Special Proceedings CASES

1. Tan vs Gedorio

Facts: Upon the death of Gerardo Tan on Oct. 14, 2000, private respondents Rogelo Lim Suga
and Helen Tan Racoma, who were claiming to be the children of the decedent moved for the
appointment of their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo Lim as special administrator. This was opposed
by the petitioner Vilma Tan, Jake Tan and Geraldine Tan, claiming that none of the respondents
can be appointed since they are not residing in the country, that Romualdo does not have the
same competence as Vilma Tan who was already acting as the de facto administratrix of the
estate, and that the nearest of kin, being the legitmate children, is preferred in the choice of
administrator (claiming that the respondent were illegitmate children).

However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court directive to account for the income of the
estate, the court granted Romualdo's appointment as special administrator.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals and was denied, hence the petition for review on
certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court in their selection
of a special administrator.

Ruling: The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers
to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the
appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.

If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference , they should pursue the
appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated the
appointment of a special administrator.

Comment: The court was correct in granting the appointment of Romualdo as special
administrator since it was shown that Vilma was in remiss after failing to follow the series of
directives and extension given to her to account for the estate.

2. Co vs Rosario
Facts: Petitioner Luis Co and Vicente Yu were appointed by the Regional Trial Court of Makati
on March 4, 1998, as special co-administrators of the estate of petitioner's father. However,
upon motion of other heirs, petitioner's appointment was set aside, whereby petitioner nominated
his son, Alvin Co, in his place, which was granted by the court.

Four years later, however, the RTC, upon motion of one the heirs, revoked the appointment of
Alvin in view of the several criminal cases filed against the latter. Petitioner files petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in revoking Alvin Co's appointment as special co-
administratro.

Ruling: The trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Alvin’s
appointment as special co-administrator. Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of
special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular
administrators. Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than
those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion.

The special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control
and who is expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, especially with respect to its
smooth administration and earliest settlement.

Comment: The Court ruled wisely because in such state, Alvin will be too occupied defending
himself from the numerous criminal case file against him to the detriment of his job as special
co-administrator. And also, same with the previous case, the prolonged litigation on the simple
issue of the removal of a special co-administrator could have been avoided if the trial court
promptly appointed a regular administrator.

3. Alan Sheker vs Estate of Alice Sheker

Facts: The will of Alice Sheker was admitted by the court and thereafter all creditors were
ordered to file their respective claims against the estate. On Oct. 7, 2002, a contingent claim for
agent's commission in the total amount of P481,250.00 was filed by petitioner.

However, the executrix of the estate moved for the dismissal of the money claim on the ground
that no docket fee was paid, no certification for non-forum shopping was attached, and no
written explanation was made as to why there was no personal service of the claim. The court
thereon dismissed the claim.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the money claim for failure to pay the docket
fee, attach a cert. of non-forum shoping, and make a personal service.

Ruling: The court erred in strictly applying Sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court because such
calls also for practicabiliy for it to apply other than the absence of special provisions.

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a
decedent is an initiatory pleading.

On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals, that the trial court has
jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a
lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without
payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of
such filing fees within a reasonable time.

on the issue of personal service, as in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not
done personally “might have been superfluous" because the distance from the petitioner's
residence and the respondent court is very far.

Petition granted.

Comment: Yes, in this case the court was too blinded with its sense of duty to follow to the rules
to the letters. The court should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the
requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service, in the interest of substantial
justice. Because in the end, it would be the estate that would benefit upon being given notice of a
money claim against it so it can be inspected and verified.

4. Reyes vs Enriquez

Facts: Petitioners claim to be the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject
parcel of land located in Talisay, Cebu, with Anacleto Cabrera. On the other hand respondents,
claim to be the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as husband and daughter of Anacleto's daughter.

On June 19, 1999, petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann Enriquez, sold 200 sq. m. out of the 1051
sq. m. for P200,000.00 to Spouses Dionisio and Catalina Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), also
their co-respondents in this case. When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the
subject land, they discovered that certain documents prevent them from doing so: (1) Affidavit
by Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating that his share in Lot No. 1851, the subject
property, is approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by Dionisia Reyes dated July 13, 1929
stating that Anacleto only owned ¼ of Lot No. 1851, while 302.55 sq. m. belongs to Dionisia
and the rest of the property is co-owned by Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes and
Maximiano Dico.

Alleging that the documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the respondents filed a complaint for
annulment or nullification of the aforementioned documents and for damages. They likewise
prayed for the "repartition and resubdivision" of the subject property.

The RTC dismissed the case, but upon appeal it was reversed, hence the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to determine their
status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the
affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes.

Ruling: Yes, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made
in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of
property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance. The respondents have yet
to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the
subject property.

The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and defend
an action in court. A real party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof. Such interest, to be considered a real
interest, must be one which is present and substantial, as distinguished from a mere expectancy,
or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.

Comment: This ruling of the court is only proper because if people are allowed to file claims
without verifying first their respective interest, then the whole system will be in shambles.
Because then, courts would try to decide on claims but only to find out later that the claimants do
not really have interest to the claim, wasting the courts time,money, and resources.