A GUIDE TO

Paul Tillich's Dynamics of Faith

INTRODUCTION

You will probably find Paul Tillich's Dynamics of Faith--abbreviatedherein as DF--hard to

understand. His vocabulary and approach tothe subject are unique and unfamiliar to most
readers. His argument isfrequently interrupted by digressions which, although sometimes
interesting,may confuse you because they divert your attention from the progress of
theargument; moreover, you may not find it easy, when you first read the book, todetect these
digressions and to separate non-essential from essential matters.And finally, his argument is
stated quite concisely, with few illustrativeexamples.

You can overcome the first difficulty by carefully reading and thenre-reading the material.
The other difficulties are diminished when thenon-essential elements have been removed from
the text and the remainingmaterial is supplemented with clarifications, elucidations,
expansions, andillustrations, drawn from some of Tillich's other writings.

The following pages attempt both to present the book's essential argument,from which non-
essential digressions have been removed, and also to clarify theargument with other material
from Tillich's works. Not everyone who readsthese pages will agree with this editing of DF,
but it can at least beclaimed for these clarifications that they are all words which Tillich
himselfwrote.

The sections printed in italic type are not from Tillich's writings and areincluded for editorial
clarification; a list of the abbreviations used toidentify Tillich's various works is provided at
the end of this document.

Guide to DF:i.1

(FAITH AS ULTIMATE CONCERN)

In DF Paul Tillich analyzes and examines the nature of"faith", but the book is at the same
time also an analysis andexamination of the nature of "religion". The phrase
"ultimateconcern" is the key to Tillich's analysis, and he explains what it means inDF:i.1.
However, there are several paragraphs, found in some ofTillich's other writings which
provide a useful introduction to this analysisof "faith" as "ultimate concern". Notice that in
theseparagraphs he makes a very important and essential distinction, which you
mustunderstand: he distinguishes between

{1} "historical religion[s]" or "the concrete religions" (bywhich he means such things as
Christianity, Judaism and so on) and

{2} "the religious dimension in man's nature" or "beingreligious" (by which he means an
aspect of the human condition, common toall people everywhere and always, regardless of
their historicaltraditions).

In DF:i.1, Tillich makes this same distinction when he talks aboutthe "content" of one's
ultimate concern as opposed to "the state ofbeing ultimately concerned"; he is also making
this distinction when hedescribes "the subjective and the objective side of the act of faith"
inDF:i.3. The "religious dimension", to which the followingquotation refers, is the principal
subject of DF.

The decisive element in the predicament of Western man in our period is hisloss of the
dimension of depth.... I suggest that we call the dimension ofdepth the religious dimension in
man's nature. Being religious means askingpassionately the question of the meaning of our
existence and being willing toreceive answers, even if the answers hurt. Such an idea makes
religionuniversally human, but it certainly differs from what is usually calledreligion. It does
not describe religion as the belief in the existence of godsor one God, and as a set of activities
and institutions for the sake ofrelating oneself to these beings in thought, devotion and
obedience.[R]eligion in its innermost nature is more than religion in this narrowersense. It is
the state of being concerned about one's own being... [LD:p.28]

There are many people who are ultimately concerned in this way who feel farremoved,
however, from religion in the narrower sense, and therefore from everyhistorical religion. It
often happens that such people take the question ofthe meaning of their life infinitely
seriously and reject any historicalreligion just for this reason. They feel that the concrete
religions fail toexpress their profound concern adequately. They are religious while
rejectingthe religions. It is this experience which forces us to distinguish themeaning of
religion as living in the dimension of depth from particularexpressions of one's ultimate
concern in the symbols and institutions of aconcrete religion. [LD:p.28]

You cannot reject religion with ultimate seriousness, because ultimateseriousness, or the state
of being ultimate concerned, is itself religion.[RD:p.8]

If we abstract the concept of religion from the great commandment, we can saythat religion is
being ultimately concerned about that which is and should beour ultimate concern. This
means that faith is the state of being grasped byan ultimate concern, and God is the name for
the content of the concern. Sucha concept of religion has little in common with the description
of religion asthe belief in the existence of a highest being called God, and the theoreticaland
practical consequences of such a belief. Instead, we are pointing to anexistential, not a
theoretical, understanding of religion. [AR:p.40]

The "great commandment" in the foregoing paragraph refers to StMatthew 22.36-38:

`Master, which is the great commandment in the law?' Jesus said unto him,`Thou shalt love
the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul,and with all thy mind. This is the
first and great commandment.' The word "existential" in that paragraph means something
practical,down-to-earth, and every day, in which "the whole existence of man isinvolved"
(DF:p.34), as opposed to something which is theoretical orspeculative in nature.

A word which appears at the beginning of DF is "spiritual".This is probably the most over-
used and misunderstood word in the religiousvocabulary. Therefore, it is important to notice
that Tillich uses it in avery simple way, which is easy to understand. For him, as you will see
in thenext quotation, "spiritual" refers to all aspects of the human conditionwhich set people
apart from "other living beings", such things as their"cognitive, aesthetic, social, political"
concerns.

Look now at some sentences from the opening paragraphs ofDF:i.1.

Man, like every living being, is concerned about many things, above all aboutthose which
condition his very existence. But man, in contrast to other livingbeings, has spiritual
concerns--cognitive, aesthetic, social, political. Someof them are urgent, often extremely
urgent, and each of them as well as thevital concerns can claim ultimacy for a human life or
the life of a socialgroup. If it claims ultimacy it demands the total surrender of him who
acceptsthis claim, and it promises total fulfillment even if all other claims have tobe subjected
to it or rejected in its name... [DF:i.1]

But it is not only the unconditional demand made by that which is one'sultimate concern, it is
also the promise of ultimate fulfillment whichis accepted in the act of faith...and it is
exclusion from such fulfillmentwhich is threatened if the unconditional demand is not obeyed.
[DF:i.1]

[An] example...is the ultimate concern with "success" and with social standingand economic
power. It is the god of many people in the highly competitiveWestern culture and it does what
every ultimate concern must do: it demandsunconditional surrender to its laws... [DF:i.1]

Tillich returns to the example of "success" later inDF:iii.2:

Success as ultimate concern is not the natural desire of actualizingpotentialities, but is

readiness to sacrifice all other values of life for thesake of a position of power and social
predominance. The anxiety about notbeing a success is an idolatrous form of the anxiety
about divine condemnation.Success is grace; lack of success, ultimate judgment. [DF:iii.2]

In the last sentence Tillich used the word "idolatrous", which, alongwith cognate forms
("idol", "idolatry"), is a very important word in hisvocabulary; it refers to the situation in
which "preliminary, finiterealities are elevated to the rank of ultimacy"; in DF:i.3, he
writesthat "a critical principle was and is at work in man's religiousconsciousness, namely,
that which is really ultimate over against what claimsto be ultimate but is only preliminary,
transitory, finite."

Faith is the state of being ultimately concerned. The content mattersinfinitely for the life of
the believer, but it does not matter for the formaldefinition of faith.... [DF:i.1]

The following paragraphs, taken from another of Tillich's books, furtherexplain what he
means by "ultimate concern".

I have sometimes explained successfully [the general idea of ultimateconcern], to people who
are shocked by the term or not readily able tocomprehend it, as taking something with
ultimate seriousness, unconditionalseriousness. That is a useful translation. It is not as good as
"concern,"but to "take seriously" is a kind of concern. And the term is in some caseseasier
than the word "concern." If people tell you, "I have no ultimateconcern"... then ask them, "Is
there really nothing at all that you take withunconditional seriousness? What, for instance,
would you be ready to suffer oreven die for?" Then you will discover that even the cynic
takes his cynicismwith ultimate seriousness, not to speak of the others, who may be
naturalists,materialists, Communists, or whatever. They certainly take something withultimate
seriousness. [UC:p.7]

We could die for a bad cause--for instance, in Hitler's Germany. This is notnecessarily a
matter of ultimate concern, although it could be for somepersons. We may go to nurse a
contagious illness, or risk death when we fightin a war, or explore countries where there is
great possibility of our notsurviving, and we think the risk is worth it. Such a risk can be
amatter of ultimate concern, but I would say then that it is misplaced ultimateconcern.... But
the question of dying or not dying is very secondary. Thereare many sacrifices much greater
than giving one's life.... I should not haveused the words "life and death" in this sense. I
should have used, as Iusually do, Hamlet's words "To be or not to be," which include much
more.[UC:p.20]

When you find what it is that a person takes so seriously, then and there youcan say, "He is
grasped by it." This means that, as his life has developed,this seriousness was not produced by
active, reflective, voluntary processes,but came to him, perhaps very early, and never left him.
Take the scientist.If he has matured in the scientific tradition, he is willing to give up
everyparticular of his scientific findings (they are all preliminary, never final),but he will
never give up the scientific attitude, even if a tyrant shoulddemand it of him. Or if he were
weak enough to give it up, he would do it witha bad conscience. And every Communist youth
who takes communism seriouslywould be the same. That is how we are grasped. We cannot
produce it, cannotsay, "I will make this or that a matter of my ultimate concern." It hasalready
grasped us when we begin to reflect on it. [UC:p.8]

[I]t sometimes happens that some form of ultimate concern, different from whatwe grew up
in, comes to us from outside. This is the missionary situation, orthe situation we usually call
conversion. And there are less dramatic ways.Suddenly, in a lecture or in a talk with a friend,
something clicks with us;before that it was meaningless. We had heard it before, we perhaps
understoodit to a certain extent, but it failed to click--and then suddenly it does.This is a more
intellectual type of conversion experience, but it can havegreat consequences in the long run.
[UC:p.9]

The word "grasped" is a translation of the German.... It means only that wedid not produce it,
but found it in ourselves. It may have developedgradually, it may sometimes be the result of a
dramatic experience. But itdoes not really occur--and here is my criticism of pietistic
conversionideas--through the establishment of a method for achieving it.... I myselfcannot
speak of this "grasping" as a dramatic event. [UC:p.9]

This formal definition [of faith] is valid for every kind of faith in allreligions and cultures....
In this formal sense of faith as ultimate concern,every human being has faith.... However
unworthy the ultimate concern'sconcrete content may be, no one can stifle such concern
completely. Thisformal concept of faith is basic and universal. It refutes the idea that
worldhistory is the battlefield between faith and un-faith (if it is permissible tocoin this word
in order to avoid the misleading term "unbelief"). There is noun-faith in the sense of
something antithetical to faith, but throughout allhistory and, above all, in the history of
religion, there have been faiths withunworthy contents. [ST-1:pp.130-131]

After reading DF:i.1, people often wonder whether they are themselves"ultimately
concerned"; here are some words in which Tillich addressesthis question.

I would not say that one must necessarily recognize [ultimate concern]. Iwould insist that one
always has something (of which one is often notconscious) that he takes with unconditional
seriousness... [Y]ou may call itGod, or even science, or the mother, or the nation. [UC:p.50]
The concept of religion which makes such a large extension of the meaning ofthe term
possible is the following. Religion is the state of being grasped byan ultimate concern, a
concern which qualifies all other concerns aspreliminary and which itself contains the answer
to the question of the meaningof our life. Therefore this concern is unconditionally serious
and shows awillingness to sacrifice any finite concern which is in conflict with it.
Thepredominant religious name for the content of such a concern is God--a god orgods. In
nontheistic religions divine qualities are ascribed to a sacredobject or an all-pervading power
or a highest principle such as the Brahma orthe One. In the secular quasi-religions the
ultimate concern is directedtowards objects like nation, science, a particular form or stage of
society, ora highest idea of humanity, which are then considered divine. [CW:pp.4-5]

Finally, readers sometimes wonder whether a person can have more than one"ultimate
concern" at the same time; Tillich has this to say about thatpossibility:

Two ultimate concerns cannot exist alongside each other. If they did, the oneor the other or
both would not really be ultimate. Actually, the one comprisesthe other. The ultimate concern
of the believer is concern about that which isreally ultimate and therefore the ground of his
being and meaning. [BR:p.59]

Guide to DF:i.2

(FAITH AS A CENTERED ACT)

In this section Tillich describes faith as a "centered act", by whichhe means an activity of "the
total personality" as opposed to "oneof the functions which constitute the totality of the
personality"; thisdescription also implies that there are certain common and
dangerousmisunderstandings of faith, which are also described in DF:ii.1-3, butare included
here as a part of the argument of DF:i.2.

Faith as ultimate concern is an act of the total personality. It happens inthe center of the
personal life and includes all its elements. Faith is themost centered act of the human mind. It
is not a movement of a special sectionor a special function of man's total being. They all are
united in the act offaith. [DF:i.2]

Our positive description of what faith is implies the rejection ofinterpretations that
dangerously distort the meaning of faith...because thedistortions exercise a tremendous power
over popular thinking and have beenlargely responsible for alienating many from religion
since the beginning ofthe scientific age.... [DF:ii.1]

The different distorted interpretations of the meaning of faith can be tracedto one source.
Faith as being ultimately concerned is a centered act of thewhole personality. If one of the
functions which constitute the totality ofthe personality is partly or completely identified with
faith, the meaning offaith is distorted.... [DF:ii.1]

[F]aith can neither be identified with nor derived from any of the mentalfunctions. Faith
cannot be created by the procedures of the intellect, or bythe endeavors of the will, or by
emotional movements. [ST-3:p.133]

Tillich then describes (DF:ii) the three distortions of "themeaning of faith", which correspond
to the "procedures" of theforegoing paragraph.
{1} the intellectualistic distortion of the meaning of faith: The mostordinary misinterpretation
of faith is to consider it an act of knowledge thathas a low degree of evidence. Something
more or less probable or improbable isaffirmed in spite of the insufficiency of its theoretical
substantiation. Thissituation is very usual in daily life. If this is meant, one is speaking
ofbelief rather than of faith. One believes that one's informationis correct.... [DF:ii.1]

[F]aith is more than trust in even the most sacred authority. It isparticipation in the subject of
one's ultimate concern with one's whole being.Therefore, the term "faith" should not be used
in connection with theoreticalknowledge, whether it is a knowledge on the basis of
immediate, prescientificor scientific evidence, or whether it is on the basis of trust in
authoritieswho themselves are dependent on direct or indirect evidence. [DF:ii.1]

That which Tillich called "subject" in the previous paragraph hesometimes calls "the
objective side of the act of faith" or "thecontent of faith" (e.g. DF:i.3).

Faith does not affirm or deny what belongs to the prescientific or scientificknowledge of our
world, whether we know it by direct experience or through theexperience of others.... Almost
all the struggles between faith and knowledgeare rooted in the wrong understanding of faith
as a type of knowledge which hasa low degree of evidence but is supported by religious
authority....[DF:ii.1]

One of the worst errors of theology and popular religion is to make statementswhich
intentionally or unintentionally contradict the structure of reality.Such an attitude is an
expression not of faith but of the confusion of faithwith belief.... [DF:ii.1]

The certitude of faith is "existential," meaning that the whole existence ofman is involved....
Faith is not belief and it is not knowledge with a lowdegree of probability. Its certitude is not
the uncertain certitude of atheoretical judgment. [DF:ii.1]

{2} the voluntaristic distortion of the meaning of faith: [T]his form ofthe distorted
interpretation of faith emphasize[s] that the lack of evidencewhich faith has must be
complemented by an act of will. This...presupposesthat faith is understood as an act of
knowledge with a limited evidence andthat the lack of evidence is made up by an act of
will...the "will tobelieve".... [S]uch an act of will does not produce faith--faith as
ultimateconcern is already given. [DF:ii.2]

It would be good if philosophers and scientists stopped accusingreligion of what is the most
frequent distortion of religion--theintellectualistic and voluntaristic misconception of faith....
[Even]theologians and, one must add, much ordinary preaching and teaching of thechurch are
responsible for [the distortion]. [BR:p.52]

{3} the emotionalistic distortion of the meaning of faith: Thedifficulty of understanding faith
either as a matter of the intellect or as amatter of will, or of both in mutual support, has led to
the interpretation offaith as emotion.... [DF:ii.3]

Certainly faith as an act of the whole personality has strong emotionalelements within it.
Emotion always expresses the involvement of the wholepersonality. [DF:ii.3]

[But i]f religion is mere feeling it is innocuous. The old conflicts betweenreligion and culture
are finished. Culture goes its way, directed byscientific knowledge, and religion is the private
affair of every individualand a mere mirror of his emotional life. No claims for truth can be
made byit. No competition with science, history, psychology, politics is possible.Religion, put
safely into the corner of feelings, has lost its danger for man'scultural activities.... [DF:ii.3]

Faith as the state of ultimate concern claims the whole man and cannot berestricted to the
subjectivity of mere feeling. It claims truth for its concernand commitment to it. [DF:ii.3]

The following paragraph summarizes what this analysis of DF:i.2, hasattempted to clarify.

Faith...is an act of the whole personality. Will, knowledge, and emotionparticipate in it. It is
an act of self-surrender, of obedience, of assent.Each of these elements must be present.
Emotional surrender without assent andobedience would by-pass the personal center. It would
be a compulsion and nota decision. Intellectual assent without emotional participation
distortsreligious existence into a nonpersonal, cognitive act. Obedience of the willwithout
assent and emotion leads into a depersonalizing slavery. Faith unitesand transcends the special
functions of the human mind; it is the most personalact of the person. But each function of the
human mind is inclined to a kind ofimperialism. It tries to become independent and to control
the others. Evenbiblical religion is not without symptoms of these trends. Faith
sometimesapproaches the point of emotional ecstasy, sometimes the point of mere
moralobedience, sometimes the point of cognitive subjection to an authority.[BR:p.53]

Guide to DF:i.3

(THE SOURCE OF FAITH)

Tillich next examines what makes it possible for people to be"ultimately concerned". A short
passage from ST sets out whatwill be explored in this part of DF.

In a short formula, one can say that faith is the state of beinggrasped by an ultimate concern.
The term "ultimate concern" unites asubjective and an objective meaning: somebody is
concerned about something heconsiders of concern. In this formal sense of faith as ultimate
concern, everyhuman being has faith. [ST-3:p.130]

The question now arises: what is the source of this all-embracing andall-transcending
concern? The word "concern" points to two sides of arelationship, the relation between the
one who is concerned and his concern. Inboth respects we have to imagine man's situation in
itself and in his world.The reality of man's ultimate concern reveals something about his
being,namely, that he is able to transcend the flux of relative and transitoryexperiences of his
ordinary life. Man's experiences, feelings, thoughtsare conditioned and finite. They not only
come and go, but their content is offinite and conditional concern--unless they are elevated to
unconditionalvalidity. But this presupposes the general possibility of doing so; itpresupposes
the element of infinity in man. Man is able to understand in animmediate personal and central
act the meaning of the ultimate, theunconditional, the absolute, the infinite. This alone makes
faith a humanpotentiality. [DF:i.3]

Man is driven toward faith by his awareness of the infinite to which hebelongs, but which he
does not own like a possession.... [DF:i.3]

It would not help at this point of our analysis to call that which is meant inthe act of faith
"God" or "a god." For at this step we ask: What in the ideaof God constitutes divinity? The
answer is: It is the element of theunconditional and of ultimacy.... If this is seen, one can
understand whyalmost everything "in heaven and on earth" has received ultimacy in the
historyof human religion. But we also can understand that a critical principle was andis at
work in man's religious consciousness, namely, that which is reallyultimate over against what
claims to be ultimate but is only preliminary,transitory, finite. [DF:i.3]

In the foregoing paragraph Tillich again refers to what he usually calls"idolatry" (see Guide
to DF:i.1); an "idol" is somethingwhich "claims to be ultimate but is only preliminary,
transitory,finite".

The term "ultimate concern" unites the subjective and the objective side ofthe act of faith--the
fides qua creditur (the faith through which onebelieves) and the fides quae creditur (the faith
which is believed)....There is no faith without a content toward which it is directed.... And
thereis no way of having the content of faith except in the act of faith. Allspeaking about
divine matters which is not done in the state of ultimateconcern is meaningless. Because that
which is meant in the act of faith cannotbe approached in any other way than through an act
of faith. [DF:i.3]

In terms like ultimate, unconditional, infinite, absolute, the differencebetween subjectivity and
objectivity is overcome.... This character of faithgives an additional criterion for
distinguishing true and false ultimacy. Thefinite which claims infinity without having it (as,
e.g., a nation or success)is not able to transcend the subject-object scheme. The more
idolatrous afaith the less it is able to overcome the cleavage between subject and
object.[DF:i.3]

Only to a very limited degree is it possible to know that a particular"content" of "ultimate

concern" is "idolatrous".

[This] can easily be proved negatively--by demonstrating...what afinite concern is. These
concerns cannot be ultimate because they aretransitory in their very character, and not merely
quantitatively transitorybut also qualitatively, in meaning and in their systems of value.... Can
onerecognize [idolatry] when he finds it? Does the individual know when he hasfound it?
Often not. Otherwise idolatry perhaps would not occur. Butjudgment of idolatry is the
function of the prophet and the mystic.... Theyhave to show to us where it is that we have
gone astray into idolatry by givingto our concern, even if we call it God, qualities that make it
finite. (Thisis what happened when God was "brought down" to become a particular friend
ofIsrael; and then the prophets severed that relationship and restored theunconditional nature
of Old Testament religion.) [UC:pp.50-51]

By "the subject-object scheme" or "the cleavage between subjectand object" Tillich means:

...the gap [which] lies between the knowing subject and the object to be knownand between
the expressing subject and the object to be expressed...the gaplies between the existing human
subject and the object for which he strives--astate of essential humanity.... [ST-3:p.68]

For that is the difference between true and idolatrous faith. In truefaith the ultimate concern is
a concern about the truly ultimate; while inidolatrous faith preliminary, finite realities are
elevated to the rank ofultimacy. The inescapable consequence of idolatrous faith is
"existentialdisappointment," a disappointment which penetrates into the very existence
ofman! This is the dynamics of idolatrous faith: that it is faith, and as such,the centered act of
a personality; that the centering point is something whichis more or less on the periphery; and
that, therefore, the act of faith leadsto a loss of the center and to a disruption of the
personality.... [DF:i.3]

In the following citation Tillich illustrates this "disruption ofthe personality".

Nothing which by its very nature is finite can rightly become a matter ofultimate concern....
Many boys are ruined because they make their mother their"ultimate concern." The mother
cannot help but be a very high symbol ofconcern, but the moment she is made a matter of
ultimate concern--or deified(it is usually unconscious, of course)--the consequences are
alwaysdestructive. For if we make a finite reality into a god, we enter the realm ofidolatry.
Instead of speaking of wrong ultimate concern I might use the wordidolatry, which is the
elevation of something finite into ultimacy. Theconsequence is always destructive, because
this finite then destroys otherfinites. The deification of the mother, for example, prevents the
boy fromhaving a normal, open personal relationship to other women. And the effects ofthis
can be seen in any educational institution...where some boys have to besent to a
psychoanalyst. [UC:pp.24-25]

Another example is the relationship between nations. If a nation makes itselfabsolute, then
necessarily, although it is only a particular reality, in thename of its absolute claim it is
compelled to overcome all other nations.Instead of trying to communicate with them, it tries
to destroy them, becauseit makes itself absolute. Much imperialistic development can be
traced to this.[UC:p.25]

It may be helpful, as a concluding comment on the material discussedin this section, to quote
again part of a passage from ST, some of whichyou have already read:

This formal concept of faith is basic and universal. It refutes the idea thatworld history is the
battlefield between faith and un-faith (if it ispermissible to coin this word in order to avoid the
misleading term"unbelief"). There is no un-faith in the sense of something antithetical tofaith,
but throughout all history and, above all, in the history of religion,there have been faiths with
unworthy contents. They invest somethingpreliminary, finite, and conditioned with the dignity
of the ultimate,infinite, and unconditional. The continuing struggle through all history
iswaged between a faith directed to ultimate reality and a faith directed towardpreliminary
realities claiming ultimacy. [ST-3:pp.130-131]

Guide to DF:i.4

(FAITH AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE HOLY)

In this section Tillich describes what is indicated by the word"holy", which occurs frequently
in discussions of religion.

Where there is faith there is an awareness of holiness.... What concerns oneultimately

becomes holy. The awareness of the holy is awareness of thepresence of the divine, namely of
the content of our ultimate concern.... Itis a presence which remains mysterious in spite of its
appearance, and itexercises both an attractive and a repulsive function on those who
encounterit...the fascinating and the shaking character of the holy.... The reason forthese two
effects of the holy is obvious if we see the relation of theexperience of the holy to the
experience of ultimate concern. The human heartseeks the infinite because that is where the
finite wants to rest. In theinfinite it sees its own fulfillment. This is the reason for the
ecstaticattraction and fascination of everything in which ultimacy is manifest. On theother
hand, if ultimacy is manifest and exercises its fascinating attraction,one realizes at the same
time the infinite distance of the finite from theinfinite and, consequently, the negative
judgment over any finite attempts toreach the infinite.... [DF:i.4]

Originally, the holy has meant what is apart from the ordinary realm of thingsand
experiences.... [DF:i.4]

The mysterious character of the holy produces an ambiguity in man's ways ofexperiencing it.
The holy can appear as creative and as destructive.... Thisambiguity, of which we still find
traces in the Old Testament, is reflected inthe ritual or quasi-ritual activities of religions and
quasi-religions(sacrifices of others or one's own bodily or mental self) which are
stronglyambiguous. One can call this ambiguity divine-demonic, whereby divine
ischaracterized by the victory of the creative over the destructive possibilityof the holy, and
the demonic is characterized by the victory of the destructiveover the creative possibility of
the holy.... [DF:i.4]

The holy which is demonic, or ultimately destructive, is identical with thecontent of idolatrous
faith. Idolatrous faith is still faith. The holy whichis demonic is still holy.... [T]he danger of
faith is idolatry and theambiguity of the holy is its demonic possibility. Our ultimate concern
candestroy us as it can heal us. But we never can be without it. [DF:i.4]

But "the holy" does not appear in the abstract.

There is no type of religion which does not personify the holy which isencountered by man in
his religious experience. In every religion theexperience of the holy is mediated by some
piece of finite reality. Everythingcan become a medium of revelation, a bearer of divine
power. "Everything" notonly includes all things in nature and culture...and history; it also
includesprinciples, categories, essences, and values. Through stars and stones, treesand
animals, growth and catastrophe; through tools and houses, sculpture andmelody, poems and
prose, laws and customs; through parts of the body andfunctions of the mind, family relations
and voluntary communities, historicalleaders and national elevation; through time and space,
being and non-being,ideals and virtues, the holy can encounter us. Everything that is, really
orideally, has become a medium of the divine mystery sometime in the course ofthe history of
religion. But, in the moment in which something took on thisrole, it also received a personal
face. Even tools and stones and categoriesbecame personal in the religious encounter, the
encounter with the holy.Persona, like the Greek prosopon, points to the individual and atthe
same time universally meaningful character of the actor on the stage.[BR:pp.22-23] (see
Guide to DF:iii.1, below)

Guide to DF:i.5

(FAITH AND DOUBT)

Tillich's discussion in DF acknowledges and then analyzes theuncertainty and anxiety which
always accompany, in way or another, the humanconfrontation with the infinite.

An act of faith is an act of a finite being who is grasped by and turned tothe infinite. It is a
finite act with all the limitations of a finite act andit is an act in which the infinite participates
beyond the limitations of afinite act. Faith is certain in so far as it is an experience of the
holy.But faith is uncertain in so far as the infinite to which it is related isreceived by a finite
being. This element of uncertainty in faith cannot beremoved, it must be accepted. And the
element in faith which accepts this iscourage. [DF:i.5]

Courage is self-affirmation "in-spite-of," that is in spite of that whichtends to prevent the self
from affirming itself. [CB:p.32]

[Man's] being is contingent; by itself it has no necessity, and therefore manrealizes that he is
the prey of nonbeing. The same contingency which hasthrown man into existence may push
him out of it.... The fact that man iscausally determined makes his being contingent with
respect to himself. Theanxiety in which he is aware of his situation is anxiety about the lack
ofnecessity of his being. He might not be! Then why is he? And why should hecontinue to be?
There is no reasonable answer. [ST-3:p.196]

Courage accepts...contingency. The man who possesses this courage does notlook beyond
himself to that from which he comes, but he rests in himself.Courage ignores the causal
dependence of everything finite. Without thiscourage no life would be possible.... [ST-
1:p.197]

Courage as an element of faith is [this] daring self-affirmation of one's ownbeing in spite of

the powers of "nonbeing" which are the heritage of everythingfinite. Where there is daring
and courage there is the possibility offailure.... Only certain is the ultimacy as ultimacy, the
infinite passion asinfinite passion.... [T]here is not certainty...about the content of ourultimate
concern.... The risk...in one's ultimate concern is indeed thegreatest risk man can run. For if it
proves to be a failure, the meaning ofone's life breaks down; one surrenders oneself, including
truth and justice, tosomething which is not worth it.... Then faith is a failure in its
concreteexpression, though it is not a failure in the experience of the unconditionalitself. A
god disappears; divinity remains.... This risk cannot be taken awayfrom any act of faith. There
is only one point which is a matter not of riskbut of immediate certainty and herein lies the
greatness and the pain of beinghuman, namely, one's standing between one's finitude and
one's potentialinfinity. [DF:i.5]

Faith includes an element of immediate awareness which gives certainty and anelement of
uncertainty. To accept this is courage.... [DF:i.5]

If faith is understood as belief that something is true, doubt is incompatiblewith the act of
faith. If faith is understood as being ultimately concerned,doubt is a necessary element in it....
[DF:i.5]

Read again the "intellectualistic distortion" of the meaning offaith" in Guide to DF:i.2, where
Tillich discussed the confusion of"faith" with "belief".

The doubt which is implicit in faith is not a doubt about facts orconclusions...[not the] doubt
which is the lifeblood of scientificresearch...methodological doubt.... [DF:i.5]

[It is also not] skeptical doubt[, which] is an attitude toward all thebeliefs of man, from sense
experiences to religious creeds...more an attitudethan an assertion...an attitude of actually
rejecting any certainty.... Theskeptic, so long as he is a serious skeptic, is not without faith,
even thoughit has no concrete content.... [DF:i.5]
The doubt which is implicit in every act of faith is...existential doubt....It does not question
whether a special proposition is true or false. It doesnot reject every concrete truth, but it is
aware of the element of insecurityin every existential truth.... [It] is not a permanent
experience within theact of faith. But it is always present as an element in the structure
offaith.... Existential doubt and faith are poles of the same reality, the stateof ultimate
concern. [DF:i.5]

Many...feel anxiety, guilt and despair about what they call "loss of faith."But serious doubt is
confirmation of faith. It indicates the seriousness ofthe concern, its unconditional character....
The criterion according to whichthey should judge themselves is the seriousness and ultimacy
of their concernabout the content of both their faith and their doubt. [DF:i.5]

[T]he risk of faith is an existential risk, a risk in which the meaning andfulfillment of our lives
is at stake, and not a theoretical judgment which maybe refuted sooner or later. [TT:p.28]

For the meaning of "existential" in Tillich, read again the openingparagraphs of Guide to
DF:i.1.

This quotation from another of Tillich's books will serve as a summary ofthis part of DF.

Faith and doubt do not essentially contradict each other. Faith is thecontinuous tension
between itself and the doubt within itself. This tensiondoes not always reach the strength of a
struggle; but, latently, it is alwayspresent. This distinguishes faith from logical evidence,
scientificprobability, traditionalistic self-certainty, and unquestioningauthoritarianism. Faith
includes both an immediate awareness of somethingunconditional and the courage to take the
risk of uncertainty upon itself.Faith says "Yes" in spite of the anxiety of "No." It does not
remove the "No"of doubt and the anxiety of doubt; it does not build a castle of doubt-
freesecurity--only a neurotically distorted faith does that--but it takes the "No"of doubt and
the anxiety of insecurity into itself. Faith embraces itself andthe doubt about itself.... Such a
faith does not need to be afraid of the freesearch for ultimate reality. [BR:p.61]

Guide to DF:i.6

(FAITH AND COMMUNITY)

The relation between an individual and the rest of society cannot long beignored in any
analysis of the nature of "religion" or "faith".Can one be religious in isolation from every
specific
"community of faith"?Does not such a community (e.g. a church)--with the implication of
orthodoxy,religious suppression, restriction--always in the long run compromise
one'sfreedom? Tillich deals briefly with these problems in this section ofDF.

(It is important here to recall the meaning of "spiritual" inDF: the word refers to all aspects of
the human condition which setpeople apart from "other living beings", such things as
their"cognitive, aesthetic, social, political" concerns.)

The answers to these often rather passionately asked questions are many-sidedand involved.
At the present point the obvious and yet significant assertionmust be made that the act of
faith, like every act in man's spiritual life, isdependent on language and therefore on
community. For only in the community ofspiritual beings is language alive. Without language
there is no act of faith,no religious experience! This refers to language generally and to the
speciallanguage in every function of man's spiritual life. The religious language,the language
of symbol and myth, is created in the community of the believersand cannot be fully
understood outside this community. But within it, thereligious language enables the act of
faith to have a concrete content. Faithneeds its language, as does every act of the personality;
without language itwould be blind, not directed toward a content, not conscious of itself.
Thisis the reason for the predominant significance of the community of faith. Onlyas a
member of such a community (even if in isolation or expulsion) can manhave a content for his
ultimate concern. Only in a community of language canman actualize his faith.... [DF:i.6]

Later in DF Tillich returns briefly to this subject in DF:v.1,when he defines "revelation":

Revelation is first of all the experience in which an ultimate concern graspsthe human mind
and creates a community in which this concern expresses itselfin symbols of action,
imagination and thought.... This is what revelationmeans, or should mean. It is an event in
which the ultimate becomes manifestin an ultimate concern, shaking and transforming the
given situation inreligion and culture. [DF:v.1] (see DF.iii)

Guide to DF:ii

The material in this chapter (WHAT FAITH IS NOT) is found inGuide to DF:i.2.

Guide to DF:iii.1

(THE MEANING OF SYMBOL)

Here Tillich describes the only way in which "ultimate concern" canbe represented: by
"symbols". Therefore, people always use the languageof symbols whenever they discuss
religious matters. He begins by assertingthat the use of "symbols" is an essential element in
religion; a shortcitation from another of his works helps to make clear why this is the case.

Man's ultimate concern must be expressed symbolically, because symboliclanguage alone is

able to express the ultimate.... [DF:iii.1]

Religious symbols are distinguished from others by the fact that they are arepresentation of
that which is unconditionally beyond the conceptual sphere;they point to the ultimate reality
implied in the religious act, to whatconcerns us ultimately.... They must express an object that
by its very naturetranscends everything in the world that is split into subjectivity
andobjectivity. A [religious] symbol points to an object which never can becomean object.
Religious symbols represent the transcendent but do not make thetranscendent immanent.
They do not make God a part of the empirical world.[RS:p.303] (see again DF:i.3; see also
DF:iii.2, below)

Next Tillich lists five characteristics of "symbols".

In order to understand religious symbols we must first understand the natureof symbols
generally. And this is a difficult task, because the term symbolis...applied to things which
should not be called symbols at all [but]signs.... [MJ:p.3]
(Sometimes Tillich uses the phrase "representative symbols" todistinguish between "religious
symbols" and those "symbols which areonly signs...such as mathematical and logical
symbols, which one could calldiscursive symbols" [MJ:p.3]. Notice the important
distinctionbetween "signs" and "symbols", which is made as a part of hisdescription of the
first characteristic.)

{1} first characteristic: First and most fundamental is the character ofall symbols to point
beyond themselves. Symbols use "symbolic material": theordinary meaning of a word, the
empirical reality of a historical figure, thetraits of a human face (in a painting), a human
catastrophe (in a drama). Butthis symbolic material is not meant in its proper and ordinary
meaning. Whenit is used as symbolic material, it points to something which cannot be
graspeddirectly but must be expressed indirectly, namely through the symbolicmaterial.
[MJ:p.4]

[This] characteristic of the symbol is its perceptibility. This implies thatsomething which is
intrinsically invisible, ideal, or transcendent is madeperceptible in the symbol and is in this
way given objectivity. [RS:p.301]

Symbols have one characteristic in common with signs; they point beyondthemselves to
something else. The red sign at the street corner points to theorder to stop the movements of
cars at certain intervals. A red light and thestopping of cars have essentially no relation to
each other, but conventionallythey are united as long as the convention lasts.... Decisive is the
fact thatsigns do not participate in the reality of that to which they point, whilesymbols do.
Therefore, signs can be replaced for reasons of expediency orconvention, while symbols
cannot. [DF:iii.1]

{2} second characteristic: The second characteristic of allrepresentative symbols is to

participate in the reality of that which theyrepresent. The concept of representation itself
implies this relation. Therepresentative of a person or an institution participates in the honor
of thosewhom he is asked to represent; but it is not he who is honored, it isthat which or he
whom he represents. [MJ:p.4]

[The symbol] participates in that to which it points: the flag participates inthe power and
dignity of the nation for which it stands.... An attack on theflag is felt as an attach on the
majesty of the group in which it isacknowledged. Such an attack is considered blasphemy.
[DF:iii.1]

{3} third characteristic: The third characteristic of a symbol is thatit opens up levels of reality
which otherwise are closed for us...whichotherwise would remain unapproachable....
[DF:iii.1]

Every symbol opens up a level of reality for which nonsymbolic speaking isinadequate. Let us
interpret this, or explain this, in terms of artisticsymbols. The more we try to enter into the
meaning of symbols, the more webecome aware that it is a function of art to open up levels of
reality; inpoetry, in visual art, and in music, levels of reality are opened up which canbe
opened up in no other way. Now if this is the function of art, thencertainly artistic creations
have symbolic character. You can take that whicha landscape of Rubens, for instance,
mediates to you. You cannot have thisexperience in any other way than through this painting
made by Rubens. Thislandscape has some heroic character; it has character of balance, of
colors, ofweights, of values, and so on. All this is very essential. What this mediatesto you
cannot be expressed in any other way than through the painting itself.The same is true also in
the relationship of poetry.... [NR:pp.56-57]

This example may show what is meant by the phrase "opening up of levels ofreality." But in
order to do this, something else must be openedup--namely...levels of our interior reality. And
they must correspond to thelevels in exterior reality which are opened up by a symbol. So
every symbol istwo edged. It opens up reality and it opens up the soul. [NR:p.57]

{4} fourth characteristic: [So the] symbol's fourth characteristic [isthat it] also unlocks
dimensions and elements of our soul which correspond tothe dimensions and elements of
reality. A great play gives us not only a newvision of the human scene, but it opens up hidden
depths of our own being.Thus we are able to receive what the play reveals to us in reality.
There arewithin us dimensions of which we cannot become aware except through
symbols....[DF:iii.1]

Artistic symbols...open up the human spirit for the dimension of aestheticexperience and they
open up reality to the dimension of its intrinsic meaning.Religious symbols mediate ultimate
reality through things, person, events whichbecause of their mediating functions receive the
quality of "holy." (seeagain DF:i.4) In the experience of holy places, times, books,words,
images, and acts, symbols of the holy reveal something of the"Holy-Itself" and produce the
experience of holiness in persons and groups. Nophilosophical concept can do the same thing,
and theological concepts aremerely conceptualizations of original religious symbols. [MJ:p.5]

{5} fifth characteristic: Symbols cannot be produced intentionally....[DF:iii.1]

[A symbol] cannot be created at will. It is not a matter of expediency andconvention, as signs

are.... Even if individual creativity is the mediumthrough which it comes into existence (the
individual artist, the individualprophet), it is the unconscious-conscious reaction of a group
through which itbecomes a symbol. No representative symbol is created and maintained
withoutacceptance by a group. [MJ:p.4]

{6} sixth characteristic: The sixth and last characteristic of thesymbol is a consequence of the
fact that symbols cannot be invented. Likeliving beings, they grow and they die. They grow
when the situation is ripefor them, and they die when the situation changes.... They die
because theycan no longer produce responses in the group where they originally
foundexpression. [DF:iii.1]

Therefore, one can metaphorically say that a symbol is born and may die.[MJ:p.4]

Symbols have...creative or destructive effects[s] on social groups. Symbolsare the main power
of integrating them: a king, an event, a document in thepolitical realm of representative
symbolism, an epic work, architecturalsymbols, a holy figure, a holy book, a holy rite in
religion. But here alsoare disintegration possibilities...causing restlessness, producing
depression,anxiety, fanaticism, etc. This depend partly on the character of that to whichthey
point, partly on the reaction of those who are grasped by them. [MJ:p.5]

Guide to DF:iii.2

(RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS)
In this section Tillich discusses "God"; this word is the principalreligious "symbol". It is
important to remember that Tillich hasalready stated that "God" is--that is to say stands for--
the"religious name for the content of [ultimate] concern".

We have discussed the meaning of symbols generally because, as we said,man's ultimate

concern must be expressed symbolically! [DF:iii.2]

That which is the true ultimate transcends the realm of finite realityinfinitely. Therefore, no
finite reality can express it directly and properly.Religiously speaking, God transcends his
own name. This is why the use of hisname becomes an abuse or a blasphemy. Whatever we
say about that whichconcerns us ultimately, whether or not we call it God, has a symbolic
meaning.It points beyond itself while participating in that to which it points. In noother way
can faith express itself adequately. The language of faith is thelanguage of symbols.... When
saying this I always expect the question: Only asymbol? He who asks this question shows that
he has not understood thedifference between signs and symbols nor the power of symbolic
language, whichsurpasses in quality and strength the power of any nonsymbolic language.
Oneshould never say "only a symbol," but one should say "not less than a symbol."[DF:iii.2]

The fundamental symbol of our ultimate concern is God.... Where there isultimate concern
God can be denied only in the name of God.... Ultimateconcern cannot deny its own character
as ultimate. Therefore, it affirms whatis meant by the word "God." Atheism, consequently,
can only mean the attemptto remove any ultimate concern--to remain unconcerned about the
meaning ofone's existence. Indifference toward the ultimate question is the onlyimaginable
form of atheism.... In any case, he who denies God as a matter ofultimate concern affirms
God, because he affirms ultimacy in his concern. Godis the fundamental symbol for what
concerns us ultimately.... God is symbolfor God. This means that in the notion of God we
must distinguish twoelements: the element of ultimacy, which is a matter of immediate
experienceand not symbolic in itself, and the element of concreteness, which is takenfrom our
ordinary experience and symbolically applied to God. [DF:iii.2]

The second "God"--in the sentence "God is symbol for God"--issometimes called by Tillich
the "God beyond God" and at other times the"God above the God of theism". In these last two
phrase the elements"beyond God" and "the God of theism" mean God as necessarilylimited
by man's finite conceptions. (see UC:p.51) In another workTillich deals with the same subject;
here is an excerpt, which may help toclarify his analysis in DF.

[D]ivine beings and the Supreme being, God, are representations of that whichis ultimately
referred to in the religious act. They are representations, forthe unconditioned transcendent
surpasses every possible conception of a being,including even the conception of a Supreme
Being. Insofar as any such being isassumed as existent, it is again annihilated in the religious
act. In thisannihilation, in this atheism immanent in the religious act, the profoundestaspect of
the religious act is manifest. Wherever this aspect is lost sightof, there results an
objectification of the Unconditioned (which is in essenceopposed to objectification), a result
which is destructive of the religious aswell as of the cultural life. Thus God is made into a
"thing" that is not areal thing but a contradiction in terms and an absurdity; demanding belief
insuch a thing is demanding a religious "work," a sacrifice, an act ofasceticism, and the self-
destruction of the human mind. It is the religiousfunction of atheism ever to remind us that the
religious act has to do with theunconditioned transcendent, and that the representations of the
Unconditionedare not objects concerning whose existence or nonexistence a discussion
wouldbe possible. [RS:pp.314-315]
[T]he word "God" involves a double meaning: it connotes the unconditionedtranscendent, the
ultimate, and also an object somehow endowed with qualitiesand actions. The first is not
figurative or symbolic, but is rather in thestrict sense what it is said to be. The second,
however is really symbolic,figurative. It is the second that is the object envisaged by the
religiousconsciousness. The idea of a Supreme Being possessing certain definitequalities is
present in the consciousness. But the religious consciousness isalso aware of the fact that
when the word "God" is heard, this idea isfigurative, that it does not signify an object, that is,
it must betranscendent. The word "God" produces a contradiction in the consciousness,
itinvolves something figurative that is present in the consciousness andsomething not
figurative that we really have in mind and that is represented bythe idea. In the word "God" is
contained at the same time that which actuallyfunctions as a representation and also the idea
that it is only arepresentation. It has the peculiarity of transcending its own conceptualcontent-
-upon this depends the numinous character that the word has in scienceand in life in spite of
every misuse through false objectification. God as anobject is a representation of the reality
ultimately referred to in thereligious act but in the word "God" this objectivity is negated and
at the sametime its representative character is asserted. [RS:p.315]

Here is the continuation of Tillich's argument in DF.

It is obvious that such an understanding of the meaning of God makes thediscussions about
the existence or nonexistence of God meaningless. It ismeaningless to question the ultimacy
of an ultimate concern.... If "existence"refers to something which can be found within the
whole of reality, no divinebeing exists.... [DF:iii.2]

God is the basic symbol of faith, but not the only one. All the qualities weattribute to him,
power, love, justice, are taken from finite experiences andapplied symbolically to that which
is beyond finitude and infinity....[DF:iii.2]

Holy things are not holy in themselves, but they point beyond themselves tothe source of all
holiness, that which is of ultimate concern. [DF:iii.2]

Guide to DF:iii.3

(SYMBOLS AND MYTHS)

Tillich closes this chapter with a discussion of "myths" (which, forChristians, are found in the
Bible).

[There are] mythical elements in stories and symbols of the Bible, bothof the Old and the New
Testaments--stories like those of the Paradise, of thefall of Adam, of the great Flood, of the
Exodus from Egypt, of the virgin birthof the Messiah, of many of his miracles, of his
resurrection and ascension, ofhis expected return as the judge of the universe. In short, all the
stories inwhich divine-human interactions are told are considered as mythological
incharacter.... [DF:iii.3]

In the following material `God' could be substituted for `gods' (cf.DF:iii.2).

The symbols of faith do not appear in isolation. They are united in "storiesof the gods," which
is the meaning of the Greek word "mythos"--myth. The godsare individualized figures,
analogous to human personalities ... producingworld and man, acting in time and space. They
participate in human greatnessand misery, in creative and destructive works. They give to
man cultural andreligious traditions, and defend these sacred rites. They help and threatenthe
human race, especially some families, tribes or nations. They appear inepiphanies and
incarnations, establish sacred places, rites and persons, andthus create a cult. [DF:iii.3]

Even one God is an object of mythological language, and if spoken about isdrawn into the
framework of time and space. Even he loses his ultimacy if madeto be the content of concrete
concerns. [DF:iii.3]

[Myth] uses material from our ordinary experience. It puts the stories of thegods into the
framework of time and space although it belongs to the nature ofthe ultimate to be beyond
time and space. [DF:iii.3]

Tillich then raises the matter of "demythologization", by which hemeans a kind of criticism of
myths, though some other writers mean somethingdifferent by the term; specifically he means
"the necessity of recognizinga symbol as a symbol and a myth as a myth" [DF:iii.3].

A myth which is understood as a myth, but not removed or replaced, can becalled a "broken
myth."... [DF:iii.3]

Literalism deprives God of his ultimacy and, religiously speaking, of hismajesty. It draws him
down to the level of that which is not ultimate, thefinite and conditional.... Faith, if it takes its
symbols literally, becomesidolatrous! It calls something ultimate which is less than
ultimate....[DF:iii.3]

Finally, these words of Tillich can serve as a summary for this section ofthe analysis:

One can replace one myth by another, but one cannot remove the myth from man'sspiritual
life. For the myth is the combination of symbols of our ultimateconcern. [DF:iii.3]

(In reference to the use of "spiritual" just above, remind yourselfof Tillich's meaning for it as
set out in the Guide to DF:i.1.)

Tillich also deals with the subject of "myths" in another work, inwhich he joins the notion of
myth as an aspect of religion to the appearance ofmythical phenomena in science; here are
some quotations from that work, whichmay be helpful in understanding DF:iii.3 and also in
perceiving there-appearance of "myth" in other realms than those which are
usuallyconsidered to be "religion". (If the following quotations fromRS do not help you to
understand DF:iii.3, then disregardthem.)

The myth is...a definite form of the cultural interpretation of existence andthus...it is viewed
as an objective creation.... The myth is classified alongwith the other cultural spheres that are
also manifested in symbols, such aslanguage, philosophy, art, etc. The subject matter of myth
is therefore not tobe considered as in any special way symbolic. It has a symbolic element
incommon with all cultural creations, for a cultural life exists only insymbols.... [RS:p.308]

[M]ythology is in its essence a cultural creation like science, art,law...[and] it has its own
proper and necessary place in the meaningfulstructure of cultural life. [RS:p.309]
Unconditioned transcendence as such is not perceptible. If it is to beperceived--and it must be
so in religion--it can be done only in mythicalconceptions. [RS:p.310]

The objects of mythical intuition are at the same time the objects ofscientific and
philosophical investigation. With the appearance of science [theobjects of mythical intuition]
enter as such into a new dialectic. Therebegins a transformation of the objects of mythical
intuition into objects ofmere empirical experience. A separate objective world arises and
confronts therational, perceiving subject. As a result, the subjective factor which isadapted to
all immediately mythical data--the inner living connection of theconsciousness with
everything existing and with the inwardness of everythingreal--disappears or is repressed.
Insofar as science thus builds up its ownworld of objects, it repels the myth. But, for the
purpose of constructingthis world of "things," science needs concepts that are transcendent
toreality. In this way science comes into a new mythical situation and itselfbecomes myth-
creative; thus, concepts like evolution, will to power, life, etc.have a mythical character. They
no longer serve only for the construction ofthe empirical order, but rather indicate the
transcendent presuppositions ofthis order. But since the element of the Unconditional is firmly
implanted ineach of the presuppositions, and since the presupposition of
allthinking...signifies...the limits...of objectification, there comes intoscience an element of the
religious, mythical mentality. Hence it is possiblefor the ultimate presuppositions of science
to be classed with the highestconcepts of abstract mysticism or of abstract monotheism. In this
way therearises an abstract myth that is no less a myth than a concrete one, even if itis broken
in its immediacy.... And from this fact it derives both its doubtfulcharacter as a science and its
religious power. [RS:pp.310-311]

Guide to DF:iv.1

(ELEMENTS OF FAITH AND THEIR DYNAMICS)

In this chapter Tillich analyzes two aspects of religious experience: thesense of the presence
of the "ultimate" and the sense of separation fromthe "ultimate".

[O]ne can distinguish two main elements in every experience of theholy:

* the first element, the presence of the holy here and now...the holiness ofbeing;

* the second element, the holy is the judgment over everything that is...theholiness of
what ought to be.

In an abbreviated way one could call:

* the first form of faith its ontological type, and

* the second form its moral type....

They are omnipresent in every act of faith, But one of them is alwayspredominant.

Guide to DF:iv.2

(ONTOLOGICAL TYPES OF FAITH)

In DF:iv.2 Tillich discusses the first or "ontologicaltype".

The holy is first of all experienced as present. It is here and now, and thismeans it encounters
us in a thing, in a person, in an event.... Such a pieceof reality has, as the traditional word
says, "sacramental" character....Faith experiences the presence of the holy.... [DF:iv.2]

Guide to DF:iv.3

(MORAL TYPES OF FAITH)

In DF:iv.3 Tillich discusses the second or "moral type".

The moral types of faith are characterized by the idea of the law. God is theGod who has
given the law as a gift and as a command. He can be approachedonly by those who obey the
law. [DF:iv.3]

Guide to DF:iv.4

(THE UNITY OF THE TYPES OF FAITH)

In DF:iv.4 Tillich shows the essential identity of the twotypes.

[T]here are always elements of the one type within the other.... In thesacramental
(ontological) type of faith the ritual law is omnipresent,demanding purification, preparation,
subjection to the liturgical rules, andethical fitness. On the other hand...many ritual elements
are present in thereligion of the law--the moral type of faith. [DF:iv.4]

Guide to DF:v.1

(FAITH AND REASON)

Is it rational to be religious? Is "faith"--that is to say,"religion"--reasonable, consistent with

"reason"? Tillich dealswith this subject in DF:v. (It would be a good idea to recall
theargument found in the Guide to DF:i.2 before reading the followinganalysis.)

[W]e must now discuss the question whether, and in what sense, faithcan be judged in terms
of truth. [DF:v.1]

The most usual way in which this problem has been discussed is tocontrast faith with reason,
and to ask whether they exclude each other orwhether they can be united in a reasonable
faith.... [I]f the meaning of faithis misunderstood in the ways we have indicated before
(DF:i.2), faithand reason exclude each other. If, however, faith is understood as the stateof
being ultimately concerned, no conflict need exist.... [DF:v.1]

Next Tillich distinguishes two uses of the word "reason":"technical reason" and "reason as the
meaningful structure of mindand reality". (Before you read further, remind yourself of the
meaning of"spiritual" as set out in the Guide to DF:i.1.)

All spiritual elements of man, in spite of their distinct character, arewithin each other. This is
true also of faith and reason. Therefore, it isnot enough to assert that the state of being
ultimately concerned is in noconflict with the rational structure of the human mind.... In
which sense, onemust ask first, is the word "reason" used when confronted with faith?

* Is it meant, as is often the case today, in the sense of scientific method,logical strictness and
technical calculation?

* Or is it used, as in most periods of Western culture, in the sense of thesource of meaning, of

structure, of norms and principles?

In the first case reason gives the tools for recognizing and controllingreality, and faith gives
the direction in which this control may be exercised.One could call this kind of reason
technical reason, providing for means butnot for ends.... In the second case, reason is identical
with the humanity ofman in contrast to all other beings. It is the basis of language, of
freedom,of creativity. It is involved in the search for knowledge, the experience ofart, the
actualization of moral commands; it makes a centered personal life anda participation in
community possible. If faith were the opposite of reason,it would tend to dehumanize man....
[DF:v.1]

ABBREVIATIONS

(all works listed below are by Paul Tillich)

AR "Aspects of a Religious Analysis of Culture" in Theology of Culture

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1959) BR
Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1955) CB
The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952) CW
Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions (New York,
Columbia University Press, 1963) DF
Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957) LD
"The Lost Dimension in Religion" in The Saturday Evening Post 230.50
[14 June 1958] MB
Morality and Beyond (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963) MJ
"The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols" in Religious
Experience and Truth [edited by Sidney Hook] (New York: New York
University Press, 1961) NR
"The Nature of Religious Language" in Theology of Culture (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1959) RD
"Religion as a Dimension in Man's Spiritual Life" in Theology of
Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959) RS
"The Religious Symbol" in Religious Experience and Truth [edited by
Sidney Hook] (New York: New York University Press, 1961) ST
Systematic Theology [vols. 1, 2, 3] (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1951 & 1957 & 1963) TC
Theology of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959) TT
"The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion" in Theology of Culture (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1959) UC
Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue [edited by D. M. Brown] (New
York: Harper & Row, 1965)