CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
DIGESTED CASES CONSTI II – Atty. Joan Largo
U.S. vs GOMEZ
Facts:
In this case, defendant was found guilty by the
trial court with the crime of practicing medicine
without a license, in violation of Section 8, Act 30
of the Philippine Commission which provides: “The
Board of Medical Examiners may refuse to issue
any of the following certificates provided for
therein to an individual convicted by a court of
competent jurisdiction of any offense involving
immoral or dishonorable conduct. In case of such
refusal, the reason therefore shall be stated to the
applicant in writing. The Board may also revoke
any such certificate for like cause, or for
unprofessional conduct, after due notice to the
person holding the certificate, and a hearing,
subject to an appeal to the Board of Health for the
Philippine Islands, the decision of which shall be
final.” Defendant contends that the court erred in
declaring the aforementioned provision are no in
conflict with the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902 and in which he relies on paragraph 1,
section 5 thereof which states: “That no law shall
be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the laws.”
Held:
Defendant’s contention is not meritorious because
the Board of Medical Examiners where given such
a responsibility through the exercise of the State’s
police power. The state has general power to
enact such laws, in relation to persons, and
property within its borders, as may promote
public health, public morals, public safety,
and the general prosperity and welfare of its
inhabitants. This power of the state is generally
denominated in its police power. It has been held
that the state cannot be deprived of its right to
exercise this power. The police power and the right
to exercise it constitute the very foundation, or at
least one of the cornerstones of the state. For the
state to deprive itself or permit it to be deprived of
the right to enact laws to promote general
prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants, and
promote public health, public morals, and public
safety, would be to destroy the very purpose and
objects of the state. No legislature can bargain
away the public health, public safety, or the public
morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much
less their servants. Governments are organized
with a view to preservation of these things. They
cannot deprive themselves of the power to provide
for them. (Stone vs. Mississippi) In order to enforce
the police power of the state, it may, under
certain conditions become necessary to
deprive its citizens of property and of a right
providing for the continuance of property,
when the property or the exercise of the
right may tend to destroy the public health,
the public morals, the public safety, and the
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general welfare and prosperity of its
inhabitants. (Slaughter House Cases) Upon police
power of the state depends the security of social
order, the life and health of the citizens, the
comfort of an existence in a thickly populated
community, the enjoyment of private and social
life, and the beneficial use of property. It extends
to the protection of the lives, limbs, health,
comfort and quiet of all persons and the protection
of all property within the state. Persons and
property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state.
BINAY vs DOMINGO
Facts:
The Burial Assistance Program (Resolution No. 60 –
assisting those who only earn less than
P2,000/month of burial assistance in the amount of
P500.00) made by Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay, in
the exercise of the police power granted to him by
the municipal charter, was referred to the
Commission on Audit after the municipal secretary
certified the disbursement of four hundred
thousand pesos for its implementation was
disallowed by said commission of such
disbursements because there cannot be seen any
perceptible connection or relation between the
objective sought to be attained and the alleged
public safety, general welfare, etc. of its
inhabitants. Hence, this petition revolving around
the pivotal issue on whether or not Resolution No.
60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise
of police power under the general welfare clause.
Held:
Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a
valid exercise of police power under the general
welfare clause. The police power is a governmental
function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty,
which was born with civilized government. It is
founded largely on the maxims, “Sic utere tuo et
ahenum non laedas” (use your property so as not
to impair others) and “Salus populi est suprema
lex” (the welfare of the people is the supreme law).
Its fundamental purpose is securing the general
welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. It is the most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a
sense it is the greatest and most powerful
attribute of the government. It is elastic and must
be responsive to various social conditions. The
care for the poor is generally recognized as a
public duty. The support for the poor has long been
an accepted exercise of police power in the
promotion of the common good.
AGUSTIN vs EDU
Facts:
The letter of instruction providing for an early
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warning device for motor vehicles is being assailed
in the case at bar as being violative of the
constitutional guarantee of due process. Petitioner
contends that they are "infected with arbitrariness
because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to
the motoring public;" 13 are "one‐sided, onerous
and patently illegal and immoral because [they]
will make manufacturers and dealers instant
millionaires at the expense of car owners who are
compelled to buy a set of the so‐called early
warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per
set." 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and
contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New
Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on
the part of the motorists who could very well
provide a practical alternative road safety device,
or a better substitute to the specified set of
EWD's."
Held:
Petitioner’s contention is erroneous because the
Letter of Instruction was issued in the exercise of
the police power which is “nothing more or less
than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty.” In the leading case of Calalang v.
Williams, Justice Laurel identified police power
with state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general
welfare. Persons and property could thus ‘be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in
order for the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the state.’ This doctrine was later
reiterated again in Primicias v. Fugoso which
referred police power as ‘the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people.’ The concept
was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm
in a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that
inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful
to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society.’ Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the
greatest benefits. In the language of Justice
Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial in
the past may be interwoven in the present with the
well-being of the nation. What are critical or urgent
changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a
dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that
men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable an
individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to communal peace, safety,
good order, and welfare.”
ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ
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Facts:
This Court has before it the delicate task of
passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a
legislative enactment, fundamental and far‐
reaching in significance. The enactment poses
questions of due process, police power and equal
protection of the laws. It also poses an important
issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which
the disputed law purports to remedy really or
actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep,
militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law
purports to protect citizen and country from the
alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of
economy it regulates, Congress attempts to
translate national aspirations for economic
independence and national security, rooted in the
drive and urge for national survival and welfare,
into a concrete and tangible measures designed to
free the national retailer from the competing
dominance of the alien, so that the country and
the nation may be free from a supposed economic
dependence and bondage. Do the facts and
circumstances justify the enactment?
Held:
It has been said the police power is so far ‐
reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
existence from the very existence of the
State itself, it does not need to be expressed
or defined in its scope; it is said to be co‐
extensive with self‐protection and survival,
and as such it is the most positive and active
of all governmental processes, the most
essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially
is it so under a modern democratic framework
where the demands of society and of nations have
multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the
field and scope of police power has become
almost boundless, just as the fields of public
interest and public welfare have become
almost all‐embracing and have transcended
human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we
cannot foresee the needs and demands of
public interest and welfare in this constantly
changing and progressive world, so we
cannot delimit beforehand the extent or
scope of police power by which and through
which the State seeks to attain or achieve
interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions
do not define the scope or extent of the
police power of the State; what they do is to
set forth the limitations thereof. The most
important of these are the due process
clause and the equal protection clause.
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold
that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a
real actual threat and danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from
dominance and control; that the enactment clearly
falls within the scope of the police power of the
State, thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future; that
the law does not violate the equal protection
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clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated,
nor the due process of law clause, because the law
is prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege;
that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry
out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident
— as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate
but actually necessary — and that in any case
such matter falls within the prerogative of the
Legislature, with whose power and discretion the
Judicial department of the Government may not
interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly
embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the
segment of the population affected; and that it
cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict
with treaty obligations because no treaty has
actually been entered into on the subject and the
police power may not be curtailed or surrendered
by any treaty or any other conventional
agreement.
THE UNITED STATES vs LUIS TORIBIO
Facts:
Appellant in the case at bar was charged for the
violation of sections 30 & 33 of Act No. 1147, an
Act regulating the registration, branding, and
slaughter of large cattle. Evidence sustained in the
trial court found that appellant slaughtered or
caused to be slaughtered for human consumption,
the carabao described in the information, without
a permit from the municipal treasurer of the
municipality where it was slaughtered. Appellant
contends that he applied for a permit to slaughter
the animal but was not given one because the
carabao was not found to be “unfit for agricultural
work” which resulted to appellant to slaughter said
carabao in a place other than the municipal
slaughterhouse. Appellant then assails the validity
of a provision under Act No. 1147 which states that
only carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be
slaughtered.
Held:
The extent and limits of what is known as the
police power have been a fruitful subject of
discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every
State in the Union. It is universally conceded to
include everything essential to the public safely,
health, and morals, and to justify the destruction
or abatement, by summary proceedings, of
whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance.
Under this power it has been held that the State
may order the destruction of a house falling to
decay or otherwise endangering the lives of
passers‐by; the demolition of such as are in the
path of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased
cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome
food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities;
the regulation of railways and other means of
public conveyance, and of interments in burial
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grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to
certain localities; the compulsary vaccination of
children; the confinement of the insane or those
afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of
vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the
suppression of obscene publications and houses of
ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses
and places where intoxicating liquors are sold.
Beyond this, however, the State may
interfere wherever the public interests
demand it, and in this particular a large
discretion is necessarily vested in the
legislature to determine, not only what the
interests of the public require, but what
measures are necessary for the protection of
such interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S.,
27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the
State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of
the public, it must appear, first, that the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require such interference;
and, second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose,
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The
legislature may not, under the guise of protecting
the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with
private business, or impose unusual and
unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.
In other words, its determination as to what is a
proper exercise of its police powers is not final or
conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the
court.
From what has been said, we think it is clear that
the enactment of the provisions of the
statute under consideration was required by
"the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular
class;" and that the prohibition of the
slaughter of carabaos for human
consumption, so long as these animals are fit
for agricultural work or draft purposes was a
"reasonably necessary" limitation on private
ownership, to protect the community from
the loss of the services of such animals by
their slaughter by improvident owners,
tempted either by greed of momentary gain,
or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal
food, even when by so doing the productive
power of the community may be measurably
and dangerously affected.
Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland &
Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that
by this "general police power of the State, persons
and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the
perfect right in the legislature to do which no
question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and
general principles, ever can be made, so far as
natural persons are concerned."
CHURCHILL vs. RAFFERTY
Facts:
The case arises from the fact that defendant,
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Collector of Internal Revenue, would like to destroy
or remove any sign, signboard, or billboard, the
property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that
such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be
offensive to the sight. The plaintiffs allege
otherwise. Was there valid exercise of police power
in this case?
Held:
Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the
police power of the Philippine Government belongs
to the Legislature and that this power is limited
only by the Acts of Congress and those
fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation
of all republican forms of government. An Act of
the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly
foreign to any of the purposes of the police power
and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of
property would, without doubt, be held to be
invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within
a proper consideration of and care for the
public health, safety, or comfort, it should
not be disturbed by the courts.
"The power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
"The police power of the State, so far, has not
received a full and complete definition. It may be
said, however, to be the right of the State, or
state functionary, to prescribe regulations
for the good order, peace, health, protection,
comfort, convenience and morals of the
community, which do not ... violate any of
the provisions of the organic law."
"It [the police power] has for its object the
improvement of social and economic conditioned
affecting the community at large and collectively
with a view to bring about "he greatest good of the
greatest number."Courts have consistently and
wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon
subjects calling for the exercise of this power. It is
elastic and is exercised from time to time as
varying social conditions demand correction."
"It may be said in a general way that the police
power extends to all the great public needs. It
may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned
by usage, or held by the prevailing morality
or strong and preponderant opinion to be
greatly and immediately necessary to the
public welfare."
"It is much easier to perceive and realize the
existence and sources of this police power than to
mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its
exercise."
MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village
Facts:
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government
Agency　tasked with the delivery of basic services
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in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village　Association
(BAVA),　respondent herein, received a letter of
request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street
of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said
opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and
convenient movement of persons and to regulate
the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was
pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924.
On the same day, the respondent was　appraised
that the perimeter wall separating the　subdivision
and Kalayaan Avenue would be　demolished.
The respondent, to stop the opening of the said
street and demolition of the wall, filed a
preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining
order. Respondent claimed that the　MMDA had
no authority to do so and the lower court decided
in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed
the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it
has the authority to open Neptune Street to
public traffic because it is an agent of the State
that can　practice police power in the delivery of
basic services in Metro Manila.
Issue:　Whether or not the MMDA has the
mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic
pursuant to
its regulatory and police powers.
Held:
The Court held that the MMDA does not have the
capacity to exercise police power. Police power　is
primarily lodged in the National Legislature.
However, police power may be delegated to
government units. Petitioner herein is a
development authority and not a political
government　unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot
exercise police power because it cannot be
delegated to them.
It is not a legislative unit of the government.
Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the
MMDA　to enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of
the　inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in
the said act that grants MMDA police power.　It is
an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with various　national
government agencies, people’s organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the　private
sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
basic services in the vast metropolitan　area.
CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY
Facts:
The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the
expropriation of a portion private　cemetery for
the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue.
Plaintiff claims that it is necessary　that such
public improvement be made in the said portion of
the private cemetery and that the　said lands are
within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said
expropriation was not necessary because other
routes　were available. They further claimed that
the expropriation of the cemetery would create
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irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those
persons owing and interested in the　graves　and
monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public
improvement was not necessary on the particular-
strip　of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed
that they have the right to exercise the power of
eminent domain and that the courts have no right
to inquire and determine the necessity of the
expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.
Issue:　Whether or not the courts may inquire
into, and hear proof of the necessity of the
expropriation.
Held:
The courts have the power of restricting the
exercise of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable　necessities of the case and for the
purposes designated by the law. The moment the
municipal　corporation or entity attempts to
exercise the authority conferred, it must comply
with the　conditions accompanying the authority.
The necessity for conferring the authority upon a
municipal corporation to exercise the right of
eminent domain is admittedly within the power of
the　legislature. But whether or not the municipal
corporation or entity is exercising the right in a
particular case under the conditions imposed by
the general authority, is a question　that the
courts have the right to inquire to.
REPUBLIC VS. CASTELVI
Facts:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease
agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis.
When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease
in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an
ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959,
however, the republic commenced the
expropriation proceedings for the land in question.
Issue: Whether or Not the compensation should
be determined as of 1947 or 1959.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the “taking” should
not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just
compensation should not be determined on the
basis of the value of the property as of that year.
The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator
must enter a private property, 2) the entry must
be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must
be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the
property must be devoted for public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for
public use must be such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of
the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as
of the date of the filing of the complaint. The
Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of
the property sought to be expropriated coincides
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with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the
filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just
compensation should be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it
is undisputed that the Republic was placed in
possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of
court, on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the
Castelvi property for the purposes of determining
the just compensation to be paid must, therefore,
be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the
complaint for eminent domain was filed.
There is no basis to the contention of the Republic
that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to
permanent right to occupy since by express
provision a lease made for a determinate time, as
was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case,
ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a
demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme
Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the New
Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in
times of extraordinary inflation or deflation
because in eminent domain cases the obligation to
pay arises from law independent of contract.
AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA
Facts:
Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a
particular lot. At the back of her Transfer
Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation
in favor of the government of any right or interest
in the property. Without prior expropriation or
negotiated sale, the government used a portion of
the lot for the construction of the Mango and
Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigable’s counsel
wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting
payment of the portion of the said lot. It was
disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th
Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a
quo a complaint against the Republic of the
Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery
of ownership and possession of the lot. According
to the defendants, the action was premature
because it was not filed first at the Office of the
Auditor General. According to them, the right of
action for the recovery of any amount had already
prescribed, that the Government had not given its
consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause
of action against the defendants.
Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the
case, appellant may properly sue the government.
Held:
In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of
Cebu, it was held that when the government takes
away property from a private landowner for public
use without going through the legal process of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved
party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its
consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in
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favor of the government appears at the back of the
certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed
any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to
the government, then she remains the owner of
the lot. She could then bring an action to recover
possession of the land anytime, because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
However, since such action is not feasible at this
time since the lot has been used for other
purposes, the only relief left is for the government
to make due compensation用rice or value of the lot
at the time of the taking.
REPUBLIC VS. PLDT
Facts:
The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political
entity exercising government powers through　one
of its branches, the Bureau of Telecommunication.
Herein defendant, PLDT is a public　service
corporation holding a franchise to install operates
and maintains a telephone system.
After its creation, the BOT set up its own
government telephone system by utilizing its own
appropriations and other equipment and by renting
trunk lines of the PLDT to enable the govt　offices
to call privately. BOT entered into an agreement
with the RCA communications for joint　overseas
telephone service whereby BOT would convey
overseas calls received by RCA to local　residents.
PLDT complained to the BOT that it was a violation
of the condition of their agreement　since the BOT
had used trunk lines only for the use of
government offices but even to serve　private
persons or the general public in competition with
the business of PLDT. Subsequently, the　plaintiff
commenced suit against PLDT asking the court
judgment be rendered ordering the PLDT　to
execute a contract with the plaintiff, through the
BOT for the use of the facilities of PLDT's
telephone system throughout the country under
such conditions as the court may consider
reasonable. The CFI rendered judgment stating
that it could not compel PLDT to enter into such
agreement.　Hence this petition.
Issue:　Whether or Not PLDT may be compelled
to enter into such agreement.
Held:
Yes, the state　may, in the interest of national
welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon
payment of just compensation, there is no reason
why the state ma not require a public utility to
render services in the general interest provided
just compensation is paid.
TELEBAP vs. COMELEC
Facts:
TELEBAP and GMA Network together filed a
petition to challenge the validity of Comelec Time
due to the fact that said provisions: (1) have taken
properties without due process of law and without
just compensation; (2) it denied the radio and
television broadcast companies the equal
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protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess
of the power given to the Comelec to regulate the
operation of media communication or information
during election period.
Held:
Petitioners' argument is without merit, All
broadcasting, whether by radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who
want to broadcast than there are frequencies
to assign. 9 A franchise is thus a privilege
subject, among other things, to amended by
Congress in accordance with the
constitutional provision that "any such
franchise or right granted . . . shall be
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal
by the Congress when the common good so
requires."
Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been
made by amendment of the franchises of radio and
television broadcast stations and, until the present
case was brought, such provisions had not
been thought of as taking property without
just compensation. Art. XII, §11 of the
Constitution authorizes the amendment of
franchises for "the common good." What
better measure can be conceived for the
common good than one for free air time for
the benefit not only of candidates but even
more of the public, particularly the voters, so
that they will be fully informed of the issues
in an election? "[I]t is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount."
Nor indeed can there be any constitutional
objection to the requirement that broadcast
stations give free air time. Even in the United
States, there are responsible scholars who believe
that government controls on broadcast media can
constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of
views and attention to public affairs to further the
system of free expression. For this purpose,
broadcast stations may be required to give free air
time to candidates in an election.
In truth, radio and television broadcasting
companies, which are given franchises, do not own
the airwaves and frequencies through which they
transmit broadcast signals and images. They are
merely given the temporary privilege of using
them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the
exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee of
some form of public service.
MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
The National Historical Institute declared the parcel
of land owned by Petitioners as a national
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historical landmark, because it was the site of the
birth of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni
Cristo. The Republic of the Philippines filed an
action to appropriate the land. Petitioners argued
that the expropriation was not for a public
purpose.
Issue: Whether or Not the taking or exercise of
eminent domain may be granted.
Held:
Public use should not be restricted to the
traditional uses. The taking is for a public use
because of the contribution of Felix Manalo to the
culture and history of the Philippines.
EPZA VS. DULAY
Facts:
The four parcels of land which are the subject of
this case is where the Mactan Export Processing
Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be
constructed. Private respondent San Antonio
Development Corporation (San Antonio, for
brevity), in which these lands are registered under,
claimed that the lands were expropriated to the
government without them reaching the agreement
as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay
then issued an order for the appointment of the
commissioners to determine the just
compensation. It was later found out that the
payment of the government to San Antonio would
be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by
the latter contending that under PD 1533, the
basis of just compensation shall be fair and
according to the fair market value declared by the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated,
or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such
objection and the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set
for the reception of the commissioner’s report.
EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and
mandamus enjoining the respondent from further
hearing the case.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and
mandatory mode of determining just
compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of
determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation
constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial
prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in
a matter in which under the Constitution is
reserved to it for financial determination. The
valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding
principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation, but it may not substitute the
court’s own judgment as to what amount should
be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The
determination of just compensation is a judicial
function. The executive department or the
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legislature may make the initial determination but
when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in
the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be
taken for public use without just compensation, no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate
that its own determination shall prevail over the
court’s findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the justness of the
decreed compensation.
DE KNECHT VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
The instant case is an unending sequel to several
suits commenced almost twenty years ago
involving a parcel of land located at the corner of
the south end of EDSA and F.B. Harrison in Pasay
City. The land was owned by petitioners Cristina de
Knecht and her son, Rene Knecht.
On the land, the Knechts constructed eight houses,
leased out the seven and occupied one of them as
their residence. In 1979, the government filed for
the expropriation of Knechts’ property.
The government wanted to use the land for the
completion of the Manila Flood Control and
Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA
towards Roxas Boulevard. In 1982, the City
Treasurer of Pasay discovered that the Knechts
failed to pay real estate taxes on the property from
1980 to 1982. As a consequence of this deficiency,
the City Treasurer sold the property at public
auction for the same amount of their deficiency
taxes. The highest bidders were respondent
Spouses Anastacio and Felisa Babiera (the
Babieras) and respondent Spouses Alejandro and
Flor Sangalang (the Sangalangs). Subsequently,
Sangalang and Babiera sold the land to respondent
Salem Investment Corporation. On February 17,
1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340
authorizing the national government to expropriate
certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA
Extension. The property of the Knechts was part of
those expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. The
government gave out just compensation for the
lands expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. Salem was
included and received partial payment. Seven of
the eight houses of the Knechts were demolished
and the government took possession of the portion
of land on which the houses stood. Since the
Knechts refused to vacate their one remaining
house, Salem filed a case against them for
unlawful detainer. As defense, the Knechts claimed
ownership of the land and building. The Municipal
Trial Court however ordered the Knechts'
ejectment thus their residence was demolished.
The Knechts continuously claimed ownership of
the property and allege that they must be given
just compensation.
Issue: Whether or not Knechts are the lawful
owners of the land at subject.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the Knechts were not
the owners anymore of the said land. The Knechts'
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
right to the land had been foreclosed after they
failed to redeem it one year after the sale at public
auction. Since the petitions questioning the order
of dismissal were likewise dismissed by the Court
of Appeals and this Court, the order of dismissal
became final and res judicata on the issue of
ownership of the land. Petitioners contended that
they did not receive notice of their tax
delinquency. Neither did they receive notice of the
auction sale. However, this question has been
previously raised in the cases which have been
already set aside. The court is not a trier of facts.
Res judicata has already set it. The Knechts
therefore are not the lawful owners of the land and
are not any longer accountable for just
compensation given by the government.
Note: Res judicata is a ground for dismissal of an
action. It is a rule that precludes parties from
relitigating Issue actually litigated and determined
by a prior and final judgment. It pervades every
well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is
based upon two grounds embodied in various
maxims of the common law 8 one, public policy
and necessity, that there should be a limit to
litigation; and another, the individual should not be
vexed twice for the same cause. When a right of
fact has been judicially tried and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity
for such trial has been given, the judgment of the
court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity
with them in law or estate. To follow a contrary
doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet
to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the
gratification of the litigious disposition of the
parties to the preservation of the public
tranquility.Res judicata applies when: (1) the
former judgment or order is final; (2) the judgment
or order is one on the merits; (3) it was rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (4) there is between the
first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter and of cause of action.
PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO
Facts:
The municipal council of baao, camarines sur
stating among others that construction of a
building, which will destroy the view of the plaza,
shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at
the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance.
Herein appellant filed a written request with the
incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building adjacent to their gasoline
station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's
name, located along the national highway and
separated from the public plaza by a creek. The
request was denied, for the reason among others
that the proposed building would destroy the view
or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants
reiterated their request for a building permit, but
again the mayor turned down the request.
Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the
construction of the building without a permit,
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because they needed a place of residence very
badly, their former house having been destroyed
by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on
leased property. Thereafter, defendants were
charged in violation of the ordinance and
subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal.
Issue:Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power.
Held:
No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The
ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that
it operates to permanently deprive appellants of
the right to use their own property; hence, it
oversteps the bounds of police power, and
amounts to a taking of appellant’s property
without just compensation. We do not overlook
that the modern tendency is to regard the
beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to
the comfort and happiness of residents.
As the case now stands, every structure that may
be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its
own beauty, stands condemned under the
ordinance in question, because it would interfere
with the view of the public plaza from the highway.
The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to
let their land remain idle and unused for the
obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being
urban in character. To legally achieve that result,
the municipality must give appellants just
compensation and an opportunity to be heard
US vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil 104
Facts:
Defendant, Ling Su Fan, is accused of attempting
to export Philippine silver coins from the
Philippines contrary to Act No. 1411 of the
Philippine Commission.　His defenses, among
others, involved the deprivation of due process
due to the confiscation of the　coins.
Held:
...phrase "due process of law" was defined by
Judge Story, in his work on Constitutional Law, as "
the law in its regular course of administration
through the courts of justice."
Due process of law in each particular case means
such an exertion of the powers of the government
as the settled maxims of law permit　and sanction,
and under such safeguards for the protection of
individual rights as those maxims prescribed for
the class of cases to which　the one in question
belongs.　Judge Cooley, in his work on
Constitutional Limitations, says:
"Due process of law" is process or proceedings
according to the law of the land. "Due process of
law" is not that the law shal l be according to　the
wishes of all the inhabitants of the state, but
simply —　First. That there shall be a law
prescribed in harmony with the general powers of
the legislative department of the Government
Second. That this law shall be reasonable in its
operation;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Third. That it shall be enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and
Fourth. That it shall be applicable alike to all the
citizens of the state or to all of a class.
Lower court's decision was affirmed convicting him
guilty with costs against him
White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila
Facts:
City of Manila passes an Ordinance preventing
hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses
and similar establishments offer ing shorttime
admission as well as pro-rated or wash up rates for
abbreviated stays.
Petitioners allege, among others, that the
Ordinance deprives their customers the
Constitutional guaranty to the right of due process.
Held:
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary
governmental encroachment against the life,
liberty and property of individuals. The　due
process guaranty serves as a protection against
arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations
and　partnerships are protected　by the guaranty
insofar as their property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been
interpreted as imposing two related but distinct
restrictions on government,　"procedural due
process" and "substantive due process."
Procedural due process refers to the procedures
that the government must　follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.
Procedural due process concerns itself with
government action adhering　to the established
process when it makes an intrusion into the private
sphere.
Substantive due process completes the protection
envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires
whether the government has　sufficient
justification for depriving a person of life, liberty,
or property.
Even as the implementation of moral norms
remains an indispensable complement to
governance, that prerogative is hardly absol ute,
especially in the face of the norms of due process
of liberty. And while the tension may often be left
to the courts to relie ve, it is　possible for the
government to avoid the constitutional conflict by
employing more judicious, less drastic means to
promote morality.
Petition was granted by the Court and held the
Ordinance unconstitutional.
Banco Español vs. Palanca, 37 Phil 921
Facts:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng secured a debt with
various parcels of real property in Manila. The debt
amounted to P218,294.10 at 8% per annum,
payable quarterly. Property's estimated value was
about　P292,558. After the instrument's execution,
mortgagor returned to Amoy, China and died on
January 29,　1810.　The foreclosure proceeding
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needed publication pursuant to section 399 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.　Publication was made in
a newspaper of Manila and an order of the court
deposited in the post office in　a stamped
envelope of the summons and complaint directed
to defendant.　The clerk, however, failed to
comply with the mail publication requirement.
The bank was able to foreclose the property
without the defendant.
After seven years, the administrator of the estate,
Vicente Palanca, appeared and requested the court
to set aside the order of default of July 2, 1908,
and the judgment rendered upon July 3, 1908, and
to　vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto.
The basis of this application, as set forth in the
motion　itself, was that the order of default and
the judgment rendered thereon were void because
the court　had never acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant or over the subject of the action.　His
appeal was denied by the lower court, hence the
appeal.
His appeal was denied by the lower court, hence
the appeal.
Issue:　Whether or not the procedural aspect of
the right to due process has been prejudiced.
Held:
1. There must be a COURT or TRIBUNAL clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it;
2. JURISDICTION must be lawfully acquired over
the person of the defendant or over the property
which is the subject of the proceeding;
3. The defendant must be given the
OPPORTUNITY to be heard; and
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful
HEARING.
The essentials of procedural fairness inn judicial
proceedings are:
Conclusions stated by the court indicated that the
judgment appealed from is without error, and the
same is accordingly affirmed.
ANG TIBAY VS. CIR
FACTS:
Petitioner, Ang Tibay has filed an opposition for
both the motion for reconsideration of CIR and the
motion for a new trial by the National Labor Union.
The National Labor Union’s case: they alleged that
Toribio Teodoro, who dominated the National
Workers’ Brotherhood of Ang Tibay,made a false
claim that there was a shortage of leather soles in
ANg Tibay that made it necessary for him to lay off
workers, however, claim was unsupported by
records of the Bureau of Customs & the accounts
of native dealers of leather. Such was just a
scheme adapted to systematically discharge all
the members of the NLU, inc., from work. · Unfair
labor practice for discriminating against the
National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring
the National Workers' Brotherhood.· That the
exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the
respondents that even with the exercise of due
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
diligence they could not be expected to have
obtained them and offered as evidence in the
Court of Industrial Relations.
That the attached documents and exhibits are of
such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein.
HELD:
motion for reconsideration denied, motion for new
trial granted.
Discussion of the Nature of the CIR to emphasize
certain guiding principles which should be
observed in the trial of cases brought before it.
Court of Industrial Relations 10 an administrative
court - exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions
in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees
- has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
consider, investigate, decide, and settle any
question, matter controversy or dispute arising
between, and/or affecting employers and
employees or laborers, and regulate the relations
between them, subject to, and in accordance with,
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103
(section 1).
There is in reality here a mingling of executive and
judicial functions, which is a departure from the
rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental
powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial
Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure,
and the Act requires it to "act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of
the case, without regard to technicalities or
legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner
as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character.
1. right to a hearing, which includes the right
of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
2. tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
3. have something to support the decision
4. evidence must be "substantial." - such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
accepts as adequate to support a
conclusion."
5. The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected. Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their right to know and meet the
case against them.
6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its
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judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. It may be that the
volume of work is such that it is literally
Relations personally to decide all controversies
coming before them.
7.The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision
in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon
it.
The court observed that, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the
National Worker's Brotherhood, the record is
barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual
basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a
conclusion of law. Therefore, in the interest of
justice, a new trial should commence giving the
movant the opportunity to present new evidence.
Diosdado Guzman vs National University
Facts:
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo
and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent
National University, have come to this Court to
seek relief from what they describe as their
school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow
them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary
legal and equitable remedies with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7,
1984, they alleged that they were denied due to
the fact that they were active participation in
peaceful mass actions within the premises of the
University.
The respondents on the other hand claimed that
the petitioners’ failure to enroll for the first
semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to
their own fault and not because of their alleged
exercise of their constitutional and human rights.
That as regards to Guzman, his academic showing
was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of
classes. That Guzman “is facing criminal charges
for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila in connection with the destruction
of properties of respondent University. The
petitioners have “failures in their records, and are
not of good scholastic standing.”
Held:
Immediately apparent from a reading of
respondents' comment and memorandum is the
fact that they had never conducted proceedings of
any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-
students had indeed led or participated "in
activities within the university premises,
conducted without prior permit from school
authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes
therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage
and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of
University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the
pendency of a civil case for damages and a
criminal case for malicious mischief against
petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish
sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment
from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission
of respondents to cite this Court to any duly
published rule of theirs by which students may be
expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor
scholastic standing.
There are withal minimum standards which must
be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process; and these are, that
(1) the students must be informed in
writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
(2) they shag have the right to
answer the charges against them,
with the assistance of counsel, if
desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the
evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.
THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE
RESPONDENTS ARE DIRECTED TO ALLOW THE
PETITIONERS TO RE-ENROLL WITHOUT PREJUDICE
TO ANY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts:
The case was about the constitutionality of EO
626-A which prohibits interprovincial movement of
carabaos.
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a
pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13,
1984, when they were confiscated by the police
station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for
violation of the above measure. The petitioner
sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court
sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and,
since they could no longer be produced, ordered
the confiscation of the bond. The court also
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack
of authority and also for its presumed validity.
Held:
The due process clause was kept
intentionally vague so it would remain also
conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary
because due process is not, like some provisions of
the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an
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implacable and immutable command for all
seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the
best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of
the due process clause was meant to make it
adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or
constricting its protection as the changing times
and circumstances may require.
The minimum requirements of due process
are notice and hearing which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with
because they are intended as a safeguard
against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying
commentary on our judicial system that the
jurisprudence of this country is rich with
applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty
to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair
play. We have consistently declared that every
person, faced by the awesome power of the State,
is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel
Webster described almost two hundred years ago
in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law
which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person
are to be secured beyond the reach of officials
who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance,
would degrade the due process clause into a worn
and empty catchword.
It has already been remarked that there are
occasions when notice and hearing may be
validly dispensed with notwithstanding the
usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also
conceded that summary action may be
validly taken in administrative proceedings
as procedural due process is not necessarily
judicial only. In the exceptional cases
accepted, however there is a justification for
the omission of the right to a previous
hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the
problem sought to be corrected and the
urgency of the need to correct it.
Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished.
EO 626-A was declared unconstitutional.
Tanada vs Tuvera
Facts:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in
demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not
been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
"otherwise provided," as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.
Issue: WON publication is needed for laws that
were to become effective immediately.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Held:
It is not correct to say that under the disputed
clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would
offend due process insofar as it would deny the
public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to
govern the legislature could validly provide that a
law is effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is
not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result and they would be so not
because of a failure to comply with but simply
because they did not know of its existence,
Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as
is commonly supposed. One can think of many
non-penal measures, like a law on prescription,
which must also be communicated to the persons
they may affect before they can begin to operate.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not
only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general
albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to
a particular individual, like a relative of President
Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It
surely cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it unquestionably does
not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in
the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an
ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the
law must invariably affect the public interest even
if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and t to the
public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those
of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Halili vs Public Service Commission
Facts:
A petition for certiorari was filed seeking for the
revocation and annulment of an order by
respondent Public Service Commission dated July
3, 1952 which changed part of the route of the bus
service established by the respondent CAM Transit
Co., Inc., between Balara and City Hall, Manila.
Petitioner herein is the holder of various
certificates of public convenience to operate auto-
truck services between Balara and various points
in the City of Manila and its suburbs.
On July 2, 1952, CAM Transit Co., Inc. filed a
petition with the respondent Commission alleging
that the route authorized in its City Hall(Manila)-
Balara line is entirely different from that supported
by the evidence presented in the hearing, and
CREATED BY: JNMONTECLARO, KVALMORIA, ADULOSA, and other sources
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praying that the certificate be amended. On the
following day, July 3, and without previous notice
to the petitioner or a previous hearing thereon,
ordered the modification of the line in accordance
with the petition.
Issue:
WON the order of the amendment of the route,
without notice to the petitioner and other
interested parties, or hearing in which the latter
may be given opportunity to be present, was
lawfully and validly issued by the Commission.
WON petitioner’s right to due process was violated.
Held:
The order by the Commission of amending the
route was not validly issued and petitioner’s right
to due process was violated.
In the first place, the power to issue provisional
permits is expressly authorized. In the second
place, the change ordered is not provisional
merely, like that granted in a provisional permit,
but final and permanent in character. In the third
place, even if the Commission is not bound by the
rules in judicial proceedings, it must bow its head
to he constitutional mandate that no person shall
be deprived of a right without due process of law.
The "due process of law" clause of the
Constitution binds not only the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines, but also
each and everyone of its branches, agencies,
etc. (16 C.J.S., 1149.)"Due process of law, or, in
the mean accord with the procedure outlines in the
law, or, in the absence of express procedure, under
such safeguards for the protection of individual
rights as the settled maxims of law permit and
sanction for the particular class of cases to which
the one in question belongs," (16 C.J.S., 1141.) In
the case at bar, the Public Service Act does not
include the amendment made in the disputed
order among those may be ordered without notice
or hearing in accordance with Section 17 of the
Act. Is the amendment, without notice or hearing,
permitted by the well settled maxims of law? We
declare it is not, because due process of law
guarantees notice and opportunity to be
heard to persons who would be affected by
the order or act contemplated.
In a General sense it means the right to be
heard before some tribunal having
jurisdiction to determine the question in
dispute.
By "due process of law" is meant orderly
proceeding adopted to the nature of the
case, before a tribunal having jurisdiction,
which proceeds upon notice, with an
opportunity to bee heard, with full power to
grant relief.
Some legal procedure in which the person
proceeded against, if he is to be concluded
thereby, shall have an opportunity to defend
himself.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
A course of proceeding according to these rules
and principles which have been established in our
system of jurisprudence for the protection and
enforcement of private rights.
Serrano vs National Labor Relations
Commission
Facts:
A petition was filed seeking a review of a
resolution made by the National Labor relations
commission which reversed the decision rendered
by theLaborArbiter and dismissed petitioner's
complaint for illegal dismissal and denied his
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner was hired by private respondent Isetann
Department Store. Sometime in 1991, as a cost-
cutting measure, said respondent decided to phase
out its entire security section and engage the
services of an independent security agency. A
memorandum was subsequently wrote to
petitioner informing him of his termination
immediately (date of effectivity of termination was
exactly the same as the date the memorandum
was made).
Issue:
WON there was a violation of petitioner's right to
due process when respondent-employer failed to
give the required 1 month notice provided in the
Labor Code.
Held:
"It is now settled that where the dismissal of one
employee is in fact for a just and valid cause and is
so proven to be but he is not accorded his right to
due process, i.e., he was not furnished the twin
requirements of notice and opportunity to be
heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the
employer must be sanctioned for non-compliance
with the requirements of, or for failure to observe,
due process."
There are three reasons why, on the other hand,
violation by the employer of the notice
requirement cannot be considered a denial of due
process resulting in the nullity of the employee's
dismissal or layoff.
The first is that the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution is a limitation on governmental
powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private
power, such as the termination of employment
under the Labor Code. This is plain from the text of
Art. III, §1 of the Constitution, viz.: "No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. . . ." The reason is simple: Only the
State has authority to take the life, liberty, or
property of the individual. The purpose of the Due
Process Clause is to ensure that the exercise of this
power is consistent with what are considered
civilized methods.
The second reason is that notice and hearing are
required under the Due Process Clause before the
CREATED BY: JNMONTECLARO, KVALMORIA, ADULOSA, and other sources
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power of organized society are brought to bear
upon the individual. This is obviously not the case
of termination of employment under Art. 283. Here
the employee is not faced with an aspect of the
adversary system. The purpose for requiring a 30-
day written notice before an employee is laid off is
not to afford him an opportunity to be heard on
any charge against him, for there is none. The
purpose rather is to give him time to prepare for
the eventual loss of his job and the DOLE an
opportunity to determine whether economic
causes do exist justifying the termination of his
employment.
The third reason why the notice requirement under
Art. 283 can not be considered a requirement of
the Due Process Clause is that the employer
cannot really be expected to be entirely an
impartial judge of his own cause. This is also the
case in termination of employment for a just cause
under Art. 282.
We hold, therefore, that, with respect to Art. 283 of
the Labor Code, the employer's failure to comply
with the notice requirement does not constitute a
denial of due process but a mere failure to observe
a procedure for the termination of employment
which makes the termination of employment
merely ineffectual. Indeed, under the Labor Code,
only the absence of a just cause for the
termination of employment can make the dismissal
of an employee illegal.
Lao Gi v Court of Appeals
Facts:
Herein petitioner faces a charge for deportation
when a judgment was rendered cancelling his
citizenship (obtained from a prior judgment) on the
ground that it was founded on fraud and
misrepresentation. Petitioners were required to
register as aliens but refused. They filed a motion
for reconsideration of the of the order directing
them to register as aliens and to oppose the
motion for their arrest but was denied by Acting
Commissioner Nituda. Petitioners filed for certiorari
in the CFI of Manila which was dismissed fo lack of
legal basis. Petition for certiorari was also
dismissed on appeal in the CA and a motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Hence, the
present petition.
Issue:
WON petitioners are entitled to the right to due
process even if they are aliens.
Held:
The power to deport an alien is an act of the State.
It is an act by or under the authority of the
sovereign power. It is a police measure against
undesirable aliens whose presence in the country
is found to be injurious to the public good and
domestic tranquility of the people.
Although a deportation proceeding does not
partake of the nature of a criminal action,
however, considering that it is a harsh and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
extraordinary administrative proceeding
affecting the freedom and liberty of a
person, the constitutional right of such
person to due process should not be denied.
Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of
the Philippines particularly on criminal
procedure are applicable to deportation
proceedings.
Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940 as amended, it is provided:
c)No alien shall be deported without being
informed of the specific grounds for deportation
nor without being given a hearing under rules of
procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of
Immigration.
Hence, the charge against an alien must specify
the acts or omissions complained of which must be
stated in ordinary and concise language to enable
a person of common understanding to know on
what ground he is intended to be deported and
enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment.
Petition is hereby granted and the questioned
order of the respondent commission on
immigration and deportation is hereby set aside.
PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSO. VS. PRADO
Facts:
The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular
No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354
withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA,
RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration
Commission and with certain other government
offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory
because while withdrawing the franking privilege
from judiciary, it retains the same for the President
& Vice-President of the Philippines, Senator &
members of the House of Representatives,
COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and
the general public. The respondents counter that
there is no discrimination because the law is based
on a valid classification in accordance with the
equal protection clause.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is
constitutional.
Held:
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in
the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice
and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in
a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the
Constitution to provide for amore specific
guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or
hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in
general may be challenged on the basis of the due
process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice,
the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause. Equal protection simply requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should
CREATED BY: JNMONTECLARO, KVALMORIA, ADULOSA, and other sources
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be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires
is equality among equals as determined according
to a valid classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is
declared unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set
aside insofar
PEOPLE VS. CAYAT
Facts:
“Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe
to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink,
any intoxicating liquors of any kind.” The law, Act
No. 1639, exempts only the so-called native wines
or liquors which the members of such tribes have
been accustomed to take.
Issue: Whether or Not the law denies equal
protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for
violation of said law.
Held:
No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid
classification, one of which is that the classification
under the law must rest on real or substantial
distinctions. The distinction is reasonable. The
classification between the members of the non-
Christian and the members of the Christian tribes
is not based upon accident of birth or parentage
but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The
term ‘non-Christian tribes’ refers to a geographical
area and more directly to natives of the Philippines
of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities. The
distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended
to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-
Christian tribes” The prohibition is germane to the
purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace
and order in and among the non- Christian tribes
has often resulted in lawlessness and crime
thereby hampering the efforts of the government
to raise their standards of life and civilization. This
law is not limited in its application to conditions
existing at the time of the enactment. It is
intended to apply for all times as long as those
conditions exist. The Act applies equally to all
members of the class. That it may be unfair in its
operation against a certain number of non-
Christians by reason of their degree of culture is
not an argument against the equality of its
operation nor affect the reasonableness of the
classification thus established.
RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
Facts:
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of
Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. The provincial board of Mindoro adopted
resolution No. 25 which states that “provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by
him and approved by the provincial board”. It is
resolved that under section 2077 of the
Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in
the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a
site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in
Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit
homesteads on this reservation providing that said
homestead applications are previously
recommended by the provincial governor.
Thereafter, the provincial governor of Mindoro
issued executive order No. 2, which says that the
provincial governor has selected a site in the sitio
of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. In that case,
pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised
Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the
townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans
east of the Baco River including those in the
districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan,
were ordered to take up their habitation on the site
of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan
who shall refuse to comply with this order shall
upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty
days, in accordance with section 2759 of the
revised Administrative Code. Said resolution of the
provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as
necessary measures for the protection of the
Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of
public forests in which they roam, and to introduce
civilized customs among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his
rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be
punished. It is alleged that the Manguianes are
being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his
companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will,
and one Dabalos is said to be held under the
custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at
Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty
without due process of law. Whether or Not Section
2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
Held:
The Court held that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code does not deprive a person of
his liberty without due process of law and does not
deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and
that confinement in reservations in accordance
with said section does not constitute slavery and
involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the
opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative
Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power,
somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the
United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code of 1917 is constitutional. The preamble of the
resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which
set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be read,
assigned as reasons fort the action, the following:
CREATED BY: JNMONTECLARO, KVALMORIA, ADULOSA, and other sources
- 15 -
(1) The failure of former attempts for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of the
province; and (2) the only successfully method for
educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to
live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-
General adds the following; (3) The protection of
the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public
forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the
Manguianes. Considered purely as an exercise of
the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that
the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority.
It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But
a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is
unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They
are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
process of law has not been followed. None of the
rights of the citizen can be taken away except by
due process of law. To constitute "due process of
law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding
is not always necessary. In some instances, even a
hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is
especially true where much must be left to the
discretion of the administrative officers in applying
a law to particular cases. The idea of the provision
in question is to unify the people of the Philippines
so that they may approach the highest conception
of nationality. The public policy of the Government
of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to
benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The
Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental
policy, must be confined for a time, as we have
said, for their own good and the good of the
country.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully
imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas
corpus can, therefore, not issue.
Villegas vs Ho
Facts:
A petition for certiorari is filed to review the
decision rendered by the CFI of Manila wherein
Ordinance 6537, which prohibits aliens from being
employed or to engage or participate in any
position or occupation or business without first
securing an employment permit from the Mayor of
Manila and paying the permit fee of fifty pesos
xxx, was declared null and void for it is arbitrary,
oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only
to aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to
life, liberty and property and therefore violates the
due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.
Issue:
WON respondent judge committed a serious and
patent error of law in ruling that ordinance 6537
violated the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Held:
No, respondent judge did not commit the errors
assigned. The ordinance in question violates the
due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to
get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who
may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to
denying him the basic right of the people in the
Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood.
While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not
obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an
alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life
without due process of law. This guarantee
includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of
protection under the due process and equal
protection clause is given to all persons,
both aliens and citizens.
International School Alliance of Educators vs
Quisumbing
Facts:
Petitioners are employees (teachers) of
respondent's school who are receiving less than
their counterparts hired abroad and now cry
discrimination. The school contends that a foreign-
hire would necessarily uproot himself from his
home country, leave his family and friends, and
take the risk of devaiting from a promising career
path - all for the purpose of pursuing his profession
as an educator, but this time in a foreign land and
such person does not enjoy security of tenure as
well so the compensation scheme is simply the
School's adaptive measure to remain competitive
on an international level in terms of attracting
competent pruofessionals in the field of
international education. The school's classification
between foreign-hires and local-hires was in the
point-of-hire so foreigners hired locally are being
classified as local-hires. Petitioner claims that such
classification is discriminatory to Filipinos and that
the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires
constitutes racial discrimination. On the other
hand, the Acting Secretary of Labor upheld the
point-of hire classification for the distinction in
salary rates. He also stated that The Union cannot
also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its
claim of parity. It is an established principle of
constitutional law that the guarantee of equal
protection of the laws is not violated by legislation
or private covenants based on reasonable
classification. A classification is reasonable if it is
based on substantial distinctions and apply to all
members of the same class. Verily, there is a
substantial distinction between foreign hires and
local hires, the former enjoying only a limited
tenure, having no amenities of their own in the
Philippines and have to be given a good
compensation package in order to attract them to
join the teaching faculty of the School.
Hence the present petition.
CREATED BY: JNMONTECLARO, KVALMORIA, ADULOSA, and other sources
- 16 -
Issue:
WON the Acting secretary erred in upholding the
reasonableness of the classification made by
respondent-school.
Held:
Yes. That public policy abhors inequality and
discrimination is beyond contention. Our
Constitution and laws reflect the policy against
these evils. The Constitution 8 in the Article on
Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress
to "give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities." The very broad Article
19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
The Constitution 18 also directs the State to
promote "equality of employment opportunities for
all." Similarly, the Labor Code 19 provides that the
State shall "ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an
affront to both the spirit and letter of these
provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial
obligation to promote and ensure equal
employment opportunities, closes its eyes to
unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions
of employment.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare," 25
"to afford labor full protection." The State,
therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the
relations between labor and capital. These
relations are not merely contractual but are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts,
collective bargaining agreements included, must
yield to the common good. Should such contracts
contain stipulations that are contrary to public
policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these
stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification
employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and
local hires to be an invalid classification. There is
no reasonable distinction between the services
rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The
practice of the School of according higher salaries
to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and,
certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this
Court.
Republic vs 　 Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Immediately upon her assumption to office
following the successful EDSA Revolution, then
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 1 (“EO No. 1”) creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”). EO
No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-
gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1
vested the PCGG with the power “(a) to conduct
investigation as may be necessary in order to
accomplish and carry out the purposes of this
order” and the power “(h) to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the purpose of this order.” Accordingly, the
PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga,
created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (“AFP Board”)
tasked to investigate reports of unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel,
whether in the active service or retired.
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board
investigated various reports of alleged unexplained
wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q.
Ramas (“Ramas”). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board
issued a Resolution on its findings and
recommendation on the reported unexplained
wealth of Ramas.
Evidence in the record showed that
respondent is the owner of a house and lot located
at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is also
the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City.
The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.
The value of the property located in
Quezon City may be estimated modestly at
P700,000.00.
The equipment/items and communication facilities
which were found in the premises of Elizabeth
Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the
PC Command of Batangas were all covered by
invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN
SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These
items could not have been in the possession of
Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by
respondent Commanding General of the Philippine
Army.
Aside from the military equipment/items
and communications equipment, the raiding team
was also able to confiscate money in the amount
of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the
house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
Affidavits of members of the Military
Security Unit, Military Security Command,
Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los
Baños, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano
is the mistress of respondent. That respondent
usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged
house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga,
Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth
Dimaano embraces and kisses respondent. That
on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car
went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with
four (4) attache cases filled with money and owned
by MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed
also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means
of income and is supported by respondent for she
was formerly a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth
Dimaano could not have used the military
equipment/items seized in her house on March 3,
1986 without the consent of respondent, he being
the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. It
is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim
CREATED BY: JNMONTECLARO, KVALMORIA, ADULOSA, and other sources
- 17 -
that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US
Dollars for she had no visible source of income.
This money was never declared in the
Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent.
There was an intention to cover the existence of
these money because these are all ill-gotten and
unexplained wealth. Were it not for the affidavits
of the members of the Military Security Unit
assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, the
existence and ownership of these money would
have never been known.
The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of
respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and
analysis by the Board’s consultant. Although the
amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars
were not included, still it was disclosed that
respondent has an unexplained wealth of
P104,134. 60.
Issue: WON the bill of rights was operative at the
time of President Aquino issued E.O. 1
Ruling:
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25
February 1986. As succinctly stated in President
Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986,
the EDSA Revolution was “done in defiance of
the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.” The
resulting government was indisputably a
revolutionary government bound by no
constitution or legal limitations except treaty
obligations that the revolutionary government, as
the de jure government in the Philippines,
assumed under international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the
revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of
Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the
interregnum, that is, after the actual and
effective take-over of power by the revolutionary
government following the cessation of resistance
by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986
(immediately before the adoption of the Provisional
Constitution); and (2) whether the protection
accorded to individuals under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“Covenant”)
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“Declaration”) remained in effect during the
interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the
1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, we rule that the protection
accorded to individuals under the Covenant and
the Declaration remained in effect during the
interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government were the
supreme law because no constitution limited the
extent and scope of such directives and orders.
With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by
the successful revolution, there was no municipal
law higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the
interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because
there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
during the interregnum.
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s
rise to the presidency was not due to
constitutional processes; in fact, it was
achieved in violation of the provisions of the
1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa
resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as
the winner in the 1986 presidential election.
Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs.
Aquino’s Government which was met by little
resistance and her control of the state evidenced
by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key
officers of the administration, the departure of the
Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary
and the Military signaled the point where the
legal system then in effect, had ceased to be
obeyed by the Filipino.
During the interregnum, the government in
power was concededly a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution. No one could validly
question the sequestration orders as violative of
the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of
Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the
sequestered companies assailed the sequestration
orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the
Freedom Constitution.
Manalili v CA　 (GR 113447) Oct. 9, 1997
Facts:
At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-
Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted
surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the
Kalookan City Cemetery. This was done after
receiving information that drug addicts were
roaming around said area.
Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen
chanced upon a male person, the petitioner, in
front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs.
The petitioner had reddish eyes and was walking in
a swaying manner.
Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but
the officers were able to introduce themselves and
asked him what he was holding in his hands.
Petitioner resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked him if
he could see what the petitioner had in his hands.
The petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the
officer to examine it. Policeman Espiritu found
suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He
kept the wallet and its marijuana contents and
took petitioner to headquarters to be further
investigated.
The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI
Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis.
Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the
suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence
inadmissible as evidence.
Held:
The general rule is a search and seizure must be
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validated by a previously secured judicial warrant;
otherwise, such a search and seizure is
unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any
evidence obtained in violation of this
constitutionally guaranteed right is legally
inadmissible in any proceeding.
The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search
incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving
vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs
search, and (5) waiver by the accused of their right
against unreasonable search and seizure. In these
cases, the search and seizure may be made only
with probable cause. Probable cause being at best
defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief
that the person accused is guilty of the offense
with which he is charged; or the existence of such
facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the
item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection
with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by is in the place to be searched.
Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been
adopted as another exception to the general rule
against a search without a warrant.
In the present case, petitioner effectively waived
the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally
obtained when he failed to raise the issue or object
thereto during the trial.
The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the respondent
court.
Agcaoili vs Molina
Facts:
In the aforecited order, complainant judge
alleged that respondent, in conducting the
preliminary investigation of the above-mentioned
criminal case, failed to exercise utmost care in the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against the
accused, Rolando Anama, based as it was, merely
on the statements of two (2) witnesses who had no
personal knowledge of the commission of the
offense charged.
Such action, complainant judge averred,
was a clear violation of section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution which requires that before a
warrant of arrest is issued, "the judge must
personally determine the existence of probable
cause from an examination under oath of the
complainant and his witnesses." 2
Mere hearsay evidence cannot be the basis
that probable cause exists, stated complainant
judge. There must be something more concrete.
Consequently, in the same order,
complainant judge recalled the warrant of arrest
and the order directing its issuance and directed
the National Bureau of Investigation, through
Regional Office No. 2, Ilagan, Isabela, to conduct
an investigation in order to avoid a possible
miscarriage of justice.
In his Comment, respondent admitted that he was
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
the inquest judge in the preliminary investigation
of the above entitled case and finding the
existence of probable cause, he ordered the
issuance of the warrant of arrest against the
accused and as the case was cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court, it was forwarded to the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Aparri, Cagayan. 3
Respondent explained that since the case
was cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office, which has the final
say and disposition on the existence of probable
cause on cases cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court, should carry the brunt of the responsibility
for "erroneous" finding of probable cause. 4
Respondent judge argued that the findings
of complainant judge in his 9 August 1993 order is
his opinion-argument and contended that "the
proper remedy for a seemingly weak probable
cause finding is a reinvestigation." 5
Issue: WON there was probable cause in the
issuance of a warrant.
Ruling:
Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the New Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires that a warrant of arrest shall be
issued only when the "municipal trial judge
conducting the preliminary investigation is
satisfied after an examination in writing in the form
of searching questions and answers, that a
probable cause exists and that there is a necessity
of placing the respondent under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice." This is in conformity with the
constitutional mandate that no "warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
In turn, probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought
to be arrested. 8
Although the foregoing provisions seemingly grant
judges wide latitude and unbridled discretion in
determining probable cause, an elementary legal
principle must not be compromised — hearsay
evidence cannot be the basis of probable cause.
The rules on evidence are explicit. A witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
from his own perception. 9 Hearsay evidence,
therefore, has no probative value whatsoever.
PEOPLE VS ESTRADA
FACTS:
A petition for review was filed seeking the reversal
of respondent Judge Estrada's order that granted
private respondent's motion to quash search
warrant 958 as well as the denial of petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. The pertinent facts of
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the present case are as follows:
> Atty. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information
and Compliance Division (LICD) of BFAD filed an
application for the issuance of a search warrant
against Aiden Lanuza (private respondent) of 516
San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City
for violation of Article 40(k) of RA 7934 (The
Consumer Act of the Philippines). However, the
application ended with a statement that the
warrant is to search the premises of another
person at a different address (Belen Cabanero at
New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu - who happened
to be the subject on whom another search was
applied for by the same applicant)
>Respondent Judge issued search warrant 958 on
June 27, 1995 which was served the next day. The
present petition stated that, during the search, the
team discovered that said address (516 xx) was
actually a 5,000-meter compound containing at
least 15 structures. The policemen proceeded to
search the residence of private respondent Lanuza
at Lot 41 of said address. Failure to find any drug
products prompted the policemen to proceed to
search a nearby warehouse at Lot 38 which yielded
52 cartons of assorted drug products.
> On August 22, 1995, private respondent Lanuza
filed a motion to quash the search warrant on the
ground that the search warrant is illegal and null
and void.
Respondent judge granted Lanyza’s motion to
quash the search warrant and denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge erred in granting
Lanuza’s motion to quash Search Warrant 958.
Held:
There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to
quash the search warrant.
Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for
nullifying the search warrant as she was not
convinced that there was probable cause for its
issuance due to the failure of the applicant to
present documentary proof indicating that private
respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell
drugs.
We hold that to establish the existence of probable
cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search
warrant, the applicant must show "facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.
The facts and circumstances that would show
probable cause must be the best evidence that
could be obtained under the circumstances. The
introduction of such evidence is necessary
especially in cases where the issue is the existence
or the negative ingredient of the offense charged
— for instance, the absence of a license required
by law, as in the present case — and such
evidence is within the knowledge and control of
the applicant who could easily produce the same.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
But if the best evidence could not be secured at
the time of application, the applicant must show a
justifiable reason therefore during the examination
by the judge. The necessity of requiring stringent
procedural safeguards before a search warrant can
be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional
right of a person to the privacy of his home and
personalities.
In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable
under the circumstances to prove that private
respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell
drugs is the certification to that effect from the
Department of Health. SPO4 Manuel Cabiles could
have easily procured such certification when he
went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of
licensed persons or entity. No justifiable reason
was introduced why such certification could not be
secured. Mere allegation as to the non-existence of
a license by private respondent is not sufficient to
establish probable cause for a search warrant.
Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not
been described with sufficient particularity in the
questioned search warrant, considering that
private respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is
actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la
Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs
sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at
Lot No. 38 within the same compound. The said
warehouse is owned by a different person.
This Court has held that the applicant should
particularly describe the place to be searched and
the person or things to be seized, wherever and
whenever it is feasible. 28 In the present case, it
must be noted that the application for search
warrant was accompanied by a sketch 29 of the
compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2-
storey residential house of private respondent with
a large "X" enclosed in a square. Within the same
compound are residences of other people,
workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With
this sketch as the guide, it could have been very
easy to describe the residential house of private
respondent with sufficient particularity so as to
segregate it from the other buildings or structures
inside the same compound. But the search warrant
merely indicated the address of the compound
which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo,
Cebu City. This description of the place to be
searched is too general and does not pinpoint the
specific house of private respondent. Thus, the
inadequacy of the description of the residence of
private respondent sought to be searched has
characterized the questioned search warrant as a
general warrant, which is violative of the
constitutional requirement.
Stonehill v Diokno
Facts:
Forty-two (42) search warrants were issued at
different dates against petitioners and the
corporations of which they were officers. Peace
officers were directed to search the persons of the
petitioners and/or their premises of their offices,
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warehouses and/or residences. Books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets, and profit
and loss statements and Bobbins were to be
seized.
Petitioner contends that the issued search
warrants were null and void as having contravened
the Constitution and the Rules of Court for, among
others, it did not describe the documents, books
and things to be seized PARTICULARLY.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant has been
validly issued.
Whether or not the seized articles may be
admitted in court.
Held:
The authority of the warrants in question may be
split in two major groups: (a) those found and
seized in the offices of the corporations; and (b)
those found and seized in the residences of the
petitioners.
The petitioners have no cause of action against the
contested warrants on the first major group. This is
because corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of their officers, directors and
stockholders. The legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired, the objection to an unlawful search
and seizure purely being personal cannot be
availed by third parties.
As to the second major group, two important
questions need be settled: (1) whether the search
warrants in question, and the searches and
seizures made under authority thereof, are valid or
not; and (2) if the answer is no, whether said
documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners.
The Constitution protects the rights of the people
from unreasonable searches and seizure. Two
points must be stressed in connection to this
constitutional mandate: (1) no warrant shall be
issued except if based upon probable cause
determined personally by the judge by the manner
set in the provision; and (2) the warrant shall
describe the things to be seized with particularly.
In the present case, no specific offense has been
alleged in the warrant’s application. The
averments of the offenses committed were
abstract and therefore, would make it impossible
for judges to determine the existence of probable
cause. Such impossibility of such determination
naturally hinders the issuance of a valid search
warrant.
The Constitution also requires the things to be
seized described with particularity. This is to
eliminate general warrants.
The Court held that the warrants issued for the
search of three residences of petitioners are null
and void.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
People vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
The properties consisted of 27 units of
distribution transformers of various sizes sold to
the University of the Philippines-Iloilo (UP, for
short) and delivered on June 15, 1987. The agreed
price, including installation cost, was $39,516.00
and was fully paid by UP to the seller, Varona
Trading, through its general manager, Danilo
Varona. On June 27, 1987, these same properties
were pulled out by Varona on the excuse that they
had certain factory defects that had to be repaired.
When Varona failed to comply with UP's demand
for their return pending their replacement, UP
referred the matter to the National Bureau of
Investigation, which found that the properties were
in the warehouse of Ruben Siao, herein private
respondent. NBI applied for and secured the
questioned search warrant, 1 which was issued by
Judge Abelardo M. Dayrit of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila on September 25, 1987. On the strength
of this warrant, NBI seized the said transformers,
which were later ascertained to be the same
transformers sold to UP, not only by their serial
numbers but also because the crates where they
were contained were marked "UP-Iloilo."
On September 28, Siao filed an urgent
motion to quash the search warrant on the ground
that Nissen-Denki Philippine Corporation, of which
he was the manager, had bought the said
transformers from Varona for the sum of
P702,483.00. The motion was denied on December
10, 1987, after a lengthy exchange of pleadings
between the parties. However, on July 7, 1988,
again after a spirited debate between the
petitioner and the private respondent, Judge Dayrit
granted Siao's motion for reconsideration and
dissolved the search warrant. He also ordered the
NBI to return the seized transformers to Siao.
UP had filed a complaint for estafa against
Varona and Siao and the City Prosecutor of Iloilo
City had lodged the corresponding information
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Upon re-
investigation of the complaint, however, it was
found that there was no cause to hold Siao for trial
and accordingly, on motion of the prosecution, the
case against him was dismissed by the trial court
on October 13, 1989.
Issue: WON the search warrant was valid.
Ruling:
The search warrant issued by the trial
court left the space in the caption intended for the
nature of the offense in blank, indicating the
uncertainty of petitioner and the court as to the
crime committed and for which the search warrant
was issued. On the other hand, all that the body of
the search warrant stated was that the
transformers were "Stolen or Embezzled and
proceeds or fruits of the offense, used or intended
to be used as the means of committing the
offense." But, since the particular offense was not
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mentioned, the reason for the issuance of the
search warrant could be anything under the sun.
There is no question that the search
warrant did not relate to a specific offense, in
violation of the doctrine announced in Stonehill v.
Diokno 2 and of Section 3 of Rule 126 providing as
follows:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. —
A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to
searched and the things to be seized. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Significantly, the petitioner has not denied
this defect in the search warrant and has merely
said that there was probable cause, omitting to
continue that it was in connection with one specific
offense. He could not, of course, for the warrant
was a scatter-shot warrant that could refer, in
Judge Dayrit's own words "to robbery, theft,
qualified theft or estafa." On this score alone, the
search warrant was totally null and void and was
correctly declared to be so by the very judge who
had issued it.
Probable cause is defined as referring to
"such facts and circumstances antecedent to the
issuance of the warrant that in themselves are
sufficient to induce a cautious person to rely on
them, and to act in pursuance thereof." 3 At the
time he issued the search warrant, there was in
Judge Dayrit's view probable cause that a crime
had been committed by Siao, who had possession
of the subject properties. However, such probable
cause no longer exists now because the
information for estafa against Siao has already
been dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila on motion of the prosecution itself. Siao's
guilt is no longer open for conjecture.
Abdula vs Guiani
Facts:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside
the warrant of arrest issued by herein respondent
Japal guiani, then presiding judge of Branch 14 of
RTC of Cotabato City, was filed before the Supreme
Court.
A complaint for murder was filed but was
dismissed by the provincial prosecutor on the
gorund that there was no prima facie case for
murder again a number of accused (6). However,
he recommended the filing of an information for
murder against one of the respondents (accused)
only before the sala of the respondent judge
Guiani. Guiani returned the case to the provincial
prosecutor for further investigation since there was
no necessary resolution required under the Rules
of Court to show how the investigating prosecutor
arrived at such a conclusion (charging only one of
the 8 respondent-accused). Upon the return of the
records of the case, it was assigned for
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
reinvestigation to another prosecutor who then
recommended the filing of charges against 5
accused, 2 of whom are herein petitioners.
On January 2, 1995, an information was filed
against petitioner-spouses and 3 others. The
following day, January 3, respondent Judge issued
a warrant for the arrest of petitioners. On January
4, petitioners filed an urgent Ex-Parte motion for
the setting aside of saide warrant of arrest. On
January 11, a petition for review was filed with the
DOJ. Despite said filing, respondent judge did not
act upon petitioner’s pending Motion to Set Aside
the Warrant of Arrest.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
praying the warrant of Arrest be set aside and
declared void ab initio.
Issue: WON the Warrant of Arrest should be set
aside and declared void ab initio.
Held:
Section 2, Art. III, 1987 Constititution: “The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and NO SEARCH
WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE
EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE
DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER
EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF
THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY
PRODUCE and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.”
It must be stressed that the 1987 Constitution
requires the judge to determine probable
cause "personally," a requirement which does not
appear in the corresponding provisions of our
previous constitutions. This emphasis evinces the
intent of the framers to place a greater degree of
responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed
under previous Constitutions.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive
and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause.
In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.
Ho vs. People 41 summarizes existing
jurisprudence on the matter as follows:
Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish to
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emphasize three vital matters once more: First, as
held in
Inting, the determination of probable cause by the
prosecutor is for a purpose different from that
which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and should be held
for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The
judge, on the other hand, determines whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for
placing him under immediate custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice.
Second, since their objectives are different, the
judge cannot rely solely on the report of the
prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. The judge must
decide independently. Hence, he must have
supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's
bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own
findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of
probable cause to issue an arrest order. This
responsibility of determining personally and
independently the existence or nonexistence of
probable cause is lodged in him by no less than
the most basic law of the land.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire
records of the case during the preliminary
investigation be submitted to and examined by the
judge.What is required, rather, is that the judge
must have sufficient supporting documents (such
as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits,
sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of
stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his
independent judgment or, at the very least, upon
which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to
the existence of probable cause. The point is: he
cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's
recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this
case.
In the case at bench, respondent admits that he
issued the questioned warrant as there was "no
reason for (him) to doubt the validity of the
certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that
a preliminary investigation was conducted and that
probable cause was found to exist as against those
charged in the information filed." The statement is
an admission that respondent relied solely and
completely on the certification made by the fiscal
that probable cause exists as against those
charged in the information and issued the
challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of
the prosecutor's findings and recommendations.
He adopted the judgment of the prosecutor
regarding the existence of probable cause as his
own. CONSEQUENTLY, THE WARRANT OF ARREST
SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID.
PICOP vs. Asuncion GR 122092 May 19, 1999
Facts:
On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector
Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant
before the Quezon City RTC, stating:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
1. The management of PICOP located at PICOP
compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del
Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo
G. Santiago, is in possession or has in its control
high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives,
which are the subject of the offense, or used or
intended to be used in committing the offense,
and which … are being kept and concealed in the
premises described.
2. That the Search Warrant should be issued to
enable any agent of the law to take possession
and bring to this Honorable Court the following
described properties:
a. 70 M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56
b. 10 M16 US rifles
c. 2 AK-47 rifles
d. 2 UZI submachine guns
e. 2 M203 Grenade Launchers cal. 40mm
f. 10 cal. 45 pistols
g. 10 cal. 38 revolvers
h. 2 ammunition reloading machines
i. Assorted ammunitions for said calibers of
firearms
j. 10 hand grenades
After propounding several questions to SPO3
Bacolod, Judge Asuncion issued the contested
search warrant.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant issued by Judge
Asuncion complied with the requisites for a valid
issuance.
Held:
Sections 3 & 4 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
provide in detail the requisites for the valid
issuance of search warrants. The requisites are: (1)
probable cause is present; (2) such presence is
determined personally by the judge; (3) the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce are personally examined by the judge, in
writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and
the things to be seized.
In the present case, the search warrant is INVALID
because (1) the trial court failed to examine
personally the complainant and the other
deponents; (2) SPO3 Bacolod had no personal
knowledge that the petitioners were not licensed
to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place
to be searched was not described with
particularity.
Chief Inspector Pascua was asked was not asked
nor said anything more in his application. He even
failed to affirm it. The trial judge failed to propound
questions, let alone probing questions. Judge
Asuncion heavily relied on their affidavits. Mere
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are
not sufficient. It is axiomatic that the examination
must be probing and exhaustive, not merely
routinary or pro-forma. The judge must not simply
rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make
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his own inquiry on the intent and justification of
the application.
SPO3 Bacolod appeared during the hearing and
was extensively examined by the judge. However,
his testimony showed that he did not have
personal knowledge that the petitioners were not
licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or
explosives in violation of PD 1866.
Lastly, the search warrant failed to describe
particularly the place to be searched. It merely
authorized the search of the aforementioned
premises. The warrant thus gives the police
officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to
search all the structures found inside the PICOP
compound. The particularization of the description
of the place to be searched may properly be done
only by the judge, and only in the warrant itself; it
cannot be left to the discretion of the police
officers conducting the search.
Since the evidences are illegally obtained, they are
deemed inadmissible in Court.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition is
GRANTED, & the Search Warrant declared NULL &
VOID.
PEOPLE VS CA (291 SCRA 400)
FACTS
A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate
the order of Judge Casanova which quashed search
warrant issued by Judge Bacalla and declared
inadmissible for any purpose the items seized
under the warrant.
>An application for a search warrant was made by
S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar Hussain who had
allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives
at Abigail Variety Store, Apt 1207 Area F. Bagon
Buhay Avenue, Sarang Palay, San Jose Del Monte,
Bulacan. The following day Search Warrant No.
1068 was issued but was served not at Abigail
Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately
adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the
arrest of 4 Pakistani nationals and the seizure of a
number of different explosives and firearms.
ISSUE: WON a search warrant was validly issued
as regard the apartment in which private
respondents were then actually residing, or more
explicitly, WON that particular apartment had been
specifically described in the warrant.
HELD:
The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising
from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the
place to be searched between the applicants for
the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and
what was done was to substitute for the place that
the Judge had written down in the warrant, the
premises that the executing officers had in their
mind. This should not have been done. It is neither
fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a
place different from that stated in the warrant on
the claim that the place actually searched —
although not that specified in the warrant — is
exactly what they had in view when they applied
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
for the warrant and had demarcated in their
supporting evidence. What is material in
determining the validity of a search is the place
stated in the warrant itself, not what the
applicants had in their thoughts, or had
represented in the proofs they submitted to the
court issuing the warrant.
The place to be searched, as set out in the
warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the
officers'
own personal knowledge of the premises, or the
evidence they adduced in support of their
application for the warrant. Such a change is
proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter
alia the search warrant to particularly describe the
place to be searched as well as the persons or
things to be seized. It would concede to police
officers the power of choosing the place to be
searched, even if it not be that delineated in the
warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of
the search process, and grant to officers executing
a search warrant that discretion which the
Constitution has precisely removed from them. The
particularization of the description of the place to
be searched may properly be done only by the
Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be
left to the discretion of the police officers
conducting the search.
VALLEJO VS CA
FACTS: A SW was applied for and subsequently
issued by respondents to be served in the Registry
of Deeds, provincial capitol of Isabela in which it
enumerated the things to be seized:
1. Undetermined number of Fake Land Titles,
Official Receipts in the Cashier's Office, Judicial
Form No. 39 known as Primary Entry Book under
No. 496 and other pertinent documents related
therewith;
2. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the
drawers of every table of employees of the
Registry (sic) of Deeds;
3. Undetermined number of land Transfer
transactions without the corresponding payment
of Capital Gains Tax and payment of
documentary Stamps.
A motion to quash the SW was filed by the
respondent contending that the things to be seized
were not described with particularity and was in a
nature of a general warrant, therefore, is a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures but was
denied by the RTC and the CA. Hence, the present
petition for certiorari. (The OSG in its comment
agreed with petitioners.)
ISSUE: WON the warrant issued by the RTC was
valid.
CREATED BY: JNMONTECLARO, KVALMORIA, ADULOSA, and other sources
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HELD:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A
search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may
be anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. – The
judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on
facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted.
The things to be seized must be described with
particularity. Technical precision of description is
not required. It is only necessary that there be
reasonable particularity and certainty as to
the identity of the property to be searched
for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a
mere roving commission. Any description of the
place or thing to be searched that will enable
the officer making the search with
reasonable certainty to locate such place or
thing is sufficient. Thus, the specific
property to be searched for should be so
particularly described as to preclude any
possibility of seizing any other property(test
of particularity).
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner and the
OSG, the terms expressly used in the warrant were
too all-embracing, with the obvious intent of
subjecting all the records pertaining to all the
transactions of the petitioner's office at the
Register of Deeds to search and seizure. Such
tenor of a seizure warrant contravenes the explicit
command of the Constitution that there be a
particular description of the things to be seized.
PEOPLE VS LAGUIO JR.
FACTS: Respondent was acquitted on 3 different
cases filed against him (dangerous drugs act,
illegal possession of firearms and comelec gun
ban) after his demurrer to evidence (inadmissibility
of the evidence) was granted due to the
illegal/unlawful arrest, search and seizure that was
conducted by the police officers contending that
he was arrested in flagrante delicto but the
defense further presented that respondent did not
do any overt act to make him be subject to a
warrantless arrest under the exceptions in section
5 of rule 113.
ISSUE: Whether there was lawful arrest, search
and seizure by the police operatives in this case
despite the absence of a WOA and/or SW.
HELD:
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
case, namely, the warrantless arrest and the
warrantless search. There is no question that
warrantless search may be conducted as an
incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a
search can be made; the process cannot be
reversed. However, if there are valid reasons to
conduct lawful search and seizure which thereafter
shows that the accused is currently committing a
crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in
flagrante delicto without need for a warrant of
arrest.
Section 5, provides three (3) instances when
warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected:
(a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto;
(b) arrest of a suspect where, based on
personal knowledge of the arresting officer,
there is probable cause that said suspect
was the author of a crime which had just
been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who
has escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused
caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph
(a) of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.
The facts and circumstances surrounding the
present case did not manifest any suspicious
behavior on the part of private respondent
Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the
attention of the police. He was merely walking
from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to
enter the parked BMW car when the police
operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his
person and commanded him to open the
compartment of the car, which was later on found
to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not
committing any visible offense then. Therefore,
there can be no valid warrantless arrest in
flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5.
It is settled that "reliable information" alone,
absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise in the presence and within the
view of the arresting officers, is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that
would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by
the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was
illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental
to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
PEOPLE VS. TABAR
CREATED BY: JNMONTECLARO, KVALMORIA, ADULOSA, and other sources
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FACTS:
Respondent-accused was charged, together with
her nephew, for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act in an information which provided that:
That on or about the 8th day of February 1989, at
about 3:00 PM. in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, with
deliberate intent, did then and there sell and
deliver, without authority of law, Three (3) sticks of
marijuana cigarettes, a (sic) prohibited drugs, to a
person who posted himself as a buyer, in Viol. of
Sec. 4, Art. 11, of RA 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Act of 1972.
The accused were then convicted of the offense
charged against them in the trial court.
On appeal, respondent presented her argument
that the lower court erred in admitting the
evidence against her when there wasn’t any
search warrant. Therefore, violating the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
ISSUE: WON there was a violation against the
constitutional guarantee of individuals against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
RULING:
The second assigned error is without merit. The
evidence for the prosecution discloses that the
appellant placed the packs of marijuana sticks
under the rolled pair of pants which she was then
carrying at the time she hurriedly left her shanty
after noticing the arrest of Rommel. When she was
asked to spread it out, which she voluntary did, the
package containing the packs of marijuana sticks
were thus exposed in plain view to the member of
the team. A crime was thus committed in the
presence of the policemen. Pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 113 and Section 12 Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court, she could lawfully be arrested and
searched for anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of an offense without the
corresponding arrest and search warrants
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that
the seach and seizure were without a
warrant, the appellant had effectively
waived her constitutional right relative
thereto by voluntarily submitting to the
seach and seizure. In People vs.
Malasugui, 20 this Court ruled:
When one voluntarily submits to a search
and consent to have it made of his person or
premises, he is precluded from later
complaining thereof. The right to be secure
from unreasonable seach may, like every
right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly.
PEOPLE VS. DORIA
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
FACTS:
A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police
which caught accused Doria red-handed of selling
prohibited drugs and during the operation the
police officers searched for the marked bills that
they used in buying said drugs which happened to
be in the house of Gaddao, according to Doria.
When they reached her house, the police officers
came upon a box. He saw that one of the box's
flaps was open and inside the box was something
wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its
contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier
"sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3
Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold
of the box. He peeked inside the box and found
that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared
to be dried marijuana leaves.
Both accused were convicted of the crime chared.
Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest of Gaddao, the
search of her person and house, and the
admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained
therefrom was valid.
HELD:
We hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-
appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests
are allowed in three instances as provided by
Section 5 of Rule 113. Under Section 5 (a), a
person may be arrested without a warrant if he
"has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria
was caught in the act of committing an offense.
When an accused is apprehended in flagrante
delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the
police are not only authorized but duty-bound to
arrest him even without a warrant.
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the
search of her person and residence, and the
seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills
are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure
without a judicial warrant and any evidence
obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. 105 The rule is,
however, not absolute. Search and seizure may
be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained there from may be admissible in
the following instances: (1) search incident
to a lawful arrest; 2) search of a moving
motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in
plain view; (5) when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Accused-appellant
Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the
buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest
under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not
committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of
the trial court, there was no occasion at all for
CREATED BY: JNMONTECLARO, KVALMORIA, ADULOSA, and other sources
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appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to
justify her arrest in "hot pursuit."114 In fact, she
was going about her daily chores when the
policemen pounced on her.
This brings us to the question of whether the trial
court correctly found that the box of marijuana was
in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence
has a prior justification for an intrusion or is
in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure. The law enforcement officer must
lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the
area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he
came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be
open to eye and hand and its discovery
inadvertent.
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the
object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The
difficulty arises when the object is inside a
closed container. Where the object seized
was inside a closed package, the object itself
is not in plain view and therefore cannot be
seized without a warrant. However, if the
package proclaims its contents, whether by
its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or if its contents are obvious
to an observer, then the contents are in plain
view and may be seized. In other words, if
the package is such that an experienced
observer could infer from its appearance that
it contains the prohibited article, then the
article is deemed in plain view. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items
that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The
marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure
without the requisite search warrant was in
violation of the law and the Constitution. 135 It was
fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been
excluded and never considered by the trial court.
PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT
Facts:
In an information filed against the accused-
appellant Mikael Malmstead was charged before
the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for violation of
Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended. Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a
Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had
visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for
Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning
of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and
stayed in that place for two (2) days. Then in the 7
in the morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went
to Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada. At about 8: 00
o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May
1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding
Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM)
stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set
up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop,
Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of
checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the
said area was prompted by persistent reports that
vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover,
information was received by the Commanding
Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
possession prohibited drugs. The group composed
of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with
Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the
designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the
morning and inspected all vehicles coming from
the Cordillera Region. The two (2) NARCOM officers
started their inspection from the front going
towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the
sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear
thereof. During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed
a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge
on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked
for accused's passport and other identification
papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer
required him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out
to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the
same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4)
suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown
packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of
the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned
out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for
questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags
from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the
bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A
teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the
teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were
bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam
stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened
the bags that accused finally presented his
passport. Accused was then brought to the
headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the
investigation room, the officers opened the teddy
bears and they were found to also contain hashish.
Representative samples were taken from the
hashish found among the personal effects of
accused and the same were brought to the PC
Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the
objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug
CREATED BY: JNMONTECLARO, KVALMORIA, ADULOSA, and other sources
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which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an
information was filed against accused for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
ACCUSED’S DEFENSE
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of
"not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of
illegal search of his personal effects. He also
claimed that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two
(2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but
were merely entrusted to him by an Australian
couple whom he met in Sagada. He further
claimed that the Australian couple intended to
take the same bus with him but because there
were no more seats available in said bus, they
decided to take the next ride and asked accused to
take charge of the bags, and that they would meet
each other at the Dangwa Station. The trial court
found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt
established beyond reasonable doubt. Seeking the
reversal of the decision of the trial court finding
him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues
that the search of his personal effects was illegal
because it was made without a search warrant
and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were
discovered during the illegal search are not
admissible as evidence against him.
Issue: Whether or Not the contention of the
accused is valid, and therefore the RTC ruling be
reversed.
Held:
The Constitution guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. However, where the search is made
pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to
obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a
private person under the following circumstances.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Accused was searched and arrested while
transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime
was actually being committed by the accused and
he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the
search made upon his personal effects falls
squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing
provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
NARCOM officers were not armed with a search
warrant when the search was made over the
personal effects of accused, however, under the
circumstances of the case, there was sufficient
probable cause for said officers to believe that
accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. Warrantless search of
the personal effects of an accused has been
declared by this Court as valid, because of
existence of probable cause, where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by
the accused, 10 or where the accused was acting
suspiciously, and attempted to flee. The appealed
judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby
affirmed. Costs against the accused-appellant.
PEOPLE VS. AMINUDIN
Facts:
Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on
June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the
M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo
City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for
him because of a tip from one their informers
simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding
what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to
their headquarters for investigation. The two
bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from
him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. It was found to contain three kilos of
what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by
an NBI forensic examiner. An information for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed
against him. Later, the information was amended
to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been
arrested with him that same evening and likewise
investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to
dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a
sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving
her after a thorough investigation." The motion
was granted, and trial proceeded only against the
accused appellant, who was eventually convicted .
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the
marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was
his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and
two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was
arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed.
His bag was confiscated without a search warrant.
At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to
force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana,
the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in
the chest and arms even as he parried the blows
while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did
not even know what marijuana looked like and that
his business was selling watches and sometimes
cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his
allegations. Saying that he only has two watches
during that time and that he did not sufficiently
proved the injuries allegedly sustained.
CREATED BY: JNMONTECLARO, KVALMORIA, ADULOSA, and other sources
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Issue: Whether or not search of defendant’s bag is
legal.
Held:
The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught
in flagrante delicto, which could allow warrantless
arrest or search. At the moment of his arrest, he
was not committing a crime. Nor was he about to
do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he
was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana
therefore could not be appreciated as evidence
against the defendant, and furthermore he is
acquitted of the crime as charged.
MALACAT vs. CA
Facts:
Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession
a hand grenade after he was searched by a group
of policemen when he was said to be acting suspici
ously when he was hanging around Plaza Miranda
with his eyes moving fast together with other Musli
m-looking men. When the policemen approached t
he group of men, they scattered in all directions w
hich prompted the police to give chase and petitio
ner was then apprehended and a search was made
on his person.
He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower
court. Hence, the present petition wherein petition
er contended that the lower court erred in holding
that the search made on him and the seizure of th
e hand grenade from him was an appropriate incid
ent to his arrest and that it erred in admitting the h
and grenade as evidence since it was admissible b
ecause it was a product of an unreasonable and ill
egal search.
Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by t
he police was valid.
Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and
seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to
validly effect the same. 31 The Constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches
and seizures refers to those effected without a
validly issued warrant, 32 subject to certain
exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests,
these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful —
A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances
contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while
that under Section 5(b) has been described as a
"hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are
limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2)
search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence
in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a search
incidental to a lawful arrest;34 and (6) a "stop and
frisk.’
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused
the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of
warrantless searches differ in terms of the
requisite quantum of proof before they may be
validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as
the precedent arrest determines the validity
of the incidental search, the legality of the
arrest is questioned in a large majority of
these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was
merely used as a pretext for conducting a
search. 36 In this instance, the law requires
that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made — the process cannot be
reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid
arrest, the arresting officer may search the
person of the arrestee and the area within
which the latter may reach for a weapon or
for evidence to destroy, and seize any money
or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the
crime, or that which may be used as
evidence, or which might furnish the
arrestee with the means of escaping or
committing violence.
We now proceed to the justification for and
allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons,"
as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself
as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear
CREATED BY: JNMONTECLARO, KVALMORIA, ADULOSA, and other sources
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for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for
the protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment . .
Other notable points of Terry are that while
probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop
and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of
the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-
frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the
general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies
the recognition that a police officer may,
under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and
(2) the more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation which permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals is not armed
with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the
police officer.
GO VS. CA
FACTS: Petitioner was the primary suspect of
killing of Maguan when he was seen by a security
officer near the place where his and the victim’s
car almost collided at the corner of a street, after
which he went of out of his car and shot Maguan,
which caused his death later on, then went back to
his car and left the scene. He was then arrested
days after the crime happened.
ISSUE: WON a lawful warratless arrest had been
effected by the San Juan Police in respect of
petitioner Go.
HELD:
We do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or
detention of petitioner in the instant case falls
within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days
after the shooting of Maguan. The
"arresting" officers obviously were not
present, within the meaning of Section 5(a),
at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected
six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably
regarded as effected "when [the shooting
had] in fact just been committed" within the
meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of
the "arresting" officers had any "personal
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
knowledge" of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot
Maguan. The information upon which the police
acted had been derived from statements made by
alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated
that petitioner was the gunman; another was able
to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate
number which turned out to be registered in
petitioner's wife's name. That information did not,
however, constitute "personal knowledge."
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no
lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
PEOPLE V. MENGOTE
Facts:
The Western Police District received a telephone
call from an informer that there were three
suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan
Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A
surveillance team of plainclothesmen was
forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen
saw two men looking from side to side, one of
whom holding his abdomen. They approached the
persons and identified themselves as policemen,
whereupon the two tried to run but unable to
escape because the other lawmen surrounded
them. The suspects were then searched. One of
them the accused-appellant was found with a .38
caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his
companion had a fan knife. The weapons were
taken from them and they were turned over to the
police headquarters for investigation. Information
was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of
illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness
testified that the weapon was among the articles
stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police
including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made
no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or
that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he
claimed that the weapon was planted on him at
the time of his arrest. He was convicted for
violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that
the weapon was not admissible as evidence
against him because it had been illegally seized
and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and
arrest was illegal.
Held:
Evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search
and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding for any
purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the
Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court,
provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a)
the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of the
facts indicating the person arrested has committed
it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped
from a penal establishment or a place where he is
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serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to
another. These requirements have not been
established in the case at bar. At the time of the
arrest in question, the accused appellant was
merely looking from side to side and holding his
abdomen, according to the arresting officers
themselves. There was apparently no offense that
has just been committed or was being actually
committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in
their presence. Moreover a person may not be
stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a
busy street on unexplained suspicion. Judgment is
reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is
acquitted.
UMIL VS. RAMOS
Facts:
On 1 February 1988, military agents were
dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential
information which was received by their office,
about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had
been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot
wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital
was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who
murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day
before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00
o'clock noon, before a road hump along
Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The
wounded man's name was listed by the hospital
management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22)
years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes,
Binan, Laguna however it was disclosed later that
the true name of the wounded man was Rolando
Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural
was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof
the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined
thereat, he was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2
CAPCOM mobile patrols.
Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully
arrested.
Held:
Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of
the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the
arrest without warrant is justified as it can
be said that he was committing as offense
when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
therefore in connection therewith constitute direct
assaults against the state and are in the nature of
continuing crimes.
PEOPLE VS. LEILA JOHNSON
Facts:
Leila Johnson was arrested at the airport after she
was found to have in her possession more than
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
500 grams of shabu when she was initially frisked
by a security personnel at a gate in the airport.
The security personnel felt something hard in
respondent’s abdominal area and when asked she
said that she had to wear 2 girdles because of an
operation. Unconvinced, the security personnel
went to her supervisor. Subsequently, after a
thorough search on respondent, packets of shabu
were seized from her.
Accused (respondent) was subsequently convicted
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
In the present appeal, respondent contended that
the search made upon her was not valid and that
her constitutional rights were infringed when such
search was conducted.
Issue: WON a valid search was made.
Held:
The constitutional right of the accused was not
violated as she was never placed under custodial
investigation but was validly arrested without
warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5,
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) when in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
and…
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the
accused above falls in either paragraph (a) or (b)
of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that
she has been subjected to custodial investigation
is far from being accurate.[18]
The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized
from her during the routine frisk at the airport was
acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the
search and seizure clause by exposure of
their persons or property to the public in a
manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation
society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over
airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation’s
airports. Passengers attempting to board an
aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors;
their carry-on baggages as well as checked
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luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray
scans. Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects, physical searches
are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the
reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs, and
notices in their airline tickets that they are subject
to search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. These announcements place passengers
on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches
and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride
having thus been obtained through a valid
warrantless search, they are admissible in
evidence against the accused-appellant
herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest,
although likewise without warrant, was
justified since it was effected upon the
discovery and recovery of “shabu” in her
person in flagrante delicto.
PAPA VS. MAGO
Facts: Mago, the owner of the goods that were
seized, when the truck transporting the goods was
intercepted by the BOC, questioned the validity of
the search conducted by them since it was made
without any search warrant and whether the BOC
has jurisdiction over the forfeited goods.
Issue: Was the search conducted by the BOC
valid?
Held:
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion
policemen had authority to effect the seizure
without any search warrant issued by a competent
court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not
require said warrant in the instant case. The Code
authorizes persons having police authority under
Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to
enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling
house; and also to inspect, search and examine
any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or
envelope or any person on board, or to stop and
search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a
search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of
a dwelling house, the Code provides that said
"dwelling house may be entered and
searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or
justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered
view, therefor, that except in the case of the
search of a dwelling house, persons exercising
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
police authority under the customs law may effect
search and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws.
In, Carroll vs US, it was made lawful for
customs officers not only to board and
search vessels within their own and
adjoining districts, but also to stop, search
and examine any vehicle, beast or person on
which or whom they should suspect there
was merchandise which was subject to duty,
or had been introduced into the United
States in any manner contrary to law,
whether by the person in charge of the
vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they
should find any goods, wares, or
merchandise thereon, which they had
probably cause to believe had been so
unlawfully brought into the country, to seize
and secure the same, and the vehicle or
beast as well, for trial and forfeiture.
ROBIN PADILLA VS. CA
Facts: Petitioner was involved in a hit and run
accident and was later apprehended by the police
after he was chased by them. During the arrest,
petitioner was found to have in his possession two
different firearms and 2 other firearms were found
inside his vehicle after the policemen saw the first
two firearms he was carrying.
Petitioner was then convicted of illegal possession
of firearms. Hence the present petition.
Issue: WON the warrantless search and arrest
conducted on petitioner was valid
Held:
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following
instances:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. —
A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to
another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested
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(i) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an
offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer
or private person. 29 Both elements concurred
here, as it has been established that petitioner's
vehicle figured in a hit and run — an offense
committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a
private person, who then sought to arrest
petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that
"presence" does not only require that the arresting
person sees the offense, but also when he "hears
the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at
once to the scene." 30 As testified to by Manarang,
he heard the screeching of tires followed by a
thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor),
reported the incident to the police and thereafter
gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his
motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After
having sent a radio report to the PNP for
assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan
bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2
Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near
the bridge who effected the actual arrest of
petitioner.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a
warrantless search and seizure of property is
valid, 44 are as follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court45 and by prevailing
jurisprudence 46,
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the
elements of which are:
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who had the right to
be where they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately
apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.
3. search of a moving vehicle. 49 Highly regulated
by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity.
4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
In conformity with respondent court's observation,
it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled
upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions
without even undertaking any active search which,
as it is commonly understood, is a prying into
hidden places for that which is concealed. 51 The
seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-
16 rifle magazine was justified for they came
within "plain view" of the policemen
who inadvertently discovered the revolver and
magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back
pocket respectively, when he raised his hands
after alighting from his Pajero. The same
justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16
armalite rifle which wasimmediately apparent to
the policemen as they took a casual glance at the
Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the
driver's seat. 52 Thus it has been held that:
(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the
commission of a criminal offense, the . . .
police officers should happen to discover a
criminal offense being committed by any
person, they are not precluded from
performing their duties as police officers for
the apprehension of the guilty person and
the taking of the, corpus delicti. 53
Objects whose possession are prohibited by
law inadvertently found in plain view are
subject to seizure even without a warrant.
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black
bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This
latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of
his right against the alleged search and
seizure 56, and that his failure to quash the
information estopped him from assailing any
purported defect.
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions
were products of an active search done by the
authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner,
their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless
can still be justified under a search incidental to a
lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest
was effected, the police may undertake a
protective search 58 of the passenger compartment
and containers in the vehicle 59 which are within
petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the
nature of the offense. 60 This satisfied the two-
tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to
be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's
custody or area of immediate control 61 and (ii) the
search was contemporaneous with the
arrest. 62 The products of that search are
admissible evidence not excluded by the
exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search
of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection
therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally
permissible when, as in this case, the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or
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probable cause to believe, before the search, that
either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein
petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the
contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds
of some criminal offense.
PEOPLE VS. MARIACOS
Facts: Respondent was found guilty of violation of
the dangerous drugs act.
She was arrested after she was carrying a bag
alleged to have prohibited drugs inside. The bag,
before it came to her possession was found inside
a passenger jeepney with no owner so the
policeman looked inside it only to find packs of
marijuana. The policeman was acting on a report
made about the bag by an agent of the Barangay
Intelligence Network.
Issue: WON the warrantless search conducted was
valid.
Held:Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation
of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is
misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked
into the contents of the suspicious bags, there was
no identified owner. He asked the other passengers
atop the jeepney but no one knew who owned the
bags. Thus, there could be no violation of the right
when no one was entitled thereto at that time.
Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a
moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of a
moving vehicle has been justified on the ground
that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it
possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could
not be expected to secure a search warrant in
order to check the contents of the bags which were
loaded on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a
search warrant would have been of no use
because the motor vehicle had already left the
locality.13
The constitutional proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of certain
exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a
lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been
upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the
seizure of evidence in plain view.
It is well to remember that in the instances we
have recognized as exceptions to the requirement
of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer
effecting the arrest or seizure must have been
impelled to do so because of probable cause. The
essential requisite of probable cause must be
satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure
can be lawfully conducted.17 Without probable
cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in
evidence against the person arrested.18
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is
guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the
existence of such facts and circumstances that can
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the items, articles or objects sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure
and destruction by law are in the place to be
searched.19
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in
the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to
be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must
be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.
PEOPLE VS. SUZUKI
Facts: Appellant was found guilty of illeal
possession of prohibited drugs and was sentenced
to death. Hence, the instant review.
The facts of the case are:
Appellant was in the airport for his flight to Manila.
PASCOM and NARCOM agents were in the airport to
follow on reports on drug trafficking.
When he walked through the metal detector, the
alarm sounded. He was bodily frisked and nothing
was found on his person so they proceeded to
check his luggage but appellant refused then
consented eventually and opened it. There they
found packs of aluminum foil and when opened, it
was found to be marijuana.
Issue: WON the PASCOM agents were authorized
to conduct the search. WON accused consented to
the search. WON the search was conducted was
incidental to a lawful arrest. WON the confiscated
items were in plain view.
Held:
In PPvs.Canton and PPvs.Johnson we validated the
search conducted on the departing passengers
and the consequent seizure of the shabu found in
their persons, thus:
"Persons may lose the protection of the search and
seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack
of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.xxx"
It should be stressed, however, that whenever the
right against unreasonable search and seizure is
challenged, an individual may choose between
invoking the constitutional protection or waiving
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his right by giving consent to the search or
seizure.9
Here, appellant voluntarily gave his consent to the
search conducted by the PASCOM agents.
It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each
case.12 Given the circumstances obtaining here, we
find the search conducted by the airport
authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative
of his constitutional rights. Hence, when the search
of the box of piaya revealed several marijuana
fruiting tops, appellant is deemed to have been
caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest
even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule
113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.13 The packs
of marijuana obtained in the course of such valid
search are thus admissible as evidence against
appellant.14
Nonetheless, we find the trial court’s reliance on
the plain view doctrine misplaced. Such doctrine
finds application only when the incriminating
nature of the object is in the "plain view" of the
police officer.15 Here, it is beyond cavil that the
marijuana seized from appellant is contained in the
box of piaya, wrapped in aluminum foil and not
immediately apparent to the airport authorities.
Neither was the search incidental to a lawful arrest
since appellant was not yet arrested at the time of
the search. To be considered a search incidental to
a lawful arrest, the law requires that there must be
a lawful arrest before the search can be made.
SALVADOR VS. PEOPLE
Facts: Petitioners, PAL ground crew employees
were allegedly caught with dutiable goods
(branded watches, etc) after PAF officers were
observing their conduct and found it to be
suspicious during a special mission given to them
to make a routine surveillance to check on reports
of alleged trafficking and smuggling being
facilitated by PAL employees.
Petitioners were convicted. Hence, the present
petition.
Issue: WON the seized items are admissible in
evidence.
Held:
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in
question, the special mission of the PAF operatives
was to conduct a surveillance operation to verify
reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by
certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of the airport.
In other words, the search made by the PAF team
on petitioner and his co-accused was in the nature
of a customs search. As such, the team properly
effected the search and seizure without a search
warrant since it exercised police authority under
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
the customs law.
In Papa vs. Mago, involving a customs search,
we held that law enforcers who are tasked to
effect the enforcement of the customs and
tariff laws are authorized to search and seize,
without a search warrant, any article, cargo or
other movable property when there is
reasonable cause to suspect that the said
items have been introduced into the
Philippines in violation of the tariff and
customs law. They may likewise conduct a
warrantless search of any vehicle
or person suspected of holding or conveying
the said articles, as in the case at bar.
In short, Mago clearly recognizes the power of
the State to foil any fraudulent schemes
resorted to by importers who evade payment
of customs duties. The Government’s policy
to combat the serious malady of smuggling
cannot be reduced to futility and impotence
on the ground that dutiable articles on which
the duty has not been paid are entitled to the
same Constitutional protection as an
individual’s private papers and effects. Here,
we see no reason not to apply this State
policy which we have continued to affirm.
EPIE JR. VS. ULAT-MARREDO
Facts: Petitioners were caught to have in their
possession lumber and subsequently could not
produce any permit from the DENR for them to cut
and transport the same. Such incident happened
after the police came about a report of a vehicle
transporting lumber without permit and after
which set up a roadblock to catch said vehicle.
After the described vehicle was spotted by the
police they intercepted it. They flagged it down
but it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it
until it reached Shilan, La Trinidad. A search of the
vehicle disclosed several pieces of Benguet pine
lumber. Petitioners could not produce the required
DENR permit to cut and transport the same.
Issue: WON the police officers have a probable
cause to believe that the subject vehicle was
loaded with illegal cargo and that, therefore, it can
be stopped and searched without a warrant.
Held:
In People v. Sarap,7 we listed the exceptions where
search and seizure may be conducted without
warrant, thus: (1) search incident to a lawful
arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3)
search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of
the evidence in plain view; (5) search when the
accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; (6) stop and
frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency
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circumstances. The only requirement in these
exceptions is the presence of probable cause.
Probable cause is the existence of such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonable,
discreet, and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the
place to be searched.8 In People v. Aruta,9 we ruled
that in warrantless searches, probable cause must
only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion
or belief that a crime has been committed or is
about to be committed. There is no hard and fast
rule or fixed formula in determining probable
cause for its determination varies according to the
facts of each case.
Here, the search involved a moving vehicle, an
instance where a warrantless search and seizure
may be conducted by peace officers. The only
issue we should determine is whether there was
probable cause to justify such warrantless search
and seizure.
In People v. Vinecarao,10 we ruled that where a
vehicle sped away after noticing a checkpoint and
even after having been flagged down by police
officers, in an apparent attempt to dissuade the
police from proceeding with their inspection, there
exists probable cause to justify a reasonable belief
on the part of the law enforcers that the persons
on board said vehicle were officers of the law or
that the vehicle contained objects which were
instruments of some offense. This ruling squarely
applies to the present case.
VALMONTE VS. GEN. DE VILLA
FACTS:
On January 20, 1987, the NCRDC was activated
with the mission of conducting security
operationswithhin its area of responsibility and
peripheral areas for thepurpose of establishing an
effective territorialdefense, maintaining peace and
order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to
the social, economic and political development of
the NCR. As part of its duty to maintain peace and
order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela and Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that because of the institution of
said checkpoints, the Velanzuela residents are
worried of being harassed and of their safety being
placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints
considering that their cars and vehicles are being
subjected to regular searches and check-ups
especially at night or at dawn without a search
warrant or a court order. Their alleged fear for their
safety increased when Benjamin Parpon was
gunned down allegedly in cold blood by members
of the NCRDC for ignoring and/or continuing to
speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air.
HELD:
Petitioner’s concern for their safety and
apprehension at being harassed by the military
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient
grounds to declare the checkpoints per se illegal.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
No proof has been presented before the Court to
show that, in the course of their routine checks,
the military, indeed, committed specific violations
of petitioners’ right against unlawful search and
seizure of other rights.
The constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right invocable
only by those whose rights have been infringed, or
threatened to be infringed.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those
which are reasonable are not forbidden.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may
be considered as a security measure to enable the
NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints
may not also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest
of public security.
Between the inherent right of the state to
protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual’s right against a
warrantless search which is, however,
reasonably conducted, the former should
prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is
susceptible of abuse by the military in the same
manner that all governmental power is susceptible
of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and irritation to
the citizen, the checkpoints during these
abnormal times, when conducted within
reasonable limits, are part of the price we
pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community.
PEOPLE VS ESCANO
Facts: Accused-appellants were convicted of
violation of PD 1866 and violation of the COMELEC
gun ban due to a checkpoint search conducted by
the police which search was subsequently
questioned by herein petitioners.
Issue: WON the checkpoint search conducted
valid?
Held:
This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are
illegal. Those which are warranted by the
exigencies of public order and are conducted
in a way least intrusive to motorists are
allowed.47 For, admittedly, routine
checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent,
on motorists' right to "free passage without
interruption," but it cannot be denied that,
as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of
travelers during which the vehicle's
occupants are required to answer a brief
question or two. For as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected
to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said
routine checks cannot be regarded as
violative of an individual's right against
CREATED BY: JNMONTECLARO, KVALMORIA, ADULOSA, and other sources
- 36 -
unreasonable search. In fact, these routine
checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are
even less intrusive.
We see no need for checkpoints to be announced,
as the accused have invoked. Not only would it be
impractical, it would also forewarn those who
intend to violate the ban. Even so, badges of
legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred from
their fixed location and the regularized manner in
which they are operated.49
Usana and Lopez also question the validity of the
search. The trial court, in convicting the three
accused for violation of R.A. No. 6425, accepted as
aboveboard the search done by the Makati Police
of the trunk of the car. Jurisprudence recognizes
six generally accepted exceptions to the warrant
requirement: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2)
search of moving vehicles; (3) evidence in plain
view; (4) customs searches; (5) consented
warrantless search; and (6) stop-and-frisk
situations.
WHO VS. AQUINO
Facts: An original action for certiorari and
prohibition to set aside respondent judge's refusal
to quash a search warrant issued by him at the
instance of respondents COSAC (Constabulary
Offshore Action Center) officers for the search and
seizure of the personal effects of petitioner official
of the WHO (World Health Organization)
notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic
immunity, as duly recognized by the executive
branch of the Philippine Government and to
prohibit respondent judge from further proceedings
in the matter.
Issue: WON diplomatic immunity is applicable.
Held:
It is a recognized principle of international law and
under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political
question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the
government, 8 and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch of the government as in the case
at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept
the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion
by the principal law officer of the government, the
Solicitor General in this case, or other officer
acting under his direction. 9 Hence, in adherence to
the settled principle that courts may not so
exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention
of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of
the government in conducting foreign relations, it
is accepted doctrine that "in such cases the judicial
department of (this) government follows the action
of the political branch and will not embarrass the
latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
PEOPLE VS. MAHINAY
FACTS:
Respondent was charged with the crime of rape
with homicide in which he was convicted in the
lower court. The information provides
That on or about the 26th day of June 1995 in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-
named accused, by means of force and
intimidation employed upon the person of
MARIA VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO, age 12
years old, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have
sexual intercourse with said MARIA VICTORIA
CHAN Y CABALLERO against her will and
without her consent; that on the occasion of
said sexual assault, the above-named accused,
choke and strangle said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN
Y CABALLERO as a result of which, said victim
died.
Contrary to law. 3
Respondent made an extra-judicial confession
during the custodial investigation which was then
admitted as evidence against him but he
subsequently pleaded not guilty of the offense
charged against him and further contended that
when he was apprehended, he heard the police
officer's plan to salvage him if he would not admit
that he was the one who raped and killed the
victim. Scared, he executed an extra-judicial
confession. He claimed that he was assisted by
Atty. Restituto Viernes only when he was forced to
sign the extra-judicial confession but evidence
proved otherwise.
HELD:
Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and
in order to ensure that the evidence against an
accused were obtained through lawful means, the
Court, as guardian of the rights of the people lays
down the procedure, guidelines and duties which
the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating
officer or his companions must do and observe at
the time of making an arrest and again at and
during the time of the custodial interrogation 40 in
accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence
and Republic Act No. 7438: 41 It is high-time to
educate our law-enforcement agencies who
neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-
called Miranda rights which had become
insufficient and which the Court must update in
the light of new legal developments:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or
under custodial investigation must be
informed in a language known to and
understood by him of the reason for the
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arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any; Every other warnings,
information or communication must be in a
language known to and understood by said
person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right
to remain silent and that any statement
he makes may be used as evidence
against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the
right to be assisted at all times and
have the presence of an independent
and competent lawyer, preferably of his
own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no
lawyer or cannot afford the services of
a lawyer, one will be provided for him;
and that a lawyer may also be engaged by
any person in his behalf, or may be
appointed by the court upon petition of the
person arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested
has a lawyer, he must be informed that no
custodial investigation in any form shall
be conducted except in the presence of
his counsel or after a valid waiver has
been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed
that, at any time, he has the right to
communicate or confer by the most
expedient means - telephone, radio, letter
or messenger - with his lawyer (either
retained or appointed), any member of his
immediate family, or any medical
doctor, priest or minister chosen by him
or by any one from his immediate
family or by his counsel, or be visited
by/confer with duly accredited national
or international non-government
organization. It shall be the responsibility
of the officer to ensure that this is
accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the
right to waive any of said rights
provided it is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently and ensure
that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested
waives his right to a lawyer, he must be
informed that it must be done in writing
AND in the presence of counsel,
otherwise, he must be warned that the
waiver is void even if he insist on his
waiver and chooses to speak;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
9. That the person arrested must be
informed that he may indicate in any
manner at any time or stage of the
process that he does not wish to be
questioned with warning that once he
makes such indication, the police may
not interrogate him if the same had not
yet commenced, or the interrogation
must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed
that his initial waiver of his right to
remain silent, the right to counsel or
any of his rights does not bar him from
invoking it at any time during the
process, regardless of whether he may have
answered some questions or volunteered
some statements;
11. He must also be informed that any
statement or evidence, as the case may
be, obtained in violation of any of the
foregoing, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall
be inadmissible in evidence.
PEOPLE VS. ALMANZAR
FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of
rape in an information which provides:
That on or about the 11th day of March
1994, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd designs,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously abduct, take and carry away
the herein complainant while walking
along Makati Avenue, Ayala Center, Makati,
Metro Manila near Landmark Department
Store on her way to Jollibee, Greenbelt
Branch, where she works as a service
crew, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, to wit: by introducing himself
as a Marikina police, poking a handgun on
the left side of the complainant's body,
and then pulling her and forcing her to
board inside the front passenger seat of
the accused' car and threatening to shoot
her and brought her to a secluded area
within Makati, where said accused at
gunpoint and intimidation, ordered herein
complainant to undress by taking off her T-
shirt, pants and panty, and by means of
force, violence and intimidation,
succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her against her will.1âwphi1.nêt
Contrary to law.1
Almanzar was then convicted of the offense
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charged against him. Hence the present review
because of the death penalty. One issues raised by
the accused was that the lower court erred in
convicting accused-appellant on the ground that
he was positively identified by complainant.
Accused-appellant primarily assails the testimony
of Sally, the complainant in this case. At the
outset, he (accused-appellant) impugns Sally's
positive identification of him as her assailant.
Specifically, accused-appellant assails the police
line-up where he was identified by the complainant
claiming that police line-ups are inherently
unreliable as they are "peculiarly riddled with
innumerable dangers and variable
factors."25 Moreover, the identification of accused-
appellant during the police line-up is allegedly
inadmissible in evidence being a fruit of an illegal
arrest and violative of accused-appellant's
constitutional right to counsel.
HELD:
Accused-appellant's allegation with respect to the
conduct of the police line-up is futile. That he was
without counsel at the time of the police line-up
does not render the same irregular or invalid. The
guarantees of Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may
be invoked only by a person while he is under
custodial investigation. Custodial investigation
starts when the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who
starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person to elicit
incriminating statements. A police line-up is
not part of the custodial investigation;
hence, the right to counsel cannot yet be
invoked at this stage.
It appears from the record that accused-appellant
was not under custodial investigation when he was
brought to the Makati police station. The police did
not, as yet, interrogate him or elicit incriminating
statements from him. He was brought to the police
station to be presented, along with other men, to
Sally and to be identified by her. The presence of
counsel at that stage was not therefore necessary.