The City Fiscal in this case did not disagree
with the judge’s investigation, and agreed with the complaints filed.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner’s contentions are to be given merit.
Held:
Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court, “where the accused has filed bail and
waived the preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the
preliminary examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest”. In the case at
bar, it is futile for the petitioner to question the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest,
because she posted the bail bond. Petitioner also erred in arguing that only the City Fiscal can
conduct a preliminary investigation. According to the Charter of the City of Dagupan, “the City
Court of Dagupan City may also conduct preliminary investigation for any offense, without regard
to the limits of punishment, and may release, or commit and bind over any person charged with
such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court”. Petition for certiorari is denied.
Restraining order issued by the Court is lifted and set aside.
POSADAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

[188 SCRA 288; G.R. NO. 89139; 2 AUG 1990]
Facts:
Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the
Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along
Magallanes Street, Davao City. While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted
petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached
the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but
his attempt to get away was unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner
where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196, two (2)
rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live
ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further
investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license
or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so.
He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from
him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.
Issue:
Whether or Not the warantless search is valid.
Held:
In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that
under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search
warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the
circumstances.
in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering that it was
effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to
inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the
petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise
may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
Page 84
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore
discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
has not been violated.
PEOPLE V. MENGOTE
[210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059; 22 JUN 1992]
Facts:
The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three
suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo,
Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The
patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They
approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run
but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then
searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions
in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were
turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. An information was filed before the RTC
convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon
was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the revolver.
For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed
to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest.
He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his
appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had
been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.
Held:
An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding
for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of
Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person arrested has
committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal establishment or a
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen,
according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just
been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their
presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy
street on unexplained suspicion.
Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.
PEOPLE VS. TANGLIBEN

[184 SCRA 220; G.R. No.L-63630; 6 Apr 1990]
Facts:
Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San Fernando
Victory Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a
traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they
found marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further
investigations. The TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search warrant.
Page 85
Held;
No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person may w/o a warrant arrest a
person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession of marijuana
and can be therefore searched lawfully even without a search warrant. Another reason is that this
case poses urgency on the part of the arresting police officers. It was found out that an informer
pointed to the accused telling the policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana. The police
officers had to act quickly and there was not enough time to secure a search warrant.
PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT

[198 SCRA 401; G.R. No. 91107; 19 Jun 1991]
Facts:
In an information filed against the accused- appellant Mikael Malmstead was charged before the
RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning
of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. Then in
the 7 in the morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada.
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain
Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to
establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was
received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The group composed of seven (7)
NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the
designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region.
The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the
bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification
papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that
was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused
opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped
in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped
objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the
bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out
of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag.
Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not
feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally
presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears
and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the
hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC
Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited
drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
ACCUSED’S DEFENSE
Page 86
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the
issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him,
but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further
claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there
were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused
to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable
doubt.
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged,
accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a
search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal
search are not admissible as evidence against him.
Issue:
Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid, and therefore the RTC ruling be reversed.
Held:
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made
pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search
made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of
law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that the
NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the
personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient
probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as
valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a
plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and
attempted to flee.
The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby affirmed. Costs against the
accused-appellant.
PEOPLE VS. AMMINUDIN

[163 SCRA 402; G.R. L-74869; 6 Jul 1988]
Facts:
Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking
from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact
waiting for him because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag
Page 87
and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation.
The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as
marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y
Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both
were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the
charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a
'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-
appellant, who was eventually convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana,
averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs
of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was
confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him
to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the
chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not
even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes
cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during
that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained.
Issue:
Whether or not search of defendant’s bag is legal.
Held:
The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow
warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor
was he about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana therefore could not be
appreciated as evidence against the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as
charged.
PEOPLE VS. SAYCON

[236 SCRA 325; G.R. NO. 110995; 5 SEPT 1994]
Facts:
On or about 8 July 1992, at about 6:00 in the morning, the Coastguard personnel received
information from NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that a suspected "shabu" courier by the name
of Alvaro Saycon was on board the MV Doña Virginia, which was arriving at that moment in
Dumaguete City. Upon receipt of the information, the Coastguard chief officer CPO Tolin,
instructed them to intercept the suspect. A combined team of NARCOM agents and Philippine
Coastguard personnel consisting of CPO Tolin, a certain Miagme, and Senior Police Officers
Ruben Laddaran and Winifredo Noble of NARCOM posted themselves at the gate of Pier 1. The
MV Doña Virginia docked at 6:00 a.m. that same morning at Pier 1 in Dumaguete City. Alvaro
Saycon alighted from the boat carrying a black bag and went through the checkpoint manned by
the Philippine Coastguard where he was identified by police officer Winifredo Noble of NARCOM.
Saycon was then invited to the Coastguard Headquarters at the Pier area. He willingly went with
them. At the headquarters, the coastguard asked Saycon to open his bag, and the latter willingly
obliged. In it were personal belongings and a maong wallet. Inside that maong wallet, there was a
Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu". When police officer Winifredo Noble asked
Saycon whether the Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu" was his, Saycon merely
bowed his head. Then Saycon, his bag and the suspected "shabu" were brought to the NARCOM
office for booking. When Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the NARCOM agents did not have a
warrant of arrest. The PNP's Forensic Analyst declared in court that she had conducted an
examination of the specimens and found out that the specimens weighed 4.2 grams in total,
consisted of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more widely known as "shabu."
Issue:
Whether or Not the warrantless search was valid.
Held:
Page 88
The warrantless search was valid, as the accused was a passenger of a motor vehicle. There
was probable cause to believe that the accused was carrying prohibited drugs. Three weeks
earlier, agents of the Narcotics Command bought methamine hydrochloride from him. An agent of
the Narcotics Command reported that the accused would be arriving on board the vessel and
carrying methamphetamine hydrochloride with him. Drug couriers do not go about their trade with
some external sign indicating that they are transporting prohibited drugs. This must be taken into
account in determining probable cause.
PEOPLE VS. MUSA

[217 SCRA 597; G.,R. NO. 96177; 27 JAN 1993]
Facts:
A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in
Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct
a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to Musa’s house and gave
the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully buys
marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned
themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was going
on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more
marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back,
giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He
raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and
arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not find the
marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the
kitchen and found a ‘cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen.’
They asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and found
dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.
Issue:
Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is unreasonable, hence,
inadmissible as evidence.
Held:
Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as evidence.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. Objects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The ‘plain view’
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the
seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the ‘plain
view’ of the object.
In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the ‘plain view’ of the police. They arrested the
accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for other evidences where they
found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately
apparent from the ‘plain view’ of said object.
Therefore, the ‘plain view’ does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be
presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.
PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

[178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO. 80806; 5 OCT 1989]
Facts:
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City
of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services
Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and
Page 89
confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks,
magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and
indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto
Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various
student organizations.
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and
co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of
the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiff’s
magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a
decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is
protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also
filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate
seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the
petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case
was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or Not the seizure was illegal.
Held:
The Court ruled that the government authorities have not shown the required proof to justify a ban
and to warrant confiscation of the literature. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court
order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a
search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The court provides the following guidelines to be
observed:
1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their
opinion an obscenity seizure is in order;
2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are
obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant
State interference and action;
3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is
to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion;
4. If in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it shall issue the search warrant
prayed for;
5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the RPC (Obscene
publications).
6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or not the
properties seized are indeed obscene.
GUANZON VS. DE VILLA

[181 SCRA 623; G.R. 80508; 30 JAN 1990]
Facts:
The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were conducted
in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target
house to be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the
policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The
residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their
houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were
ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents
complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their
valuables. Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents
also reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained
also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical informations. The
respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contends that the Constitution
grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance
of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal
elements coddled by the communities were the said drives were conducted. They said that they
have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and
Page 90
foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event.
Issue:
Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights.
Held:
It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the
methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it
appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before
any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing
that the objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th
rights of the squatters and low income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should
not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is properly
charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom
the court can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given.
In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court temporary
restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC
of Manila.
PEOPLE VS. ARUTA

[288 SCRA 626; G.R. NO. 120515; 13 APR 1998]
Facts:
On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain “Aling Rosa” will be
arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team. The next day,
at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when the informer
pointed out who “Aling Rosa” was, the team approached her and introduced themselves as
NARCOM agents. When Abello asked “aling Rosa” about the contents of her bag, the latter
handed it out to the police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked
“cash katutak”.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality
of the search and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused claimed that she had just
come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie “Balweg”. While about to cross the road
an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later on arrested by
the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman was nowhere
to be found. Also, no search warrant was presented.
The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972
Issue:
Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused.
Held:
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present
in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent, and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
Page 91
The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and
seizure can be lawfully conducted.
The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street and
was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime.
There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accused’s bag, there was no
probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested.
The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. The
seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence.
RULE 113, RULES OF COURT
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
RULE 126, RULES OF COURT
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An application for search
warrant shall be filed with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where
the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the
court where the criminal action is pending.
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. — The officer, if refused admittance to
the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any
outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the
warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon.
(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant,
together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the
return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was
issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made,
the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and
shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that
subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book
on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other
actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.
Page 92
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL
Art 3, Sec. 6. “The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.”
CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR

[82 PHIL 851; NO.L-2690; 1 JAN 1949]
Facts:
This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita
Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar,
respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment
agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence,
which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was
restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her
transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed
to leave.
Issue:
Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without
returning the advance payment it gave?
Held:
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or

maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force
has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the
deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another,
freedom to choose one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to
founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an
impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail
the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such
psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the
protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
duress or physical coercion.
MANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS

[142 SCRA 149; G.R. NO. L-62100; 30 MAY 1986]
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a
motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire
to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The
prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals
seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove,
respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ
commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command
(AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Page 93
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which
granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his
liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Issue:
Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.
Held:
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon
petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave
the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the
business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS

[177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211; 15 SEPT 1989]
Facts:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres.
Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the
President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the
Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1
and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President
impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino)
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held:
"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's
country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to
travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a
state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct
rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country,
including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security,
public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's
country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the
liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered
view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International
Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by
the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after
the Marcos regime.
Page 94
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SILVERIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

[195 SCRA 760 ; G.R. 94284; 8 APR 1991]
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised securities act. Respondent
filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold departure order. The RTC
ordered the DFA to cancel petitioner’s passport, based on the finding that the petitioner has not
been arraigned and there was evidence to show that the accused has left the country with out the
knowledge and the permission of the court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court.
Held:
The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has been issued by
reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments. There is a valid restriction on the right to
travel, it is imposed that the accused must make himself available whenever the court requires
his presence. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the
country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p.
138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a
warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where
the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par. ]).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty
of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or
administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can
impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may
be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution,
Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the
1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous
regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel
upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center,
No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure
from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may
be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People
of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and
proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to
Court Orders and processes
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. VASQUEZ

[217 SCRA 633; G.R. NOS. 99289-90; 27 JAN 1993]
Facts:
An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for release fixed at Php.
15,000 so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the later
filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the
cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The
Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner,
by reason of the announcement she made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a
fellowship a Harvard. In the instant motion she submitted before the S.C. she argues that her
right to travel is impaired.
Page 95
Issue:
Whether or Not the petitioner’s right to travel is impaired.
Held:
The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public statement, that she he
every intension of leaving the country to pursue higher studies abroad. The court upholds the
course of action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go
abroad and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of
respondent court’s inherent power to preserve and to maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction
over the case and the person of the accused.
Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herself amenable
at all times to the orders and process of eth court. She may legally be prohibited from leaving the
country during the pendency of the case. (Manotoc v. C.A.)
MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

[247 SCRA 127; G.R. NO. 115132-34; 9 AUG 1995]
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside as arbitrary and in grave abuse of discretion resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan's First Division denying petitioner's motion for leave to travel abroad for
medical treatment.
The former first lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
of violating 3 of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After conviction she filed a "Motion for
Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and treatment by practitioners of oriental
medicine in China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening medical condition"
requiring facilities not available in the Philippines that was denied. Then she again filed an
"Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and treatment in
China. This was supported by several medical reports that were prepared by her doctor Roberto
Anastacio.
Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos to US and Europe for treatment of
several Heart diseases alleging that the tests were not available here.
The presiding justice, Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the
Philippine Heart Center, and later wrote him a letter, asking for "expert opinion on coronary
medicine". The court still found no merit to allow the petitioners motion to leave and denied all of
the motions.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to Admit Clinical Summary and to
Resolve Motion for Reconsideration." Attached was a recent medical report and letters of Vice
President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and those of
twenty four members of the House of Representatives requesting the court to allow petitioner to
travel abroad. This was also denied by the Court also stating their express disapproval of the
involvement of the VP and the Cabinet members so as to influence the resolutions, decisions or
orders or any judicial action of respondent court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Sandiganbayan erred in disallowing the Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad
because it (1) disregarded the medical findings (2) it motu propio contacted a third party asking
the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings (3) said that there was no
necessity to get medical treatment abroad.
Held:
No. The contention of the petitioner that was invalid to contact a third party asking the latter to
give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings was erroneous. Respondent court had
to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her physician. The
court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving her
request for permission to travel. What would be objectionable would be if respondent court
obtained information without disclosing its source to the parties and used it in deciding a case
against them.
Page 96
In disregarding the medical reports, the petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad. It
should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in
several cases, in two of which she was convicted although the decision is still pending
reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the burden was
on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek
medical treatment in foreign countries.
On the third issue, the Court ordered petitioner to undergo several tests which summarily states
that the required medical treatment was available here in the Philippines and that the expertise
and facilities here were more than adequate to cater to her medical treatment. The heart ailments
of the petitioner were not as severe as that was reported by Dr. Anastacio.
Wherefore, the petitioner is Dismissed without prejudice to the filling of another motion for leave
to travel abroad, should petitioner still desire, based on her heart condition. In such an event the
determination of her medical condition should be made by joint panel of medical specialists
recommended by both the accused and the prosecution.
RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO

[39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]
Facts:
The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants
(uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands.
It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in
the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation
providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial
governor.
In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in
the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the
districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the
site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order
shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of
the revised Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they
roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the
custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
Issue:
Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty pf abode.
Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Held:
The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his
liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement
in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary
servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a
legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people
of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige
them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the
necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
Page 97
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines.
“Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and
for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do
exactly as he pleases.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus
can, therefore, not issue.
Page 98
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Art 3, Sec. 5. “No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required
for the exercise of civil or political rights.”
AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ

[64 PHIL 201; G.R. NO. 45459; 13 MAR 1937]
Facts:
Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating
that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion,
etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the
purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a
weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in
accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the
production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.
Held:
What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is
however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in
human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to
his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of
morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052
“advantageous to the government” does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance
of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage
stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the
Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress.” The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila,
being the seat of that congress. This was to “to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists,” the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance.
Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church,
any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the
Government.
GARCES VS. ESTENZO

[104 SCRA 510; G.R. L-53487; 25 MAY 1981]
Facts:
Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:
a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of

April. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the
construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through
the selling of tickets and cash donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the
caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his
residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The image would be
made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saint’s feast day.
These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The
image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after
a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it
was the church’s property since church funds were used in its acquisition.
Page 99
Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case
against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain
Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of
the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church,
contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.
Issue:
Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.
Held:
No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image
was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of
favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any
activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal.
Practically, the image was placed in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be made available
to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the
council’s funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the
determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is
no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every government activity
which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the
constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and
banning the use of public money or property.
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY VS. CITY OF MANILA

[101PHIL 386; G.R. NO. 9637; 30 APR 1957]
Facts:
New York’s Education Law requires local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of
charge to all students in grade 7 to 12, including those in private schools. The Board of Education
contended that said statute was invalid and violative of the State and Federal Constitutions. An
order barring the Commissioner of Education (Allen) from removing appellant’s members from
office for failure to comply with the requirement and an order preventing the use of state funds for
the purchase of textbooks to be lent to parochial schools were sought for. The trial court held the
statute unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the decision and dismissed the
complaint since the appellant have no standing. The New York Court of Appeals, ruled that the
appellants have standing but the law is not unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or Not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free
exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).
Held:
Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:
(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious
information.
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets
was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean
that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit.
For this reason. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as
amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs.
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any
charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious
practices.
Page 100
It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional,
however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No.
2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to
license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.
WHEREFORE, defendant shall return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it.
GERMAN VS. BARANGAN

[135 SCRA 514; G.R. NO. 68828; 27 MAR 1985]
Facts:
Petitioners converged at J.P. Laurel Street to hear Mass at the St. Jude Chapel, which adjoined
Malacañang. Respondent barred them for security reasons. Petitioners filed a petition for
mandamus.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a violation of the constitutional freedom.
Held:
Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship but to conduct an anti-
government demonstration since they wore yellow T-shirts, raised their clenched fists and
shouted anti- government slogans. While every citizen has the right to religious freedom, the
exercise must be done in good faith. Besides, the restriction was reasonable as it was designed
to protect the lives of the President and his family, government officials and diplomatic and
foreign guests transacting business with Malacanang. The restriction was also intended to secure
the executive offices within the Malacanang grounds from possible external attacks and
disturbances. (Minority opinion) The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the
exercise of the freedom of religion is the existence of a grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has
a right to prevent. The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger lies on the
officials who would restrain petitioners. Respondents were in full control and had the capability to
stop any untoward move. There was no clear and present danger of any serious evil to public
safety or the security of Malacanang.
EBRALINAG VS. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF CEBU

[219 SCRA 256 ; G.R. NO. 95770; 1 MAR 1993]
Facts:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated for
raising same issue. Petitioners allege that the public respondents acted without or in excess of
their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS
and GS students of Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Caracar, Taburan and Asturias in Cebu. Public
school authorities expelled these students for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem
and recite the “Panatang Makabayan” required by RA1265. They are Jehovah’s Witnesses
believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings.
They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against
official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al
v. Secretary of Education. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the
church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any
religious ceremony. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not
mean exception from non-discriminatory laws like the saluting of flag and singing national
anthem. This exemption disrupts school discipline and demoralizes the teachings of civic
consciousness and duties of citizenship.
Issue:
Whether or Not religious freedom has been violated.
Held:
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right to religious
worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought. 2.)
Freedom to act on one’s belief regulated and translated to external acts. The only limitation to
Page 101
religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health
and interests where State has right to prevent. The expulsion of the petitioners from the school is
not justified.
The 30 yr old previous GERONA decision of expelling and dismissing students and teachers who
refuse to obey RA1265 is violates exercise of freedom of speech and religious profession and
worship. Jehovah’s Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this right
does not give them the right to disrupt such ceremonies. In the case at bar, the Students
expelled were only standing quietly during ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly, it
doesn’t present any danger so evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. What the petitioner’s
request is exemption from flag ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools. The expulsion
of the students by reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizen’s right to free
education. The non-observance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute ignorance of
patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national heroes, civic
consciousness and form of government are part of the school curricula. Therefore, expulsion due
to religious beliefs is unjustified.
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED. Expulsion is ANNULLED.
FONACIER VS. COURT OF APPEALS

[96 PHIL 417; G.R. L-5917; 28 JAN 1955]
Facts:
Case was filed by Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI), represented by its supreme bishop Gerardo
Bayaca, against Bishop Fonacier seeking to render an accounting of his administration of all the
temporal properties and to recover the same on the ground that he ceased to be the supreme
bishop of IFI. Isabelo De los Reyes Jr. had been elected as the Supreme Bishop.
Petitioner claims that he was not properly removed as Supreme Bishop and his legal successor
was Juan Jamias. He claims that the there was an accounting of his administration and was
turned over to bishop Jamias. Also, that Isabelo De los Reyes and Bayaca have abandoned their
faith and formally joined the Prostestant Episcopal Church of America.
CFI rendered judgment declaring Isabelo De Los Reyes, Jr. as the sole and legitimate Supreme
Bishop of IFI and ordered Fonacier to render an accounting of his admistration
CA affirmed the decision of the CFI
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner should still be regarded as the legitimate supreme bishop of IFI.
Held:
Supreme Court affirmed CA’s decision. The legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI is Isabelo De los
Reyes, Jr. The Supreme Court affirms the validity of the election of Bishop Delos Reyes as the
Supreme Bishop based on their internal laws
To finally dispose of the property issue, the Court, citing Watson v. Jones,368 declared that the
rule in property controversies within religious congregations strictly independent of any other
superior ecclesiastical association (such as the Philippine Independent Church) is that the rules
for resolving such controversies should be those of any voluntary association. If the congregation
adopts the majority rule then the majority should prevail; if it adopts adherence to duly constituted
authorities within the congregation, then that should be followed.
PAMIL VS. TELECOM

[86 SCRA 413; G.R. 34854; 20 NOV 1978]
Facts:
Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected as Municipal Mayor in Alburquerque, Bohol. Petitioner, also
an aspirant for said office, then filed a suit for quo warranto for Gonzaga’s disqualification based
on the Administrative Code provision: “In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a
municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or
compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the
municipality." The respondent Judge, in sustaiing Fr. Gonzaga’s right to the office, ruled that the
Page 102
provision had already been impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. Petitioner on the
other hand argues that there was no implied repeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not Fr. Gonzaga is eligible for the position of municipal mayor, according to law.
Whether or Not the prohibition regarding elected or appointed ecclesiastics is constitutional.
Held:
The court was divided. Five voted that the prohibition was not unconstitutional. Seven others
voted that the provision was impliedly repealed. However, the minority vote overruled the seven.
According to the dissenting seven, there are three reasons for the said provision to be
inoperative. First, the 1935 Constitution stated, “No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.” Second, said section 2175 is superseded by the Constitution.
Third, section 2175 has been repealed by Sec. 23 of the Election Code (1971): “Appointive public
office holders and active members of the Armed Forces are no longer disqualified from running
for an elective office”. Ecclesiastics were no longer included in the enumeration of persons
ineligible under the said Election Code. On the other hand, the controlling five argued: Section
2175 of the Administrative Code deals with a matter different from that of section 23 of the
Election Code. Also, section 2175 of the Administrative Code did not violate the right to freedom
of religion because it did not give any requirement for a religious test.
The view of the dissenting seven failed to obtain a vote of eight members, so it was not
controlling. The provision of the Administrative Code remained operative.
ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR

[492 SCRA 1 ; AM NO P-02-1651; 22 JUN 2006]
Facts:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with
Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him
as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is
still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if
the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective
when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Issue:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
Held:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion.
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The
State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of
an unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be
kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
Page 103
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.
This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided
it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a
compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive
means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes
an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

[405 SCRA 497;GR 153888; 9 JUL 2003]
Facts:
Petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) is a corporation that operates
under Department of Social Welfare and Development, a non-governmental organization that
extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It claims to
be a federation of national Islamic organizations and an active member of international
organizations such as the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific
(RISEAP) and The World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue
halal certifications in the Philippines. Thus, among the functions petitioner carries out is to
conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified
products and manufacturers.
Petitioner alleges that, the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food
producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on the
Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal
certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified
products and food manufacturers. Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal certificates a
distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent Office.
On 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 465 creating the Philippine
Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation.
Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform
other related regulatory activities.
Issue:
Whether or Not EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.
Held:
It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal
certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or
scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, a food product
becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only
practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. A government agency like herein
respondent OMA cannot therefore perform a religious function like certifying qualified food
products as halal. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function
because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the
exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of
Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are
fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the
State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on
halal food.
In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on
the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA
the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the muslim
Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government
agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human
consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the
religious freedom of Muslims.
Page 104
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Art 3, Sec. 4. “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.”
Art 3, Sec. 7. “The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.”
Art 3, Sec. 8. “The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.”
Art 3, Sec. 18. “(1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations.”
NEAR VS. MINNESOTA

[283 US 697]
Facts:
A complaint alleged that the defendants, on September 24, 1927, and on eight subsequent dates
in October and November, 1927, published and circulated editions of “The Saturday
Press”(published in Minneapolis) which were 'largely devoted to malicious, scandalous and
defamatory articles'(based on Session Laws of Minnesota). The articles charged, in substance,
provides that a Jewish gangster was in control of gambling, bootlegging, and racketeering in
Minneapolis, and that law enforcing officers and agencies were not energetically performing their
duties. Most of the charges were directed against the chief of police; he was charged with gross
neglect of duty, illicit relations with gangsters, and with participation in graft. The county attorney
was charged with knowing the existing conditions and with failure to take adequate measures to
remedy them. The mayor was accused of inefficiency and dereliction. One member of the grand
jury was stated to be in sympathy with the gangsters. A special grand jury and a special
prosecutor were demanded to deal with the situation in general, and, in particular, to investigate
an attempt to assassinate one Guilford, one of the original defendants, who, it appears from the
articles, was shot by gangsters after the first issue of the periodical had been published. Now
defendants challenged the Minnesota statute which provides for the abatement, as a public
nuisance, of a malicious, scandalous and defamatory news paper, magazine or other periodical.
The District Court ruled against defendants. Hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the proceeding authorized by the statute herein constitutes an infringement of the
freedom of the press.
Held:
Yes. The insistence that the statute is designed to prevent the circulation of scandal which tends
to disturb the public peace and to provoke assaults and the commission of crime is unavailing.
The reason for the enactment, as the state court has said, is that prosecutions to enforce penal
statutes for libel do not result in 'efficient repression or suppression of the evils of scandal.' In the
present instance, the proof was that nine editions of the newspaper or periodical in question were
published on successive dates, and that they were chiefly devoted to charges against public
officers and in relation to the prevalence and protection of crime. In such a case, these officers
are not left to their ordinary remedy in a suit for libel, or the authorities to a prosecution for
criminal libel. The statute not only operates to suppress the offending newspaper or periodical,
but to put the publisher under an effective censorship.
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to
forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper,
mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity.
The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsible in case
of its abuse.' Public officers, whose character and conduct remain open to debate and free
Page 105
discussion in the press, find their remedies for false accusations in actions under libel laws
providing for redress and punishment, and not in proceedings to restrain the publication of
newspapers and periodicals.
Characterizing the publication as a business, and the business as a nuisance, does not permit an
invasion of the constitutional immunity against restraint. Nor can it be said that the constitutional
freedom from previous restraint is lost because charges are made of derelictions which constitute
crimes.
The preliminary freedom, by virtue of the very reason for its existence, does not depend, as this
court has said, on proof of truth.
GROSJEAN VS. AMERICAN PRESS CO.

[297 US 233]
Facts:
The nine publishers(corporations) who brought the suit publish thirteen newspapers and these
thirteen publications are the only ones within the state of Louisiana having each a circulation of
more than 20,000 copies per week. The suit assailed Act No. 231 of the Louisiana Legislature, as
their freedom of the press was abridged in contravention to the due process clause.
Issue:
Whether or Not Act 23 unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes. Freedom of speech and of the press are rights of the same fundamental character,
safeguarded by the due process of law clause. The word 'liberty' contained in that amendment
embraces not only the right of a person to be free from physical restraint, but the right to be free
in the enjoyment of all his faculties as well.
The Act operates as a restraint in a double sense. First, its effect is to curtail the amount of
revenue realized from advertising; and, second, its direct tendency is to restrict circulation. This
is plain enough when we consider that, if it were increased to a high degree, as it could be if valid
it well might result in destroying both advertising and circulation.
Judge Cooley has laid down the test to be applied: The evils to be prevented were not the
censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might
prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to
prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.
The tax here involved is bad not because it takes money from the pockets of the appellees. It is
bad because, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the
circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties. A
free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the people.
The form in which the tax is imposed is in itself suspicious. It is not measured or limited by the
volume of advertisements. It is measured alone by the extent of the circulation of the publication
in which the advertisements are carried, with the plain purpose of penalizing the publishers and
curtailing the circulation of a selected group of newspapers.
NEW YORK TIMES VS. UNITED STATES

[403 US 713]
Facts:
The court granted certiorari in the cases in which the United States seeks to enjoin the New York
Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified study entitled "History
of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." Said articles reveal the workings of
government that led to the Vietnam war. The Government argues that "the authority of the
Executive Department to protect the nation against publication of information whose disclosure
would endanger the national security stems from two interrelated sources: the constitutional
power of the President over the conduct of foreign affairs and his authority as Commander-in-
Chief. In such case the Executive Branch seeks judicial aid in preventing publication. The court
ruled in favor of the newspaper companies hence the appeal.
Page 106
Issue:
Whether or not the freedom of the press was abridged.
Held:
Yes. To find that the President has "inherent power" to halt the publication of news by resort to
the courts would wipe out the First Amendment (Bill of Rights) and destroy the fundamental
liberty and security of the very people the Government hopes to make "secure."
No branch of government could abridge the people's rights granted by the Constitution including
the freedom of the press. The language of the First Amendment support the view that the press
must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior
restraints. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the
people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And
paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the
government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign
fevers and foreign shot and shell.
GONZALES VS. COMELEC

[27 SCRA 835; G.R. L-27833; 18 APR 1969]
Facts:
RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates
and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on
constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom
of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at
the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the
Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently
elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a
registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was the
further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign
are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or
curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement
and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the
absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of
petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada was asked to appear as
amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on
the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its
enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil
of elections, whether for national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted
campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of
efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties
Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their
opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state.
Issue:
Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable
criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the “clear and present
danger” rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the
comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil'
sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a
definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly
established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that “If the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.” It is not
necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated.
It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language
used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is
Page 107
sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.
The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more
precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the
clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Tañada clearly explained, such provisions were
deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response
not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive
evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has
invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country.
The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to
meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of
grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress
has a right to prevent.
The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews

for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the
publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes
whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or
against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

[259 SCRA 529; G.R. NO. 119673; 26 JUL 1996]
Facts:
Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every
Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's
religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions.
Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the
VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series
as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against
other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the
Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter
of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez
reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in is protected
by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that the episode
poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the
respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring
petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program
Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under
PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on
the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not
to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages
Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of
religious exercise and expression.
Held:
Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden
of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act
of censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms
of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses
petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. “attack” is
different from “offend” any race or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the
criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms,
however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to
favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and
beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the
Page 108
establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion.
Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it
attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our
country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by
encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to
prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that
infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to
avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about
especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including
religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a
substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the
case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner
of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the
causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The
determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication
falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function
which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of
prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies.
ADIONG VS. COMELEC

[207 SCRA 712; G.R. NO. 103956; 31 MAR 1992]
Facts:
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 which provides that decals and stickers may be
posted only in any of the authorized posting areas, prohibiting posting in "mobile" places, public
or private. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now
assails the Resolution. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television
and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer
grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition.
Issue:
Whether or Not the COMELEC’s prohibition unconstitutional.
Held:
The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. The preferred
freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The so-
called balancing of interests — individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on
the other — is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also
gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest,
and orderly elections. When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a
candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions
intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC,
should lean in favor of freedom. The regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the
test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its application, if it
restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his or her qualifications, if it
cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable
nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not
endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by
such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and
expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear
and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a
clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. The regulation strikes at the freedom
of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to
agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have
it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his
own and not of anybody else. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be
posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a
privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by
the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
Page 109
The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private
except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship.
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC

[201 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 1026653; 5 MAR 1992]
Facts:
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from
selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are
candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992
elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and
of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that
Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees
comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section
11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression
with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or
political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in
derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information
and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b)
abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based
campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the
newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a
substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in
the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.
Held:
Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines
freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in
conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a
specific limited period — i.e., "during the election period." In our own society, equality of
opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources
that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies
given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that
"the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law." The essential question is whether or not the assailed
legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises during
an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of
media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and
freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the
permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the
operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time
to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by
newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates,
their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does
not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or
editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs
and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact
advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read
as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for
by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political
advertisements of particular candidates.
The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is
not unduly repressive or unreasonable.
US VS. BUSTOS
[37 PHIL. 731; G.R. L-12592; 8 MAR 1918]
Page 110
Facts:
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and
prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged communication) through the
law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman
Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office
and asking for his removal. The specific charges against the justice of the peace include the
solicitation of money from persons who have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan
alleged that accused published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and
libelous against him.
Issue:
Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech
and free press.
Held:
Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial
conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is
wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot
criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will
be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in
the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official
dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to
the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and
the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of
persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government
for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume
responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have
demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the
development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure
and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is
privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he
is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are probably
not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith
surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in
office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal
from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the
privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that
presumption. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to
discover grounds of malice or falsity.
PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

[178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5 OCT 1989]
Facts:
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City
of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services
Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and
confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks,
magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and
indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto
Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various
student organizations.
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and
co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
Page 111
Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of
the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiff’s
magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a
decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is
protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also
filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate
seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the
petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case
was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.
Held:
Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from
pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the
author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to
say, that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for
commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the
Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is
to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose
hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it
shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is
obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to
be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The
government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and
to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court
order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a
search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must
apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is
in order and that;
1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are
obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant
State interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is
to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion;
AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG

[160 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988]
Facts:
Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer
Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and
international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion
picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other
government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film
production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama"

style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual
documentary footage as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and
Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian have developed a
script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of
his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production,
film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this
demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to
film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to
privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to
plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which
Page 112
nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.
Held:
Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion
pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television.
Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity
expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of
expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience.
Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would
precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of
any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates
to a highly critical stage in the history of the country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that
petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures
were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional
freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a
requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its
presentation of events.
LOPEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

[34 SCRA 116; L-26549; 31 JUL 1970]
Facts:
In the early part of January, 1956, there appeared on the front page of The Manila Chronicle, of
which petitioner Lopez was the publisher, as well as on other dailies, a news story of a sanitary
inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz, sending a distress signal to a passing
United States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila. An American Army
plane dropping on the beach of an island an emergency-sustenance kit containing, among other
things, a two-way radio set. He utilized it to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the
place were living in terror, due to a series of killings committed since Christmas of 1955. Losing
no time, the Philippines defense establishment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers.
Upon arriving Major Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man named
Fidel Cruz who merely wanted transportation home to Manila. In view of this finding, Major
Encarnacion branded as a "hoax," the report of respondent.
This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial
article to it in its issue of January 15, 1956. Mention was made that while Fidel Cruz’ story turned
out to be false it brought attention to the government that people in that most people in the area
are sick sick, only two individuals able to read and write, food and clothing being scarce.
The magazine carried photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the
pictures that were published were that of private respondent Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman
contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned out that the photographs of respondent Cruz and
that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector, were on file in the library of the Manila Chronicle but when
the news quiz format was prepared, the two photographs were in advertently switched. However
a correction was published immediately.
Respondent sued petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of damages
alleging the defamatory character of the above publication of his picture. Defense interposed that
they are beating the deadline. The court ruled in his favor. Hence the appeal.
Issue:
Page 113
Whether or Not petitioners abused the freedom of the press.
Held:
No. The SC, quoting Quisumbing v. Lopez, found for plaintiff, but with reduced damages, since
the error in this case could have been checked considering that this was a weekly magazine and
not a daily. The ruling: "there is no evidence in the record to prove that the publication of the news
item under consideration was prompted by personal ill will or spite, or that there was intention to
do harm,' and that on the other hand there was 'an honest and high sense of duty to serve the
best interests of the public, without self-seeking motive and with malice towards none.' Every
citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that
the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the
freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable
them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the
preparation of stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race with their deadlines; and
consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.
“No inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what
otherwise could be characterized as libel whether in the form of printed words or a defamatory
imputation resulting from the publication of respondent's picture with the offensive caption as in
the case here complained of. This is merely to underscore the primacy that freedom of the press
enjoys.”
PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO

[80 PHIL 71; L-1800; 27 JAN 1948]
Facts:
An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to
them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The
reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions,
specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be
delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in
the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of
public order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local government. Stating
as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and
penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to
disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful
purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included
herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.1
Issue:
Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.
Held:
Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two
constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or
refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in
the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to
reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view
to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by
others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court
favored the second construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to
prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited
power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of
national emergency.
The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of
free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational
fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious
evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be
prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in
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destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of
serious injury to the state.
ZALDIVAR VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

[170 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 79690-707; 1 FEB 1989]
Facts:
The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from
investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, respondent’s powers as Tanodbayan have been superseded
by the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special Prosecutor of
the State, and can only conduct an investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the
Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent wherein he included
statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. This include: (a)That he had
been approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go slow on
Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to refrain from
investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will
embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned respondent was called
over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against
two Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying that the SC’s order '"heightens
the people's apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because the people
have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free” was publicized in
leading newspapers.
Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not be
punished for contempt of court for making such public statements reported in the media.
Respondent then sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution
of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the
whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on
responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that
respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of
judging him impartially and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court and
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his
freedom of speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the
"visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and
contempt charges."
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression.
Held:
There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible
tendency," it was simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court
which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held
that the statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a
manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech.
What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive
evil" consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also
the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the
destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and
officers of the courts, which has some implications to the society.
REYES VS. BAGATSING
[125 SCRA 553; L-65366; 9 NOV 1983]
Facts:
Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October
26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United
States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be
held. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. That
would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing
session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the
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exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would
be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request was denied. Reference
was made to persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to
infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to
attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum
or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public
may be ensured. An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted on the
ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is
violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies within a
radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes.
Hence the Court resolves.
Issue:
Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble violated.
Held:
Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication
that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public
places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use
dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be
no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on
the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Time immemorial Luneta has
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions.
Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens.
With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and even if it could
be shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that respondent could legally act the
way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged.
A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly
should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will
take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public
official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or
to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or
modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached.
Notice is given to applicants for the denial.
BAYAN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA

[488 SCRA 226; G.R. NO. 169838; 25 APR 2006]
Facts:
Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYAN’s rally was violently
dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they
was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that the right to peaceful
assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of “Calibrated Preemptive
Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a
rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them
along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of
their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU
also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the UST and going
towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them
from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them.
Three other rallyists were arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them in
toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They
seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit, no rally” policy and the CPR policy
announced on Sept. 21, 2005.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the
Philippines is a signatory.
Page 116
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice
of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a
public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a
curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it
puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without
a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not
mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an
ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from
being void for being vague and for lack of publication.
KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P.
No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the
legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the
Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too
comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain
events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to
the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the
rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy.
Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the
Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably
assemble.
Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent
grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and
trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies.
According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No.
880. and that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that
B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.
Issue:
Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.
Held:
No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise
the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P.
880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time,
place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use
public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and
entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is
independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no prior restraint,
since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and
must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is
used by some police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in
lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared null and void.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps
for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the
establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and
municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the
giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably
assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet
complied with Section 15 of the law.
FERNANDO VS. ESTORNINOS

[G.R. NO 159751; 6 DEC 2006]
Facts:
Page 117
Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, officers of the PNP Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group in the National Capital Region conducted police surveillance
on the store Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair) in Quiapo. A Search Warrant for
violation of Article 201 of RPC against petitioner and a certain Warren Tingchuy and the seizure
of the following items:
a. Copies of New Rave Magazines with nude obscene pictures;

b. Copies of IOU Penthouse Magazine with nude obscene pictures;
c. Copies of Hustler International Magazine with nude obscene pictures; and
d. Copies of VHS tapes containing pornographic shows.
The police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five VHS tapes(among of which is
“Kahit sa Pangarap Lang” with Myra Manibog as actress who is naked) and ten different
magazines(Dalaga, Penthouse, Swank, Erotic, Rave, Playhouse, Gallery, QUI), which they
deemed pornographic. Petitioners were charged and convicted. CA affirmed the decision hence
this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the CA erred in affirming RTC’s decision.
Held:
No. As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in
pursuing its mandate to protect the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must
justify the regulation or limitation. (Kottinger Rule Applied).
MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO

[129 SCRA 359; G.R. NO.62270; 21 MAY 1984]
Facts:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought
and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00
P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general
assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place
indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor
lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to
the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same
day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the
area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed. They were asked to
explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then
on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under preventive suspension for their
failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof was challenged by
petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private respondents and before
the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of
the charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted
resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one
academic year. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed,
there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
Held:
Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a
rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity
taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public
disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct,
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational
institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving
public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there
be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to
present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards
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displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however,
by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired
being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school
premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny
such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to
the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-
academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred
should not be disproportionate to the offense.
NON VS. DAMES

[185 SCRA 523; G.R. NO. 89317; 20 MAY 1990]
Facts:
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were
not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating
in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests
is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school,
but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now petition the court to reverse its ruling in Alcuaz
vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court said that petitioners waived their
privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and
used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89, which states that: The
Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and
attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the
institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the
college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of
conduct and discipline.
Issue:
Whether or Not the students’ right to freedom of speech and assembly infringed.
Held:
Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution
is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. However there are limitations.
The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights within the school
presupposes that conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it
stems from time, place, or type of behavior should not materially disrupt classwork or must not
involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
IN RE: TULFO
[A.M. NO. 90-4-1545-0; 17 APR 1990]
Facts:
In Oct. 13, 1989, Tulfo wrote an article in his column in PDI 'On Target' stating that the Supreme
Court rendered an idiotic decision in legalizing checkpoints, and again on Oct. 16, 1989, where
he called the Supreme Court stupid and "sangkatutak na mga bobo justices of the Philippine
Supreme Court". Tulfo was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
Tulfo said that he was just reacting emotionally because he had been a victim of harassment in
the checkpoints, and "idiotic" meant illogical and unwise, and "bobo" was just quoted from other
attorneys, and since the case had been decided and terminated, there was not contempts. Lastly,
the article does not pose any clear and present danger to the Supreme court.
Issue:
Whether or Not Tulfo is in contempt.
Held:
Yes. At the time Tulfo wrote the article, the checkpoints case had not yet been decided upon, and
the Supreme Court was still acting on an MR filed from the CA. The power to punish is inherent
as it is essential for self-preservation. Contempt of court is defiance of the authority, justice and
Page 119
dignity of the courts. It brings disrepute to the court. There are two kinds of publications which can
be punished for contempt:
a. those whose object is to affect the decision in a pending case.

b. those whose object is to bring courts to discredit. Tulfo's article constituted both.
It should have been okay to criticize if respectful language was used, but if its object is only to
degrade and ridicule, then it is clearly an obstruction of justice. Nothing constructive can be
gained from them. Being emotional is no excuse for being insulting. Quoting is not an excuse
also, because at the end of his article, Tulfo said, "So you bobo justices, watch out!" Also, he said
he was not sorry for having written the articles.
Tulfo is found in contempt of court and is gravely censured.
PBM EMPLOYEES VS. PBM

[51 SCRA 189; G.R. NO. L-31195; 5 JUN 1993]
Facts:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor
union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and
petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner
Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO
thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally
cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained
further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no
quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company
personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not
unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of
absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of
the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an
illegal strike. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with
the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should
not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third
shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a
charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, for a violation of
Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.
Held:
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the
right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent
firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report
to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not
even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their
freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution
of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for
their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it
would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the
morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights.
The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as
they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the
condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a
matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families.
Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being
broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As
heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly
Page 120
and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. To regard
the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for
the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of
the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts
a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If
demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the Issue raised by
the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of
the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as
a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet
continued alleged police persecution.
Page 121
THE IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
Art 3, Sec. 10. “No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.”
RUTTER VS. ESTEBAN

[93 PHIL 68; NO.L-3708; 18 MAY 1953]
Facts:
On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land situated in the Manila for P9,600 of
which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or
before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of 7
percent per annum. To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage has been
constituted in favor of the plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as
well as the interest that had accrued and so Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance
due, the interest due and the attorney's fees. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the
properties mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban claims that this is a prewar obligation
contracted and that he is a war sufferer, having filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage
Commission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that under
section 2 of RA 342(moratorium law), payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the
lapse of eight years. The complaint was dismissed. A motion for recon was made which assails
the constitutionality of RA 342.
Issue:
Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non-impairment clause grounds.
Held:
Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through
the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of police power. The
economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective
power notwithstanding interference with contracts. The question is not whether the legislative
action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is
addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that
end.
However based on the President’s general SONA and consistent with what the Court believes to
be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, declared that the continued
operation and enforcement of RA 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and
should not be prolonged should be declared null and void and without effect. This holds true as
regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, with greater force and reason considering that said
Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the suspension of the
enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations.
ORTIGAS VS. FEATI BANK

[94 SCRA 533; NO.L-24670; 14 DEC 1979]
Facts:
Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly
the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA. On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto
Padilla and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on
installments over two parcels of land of the Subdivision. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees
transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon
completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of
sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of
sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that:
1. The parcel of land shall be used exclusively for residential purposes, and she shall not be
entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the
Seller.
2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be constructed at any
time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and properly painted, (b) provided with
Page 122
modern sanitary installations connected either to the public sewer or to an approved

septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of less than two (2) meters from its
boundary lines.
Eventually said lots were bought by defendant. Lot 5 directly from Chavez and Lot 6 from
Republic Flour Mills by deed of exchange, with same restrictions. Plaintiff claims that restriction is
for the beautification of the subdivision. Defendant claimed of the commercialization of western
part of EDSA. Defendant began constructing a commercial bank building. Plaintiff demand to stop
it, which forced him to file a case, which was later dismissed, upholding police power. Motion for
recon was denied, hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not non-impairment clause violated.
Held:
No. Resolution is a valid exercise of police power. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through
several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic
and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare
of the residents in its route. Health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people
in the locality are justifications for this. It should be stressed, that while non-impairment of
contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with
the legitimate exercise of police power.
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ

[146 SCRA 323; NO.L-63419; 18 DEC 1986]
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or Not BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. Whether or not BP 22 transgresses the

Held:
The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful"
contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Checks can not be categorized
as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become
a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely
free from the regulatory power of the state.
and putting them in circulation.
Page 123
EX POST FACTO LAWS
Art 3, Sec. 22. “No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.”
PEOPLE VS. FERRER

[48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-32613-14; 27 DEC 1972]
Facts:
Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-
Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion
against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers,
subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for
being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the
Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and
Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.)
Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard
of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP
regardless of voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and
similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the
Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow
the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal
means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines.
Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable.
Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be
made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false
evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to
death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath.
Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if
thought, assembly and association.
Issue:
Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.
Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.
Held:
The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the
substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute
be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute
specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill
of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies
not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their
successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person.
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was
acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element
of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a
member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and
encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after
approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act
is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section
8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having
been made.
Page 124
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine
Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the
Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of
“Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and
statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further
stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the
prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and
PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to
proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be
established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization
purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a
domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by
overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is
willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme
Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.
BAYOT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

[128 SCRA 383; NO.L-61776 TO NO.L-61861; 23 MAR 1984]
Facts:
Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa thru
falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his
alleged involvement as a government auditor of the commission on audit assigned to the
Ministry of education and culture, with some other employees from the said ministry. The bureau
of treasury and the teacher’s camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious
TCAA checks for the nom-existent obligations of the teacher’s camp resulting in damage to the
government of several millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for
municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on January 1980. but on May 1980
Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the accused together with his other co-
accused in all but one of the thirty two cases filed against them.
On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019.
Issue:
Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an ex post facto law.
Held:
The court finds no merit in the petitioner’s contention that RA 3019 as amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the crime of estafa through falsification of Public Documents
as among crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from public
office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition
against the enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment and
public office during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a
result of a judicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to
reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. And
does not violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto law.
The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying a
position diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision
clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under RA 3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public
funds or property or whatever stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended
Page 125
from office. The use of the word “office” applies to any office which the officer charged may be
holding and not only the particular office under which he was charged.
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

[211 SCRA 241; G.R. NO. 101724; 3 JUL 1992]
Facts:
Two letter complaints were filed with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio on October 28,1986 and
December 9, 1986, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of Congressman
Democrito Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after private respondent had replaced Mrs. Plaza as
OIC/provincial Governor of Agusan del Sur on March 1986 The complaint questioned the
issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the provincial attorney in 1976 of a free patent
title for a lot in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. He
misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the lands subject herein are
disposable lands, thereby inducing said inspector to recommend approval of his application for
free patent. On August 10, 1989 an information for violation of RA 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act was then filed in the Sandiganbayan after an ex parte preliminary investigation. A
motion to quash the information was filed by the private respondent contending among others
that he is charged for an offence which has prescribed. Said motion was granted. The crime was
committed on January 21, 1976, period of prescription was 10 years, therefore it has prescribed
in 1986. Now the motion to quash was being assailed.
Issue:
Whether or Not the motion to quash validly granted.
Held:
Yes. RA 3019, being a special law the computation of the period for the prescription of the crime
is governed by Sec. 29 of Act No. 3326, which begins to run from the day of the commission of
the crime and not the discovery of it. Additionally, BP 195 which was approved on March 16,
1982, amending Sec. 11 of RA 3019 by increasing ten to fifteen years of the period for the
prescription or extinguishment of a violation of RA 3019 may not be given retroactive application
to the crime which was committed by Paredes, as it is prejudicial to the accused. To apply BP
195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law1 for it would alter his situation to his
disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished
under the law existing when it was committed.
Page 126
NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT
Art 3, Sec. 20. “No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.”
SERAFIN VS. LINDAYAG

[67 SCRA 166; ADM. MATTER. NO. 297-MJ; 30 SEPT 1975]
Facts:
Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito Mendoza, then municipal
secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza and therefore an estafa case was filed against her.
Complainant admitted complaint. Now complainant filed a case against respondent Judge for not
dismissing the case and issuing a warrant of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple
indebtedness, since elements of estafa are not present. Further she contended that no person
should be imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of a sum of money. Two months after
respondent dismissed plaintiff’s case. (Judge here committed gross ignorance of law. Even if
complainant desisted case was pursued.)
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the imprisonment of
plaintiff for non-payment of debt?
Held:
Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as, his debt is considered a simple loan granted by
her friends to her. There is no collateral or security because complainant was an old friend of the
spouses who lent the money and that when they wrote her a letter of demand she promised to
pay them and said that if she failed to keep her promise, they could get her valuable things at her
home. Under the Constitution she is protected. Judge therefore in admitting such a "criminal
complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the complaint and the "evidence"
presented, and issuing on the same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless finding
"that the accused is probably guilty of the crime charged," respondent grossly failed to perform
his duties properly.
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ

[146 SCRA 323; NO.L-63419; 18 DEC 1986]
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State.
Held:
The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong,
hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be
outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of
its police power.
Page 127
Page 128
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
Art 3, Sec. 18. “(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment
for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”
CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR

[82 PHIL 851; NO.L-2690; 1 JAN 1949]
Facts:
This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita
Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar,
respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment
agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence,
which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was
restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her
transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed
to leave.
Issue:
Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without
returning the advance payment it gave?
Held:
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or

maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force
has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the
deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another,
freedom to choose one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to
founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an
impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail
the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such
psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the
protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
duress or physical coercion.
Page 129
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Art 3, Sec. 15. “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in
cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.”
LANSANG VS. GARCIA

[42 SCRA 448; L-33964; 11 Dec 1971]
Facts:
In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was
holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the
general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the
platform where said candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many
more injured. Proclamation 889 was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of
habeas corpus stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly
seize political power. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have
been arrested without a warrant.
It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons
caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the
word “actually staging”. Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27
provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13
provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces
and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended.
Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion
insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however it became moot and academic
since it was amended. Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require the issuance
of proclamations stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the
suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that
no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after
August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-
existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and
weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it
may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations.
Now the Court resolves after conclusive decision reached by majority.
Issue:
Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and
conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons.
Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.
Held:
The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions must concur
for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be
"invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must
require the suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out
the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces,
proved inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least
harsh.
Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20
barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents
in the Greater Manila Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine
major labor organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or youth organizations; about
thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP.
Page 130
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
Art 3, Sec. 12. “(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.”
Art 3, Sec. 14. “(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.”
Art 3, Sec. 11. “Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.”
Art 3, Sec. 16. “All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.”
Art 3, Sec. 17. “No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.”
Art 3, Sec. 19. “(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any
prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman
conditions shall be dealt with by law.”
Art 3, Sec. 21. “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute
a bar to another prosecution for the same act.”
GAMBOA VS. CRUZ

[162 SCRA 642;L-56291; 27 JUN 1988]
Facts:
Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including
petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was
charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without
notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due
process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner’s right to counsel and due process violated.
Held:
No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled,
at such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment
there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even
plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he
Page 131
should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be
made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and
constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose
not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What
due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON

[175 SCRA 216; G.R. NO. 85215; 7 JUL 1989]
Facts:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City
station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL
management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled
in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining
Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which
Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of
P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused
proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a
compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against
Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ written
admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the
accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that
accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A
motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission
and statement of accused.
Held:
No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to
witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not
present in case at bar).
This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of
subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to
be a witness against himself.” It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions
and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question,
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It
does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at
the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should
know. He must claim it and could be waived.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused
include:
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at
the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
PEOPLE VS. MAQUEDA

[242 SCRA 565; G.R. NO.112983; 22 MAR 1994]
Facts:
Page 132
British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB) was slain inside his house in Tuba, Benguet
while his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza was badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a
robbery. Two household helpers of the victims identified Salvamante (a former houseboy of the
victims) and Maqueda as the robbers. Mike Tabayan and his friend also saw the two accused a
kilometer away from the house of the victims that same morning, when the two accused asked
them for directions.
Maqueda was then arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon. He was taken to Calauag, Quezon where
he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime. According
to SPO3 Molleno, he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before he signed such
document. Afterwards he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail. While he was under
detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and
volunteering to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least
guilty among the accused in this case."
Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the robbery to Prosecutor Zarate
and to Salvosa.
Issue:
Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the Sinumpaan Salaysay is admissible
as evidence.
Held:
No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was in clear violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused. First, he was not informed of his right to remain silent and his
right to counsel. Second, he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. At the time of
the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to
remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any
prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a
case had already been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so.
The contention of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to such rights anymore because
the information has been filed and a warrant of arrest has been issued already, is untenable. The
exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section
12(1) of the Bill of Rights are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint
or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense."
Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore, such extra-judicial admission is
inadmissible as evidence.
As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial
court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to
prove the truth of the admission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. Maqueda
voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in
connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission
(Salvosa), it was given to a private person therefore admissible.
Note: a distinction between a confession and admission has been made by the SC:
Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him.
Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or
of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
PEOPLE VS. BANDULA

[232 SCRA 566; G.R. NO. 89223; 27 MAY 1994]
Facts:
Six armed men barged into the compound of Polo Coconut Plantation in Tanjay, Negros Oriental.
The armed men were identified by Security Guard, including accused. Salva and Pastrano,
security guards were hogtied and accused proceeded to the Atty. Garay, counsel of plantation.
They ransacked the place and took with them money and other valuables. Atty. Garay was killed.
Accused-appellant is charged with robbery with homicide along with 3 others who were acquitted
for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant was convicted.
Page 133
Now, appellant argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao executed
suffer from constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence considering that they were
extracted under duress and intimidation, and were merely countersigned later by the municipal
attorney who, by the nature of his position, was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel
of their choice. Consequently, without the extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without
sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime charged.
Issue:
Whether or Not extrajudicial confessions of appellant is admissible as evidence against him.
Held:
No. When accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately
after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the
custodial investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to
appellant Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna,
the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used
against the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in
Sec. 12, Art. III. Irregularities present include:
1. The investigators did not inform the accused of their right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of their own choice, even before
attempting to elicit statements that would incriminate them.
2. Investigators continuously disregard the repeated requests of the accused for medical
assistance. Reason for Accused Sedigo’s "black eye" which even
Pat. Baldejera admitted is not established, as well as Bandula’s fractured rib.
3. Counsel must be independent. He cannot be a special counsel, public or private
prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly
adverse to the accused.
PEOPLE VS. LUCERO

[244 SCRA 425; G.R. NO.97936; 29 MAY 1995]
Facts:
Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and John Doe
were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.
The prosecution:
Accused-appellant (alighted from a gray-reddish car), armed with handgun, blocked the way of
the said complainant who was on board a Mercedes Benz passing along Road 14, Mindanao
Avenue, Pag-asa, QC, rob and carry away cash money; one gold necklace with cross pendant, 7
karat; one gold Rolex watch; one 3 karat gold ring; one 2 karat gold ring, domino style; one solid
gold bracelet; all worth P363,600.00, belonging to DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID. Accused shot
LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, a driver of the said offended party, thus inflicting upon him
mortal wounds, which resulted to the instantaneous death of ALERIA.
Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended.
When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, in due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta conferred with
Lucero. He apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He observed no reaction from Lucero.
Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice.
When the investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the
wake of his friend. The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's
house. The extrajudicial statement of Lucero was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already
signed by Lucero.
The three accused denied complicity in the crime charged.
Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that he was at his house in Caloocan City.
He said he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while he was walking
towards his house. They chased him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and pushed him into a
Page 134
jeep. He was blindfolded the whole night and did not know where he was taken. The men turned
out to be police officers.
The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He was not
informed of the offense for which he was being investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of
the complainant.
Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other accused in this case. He
said he only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. He was made to line-up
four (4) times before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time.
Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession under duress. He denied engaging the
services of Atty, Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not present during his
actual custodial interrogation.
After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. The trial court,
however, convicted accused Lucero GUILTY as principal by direct participation of Robbery with
Homicide and sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Issue:
Whether or Not the lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant.
Held:
Appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial confession.
Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be
provided with counsel. The Court have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of hostility
against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect.
Force and fraud tarnish confessions can render them inadmissible.
The records show that Atty. Peralta, who was not the counsel of choice of appellant. Atty. Peralta
himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant although his impression was that
appellant understood him. More so, it was during his absence that appellant gave an
uncounselled confession.
Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and
vigilant counsel. The circumstances clearly demonstrate that appellant received no effective
counseling from Atty. Peralta.
Whereof, Decision convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel is hereby reversed.
PEOPLE VS. AGUSTIN

[240 SCRA 541; G.R. NO. 110290; 25 JAN 1995]
Facts:
Dr. Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son, Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa; his
daughter, Dominic; and Danny, a family friend, were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the
doctor's residence at Malvar Street, Baguio City. While they were cruising along Malvar Street
and nearing the Baptist church, a man came out from the right side of a car parked about two
meters to the church. The man approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its
window, and fired at the passengers. The Brasilia swerved and hit a fence. The gunman
immediately returned to the parked car which then sped away. All those in the car were hit and
Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Dominic was bale to get out of the Brasilia to
run to the Alabanza store where she telephoned her mother. Later, she and her mother brought
her father and Anthony to the hospital. Danny went home and was then brought to the Hospital
for treatment.
Accused Quiaño, an alleged former military agent who had been picked up by the police
authorities, confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia
in his office that he was the triggerman. He implicated Abenoja, Jr., who engaged him to kill Dr.
Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During the
investigation, Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of
the proceedings during the investigation as transcribed with the sworn statement of Quiaño was
signed, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia. The
following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was investigated and was afforded the privileges
like that of Quijano. Agustin’s defense interpose that he was forced to admit involvement at
Page 135
gunpoint in the Kennon Road. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer, Cajucom
(a law partner of the private prosecutor), he nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin,
and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in
Ilocano, the dialect he understands. The promise that he would be discharged as a witness did
not push through since Quijano escaped. However the RTC convicted him, since conspiracy was
established. Hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not accused-appellant’s extrajudicial statements admissible as evidence.
Held:
No. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. In a confession, there is an

acknowledgment of guilt of the accused, while an admission is a statement direct or implied of
facts pertinent to the issue. The rule on inadmissibility, however expressly includes admissions,
not just confessions.The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in twenty-two pages
appear to be signed by him and Atty. Cajucom but for reasons not explained in the records, the
transcript of the notes which consists of twelve pages was not signed by the appellant. Since the
court cannot even read or decipher the stenographic notes it cannot be expected that appellant,
who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to read or decipher its contents. The
appellant, therefore was deprived of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution.
Firstly, he was not fully and properly informed of his rights. The appellant was not explicitly told of
his right to have a competent and independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had
in mind any such counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he could
not, whether he would agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not
categorically informed that he could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and that this
waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel. He had, in fact, waived his right to
remain silent by agreeing to be investigated. Yet, no written waiver of such right appears in the
transcript and no other independent evidence was offered to prove its existence. In short, after
the appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the City fiscal, through suggestive
language, immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom was ready to assist him. Moreso said
counsel is not independent since he is an associate of the private prosecutor.
PEOPLE VS. BOLANOS

[211 SCRA 262; G.R. NO. 101808; 3 JUL 1992]
Facts:
Oscar Pagdalian was murdered in Marble Supply, Balagtas Bulacan. According to Pat. Rolando
Alcantara and Francisco Dayao, deceased was with two companions on the previous night, one
of whom the accused who had a drinking spree with the deceased. When they apprehended the
accused they found the firearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly
seated. They boarded accused along with Magtibay, other accused on the police vehicle and
brought them to the police station. While in the vehicle Bolanos admitted that he killed the
deceased. RTC convicted him hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not accused-appellant deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.
Held:
Yes. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way
to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have
been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution,
more particularly par. 1 and par. 3.
PEOPLE VS. MACAM

[238 SCRA 306; G.R. NOS. 91011-12; 24 NOV 1994]
Facts:
Prosecution’s version:
On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan Jr., Danilo Roque and
Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito Macam (uncle of Eduardo Macam) located at 43
Page 136
Ferma Road QC. Upon the arrival of the accused, Benito invited the former to have lunch. Benito
asked his maid Salvacion Enrera to call the companions of Eduardo who were waiting in a tricycle
outside the house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D. Roque entered the house while E. Roque
remained in the tricycle. After all the accused had taken their lunch, Eduardo Macam grabbed
the clutch bag of Benito Macam and pulled out his uncle’s gun then declared a hold-up. They tied
up the wife (Leticia Macam), children, maid (Salvacion) and Nilo Alcantara and brought them to
the room upstairs. After a while Leticia was brought to the bathroom and after she screamed she
was stabbed and killed by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo and Salvacion was also stabbed but survived.
The total value of the items taken was P536, 700.00.
Defense’s version:
Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4 accused to Benito’s house for a
fee of P50.00. Instead of paying him, he was given a calling card by Eduardo Macam so that he
can be paid the following day. Upon arriving, he went with the accused inside the house to have
lunch. Thereafter he washed the dishes and swept the floor. When Eugenio Cawilan pulled a gun
and announced the hold-up, he was asked to gather some things and which he abided out of
fear. While putting the said thins inside the car of Benito (victim) he heard the accused saying
“kailangan patayin ang mga taong yan dahil kilala ako ng mga yan”. Upon hearing such phrase
he escaped and went home using his tricycle. He also testified that his brother Ernesto Roque
has just arrived from the province and in no way can be involved in the case at bar. On the
following day, together with his brother, they went to the factory of the Zesto Juice (owned by the
father of Eduardo Macam) for him to get his payment (50.00) . He and his brother was suddenly
apprehended by the security guards and brought to the police headquarters in Q.C. They were
also forced to admit certain things.
After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and bore contusions on their faces
caused by blows inflicted in their faces during investigation, was brought to the QC General
Hospital before each surviving victims and made to line-up for identification. Eugenio Cawilan
was also charged with Anti-fencing Law but was acquitted in the said case.
Issue:
Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. WON the arrest was valid. WON the
evidence from the line-up is admissible.
Held:
It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before trial.
A police line-up is considered a “critical” stage of the proceedings. Any identification of an
uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. HOWEVER, the prosecution did
not present evidence regarding appellant’s identification at the line-up. The witnesses identified
the accused again in open court. Also, accused did not object to the in-court identification as
being tainted by illegal line-up.
The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. HOWEVER, they are estopped from
questioning the legality of such arrest because they have not moved to quash the said
information and therefore voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by
entering a plea of not guilty and participating in trial.
The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque, while remaining outside the
house served as a looked out.
Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque is guilty of the
crime of robbery with homicide as co-conspirators of the other accused to suffer reclusion
perpetua.
Things taken: 2 toygun, airgun riffle, CO2 refiller, TV, betamax tapes, betamax rewinder,
Samsonite attache case, typewriter, chessboard, TOYOTA Crown Car Plate No. CAS-997,
assorted jewelry. .22 gun and money.
PEOPLE VS. DY
[158 SCRA 111; G.R. 74517; 23 FEB 1988]
Facts:
Pat. Padilla reported along with Benny Dy, with caliber .38 as suspect to the shooting incident at
"Benny's Bar," at Sitio Angol, Manoc-Manoc Malay, Aklan (Boracay) situated on the Island which
Page 137
caused the death of Christian Langel Philippe, tourist, 24 years old and a Swiss nationale. He
was charged with the Murder With the Use of Unlicensed firearms. Appellant alleges that he
carried the victim to the shore to be brought to the hospital to save the latter, and who facilitated
the surrender to Pat. Padilla a gun which his helper found the following morning while cleaning
the bar. Accused posted bail which was granted. The accused denied having made any oral
confession alleging that he went to Pat. Padilla not to report the incident but to state that a boy
helper in the bar had found a gun on the sand floor while cleaning and that Pat. Padilla picked up
the gun from the bar at his request. The Accused argues that even if he did make such a
confession, the same would be inadmissible in evidence. He was found guilty in the RTC. Hence
the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the lower court correct in saying that the constitutional procedure on custodial
interrogation is not applicable in the instant case.
Held:
YES. Appellant's assertion that the gun he had surrendered was merely found by a boy helper
while cleaning the bar deserves no credence for, if it were so, it would have been absurd for him
to have placed himself under police custody in the early morning after the incident. Sworn
Complaint for "Murder with Use of Unlicensed Firearm" signed by the Chief of Police also attests
to Appellant's oral confession. That Complaint forms part of the record of the proceedings before
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga, Aklan, and is prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. Appellant's voluntary surrender implies no violation as "no warrant of arrest is
issued for the apprehension of the accused for the reason that he is already under police custody
before the filing of the complaint." What was told by the Accused to Pat, Padilla was a
spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given in ordinary manner. No written
confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation.
NAVALLO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

[234 SCRA 177; G.R. NO. 97214; 18 JUL 1994]
Facts:
Accused was the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational School,
which school is also located at del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. His duties included the collection
of tuition fees, preparation of vouchers for salaries of teachers and employees, and remittance of
collections exceeding P500.00 to the National Treasury. An information for malversation of public
funds was filed. A warrant of arrest was issued, but accused-petitioner could not be found. on 10
December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect creating the Sandiganbayan and
conferring on it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers
embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally
arrested. He was released on provisional liberty upon the approval of his property bail bond.
When arraigned by the RTC on 18 July 1985, he pleaded not guilty. Upon motion of the
prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan.
Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quiñones-Marcos opined that since Navallo had already been
arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking
cognizance of the case. The matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held
otherwise. The information was then docketed with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's
arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned with a certification by the
RTC Clerk of Court that the accused had posted a bail bond. Navallo filed a motion to quash,
contending (1) that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense and the person of the
accused and (2) that since the accused had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to
prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy. However this was
denied and trial ensued and he was found guilty.
Issue:
Whether or Not the constitutional right against double jeopardy and in custodial investigations in
favor of the accused violated.
Held:
No. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following requisites:
Page 138
(1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction;
(2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case;
(3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and
(4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express
consent.
The RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which by
then had already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there
terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed.
No. Appellant is not in custodial investigation. A person under a normal audit examination is not
under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law
enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been
"pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime (examined cash, as ordered
by Espino, the provincial auditor) appears to be belied by his own testimony.
PEOPLE VS. ALICANDO

[251 SCRA 293; G.R. NO. 117487; 2 DEC 1995]
Facts:
Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a minor,
four years of age, choking her with his right hand. The incident happened after appellant drank
liquor. A neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago found the victim’s body and the parents and police were
informed. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length from Penecilla's house.
Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt
without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow
up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's
green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of
which were presented as evidence for the prosecution. He was arraigned with the assistance of
Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC convicted him. Hence an
automatic review for the imposition of death penalty.
Issue:
Whether or Not the death penalty proper.
Held:
No. The records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the language
or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the English language.
It is unknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what dialect
is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information couched in English
was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. The RTC violated
section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant his
constitutional right to due process of law. It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment of
the appellant was regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable
presumption. There could be no presumption. The court must be sure.
The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant.
Said section requires that the court shall conduct a searching inquiry the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. The trial
court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant
when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was
medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover
late body marks of maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone.
Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists of a pillow with
bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused colored white with bloodstains on its
bottom. These physical evidence are evidence of the highest order. They strongly corroborate the
testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped.These are inadmissible evidence for they
were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial interrogation
where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel.
Page 139
PEOPLE VS. DE GUZMAN

[224 SCRA 93; G.R. NOS. 98321-24; 30 JUN 1993]
Facts:
All the accused were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu with three counts of
murder and one count of frustrated murder in four Informations. The victim Jose Bantug was
found with gunshots in the head, body, and skull. The other three informations charged them with
the murder of Francisco Carteciano y Sorilla and Antonio S. Carteciano, and the frustrated
murder of Lorna V. Carteciano. The other 8 accused were acquitted on the ground of reasonable
doubt, while Victor Nuñez was found guilty. The facts shown by evidence are: One morning,
Major Antonio Carteciano was driving his private jeep Camp General Arcadio Maxilom in Lahug,
Cebu City where he was stationed as medical officer of the PC/INP Provincial Command. In the
front seat with him is his wife Lorna, and at the backseat are his mother in law, son, brother
Francisco, neighbor Bantug, and Bantug’s son. Near the intersection, gunshots were heard from
the left side of the street. Major Carteciano took his .45 cal pistol and fired. However, gunshots
were fired in succession, and Major Carteciano, his brother Francisco, Jose Bantug, and his wife
Lorna were hit. When the jeep stopped, several gunmen approached them. Nuñez demanded
Lorna to give Nuñez her husband’s pistol. Lorna asked to take her valuables instead. Then,
Nuñez shot Major Carteciano’s head point blank. Then the gunmen hijacked another jeep and
took off. Lorna, her mother Juanita Ricaplaza, and her son Reiser Carteciano positively identified
the accused. Lorna identified Nuñez as the one who shot her husband. Nuñez claimed that his
arrest was illegal and that he was deprived of his right to counsel when he was subjected to a
paraffin test without the assistance of counsel.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused Nuñez’s constitutional right was violated
Held:
No. Nuñez pleaded not guilty at the arraignment. Therefore, he is estopped from questioning the
validity of his arrest. Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for
setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The
witnesses also positively identified the accused, so he cannot question the credibility of the
witnesses. Regarding his right to counsel, the Supreme Court held that-- the right to counsel
attaches only upon the start of an investigation, that is, when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused. At such point
or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious
practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person
undergoing interrogation. In the case at bar, when accused was subjected to a paraffin test, he
was not then under custodial investigation. Accused-appellant also argued that since his co-
accused were acquitted, then their acquittal negates conspiracy among them, and he should not
be convicted with the charges filed. However, the Court held that conspiracy was still proven by
the evidence, and the other co-accused were acquitted only because there was reasonable
doubt. Therefore, accused-appellant is still convicted of the four charges against him.
We, therefore, find that the conviction of accused-appellant for the crimes charged has been
established beyond reasonable doubt and the penalty imposed is in accordance with law.
However, the civil indemnity imposed by the trial court should be increased to P50,000 in
conformity with our recent rulings on the matter.
WHEREFORE, except for the modification that the civil indemnity to be paid by accused-
appellant Victor Nuñez, Jr. to the heirs of each victim who died is hereby increased to P50,000,
the appealed decision is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs against accused-
appellant
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO

[198 SCRA 130; G.R. NO.79269; 5 JUN 1991]
Facts:
Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts
committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash
alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants;
and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987
Page 140
Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail
anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART.
135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among
others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the
bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once
every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental
motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present
evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply
with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from
detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and
presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose
identity and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00
was offered and paid for his arrest.
This however was denied. Hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.
Held:
Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital
offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital
offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the
amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to
the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.
Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements
were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz
and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit
themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security
given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule
that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which
is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
CARPIO VS. MAGLALANG

[196 SCRA 41; G.R. NO. 78162; 19 APR 1991]
Facts:
On January 8, 1987, information for the murder of Mayor Jose Payumo of Dinalupihan Bataan
was filed against Escaño and ten other unindentified persons by the provincial fiscal in the RTC of
Bataan at Balanga. Four days later, the Acting Executive Judge of said court issued an order of
arrest against Escaño recommending no bail for his provisional liberty. Pat. Cesar Diego who
acted on the warrant returned to the court with a certification issued by NBI agent Gonzales,
stating therein that accused was still under investigation.
Through counsel Rolando T. Cainoy, Escaño filed in court an urgent ex-parte motion for his
commitment at the provincial jail of Bataan on the ground that he wanted to be where his family
and counsel could have easy access to him. He alleged therein that his detention at the NBI
headquarters in Manila was irregular and in defiance of the warrant of arrest issued by the court.
This was granted.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Director Carpio stating that the NBI needed physical
custody of Escaño for the identification of the other accused in the case who were still the objects
of a manhunt by NBI agents; that in view of the finding of NBI agents that the other accused and
Page 141
suspects in the case were subversive elements or members of the New People's Army, it was for
the best interest of Escaño that he be detained at the NBI lock-up cell where security measures
were adequate; and that the NBI would produce the person of Escaño before the court whenever
required and every time that there would be a hearing on the case. However another motion was
executed by Escaño stating that he now wants to be detained in the NBI, alleging that he did not
authorize his counsel to execute the first motion. Also, Escaño's counsel Rolando T. Cainoy filed
an application for bail stating that Escaño was arrested by NBI agents on December 7, 1986
without a warrant having been presented to him and that since then he had been detained in the
lock-up cell of the NBI; that said agents, also without a warrant, searched his house when he was
arrested; that he was subjected to inhuman torture and forced to admit participation in the killing
of Mayor Payumo and to implicate other persons, and that during the custodial investigation, he
was not represented by counsel. In opposing said application, the public prosecutor averred that
the accused was charged with a capital offense for which no bail may be availed of, that the
reasons advanced in said application would be overcome by strong and sufficient evidence; and
that during the custodial investigation, he was represented by counsel. The court granted the
application for bail fixing the same at P30,000, having found no sufficient evidence against
accused. Director Carpio was ordered to justify his actions and so as not to be considered in
contempt.
Issue:
Whether or Not the order granting right to bail was proper.
Held:
No. The order granting bail had been rendered moot not only by the fact that he had been
released from NBI custody, but also because Escaño jumped bail and did not appear on the date
set for his arraignment. Notwithstanding, the Court resolved the issue of the legality of the order
granting bail to Escaño. Although the right to bail is principally for the benefit of the accused, in
the judicial determination of the availability of said right, the prosecution should be afforded
procedural due process. Thus, in the summary proceeding on a motion praying for admission to
bail, the prosecution should be given the opportunity to present evidence and, thereafter, the
court should spell out at least a resume of the evidence on which its order granting or denying
bail is based. Otherwise, the order is defective and voidable. In the case at bar the RTC erred in
not summarizing the factual basis of its order granting bail, the court merely stated the number of
prosecution witnesses but not their respective testimonies, and concluded that the evidence
presented by the prosecution was not "sufficiently strong" to deny bail to Escaño.
The facts, however, that Mayor Payumo was killed on August 20, 1986 when the 1973
Constitution allowing the death penalty was still in force and that the application for bail was made
on March 5, 1987 during the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution which abolished the death
penalty, should not have gotten in the way of resolving the application for bail in accordance with
the Constitution and procedural rules. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides
that "(a)ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law." As the phrase "capital offenses" has been
replaced by the phrase "offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, 25 crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua instead of those punishable by the death penalty, when evidence of guilt is
strong, are the exceptions to the rule that the right to bail should be made available to all
accused. As the court itself acknowledged in its order of April 2, 1987 that "capital punishment" in
Section 4, Rule 114 has been amended to reclusion perpetua, the court should have proceeded
accordingly: i.e., resolved the application for bail pursuant to Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution. It did not have to invoke the abolition of the death penalty and the lack of legislative
enactment restoring it in justifying the grant of bail. All it had to do was to determine whether
evidence of guilt is strong in the light of the provision of Section 13, Article III.
The RTC has the discretion in the consideration of the strength of the evidence at hand.
However, in the exercise of said discretion, the court is controlled by the following: first, the
applicable provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which this Court
may promulgate; and third, by those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of
the laws of the land. 27 The lower court not only failed to properly apply the pertinent provisions
of the Constitution and the Rules but it also disregarded equity and justice by its failure to take
into account the factual milieu surrounding the detention of Escaño
PEOPLE VS. FORTES

[223 SCRA 619; G.R. NO. 90643; 25 JUN 1993]
Facts:
Page 142
Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon,

accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to
report a rape committed against the latter by the accused. Following this, the accused was
apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was granted for accused’s provisional release. The
MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of bond was
denied. Now accused assails denial of bail on the ground that the same amounted to an undue
denial of his constitutional right to bail.
Issue:
Whether or Not the accused’s right to bail violated.
Held:
No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of
discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the offense charged is punishable by
reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is
strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.
But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of
right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by
the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of
the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court.
COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA

[200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG 1991]
Facts:
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to
appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed
coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of
the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their
motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was
denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer
for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the
provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even
military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the
ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred
to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after
more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.
Held:
NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the
pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after
the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to
submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration
which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the
subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver
of their right to submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge.
(Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM)
It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of
violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release
and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional
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Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on
petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is
not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The
right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest,
there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy
trial. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation
only after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in
the failed coup.
Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the
petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right
of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the
petitions are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private
respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.
MANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS

[142 SCRA 149; G.R. NO. L-62100; 30 MAY 1986]
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a
motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire
to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The
prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals
seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove,
respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ
commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command
(AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which
granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his
liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Issue:
Whether or Not the right to bail a matter of right.
Held:
The right to bail is a matter of right if the charge is not a capital offense or punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death.
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts.
Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the
business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.
CALLANTA VS. VILLANUEVA

[77 SCRA 377; G.R. NOS. 24646 & L-24674; 20 JUN 1977]
Facts:
Two complaints for grave oral defamation were filed against Faustina Callanta. The City Judge of
Dagupan City, Felipe Villanueva, denied the motions to quash the complaints. Thus, petitioner
Page 144
Callanta brought the suits for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Petitioner questions the validity of
the issuance of warrant of arrest by respondent, arguing that the City Fiscal should have
conducted the preliminary investigation. According to petitioner’s counsel, there was jurisdictional
infirmity. After the issuance of the warrants of arrest and the bail fixed at P600, petitioner posted
the bail bond, thus obtaining her provisional liberty. The City Fiscal in this case did not disagree
with the judge’s investigation, and agreed with the complaints filed.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner’s contentions are to be given merit.
Held:
Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court, “where the accused has filed bail and
waived the preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the
preliminary examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest”. In the case at
bar, it is futile for the petitioner to question the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest,
because she posted the bail bond. Petitioner also erred in arguing that only the City Fiscal can
conduct a preliminary investigation. According to the Charter of the City of Dagupan, “the City
Court of Dagupan City may also conduct preliminary investigation for any offense, without regard
to the limits of punishment, and may release, or commit and bind over any person charged with
such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court”. Petition for certiorari is denied.
Restraining order issued by the Court is lifted and set aside.
TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

[159 SCRA 70; G.R. NOS. L-72335-39; 21 MAR 1988]
Facts:
The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal
Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of
alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S.
Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it
became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President
Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was
resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted
on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's
resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential
Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted
to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against
former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-
affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only
on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations
were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1)
Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his
brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from
Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the
release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the
Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for
his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and
1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived
accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against
him. It was denied hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
Held:
YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the
complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President
Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary
investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant
and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the
Page 145
Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911)
prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation
by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law
is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with
absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable
in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.
GALMAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

[144 SCRA 43; G.R. NO.72670; 12 SEP 1986]
Facts:
Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that
had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-
blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span
of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown
and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that
the military escorts gunned him down in turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of
people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and
freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating
that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only
the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was
the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two
reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the
title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would
exclude nineteen of them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in
the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the
restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to
respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a
copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss
the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from
rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period
counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which
apparently was not served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the
legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that
the people are entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime
charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents
submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot
and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that
respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of
justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people
of the Philippines to due process of law.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.
Held:
Page 146
Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases
which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements
of due process.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was
no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he
revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos
to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacañang wanted dismissal to the extent that a
prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacañang Conference planned a
scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by
categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice
Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner
room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with
the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the
meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see
the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told
them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres.
Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and
from Malacañang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the
Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the
Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which
proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of
total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres.
Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not
by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder
that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his
announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration
of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better
arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may
claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if
some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The
disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera,
"nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment
of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by
virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The
custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The
monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacañang and by Malacañang personnel.
The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all
of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the
Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of
the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored
and disregarded.
The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the
government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in
the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal
Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial
authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of justice."
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the
handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference
(and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified
respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to
exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert
and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to
know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having
been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in
legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All
acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the
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Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had
required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining
order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its
decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts
of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of
jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial
court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes
charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of
government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no
constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in
accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and
honor.
PEOPLE VS. DRAMAYO

[42 SCRA 60; G.R. L-21325; 29 OCT 1971]
Facts:
Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery
case where he is an accused. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who
was returning from Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby. Only Dramayo and
Ecubin were convicted in the RTC for murder. Hence the appeal
Issue:
Whether or not the accused’s criminal liability proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
Yes. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence. So it must be,
according to the Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not,
according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution
demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on
their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction
be in existence. Their guilt be shown beyond reasonable doubt. What is required then is moral
certainty. "By reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is doubt
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let
the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded by the law
to convict of any carnal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to
every proposition of proof regular to constitute the offense."
The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two
appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than
amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was
more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. The principal
contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely
advanced for the first time, there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of
the defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did
hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty
having arisen as to their capability.
DUMLAO VS. COMELEC

[95 SCRA 392; L-52245; 22 JAN 1980]
Facts:
Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52 as

discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
Sec. 4 provides that any retired elective provicial or municipal official who has received payments
of retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of
office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local
office from which he has retired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation.
Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52,
which states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including those
Page 148
amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for
any of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided
that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the
filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
Issue:
Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and thus, should
be declared null and void
Held:
In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains constitutional

and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification. One class can be treated differently from another class. In this case, employees 65
years of age are classified differently from younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to
satisfy the “need for new blood” in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it
should be declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
guaranteed to an accused. “Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation,
according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso
contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from
running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a
civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the
degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one
against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for
public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been
filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime
with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to
hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).”
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may
be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the
elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary
proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts
rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of
findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will
thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be
allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable
portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of
Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.
Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid
and that portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby
declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
guaranteed to an accused.
PEOPLE VS. ALCANTARA

[240 SCRA 122; G.R. NO. 91283; 17 JAN 1995]
Facts:
On July 19, 1988, Venancio Patricio, accompanied by Larry Salvador, drove a ten-wheeler truck a
Coca-Cola plant in Antipolo to load cases of softdrinks. They were about to leave the plant at
10:00pm when several men approached them to hitch for a ride. Ascertaining that Salvador knew
appellant, Venancio accommodated appellant's request. Appellant had four companions. At
Ortigas Ave., one of them poked a gun at Venancio and grabbed the steering wheel. At the North
Diversion Road, Venancio and Salvador(helper) were brought down from the vehicle and tied to
the fence of the expressway, thereafter they were stabbed and left bleeding to death. Venancio
survived but Salvador did not.Appellant was arrested in the vicinity of Otis Street in Pandacan,
Manila. A few days later, he was turned over to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group. Sgt.
Alberto Awanan brought the appellant to the MCU hospital and was presented to Venancio for
identification. Appellant was brought to the Headquarters at Camp Crame where he confessed.
Page 149
Appelant’s Defense: Denial and alibi. He said that he was just applying to be a driver and stayed
there even if he was told that no work was available, to confirm with the truck drivers. While he
was applying for CONCEPCION TRUCKING located across Otis street from the Coca-cola plant.
He was arrested. He denied any knowledge of the "hit" on the Coca-cola delivery truck. He
remained in the custody of the police for two days and two nights. On the third day of his
detention, he was turned over to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group. Appellant was the
brought to the MCU hospital. He was made to confront Venancio whom he saw for the first time.
CHPG Sgt. Awanan asked Venancio twice if appellant was among those who hijacked the truck
he was driving. On both times, Venancio did not respond. Undaunted, Sgt. Awanan, called to a
photographer present, forced appellant to stand about a foot from Venancio, and told the latter to
just point at the suspect. "Basta ituro mo lang," Sgt. Awanan directed. Venancio obeyed, and
pictures of him pointing to the suspect were taken. From the hospital, appellant was brought to
the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group headquarters at Camp Crame. Without being apprised of
his rights nor provided with counsel, he was interrogated and urged to confess his guilt. He
balked. At ten o'clock that night, hours after questioning began, appellant's interrogators started
boxing him and kicking him. He was also hit on the back with a chair, and electrocuted. Still, he
refused to admit to the crime. In the midst of his ordeal, appellant heard someone say, "Tubigan
na iyan." He was then blindfolded and brought to another room where he was made to lie down.
Water was slowly and continuously poured on his face, over his mouth. Appellant could no longer
bear the pain caused by the water treatment. Finally, he confessed to being one of the hijackers.
He was led to another room, where he was handcuffed and left until the following day. Later, he
was made to sign prepared statements containing his full confession.
Alcantara was arraigned under an information charging him and four others (at large) with the
crime of robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide.
The trial court convicted the accused despite the following inconsistency between Venancio’s
affidavit and testimony:
Affidavit Testimony
1. mentioned 5 assailants - only Alcantara was identified
2. stabbing was preceded by a - only 3 assailants had a
3. conference by all assailants - conference
4. claimed to have allowed assailants - failed to identify Alcantara
5. to hitch a ride because Alcantara - at the hospital and in open
6. was familiar to them - court (pointed to another person)
Issue:
Whether or not the rights of the accused was violated.
Held:
YES. The people’s evidence failed to meet the quantum required to overcome the presumption.
The second identification which correctly pointed to accused by Venancio should not be credited.
There is no reason for him to err as they know each other for 3 years. It was also incorrect to give
too much weight to Police Sgt. Awanan’s testimony as to the “previous identification” at the
hospital. The testimony of Sgt. Awanan was not corroborated by Venancio.
The identification procedure was irregular. Due process demands that the identification procedure
of criminal suspects must be free from impermissible suggestions as the influence of improper
suggestion probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor.
Conviction must be based on the strength of the prosecution and not the weakness of the
defense. There was blatant violation of the constitutional rights of appellant as an accused.
Appellant belongs to the economically deprived in our society. He is nearly illiterate(third grade
education). Our Constitution and our laws strictly ordain their protection following the Magsaysay
desideratum that those who have less in life should have more in law.
CORPUZ VS. REPUBLIC

[194 SCRA 73; G.R. NO. 74259; 14 FEB 1991]
Facts:
Generoso Corpuz is the Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of
Nueva Viscaya. He was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said office. In this capacity,
he received collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to
Page 150
government accounts. On April 13, 1981 his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was
terminated and a transfer of accountabilities was effected between him and his successor. The
Certificate of turnover revealed a shortage of P72,823.00. He was able to pay only P10,159.50.
After a final demand letter for the total of P50,596.07 which was not met, a case of malversation
was filed against him. Corpuz did not deny such facts but he insists that the shortage was
malversed by other persons. He alleged that Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through 1 of 4 separate
checks (PNB) issued and encashed such checks while he was of leave. Also, Acting Deputy
Provincial Treasurer Bernardo Aluning made to post the amount on his cashbook although he
had not received the said amount. He was convicted in Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether or Not Corpuz is guilty of malversation.
Held:
It is a subtle way of camouflaging the embezzlement of the money equivalent when 1 of the 4
checks issued and encashed in the same day was entered in the accused’s cash book 3 months
after such encashments. Also, Corpuz claim that he was absent when Paymaster Diosdado
Pineda through 1 of 4 separate checks (PNB) issued and encashed such checks, was not
proven.
Post-Audit is not a preliminary requirement to filing a malversation case. The failure of the public
officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by
an authorized officer shall be a prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to
personal use.
The equipoise rule(balancing test) which is the presumption of innocence is applicable only where
the evidence of the parties is evenly balance, in which case the scale of justice should be tilt in
favor of the accused. There is no such balance in the case at bar. The evidence of the
prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his claims. The
presumed innocence must yield to the positive finding that he is guilty of malversation.
Wherefore his petition is denied. He is guilty as principal of Malversation of Public Funds.
PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO

[85 PHIL 752; G.R.L-2809; 22 MAR 1950]
Facts:
Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal
detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and
without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado
for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded
guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence
was presented to indict the latter.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.
Held:
Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : “If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be
informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he
desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable
time must be allowed for procuring attorney.” This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our
Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal
cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by
counsel.
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record
does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had
reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation
was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way
of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the
voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information
Page 151
that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case.
Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was
not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have
seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given
by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.
PEOPLE VS. MAGSI

[124 SCRA 64; G.R. NO.L-32888; 12 AUG 1983]
Facts:
Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled
before the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union. The case was actually set and
rescheduled for six (6) times, first of which was on August 1, 1970. On that date, despite
appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing was
re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of
accused desire to be represented by a de parte counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera
moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favorably acted on by the court on September
7, 1970. At the second hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the de officio and de parte
counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the next day and
the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the third
hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officio counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was
reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only. The accused del
Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with the allegation that he committed the crime out
of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other coaccused. Appellant was found guilty of
murder and made to suffer the death penalty.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of the rights of the accused.
Held:
YES. The desire to speed up the disposition of cases should not be effected at the sacrifice of the
basic rights of the accused. Citing People vs. Domingo (55 SCRA 243-244): the trial courts
should exercise solicitous care before sentencing the accused on a plea of guilty especially in
capital offenses by first insuring that the accused fully understands the gravity of the offense, the
severity of the consequences attached thereto as well as the meaning and significance of his plea
of guilty; and that the prudent and proper thing to do in capital cases is to take testimony, to
assure the court that the accused has not misunderstood the nature and effect of his plea of
guilty. Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the
interests of the accused, resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of evidence when
in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether he
understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient compliance.
SORIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

[131 SCRA 184; G.R. NO.L-65952; 31 JUL 1984]
Facts:
Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an Asst. Fiscal, was assigned to
investigate. In the course of the investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 from Tan as price
for dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the NBI which set up an entrapment. Tan was given a
Php.2000, marked bill, and he had supplied the other half. The entrapment succeeded and an
information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision
finding the petitioner guilty as a principal in violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(R.A.3019). A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this instant
petition.
Issue:
Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as contract or
transaction within the purview of .RA.3019.
Held:
Page 152
R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx b. Directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the Govt. and any other party wherein the
public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC
and not a violation of R.A. 3019 sec.3 (b). The offense of direct bribery is not the offense charged
and is not included in the offense charged which is violation of R.A.3019 sec.3 (b).
The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not limited to commercial or business
transaction, but includes all kinds of transaction whether commercial, civil, or administrative in
nature.
The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the
petitioner was neither a contract nor transaction. A transaction like a contract is one which
involves some consideration as in credit transactions. And this element is absent in the
investigation conducted by the petitioner.
Judgment modified. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC.
BORJA VS. MENDOZA

[77 SCRA 422; G.R. NO.L-45667; 20 JUN 1977]
Facts:
Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was not arraigned.
That not withstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and
rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was appealed to the
Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged that the
failure to arraign him is a violation of his constitutional rights. It was also alleged that without any
notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the
appealed case was rendered The Solicitor General commented that the decision should be
annulled because there was no arraignment.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner’s constitutional right was violated when he was not arraigned.
Held:
Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed
as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a
showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the
evidence against him. It is also not just due process that requires an arraignment. It is required in
the Rules that an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge
that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom,
even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he
must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. Being
arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also, respondent
Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment. With the
violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is
correct that the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should
be set aside for being null. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of
the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R.
Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical
injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza
dated November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set
aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight
physical injuries, with due respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting
with the arraignment of petitioner.
Page 153
CONDE VS. RIVERA

[45 PHIL 650; G.R. NO. 21741; 25 JAN 1924]
Facts:
Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to
no less the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her
witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause
postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after
the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as
far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.
Held:
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused
persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been
deprived of that right in defiance of law. We lay down the legal proposition that, where a
prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant
against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year,
the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
PEOPLE VS. TAMPAL

[244 SCRA 202; G.R. NO. 102485; 22 MAY 1995]
Facts:
Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, Samuel Padumon, Pablito Suco, Dario
Suco and Galvino Cadling were charged of robbery with homicide and multiple serious physical
injuries in the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga with Hon. Wilfredo Ochotorena as presiding
judge. However, only private respondents, Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon,
and Samuel Padumon were arrested, while the others remained at large.
The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Wilfredo
Guantero moved for postponement due to his failure to contact the material witnesses. The case
was reset without any objection from the defense counsel. The case was called on September
20, 1991 but the prosecutor was not present. The respondent judge considered the absence of
the prosecutor as unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute. The
prosecution filed a motion for reconsidereation, claiming that his absence was because such date
was a Muslim holiday and the office of the Provincial prosecutor was closed on that day. The
motion was denied by respondent judge.
Issue:
Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition
of their cases.
Whether or Not the dismissal serves as a bar to reinstatement of the case.
Held:
In determining the right of an accused to speedy disposition of their case, courts should do more
than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of
the case. What are violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial are unjustified
postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. In the facts above, there
was no showing that there was an unjust delay caused by the prosecution, hence, the respondent
judge should have given the prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its case.
The private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. In several cases it was
held that dismissal on the grounds of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would
Page 154
bar another prosecution for the same offense, but in this case, this does not apply, considering
that the rights of the accused to a speedy trial was not violated by the State. Therefore, the order
of dismissal is annulled and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8493 “THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT”
The arraignment of an accused shall be held within 30 days from filing of the information, or from
the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is
pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the
accused shall have at least 15 days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within 30 days from
arraignment as fixed by the court. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed 180 days from
the 1st day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE TV OF TRIAL OF JOSEPH ESTRADA

[360 SCRA 248; A.M. NO 01-4-03-SC; 29 JUN 2001]
Facts:
The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the Court to allow
live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against
former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of
full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was
seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney
Ricardo Romulo.
Issue:
Whether or Not live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed
against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be permitted by the court.
Held:
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the other
hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair
and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the
right of the accused must be preferred to win.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a
trial that is not lifted about its individual settings nor made an object of public’s attention and
where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only be
evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded.
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else,
where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is
fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in
secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial, it only implies
that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and
comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public. Nevertheless, within the
courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process
which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.
PEOPLE VS. SALAS

[143 SCRA 163; G.R. NO. L-66469; 29 JUL 1986]
Facts:
At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992, a 60 year old woman, identified as Virginia
Talens was found lying dead in a canal at Bo. San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga; she was last
seen alive at about 3:00 o'clock early morning of March 6, 1992 by Orlando Pangan and Richard
Pangan who were with her going home coming from the wake of one Leonardo Flores; both
Page 155
Orlando and Richard Pangan testified that accused was with them in going home at about 3:00
o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992; Orlando and Richard Pangan reached first their house
and left the two on the way and that was the last time Virginia was seen alive; just a few minutes
after reaching his house and while inside his house, Orlando Pangan heard a shout; another
woman, one Serafia Gutierrez, testified that she likewise was awakened by a shout at about 3:00
in the morning; Dr. Aguda who autopsied the victim found hematoma on the head and chest, an
abrasion on the left chin and stabwound on the neck which stabwound, the doctor claims, was the
cause of death of the victim; Police Investigator Gonzales who immediately responded upon
report, recovered at the scene a pin, the victim's wristwatch, earring, a ring and P135.00 money;
he likewise found on March 9, 1992 when he continued his investigation bloodstain on the front
door of the house of the accused which bloodstain when submitted for examination was found to
be of human blood; one Resultay was with Virginia Talens at about 5:00 afternoon of March 5,
1992 in going to the wake, who claims that Virginia had money on a purse as while they were on
the way Virginia bet on a jueteng she saw Virginia got money from her purse a P500.00 bill but as
she had no change she instead took P8.00 from her other pocket; one Ramil Talens, a son of the
victim corroborated the claim of Resultay that Virginia had with her at that time money worth
P2,000.00 as in the morning of March 5, 1992 he gave her mother for safekeeping the sum of
P1,500.00 which he claims his mother placed in her purse and claims further that at the wake, he
asked and was given P50.00 by his mother as he also participated in the gambling thereat,
however, the purse of Virginia containing about P2,000.00 was no longer to be found when she
was found dead; Orlando Pangan saw the accused gambled in the wake; Virginia likewise
gambled at the wake; accused had been working for three days before March 6 at Sta. Ana,
Pampanga and up to March 5, 1992, but the following day, he did not anymore report for work at
Sta. Ana, Pampanga, was no longer to be found and was last seen at about 3:00 morning
together with Virginia Talens on their way home coming from the wake; the parents of [the]
accused were informed by Investigator Gonzales that their son was the suspect and adviced
them to surrender him, but since March 6, 1992 when accused left Mexico, Pampanga, he
returned only on September 19, 1992 at Arayat, Pampanga, not at Mexico, Pampanga where he
was ultimately apprehended by the Mexico Police on September 22, 1992 after chancing on a
radio message by the police of Arayat to their Provincial commander that a vehicular incident
occurred at Arayat, Pampanga where one Elmer Salas was the victim and was hospitalized at the
district hospital at Arayat, Pampanga where he used the name of Rommel Salas and not Elmer
Salas. The trial court rendered convicting Salas for Robbery with Homicide
Issue:
Whether or Not there is evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction of the appellant of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide.
Whether or Not the appellant’s crime homicide or robbery with homicide.
Held:
There was no eyewitness or direct evidence; either to the robbery or to the homicide and none of
the things allegedly stolen were ever recovered. However, direct evidence is not the only matrix
from which the trial court may draw its findings and conclusion of culpability. Resort to
circumstantial evidence is essential when to insist on direct testimony would result in setting
felons free.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the theory that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every
other possible, rational hypothesis excepting that of guilt. All the circumstances established must
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one and fair and reasonable conclusion pointing
solely to the accused, to the exclusion of all other persons, as the author of the crime. The facts
and circumstances consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence
can constitute evidence which, in weight and probative value, may be deemed to surpass even
direct evidence in its effect on the court.
The fatal stabbing of Virginia Talens occurred at around 3:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant
hastily abandoned his house in Barrio San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga, his residence since
childhood, on that very date. Appellant was nowhere when his co-worker and barrio mate,
Eduardo Bagtas, came to appellant's house to fetch him for work at around 6:30 to 7:00 a.m. of
March 6, 1992. Appellant also abandoned his job as a painter in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, on March
6, 1992, the date of the crime, leaving behind an unfinished painting project. He was not seen
again from said date. Police investigators found human bloodstains on the front door of
appellant's house, on his clothing, and on his yellow slippers after the victim was killed. Despite
efforts of the police to find appellant as the principal suspect, a fact known to appellant's family
and neighbors, appellant did not present himself to the authorities. Appellant was apprehended
Page 156
only a full six months after the date of the crime, following his confinement in a hospital in Arayat,
Pampanga because he was sideswiped by a Victory Liner bus in Arayat. When hospitalized,
appellant used the alias Rommel Salas, instead of his true name Elmer Salas. These
circumstances denote flight, which when unexplained, has always been considered by the courts
as indicative of guilt.
Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake they attended. The victim was, in fact, enjoying a
winning streak when her son, Ramil Talens, came to fetch her but which he failed to do because
his mother was winning, and she refused to leave. The purse of Talens containing cash was gone
when her corpse was found in the canal with a stab wound and bruises. What was left was a
safety pin which victim used to fasten the missing purse to her clothes.
Denial is an inherently weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-
culpability to merit credibility. Denial is negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight over the testimonies of credible witnesses who positively testified that
appellant was at the locus criminis and was the last person seen with the victim alive.
The absence of evidence showing any improper motive on the part of the principal witness for the
prosecution to falsely testify against the appellant strongly tends to buttress the conclusion that
no such improper motive exists and that the testimony of said witnesses deserve full faith and
credit.
The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself
up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt
or he wants to save the State the trouble of having to effect his arrest. Spontaneity and intent to
give one's self up are absent where the accused went into hiding for six months after the incident
and had to resort to an alias when he was involved in an accident being investigated by the police
authorities.
Robbery with Homicide is a special complex crime against property. Homicide is incidental to the
robbery which is the main purpose of the criminal. In charging Robbery with Homicide, the onus
probandi is to establish: "(a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or
intimidation against a person; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized
with animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of
homicide, which is used in the generic sense, was committed." Although there was no witness as
to the actual robbing of the victim, there is testimony that the victim had more or less P2,000.00;
and wore gold earrings valued at P750.00. These were never recovered.
While there is indeed no direct proof that Virginia Talens was robbed at the time she was killed,
we may conclude from four circumstances that the robbery occasioned her killing: (1) Both
appellant and victim gambled at the wake. (2) The appellant knew that victim was winning. (3)
The victim was last seen alive with appellant. (4) The victim's purse containing her money and
earrings were missing from her body when found.
The decision of the regional trial court is affirmed. Costs against appellant. So ordered.
PEOPLE VS. MAGPALAO

[197 SCRA 79; G.R. NO. 92415; 14 MAY 1991]
Facts:
Eleven (11) people rode in a Ford Fiera going to Baguio. Namely they are: Felizardo Galvez,
Jimmy Jetwani, Simeon Calama, Rene Salonga, Eduardo Lopez, Adolfo Quiambao, Aliman Bara-
akal, Anwar Hadji Edris, Gumanak Ompa and defendant-appelants in this case, Omar Magpalao
and Rex Magumnang.
After an hour of driving, the car stopped so that one of the passengers could urinate. While the
car was stopped the Bara-akal, Edris, Ompa, Magpalao and Magumnang pointed guns and
knives at the other passengers and divested them of their properties.
On of the robbers then ordered Galvez to drive the car towards the precipice (bangin). When the
car was near the precipice, Galvez then stepped to the brakes. The other passengers jumped out
of the car and went to different directions to escape. Galvez however, was left in side the car and
was stabbed by one of the robbers. The robbers then escaped. Quiambao, who owned the car
helped Galvez to get to a hospital. Galvez died in the hospital. The robbers were then
apprehended with the exception of Edris who remain at large. Mangumnang however escaped
while being in detention and Bara-akal died inside the jail. Since Mangumnang was not arrested,
Page 157
the trial in absentia continued as to him. Ompa, Magpalao, and Magumnang were all held guilty
as principal by direct participation of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Issue:
Whether or Not the lower court erred in failing to apply the Constitutional mandate on the
presumption of innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt when it allowed the trial in
absentia to push through on the part of defendant-appellant Magumnang.
Held:
The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The reason is that the lower court has
jurisdiction over Magumnang the moment the latter was in custody. Jurisdiction once acquired is
not lost upon the instance of parties but until the case is terminated. Since all the requisites of trial
in absentia are complete, the court has jurisdiction over Magumnang.
In addition, Magumnang was presumed innocent during his trial in absentia. The prosecution had
strong evidence against him as proof beyond reasonable doubt that he is a principal by direct
participation in the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Thus, the Constitutional mandate was not
violated.
PEOPLE VS. ACABAL

[226 SCRA 694 ; G.R. NO. 103604, 23 SEP 1993]
Facts:
The accusatory portion in the information for murder. Facts are as follows:
"That sometime in the evening of the 28th of January, 1980, at Nagbinlod, Municipality of Sta.
Catalina, Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, including several 'John Does', conspiring and confederating with one another,
with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation and being then armed with bolos
and 'pinuti', did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use
personal violence on the person of one Rizalina Apatan Silvano while the latter was about to
leave her house and inflicting upon her injuries, to wit: 'right leg amputated below the knee; left
leg hacked behind the knee; abdomen hacked with viscerae evacerated,' and did then and there
set the house on fire while the aforementioned Rizalina Apatan Silvano was inside said house
trying to escape therefrom, and allowing her to be burned inside said house which was burned to
the ground, thereby causing upon said Rizalina Apatan Silvano her death and burning her beyond
recognition.
But on 16 May 1987, a fire gutted the building where Branch 37 was located and the records of
these two cases were burned. The records were subsequently reconstituted upon petition of the
prosecuting fiscal. The testimonies of the witnesses were retaken, however, before it could
commence, accused Engracio Valeriano jumped bail and the warrant for his arrest issued on 16
November 1987 was returned unserved because he could not be found. An alias warrant for his
arrest was issued on 26 June 1989, but he remains at large up to the present.
After the completion of the re-taking of the testimonies of the witnesses in Branch 37, Criminal
Cases Nos. 4584 and 4585 were re-raffled to Branch 33 of the trial court, then presided over by
Judge Pacifico S. Bulado.
The decision of the trial court, per Judge Pacifico S. Bulado, dated 31 October 1991 but
promulgated on 20 December 1991, contained no specific dispositive portion. Its rulings are
found in the last two paragraphs which read as follows:
"The elements of murder in this case, Criminal Case No. 4585 for the killing of Rizalina Apatan-
Silvano having been proved by the prosecution beyond doubt, the accused JUANITO
RISMUNDO, MACARIO ACABAL and ABUNDIO NAHID, considering the attendant qualifying
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, use of fire by burning the house of victim Rizalina
Apatan-Silvano in order to forcibly drive her out of her house and hack her to death, the abuse of
superior strength, the penalty impossable [sic] here will be in its maximum degree, that is
reclusion perpetua taking into account Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty now for
murder is Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua, and for all the accused to indemnify the
heirs of the victim the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos since this case occurred [sic]
in 1980. For the wounding of the victim Wilson A. Silvano, this Court believes that simple
frustrated homicide only is committed by the accused Engracio Valeriano only.
Page 158
But since the person who actually inflicted the injuries of victim Wilson Silvano, accused Engracio
Valeriano only is nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a fugitive
or at large, no penalty could be imposed on him since he is beyond the jurisdiction of this court to
reach. All the other two (2) accused, JUANITO RISMUNDO and ABUNDIO NAHID are hereby
ordered and declared absolved from any criminal responsibility from frustrated homicide.
The bail bond put up by the three accused, namely: Juanito Rismundo, Macario Acabal and
Abundio Nahid are hereby ordered cancelled and let a warrant of arrest be issued for their
immediate confinement."
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment complied with the Rules of Court.
Whether or not the cancellation of the bail bonds of the accused is valid.
Whether or not the accused may be tried in absentia.
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of frustrated murder.
Held:
We find that the decision substantially complies with the Rules of Court on judgments as it did
sentence the accused-appellants to reclusion perpetua. A judgment of conviction shall state (a)
the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission, if there are any; (b) the
participation of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice or
accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or
damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if
there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or
waived.
It is obvious that they clearly understood that they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal
Case No. 4585. Were it otherwise, they would not have declared in open court their intention to
appeal immediately after the promulgation of the decision and would not have subsequently filed
their written notice of appeal.
Accused-appellants contend that the trial court did not impose any sentence and so cannot
cancel anymore their bail bonds and direct their arrest and immediate commitment because it
already lost jurisdiction over their persons when they perfected their appeal.
The decision did impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since the order cancelling their bail
bonds and directing their arrest is contained in the decision itself, it is apparent that their
abovementioned contention is highly illogical. At the time the order in question was made, the trial
court still had jurisdiction over the persons of the accused-appellants.
The trial court further erred in holding that no penalty could be imposed on accused Engracio
Valeriano in Criminal Case No. 4584 because he "is nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to
the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or at large." The court ignored the fact that Engracio jumped
bail after he had been arraigned, just before the retaking of evidence commenced. Paragraph (2),
Section 14, Article III of the Constitution permits trial in absentia after the accused has been
arraigned provided he has been duly notified of the trial and his failure to appear thereat is
unjustified. One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for his non-appearance during
the trial.
Accordingly, after the trial in absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and
promulgation may be made by simply recording the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy
thereof served upon his counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to be present at the
promulgation is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel.
In conclusion, because of reasonable doubt as to their guilt, the accused-appellants must be

acquitted. Every accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved; that presumption is
solemnly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The contrary requires proof beyond reasonable doubt,
or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Short of this, it is not
only the right of the accused to be freed; it is even the constitutional duty of the court to acquit
him.
Page 159
US VS. TAN TENG

[23 PHIL 145; G.R. NO. 7081; 7 SEP 1912]
Facts:
The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was gambling near
the house of the victim and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the
floor and place his private parts over hers. Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a
disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about what had happened and reported it to
the police.
Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. He was then
stripped of his clothing and was examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same
symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of
the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant
was suffering from gonorrhea.
The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired came
from the defendant herein. Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge
by the latter. The defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissible because it was
taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination.
Issue:
Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendant’s rights
against self-incrimination.
Held:
The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of the said right.
He was neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance
was taken from his body without his objection and was examined by competent medical authority.
The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as
evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if the offender apprehended was a
thief and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence against him.
VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS

[41 PHIL 62; G.R. NO. 16444; 8 SEP 1920]
Facts:
Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to
subject herself into physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the
determine the crime of adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical
examination interposing the defense that such examination was a violation of her constitutional
rights against self-incrimination.
Issue:
Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional rights
against self-incrimination.
Held:
No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that
no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a
prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is
that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.
BELTRAN VS. SAMSON

[53 PHIL 570; G.R. NO. 32025; 23 SEPT 1929]
Facts:
Page 160
Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting
as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would
be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would
give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place.
He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself.
Issue:
Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing
the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be
falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional
provision under examination.
Held:
The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely
and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the
purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body,
or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the
application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner
herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the
respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is
similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the
purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to
produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in
both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in
the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not
granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a
municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens
of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without
resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right
guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in
evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre
of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.
PASCUAL VS. BME

[28 SCRA 345; G.R. NO. 25018; 26 MAY 1969]
Facts:
Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical
Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged
immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the
petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that
to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of
grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to
the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only
when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged
that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the
first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative
charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.
Issue:
Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the Self-
Incrimination Clause.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for
alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-
incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his
consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the
Page 161
accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to
take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer
not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The
constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to
remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a
defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand —
with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands
for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such
desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the
high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic
creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is
given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a
government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.
PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN

[17 SCRA 1119; G.R. NO. L-26376; 31 AUG 1966]
Facts:
Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being arraigned, he
entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted y counsel. At his counsel de officio, he
was allowed to present evidence and consequently testified that he stabbed the deceased in self-
defense. In addition, he stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On
the basis of the testimony of the accused, he was acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed.
Issue:
Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is an essential requisite to
double jeopardy. The accused had first entered a plea of guilty but however testified that he acted
in complete self-defense. Said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the
court a quo should have required him to plead a new charge, or at least direct that a new plea of
not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. Therefore, there has been no standing of plea
during the judgment of acquittal, so there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal
herein.
PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA

[23 SCRA 1249; G.R. L-24447; 29 JUN 1968]
Facts:
The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao,
Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure
to allege vivid designs in the info. Said motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the
prosecution appealed.
Issue:
Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy.
Held:
In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have
obtained in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's
motion to dismiss. The “doctrine of double jeopardy” as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies
to wit when the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will
not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case
Page 162
is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby
prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of
conviction against him.
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of
the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect.
9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal.
PAULIN VS. GIMENEZ

[217 SCRA 386; G.R. NO. 103323; 21 JAN 1993]
Facts:
Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were smothered with dust when they were
overtaken by the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, Mabuyo followed the
vehicle until the latter entered the gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby security guard
for the identity of the owner of the vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his duties, petitioners
allegedly pointed their guns at him. Thus, he immediately ordered his subordinate to call the
police and block road to prevent the petitioners’ escape. Upon the arrival of the police, petitioners
put their guns down and were immediately apprehended.
A complaint “grave threats” was filed against the petitioners (Criminal Case No. 5204). It was
dismissed by the court acting on the motion of the petitioners. Mabuyo filed a MOR thus the
dismissal was reversed. Thereafter, petitioners filed for “certiorari, prohibition, damages, with
relief of preliminary injunction and the issuance of a TRO” (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed for
lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading and ordered to proceed with the trial of the case.
Hence, this instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or Not the dismissal of 5204 was a judgment of acquittal.
Whether or Not the judge ignored petitioner’s right against double jeopardy by dismissing CEB-
9207.
Held:
For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of
the accused. Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the
accused, he has deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In the case at
bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not
attach.
Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The latter is always based on merit
that shows that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not guilty. While the former, in the
case at bar, terminated the proceedings because no finding was made as to the guilt or
innocence of the petitioners.
The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the order of dismissal for the reception of
further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it prematurely
terminated and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right to complete the
presentation of its evidence. The rule on summary procedure was correctly applied.
PEOPLE VS. COURT OF SILAY

[74 SCRA 248; G.R. NO. L-43790; 9 DEC 1976]
Facts:
That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico
who were then scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars No.1743,1686
and 1022 loaded with sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report cards),
Apparently, it was proven and shown that there was padding of the weight of the sugar canes
and that the information on the tarjetas were to be false making it appear to be heavier than its
actual weight. The three accused then were charged with “Falsification by private individuals and
use of falsified document”. After the prosecution had presented, the respondent moved to
dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidences presented were not sufficient
to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on the motion, respondent court issued
Page 163
its order dismissing the case on the ground that the acts committed by the accused do not
constituted the crime of falsification as strictly enumerated in the revised penal code defining the
crime of falsification which was charged earlier and that their case be dismissed. People asserts
that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable even if the case at bar was dismissed because
according to them, it was done with the consent of the accused therefore waiving there defense
of double jeopardy. The accused on the other hand, reiterated the fact that the dismissal was
due to lack of merits of the prosecution which would have the same effect as an acquittal which
will bar the prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust and unconstitutional for
the accused due to double jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the plaintiff.
Issue:
Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the accused Sensio, Millan and
Jochico in double jeopardy
Held:
Yes the revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the
case has been dismissed earlier due to lack of merits. It is true that the criminal case of
falsification was dismissed on a motion of the accused however this was a motion filed after the
prosecution had rested its case, calling for the evidence beyond reasonable ground which the
prosecution had not been able to do which would be tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar the
prosecution of another case. As it was stated on the requirements of a valid defense of double
jeopardy it says: That there should be a valid complaint, second would be that such complaint
be filed before a competent court and to which the accused has pleaded and that defendant was
previously acquitted, convicted or dismissed or otherwise terminated without express consent of
the accused in which were all present in the case at bar. There was indeed a valid, legitimate
complaint and concern against the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico which was filed at a
competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. It was also mentioned that the accused
pleaded not guilty and during the time of trial, it was proven that the case used against the
accused were not sufficient to prove them guilty beyond reasonable doubt therefore dismissing
the case which translates to acquittal. It explained further that there are two instances when we
can conclude that there is jeopardy when first is that the ground for the dismissal of the case was
due to insufficiency of evidence and second, when the proceedings have been reasonably
prolonged as to violate the right of the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites given, it was
the first on that is very much applicable to our case at bar where there was dismissal of the case
due to insufficiency of evidence which will bar the approval of the petition in the case at bar for it
will constitute double jeopardy on the part of the accused which the law despises.
PEOPLE VS. RELOVA

[149 SCRA 292; G.R. NO.L-45129; 6 MAR 1987]
FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set aside
the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr.
Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of Batangas Electric
Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and
examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia.
They discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city
government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said devices are
designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the
plant’s electric meter. The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint
was filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act
being a light felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was
filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas
Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and prejudice to
City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to
quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscal’s claim is that it is not double
jeopardy because the first offense charged against the accused was unauthorized installation of
electrical devices without the approval and necessary authority from the City Government which
was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the second
offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code making it a
different crime charged against the 1st complaint against Mr.Opulencia.
Issue:
Page 164
Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the second
offense charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of
electricity punishable by a statute against the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense because as
tediously explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of
double jeopardy. The first would be that “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense and the second sentence states that “If an act is punishable by a law or an
ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act”. In the
case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2 nd kind
or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the
same act. It further explains that even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing that the
first charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge was a violation against
the revised penal code, the fact that the two charges sprung from one and the same act of
conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the
other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that Mr. Opulencia was
acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the same
identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.
ESMENA VS. POGOY

[102 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-54110; 20 FEB 1981]
Facts:
Petitioners Esmeña and Alba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of Cebu City for
allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to
be given to them because the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners
pleaded “Not Guilty”. No trial came in after the arraignment due to the priest’s request to move it
on another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but
the fiscal informed the court that it received a telegram stating that the complainant was sick. The
accused invoked their right to speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case because the
trial was already dragging the accused and that the priest’s telegram did not have a medical
certificate attached to it in order for the court to recognize the complainant’s reason to be valid in
order to reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to revive the
case and attached the medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that the priest was indeed
sick of influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmeña and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case
on the ground of double jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due to
complainant’s failure to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy
Held:
Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case
has been dismissed already without the consent of the accused which would have an effect of an
acquittal on the case filed. The dismissal was due to complainant’s incapability to present its
evidence due to non appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar
further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. For double jeopardy to exist these
three requisites should be present, that one, there is a valid complaint or information filed second,
that it is done before a court of competent jurisdiction and third, that the accused has been
arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. In the case at bar, all three conditions
were present, as the case filed was grave coercion, filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to
where the coercion took place and last the accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the
complaint or the information. When these three conditions are present then the acquittal,
conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case without his express
consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. In
the case, it was evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and asked
for the trial of the case and not its termination which would mean that respondents had no
expressed consent to the dismissal of the case which would make the case filed res judicata and
has been dismissed by the competent court in order to protect the respondents as well for their
right to speedy trial which will be equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar
to further prosecution.
Page 165
PEOPLE VS. DE LA TORRE

[380 SCRA 586; G.R. NOS. 137953-58; 11 MAR 2002]
Facts:
Wilfredo dela Torre, appellee, has three children from a common-law relationship, the eldest of
which is Mary Rose. When Mary Rose was 7 yearsold, her mother left them together with her
youngest brother so she and her other brother were left to the care of her father.
Mary Rose was the brightest in her class despite their poverty. However, in January 1997, a
sudden change in Mary Rose’s behavior behavior was noticed. She was twelve years old at that
time. She appeared sleepy, snobbish and she also urinated on her panty. When confronted by
her head teacher, Mary Rose admitted that she was abused repeatedly by her father. Her father,
however, denied vehemently the charges being imputed to him by her daughter.
The RTC convicted appellee of two counts of acts of lasciviousness and four counts of murder.
However, the RTC refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained
that there were circumstances that mitigated the gravity of the offenses such as the absence of
any actual physical violence or intimidation on the commission of the acts, that after the mother of
Mary Rose left the conjugal home, for more than five years, Wilfredo, Mary Rose and her brother
were living together as a family and Mary Rose was never molested by her father.
The prosecution seeks to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty of death of
the accused. It argues that it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the accused, and that
she was below eighteen years old when the rapes took place. As a consequence, the trial court
should have been imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. 7659. .
Issue:
Whether or Not the Court erred in penalizing the appellee with reclusion perpetua in each of the
four indictments of rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A.
7659.
Held:
Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from a
judgment or final order unless the accused will be put in double jeopardy. In People vs. Leones,
it declared that:
“while it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort, there are allegations of
error committed by a lower court which we ought not to look into to uphold the
right of the accused. Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution seeking to
increase the penalty imposed upon the accused for this runs afoul of the right of
the accused against double jeopardy…When the accused after conviction by the
trial court did not appeal his decision, an appeal by the government seeking to
increase the penalty imposed by the trial court places the accused in double
jeopardy and should therefore be dismissed.”
The ban on double jeopardy primarily prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an
instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated
trials. It also serves as a deterrent from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of
securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the
defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.
Being violative of the right against double jeopardy, the appeal of the prosecution cannot prosper.
Page 166
CITIZENSHIP
Page 167
CITIZENSHIP
Art. 4
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.
Sec. 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Sec. 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their
act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law.
FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC

[174 SCRA 245; G.R. NO. 87193; 23 JUN 1989]
Facts:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on

January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of
Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his
personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and
proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the
United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he
was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses
that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His
naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the
unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had
returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. In
their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized
American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on
January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also
argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from
continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his
alienage. Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that
Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his
naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the
Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not
amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also
joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was
not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of
the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the
termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a
Filipino.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his
election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
Held:
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all
public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the
Page 168
specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local
elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the
constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status.
The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983
per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California,
as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos
dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into
embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of
his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country
while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of
Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack
of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total
loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the
Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of
great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly
restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive
mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant
children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of
his loyalty and love.
Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.
Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-
Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory.
MERCADO VS. MANZANO

[307 SCRA 630; G.R. NO. 135083; 26 MAY 1999]
Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are

candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998
elections. Private respondent was the winner of the said election but the
proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding
the citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent
is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the
petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant
to the Local Government code that provides that persons who possess dual
citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. Private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election.
Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC
reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the
position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers
proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal
of the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent
disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.
Issue:
Page 169
Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.
Held:
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance,
such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state
which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because
he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of
our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or
mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born
in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry
aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual’s volition.
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as
a dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is

not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and
support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has,
as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen. On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the
Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and
taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.
TECSON VS. COMELEC

[424 SCRA 277; G.R. No. 161434; 3 Mar 2004]
Facts:
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to
deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino
citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley
Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on
two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before
his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F.
Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
Page 170
Issue:
Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.
Held:
It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year
1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place
of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been
his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en
masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo
Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The
1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to
all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate
or illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code.
BENGZON VS. HRET

[357 SCRA 545; G. R. No. 142840; 7 May 2001]
Facts:
Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was
the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United
States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among
other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.” He
was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Issue:
Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Held:
Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process
of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if
he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored
to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Page 171

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San Beda College of Law – Alabang

Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests

FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

PEOPLE VS. POMAR

Whether or not Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional.

LAMBINO VS. COMELEC

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC

GONZALES VS. COMELEC

The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.

2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the

Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the

Article XV of the Constitution provides:

. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC

Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. — During

It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it

Whether or not Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional.

BONDOC VS. PINEDA

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura

Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.

Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.

DUMLAO VS. COMELEC

Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52 as

Whether or not the requisites of judicial review are complied with

In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains constitutional

LACSON VS. PEREZ

SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

JOYA VS. PCGG

Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR.

Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.

Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit.

Whether or not the TLA’s can be out rightly cancelled.

Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.

AGAN JR. VS. PIATCO

UMALI VS. GUINGONA

Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security of Tenure.

Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law

Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

REPUBLIC ACT 6735, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT

THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF

AGUSTIN VS. EDU

Whether or not Petitioner’s contentions possess merit.

ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ

Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.

LUTZ VS. ARANETA

TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed

"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. —

be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction

Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional .

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

ASSO. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SEC. OF DAR

Several petitions are the root of the case:

Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s, PD, and RA were constitutional.

LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ

Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State.

KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA

TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ

"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a