Forged in Flames

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History Honours
Full Name: Garrett Ernst Eriksen Student No: 607e4967

Supervisor: Professor Gary Baines Due Date: 12 November 2010
Thesis Title:
Forged in Flames:
The SADF experience of
The Battles of Cuito Cuanavale
1987 – 1988
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Contents
1. THE BATTLES OF CUITO CUANAVALE
– A LITERATURE REVIEW
A literature review detailing select pieces of literature on
The Battles of Cuito Cuanavale.
- Pages 3 - 27
2. FORGED IN FLAMES: THE SADF EXPERIENCE OF
THE BATTLES OF CUITO CUANAVALE 1987 – 1988
– DE FACTO SCRIPT
A script of the included documentary: Forged in Flames: The SADF experience of
The Battles of Cuito Cuanavale 1987 – 1988.
- Pages 28 - 34
3. TREATMENT ON THE MAKING AND WRITING OF:
FORGED IN FLAMES
Detailing the journey from inception to completion of all aspects of this thesis.
- Pages 35 - 44
4. TRANSCRIPTIONS OF INTERVIEWS HELD BETWEEN
30 AUGUST 2010 – 03 SEPTEMBER 2010-11-09
Transcriptions of the interviews held with Danie Crowther, Johann Lehman and
Rodercik van der Westhuizen.
- Pages 45 - 92
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The Battles of Cuito Cuanavale – A Literature Review
INTRODUCTION
Background
The South African Border War took place during the years 1966 to 1989 and has been
the subject of controversial studies, scholarly analyses and political scrutiny for many
years since. Arguably, however, no Border War battles have been more controversial
than those involving the town of Cuito Cuanavale in Angola during which Angolan
and Cuban forces, with Soviet support, and South African and UNITA forces engaged
in fierce skirmishes for control of the area in and around the obscure Angolan town.
The Battles of Cuito Cuanavale1 lasted from December 1987 to March 1988
and were arguably the most important battles of the South African Border War. The
ceasefire that followed the Battles of Cuito Cuanavale is regarded as a pivotal event in
the implementation of UN resolution 435, which brought about the withdrawal of
SADF forces from Angola and Namibia, and as a seminal event which lead to the end
of Apartheid South Africa. It was also an important event in the Angolan Civil War
(1975 – 2002) and lead to the independence of Namibia.
New information and fresh research concerning the battles held there are
continuously published, with a new generation interested in dealing with the legacies
of the conflicts in Angola. A constant flow of debate on who “won” the overall
skirmish underpins the research and memories of some of those involved, as (ex-)
soldiers, civilians, scholars and politicians all vie for control over this knowledge and
the implications it may hold. In the last eight or so years, several books have been
written on the subject; mostly from the view of ex-soldiers or other people directly
involved.
1
In this paper I have purposefully chosen to use the term “Battles of Cuito Cuanavale”, as opposed to
the title “Battle of Cuito Cuanavale”, which is the traditional title given to this period.
While it is true that several battles did occur at Cuito Cuanavale, the latter is usually used to encompass
the entire period from December 1987 to March 1988, which, through my research, I have come to
conclude is an inaccurate title. Defining all the events that occurred between that time as one battle, is a
misnomer to say the least, and was originally created for ease of use by Cuban and Angolan
propaganda as a symbol to rally behind. The name was picked up and distributed by news agencies
around the world, and popularised by anyone sympathetic to the Angolan cause and/or by those who
stood against Apartheid and the SADF, whom they saw as the Apartheid governments’ guard-dog. The
misnomer has since been latched on to and perpetuated by historians, researchers and journalists alike.
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This literature review will serve as a guide that will briefly outline the Battles
of Cuito Cuanavale and a choice of relevant works concerned with the topic. This will
hopefully provide the would-be researcher with the information that they would need,
in order to adequately decipher the events that happened there and what they meant to
the people involved, those who write about it and historians today.
Objective
This research paper will comprise a literature review of selections from available
literature concerning the Battles of Cuito Cuanavale in Angola during the South
African Border War. The paper will focus on issues concerning South African
Defence Force (SADF) involvement in Cutio Cuanavale specifically, and will, for the
most part, ignore most other work on the Border War, only using general information
for contextual purposes, unless it pertains to this battle in some way or another. This
also extends to circumstances leading up to the battle as well as the aftermath. This
paper will hopefully guide the reader through relevant materials that will help provide
an understanding of the battle and the people who were involved.
Make no mistake, the soldier’s thoughts and feelings in the matter are as relevant
to this paper’s objective as any geographical or tactical data one may come across. As
such, most of the literature selected has been written by South Africans who were
either ex-SADF, military historians or conventional historians; this, I believe, is an
excellent place to begin work on unpacking the events at Cuito Cuanavale. Although,
there is the danger that some of these sources will be rather biased (in fact many are);
however, if enough of them are consulted, a more balanced picture can be formed.
But the psychology of the soldier must never be forgotten:
“War stories aren’t always about war, per se. They aren’t about bombs and bullets
and military manoeuvres. They aren’t about tactics, they aren’t about foxholes and
canteens. A war story, like any good story, is finally about the human heart.”
-Tim O’Brien
The soldiers in the Border War are not dead and forgotten; they are alive, here, now,
writing about and remembering their experiences. And it is our job as historians to
understand what it is they are trying to say, as well as the circumstances and events
that occurred then and how they are relevant now.
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HISTORICAL CONTEXT
After the Carnation Revolution in Portugal of April 1974, Angola became an

independent nation, due to Portugal releasing its overseas colonies, and a transitional
government was put in place. Almost immediately, the three militant, political groups,
who had been fighting for Angolan independence, turned on each other and the
interim government and began the Angolan Civil War (1975 – 2002).
The three factions engaged in the civil war were: the leftist MPLA (and its
armed wing FAPLA), led by Agostinho Neto, the conservative FNLA, led by Holden
Roberto (who was supported by Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre); and UNITA, led by
Jonas Savimbi (who originally had broken away from the FNLA and would later
come to be sponsored by the US CIA and South Africa). Each group managed to
capture their ethnic strongholds and began launching operations all over the country:
the MPLA in central Angola (and thus the capital), the FNLA in the north and UNITA
in the south.
Shortly before the Carnation Revolution, a League of Nations mandate, which
stipulated South Africa as the official administrative supervising body over South-
West Africa from 1919 onwards, was terminated by the United Nations in 1966.
South Africa refused the termination and in 1971, the UN declared the presence of
South Africa in the newly renamed Namibia illegal. South-West Africa was adjacent
to southern Angola and thus a beneficial partnership formed between UNITA and the
SAP (South African Police) and SADF when SWAPO (Southwest African liberation
movement) began armed resistance in early 1966, using southern Angola as a staging
area for operations into Southwest Africa. Thus, UNITA became an invaluable ally
against SWAPO for the SADF (although this was not the case from the outset.)
Most of the Angolan Civil War took place during the Cold War, which saw
the Soviet Union and United States of America attempting to manipulate the outcome
of the arms race by gaining power through proxies in other countries, Angola was no
different. The liberation movements in Africa, who naturally opposed apartheid in
South Africa, found support in socialist countries, such as Cuba and the USSR.
Angola and SWAPO were supported by the afore mentioned, as well as a few other
eastern bloc countries, whilst countries like the US covertly supported South Africa
and UNITA. In this way, a mini-Cold War was being fought in Angola, with the
winner being either the East or the West and her respective proxies. This, of course,
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begs the question then: was Cuba simply a Soviet proxy in this conflict, and South
Africa and American one?
After the Cubans had assisted the MPLA in consolidating power in 1975, they
decided to remain until conditions in the country stabilised, whilst the USSR supplied
FAPLA with munitions, advisors and technical staff. UNITA, meanwhile supported
by South Africa and the US in the form of soldiers from the former and funds and
weaponry from the latter, began posing considerable threat to the Angolan
government, and by extension the Soviet Unions’ support.
South Africa wished to prevent the MPLA government from gaining control
of south-eastern Angola and to keep UNITA in power in the region as a territorial
buffer zone, partly to prevent the spread of communism over South Africa’s borders,
aka “Die Rooi Gevaar” (The Red Danger), partly to ensure SWAPO guerrillas would
have difficulties launching attacks into Namibia and partly to ensure a foothold in
Angola should further actions against the Angolan government become necessary
should South Africa, or her surrounding territories, become threatened.
The MPLA was viewed by Pretoria as a pseudo-Soviet government, with
strong communist ties, and the continued presence of Cuban troops simply served to
strengthen this view. It was within South Africa’s interests to overthrow the current
Angolan government, based in the capital of Luanada, and replace it with a “friendly”
anti-communist one.
Leaping ahead to 1987, the Angolan government launched Operation
Saludando Octubre with the intention of removing UNITA forces from their
strongholds at Mavinga and Jamba. As with many previous operations, preparation
and direction were in the hands of the Soviet advisors; as were the higher ranks of the
FAPLA military occupied by Soviet officers. FAPLA was given new armour and air
power which increased their military might significantly. The Cubans did not engage
actively in the combat that took place and instead provided support functions. The
attack would commence from the town of Cuito Cuanavale.
The SADF noted the military build-up around Cuito and promptly warned
UNITA. However, the SADF was aware that UNITA would be overwhelmed by the
military force assembled by the Angolan government and decided to intervene on
June 15, launching Operation Moduler on 4 August 1987 to halt the FAPLA advance
on Mavinga. Shortly after consolidating themselves in Cuito, FAPLA brigades left the
Angolan town and advanced towards Mavinga. On August 28 they reached the
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northern banks of the Lomba River near Mavinga, where they had been expected by
the SADF.
The resulting battle has since been called the Battle of Lomba River and is
known for the series of severe skirmishes, between 9 September and 7 October,
wherein FAPLA suffered heavy losses, owing to SADF and UNITA forces, and was
prevented from crossing the Lomba River. Following this, the Soviets withdrew their
advisors, thus leaving FAPLA without any senior officers, providing a significant
strategic advantage to the SADF / UNITA forces.
Operation Hooper was launched on 29 September by SADF and UNITA
forces, with the objective being an offensive strike on the Angolan army. On 3
October, a FAPLA battalion was utterly destroyed on the southern banks of the
Lomba River by SADF and UNITA forces, and two days later the Angolans retreated
190km back to Cuito Cuanavle where they proceeded to fortify the area. SADF and
UNITA forces began a siege of Cuito on 14 October with long-range artillery, and
used the strategic advantage of artillery fire to prevent enemy retreat, as well as to
maintain control of the bridge and airstrip near Cuito.
By November of that year, UNITA had control of the road from Menongue,
on and around which they planted mines and set up guerrilla ambushes, whilst the
SADF were engaged in artillery strikes as well as the destruction of the remains of
three FAPLA units, east of the Cuito River near Tumpo, who had been cut off by
SADF artillery strikes. The now surrounded FAPLA units, who had also lost any
armour or artillery abilities, were on the verge of annihilation by UNITA and the
SADF.
This dire situation prompted the Angolan government to request urgent
military intervention from Cuba, to which they responded almost immediately with
over 15,000 elite troops, including officers, technicians, advisors and special forces
operatives. The first Cuban troops arrived on 5 December, and began to reinforce the
Angolan position at Cuito. This had become personal for Fidel Castro, who saw a
potential South African victory as a win for the apartheid regime and a loss for
socialist pride (although, it is probably safe to say it was his pride on the line, more
than socialism’s). On 25 November, the UN demanded the unconditional withdrawal
of the SADF from Angola by December 10, and the SADF replied by putting further
pressure on the besieged Angolans.
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From 13 January 1988 until 23 March, six large-scale assaults were performed
by the SADF and UNITA on the entrenched Angolans, but only the first produced any
worthwhile results, which were soon overturned by the third assault, after FAPLA
troops found and effectively used a perfectly defensible position to the north near the
Dala River. Eventually, the assault was brought to a halt by combined Angolan and
Cuban forces.
Cuban reinforcements neutralised the SADF’s air superiority, and this in turn
made ground operations costly and dangerous. Unable to gain any further ground, and
suffering a final failed assault on 23 March 1988, the SADF withdrew the majority of
its forces, leaving a small holding-force to secure their retreat with heavily mined
areas.
Six months later, South Africa finally withdrew all remaining forces, and the
implementation of UN resolution 435 lead to Namibian independence one month
later. A peace agreement was finally signed in New York on 22 December 1988,
mediated by Chester Crocker, a significant figure throughout the peace proceedings,
and Cuba finally pulled its troops out on 1 July 1991.
The collective battles at Cuito Cuanavale, lasting over six months, make up
the largest battle to occur on the African continent since World War II. The death toll
for the Angolans was high, around 20,000 soldiers killed. Debates on which side was
victorious still rage to this day; in terms of a military victory before Cuito, the SADF
and UNITA had clearly won, however the assaults on Cuito Cuanavale ended in
defeat for the assailants, and was the first SADF offensive that had been halted for
many years. Arguably, these events were significant, not only for the outcome of the
Cold War, but also for Namibian independence and the ending of the apartheid
regime.
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CUITO CUANAVALE – PERCEPTIONS OF THE BATTLE
The events in Angola between 1988-1989, and the Border War in general, have
comparatively few texts actually written about them than, for example, the two World
Wars or the Vietnam War, and is a conflict which is little known in common
understandings around the world. The average South African university library, and
perhaps city library, will no doubt host a few books on the Border War, but most
literature would have to be procured either via book stores, internet orders or
borrowed from private collections. The last five or so years, though, have seen a
revival of interest in the Border War, and the desire for all its secrets and battles to be
displayed, much like with the Vietnam War for US soldiers (which was also not
considered mainstream for a while but is now the subject of many films and books),
and so this literature review can be written, despite a lack of “mainstream” literature.
This revival is possibly spurred on by the next generation of South African’s taking an
interest in what many of their parents or relatives had to live through and take part in
during the apartheid era, and by ex-soldiers finally coming to terms with and writing
about their experiences.
In South Africa, the Border War, in general, is considered something that
happened during, and as a result of, the Apartheid regime, and thus, most young South
Africans dismiss it as something that happened to the previous generation, but not
something they should concern themselves with anymore. The Border War is not
something readily taught in most schools or universities, and it is considered taboo in
many parts of the country to even speak about. Many black South Africans consider
the Border War the final act of aggression the apartheid government managed to
inflict before it was finally ended in 1994.2 As such, the final Battles at Cuito
Cuanavale, despite the victories the SADF did achieve there, are considered the
definitive blow by black-Africa against white-Africa which ended apartheid, as the
SADF was forced to withdraw after some failed operations and due to international
pressure. According to most of the literature (mostly autobiographies and biographies)
the SADF’s goal was never to conquer Angola, or Cuito Cuanavale, but thanks to
Cuba’s propaganda initiatives, stating that they had beaten the SADF, striking a
2
African Union report, 1983, “Resolutions adopted by the Nineteenth Assembly Head of State and
Government” in Organiztion of African Unity. (Accessed on 30/10/10), pp 23:
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Decisions/hog/sHoGAssembly1983.pdf
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decisive blow against apartheid, the world believed that this was indeed the case. The
apartheid government did counter these claims, stating that they had won the war,
whilst paradoxically they were in the process of silencing any news about the war
overall in South Africa and eventually ended Apartheid in any case.
Now, more and more texts are coming to the fore, and the opportunity to
effectively research the Border War, or in this case the Battles of Cuito Cuanavale,
has never been greater. This literature review will serve as a guide through some of
the texts which I believe have assisted me the most in understanding the events at
Cuito. Some of these works are also highly recommended by academics and ex-
soldiers alike and so special care should be taken in understanding them as many are
personal accounts, which, of course, is one of the best ways to understand any battle.
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Historical Narratives
When creating a critical literature review, one should always keep in mind the
author’s agenda, perspectives and disposition. Even though objectivity is something
many historical authors strive towards, it is something that, arguably, is not
achievable. The predisposition of the author(s) always enter into whatever it is they
are writing, even this literature review will be affected thus. It should also be noted
that some authors, especially in this situation, write their opinion and interpretation of
events unabashedly with their own bias, which is more than fine, provided the reader
is aware of this when reading the work. The literature analysed in this review, will
focus on who the authors are, why they are writing what they are writing, their
perspectives on the battles at Cuito Cuanavale and the more topical aspect of who, in
their opinion, won the overall conflict at Cuito.
The “who won” debate essentially consists of two camps: the Cuban / Angolan and
the UNITA / SADF. Both sides maintain that, despite any battles lost, setbacks or
failures, theirs was the overall victory. On both sides one will still find veterans of the
conflict who state categorically that their side won, regardless of what the other says.
Cuba was very quick and very loud in maintaining that they won, and
broadcast this “fact” to the whole world within days of the SADF pulling back. This is
so well believed that even Nelson Mandela, whilst visiting Havana in July 1991, said:
“We come here with a sense of the great debt that is owed to the people of Cuba.
What other country can point to a record of greater selflessness than Cuba has
displayed in its relations with Africa?”3 in reference to the overall part that Cuba
played in liberation movements across Africa and the victory they created in Angola.
The names of fallen Cuban soldiers have even been included on the recently built
memorial wall in Freedom Park near Johannesburg, which honours heroes who fought
against apartheid, to the exclusion of all fallen SADF soldiers, who were seen as
defenders of apartheid.
3
Mills, G. & Williams, D. 7 Battles that Shaped South Africa. (2006) – Pp 187
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The War For Africa: Twelve Months That Transformed a Continent

- Fred Bridgland
Fred Bridgland’s The War For Africa: Twelve Months That Transformed a Continent,
covers the 1987 - 1988 operations which we are mostly concerned with, and provides
excellent analyses and facts, while also giving credit where credit is due, i.e. he also
acknowledges UNITA’s contribution to the victories the SADF enjoyed. Bridgland
also analyses how Cuba immediately claimed victory, after the peace accords were
signed, which Bridgland points out was “nonsense”, but that:
“…the Cuban story was taken at face value by Castro’s sympathisers in the
Western press and repeated so many times that it became received truth. The
Cubans were helped by the South Africans’ own clumsy efforts at propaganda,
which amounted to saying as little as possible about the full-scale war they
fought in Angola.”4
This is somewhat different to the viewpoint that Dr Greg Mills and David
Williams, authors of 7 Battles that Shaped South Africa, take wherein they hint of an
overall loss for the SADF / UNITA side whilst still showing that both sides lost and
won. At a glance, they do not seem to take any specific sides in their final few
paragraphs, rather choosing to write on the victories and defeats on both sides, which
include negotiation, military, political, economic and social spheres. They provide an
overview of the negotiation processes and touch briefly on the aftermath of the battle,
neither stating anyone categorically lost or won, although hinting along the way that
one side did loose. Given the guide-book style of their writing, and their aim to reach
a wide reader base, their style allows for a birds-eye view, as it were, on the numerous
operational outcomes.
Bridgland goes on to say that the SADF at no stage had wanted an all-out war
that would take them to Luanda as conquerors. Their objectives had been to fight a
limited war in support of UNITA and prevent the Cubans from capturing UNITA’s
strongholds; a view that General Jannie Geldenhuys, author of At The Front, also
shares. The SADF had succeeded in this and was content to let the Cubans take the
limelight (although, many ex-SADF want their victories acknowledged now).
4
Bridgland, F. The War for Africa: Twelve Months that Transformed a Continent. – Pp 228
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Bridgland summarises the war thus:
“The War for Africa and the New York accords provided Cuba with pretexts
for slipping out of a commitment that had become too hot and too expensive to
handle. In 1975, when the Cuban adventure in Angola began, the ‘scientific
socialist’ and ‘internationalist’ tide running from Moscow looked unstoppable.
By 1988 it was a faded dream. Despite 13 years of Cuban support, the Angolan
economy was ruined. The Marxist MPLA was in utter disarray and was trying
desperately to shed its ‘scientific-socialist’ past... Castro’s dreams of a Marxist
revolution spreading from Angola to encompass the whole of Southern Africa
had become a poor music hall joke...”5
This work really puts some meat on the bones of our research, and gives a very
wide scope of events whilst also detailing the events as much as possible, and with the
focus being on the 1987 to 1988 operations in Angola; certainly an interesting take on
Cuito. This is the first work so far, in this review, where the author is foreign. This
provides us with some “outsiders” perspective as well. Bridgland is a British writer,
biographer and is known as one of Britain’s most experienced foreign correspondents.
He has reported on wars in The Middle East, Pakistan, India and Africa, and has
filmed a documentary on the Angolan civil war which has been screened
internationally.
He is credited as the being first to report on South Africa’s secret, US-backed
invasion of Angola in 1975, uncovering the CIA’s involvement in the Border War in
the process. It should be noted, however, that he has frequently been labelled as a
sympathiser to Jonas Savimbi, UNITA’s leader, and never more so than when he
published his first book Jonas Savimbi: A Key To Africa. Thus, any researcher should
be aware that these sympathies may colour his work.
5
Bridgland, F. The War for Africa: Twelve Months that Transformed a Continent. – Pp 372
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7 Battles That Shaped South Africa

- Greg Mills and David Williams
Possibly the best text for a quick understanding of Cuito Cuanavale is 7 Battles That
Shaped South Africa by Dr Greg Mills and David Williams. Dr Mills is currently the
director of The Brenthurst Foundation, which is “dedicated to strengthening Africa’s
economic performance”.6 He has degrees from universities as far afield as Cape Town
and Lancaster and has taught in several universities in the Western Cape. He has been
Director of Studies and then National Director at the South African Institute of
International Affairs and has also published several journals and local and
international press articles. David Williams is an Associate Deputy Editor of the
Financial Mail and an SAIIA Research Associate. He is acknowledged as an expert
on several desert campaigns in the El Alamein battles and has lectured often on
military subjects in South Africa. He has also served in the South African military and
at one point qualified as a Citizen Force infantry section leader. He has reported on
military affairs for the Financial Mail for many years and has published two books on
sport.
Given their backgrounds, why are these authors writing about Cuito?
According to their preface, they were inspired to write on the most influential South
African battles due to a conversation, between the authors, in 2002 wherein they
discussed the role of South Africa in World War II. More specifically, with reference
to the Italian POW’s who were incarcerated in South Africa during that time and how
this affected South African society. This brought about the discussion on South
Africa’s long involvement in warfare, and thus the decision to write this work was
taken between the two.
This work, as the title states, provides information on seven different battles
that occurred in South Africa through the ages and, as such, does not delve too deeply
into the battles themselves, but rather provides a guided overview of these events, and
so is perfect for building some framework on which to understand our specific battle
further. The authors acknowledge in the preface that this book is meant to be an
overview, and not “an exhaustive, encyclopaedic account of South African military
history.”7 They also go on to state that the work is meant to appeal to a wide range of
6
7
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readers and that it is also meant to act as a rough guide to the battle sites themselves.
The authors have also personally visited each battle site themselves (except in the
case of Cuito, which is rather disappointing, considering how thorough the rest of the
work is) and have done extensive research into the events before, during and after the
battles.
The text traces the battle from beginning to end, including a lengthy first few
pages on the Border War itself and the events leading up to it, as well as some of the
aftermath of the battle and the Border War. Whereas, not nearly detailed as, for
example, Fred Bridgland’s The War for Africa, (whom Mills and Williams mention in
the opening page of the Cuito section) which really pushes to cover all the angles of
the Border War, it certainly makes up for it by providing the information in a reader-
friendly manner, ensuring all the main players are accounted for, as well as the main
events that make up the battle, such as the SADF / UNITA ambush of the FAPLA
forces at Lomba river, the siege of Cuito, the UN negotiations and resolution, etc.
The chapter also speaks about the lack of knowledge that the general public in
South Africa had of the battle (of which Bridgland and Jannie Geldenhuys, author of
At The Front, speak of at length) and the war in general. Many of the other texts seem
to gloss over this or mention it only briefly, but it was a huge factor not only for the
civilians but also the soldiers. It goes on to dedicate an ample amount of the pages to
understanding Cuba’s involvement and motivations in the war and at Cuito, which is
critical to understanding why the SADF pulled out of the conflict.
So, in their opinion, who won? As stated earlier, they take a more impartial
stance, showing who won and lost on both sides, and also chastising both sides for
their stubbornness. However, and this may simply be because they are South African
authors and thus have opinions with more South African slants than not, they do seem
to point out that the SADF lost overall as they were forced to give up many things at
the following negotiations.
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At The Front: A General’s Account of South Africa’s Border War

- Johannes Geldenhuys
Now we move on to a text of a more biographical nature. I would go so far as to say

that I enjoyed reading this one almost as much as I felt I had received an education on
the Border War from its pages. At The Front: A General’s Account of South Africa’s
Border War is written by Johannes “Jannie” Geldenhuys, a prolific figure in South
African and SADF history. He joined the South African Army as an infantryman in
1954, commanded South West Africa Command from 1977 to 1980 and was briefly
the first General Officer Commanding of the South West Africa Territory Force in
1980 before being promoted to Chief of the Army. He served as Chief of the SA
Defence Force from 1985 to 1990, and was a member of the negotiating team which
ended the 23-year-long Border War in 1989. He was one of the first authors to write
about the Border War and published At The Front in 1994 (although, at the time is
was under the title: Die Wat Wen (Those Who Win)), and republished it in 2009,
making use of new information and revised personal accounts to explain South
Africa’s Border War in this all-inclusive work. As Geldenhuys was directly involved
in most of the decisions involving Border War activities, and considering his
experience as a soldier and as a commanding officer, this particular work comes
highly recommended for understanding the mindset of the SADF intelligencia and the
workings of the upper echelons of Pretoria High Command.
His work is essentially biographical, however, but this simply allows the
reader to relate better to what he writes so one can understand the events from the
ground up, as it were. It is also a broad work, only briefly touching on specific events,
operations and tactics, instead rather giving a “general’s account of South Africa’s
Border War” than a specific retelling.
After the framework generated by the first text, and the strengthening from the
previous text, this is a good way to build some alternative understanding, as
understanding the commander’s mind-set during the war is just as important as
knowing the events themselves. Why this book is such a worthwhile source is that
Geldenhuys has kept his views and information largely unchanged, refusing to alter it
to fit political pressures or to compromise his thoughts and experiences on the matter.
One must always keep in mind, however, not too get too caught up in the stories, as
one must try to keep things relatively critical.
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Geldenhuys takes the stance that the SADF did not “win” the overall battle per
se, but rather that the SADF succeeded in achieving its objectives in the field, and
simply drew a stale-mate when attempting to take Cuito; justifying why certain
decisions were made with regards to pulling out. He also talks of media
misrepresentation, during and after the Border War, and of the media blackout
surrounding Cuito Cuanavale, berating local and international news agents for
believing propaganda then as now. One should be aware that this is Geldenhuys’
personal account of the Border War, and so much of what he says is personal opinion,
but he is frank about what he writes and only omits things, it seems, that may harm
himself or his family. If anything, he adds his own personal narrative to the overall
story of the Border War in a way that can help bring an aspect of understanding to
events at Cuito Cuanavale, or the Border War in general.
18
The Buffalo Soldiers: The story of South Africa’s 32 Battalion 1975-1993

- Jan Breytenbach
One of the most important pieces on the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale is written by
Colonel Jan Breytenbach, who was appointed by the Founder of the South African
Special Forces Brigade, General Frits Loots, as the first commander of 1
Reconnaissance Commando, aka “Recce’s” (the first unit founded within the South
African Special Forces.) He was also appointed as the first commander of the 32-
Battalion, aka “Buffalo Battalion”, as well as 44-Para Brigade. Thus, his text The
Buffalo Soldiers: The story of South Africa’s 32 Battalion 1975-1993, should be of
very special interest to anyone doing research on Cuito. This unit is legendary in the
SADF and was well-known amongst the Angolan and Cuban forces during the
skirmishes there, not to mention anywhere else on the continent high-command
needed them. It should be noted, however, that Breytenbach himself was not at Cuito
Cuanavale; rather the stories are told through the eyes of people who were under his
command and experienced Cuito first-hand.
32-Battalion were mainly deployed in southern Angola, acting as a buffer
between the SADF’s regular forces and its enemies. They also assisted UNITA
directly, although their main function was counter-insurgency, which eventually led to
them also being used as a semi-conventional force, especially during the later phases
of the war and at the various battles around Cuito Cuanavale. As such, 32 Battalions
involvement in the Border War is reported to have been greater than that of any other
unit of the SADF. It is also claimed that they caused more enemy casualties than any
other SADF unit, but these claims still require verification. Their legendary status was
boosted even further by their reputation for brutality, including allegations of targeted
attacks on civilians; torture and massacre (although, these reports are as hard to find
citations for as are their legendary achievements. That being said, they were highly
decorated for a reason, and many of the fantastical stories one would not believe are
indeed true.) The Buffalo Soldiers focuses on 32-Battalions story specifically, but they
were so widely used for so many roles, and were so deeply involved in skirmishes at
Cuito Cuanavale, that this work is an excellent resource for the would-be researcher
as it is filled with personal accounts and raw emotion (which is, of course, a danger in
and of itself when researching this work, as one might be swept up in the emotion of
the author).
19
As with any mainly biographical work, this is filled with the bias of the writer,
however, this work should be noted for the seeming lack of any particular stance on
part of the author. This work is about the Recce’s, their deeds, services, victories and
losses as well as personal experiences. Breytenbach seems to refrain from stating any
definitive “who won” scenario and rather focuses on his own story as well as those of
the men he commanded, only commenting on political situations directly involving
him and 32-Battalion, which, of course, is completely fair given that the focus of his
writing is 32-Battalion.
20
Days of the Generals: The untold story of South Africa’s Apartheid-era Military Generals
- Hilton Hamann
Next is Hilton Hamann’s Days of the Generals: The untold story of South Africa’s Apartheid-
era Military Generals, which consists of interviews with retired South African generals and
focuses on strategic elements and even differences between the generals themselves. This
work broadly speaks about various SADF operations, and focuses briefly on the Battle of
Cuito Cuanavale by describing the stalemated series of battles that occurred there, which led
to successful negotiations on the independence of Namibia. Hamann was conscripted into the
SADF in 1975 and fought in Angola that year. Hamann later became the military
correspondent for the Sunday Times, also wrote for the magazine Soldier of Fortune (which
has a long-standing and somewhat dubious reputation as a magazine for mercenaries and
assassins8), and travelled with the SADF, UNITA, and South Africa’s Special Forces.
This is the first instance, in this literature review, where we encounter a “scoresheet”
wherein the author points out that the SADF “won” due to the fact that their losses were far
fewer than the Angolans and Cubans. 4,785 men are listed as killed in action on the Cuban /
Angolan side, whilst 31 men were confirmed for the SADF. Naturally, this kind of
“scoresheet mentality” tends to bias the author to the point where wins and losses are
determined by numbers alone, thus devaluing human life and experience with regards to their
wartime experiences and accomplishments (or failures.), not to mention that it also blatantly
ignores the political consequences of the battles, and thus the fallout that the soldiers had to
deal with.
We find here though, that both Hamann and Clive Holt, author of At Thy Call, leave
out any UNITA losses, even though they too were heavy. It can be argued that the UNITA
losses were irrelevant to deciding an SADF military victory, in which case the SADF were
most certainly victorious up until the Cubans prevented them from advancing, however
UNITA were most certainly integral to some of the military victories the SADF enjoyed. That
being said, these works are SADF-based (and thus biased to varying degrees), and so it can
also be argued that UNITA losses are not important to the texts being discussed. One must be
aware that, as this is a collection of interviews, it is mostly a collection of personal opinions,
and therefore should be viewed as a series of personal views on historical events.
8
New York Times report on Soldier of Fortune magazine contract killings lawsuit outcome (2000)
(accessed on 30/10/10): http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9D01E5D9113FF935A25753C1A9669C8B63&sec=&spon=&&scp=10&sq=Soldier%20of
%20Fortune%20magazine&st=cse
21
On the Border 1965 - 1990: the White South African Military Experience
- David Williams
On the Border 1965 - 1990: the White South African Military Experience is also a very
important work to consider. It is written by David Williams, who also co-authored 7 Battles
that Shaped South Africa, who writes from personal experience as a professional conscripted
soldier and focuses on the trials the raw recruits endured, using his personal diary, and many
other first hand accounts, both from soldiers and officers, as references. Williams provides us
with the “grunts-eye view” which one can compare and contrast against the “generals-eye
view” from At The Front. He explains:
“Though the Border War ended 18 years ago, the war for its history continues
to wage. The term ‘border’ was deliberately used by the state to perpetuate the
fiction that troops were protecting the border and not actually fighting on
foreign soil.”9
This is important for understanding the mindsets of the soldiers fighting at Cuito. The
personal accounts truly bring the operations to the fore. One should be made aware, however,
that even though the work has many excellent pictures, details, such as who is in the photo
and where / when it was taken, are left out. However, Williams does include a terminology
glossary, a good list of sources and bibliography, as well as a worthwhile index and this book
is endorsed by Chester Crocker, who was pivotal in the negotiations that ended the Border
War.
Williams dedicates the final chapter of his work to the question of “who won?” and
discusses it at length. He begins by presenting equal arguments from both sides, and then
focuses on SADF opinions specifically, citing Geldenhuys’ opinions above most others.
Williams seems to lean more towards the stance that no-one “won” per se, but rather that the
SADF objectives were met, which he then questions as possible “face-saving tactics”.10 He
also states that the question of “who won?” has: “…distracted attention from two other
engagements that were arguably more important – both tactically and strategically”11,
meaning the “thrust by FAPLA and the Cubans towards the Namibian border.”12
9
Williams, D. On The Border: The White South African Military Experience 1965 – 1990. – Pp 117
10
Ibid – Pp 118
11
Ibid – Pp 118
12
Ibid – Pp 118
22
At Thy Call We Did Not Falter

- Clive Holt
This next work comes personally recommended to me by many ex-soldiers and some
researchers, whom I interviewed regarding their experiences in Angola. At Thy Call
We Did Not Falter, by Clive Holt, is a corporal’s account of Operations Hooper,
Packer and Excite in 1988, the final year of the Border War. The title comes from the
South African national anthem at the time, The Call of South Africa: “At thy call we
shall not falter, Firm and steadfast we shall stand, At thy will to live or perish, Oh
South Africa, dear land.”13 Operations Hooper and Packer were important events in
the timeline of the Cuito Cuanavale battle and is considered the culmination of South
African efforts to assist UNITA movements and maintain a strategic base area. These
operations involved the heaviest conventional fighting the country has engaged in
since World War II.
Holt was a mechanised infantryman with 61 Mechanised Battalion Group ( a
group also heavily involved in Cuito and one recommended as a good source of info
by other soldiers and researchers) and was among the unlucky men who became
caught up in this fighting in late December 1987 and early 1988. The book contains
some rare pictures of the damage caused during the battles, which are few and far
between but most definitely help illustrate the occurrences there. One should keep in
mind what Holt said, regarding his work, when reading it:
“The Angolan war affected my life and the lives of many others in ways we have
not even begun to fathom. It was never my intention to produce a historical account
of the war; that has already been done. I wanted to write a first-hand account of
what it was like to fight in the war, based on my personal experiences and thoughts,
which I recorded in my diary.”14
13
Holt, C. At Thy Call – We Did Not Falter. – Pp 4
14
Ibid – Pp 185
23
Indeed, Holt succeeds in producing a vivid and powerful first-hand account of his and
others experiences on the Border.
Holt does not state specifically who “won”, but simply offers SADF and
FAPLA figures (read: losses) in contrast against each other (which overwhelmingly
shows the SADF as the victor against FAPLA – although, yet again, UNITA losses
are omitted) and strategic and tactical objectives which were achieved on part of the
SADF. He paints the image that the SADF won the conflict but without expressly
saying so, rather ending that particular train of thought with the short statement: “You
decide who ‘won’”15, which could be construed as Holt dodging the bullet, so to
speak.
15
Holt, C. At Thy Call – We Did Not Falter – Pp 108
24
Beyond the Border War: New Perspectives on Southern Africa’s Late-Cold War
Conflicts
- Gary Baines and Peter Vale (eds.)
This next text is written by a wide variety of academics and delves deeply into the
almost everything there is to do with the Border War, with a chapter dedicated to
Cuito Cuanavale specifically. Now that the researcher has presumably familiarised his
or herself with the Border War and Cuito; Beyond the Border War: New Perspectives
on Southern Africa’s Late-Cold War Conflicts, which is edited by and with
contributions from Professors Gary Baines and Peter Vale, is the next important work
to consider.
Unlike the previous texts, this one hosts many different pieces of research,
opinions, criticisms and historical narratives. These different chapters will provide the
reader with a well-rounded perspective on the Border War, allowing one to get to
grips with many approaches to the subject, and for those researching Cuito Cuanavale,
it debunks many myths surrounding the events that happened there (although, it
should be said that a few of the previous texts mentioned also do, or at least try to).
Chapter 12, “Countdown to Cuito Cuanavale: Cuba’s Angolan Campaign” by
Edgar Dosman, is the chapter this review will be most concerned with analysing.
Dosman is currently a Senior Research Fellow and Professor in the Department of
Political Science at York University in Toronto. He has a PhD in Government and is a
“frequent writer and commentator on international affairs”.16 He is currently writing a
book on Cuba’s involvement in the war in Angola, from 1975 – 1991.
His chapter is the only instance in this review wherein the author writes more
on the Cuban involvement, and from the Cuban perspective, than from any other
perspective. Thus, this is a valuable resource for the would-be researcher where
information on Cuba’s involvement specifically is rare (in English at least). To
Dosman’s credit, he does state things with relative balance, acknowledging the
accomplishments and failures of both belligerents, but it is his access to Cuban
documents that makes his perspective unique in this review.
16
Baines, G. & Vale, P. (eds) Beyond the Border War: New Perspectives on Southern Africa’s Late-
Cold War Conflicts. (2008) – Pp x
25
Unlike most of the other texts, that deal mostly with the SADF specifically or
briefly mention UNITA involvement, Dosman analyses and critiques the relationship
between the Cubans and Angolans and determines whether or not the MPLA was
simply a Cuban proxy, as many of the previous texts state.
“In challenging the orthodoxy of the military history of the sub-continent,

Dosman supports Pierro Gleijeses’17 contention that intervention in Angola
proved to be South Africa’s, and not Cuba’s, Vietnam!”18
This sentence alone demonstrates Dosman’s perspective on “who won” wherein,

despite the relative balance of his article, he does feel that the SADF lost the most in
this conflict, not in terms of men or equipment, but rather in terms of political stakes
and perhaps credibility. One must ask, is this due to his Cuban-orientated perspective?
Perhaps, but his reasoning is sound and his facts are well-researched. This article
provides a worthy balance to the Border War perspectives and research.
The prospective researcher should keep in mind, as with all academic works,
that this work is not the be-all and end-all of the information on the Border War, and
is more of a collection of steps in the right direction: towards a more thorough
understanding of the Border War, albeit steps that take you past some very
informative signs on the sides of the academic road. Beyond the Border War, unlike
most the previous works, is not written by soldiers or ex-combatants or people who
have directly experienced war, and thus the articles can provide decent academic
understanding to a researcher who has encountered mostly biographical work, until
now.
17
A professor of US foreign policy and author of Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and
Africa, 1959–1976 – a book tracing the Cuban intervention in Angola.
18
Baines, G. & Vale, P. (eds) Beyond the Border War: New Perspectives on Southern Africa’s Late-
Cold War Conflicts. (2008) – Pp 9
26
CONCLUSION
“The victors of the liberation struggle, whose refrain is now the official voice,
appear to have triumphed in their version of events. Those who espouse the
SADF version are largely seen as discredited adherents of a regime based on
lies.”19
This quote accurately, and perhaps unfortunately, sums up the current viewpoint on
research into the Border War in South Africa. For the most part, if one writes from an
SADF perspective, one is considered an apartheid sympathiser. Conversely, research
from the Cuban / Angolan side is seen as false or exaggerating claims of SADF
failures and Cuban / Angolan successes, by many ex-SADF and some researchers.
Even though there is little written on the Border War, when compared to the
Vietnam War or World War II or even simply the Anglo-Boer War, there is a revival
occurring where the newer generations are taking a direct interest in South Africa and
South Africa’s history and getting to grips with subjects that have been taboo for so
long. The veterans of the Border War are also slowly but surely coming to the fore,
telling their stories and demanding to be understood rather than shunned.
Why this subject is exciting now is that it’s still fresh, there are still new
discoveries being made and soldiers to be interviewed and academics to generate a
real interest. People still have a passion for what happened there because it happened
to them. It was only a generation ago, and such a rare opportunity to engage with
those who fought the battles is exactly what a historian searches for.
For the time being, the occasional academic text and biographies are what will
constitute Border War literature, especially in the case of the Battles of Cuito
Cuanavale. Hopefully, this will soon change and the taboo subject of what really
happened there and who “won” will no longer be taboo, and will be something we can
discuss, not only as academics, but as a South African nation, where we acknowledge
those who served their country, regardless of what their government ordered them to
do.
19
Williams, D. On The Border: The White South African Military Experience 1965 – 1990. – Pp 117
27
Bibliography
Baines, G. & Vale, P. (eds) Beyond the Border War: New Perspectives on Southern
Africa’s Late-Cold War Conflicts. (2008)
Breytenbach, J. The Buffalo Soldiers: The Story of South Africa’s 32-Battalion 1975-
1993. (2009)
Bridgland, F. The War for Africa: Twelve Months that Transformed a Continent.
(1990)
Geldenhuys, J. At the Front: A General’s Account of South Africa’s Border War.

(2009)
Hamann, H. Days of the Generals: The Untold Story of South Africa’s Apartheid-era
Military Generals. (2008)
Holt, C. At Thy Call – We Did Not Falter. (2005)
Mills, G. & Williams, D. 7 Battles that Shaped South Africa. (2006)
Williams, D. On The Border: The White South African Military Experience 1965 –
1990. (2008)
African Union report, 1983, “Resolutions adopted by the Nineteenth Assembly Head
of State and Government” in Organiztion of African Unity. (Accessed on 30/10/10):
http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Decisions/hog/sHoGAssembly1983.pdf
New York Times report on Soldier of Fortune magazine contract killings lawsuit
outcome (2000) (accessed on 30/10/10):
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9D01E5D9113FF935A25753C1A9669C8B63&sec=&spon=&&scp=10&sq=Sol
dier%20of%20Fortune%20magazine&st=cse
28
Forged in Flames:
1987 – 1988
De facto Script
Garrett Eriksen
607e4967
12 November 2010
29
[Film Begins.
White text on black background fades in and fades out x 4: ]
The South African Border War lasted from 1966 to 1989.
During that time, many battles were fought, won and lost.
Cuito Cuanavale, an obscure Angolan town, became the final skirmish point, of a
series of battles and operations, lasting almost a year.
These are the stories of three SADF soldiers who fought in those battles.
[Music begins: “When the Man Comes Around – Johnny Cash”

White text on black background fades in, then fades out: ]
Forged in Flames:
1987 – 1988
[Series of Border War footage cuts begin to play.

Song and cuts end after approximately two minutes.
Fade to black.]
[Music begins: “Battlefield 1942 Theme”

Fade in from black to Google Earth Earth spinning.
It comes to a halt over Africa.
Yellow border-lines appear and Google Earth zooms in to Cuito Cuanavale - Angola.
White text on dimmed background fades in: ]
The battles of Cuito Cuanavale lasted from December 1987 to March 1988 and
were arguably the most important battles of the South African Border War.
30
[Text fades out.

Google Earth then zooms out to show markers for Operations Modular, Pack &
Hooper as well as a marker for Mavinga.
Operations Modular, Hooper and Packer were the three main operations
undertaken by the SADF and UNITA against the Angolan FAPLA forces, who
were supported by Russian advisors & Cuban troops.
[Text fades in to next text: ]
Mavinga was a strategically significant base which acted as a gateway from the
north to UNITA-held Jamba.
[Text fades out.

Google Earth fades to black.
Music ends.]
[Fade in to Danie Crowther section of interview.

Caption fades in: ]
Lt. Col. Danie Crowther

SADF Military Intelligence Officer (Ret.)
[Text fades out.

Danie talks on Military Intelligence, FAPLA & UNITA.
Fade to black.]
[Music begins: “Battlefield 1942 Theme”

Fade in to Google Earth map showing markers for Operations Modular, Pack &
Hooper and Mavinga.
Marker for SA-8 SAM System appears, zooms in.
31
Major Johann Lehman and Captain Piet “Boer” van Zyl capture an SA-8 SAM
system west of Cizizi / Cunzumbia confluence with the Lomba river.
This was the first time such powerful and advanced Soviet tech had been
captured by a Western nation since the start of the Cold War.
[Text fades out.

Google Earth fades to black.
Music ends.]
[Fade in to Johann Lehman interview.

Caption fades in: ]
Lt. Col. Johann Lehman

SAAF Intelligence Liaison Officer (Ret.)
[Text fades out.

Johann talks on capturing of SA-8.
Fade to black.]
[Fade in to second Danie Crowther section.

Danie talks on FAPLA / SADF engagements.
Fade to black.]
[Fade in to Roderick van der Westhuizen interview.

Caption fades in: ]
Cpl. Roderick van der Westhuizen

SADF 61 Mechanised Battalion (Ret.)
32
[Text fades out.

Roderick talks on personal experiences as part of 61 Mechanised, also provides
personal opinion on Border War in general.
Fade to black.]
[Fade in to second Johann Lehman section.

Lehman provides opinion on importance of Cuito Cuanavale to parties concerned.
Fade to black.]
[Fade in to third Dane Crowther section.

Crowther provides opinion on Border War, Angolan operations and Cuito
Cuanavale.
Fade to black.]
[Music begins: “Die Kaplyn – Bok van Blerk”

Music video of song begins to play.
Afrikaans text (part of the music video) appears at the bottom of the screen: ]
Die Suid-Afrikaanse Grensoorlog – 1966 – 1989

(The South African Border War – 1966 – 1989)
Die Kaplyn was ‘n oopgeskraapte stuk grond aan die gevegsfront.

(The “Cut Line” was a
Dit was die Grens.

(It was the Border.)
Elke jong seun moes gaan veg.

(Every young boy had to fight.)
[White text on dimmed background fades in: ]

33
The ceasefire that followed the battles of Cuito Cuanavale is regarded as a

pivotal event in the implementation of UN resolution 435, which brought about
the withdrawal of SADF forces from Angola and Namibia, and as a seminal
event which lead to the end of Apartheid South Africa.
It was also an important even in the Angolan Civil War (1974 – 2002) and lead to
the independence of Namibia.
[Text fades out.

Music video continues.
Credits roll: ]
Forged in Flames:
1987 – 1988
Directed, filmed and edited by:

Garrett Eriksen
Special thanks to:

Danie Crowther
Johann Lehman
Roderick van der Westhuizen
Gary Baines
Glenn & Andrew Eriksen
Linda de Jager
34
MNET
All those in the armed forces (serving and retired) who assisted me in my
research.
All those in academic departments at Rhodes University and abroad who also
assisted me in my research.
All those who assisted me on my journey and provided me with open homes,
hearts and minds.
Stock Footage Courtesy of MNET
Music used:
Johnny Cash
“When The Man Comes Around”
“Battlefield 1942 Theme”
Bok van Blerk

“Die Kaplyn”
All video footage and audio data included in this film are the licence and
property of their respective owners. This is purely a non-profit academic work.
“War stories aren’t always about war, per se. They aren’t about bombs and
bullets and military manoeuvres. They aren’t about tactics, they aren’t about
foxholes and canteens. A war story, like any good story, is finally about the
human heart.”
-Tim O’Brien
[Music video ends.

Film ends. Fade to black.]
35
Treatment on the making and writing of:

Forged in Flames: The SADF experience of
The Battles of Cuito Cuanavale 1987 – 1988
Detailing the journey from inception to completion

of all aspects of this thesis.
36
The biggest danger when filming a documentary, especially one about human
experience, is becoming so involved in the story you are creating that you fail to
remain critical, and instead start to relate to those you are interviewing. Unfortunately,
I found myself falling into this trap and for quite a while, my new found loyalty and
friendship to the people I had interviewed, who had allowed me to be the one to tell
their stories, coloured my view of my research. I found myself sympathising with
most of what they said and defending them personally, rather than defending my work
on its own merits. Of course, developing friendships and relating to people is only
natural, it is just what happens, and is practically unavoidable.
As a researcher, however, and especially when dealing with research on
peoples experiences, remaining critical is what is important. One should also realise,
that being critical, does not mean being disloyal, or that you have to disprove the
stories the people you interviewed have shared, or show them in an unfavourable
light. All it means is that, you should not let your emotions cloud your judgement to
the point where your work becomes biased and one-sided (but do not forget to include
emotion in your work, or it will be dull and unreadable.) Try to balance it all and use
your emotions to your advantage instead of your detriment. At the very least, one
should strive to be critical when putting together the final draft.
Initially I was not sure what I wanted to research for my Rhodes University History
Honours thesis, but I knew I wanted to do something to do with warfare and soldiers
experiences, possibly on the South African Border War. I knew very little about it at
the time, apart from the fact that my father, Andrew Eriksen, had served as an Able
Seaman at Walvis Bay, at the signal station at Rooikop and that many of my
Afrikaans friends’ fathers had also served in the SADF, or who are serving currently
in the SADF or SAPS (South African Police Service). Not to mention I also grew up
in Oudtshoorn in the Western Cape, which was a military town with one of the most
highly rated infantry training regiments in the world at the time; so seeing a Casspir,
an Ystervark20 and a line of soldiers marching about when I was growing up was not
that odd an occurrence. I spoke to Professor Gary Baines, whose course entitled
“Contest Pasts: History and Memory” had sparked my interest in how the world views
20
Information on Ystervark AA vehicle, as per 61 Mech specifications (accessed: 08/11/10):
http://www.61mech.org.za/equipment/14-ystervark
37
and remembers an experience, especially for soldiers, and he helped me whittle the
scope of my project down from the whole Border War, to just focussing on “The
Battle of Cuito Cuanavale”.
Initial research was difficult as there was not much readily available to look at,
apart from a few books Professor Baines lent me. I soon found that I had to purchase
most books myself and trawl the internet for more information. I found that there
were actually quite a few forums and websites on the Border War, and even quite a
few on Cuito and Angola in general. It was surprising how vocal these soldiers were
on the internet, some had created music videos of their experiences with footage and
photos from the Border War interlaced with music (usually Afrikaans country songs
about/from that era) and a stirring message near the beginning or end. One group has
even taken to creating miniature vehicles and models for war games they play with
Border War themes, even going so far as to create products such as t-shirts and
DVD’s that one can order via their site.21 One would think that the selling of Border
War themed t-shirts would cause some form of disapproval, even outrage, amongst
ex-SADF combatants, but it seems there is quite a vocal and positive community on
the websites forum that appears to not only support this, but offers insight into
improving models and even combat strategies for their games, as well as shirt
designs!
I looked further into the internet forums and stumbled into the argument that
seems to plague the operations that happened in Angola, namely “who won?” There
seem to be three general opinions on this question, and all seem to be very set in what
they believe: 1) the SADF won. 2) Cuba / FAPLA won. 3) Cuito Cuanavale was
never the objective in the first place, so no-one won as the SADF pulled out before
the fight could be concluded. I can’t help but notice that in all three camps, UNITA
seems to have been forgotten on the wayside. That being said, I do find that many
soldiers speak of UNITA troops fondly, but only seem to forget them when it comes
to tallying the score, as it were. Another camp exists, usually maintained by
researchers, that states that Cuito was the objective and that option 3) mentioned
earlier, is a story used by the SADF to “save-face” (more on this later).
Eventually I decided that I wanted to do something unique with this topic, so I
decided to attempt to make a video game wherein the character would be able to play
a soldier from the different factions (SADF, UNITA, FAPLA or Cuba), and will
21
“War In Angola” miniatures website (accessed: 08/11/10): http://www.warinangola.com/
38
engage in various missions designed to not only provide the player with an idea of
what battles were like in those conflicts, but also educate them on the operations and
events that happened before, during and after the Border War. It was very ambitious,
too ambitious in fact, and whereas I did find some individuals who were interested in
creating the game themselves (and who have already made some progress)22 and who
were willing to help me, I soon found that I lacked the experience, expertise,
manpower and time to create this game as I had envisioned it. I abandoned the video
game concept and instead looked towards my background in film, and decided that a
documentary might not only better suit me, but this project as well. I cleared this with
Professor Baines and thought about the script whilst I was busy writing my literature
review.
The literature review was a research project for Professor Baines’ and Professor
Vales’ Cold War Studies course, from the beginning of the year, which I decided to
add to my thesis. It focuses on mainly biographical and auto-biographical material,
with a few other non-biographical works as well, and in turn focuses on Cuito
Cuanavale. On a side note, I mentioned in the literature review that I chose to call
these the “Battles of Cuito Cuanavale”, instead of “Battle of Cuito Cuanvale”.
Through my research, and interviews with the soldiers I met, I believe this is a far
more accurate title. Even at Cuito Cuanavale, there was no one defining battle, there
were up to six battles that occurred around the town, all with varying ferocity, and
before that many other operations and battles all through Angola. There was no final
climax; the SADF withdrew and Cuito remained occupied. It all petered out as the
negotiations began to make headway. The “Battle of Cuito Cuanavale” never
happened, and was simply something Cuban propaganda created, named and used as a
symbol to rally behind and which the media picked up and popularised. Even the title
I created is actually quite inaccurate as it suggests Cuito Cuanavale was a climax to
the operations that came before it, but the operations ended in something of a stale-
mated anti-climax with Cutio just happening to be the final place the SADF could not
or did not take (depending on who you believe). I am not trying to choose a side here,
rather I am suggesting that “The Battle of Cuito Cuanvale” stops being used as the
title to describe the battles that happened there and a new title is given to it, or none at
22
“Bush Wars” game mod website (accessed: 08/11/10):
http://www.armedassault.info/_hosted/bushwars/index.html
39
all and each operation is treated separately. I think that this aspect may also be part of
the “who won” debate, as many people I spoke to, via emails, in person and on the
forums, told me that calling it “The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale” is highly inaccurate
and that I should look into it.
In order to facilitate the documentary, I had to find people to interview. So I used the
websites that I had made note of, from my previous trawling, and sent word out
detailing what my thesis was about and that I was looking for people to interview or
just provide basic information that could assist me in my project (this was about the
time people told me my title was wrong, as mentioned above). Very quickly I
received emails and replies to forum discussion boards on my request, with people
offering themselves to be interviewed, suggesting I get in contact with certain
individuals or organisations, website and book suggestions. It was through this
method that I eventually got hold of the three men I ended up interviewing: Danie
Crowther, Johann Lehman and Roderick van der Westhuizen. Danie and Johan both
live in Clarens in the Freestate and Roderick lives in Oudtshoorn (my hometown).
Approximately twenty people were interested in being interviewed, of those ten were
of direct relevance to my research and of those I chose Danie, Johann and Roderick as
they seemed to be of most interest as well as being the most convenient to interview.
All who contacted me were SADF or 61 Mech, except for one UNITA member who
only contacted me after the interviews had been completed.
I chose Danie, for his role as a military intelligence officer, and his
connections within the (ex-)SADF then and now, Johann, for his role in capturing the
SA-8 missile system, which I had read about in 7 Battles That Shaped South Africa by
Greg Mills and David Williams, and for his proximity to Danie. I chose Roderick, for
his “on the ground” experience in 61 Mechanised Battalion and his geographic
location. As a student researcher, I had no budget to speak of, so I had to pick
locations and interviews that were relevant to my work, as well as economically
efficient. Thanks to the generosity of my parents, Andrew and Glenn Eriksen, I
managed to achieve this and I believe the information I got from the interviews was
worth more than all the petrol money I could muster.
After arranging the interview times, which were to be during the vacation we
had from Rhodes University, between 28 August to 5 September 2010, I drove up to
40
Clarens and spent the night at Danie’s farm.23 In his interview he was very
forthcoming with information and provided plenty of reference material for later
research. Johann was just as interesting and very helpful in helping me pinpoint on
Google Earth maps where the SA-8 system was captured (as Google Earth has no
listing of the Angolan river systems, which made it nearly impossible to track the
operations properly until I found a download which mapped out most SADF
operations in the Border War24). Roderick’s account hit me the hardest, it was clear
the story he told was rather unsettling and painful for him, but I think he was happy
someone was taking an interest. His war memorabilia collection from Angola was
also very interesting to go over, as well as his photographs.
I spent the next few months editing the footage and putting together what I thought
would work for the tone of the film. I managed to get stock footage from MNET and
used excerpt from their Grensoorlog documentary series, as well as Google Earth
map footage and a variety of music tracks, as well as Bok van Blerk’s Die Kaplyn
music video as my credits background.
The footage flows from a collection of Border War images, captured from the
Grensoorlog DVD’s, with Johnny Cash’s “When the Man Comes Around” playing in
the background. I chose this song for its apocalyptic imagery, as Cash sings about the
end of the world brought about by the biblical apocalypse. I believe it was an apt
metaphor as the war destroyed and ended many lives and changed the world for many
more, as war tends to do. The footage then moves to Google Earth with the war-
themed “Battlefield 1942 Theme” song playing. I felt this footage was similar to those
games and movies where a futuristic, holographic map is used to display the
battleground for the soldiers, and it was something of a homage to the game I never
managed to create. The music is also from a war-themed computer game, so I thought
they matched quite well. I wanted the audience to be able to see the places that the
interviewees talk about, so they can get an idea of where things were in relation to one
another. I also added some text to set the scene further and provide more context for
the audience, this was my replacement for the narrator voice, which is explained
further on.
23
I would just like to take this opportunity to thank Danie and his lovely wife for having me over and
for the delicious supper, as well as Johann and Roderick for their time and support.
24
User-made Google Earth Map of South African Border War (accessed: 08/11/10):
http://bbs.keyhole.com/ubb/ubbthreads.php?ubb=showthreaded&Number=425893&site_id=1#import
41
The documentary then moves to the first interview, which consists of Danie
Crowther speaking about SADF military intelligence as well as UNITA and FAPLA
and their relations to one another. Following that is another Google Earth section with
information and markers about the SA-8 system. This sets up Johann Lehman’s
interview where he speaks of his capturing of the SA-8. We then move to Roderick
van der Westhuizen’s section, wherein he speaks of his personal experience involving
a MiG dropping a bomb on his mechanised battalion, killing and injuring two soldiers
respectively. He then provides his final opinion of the Angolan operations. We then
have Johann and then Danie doing likewise, ending with Danie’s final words on the
matter. Following this is Bok van Blerk’s Die Kaplyn with the credit sequence rolling.
I originally had a different song chosen, but Professor Baines suggested this song and
I feel it suits the ending far better, especially the lyrics which talk of the “Cut Line”.
The blurb under the music video on the page for van Blerk’s CD reads:
“From 1966 to 1989 The South African Defense Force (SADF) fought a
war on the border between Angola and South West Africa (today known as
Namibia). This 23 year conflict is today referred to as the Forgotten War.
The 'Kaplyn' (cutline) was a thin strip of land cleared of any growth. This
was the border.
During this period every single white South African son was forced,
through the Conscript System, to serve at first, one, then later two years as
soon as they left school. A total of 715 South African Soldiers gave their
lives to protect their country.”25
Originally I had wanted to film a documentary which was done in “omniscient

narrator” style, which basically entailed that members from both sides of the conflict
are interviewed and the documentary does not take a particular stance. Rather it “tells
it like it is”, showing the different sides and arguments, spiced up with footage and
music, and lets the audience decide. It was only when I was editing the footage that I
started realising that I wanted to make this more about the three men I had
interviewed, and their experiences as soldiers in the SADF, than the overall conflict. I
25
Blurb for Bok van Blerk’s Die Kaplyn music video (accessed: 08/11/10):
http://www.liquida.com/video/a3e63cb5c/die-kaplyn-bok-van-blerk-van-cd-afrikanerhart-blog-www-
diekaplyn-co-za/
42
also left out the narrator voice to allow them to tell the story themselves, thus keeping
it more personal and focused.
I think, in the end, it came out very well and I thoroughly enjoyed the entire
process leading up to it and the stress that occurred whilst creating it. I am hoping
that, at some point, I can take this to a production company and get a proper budgeted
documentary made, in the same style as those that include actors and fabricated
scenes and explosions of all sorts. Joking aside, I think this is the kind of conflict that
could benefit from having a more soldier-specific approach, for both sides of the
conflict, and hopefully this will allow a more diverse audience to connect with and
understand the soldiers who fought in the South African Border War.
One piece of critique I have is that the three I interviewed seemed to have similar
opinions on what happened, to the point where it warrants further investigation,
seeing as this ties in with the “who won” arguments: they all said that Cuito
Cuanavale was not an objective and that the true objective, which basically boiled
down to installing democracy in Namibia and Angola without communist / Cuban /
Soviet influence, and thus protecting South Africa from Die Rooi Gevaar26, was
achieved. They also said that, if one looked at the SADF’s operations per objective,
most of them were successful, and that, when compared to those of FAPLA or the
Cubans, the SADF is the clear winner. This includes losses, as the SADF lost far
fewer troops and equipment than did any other force present. When speaking with my
father, he also agreed that, at the time, it was a fact that the Soviets would probably
invade South Africa at some point and that the SADF was all that stood between
South Africa and a communist take over, which at the time was a terrifying prospect.
Danie and Johann were quite positive about their experiences in Angola,
almost to the point of nonchalantness, whilst Roderick was decidedly more bitter in
his recalling. Despite this, all three believed the war was important and that without it,
South Africa would be a very different country. One has to ask, though, given the
time scale between the conflict, the natural degrading of ones memories and the
literature and general opinions that would probably circulate amongst these close-knit
groups of currently serving and ex-soldiers, how much of their opinion has been
altered or coloured by the influence that such information circulation would have.
26
“The Red Danger” – referring to the threat of communism.
43
Their opinions seem to be shared, for the most part, by the online communities
I mentioned earlier, and in much of the literature. Of course, it is only fair that they
feel pride in their part in the war, as they lost many friends and relatives and faced
much trauma fighting for what they believed was right. They state that they did not
fight for apartheid and that they were fighting to preserve South Africa and prevent
communist-friendly governments from starting near South Africa. This may be true
for them, being what they genuinely believed then and now, it could also be that they
are reacting to the general negativity and anger that has been displayed towards the
(ex-)SADF and the conflict in general, as the SADF was seen by many as the
Apartheid governments guard-dogs. They could be pulling back defensively, using a
“it wasn’t our fault, we were following orders” cover story, which would also be
understandable considering how many South Africans, especially black South
Africans, still feel about the war and the era pre-1994. The Border War is known as
“The Forgotten War” by many ex-SADF and some researchers, that title alone
suggests that, much like the Vietnam War for American soldiers, their achievements
and sacrifices have not only been misunderstood, but disregarded utterly and even
blamed for being negative impacts on South Africa.
Honestly, it is hard to say. I was not fully aware of what was happening until it
was well over as I was just a child when all these great political changes were
occurring. What I do know is that they believe what they are saying is true, and many
will stick by this until they die. As a historian, and as a critical thinker, it is my job to
ask these questions, even if they are uncomfortable or difficult. It can be very hard
being critical of someone whom you consider a friend, and again, these are the
dangers associated with creating a documentary such as this one. However, if they
truly stand by their convictions, then no manner of critical questioning in the world
will alter that, which can be a blessing and a curse.
Overall, this has been an amazing journey and hopefully, the research
generated here will inspire further researchers to delve into this incredibly interesting
field whilst it is still available to be researched. The soldiers who fought in the
conflicts in Angola need their stories told and analysed so that everyone can better
understand them and so that we can remember the Forgotten War.
44
References
Information on Ystervark AA vehicle, as per 61 Mech specifications (accessed:

08/11/10):
http://www.61mech.org.za/equipment/14-ystervark
“War In Angola” miniatures website (accessed: 08/11/10):

http://www.warinangola.com/
“Bush Wars” game mod website (accessed: 08/11/10):

http://www.armedassault.info/_hosted/bushwars/index.html
User-made Google Earth Map of South African Border War (accessed: 08/11/10):
http://bbs.keyhole.com/ubb/ubbthreads.php?
ubb=showthreaded&Number=425893&site_id=1#import
Blurb for Bok van Blerk’s Die Kaplyn music video (accessed: 08/11/10):
http://www.liquida.com/video/a3e63cb5c/die-kaplyn-bok-van-blerk-van-cd-
afrikanerhart-blog-www-diekaplyn-co-za/
45
Transcriptions of interviews held between

30 August 2010 – 03 September 2010-11-09
Interviewer:
Garrett Eriksen
607e4967
Interviewed (in order):

Lt. Col. Danie Crowther – SADF Military Intelligence Officer
Lt. Col. Johann Lehman – SAAF Military Intelligence Liaison Officer
Cpl. Roderick van der Westhuizen – 61 Mechanised Battalion
Subject:
Personal experiences in Angolan Border War operations with special
reference to the Battles of Cuito Cuanavale
46
Lt. Col. Danie Crowther – 30 August 2010

Okay I started my career in the military in 1980. Being called up for national service
to Potchefstroom. The artillery was 1st,4th Field regiment, I then got selected for junior
officer’s course, went to the school of artillery in Potch. In 1981 moved to 14th Field
Regiment and that was also my first exposure on the border. We also participated in
Operation Protea in the artillery at that time. 19……
I then…first joined short service for an additional two years in1982, I think, I was
recruited into the Military Intelligence Division, South African Military Intelligence
Service. As such I did the selection, got approved, and was transferred to Military
Intelligence Headquarters in Pretoria, which was at that point in the Pointon building.
I then went to the Military Academy. I did the B Mil degree and went back to
Pretoria in 1985. As from 1986 I was working on the Angolan Desk in Military
Intelligence…External Directorate, external Theatre, which covered all the so called
frontline states at the time.
Right, so in the headquarters the….what military intelligence…..the Intelligence
Service within the Defence Force was first of all the arms of services. They each had
their own intelligence. At the Chief of Staff Intelligence, which was Military
Intelligence Division was the Strategic Intelligence Organisation of the Defence
Force. Whereas the army, navy, the air force and the medical services also had their
own intelligences. It was purely intelligence of a tactical nature. So it has to do with
battles. What happened there…..our role as a strategic Intelligence organisation was
to look at the whole conflict…at the theatre of conflict that took place. Which means
that where the desk, or the section that we working in, was called the section western
front. Which included Namibia and Angola because it’s one theatre of battle. But of
course you must also take into consideration that that war took place against a bigger
background, which was the Cold War.
So of course that also meant that we looked at policy and decisions in the West,
specifically the United States and Britain, that could influence the war. We had
intense knowledge of the Russian, the Soviet government and what’s happening in
there, and of course Cuba which was heavily involved in that war. So it’s not only
about military, it’s about politics, it’s about economics, and in the end every…all the
47
factors that influenced in the end our forces on the ground. The team at Western Front
were highly trained. I think we were the best in the world on what we did, especially
Angola. I think we knew more about Angola than the Angolans themselves, at the
time Same with what’s happening in SWAPO. I’ll just talk a little bit about the
intelligence work. People often do not understand it properly because there’s a sort of
mystical secrecy stuff around it and there is that too. But the majority of our
information was open source information, so we would…had a section that collected
newspapers from all over the world and our military attaches gave us information and
always in any service like that, that forms the bulk of your intelligence work, from
where you can do your analysis. Then we had other sources which was very
important to us was electronic warfare where we listened to two way radio
communications of the enemy. We also had, together with national Intelligence, the
capabilities to intercept satellite communications. A system called Valkoog, which I
believe is still in existence today. I suppose much more advanced, which allowed us
to intercept telex communication, stuff like that which was a vital part of our
intelligence collection. We then also had relationships with various other intelligence
agencies of countries that were…I won’t say necessarily pro South Africa, but that
more anti-Soviet in that sense.
So we worked together with the CIA, the American Defence Intelligence, with the
Brits, with Germany, with Israel, and various other services. And there was a regular
exchange of information between that. Another component of our intelligence feed
was of course our forces on the ground, so there was a good communication system
right from the border, from the front to the various sector headquarters, to sector
headquarters to the territory force in Namibia, and from there feed through to us and
the communication line was effective and fast and it worked well. We also…..that
was at the time a highly secret component, but we had an intelligence staff deployed
with UNITA which was an important part to access all the information that UNITA
gave us with their forces on the ground. Okay, then there was the covert collection
aside, where we had teams, the Directorate of Covert Collections was responsible for
that, where they had their sources within various strategic positions within the
Angolans, within SWAPO etc. And this is the cloak and dagger stuff, and all that
information was also fed through to the desk where we would evaluate it and
disseminate it to the relevant things. That’s more or less what the work entailed.
48
It also meant that this team was highly schooled in the soviet military tactics and
operations, and how to…how it was conducted. I think that knowledge was centred in
Military Intelligence Division. Within the army even, I mean we reported directly to
the Chief of the Defence Force, so we weren’t part of the army or the navy, whatever.
We were Chief of the Defence Force staff. The division itself did not have any
operational capabilities as such. There’s perceptions that has been created in the
media, especially herein the early 90’s that military intelligence was involved with the
third force, and it’s all nonsense. The organisation did not have that capability. We
did not have the capability to run operations, except operations to gather intelligence
or to communicate certain message outside. That’s the essence of…of…of the work.
Right, the focus here is what happened in…in…in the Cuando Cubango Province
1987. It…..that battle was, I think, the…..I think everybody knows that that was the
turning point. That was the defining moment in this long history of that war when that
triggered the negotiation process. FAPLA tried to attack UNITA and the focus has
always been to destroy the Jamba. Which was the headquarters of UNITA in South
East Angola, from where UNITA fought their war all over Angola.
Now the whole South Eastern Part of Angola, specifically the Cuando Cubango
province was controlled by UNITA’s, FAPLA had no access to that territory and of
course it was a thorn in their flesh. The support to UNITA was very important for
South Africa, because UNITA formed a buffer between…from the Namibian border
between the South African forces, the Cuban forces, and it hindered SWAPO ion
executing their…their infiltrations into Namibia. It was also important….UNITA
played an important role in bringing about a balance of forces, a balance of power in
Angola. Now that balance of power in Angola was..…was vitally important. Given
the background against the cold war, I think I must just explain that a bit. If we looked
at the cold war which was essentially triggered by Soviet expansionism which started
straight after the Second World War, it built up over time. We had the arms race
between the…specifically the United States and the Soviets into nuclear and various
areas. But the Soviet doctrine was focused thereon to get the communist ideology
established all over the world. And there were certain strategic areas for that to take
place. And Southern Africa is one of those vital points, and it had to do with a few
things. And I think the first thing is the strategic location of South Africa in terms of
shipping routes.
49
If you control the southern port of Africa, a huge part….I can’t remember the exact
figures now…of the shipping from East to West goes past the Cape of Good Hope So
it is strategic in a geopolitical sense It is highly important. At the time South Africa
itself was the biggest producer of gold and various other minerals in the world. And
for any…..in this ideological warfare that took place between these two super-powers,
access to those minerals was important. Also, denying the other party access to that
minerals was important, if you can’t get your hands on it yourself. So…the Soviets
had the strategy of letting other people fight their wars for them. And that’s where the
surrogate forces was created. And that happened all over the world. The history of all
those revolutions in the territories was taking place.
So, on the one hand we had this…er…..battle taking place here in the southern point
of Africa, against the background of a conflict between the United States and the
Soviet Union. And for both parties the outcome of it was important. But there was
another dimension to the war, and that was that within South Africa we were facing a
revolutionary war. A revolutionary war defined in our terms, and that’s a recognised
definition all over the world. That a revolutionary war is fought to bring about a
change of government by unconstitutional means. And that was in essence what the
ANC was fighting in South Africa. That was what SWAPO was trying to bring about
in Namibia. That is how the MPLA came to power in Angola. That is how FRELIMO
came into power was through this means. So that was one of the methods that the
Soviets used with their doctrine to get governments, pro-Soviet governments into
place into various places in the world and specifically also in Africa.
Right, um…..in Angola, since 1976, more or less, the Cuban forces was a factor. I’m
not going to go too much into the history of that now, but at that time when we
reached 1987 the Cuban forces reached the level of about forty thousand troops. Very
well equipped with the best Soviet technology that was available at the time, like the
SA-8 air defence system. It’s a ground to air missile defence system. It was unique in
the world. The west had nothing similar, and we didn’t even have the capability of
neutralising it at the time. It was a very, very effective weapon system. Highly
sophisticated. Tanks, T54 tanks generally later in the war the T62 tanks that came in.
Towards the end brought in by the 50th Division of Cuban forces, and that was the
first time that this highly sophisticated Soviet equipment was used in a war anywhere
on the globe. Right…we….okay, given the situation in Angola, the focus was for
FAPLA to destroy UNITA. Without destroying UNITA they did not foresee a
50
change of government can take place in Namibia. And I think they were right in that
sense.
So they started…they launched offensives …in 1985 Operation Second Congress was
launched from Cuito Cuanavale with the aim to capture first Mavinga and then Jamba.
They reached the outskirts of Mavinga, they were stopped by UNITA, with the aid of
South African artillery..…at the time that was deployed, and some ground forces, very
limited forces. In 1986 there was Operation Alpha Centauri, then launched by
FAPLA. Same pattern, and they got hammered properly. South African Air Force
involvement, artillery involvement, very little ground forces. There were some 32
battalion elements and some special forces that was deployed, but that’s it. I don’t
think in those two operations the total contingent of South Africans on it were SADF
soldiers on the ground. I don’t think that the total contingent of South African forces
committed in 1985 and 1986 was ever more than three to five hundred, if that. And
here I’m talking about specific operations in aid of UNITA. Right, 1987 was a total…
in early 1987 we received the first indications that a major offensive was being
planned. I can remember very well the first….although we suspected in our
appreciations and with loose pieces of information coming in, that a build-up of
equipment and……was about to happen in Angola. We intercepted a letter from
President dos Santos to a lobbying group in the United States, where he instructed
them to help to prepare the….to, ja…call it a propaganda war if you want to, but to
prepare the climate for a major offensive against UNITA, and he gave them certain
guidelines. And from that we clearly deduced that something big was coming. And
now with a piece of strategic intelligence like that, immediately it triggers a whole
process of collecting, of being very aware and so on.
We quickly picked up that more arms were coming into Angola, ships were coming
from Russia, more tanks. And we were seeing FAPLA 16th Brigade being re-trained
by the Cubans, re-equipped. So the 21st Brigade, the 25th Brigade, the 47th Brigade, all
of them was being re-equipped and being re-trained. And it’s all indications of a
major offensive being planned. As time developed, we became very well aware of
what their plans was. The early preparation phases took place where our…we liaised
extremely close with UNITA to prepare for that. We did…..we expected that South
African forces would be involved because we quickly realised…I think round about
June, July, we already knew that UNITA will not be able to…to….to…withstand this
onslaught on their own. Although we didn’t know what force levels would be
51
involved, there was no doubt in our mind that the SADF will get involved in those …
in this coming battle. So ground reconnaissance was done. We did very detail terrain
studies, so that we could predict the routes on which FAPLA was going to advance
towards Mavinga and then later Jamba.
The…um…..the offensive, the build-up took place, and we defined the start of the
defence….the offensive, the moment the FAPLA forces crossed the Cuito River at
Cuito Cuanavale Now the name Cuito Cuanavale is about the confluence…it’s a small
little village on the confluence of the Cuito and the Cuanavale rivers. There’s a bridge
there which is a vital…in their communication and their logistics and so on. So the
first step was to take the bridge out. Um….we waited ‘til the main force of
the….which consisted of four brigades. The 21st Brigade, 16th Brigade, 47th Brigade,
59th Brigade and…sorry five brigades and the 25th Brigade, which formed the main
force of…of FAPLA when they crossed the river we wanted to take the bridge out so
that they are cut off from their logistics. That was firstly done by a team of
reconnaissance Special Forces guys, that was dropped off north of the bridge. They
then swam down the river. They were from 4th Reconnaissance Regiment which was
the divers. Quite an interesting story. The guys got to the bridge, they attached the
explosives, got back into the river and one of them was bitten by a crocodile right
between his legs. The crocodile missed his vital parts, luckily. But they then…the
guards on the bridge became aware of their presence and there was a lot of shooting
going on and so on. They hid on the river-bed between the reeds and a day or what
later got out. All of them alive. But the charges went off…it did damage the bridge,
but not enough.
So a second attempt was made, and that was….I believe one of the first times that a
smart-bomb was used by an air force in an operation where this bomb…I think there’s
better technology today,…but essentially they video-tape the route to the bridge, the
bomb gets dropped many kilometres from it and then follows the path up the river,
and that took out a section of the bridge. It was not big enough to stop them. They
managed to do some repairs, but it allowed time to…to prepare. The first
deployment of South African forces was artillery. UNITA was already deployed
there, their regular battalions there. Their regular battalions were the guys trained in
conventional warfare, armed with relatively light equipment, but they were okay.
They were good, well-trained. And it was their job to stop it. So the initial forces
from South African side was first of all the artillery. The Valkyrie 127 mm multiple
52
rocket launchers, G5 guns, and then the anti-tank eskadron Squadron from 32
Battalion was also deployed. They were equipped with Ratel 90’s to that.
Now at the time I was still in Pretoria at Headquarters. My job there was to be totally
focused on the tactical situation. I had to compile the maps and then do the daily
briefing to the general staff at Defence Headquarters, as well as to Chief of Staff
Intelligence. Started very early in the mornings, collected the information, plotted it
on maps, contacted whoever needs to be contacted to get clarification and by …
normally by 7o’clock in the morning we would start the briefings. So I was in a
position where I was very well aware of what was happening on the ground. Right,
the first skirmishes took place just outside of Cuito Cuanavale..
Now just...I want to say at this point, the words battle for Cuito Cuanavale is a bit of a
misnomer, because there was never a battle at Cuito Cuanavale. Everything took
place to the west of…..excuse me, to the east of the Cuito River. And there was never
an intention to go to the west where Cuito Cuanavale is situated. The instruction…the
first instruction to the forces was to harass and delay the advance of FAPLA up to the
Lombo River. At the Lombo River…. then further forces were committed. 61
Mechanised Battalion was deployed, as well as the rest of 32 Battalion, elements of
101 Battalion, some Special Forces and supporting staff. That was the combat units
at that time. In total not more than one thousand five hundred people. We’re talking
at more or less four hundred and fifty fighting combat troops and the rest was support.
Logistics staff etc. etc. Air Force was already involved.
The Air Force also played their role in stopping the advance, but we had a big
problem. Fr the first time we did not have air superiority. It had to do with a few
things. The first one was the distance from Rundu. We were now fighting about 350
kilometres into Angola and the holding time of the Mirages was very short. And
secondly is….for the first time they deployed the SA-8 missile system which we knew
very little about, except that it’s very effective Now that meant that the Air Force had
to change their strategies. That mostly the Mirages would come in very, very low and
then do a toss bombing. They would release the pitch up into the air, round about four
kilometers before the target, throw in the bombs and then break away to stay out of
range of the SA-8’s which…the guys were bloody good. They were still effective.
But it’s not an ideal situation. The other thing is that they could not keep the MiG’s
away from us because of the holding time is so short, in the air. Which meant that far
the Angolan air force had free reign. That limited our movement during the day. We
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moved mainly in the night because we will get bombed. I’ll talk a bit about the
bombing a bit later.
Right, so FAPLA advanced up to the Lomba River and that was the second phase of
the operation….was to halt the advance at the Lomba River. That was the specific
instruction to the forces. The first attempt to cross was 21st Brigade. The Lomba
River runs from west to east. Then there are two rivers running from north to south
into the Lomba River. The Cuzizi and the Cunzumbia. The 21st Brigade was deployed
to the west…excuse me, east of the Cunzumbia River. And they tried with the first
attempt to establish a bridge there and cross the river. The river itself is not the only
obstacle in that crossing because it’s a floodplain that’s about at places up to five, six
kilometres wide, with no trees on it. Dense, dense bush on the side, then you have this
floodplain with a river in the middle .. It’s quite a big river. They used T & M bridges
that they wanted to cross. The tactics was to first of all bomb the opposite side, where
they want to cross, with artillery, then move in the tanks up to the crossing point. Start
shooting anything that moves on the other side. Get the bridge across the river, cross
the first few tanks to establish a bridge-head, and then the infantry would cross, move
a bit further ahead and then allow the rest of the forces to go in.
32 Battalion was deployed there, they dug in, in proper defensive positions, just on
the bush-line next to the…um….next….ja, next to the floodplain. And then withdrew
out of the positions. The reason was the fears of gas attacks. We had several reports
during the time that chemical and biological weapons were used by the FAPLA
forces. We had several cases…now I’ve seen these guys myself from UNITA that
was bombed in the north of the country by artillery…had some very strange
symptoms. Many of them we flew up to Pretoria and was…there was a lot of time
spent on what was it that poisoned them. And we didn’t really know. All we knew is
these guys did use gas. We also knew that they were equipped for this type of warfare.
Now it’s something we knew very little about, really. We had very rudimentary
protection against it. Some gas-masks was available, but we basically used raincoats
as protections, you know. We didn’t know. So we….we……32 Battalion pulled out
of the positions. When the artillery from FAPLA bombed that positions there was
nobody there. When the artillery fire lifted, very early in the morning, 32 Battalion
quietly moved back into position.
When they crossed the river they waited till the first tank crossed the bridge and all
hell broke loose. They fired with….phew,.., I’ll have to check the name on the
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system, but it’s a laser-guided anti-tank missile which was used the first time in battle
there. It was still under testing. That took out the first tanks and the Valkyrie systems
caused havoc with their infantry. So they failed. They tried a second time, also failed.
My involvement in that operation was just after that battle. I was in Pretoria and
General Chris Thirion Who was the Chief Director of Military Intelligence, he called
me to my office and said ‘you need to deploy’. Combat Group Bravo which consisted
of 32 Battalion and elements from 101 Battalion as their Intelligence Officer. I was a
Captain at the time. I had 24 hours to pack and say bye to my wife. Next morning I
was on a plane to Rundu arrived in Rundu, reported at the Sector 20 Headquarters, the
Intelligence office there to get briefed. I then reported to the Chief of Staff
Intelligence base in Rundu, which was the UNITA liaison office. Drew some
equipment there. I didn’t really know where I was going. I must say it was quite a
situation. That night got onto an aircraft, flew to Mavinga and then had to find a
vehicle and somebody. I then hitch-hiked and found a Buffel that took me to the
Brigade Administrative area and the Brigade Headquarters which was deployed round
about….I’d say….forty kilometres south of the Lomba River, to the west of Mavinga.
Arrived there at the night, got briefed and the next day joined the …..Commandant
Robbie Hartslief was the Commander of Combat Group Bravo and I joined the
combat group there as the Intelligence Officer and immediately started preparing.
Luckily I knew exactly what the situation on the ground was. They were without an
Intelligence office for a while. The one they had was sent to 61 Battalion because the
guy was…at 61 Battalion was not very good, and then pulled back.
Right. Um……Okay, then….I don’t know. I’m not going to describe every single
battle, but the big crunch thing……okay that was after the second attempt of 21st
Brigade What happened then was at the source of the Lomba, the 47th Brigade went
around the source of the Lomba to the south of the river to establish the bridge-head
there. They were not going to join up then with 21 Battalion, but with 59. 59
Battalion was deployed between the The Cuzizi and the Cunzumbia rivers, so when
they….the first crossing failed with 21, they then decided send 47 around the source,
let them establish the bridge-head, bring the 59th over and then move westwards
along the Lomba and allow 21 to join and move from there to Mavinga. That was the
plan on FAPLA’s side. Although we knew 47 was going to go around the source,
there was no attempt made to stop them, there was only harassment fire from the
artillery, and we allowed them to deploy it. Very near the confluence of the Cuzizi /
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Lomba rivers. 61 Mechanised Battalion led the attack against 47. The first attempt
was unsuccessful. It was mainly terrain, that was the issue. The bush is dense. It’s
extremely dense. You…er…you can’t see more than 20 metres in that bush, which
means that your main weapons, your anti-tank weapons cannot be applied. But terrain
is neutral, because it’s the same for the other forces as well. What FAPLA did in that
situation was these guys were very good at digging, and they dug themselves in. We
didn’t like that very much. We preferred mobile warfare, and we would rather move
to a point where we attack and be able to move out quickly and never get dug in to a
specific situation except the situation where we had the river crossing. That’s
different.
Right, but these guys dug in and 47th was well dug in. Everything was underground.
Good overhead cover….um…and there they were sitting. So it’s a tough nut to crack.
61 failed in their first attack. I think we lost a few troops. They re-grouped, decided
to attack from a different direction, I think three days later, and it was havoc.
Um….behind the 47th Brigade a bridgehead was already….a bridge was already set up
across the river, and that was the escape route should they go into trouble. When the
attack came with huge ferocity, the G5’s were devastating, and when they started
withdrawing…um…the artillery took out the bridge behind them so they had nowhere
to go. 47th Brigade was crushed. There was nothing left. Only two hundred infantry
without equipment. We captured all their tanks, all their equipment, and that is where
the SA8 missile system first fell into South African hands. Johann Lehman was the
guy responsible for that. Um…..right, so…..right….um…47th Brigade was crushed
and that marked the end of the FAPLA advance. They were effectively stopped.
Although FAPLA at that point did not give up on the offensive. They decided to re-
group, so they retreated their forces to form more or less a defensive perimeter around
the bridge at Cuito Cuanavale, if you want to call it …so they deployed forces to the
sources of the Mianei river, then at the confluence of the Hube and…what’s that
river? …um…that’s the Cunzumbia? Anyway there’s a bridge there. 21st Brigade
was there, 16th Brigade further north, 21st Brigade between the two of them. I
lie….the first…then….I must just remember now. Sorry, let me just re-think again.
Okay, they withdrew back to …first to the north and then they deployed southwards
again. This time to…..to…between the Cuito River and the source of the Lomba.
There’s a river there, the Miyama….. Miyama formed the southern part. They
deployed there with 25th Brigade and 59th Brigade to the west. There we had a very
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interesting thing. When these troops were moving down we knew their movements so
well. We know exactly the speed at which they move when they advance. And we
were picking up on the radio that the communications between the front tank
commanders who were leading the advance. So we calc…we knew the position
where they started, but there were no eyes on them so we couldn’t see where these
guys were. There were no artillery observers that could see their movements and so
on. But we guessed it and we calculated..okay, they should be more or less in this
area. We plotted it on a map and we gave those co-ordinates through to the artillery
who started firing. In the meantime our guys were listening to the tank commander
reporting. And we would report, ‘shots landed 50 metres to the left of us’. We would
tell the artillery move the fire 50 left, until the radio went quiet. That was…ja. And
that tactic was used several times.. When we used their own communications and the
way they reported on our fire to…to…to hit them.
Right, then we….er….Combat Group Bravo decided to attack 25th Brigade at the
source of the Mianei. It was hectic. Once again the terrain is inhospitable. It is
absolutely terrible. You can’t see. It is high trees, big trees, and bush with heavy
undergrowth. And I think we took a bit of the plan, I can remember the two of the
Intelligence officers it was 61 and 32. We were not happy with their plan these two
commanders came up with. Because what they decided was to move to the north, find
the tracks of where 25th went to their deployment area and then just follow the tracks
in until we get them and hit them. Which is stupid because that’s where the guys are
going to deploy their main force. We had zero intelligence on the deployment
itself….let me say quality intelligence. We didn’t have aerial photography, for
instance, available yet. The only thing is we had ground forces supported more or less
where the position was. We moved to the north, we joined up with UNITA and we
started to ring in with 61 as the attacking force, 32 Battalion in depth. And as
expected, all hell broke loose. They started shooting at us. We turned around and we
ran. That’s the first time I actually saw the whole 61…what they looked like.
Because you can’t see the whole battalion in the bush. But where we were
deployed….. the holding force, and 61 was in front, all these vehicles came past us
when they started shooting. We then, with the anti-tank weapons, just held FAPLA
back so that 61 can re-group and then we withdrew out of it. The….the battle had a
bit….after that a bit of a stalemate for a week or more.
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I think everybody rested after the previous battles. From our side, we re-grouped, did
re-training, some R & R. It was wonderful. We were there in the bush. They flew in
meat for us so that we could have a braai for the first time in months. It was quite
great. Okay, then the instructions came for FAPLA to move further back and form
the defensive perimeter around Cuito Cuanavale. We then decided to stop that retreat
of the 25th Brigade, and we engaged them at the source of the Hube River. That
battle….phew..they were…as they pulled back to the north they stopped against the
Hube River with their defence focused to the south. We decided to attack them all
along the side of the river from the west with the combined force from 32 Battalion
and 61, it was Combat Group Alpha and bravo, to move in there. We moved all
through the night. The battle started very early in the morning and lasted about nine
hours. At the time we took out….if I remember correctly, eleven tanks, from their
side. We …considerable losses on their side. We did not lose…we had some
wounded, nobody dead.
There was a terrifying experience. It was the first time that…although I’ve read in
books that it is in Russian doctrine, that the red eye, the Russian 122mm rocket
launchers, was used in a direct role. In other words we could see it just across the
little stream there. And this rocket launcher took it’s rockets down, because it’s an
indirect weapon. It’s supposed to fire over kilometres. And the next moment all this
stuff just starts going past you. It is crazy. But it didn’t hit us. It was a fierce battle.
A bit of a humorous incident there was we didn’t have a padre with our combat group.
Normally after battles we…it was between….the various squadron commanders or
the company commanders and Robbie Hartslief, Commander Hartslief to de-brief the
soldiers. So they would do it in their own way. Read a bit out of the bible, everybody
tell their story, cry a bit about lost comrades etc. etc. and then ‘Okay boys, let’s go
back to battle’. There was no professional way of dealing with this and the chaplains
were normally supposed to do it and we didn’t have a chaplain. Just before that battle
a young chaplain, he was an Anglican Chaplain if I remember correctly, was attached
to our Unit and he was specifically given to me because I had space in the Ratel. So
he formed part of our crew. Um….within the heat of the battle of that day, when we
re-grouped in the evening the Padre was gone. We didn’t know where he was. No
idea. He was gone. Now this is scary stuff…um…no other troops lost, this guy is
gone. He was reported missing in action. Nobody…some troops saw him at some
time, and we tried to find out but nobody really know. About three days later we then
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found reports, way back from the brigade administrative area which was about eighty
kilometres from us, which is about… in that bush it’s about three days drive. He
arrived there. He hitch-hiked some logistics vehicle back but he just said ‘ no more
battle for me’. He was out. That happened thee at Hube river.
Right…um, we withdrew 25th and 59th then went around the source of the Hube river
to cross the bridge and a very silly instruction came from Brigadier Swart who then
took over as the Brigade Commander, whom I felt at the time was not really in touch
with what was going on. He felt that FAPLA was now so de-moralised that they
won’t fight back any more All we have to do is just chase them and shoot them a little
bit. They will bugger off across the Cuito River, which of course didn’t…so they
chased them across the bridge and then the guys dug in. So now we had the 25th
Brigade at the Shamabinga? Bridge, we had 21st Brigade further north, we had the
remnants of 21st Brigade and we had 16th Brigade dug in. It was then decided to
attack 16th Brigade. The forces were then strengthened and 4th South African Infantry
Regiment was deployed. 4 SAI. And for the first time tanks arrived from the front. It
was huge excitement. We couldn’t believe our eyes. I mean we were fighting all these
days, various fights against tanks, we shot out many of those, over a hundred at that
time, and we never had tanks of our own. Doctrine wise you fight tanks with tanks,
and we didn’t do it. This was big-time now. And 4 SAI was used to attack 16th
Brigade. A very fierce battle raged. I didn’t take part in it. We were deployed in depth
as a reserve force. We listened to it on the radios and we heard the shooting. That was
two days o heavy fighting. Withdrew, they went back and they caused them severe
losses and 16th Brigade was dislodged from that position and moved closer to Cuito
Cuanavale…..um….then……we…we were now nearing the end of Operation
Modular.
On the 25th…sorry the 24th of November, Combat Group Bravo was ordered to attack
the 25th Brigade at the Shambinga bridge. Once again a very difficult tactical
situation with the bush. We decided to use the Shambinga River as our navigational
aid, move in around the source, then come in from the north. Our terrain evaluation
told us that where 25th Brigade was deployed, just to the north west of it was high
ground. A little hill. And what they normally would do is what’s called a brigade
outpost, would be deployed on top of that, with about four tanks, some infantry. The
idea is to force you to attack them and then they would withdraw you……withdraw to
their defensive positions to pull you in to where their main force are deployed. So
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that’s the most dangerous route of attack. And we evaluated that deployment. We had
some good feedback from the artillery guys who had visual on the target. We once
again didn’t have aerial photography, but we felt sure we could do it. But we had to
pass that little high ground. And the idea was that we would get close, then UNITA’s
5th Regular Brigade would be used to attack that force, that brigade outpost, to allow
us to pass and then we would attack from the east and not the north-west which they
would have liked us to do.
It was difficult going. We departed at dawn, right through the night, and we had to
move through the positions where 16th Brigade was previously deployed with a battle
with 4 SAI Now they were dug in, so it was extreme slow movement at night. I know.
I was, as Intelligence Officer, navigating this force during that night. It was
nightmarish. So we were very late. It was already daylight when we arrived close to
their positions. And UNITA, as usual, was late. Er…eventually, then there was
minefield, we had to clear that before we could get through on our route. Luckily we
saw it in time. UNITA then attacked the brigade outpost and failed miserably. They
just fired their weapons for five minutes and that’s it. Gone. So we decided we’ll take
it. Do it ourselves. We’ll take these guys head-on. So we moved into that bush, onto
that hill, engaged the enemy on the hill ..um….and we quickly wiped out that little
force and as we moved over the top of the hill we were now on a slope facing the
enemy. And just after the short battle we were busy with re-grouping. So that meant
that the guys were out of the vehicles, they were counting their ammunition, do
replenishment where necessary, check the vehicles, etc. etc.
I was sitting in my Ratel with all the intelligence systems and radios and stuff going,
and I heard one of the artillery observers directing fire onto the target. Now I needed
more information. I didn’t know exactly where their tanks were deployed. You know
we used a tactical map of that area, and we always tried to determine as accurately as
possible where the headquarters of the enemy is. Where their…. we looked for things
like radio masts and most importantly, what my Commander always wanted to know,
Robbie Hartslief, is ‘where is the tanks?’. Because if you break the back of the tanks
you destroy the force. Now while we sitting here, their artillery was responding as is
their tactics onto this hill. But the artillery was shooting over our heads behind us on
top of the hill. I made contact with the artillery observer and he said well he was not
far, about three hundred metres in front of our tanks in a tree. And he gave me some
directions. I went to Robbie Hartslief, told him that we have visual on the target and
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that I’m going to go to the guy. He said he is coming with, and Hannes Nortmann
who was the Commander of the Squadron, Ratel 90. Squadron Commander, Major…
um….the three of us then set off on foot. Now in this type of situation, you know you
sit in a Ratel with a heavy helmet, with radios and stuff. Here I just took it off, I took
a map, my sketch-book, a binoculars, compass, all the tools of my trade, not even a
rifle, no helmet, nothing, and run. And the three of us went there, we found the guy,
we got up into the top of a tree
Okay, right, so it was me, Robbie Hartslief and Hannes Nortmann. We arrived at this
young artillery observer. He was a lieutenant, I think. And he was parked with a
Casspir underneath the tree and he was up in the tree. We climbed up there and we
had a beautiful view of the 25th Brigade’s position. I was sitting there with my sketch
book and could plot what was happening. In the meantime this artillery firing that
went over the hill stopped. I was immediately concerned about it because I knew that
they were going to adjust the fire, but the big question is do they know where we are.
The next moment we draw small arms fire. We literally fell out of the tree, lie down
behind the wheel of the Casspir. We had about six troops just as protection around us.
There was exchanged fire, but it was short, it took about a minute or so and it stopped.
Robbie Hartslief was next to me and he said ‘what was that?” I said ‘well, I think it
was a reconnaissance element from the enemy that…to find out where our position is.
They want to adjust the artillery fire. He then said ‘well , let’s get back’ He
immediately radioed back all troops back into the vehicles because they were out in
the open at the time. I did not go back to my vehicle. I got back into the tree because I
needed more. I was still busy checking this situation out, and I still didn’t know where
all the tanks were I sat there, I spotted them and was quite excited, I could advise the
commander on how to proceed with the attack and I had to run about three, four
hundred metres back to my Ratel.
Heavy artillery fire rained down on our position. It was D30 guns, it was 122 rockets,
the whole works. And mortar fire as well. That was the longest run of my life. I
didn’t make it. A few metres away from my Ratel I could already see it. As I was
running, something exploded in front of me and hit me on the top of my head, as I
was running, it penetrated here, my face, and my chest .I fell down. I couldn’t walk.
I didn’t know I was hit in the head, I thought I was hit on the legs because I couldn’t
move my legs. But I was totally conscious. A few minutes before that there was guy
called Jan Swart. He was standing next to his vehicle and I shouted for Jan. He came
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to me, saw what was happening and went to fetch a medic. Medics came. At that time
another mortar fell on top of the hatch of a Ratel that was parked right behind me and
that driver was killed instantly in that situation He was the only guy we lost that day
There were about fourteen of us wounded with that artillery fire. The UNITA
Commander was also shot in his stomach. They then… ..the medic stitched me up.
My face…immediately, there under fire. They then took me, put me into the Ratel and
Robbie Hartslief decided to withdraw. And that was the end of the operation for me. I
had to wait until night-time, got blood transfusions, was then transferred. Had to go
by field ambulance to a point where a helicopter can pick me up, which had to be out
of the artillery range. So it was only about midnight. It was about three o’clock in the
afternoon when I was shot. At midnight we had a copter pick me up, flew me to
Mavinga, there on a Hercules C-130. To Rundu, into the hospital at Rundu, and only
there I realized I was actually shot in the head, when they did the X-rays. They then
casevaced me back to Pretoria and round about six o’clock the next day I arrived at 1
Military Hospital. That was the Thursday. Friday night they did a brain operation.
They could not take the shrapnel out. It was still in my head. I was paralysed on my
left-hand side. The medical treatment we received was world class. A few weeks later
I was walking again and although I was booked off for three months, I couldn’t . I
think I stayed home a week and I said to my wife ‘I can’t sit at home while my mates
are dying in the bush. I have to get back to work’. And I went back to Military
Intelligence Division, walking with walking stick…not really walking, more limping
all over the place. But anyway, we got on walking. Right, so I assumed my role again
at Headquarters, briefing general staff, keeping everyone up to date with the day-
today- running of the battles.
To briefly summarise what happened next was the 32 Battalion and 61 Mech and 4
SAI. Was replaced with citizen troops. We then led several attacks against these
forces. The instruction was to cause enough damage to these forces so that they will
not be able to launch another offensive at that time. So that consisted of constant
artillery fire, some ground attacks against these forces which were now very deeply
entrenched more or less in a half circle to the east of the Cuito River. And they
wanted to drive these forces back against the river and then create a….a…..enough of
a hindrance in terms of minefields, to make it extremely difficult to cross. Cuito
Cuanavale was never in the picture, never. The only thing that happened east of the
river there was an element of 32 Battalion. Once again Robbie Hartslief, and some
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artillery guys who went to the far east of the river up to Manong and fired some
artillery on their logistic troops. Just to cause some disruption there as well.
That’s it. It has nothing to do with Cuito Cuanavale. The idea from the beginning
was harass, slow down the advance, stop the advance, chase them back and then cause
as many losses as we can to the forces. In that we succeeded at that time. Right,
round about that time the Cubans brought in the 50th Division from Cuba, to deploy in
the west. Now what nobody knew at that time is that the first contact was made via a
messenger…it was a major that arrived in Pretoria from Portugal with a message from
Dos Santos. It was actually a funny situation. This guy tired to contact the ministry of
Foreign Affairs. When they heard it was about Angola they said the military must
handle it. They gave him the number of the Minister of Defence. They refereed it to
the Chief of the Defence Force, who referred it to the Chief of Staff Intelligence, who
referred it Chief Directorate Military Intelligence to Directorate External Theatre, and
it landed on my desk. To go and see this guy…um….I didn’t know what it was about,
met him, saw the letter and realized something is happening. They wanted to talk.
Now although the indications of 50th Division deployment and the intelligence was
already coming in, its’ often the perception, especially by the Cuban propaganda, that
the deployment of the 50th Division in the west, together with so-called losses we
suffered in Cuito Cuanavale. I don’t know what losses they were talking about, very
few…um, forced our hand to go into negotiations.
It is not true negotiations had already started before that. I think it did play…..the
deployment of the 50th Division did play a role in giving more urgency to the matter.
Now, with the deployment of the 50th Division into western Angola…um…or south-
western Angola, did put, from a pure military perspective, us in a bit of a dilemma.
The planning to....to attack this forces was done. It was huge planning. It was called
Operation Hilti and never took place. And that would have been an attack on the
main force at Manong. Our estimates was that on the first day of battle we would have
lost three hundred troops which I think was politically unacceptable at the time.
Um…right, the negotiations then started. The first….er…meetings was very, very
covert meetings and it was mainly between departmental officials. We established a
communication channel between South Africa and Angolans in New York at the
United Nations, where there was representatives from them through Foreign Affairs.
A team was assembled from the Department of Foreign Affairs, from SADF and
National Intelligence.
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Yes. To run this negotiation. It changed our focus on the desk quite a lot. Now we
had to still look at this military situation, but we had to put ourselves in the position to
know what these negotiations were about. The first meetings then took place in Cape
Verde…er….on the island there where….on a technical level the main thing that was
discussed was the way withdrawals should take place because here linkage was the
issue. Now, let me come back. If we look at the war in 1974 where it all started, and
specifically in 1978, when the United Nations…their Resolution 435 was accepted,
South Africa accepted the implementation of Resolution 435 in ’78 already, but on the
condition that the Cuban troops must leave Angola and that the democratic process
must take place in Namibia. If you look at what firstly SWAPO was planning at that
stage, and specifically the Constitution they drew up for Namibia in 1978….it was to
have a one party Marxist government in Namibia. The intention was to cause that by
revolution. That was it.
Secondly, at the time in 1978, the escalation of the presence of Cuban forces took
place. South Africa always said that from 1978 on…um…from 1978 on, that we will
implement it if there is a democratic process and the Cubans withdrew. And that was
still the position we went into the negotiations…Chester Crocker got involved and the
whole issue of linkage was brought into the….it has been around for a long time, but
that was now on the forefront. That, yes, we negotiate, the message from the
Angolans was very clear. The losses was unacceptable to them. They could not
continue. We had, in the negotiation process, a very militant stance from the Cuban
side throughout, but the openness to talk was there. An interesting thing that…
okay….we…I’ll come back to that just a bit later…….several meetings then took
place in the technical level, that decided how withdrawal should take place. And it
had to do with, first of all more or less the line from Lubongo. To Cuito Cuanavale.
All forces had to move north to that, and then further back to the north of the
Benguela railway line. The Cuban withdrawal, a phased withdrawal for them and
them out of the country. Whereas the South African forces would first of all
withdraw out of Angola, consolidate in Namibia, specifically Sector 1 Zero and 2zero.
That was in Oshakati, and Rundu. Then group at Groottfontein and move back with
the final movement back taking place on the 1st of March 1989. That was the time.
The negotiation process was difficult at times. I was in several of those meetings, and
then the breakthrough came in Egypt. The meetings in Cairo where the
Minister…..where the politicians got involved. We had Pik Botha there, General
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Magnus Malan was there, the Minister of Foreign Affairs from…from…..Cuba. The
initial...the first day of the negotiations in Cairo was hectic. It was to such a point that
the South Africans felt, ja, we’re not going ahead. But then a key meeting took place
between General Ochoa Sanchez who was the Commander of the Cuban forces in
Angola and General Jannie Geldenhuys. The two of them had a discussion where a
very cordial discussion….I wasn’t present in the meeting, but I later on had to do the
transcript… you know, when General Geldenhuys told us what happened we wrote it
down. And essentially the message was that the sons of both countries, Cuba and
South Africa, were dying in a foreign country and it is time to end the war. And that
meeting of minds that took place between those two generals then transferred back
into the political arena. Sadly, Ochoa Sanchez was blamed for the loss at Cuito
Cuanavale Was later brought some trumped-up charges against him. I’ve got the book
here interestingly enough, if you want to read it. The Cuban version. And he was
executed by the Cubans.
Right, various commissions were set up to monitor the ceasefire. The ceasefire was
signed and basically that withdrawal then took place eventually at the start of
Resolution 435. Now there was another thing there was when the SWAPO invasion at
1…..1st of April, sorry, 1st of April 1989. I’m not going to go into that now because its
past Cuito Cuanavale. Right, just some perspective, if we look at the objectives that
was set to the South African Defence Force by the Government in 1978. It was that
Resolution 435 must be implemented in Namibia, that it must be a democratic
Constitution and there must be no Cuban forces in Angola when that happens. That
was the aim of the war. We achieved that. We achieved that.
The other thing is that means that that conventional side, as far as I’m concerned,
we’ve won hands down. If we look at what the other side was planning…that was to
have a revolutionary overthrow of the South African presence in Namibia, the
establishment of a communist, one-party state in Namibia, that did not happen.
Which meant that there is a whole other dimension to the war which I didn’t even
touch on. That’s what happened in Namibia. That was revolution, a counter-
revolutionary war that we were fighting. We won that hands down. I can even pull
that through to South Africa. If we look at what the ANC intended, specifically their
Kabwe Conference, also in 1978, it took place in Tanzania. No I lie, it took place in
’87. At Kabwe in Tanzania, the ANC had a specifically revolutionary programme.
And that was the unconstitutional overthrow of the government in South Africa and
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the establishment of a democracy as they called it. But if you look at that document it
is a Marxist document. That did not happen. I think that the Defence Force, South
African Defence Force, in both Namibia and South Africa, has fought one of the most
successful counter-revolutionary wars that the world has ever seen. Because we
implemented the democratic state in both Namibia and in South Africa.
The fact that the AMC or the SWAPO, politically became the government of the day
is neither here nor there. That is not what it was about. It was never about the party.
SWAPO was always legal in Namibia. They could operate. It was different in South
Africa, but in SWAPO was always a legal political party there. The only part that was
banned was their military wing….plan which was solely defeated, many times over.
Um….so…um….I think information…I think that was....because people often ask me
‘was this war worth it?” I don’t think any war is ever worth it. But if we look at what
South Africa set out to achieve in Namibia and Angola, we have achieved that. And
that is the important point. It’s not about the propaganda or Cuito Cuanavale.
Although it was a defining battle. Um…that was not the strategy…the strategy of
South Africa was not to win Cuito Cuanavale, or any other battle for that matter. It
was to have a democracy established without Cuban and Soviet presence in Angola.
And that’s what we achieved in that war. I think that’s the essence of it for me.
Um, a few other remarks. I think…I feel greatly honoured to have been part of the
South African Defence Force. We were….I nearly swore there. We were bloody
good. We knew what we were doing. Our troops were in very difficult situations
in….in almost unthinkable situations. Brave, well-equipped, well motivated, and there
were hard times. I know there was a tone time during the Operation Modular there
was mutiny, almost. A mutiny in 61 when one of their companies refused to go back
into battle. After these guys had really got hammered hard. 18 year old guys that
saw, in that 3-4 months, more battle than almost any soldier has seen during the whole
second World War. I don’t know if I can describe to you the intensity. You know I
pershonally was involved in ten conventional battles. And when it’s conventional
battles, I’m not talking about a skirmish. We’re talking about big stuff here. Tanks,
aircraft, bombing the shit out of you…the noise. And these battles last for hours on
end. It is never-ending. You go without sleep for days. You don’t know what a bed is
like. You stink. You haven’t seen a bath or water for two, three months. It’s hard.
It’s tough conditions. And yet these guys, many of them national servicemen…. it
was exemplary. I’m so proud to have been part of that. It was worth it. Every bit. I
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think that’s my summary. I don’t know if you have more questions? If there anything
you want me to specifically go in…?
(Garrett Eriksen: )
Why do you think they have given it the name the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale?
Why do you think that title specifically has suddenly become the thing? Do you
think it is partly because of the original propaganda from Cuba, that they named
it that? Was it a name that they just picked up somewhere?
I think that specific…there was a speech Fidel Castro made. Um….More or less
when the ceasefire was signed. More or less.. that was more or less the timing. Where
he gave an analysis of the situation. A very long speech, but it’s quite a famous
speech. It’s worthwhile reading it. Where he gave his perspective of the war in
Angola. And Fidel Castro really twisted the facts. And the way, in that speech, he
described it…was that South Africa was the aggressor in south-east Angola. That the
offensive was launched because of the South African presence there. Which is
bullshit. We weren’t there. We only went in when they started the offensive. And then
that we wanted to take the strategic town of Cuito Cuanavale, but could not succeed.
We did not take Cuito Carnvavale because we did not want to. But, okay, and then he
said because our forces…now they totally overestimated our forces. I mean we were
never more than three thousand two hundred troops I think, in total, involved in the 6th
military region of the FAPLA…the Cuando Cubango Province . Never more than
three thousand two hundred at any time. I don’t think in any operation there were
more than three thousand two hundred troops. Their estimates of South African
troops, there runs into the tens of thousands. They say 30, 40, depending on which
fool you propaganda you read. He said they were committed there, and their strategy
was then to deploy the 50th Division in the west, which would split the forces in two.
And South Africa has committed so many forces and they would not be able to cope..
…and because of that clever strategy of that, we had to negotiate. It’s not true. We
had three thousand two hundred there and we had another two hundred thousand
available to go in if we wanted to. Sorry,….but that storyline was now carried
through in all the propaganda from that anti South African forces over the time. And
this story is being told over and over, and over. And it’s not true. It doesn’t
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correspond with the facts on the ground. We know it, I mean we were there. Anyway,
we were part of that process, so ja, never. It was never the intention. In fact, we never
really had a fight with the Angolans. You know, we …it was never about Angola. It
was about the Cubans ja. Getting them out. And strategy dictated and so on. And it
was about SWAPO, very definitely, in the end. We didn’t really have a fight with the
Angolans. I mean there was no reason for us to go and attack Luanda or Cuito
Cuanavale or anything. That’s silly. But I think that’s why that story…specifically
that speech of Castro, paved the way for this propaganda exercise that took place and
still continues.
Do you think that the SADF veterans have been partly betrayed by their
country, I suppose, after the war and even now, as far as …the general opinion
seems to be that the SADF at the time was fighting for apartheid, and you know,
they were apartheid’s lapdogs. And we do know that the SAP and the SADF
were used for example clearing out certain townships and what not. But the
general opinion is that…………….
Let me just put a thing here straight. We were bloody professional as soldiers. And we
were taught to serve first of all everything we did was guided by the Defence Force
Act and the Constitution of South Africa. Not apartheid. Not the political party. We
were apolitical in a sense. And I’m talking about professional soldiers, and I know
that there are a lot of national servicemen that has certain perceptions about
specifically the communication that was given to them about the ANC and so on. And
most of the stuff they heard were true, but there is all this perceptions that is created.
So first of all …even in my later career where I was involved internally in South
Africa, it was always apolitical. It was always objective. We told politicians stuff they
didn’t like to hear. And our job was to stabilize the situation. To have a stable and
safe environment wherein, in the end, elections could take place. And it happened. So
we were successful in that.
With a change of government,..um…it is..…I think the end of a war is always a
difficult situation for battle-hardened soldiers because we don’t like peacetime that
much. It’s a bit boring being a peacetime army I think. Betrayal….there are a lot of
emotions about it. Um…I don’t think so. You know I know the generals, many of
them. I know them well. My father was also one of them and these guys always
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remained loyal. And to this day if you go and speak to General Geldenhuys and these
guys, they’ve got the highest appreciation for..for..for what everybody has done Not
just the guys in battle. Also the guys who did the work here at home….and the
extreme difficult situation we had here in South Africa, with this deployment in the
townships. I don’t think that any General liked to send these troops into that
conditions. But the change of government, and with the propaganda in it, I think the
betrayal is in there. In that. That we got tarred with a political brush, which I don’t
think we deserved. That is…I don’t blame the generals. I do think that the politicians
hasn’t done a good job in the negotiation process, to protect our interests. It became,
for many of us who were professional soldiers and who would have liked to be a
professional soldier until we retire, it became impossible for us to continue in the
SADF because of politics and we were tarred with a brush which we didn’t deserve.
In that sense that is sad, ja. I won’t blame generals, no. But the politicians made a
hash of the negotiations as far as this is concerned.
Thank you. Is there anything else you want to say. I think I’m ....
Are you happy?
Ja, no that’s great. Thank you so much.
Pleasure, there’s so much more I could tell.
- END -
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Lt. Col. Johann Lehman
Okay, um….let’s just begin by just telling me…um….your name, occupation,

what rank you were when you retired or left the armed forces. And then just tell
me what you are going to be talking about.
My name is Johann Lehmann. I live in Clarens and I run a little accommodation

establishment. The period we are talking about, I was a so-called Intelligence Liaison
Officer between the South African forces and the UNITA forces. I‘m talking about
the period 1986 to 1988, I left the air force in 1993. The rank of Commandant, then
Lieutenant.
I think you want to know about 1987 Modular and the taking of the SA8. I was
somehow…got separated from my liaison team in…...must have been September of
1987 and found myself billeted with the forward command group of 32 Battalion.
And together with a guy called Piet van Zyl, Captain Piet van Zyl, famous ‘Piet
Boer’. Was asked by Jan Hougaardt to do a recce into the area where 47 Brigade was
cornered and got taken out during the course of a day and a night. And we drove into
this heavily wooded, previously heavily wooded area, as daylight broke and found
ourselves in the middle of what then looked like Delville Wood. And it was the
position where they had drawn laager, and I think in the previous day they were taken
out..they were heavily bombarded by SAF Mirages, by the G5 cannons, by MRL’S or
MLR’s….MRL’s… and during the course of that night they had actually tried to
escape. This was just on the heavily wooded area next to the floodplain. And they
built, with logs that they had cut, they built a road leading up to the river
that….Timb????
(Danie Crowther: )
Lombo confluence?
Timpoo river Ja. Lomba, it was the Lomba river, sorry. And then tried to escape and
take as many of their vehicles and whatever with them. And they were heavily
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bombarded on the way. We had a forward observer, artillery observer, directing the
fire after them. In any case, as I said, when we arrived there it was the remnants of
the Brigade. It looked like…….serious damage was inflicted. anyway we walked out
just past the tree-line and looked out over the floodplain and the floodplain was about
a kilometre…maybe a kilometre…and in the distance we could see where the vehicles
had gotten stuck in the mud as they tried to cross. They did some fantastic things I
mean it must have been horrendous, under fire, to do what they did. And to drive…a
PT76, they actually drove into the river and crossed over this flat top PT76. But of
course a lot of the stuff got left behind.
Anyway I…..with the binoculars I spotted what looked, in this haze, this morning
light, like an SAA and I recognised that because of my background…it was an air-to-
ground missile type. And I realised what it was and got onto the radio back to
headquarters and said ’listen I think this is what we’ve got’. They didn’t believe me.
So Piet and I decided to take a walk out. We walked and as we got closer of course
this was it. And it seemed intact.
Anyway so we walked across. We had a couple of UNITA’s that accompanied us. A
couple of UNITA soldiers. We got there and noticed that these things were actually
bogged down in this mud while the one was trying to tow the other. It was the actual
SA8, the launching platform, and then there was another vehicle, SA vehicle, SA
vehicle with a missile carrier. With a couple of missiles in it. The one was trying to
tow the other. They both got bogged down. And Piet was a ..Piet Boer was a farmer
and he used to drive D8 bulldozers. He noticed a tank standing close by and this tank
was still idling. He said that he could drive this things. And so we got the tank in
position and we uncoupled the two vehicles and they were totally lying flat o their
stomachs in this mud, and started hauling out the first one. I think at that stage, 21
Brigade was across the road in the tree-line across…on the other side of the river, and
they must have noticed that there was something going on. And they started
bombarding us.
The first vehicle we took out up to the tree-line, came back with the second one and
got that out. And as I said, in the meantime, they weren’t too happy about it on the
other side. And I think we went back for a total of six or seven trips, trying to get as
much stuff as we can…and logging, by then headquarters was onto us and trying to
get picture of what was on the ground. And it finally just got crazy, MiG’s were
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rolling in and they were really…I think they got some sort of instruction. We believe
later, in the intercepts, that they were told to stop us at all costs.
Anyway we finally left the scene and spent the night with the vehicle in the place
where we parked them and camouflaged them. And that night we towed…one of them
was drivable, funnily enough. The missile vehicle you could still drive. We figured
that out. Drove that on its own and the actual SA8 Piet towed with a tank to a position
in about thirty kilometres from where FAPLA was. and the following day they flew
Mossie Basson and everybody else, he was a technical type. To come and have a look
at these things. And there they stayed for a couple of days And I know UNITA was
under huge pressure from the Americans to get these systems. But eventually, with
the help of 32 Battalion, we had a whole protection force. Finally we got it all back to
the Brigade headquarters and from there of course it was recovered later. I think we
the tug-of-war between UNITA and South Africa carried on for quite a while to get
access to these things. But Piet and ….I. I mean our job was finished now. We went
back. I think we popped about a handful of Reactivans, didn’t sleep for 72 hours. Got
back to the Brigade headquarters, had a couple of beers and collapsed for 24 hours,
and that was it.
Johan could you maybe give me some background on the SA8 and the effect the
SA8 had on the missile, and then afterwards…what was the significance of the
SA8 missile system?
Well I mean, when the planning phase…there were two things which largely
determined our tactics halfway through this war. Because we always enjoyed air
superiority, we always enjoyed…you know…and of course the army could operate
under this umbrella of air superiority. But we heard through intercepts prior to the
actual advance or the start of the offensive, that they had a secret weapon...or that they
had secret weapons. And this time around it would be a different story. It turned out
they were referring to two things. They were referring to the SA8, which at that stage
was a premier tactical ground-to-air missile system that the Soviets deployed. And
the second was of course the front vector air-to-air missile, which took everybody by
surprise. Well, the net result of the SA8 of course was that, given it envelope, that you
couldn’t safely operate below 20 000 feet. You either had to go in very low or stay
above 20 000 feet. Very, very capable missile system. Not of the range, at that stage.
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We lost….the first time we really became aware of it was when we lost a Bosbok – an
artillery spotter aircraft in the same vicinity about four or six weeks prior to this
incident. We lost the pilot and the observer. Two of them. And then, all of a sudden
we realised there was shit, you know. So that certainly just brought in a whole new
dimension to what we felt was our right to do in the war...all our previous clashes
with these guys. So certainly that changed tactics, it change dour freedom of
movement, it changed everything. And of course when the first Mirage was hit by the
front-vector missile and the SAF declined to do any……any…….any further flights.
Certainly interceptor flights. That, once again, changed the face of the war. And the
army had to adapt and we had to adapt very quickly. Certainly to the army’s credit
they managed to still use artillery. Because of course that was your next big thing, I
mean even though you are flying from a position where…from ground force you are
relatively safe the air, the air threat… it remained a huge problem. But they continued
to support…they continued to fight the war.
So certainly the…of course the 8…the first time ever that a western back or western
back force defence force got hold of one of these things and in the ensuing times, a
couple of months, we managed to find out how the thing operated, what the PRF was.
The PRF was important because you base your electronic counter measures…
on….the once you know the pulse frequency you can develop a counter-measure. The
system spent some time in…it was shipped to Israel. It was flown…it was tested
extensively and flown against extensively. And when the Americans went in…...the
first Gulf war, and that was one of the systems they faced. They had everything
ready. They could ….the ECM’s was in place. So it meant, I think, for a lot of people
and for a lot of defence forces and for a lot of countries it meant quite a lot in the end.
We didn’t know that of course. For us it was just ‘there’s something, let’s go and grab
it’, you know. But no, I think….listen we had a nice time taking it out. It was a lot of
fun.
Is there anything else? Like is there any general opinion you have of…like you
were telling me earlier the…well, your opinion on like who won? you were
saying that there was no ‘who won’ as far as….
Listen, I mean, when that phase, Modular…we certainly did what we were supposed
to do. The objective was to take Mavinga and deny Savimbi a forward air base or a
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logistical supply base. That was where we were flying logistics into. That failed. With
huge men and material losses. There are various opinions, but the average body
counts are there. We then pushed them back, back to Cuito Cuanavale. They still
retained a slight bridgehead, but I mean it was nothing, really. But that’s where they
stayed. I mean that offensive of theirs was stopped. Then Patter which…Modular
Packer, Hooper Packer. Which was a holding exercise while men and material were
changed and then Hooper. Eventually….and I think…..you know… that was… it was
still a holding exercise. There were various..…I sat in on planning exercises where the
possibilities of taking Cuito and taking actually Manong that’s where they were
staging their offensive from at that stage. Cuito was nothing. Cuito was a shell. The
runway was non-operative. There was nothing. Ja.
Farewell portion left out between visitors and interviewer
Ja, we were either crossing the river, taking Cuito and then…anyway. We did that in
’86 by the way. We had forces on Cuito. Jan Breytenbach was the leader of that little
expedition. And we held Cuito for a couple of days until the tanks rolled in and
UNITA ran (last word inaudible). But it became a political decision. You made a
body-bag count and projections and said ‘well listen, how many losses can we
justify?’, and that’s why it was stopped. In ’88 I was with the Cactus missile system,
the Crotale missile system. We were sitting on the high ground at Shabing(?). We
managed to lift their aircraft. Once again the same role that the SA8 played with us.
So they were limited to operating from 20 000 feet, and very effectively. So our guys
did a bit of manoeuvring and…but as far as I’m concerned, it was then a process of…
tactically and on the ground, holding these guys and keeping them from achieving
whatever objective they still had in mind. While the politicians were busy negotiating
a settlement. As far as I’m concerned it’s not an argument. There is no argument. We
did what we were supposed to do. It’s a pity that we…tactically that we were
restrained. I mean if we really wanted to, of course, we could have done what we
liked. But it was not our decision to make. Ja, so….done.
Anything else you want to add?
Unless you ask me something specifically, of a certain (intelligible) or whatever?

74
Well, there’s….general..from the literature…there’s an opinion that the reason

we were pulled back in the end was when FAPLA and that entrenched
themselves in Cuito there were three or so operations to try and get in there and
try and push them out, but they eventually repelled and repelled and the losses
became too great for SA to…..
Yes, you see once again it was this inertia that was caused by the political
considerations. Also, with Packer of course, there was a troop change-over. One
section of national servicemen at that stage had to go, others had to come in, we re-
trained and whatever, and in that time it obviously gave them the opportunity to
entrench themselves in Cuito. It also gave them the opportunity to lay the minefield.
etc. etc. etc. But those are things that you can overcome, with enough will, whatever,
it’s not an issue. Certainly Cuito Cuanavale, as I said, was…..the little town itself…
the runway, whatever, was nothing. I sat on the high-ground overlooking Cuito.
There were a couple of BM21’s , they used to drive around, stop, fire off one or two
missiles and then get up again. There was nothing. We were bombarding that place,
we had to. ..to smithereens. It became a symbol. They had a bridgehead, and that’s
all they were interested in you know. I think we probed a couple of times. We brought
in the tanks, the Oliphant tank. We brought in the G6’s for the first time.
So then it also… I think it was a bit of a FAPLA’s competition. Right, now we’ve got
the tanks, now we’ve got the G6’s, what are we going to do with them? And
obviously those…..the powers to be concerned with the deployment of the Oliphant,
wanted to prove themselves. Same with the G6’s. But it still remained a non-event. I
think we lost two or three tanks, as far as I remember…that was about it. But it still
remained a non-event. We were all sitting there waiting, looking at each other, with
skirmishes here, skirmishes there. But by then there was…there was inertia. Nothing
going on. It was a holding exercise. No, I left in…I left that area...the area of
operation in about May of ’88 and then pulled back and of course by then I think the
groundwork ..whatever, had been done and the political decision was pending, and
that’s eventually what happened. As far as I’m concerned the initial FAPLA
objective of taking Mavinga, with limited resources that we had on the ground, in
support of UNITA. I think the figures were, I’m not 100% sure. But I think the
frontline troops never more than three hundred. Am I right? three thousand?
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Three thousand? Never more than three thousand. Back-ups of course, etc etc. But
with the couple of thousand UNITA’s in support position. They were okay, but they
couldn’t hold . They were fine for a limited type of operations, but certainly nothing
conventional. With what we had facing the forces opposing us, I think it was a great
war…a great little war. And we certainly proved that we could go up against vastly
superior forces. You know at one stage, and if you think about it, and I think the
people were very pissed off with the SAF forces when they indicated that they were
not prepared to fly anymore. At that stage the 61 Mechanised and the other
mechanised elements were going up against tanks with Ratel 90’s.
I mean….in terrible conditions, heavily wooded, soft sand, you know? Not the type
of terrain where an armoured battle would ideally…terrain hat would ideally suit an
armoured battle. You like nice open ground. You like, you know, that sort of stuff.
Hard underfoot… or your conditions underfoot must be allright. Terrible conditions.
And they were winning. They were taking these tanks head-on. And that’s of course
what pissed off a lot of the army guys, when the air force phase 1 missile…and I’m an
air force guy. I was there. No it was a splendid effort.
- END -
76
Cpl. Roderick van der Westhuizen
I thought you were just going to ask me one or two questions and that was it.
Well, you only have to speak for as long as you want to. Okay, first, just tell me
your name and your original rank when you finally left the SADF, and what
operations you were involved in. And then after you have told me that you can
just start speaking about your direct stories as far as Modular goes. You don’t
have to tell me like pershonal stories, just your general…you know, how the
thing went. And after you’ve told me how the operation went, you can feel free to
tell me any opinions on the overall battle, what happened afterwards. Okay?
Right. I’m Roderick van der Westhuizen. I used to serve with 61 Mechanised
Battalion Group. When I left I was a corporal. I was a national serviceman from
January ’86 until December ’87. I was involved in Operation Modular. Yes. What
basically happened was we did our basic training in South Africa. I was with
Armoured Corps. We used to work with armoured cars. Then towards the end of ’86
we went up to the border. To 61….first I was with 2 Special Service Battalion, then
we went up o 61 Specialised Mechanic…whatever. There we did specific training.
We didn’t understand it at that stage, but afterwards we found out that the powers that
be knew exactly what was going on and what was transpiring, what would eventually
happen. And we did specific training for that. At that stage it was fun and games for
us. But afterwards we realised. What basically happened was we did specific training,
which eventually was a very good thing. They split us up, for example into two
groups. There was a red force and a blue force. The red force had to do an advance on
a specific target and the other group had to halt the advance, you know, stop them.
Yes, that was basically it. And we did specific operations and training operations and
stuff. And at one stage we were close to Rundu and we had to go back to the base
where they installed better sights for the armoured vehicles. Better than the ones we
used to use .We went back to Rundu and we were busy with an operation and one
77
night they just called us all to the Commander’s Ratel and he briefed us. He told us
that everybody had to go back, write letters to their parents without giving any
specific information and that we had to give that to our troop commanders and get
everything packed and ready. And he said to us the next morning when the sun rose
we will already be inside Angola. Which also happened. . You know they sent the
letters and stuff, but the next day...that night we crossed the river and the next day we
were in Angola. We travelled towards Mavinga. At that stage, if I can just basically
explain what the purpose of the operation was. The eastern part of the Angolan
border between Namibia and Angola was fairly safe because that was controlled by
UNITA forces. And we didn’t have too much problems there. The western section
,however, was not controlled by UNITA and MPLA and SWAPO forces used to cross
the border, plant land-mines and attack people. As it was explained to us. I don’t
have proof of this, but as explained to us at that stage, in one year they had already…
not abducted…hi-jacked, two schools. I don’t know exactly what the term is, but they
took two schools with teachers and everybody, at gunpoint, took them across the
border, brainwashed them and trained them to be...we used to call them terrorists, in
order for them to attack us at a later stage.
So then what basically happened was that MPLA was supported by Cuban and
Russian forces...not only forces, advisors etc etc. and they then planned an advance on
the UNITA forces. The way I understood it was that UNITA and MPLA forces were
quite similar in strength and abilities, but with the help of the Cubans and the
Russians you know, UNITA didn’t stand a chance. And if they defeated, the UNITA
forces, then that whole part of the border would be exposed and it would make our
task almost impossible and the risk would be much more….the danger would be much
more. So basically what we then did was we then went across the border to help
UNITA to stop the advance. Because UNITA was our ally and also for our own
interests.
Yes, okay, at that stage, as I said, UNITA’s forward base was Mavinga, and their
main base was Jamba. The MPLA forces, their main base was Cuito Cuanavale.
Right. As I said, we went across the border. The main clashes were roughly four
hundred kilometres into Angola and we took a circular route. We didn’t go into Jamba
or Mavinga, we went past them. We didn’t really see anything. You know for about
four hundred kilometres into Angola...you know, it was just sand and bush, there was
no roads, no houses, nothing, you know. And then, we were briefed on a need to
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know basis. So we didn’t know exactly what was going on, they briefed us in a way
so we knew basically what was going on, but we didn’t know where we were and how
we were involved. And then at one stage, if I remember correctly the 47th Brigade and
the 51st or 59 Brigade of MPLA wanted to cross the Lomba River because it was one
of their major obstacles. If they cross that river they had a clear path to Jamba or
Mavinga. And as they were busy crossing the river we went in to stop them. That was
our first clash. Our first contact that we made.
Yes, and then basically from there it was ….our Commanders used the resources they
had. We didn’t know exactly what was going on. So at some stages we were pulled
back. At some stages we went forward. Various things happened but we only knew
our own part. You know, where we were involved in. Sometimes….all kinds of things
happened. I can tell you, you know, a lot of different stories of what happened. For
example at one stage they moved in with tanks…the whole Brigade moved into one
specific spot where they basically cornered themselves into a place where two rivers
converged. And we went forward and at this one entrance point we deployed and we
waited for them so that if they did come out, you know, we had the side flank and we
could attack them. We were so close to them at that stage that at night we could hear
them speaking, you could see them sitting around their fires, you know, speaking
Cuban and whatever, and Portuguese. So we couldn’t make any noise, we couldn’t
light any fires. We couldn’t even Inside the Ratels there is an infra-red light. You
could not see it from a distance. We couldn’t use any of that. It was a little bit tricky
because the section we had to sit in was a burnt-out piece of bush. There was no real
cover. Um….so that type of experiences. Um…..right. There are so many things I
can tell you about.
Anything you feel like sharing.
Yes. Right. What was a problem when we came out they kept us about 18 k’s into
Angola at the rehabilitation camp and there we discussed…you know, we did a de-
briefing session. There we discussed, you know, what was our strengths, what was
our weaknesses, you know. What they can take into consideration in future.. I can
remember a lot about what happened there you know, so if I can go back onto
that……If I can just basically explain to you. A tank and a Ratel is not really evenly
matched because a D54 tank at the front of the turret ring it has 107mm of armoured
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steel. A Ratel never has more than 10 mm of steel anywhere on the vehicle. A tank
has a 105mm cannon with, I think, two or three different armour- piercing type of
rounds. We only had one 90mm, you know. They had a crew of four. One guy was
just loading one guy aiming and firing the cannon, the other guy giving instructions.
With us we had a crew of three. There was a driver a gunner and a crew commander
The crew commander had to basically give instructions, tell the driver what to do,
load the cannon, you know, and do everything. Which made the, you know...they
were much faster, more efficient. A tank used to work with joysticks and when it
locked onto a target it remained on the target, the vehicle could move. The Ratel we
had to use hand-wheels, you know, if the Ratel moved the whole turret was static.
They had infra-red distance...an instrument that could give them the distance.
Our group commander had to stick his head out of the turret an judge from his own
training...and that was 1200 metres or whatever, the distance. So what they told us on
the training was that if a tank spotted you…okay I just wanted to say one other
thing...if we went into contact there used to be 4 vehicles in a troop. These 4 vehicle
shad to move separately. For example 1 and 3 would be in a position to fire, 3 and 4
had to move. 3 and 4 used to go into position then 1 and 2 had to move. We had
basically I think it was 34 seconds in a position, then we had to move. If it was out in
the open, because if a tank spotted us and it locked onto our position, then it could
move and fire. And what they used to tell us was if it fired once and it missed, then
you knew you were dead. Because the next, you know, the next shot would take out
the Ratel, you know, without any problems, I also read in the books that, I think on
average, we shot some tanks, I think, up to seven times. I think at least three times
before we could disable it, with one Ratel, which you know, the odds was……… So
the odds were not even, you know. But even so the statistics I heard when we came
out, I knew we lost three Ratels and in that contact that we were involved in, we shot
out 61 tanks. The personnel ..we lost 31 of our…of my colleagues was killed, and if
I’m not mistaken it was something like was four and half thousand of the MPLA,
Cuban and Russian forces who were killed. So even though the odds were stacked
against us ,you know just because of good training and good motivation and stuff like
that…that part was a very, very good success for us.
Some things that went wrong was for example, because we were 400 kilometres into
Angola our air force could not give us support. Their MiG’s flew over us every day.
Where they thought we used to be, they threw bombs all day long. They were trying
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to see where we were. So we could travel at night and when…at dusk…. in the
morning at dawn before it started getting light we had to camouflage all our vehicles,
we had to dig fox-holes for if they started bombing us and the rest of the day we used
to spend maintaining the vehicles and the firearms, cleaning and stuff like that, our
armaments. Yes, they…their…the biggest threat to them was our G5 cannons. The G5
cannons had a range of 40 kilometres and they were very accurate. So what happened
once was, for example, we were still travelling towards them. In the end, after this
manoeuvre we were so close to Cuito Cuanavale, that from a MiG taxiing on the
runway, until it was above us ready to throw its bombs, it was three minutes or
something like that. We were very close to them, and during this stage one morning,
we were travelling right through the night and when the sun came up we were still
travelling and everyone knew it was extremely dangerous but our commander got lost
so we carried on travelling. And you cannot just stop, you have to follow them or
otherwise you get lost, you don’t know anything, you just follow the convoy, so what
happened at this stage, he explained to us that we had to wait where we were and he
went forward. He didn’t give clear instructions. He just said ‘wait’, you know. What
we used to then was what they called...in Afrikaans they call it a vis-graat. One
vehicle would go left, the one would go right, the next one would go left again at
different distances off the track , you know, so they could be scattered. Because if
everybody was in a line a fighter aircraft can come in and you know just…
strafe...everybody in a line.
So we decided to pull off in that way as we were trained as we used to do. And then
we were sitting there. And as I said the sun was coming out, you could see this dust
cloud coming out clearly where we were travelling. We were just sitting there. We
didn’t know what was going on. At that stage some of us decided that we were going
to camo the vehicles. The problem with that is that if you do camo the vehicle the
camo net gets stuck in the bushes, and in the vehicle, and everywhere. You cannot jus
troll it up in five minutes and get going again. It takes a while to clear this up again.
So we were not sure, you know. If he came back and said ‘rush, rush, go’ then we
would not be able to. On the other hand, while we sitting there we were totally
exposed. So a few of us decided we were not taking the risk , we were going to camo
it anyway. At that stage I used to be a commander on a Ratel. A command Ratel I
used to be a crew commander, but because of my training and whenever somebody
became ill I used to help out in different places .In one contact I was a gunner. In a
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different contact I was a crew commander and at that specific stage I was driving a Q4
truck with rations and water and fuel and ammunition, you know. all stacked on
this…..and I was busy camo-ing, rolling out the net and putting in bushes and stuff
when I heard fighter aircraft. And at that stage, because of our experiences, you know,
when you hear fighter aircraft you know it is extreme danger.
So While I was standing on top of the truck camo-ing I heard this, I looked up I saw
one aircraft flying very low and very slow, coming at us. Basically in the direction we
were travelling he came in the direction opposite us. I stood there and I watched, and
I didn’t hear him turn around or anything. I got the impression that because he was so
low he was looking, maybe further out from the aircraft where he didn’t see us right
below him, but what I didn’t know was that he did spot us. And afterwards, that this
was a Russian pilot. If I can just quickly explain that. The MPLA pilots were quite
bad. At some stages when we were in contact they used to drop bombs on their own
people . they were not really well trained. The Cubans were much more efficient,
but…....they…..for example the Angolan pilots would sit and squabble between
themselves while they were flying. The Cubans were much more disciplined, and
much more better trained. So they used to be quite effective. The Russians on the
other hand, this is what I heard, were so well trained that they didn’t even speak on
the air. They just pressed the clicker switch. They had codes you know. One click to
go here, two clicks to do something else, whatever. They came directly....that was
shortly after the conflict tin Afghanistan...where the Russians in Afghanistan where
they were in war….. so those pilots came directly from there, so they were
experienced, they had all the training, all the experience, whatever. What I heard was
that there were three aircraft and the main pilot...the aircraft I saw was a Russian pilot
and I think he had two Cuban wingmen. That’s the way I understood it afterwards,
I’m not sure of the facts.
Anyway he did spot us, he turned around, he radioed in and when he came in for the
second round, there was already a…in Afrikaans you call it an eskadron. I’m not sure
what you call it in English…a whole group of airplanes already bombed up and taking
off already on their way towards us. As I said we were not that far from Cuito
Cuanavale at that stage, so they could reach us quite quickly Then when he came in
for the second round I jumped off the truck. I was standing next to the truck and I saw
the aircraft coming in, at that stage we were travelling all night we were all of us
extremely tired. The dust is fine dust .it sits in your eyes. It causes mud. When you
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rub your eyes you are in a bit of a state anyway I was standing there and I was
watching this Mig coming in. I think it was a MiG 21 or a MiG 23. I’m not sure. And
I saw the bomb underneath it detach and it started falling slowly. It was quite a big
bomb, it was either a 500 or 1000pound bomb. And I saw a parachute behind it
deploy, at that stage I’m not sure if it was the tiredness or whatever, I didn’t register
what was going on I saw this bomb fall and it exploded. And it was one massive
explosion. From where I stood it was, I guess, just one ball of flame and afterwards I
heard someone screaming and only then I registered what was going on.
I was standing there right next to a truck full of ammunition and then everyone
realised now there’s trouble because this...then I noticed that whatever they hit was
making a cloud of black smoke into the air so anyone from anywhere could see
clearly where we were stuck. At that stage I asked the guys around me from the other
vehicles. There was a shona. And we were in the bushes right next to the shona. and I
asked them to dig foxholes for the injured right behind the shona the thought was that
they would expect us to flee into the bush and they would start bombing into the bush
and it would be safest on the edge of the shona. They would not expect us. And I
rushed in and another friend of mine, Duncan Taylor, he had taken out the driver okay
let me explain it this way. The driver that was driving all night was lying inside the
Ratel You get two doors that you open with hydraulics on the sides, then there’s a
little gangetjie, a corridor, where, if you do travel...take people, there’s three seats
there and where their feet used to be there’s a grid and he was lying on that grid
sleeping.
The crew commander was away from the vehicle and the gunner as well. The gunner
was talking to his friends at another Ratel , I believe about 20 metres away and he was
finished talking and he was getting off the gunner and he took water behind the rear
wheels, there is a little water tank and he was taking water to drink and while he was
busy the bomb fell. The bomb hit just behind the turret, on the body of the Ratel and it
went in. It was so big, the explosion, that it broke the...we call it the romp..and it went
in.
Okay, the guy that was taking water, the gunner...if I can quickly explain…this part of
his leg was shot away. only the tendon at the back was there, and the piece of the leg
that was...no.. he had his boots and his socks and everything on. It went through his
browns, his socks and boots, like a knife through butter. You know, it was cut clean
there isn’t even a threads or anything sticking out it was clean cut. And the part of the
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bones, of the fat and the flesh sticking out. But Anyway he was the guy that was
screaming .the guy that was lying inside. De Jager, the shrapnel of the explosion
pierced his body all over. For example in the the back of his head there was piece of
shrapnel that went into the floor underneath the grid and then ricocheted into his head.
For example on his leg there was a hole big enough...for example the medics had
tweezers that used to look like a scissors, you know? It had handles, and it could
clamp. They put it in and they clamped the vein.
I said Duncan took him away, carried him out. I put a stretcher I ran there and put him
on the stretcher and then the medics came and they started helping him. Because we
were so far into Angola we didn’t have water supplies, you know. We used to take
water supplies from the rivers at night and so we didn’t shave, we didn’t…. we only
washed when ewe really could when we reached a river we would jump in and we
would wash.
So Frikkie was lying there, you know, his beard was singed by the explosion and he
was full of holes You could see the holes and see the blood spreading around it And
he was pleading with us to help him. He was moaning of the pain and pleading with
us to help. We were just watching him, you know, there was nothing we could do. We
tried to console him a little bit, and tell him, you know ‘be patient, help is on its way’,
stuff like that. But it wasn’t much of a help. And also because we were so far into
Angola we couldn’t have air support. The choppers could only come in at night to
casevac. We used to call it casevac...Casualty Evacuation. So it took him about 8
hours to die. And only after nightfall the choppers came in. So he was already dead by
then. The other guy…I cannot remember his name right now…the gunner who lost
his foot. He was also lying there in pain you know, and.…Because we used to casevac
all our injured and dead. They just left them there to rot, so the flies were terrible.
Yes, it was bad. We tried to, you know, make it as comfortable as possible for them.
But, for example Frikkie, they gave him three morphine injections before he could
really, you know, lie still. They could work with him. Okay, then we carried him to
the edge of the shona. Yes, and as I said only that night they came into casevac, all of
them. What happened there, the way I understand it, as I said...our anti-aircraft
systems used to be 20mm cannons mounted in the back of a Unimark(?). We used to
call them ystervarkies. And every day the MiGs came over we used to see, we used to
watch this. The MiGs came past and then you see the airbus, you know. There was a
long path, then the airbus. The next time they came past you see the airbus and then
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the MiG came past, so they didn’t really have a chance. At that stage we had Mirages.
I think we had just stated with the Cheetah, but their MiG 21 was the equivalent of
ours. The MiG 23 at that stage was much more advanced than ours. You know. They
had a frontal attack system where we had a heat detecting system, things like that for
example. So we didn’t really have a chance against their fighter aircraft. But on that
specific day because the pilot flew so low and so slow, he was so over-confident.
What happened was that our anti-aircraft came behind us. We were in a unit with
different sections. You know, we had artillery, we had armoured cars, we had anti-
aircraft. All of that in one group. And this one guy was busy opening the flaps, and he
dropped the flaps, he was about to get off when he heard this MiG approaching, so he
got in behind the controls and as the MiG came over he started shooting. And I
believe the only MiG that was hit by a 20ml was that specific MiG that dropped the
bomb. And they say they saw smoke coming out of it and then it turned round and
went back to Cuito Cuanavale. And because of that they called back the whole
eskadron, the whole group that was on their way towards us.
In my opinion, if that did not happen, then most of our group would have been killed
that day and wiped out. Because, as I say this Ratel was burning. There was a huge
column of black smoke in the air. They would have most probably just started
bombing on the smoke and then just spread out. They had the whole day. That was
about 8oclocok in the morning. They had the whole day to bomb that whole piece of
bush where we were in, you know. The chances of any of us surviving was quite slim.
Especially us that was close to where it happened. But that’s the way things worked
out you know. There was bad things, and in some miraculous way, you know, it
worked out well as well. Um…..yes. That’s the one experience.
Yes, as I said, if I stick to experiences I’m going to keep you busy all day. A few
things I can just mention was that, as I say, we were well-motivated and well trained,
so although we had inferior equipment, we had much bigger successes than them.
What basically happened was they tried to move in on UNITA. We stopped them and
we beat them back. And it was like…it was a conventional war, but there was
guerrilla tactics as well. We used to hit them at times etc. There’s so much things I
can say, you know. I’m trying to figure out what’s worthwhile.
Well just maybe one or two things that you think are really important to people
understanding this war. Like if someone viewed this documentary, what would it
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be like? Say one or two or three things that you think are really important that
they know about this.
What I can mention is at one stage one of the MPLA people got lost and he came into
our people, you know. We caught him. At that stage somebody gave him what was
left of their rat-pack for the day, you know.. He ate. You know, he was very hungry,
and afterwards he put, I think, the dog biscuits into his pocket. And he said that was
the only time in the whole war that he had enough food to put in his pockets. You
know. That’s the way it worked. He was afraid to come towards us you know because
they explained to them that whoever we caught we would sodomise them, we would
torture them and all kinds of stuff. So they had a fear. And this guy couldn’t believe
the type of treatment he got. Yes.
What happened was at one stage….some of the tanks that were shot out…I didn’t see
it for myself, but the people explained it. Some of those tanks even had…what is
boei? Like shackles, welded into the tanks. For example the driver, they would put in
the tank and they would lock him into the tank. He wouldn’t be able to get out and run
away. So, you know, they were forcing them to make war They weren’t really
motivated. Another thing that I hear. I’m going to jump around a bit now,
because...you know….another thing I hear, even with the Afghanistan war they refer
to and all the other conflicts all over, that at that stage it was the only full Russian
General outside of Russia who was in Angola during that operation. Because…now
it’s a little bit of a problem to distinguish, but while we were trained they were always
talking about the communism and the threat towards our democracy, you know…our
The rooi gevaar?
Ja. The rooi gevaar. They were always talking about that. But what they also told us
is that if something happened, for example, they would block the Suez Canal, the only
route between the east and the west would be around South Africa. So its…that was
quite crucial They also said that all the resources, you know, agricultural resources,
gold, diamonds, that type of stuff, everything that you can find anywhere else in the
world is in south Africa and that could be a measure to see how desperate they were
to capture South Africa .That’s why…because they pumped ink you know, huge
amounts of weaponry, personnel, to try and win this war. And this was explained to us
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the reason why. So it was quite intense. At that stage they said it was the biggest
conventional war since the 2nd World War. They said that our killing rate was best
since the 1st World War. You know, the killing rate being that we lost thirty one and
they lost four and half thousand, if you take the amounts. If you took the amount of
money and the people they put into this you know, so it was quite a…..desperate
attempt from their side, you know. They had previous operations that was similar,
where they tried to move against UNITA and they were unsuccessful and this time
they really threw everything into it.
Yes, another thing that is fairly significant is at that stage we never had…..we had a
battalion and they had much more advanced weaponry and much more people than us.
If you take a Brigade it’s built up out of various battalions. We only had one battalion
there. So we were about a thousand men. Each brigade they had …they used to have
much more personnel. So if you take it in that sense, then, you know, they had
superior numbers, superior equipment, but even that...even though, because of that we
still had big successes, if you look at it in that way. The way that I understand it why
there’s now such a debate and discussion about this and why they are trying to say
that we are not as good as we like to portray, is...um...the way I understand it now, is
that they tried to move in on UNITA, we went in to stop them.
That part of Operation Modular was extremely successful in every way that you can
look at it. It was extremely successful. What happened after that is that they dried to
push their forces back towards Cuito Cuanavale. And I think they tried to, you know,
destroy their infrastructure in such a way that they could not easily re-start their effort,
you know. If we withdrew they couldn’t just you know, ‘okay, now they’re gone’,
and just start driving down the same road and attack UNITA once again. I think they
wanted to ensure that, you know, they blow up the bridges, stuff like that, to make it
difficult for them. Which was also not all that bad. But then at one stage I believe
someone got it into their head that we should attack Cuito Cuanavale itself. Which
was an extremely dumb thing to do because of the situation, because of, you know,
the rivers and everything around it. As they explained, what would you do with it if
you did capture it? It’s pretty idiotic and useless. And I think at that stage somebody
thought everything was going so well, we might as well take it one step further. And
then they got into a situation and thought no it’s not that good. And we did lose a few
tanks and we were…because of what happened there it discredited everything that
went before that, you know. So if you look at it, Operation Modular was a big
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success. The part after that was also successful and then they went and, you know,
tried to do something that they never should have. And where the chances of success
were slim and when our forces withdrew then, it was easy for them to say ‘they lost
the war’. So it is tainted in a way and if you look at everything together then in many
ways we did get a bit of a hiding. But that was only one part of it. If you look at the
rest of it, you know, it was a sound success, all of it.
One or two other things I can just quickly mention is that while we were in the veld,
or in the bush. They used to give us briefings on certain things so we had an idea of
what was going on. Just one of two of these sections was, for example, whenever a
MiG used to taxi on the runway we use to know about this. You know, on the radio
they would say ‘Victor, Victors’. You know, ‘victor victor’ is the sound of the
vliegtuie. So we would know there is danger .we would lie low. We wouldn’t move
around. Because if you fly over and Ratels are camo’ed you can’t really see it, but if
someone moves you can pick it up very quickly. Our intel was so good, our recces
were so good that they knew everything. Say for example if a MiG attacked and it
was a Russian pilot, we used to know about it. That was very good in our favour.
There was one stage where our G5 cannons were 40 kilometres away from Cuito
Cuanavale. One of three MiG’s taxied and they shot it out on the runway, before it
could take off. That’s how good our systems used to be .There was one stage where
they had a meeting in a hangar on the airfield and something went wrong, they didn’t
yet…pitch up, but all their top brass would be there and with the G5’s they shot that
whole hangar to pieces. Everything was burning in the morning. But as I said, if
something happened and they were not there so that was unsuccessful.
What used to happen also, as I said, their dead and their wounded they would
sometimes just leave, you know. They wouldn’t bother. Which is a little bit gory, but
we could only get water if we could get to rivers. So for some stages up to more than
two weeks we didn’t get any water whatsoever. Then when we did get water, it would
be muddy and full of tadpoles and everything, and sometimes there would be corpses
rotting in this water. And that was the water we used. For example if you take your
fire bucket thatch was around your water bottle and you put water in it and you boil it
to try and make coffee, then eventually there would be a ring on the inside of this fire
bucket that you cannot get...you know, where you just take sand and water and sand
and rub everything off, you couldn’t get it off. That ring was there. So it was a little
bit gory. Another thing is that they normally only sent in their choppers to Casevac
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when it was Russians that was injured. Not even the Cubans they really put an effort
into it. At one stage one of these chopper that came into Casevac, the Russians, was
also shot down, also by a G5..So yes, the G5’s really gave them hell and the G5’s was
our…if it wasn’t for the G5’s it would have been different. And that was why, every
day when they flew around, wherever they thought the G5’s would be, that’s where
they dropped their bombs. We were sitting there, for example if a MiG 23, it slows
down, the wings come forward. Speeds up, the wings go back. We would sit and
watch them cross over us all day, drop bombs all around us, you know. It was not that
good because when we came back, whenever I heard a jet I would just freeze up and
go into a state of shock almost.
What happened once was we were on our way to our Commander’s Ratel for a
briefing session. Normally they told us when our, uh, our aircraft came in. what they
said whenever our aircraft came in they could drop bombs on a specific point or
target, and then they used to withdraw, What happened there was they turned
around...I think they had something like three and a half minutes manoeuvring space
then they had to get out because the MiG 23 was vastly superior and they had to put
on their after-burners to get out.. And at one stage we were on our way to a
Commander’s Ratel for a briefing session and there was a ...we call it a waterbanker,
you know, it was a truck, a water truck and we used to go there and fill lour water
bowls and then walk to his Ratel, and sit down and he would take out his maps and
show us what is going on. And as we were walking towards that we just heard this
sound. And what happened is our mirages came in but they didn’t tell us in advance.
They used to, but this time they did not. So the mirages came in and I think it was
something like sixteen kilometres before the target they used to pull up and release
their bombs. With that, the momentum would take the bombs to where they had to
drop. So as we looked up we saw these fighter aircraft pull up and we used to see the
bombs released. And everyone went into a state of panic. The driver of the
Commander’s Ratel…the foxhole used to be about a metre high…deep, you know,
roughly.
At that stage 8 people got into this hole, the top one was lying level with the ground,
he didn’t get inside. He was just lying there. Some people ran into the bush. I think
one of them only got back...we only found someone two days later. And everyone was
just running all over because of this. We didn’t know what was going on. Another
stage, also, we saw that…a Mirage and a MiG you know, got into like a dogfight. And
89
at that stage I was with one of the armoured…I was driving either a water-bunker or
an ammo-bunker. But .anyway I was not with the group itself. The group went
forward to, you know, they were in a conflict. In a contact situation. And the rest of us
were at the temporary base, guarding the temporary base for whenever they came
back. And as we were standing there this Mirage came over. But it felt like tree-top
height. It was right over us. Straight over us. I had just reached the water bunker when
that happened and a few seconds later we thought okay that was it, and a few seconds
later this Mig was right behind the Mirage, also coming at a terrific speed and noise,
you know. The guys….because of the shock he just fell over. I had to catch the guy
because he just fell over. Afterwards he said he had a bitter taste in his mouth, you
know, because of the shock. Yes, there’s, as I said, there’s all kinds of stuff I can tell
you. What else?
I think I’m nearing the end of my….tape. Um…do you want to…I think we’re
towards the end here now. I’m thinking is there anything you want to say like
after the war. Like how it was perceived afterwards? How your life has been
since? How the war has…ja, just like your opinion..because there’s that big
debate on who won, overall. What’s your opinion about that?
Woo, I’ve got lots of opinions. Okay, we did have a rehabilitation camp before we
came out of Angola. We had a rehabilitation camp and then we withdrew. At that
stage we were quite negative because, I’ll quickly just mention…One night we knew
something was going on quite close to where we were because there was a lot of
activity. And that night I saw the choppers coming in. I leopard-crawled through the
bush and got close to....I shouldn’t have been there, but I could hear that our generals
and general Savimbi was there. Everybody was sitting around talking. And at that
stage they needed to decide whether they used to...you know …we were towards the
end of our two years, if they were going to withdraw us and bring in new guys, or are
they going to keep us there because we had the experience and the training. But we
were de-moralised because we had lost our, you know, some of our guys and we had
been there for quite a long time. We were very demoralised. They had to decide
whether to continue with the experienced and the demoralised people or get the more
motivated people that now didn’t have the experience. And eventually, you know, we
90
were the lucky ones and they brought in new guys and it went into, I think, Hooper
and then Packer.
When we did come out...eventually, like for example when we landed in Pretoria, at
Waterkloof Air Base, with the Flossie. All the generals and brigadiers, everyone was
standing there and saying ‘welcome back, our heroes’, We just said ’get lost, we’re
not interested, just bugger off’, you know, ‘we want to get home’. So at that stage we
were not really…they were trying to….the way we experienced it, you know, it was
like two politicians sitting around the table playing chess and the one guy was saying’
‘Okay they’ve taken one of my pieces, I’m going to show you now’ and push 1000
men into bush. They never saw us, they never knew us, they didn’t worry about our
experiences or backgrounds It was just a situation of Cuba is going to try and show us
something, and we’re going to show them something. It was like a political game and
we were very demoralised about the whole situation. If I had to look back now I
would say that it was important and it needed to happen. Because it’s easy to say that
when we withdrew, SWAPO took over Namibia anyway. What we were fighting for
was undone anyway. But if we did not keep up, you know. We had big successes.
The operations before us also had big successes. But if that did not happen, then
maybe South Africa would be totally different now.
Because at that stage it was still a cold war. Say for example if South Africa came
under indirect Russian rule it would be a totally different situation here today. So we
did what we had to do and at that stage it was not a very good system. Although I
believe the national service was a good system to get the guys focused and motivated
and make men out of them. But everything was fun and good and built us up there
until we made contact and we see the guys lying there wounded, you know Because
we got guys back that were wounded and shot to pieces. The guy who died you can
live with because its final, but the guys who were wounded….we were 18, 19 years
old at that stage. That stuck with us. It you’re your mind. Saw the guys cracking,
stuff like that. Yes the rehabilitation camp was basically to de-brief us. See what was
good, what was bad and after that, that was it basically. We had served our purpose,
get lost, you know. That was the end of it. Our government didn’t really support us.
You don’t only think of monetary terms, you think of all kinds of other stuff, for
example. once the guys on the other side, Umkonto wi Sizwe and APLA and those
guys you know, they got good posts and they got pensions and all…they got a lot of
money.. ..got a package, whatever.
91
Our guys, at that stage was fighting for..to preserve what was in South Africa and also
in Namibia and it was just basically that was it. We were used and after they had
finished using us we were discarded. It was not very good. Just one thing I’d also like
to mention. Many people think of us as oppressors, which is totally not the case. We
used to work very well. Apartheid was something that was in South Africa. Where we
were there was no such thing .We used to work with all races every day in the bush.
We had to rely on each other to survive. I would like to say something else as well.
At one stage while we were busy, also moving. There was rumours that there were
very special forces close to us. Going to attack us and this one morning I was busy
around my Ratel and I noticed someone close to the Ratel and I watched this guy and
it was one of 32 battalion’s guys. 32 had a lot of people that came out of Angola that
converted and started helping us. Eventually I started talking to this guy. This guy was
Portuguese speaking. He could barely speak English. He used to be with the enemy,
and he was helping us. He dug himself in, he packed his supplies around him. Dug
himself in. He lay there for 3 days. I never saw him move He protected us. If there
was a special force. We were conventional warfare, you know, Ratel against the
tanks, something like that. But somebody creeping through the bush, coming to attack
us, you know, we didn’t have training for that type of thing. We were exposed .When
I did speak to this guy he said that he used to live in Cuito Cuanavale and him and his
father and his brothers had left fifteen years earlier. His mother and his sisters had
remained behind. Here we are, almost attacking Cuito Cuanavale, throwing bombs on
Cuito Cuanavale and he is not asking questions. He is not saying ‘I don’t want to do
this, what about my sisters?’ he is doing his part. He is giving his everything. And
that’s something else that makes a person very bitter as well. For example, 32
Battalion was eventually just disbanded. Those guys that came over to us and did
everything that we asked of them. They were also discarded you know, not so badly
with us, but also with them, So yes, it’s not a good experience. Sorry, what else was
your question?
On your…the whole who won debate. There’s three camps, there’s the one that
said Cuba and Angola definitely won. The other one that says SADF definitely
won and then there’s the other one that says no one won. SADF just completed
their objectives successfully, and that’s what happened and then Cuba went. And
the big propaganda story about it. So that’s the three.
92
Yes, the problem is with politics. What they said, the first casualty of war where
politics is involved in always the truth. And that’s basically how I believe as well.
What happened is they sent in the best equipment, MiG’s the latest tanks and MiG’s.
The best equipment, with thousands and thousands of people. We went in with the
equipment that we had. It was sufficient at that stage, with only 1000 men. We
stopped them from wiping out UNITA and getting access to that part of the border, so
whatever….what we did do….in a fairly short space of time, we did it very
successfully. So our objective was met. They tried to remove UNITA, they never
succeeded. They never really even crossed the Lomba. They got a few vehicles this
side of the Lomba and we gave them a proper hiding and sent them running,. So they
never got close to their objectives. And as I explained, what happened then is
somebody high up in our command structure decided that they wanted to take it too
far, and he made a mistake and then they gave us a hiding in that specific last part of
the operation. Which was stupid of us to do. We should never have gone there. And
then they did have success. They had the upper hand in that limited space of time,
whatever. There they had success. They were triumphant. So either side has a little bit
of merit to say….
What I do want to say, but if you look at the bigger picture and you look at the whole
scenario,, they tried to do something. They were not even closely successful,
whatsoever. We went in to stop them. We did stop them. So you look at it in that
sense then I would say that whatever we set out to do we did. And you know, I think
we were…, yes…….I don’t think we have anything about that section to regret. I
think we can be proud. And as I said we never went to oppress anybody or anything.
We worked with them. We tried to…..whenever a school was abducted we tried to get
those children back, you know. We were working more for the local population of
Namibia than for anything else. So you know, anybody trying to politicise it
afterwards and say that we were oppressors and we were White and we were fighting
Blacks, that’s utter bullshit. It never happened that way.
- END -

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Full Name: Garrett Ernst Eriksen Student No: 607e4967

1. THE BATTLES OF CUITO CUANAVALE

A literature review detailing select pieces of literature on

The Battles of Cuito Cuanavale.

2. FORGED IN FLAMES: THE SADF EXPERIENCE OF

THE BATTLES OF CUITO CUANAVALE 1987 – 1988

A script of the included documentary: Forged in Flames: The SADF experience of

The Battles of Cuito Cuanavale 1987 – 1988.

3. TREATMENT ON THE MAKING AND WRITING OF:

4. TRANSCRIPTIONS OF INTERVIEWS HELD BETWEEN

30 AUGUST 2010 – 03 SEPTEMBER 2010-11-09

Rodercik van der Westhuizen.

The Battles of Cuito Cuanavale – A Literature Review

After the Carnation Revolution in Portugal of April 1974, Angola became an

CUITO CUANAVALE – PERCEPTIONS OF THE BATTLE

The War For Africa: Twelve Months That Transformed a Continent

Bridgland summarises the war thus:

7 Battles That Shaped South Africa

At The Front: A General’s Account of South Africa’s Border War

Now we move on to a text of a more biographical nature. I would go so far as to say

The Buffalo Soldiers: The story of South Africa’s 32 Battalion 1975-1993

At Thy Call We Did Not Falter

“In challenging the orthodoxy of the military history of the sub-continent,

This sentence alone demonstrates Dosman’s perspective on “who won” wherein,

Geldenhuys, J. At the Front: A General’s Account of South Africa’s Border War.

Holt, C. At Thy Call – We Did Not Falter. (2005)

Mills, G. & Williams, D. 7 Battles that Shaped South Africa. (2006)

The South African Border War lasted from 1966 to 1989.

[Music begins: “When the Man Comes Around – Johnny Cash”

[Series of Border War footage cuts begin to play.

[Music begins: “Battlefield 1942 Theme”

[Text fades out.

[Text fades in to next text: ]

[Text fades out.

[Fade in to Danie Crowther section of interview.

Lt. Col. Danie Crowther

[Text fades out.

[Music begins: “Battlefield 1942 Theme”

[Text fades in to next text: ]

[Text fades out.

[Fade in to Johann Lehman interview.

Lt. Col. Johann Lehman

[Text fades out.

[Fade in to second Danie Crowther section.

[Fade in to Roderick van der Westhuizen interview.

Cpl. Roderick van der Westhuizen

[Text fades out.

[Fade in to second Johann Lehman section.

[Fade in to third Dane Crowther section.

[Music begins: “Die Kaplyn – Bok van Blerk”

Die Suid-Afrikaanse Grensoorlog – 1966 – 1989

Die Kaplyn was ‘n oopgeskraapte stuk grond aan die gevegsfront.

Dit was die Grens.

Elke jong seun moes gaan veg.

[White text on dimmed background fades in: ]

The ceasefire that followed the battles of Cuito Cuanavale is regarded as a

[Text fades in to next text: ]

[Text fades out.

Directed, filmed and edited by:

Special thanks to:

Roderick van der Westhuizen

Glenn & Andrew Eriksen

Stock Footage Courtesy of MNET