CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II but has reason as a standard.
In this case, the
CASES
WHO EXERCISES THESE GOV’T POWER
cases:
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL
OPERATORS ASSOC., INC VS MAYOR OF
MANILA
G.R. No. L-24693
Police Power – Due Process Clause
On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board
enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved
by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760
sought to regulate hotels and motels. It
classified them into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr)
and 2nd class (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also
compelled hotels/motels to get the
demographics of anyone who checks in to
their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to
have wide open spaces so as not to conceal
the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate
impugned the validity of the law averring that
such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due
process. The lower court as well as the
appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the
due process clause.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There
is a presumption that the laws enacted by
Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o
a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity,
the presumption stays. As in this case, there
was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot
prevail over the presumption. Further, the
ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power.
There is no question but that the challenged
ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. This
is to minimize prostitution. The increase in
taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in
doing any business other than legal but also
increases the revenue of the lgu concerned.
And taxation is a valid exercise of police power
as well. The due process contention is likewise
untenable, due process has no exact definition
precise reason why the ordinance was enacted
was to curb down prostitution in the city which
is reason enough and cannot be defeated by
mere singling out of the provisions of the said
ordinance alleged to be vague.
POLICE POWER
On the legislative organs of the government,
whether national of local, primarily rest the
exercise of the police power, which, it cannot
be too often emphasized, is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. Police power is based
upon the concept of necessity of the State and
its corresponding right to protect itself and its
people.43 Police power has been used as
justification for numerous and varied actions
by the State. These range from the regulation
of dance halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas
stations46 and cockpits.47 The awesome
scope of police power is best demonstrated by
the fact that in its hundred or so years of
presence in our nation’s legal system, its use
has rarely been denied.
May Courts Inquire Upon the Exercise of Police
Power?
In view of the requirements of due process,
equal protection and other applicable
constitutional guaranties, however, the
exercise of such police power insofar as it may
affect the life, liberty or property of any person
is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such
exercise of police power may be considered as
either capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional
guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
Two types of Due Process
Procedural Due Process: Procedural due
process refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property.49
Procedural due process concerns itself with
government action adhering to the established
process when it makes an intrusion into the
private sphere. Examples range from the form
of notice given to the level of formality of a
hearing.
Substantive Due Process: Substantive due
process completes the protection envisioned
by the due process clause. It inquires whether
the government has sufficient justification for
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
CHURCHILL vs. RAFFERTY,
G.R. NO. L-10572, December 21, 1915 ( 32 Phil
580)
FACTS:
The case arises from the fact that defendant,
Collector of Internal Revenue, would like to
destroy or remove any sign, signboard, or
billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the
sole reason that such sign, signboard, or
billboard is, or may be offensive to the sight.
The plaintiffs allege otherwise. Was there valid
exercise of police power in this case?
HELD:
Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise
of the police power of the Philippine
Government belongs to the Legislature and
that this power is limited only by the Acts of
Congress and those fundamentals principles
which lie at the foundation of all republican
forms of government. An Act of the Legislature
which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to
any of the purposes of the police power and
interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of
property would, without doubt, be held to be
invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within
a proper consideration of and care for the
public health, safety, or comfort, it should not
be disturbed by the courts.
"The power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties
or without, not repugnant to the constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same."
"The police power of the State, so far, has not
received a full and complete definition. It may
be said, however, to be the right of the State,
or state functionary, to prescribe regulations
for the good order, peace, health, protection,
comfort, convenience and morals of the
community, which do not ... violate any of the
provisions of the organic law."
"It [the police power] has for its object the
improvement of social and economic
conditioned affecting the community at large
and collectively with a view to bring about "he
greatest good of the greatest number."Courts
have consistently and wisely declined to set
any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for
the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is
exercised from time to time as varying social
conditions demand correction."
"It may be said in a general way that the
police power extends to all the great public
needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is
sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing
morality or strong and preponderant opinion to
be greatly and immediately necessary to the
public welfare."
"It is much easier to perceive and realize the
existence and sources of this police power
than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe
limits to its exercise."
ACEBEDO OPTICAL Co. v. CA
G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000
Police Power as exercised by LGUs, restrictions
and qualifications
Power of city mayor to grant/cancel/revoke
business permits
Granting of business permits vs. granting of
permit to practice profession
FACTS:
Petitioner applied with the Office of the City
Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. Permit
was therefor issued, subject to certain
conditions like prohibition of putting up an
optical clinic, examining and/or prescribing
reading and similar optical glasses, etc. When
it was found that petitioner violated these
conditions, its business permit was cancelled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition of special
conditions by the public respondents were acts
ultra vires
RULING:
Police Power exercised by LGUs
Police power as an inherent attribute of
sovereignty is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. The State,
through the legislature, has delegated the
exercise of police power to local government
units, as agencies of the State, in order to
effectively accomplish and carry out the
declared objects of their creation. This
delegation of police power is embodied in the
general welfare clause of the Local
Government Code xxx
The scope of police power has been held to be
so comprehensive as to encompass almost all
matters affecting the health, safety, peace,
order, morals, comfort and convenience of the
community. Police power is essentially
regulatory in nature and the power to issue
licenses or grant business permits, if exercised
for a regulatory and not revenue-raising
purpose, is within the ambit of this power.
Power of city mayor to grant business permits
The authority of city mayors to issue or grant
licenses and business permits is beyond cavil.
It is provided for by law.
However, the power to grant or issue licenses
or business permits must always be exercised
in accordance with law, with utmost
observance of the rights of all concerned to
due process and equal protection of the law.
But can city mayor cancel business permits or
impose special conditions? As aptly discussed
by the Solicitor General in his Comment, the
power to issue licenses and permits
necessarily includes the corollary power to
revoke, withdraw or cancel the same. And the
power to revoke or cancel, likewise includes
the power to restrict through the imposition of
certain conditions.
Did the conditions or restrictions imposed
amount to a confiscation of the business?
Distinction must be made between the grant
of a license or permit to do business and the
issuance of a license to engage in the practice
of a particular profession. The first is usually
granted by the local authorities and the
second is issued by the Board or Commission
tasked to regulate the particular profession. A
business permit authorizes the person, natural
or otherwise, to engage in business or some
form of commercial activity. A professional
license, on the other hand, is the grant of
authority to a natural person to engage in the
practice or exercise of his or her profession.
In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner
from respondent City Mayor is a permit to
engage in the business of running an optical
shop. It does not purport to seek a license to
engage in the practice of optometry as a
corporate body or entity, although it does
have in its employ, persons who are duly
licensed to practice optometry by the Board of
Examiners in Optometry.
MMDA VS BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION
Date: March 27, 2000
Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority
Respondent: Bel Air Village Association Inc
FACTS:
MMDA is a government agency tasked with the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-
Air Village Association, Inc. is a non-stock, non-
profit corporation whose members are
homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private
subdivision in Makati City. BAVA is the
registered owner of Neptune Street, a road
inside Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received
from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice
dated December 22, 1995 requesting
respondent to open Neptune Street to public
vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. BAVA
was apprised that the perimeter wall
separating the subdivision from the adjacent
Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
On January 2, 1996, BAVA instituted against
petitioner before the RTC a civil case for
injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance
of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining
the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting
the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial
court issued a temporary restraining order the
following day. After due hearing, the trial court
denied the issuance of preliminary injunction.
On appeal, the CA rendered a Decision on the
merits of the case finding that the MMDA has
no authority to order the opening of Neptune
Street, a private subdivision road and cause
the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held
that the authority is lodged in the City Council
of Makati by ordinance.
ISSUE: WON the MMDA has authority to
open Neptune Road to the public
HELD: No
Ratio: MMDA claims that it has the authority to
open Neptune Street to public traffic because
it is an agent of the state endowed with police
power in the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila. One of these basic services is traffic
management which involves the regulation of
the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety,
convenience and welfare of the general public.
It is alleged that the police power of MMDA
was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated
cases of Sangalang v. IAC. From the premise
that it has police power, it is now urged that
there is no need for the City of Makati to enact
an ordinance opening Neptune street to the
public.
Police power is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty. It has been defined as the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to
make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without,
not repugnant to the Constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of
the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the
same. The power is plenary and its scope is
vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying
measures for public health, public safety,
public morals, and the general welfare.
It bears stressing that police power is
lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It
cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power.
The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the
lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local government units. Once delegated, the
agents can exercise only such legislative
powers as are conferred on them by the
national lawmaking body.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a
body composed of several local
government units - i.e., twelve (12) cities
and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities
of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati,
Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pinas,
Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the
municipalities of Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros,
San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of
RA 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila
was declared as a "special development
and administrative region" and the
Administration of "metro-wide" basic
services affecting the region placed
under "a development authority" referred
to as the MMDA.
The implementation of the MMDA’s
plans, programs and projects is undertaken by
the local government units, national
government agencies, accredited people’s
organizations, non-governmental
organizations, and the private sector as well as
by the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the
MMDA has the power to enter into contracts,
memoranda of agreement and other
cooperative arrangements with these bodies
for the delivery of the required services within
Metro Manila.
Clearly, the scope of the MMDA’s
function is limited to the delivery of the seven
(7) basic services. One of these is transport
and traffic management which includes the
formulation and monitoring of policies,
standards and projects to rationalize the
existing transport operations, infrastructure
requirements, the use of thoroughfares and
promotion of the safe movement of persons
and goods. It also covers the mass transport
system and the institution of a system of road
regulation, the administration of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering
services and traffic education programs,
including the institution of a single ticketing
system in Metro Manila for traffic violations.
Under this service, the MMDA is expressly
authorized "to set the policies concerning
traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all traffic management
programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install
and administer a single ticketing system," fix,
impose and collect fines and penalties for all
traffic violations.
It will be noted that the powers of the
MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a
system and administration. There is no
syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the
MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not
been delegated any legislative power. Unlike
the legislative bodies of the local government
units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924
that empowers the MMDA or its Council to
"enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare" of
the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is,
as termed in the charter itself, a "development
authority." It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with the various national
government agencies, people’s organizations,
non-governmental organizations and the
private sector for the efficient and expeditious
delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area. All its functions are
administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself
Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the
cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate
Court where we upheld a zoning ordinance
issued by the Metro Manila Commission
(MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an
exercise of police power. The first Sangalang
decision was on the merits of the petition,
while the second decision denied
reconsideration of the first case and in
addition discussed the case of Yabut v. Court
of Appeals.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the
two Sangalang cases do not apply to the
case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning
ordinances passed by the municipal council of
Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the
basis for the proposed opening of Neptune
Street is contained in the notice of December
22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent
BAVA, through its president. The notice does
not cite any ordinance or law, either by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by
the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed
opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA
simply relied on its authority under its charter
"to rationalize the use of roads and/or
thoroughfares for the safe and convenient
movement of persons." Rationalizing the use
of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts
that fall within the scope of transport and
traffic management. By no stretch of the
imagination, however, can this be interpreted
as an express or implied grant of ordinance-
making power, much less police power.
Misjuris
Secondly, the MMDA is not the
same entity as the MMC in Sangalang.
Although the MMC is the forerunner of
the present MMDA, an examination of
Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the
charter of the MMC, shows that the latter
possessed greater powers which were
not bestowed on the present MMDA. Jjlex
In 1990, President Aquino issued
Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and
constituted the Metropolitan Manila
Authority (MMA). The powers and
functions of the MMC were devolved to
the MMA. It ought to be stressed,
however, that not all powers and
functions of the MMC were passed to the
MMA. The MMA’s power was limited to
the "delivery of basic urban services
requiring coordination in Metropolitan
Manila." The MMA’s governing body, the
Metropolitan Manila Council, although
composed of the mayors of the
component cities and municipalities, was
merely given the power of: (1)
formulation of policies on the delivery of
basic services requiring coordination and
consolidation; and (2) promulgation of
resolutions and other issuances, approval
of a code of basic services and the
exercise of its rule-making power.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the
local government units became primarily
responsible for the governance of their
respective political subdivisions. The MMA’s
jurisdiction was limited to addressing
common problems involving basic services
that transcended local boundaries. It did not
have legislative power. Its power was
merely to provide the local government units
technical assistance in the preparation of local
development plans. Any semblance of
legislative power it had was confined to a
"review [of] legislation proposed by the local
legislative assemblies to ensure consistency
among local governments and with the
comprehensive development plan of Metro
Manila," and to "advise the local governments
accordingly."
When R.A. No. 7924 took effect,
Metropolitan Manila became a "special
development and administrative region"
and the MMDA a "special development
authority" whose functions were "without
prejudice to the autonomy of the affected
local government units." The character of
the MMDA was clearly defined in the
legislative debates enacting its charter.
It is thus beyond doubt that the
MMDA is not a local government unit or a
public corporation endowed with
legislative power. It is not even a "special
metropolitan political subdivision" as
contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the
Constitution. The creation of a "special
metropolitan political subdivision" requires the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to
the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite.
The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official
elected by the people, but appointed by the
President with the rank and privileges of a
cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is
to perform such other duties as may be
assigned to him by the President, whereas in
local government units, the President merely
exercises supervisory authority. This
emphasizes the administrative character of
the MMDA.
Clearly then, the MMC under P. D.
No. 824 is not the same entity as the
MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the
MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact
ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the local government units,
acting through their respective legislative
councils, that possess legislative power and
police power. In the case at bar, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did
not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering
the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its
proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal
and the respondent Court of Appeals did not
err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the
other issues as they are unnecessary. Esmso
We stress that this decision does not
make light of the MMDA’s noble efforts to
solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro
Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and traffic
bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our
once sprawling boulevards and avenues are
now crammed with cars while city streets are
clogged with motorists and pedestrians. Traffic
has become a social malaise affecting our
people’s productivity and the efficient delivery
of goods and services in the country. The
MMDA was created to put some order in the
metropolitan transportation system but
unfortunately the powers granted by its
charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot
justify the opening for public use of a private
street in a private subdivision without any
legal warrant. The promotion of the general
welfare is not antithetical to the preservation
of the rule of law.
ART. 3 Sec. 1 SCOPE OF PROTECTED LIFE,
LIBERTY AND PROPERTY
cases:
DUNCAN ASSOC. OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO
VS. GLAXO WELLCOME PHILS., INC.
438 SCRA 343
FACTS:
Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical
representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of
employment signed by Tecson stipulates,
among others, that he agrees to study and
abide by the existing company rules; to
disclose to management any existing future
relationship by consanguinity or affinity with
co-employees or employees with competing
drug companies and should management find
that such relationship poses a prossible
conflict of interest, to resign from the
company. Company's Code of Employee
Conduct provides the same with stipulation
that management may transfer the employee
to another department in a non-
counterchecking position or preparation for
employment outside of the company after 6
months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market
Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-
Camarines Norte area and entered into a
romantic relationship with Betsy, an employee
of Astra, Glaxo's competition. Before getting
married, Tecson's District Manager reminded
him several times of the conflict of interest but
marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan.
1999, Tecson's superiors informed him of
conflict of intrest. Tecson asked for time to
comply with the condition (that either he or
Betsy resign from their respective positions).
Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo
transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-
Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request
against transfer was denied, Tecson brought
the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee
and while pending, he continued to act as
medical representative in the Camarines Sur-
Camarines Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000,
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid...
ISSUE:
Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical
company prohibiting its employees from
marrying employees of any competitor
company is valid
RULING:
On Equal Protection
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets,
manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies,
and other confidential programs and
information from competitors. The prohibition
against pesonal or marital relationships with
employees of competitor companies upon
Glaxo's employees is reasonable under the
circumstances because relationships of that
nature might compromise the interests of the
company. That Glaxo possesses the right to
protect its economic interest cannot be
denied.
It is the settled principle that the commands of
the equal protection clause are addressed only
to the state or those acting under color of its
authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long
array of US Supreme Court decisions that the
equal protection clause erects to shield
against merely privately conduct, however,
discriminatory or wrongful.
The company actually enforced the policy after
repeated requests to the employee to comply
with the policy. Indeed the application of the
policy was made in an impartial and even-
handed manner, with due regard for the lot of
the employee.
On Constructive Dismissal
Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting,
an involuntary resignation resorted to when
continued employment becomes impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely; when there is
demotion in rank, or diminution in pay; or
when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or
disdain by an employer becomes unbearable
to the employee. None of these conditions are
present in the instant case.
HELD:
The challenged policy has been implemented
by Glaxo impartially and disinterestedly for a
long period of time. In the case at bar, the
record shows that Glaxo gave Tecson several
chances to eliminate the conflict of interest
brought about by his relationship with Betsy,
but he never availed of any of them.
"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack
of merit."
TWO KINDS OF DUE PROCESS
cases:
BANCO ESPANOL FILIPINO v. PALANCA
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction
over the property which is the subject of the
litigation may result either from a seizure of
the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into the actual custody of the law, or it
may result from the institution of legal
proceedings wherein, under special provisions
of law, the power of the court over the
property is recognized and made effective.
The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to
be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is
expressed the idea that while it is not strictly
speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of
that nature and is substantially such.
DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE
PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to
be in the possession of its owner, in person or
by agent; and he may be safely held, under
certain conditions, to be affected with
knowledge that proceedings have been
instituted for its condemnation and sale.
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco
mortgaged various parcels of real property in
Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino.
Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and
there he died on January 29, 1810 without
returning again to the Philippines. The
mortgagor then instituted foreclosure
proceeding but since defendant is a non-
resident, it was necessary to give notice by
publication. The Clerk of Court was also
directed to send copy of the summons to the
defendant’s last known address, which is in
Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk
complied with this requirement. Nevertheless,
after publication in a newspaper of the City of
Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by
default was rendered. The decision was
likewise published and afterwards sale by
public auction was held with the bank as the
highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale
was confirmed by the court. However, about
seven years after the confirmation of this sale,
a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as
administrator of the estate of the original
defendant, wherein the applicant requested
the court to set aside the order of default and
the judgment, and to vacate all the
proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of
this application was that the order of default
and the judgment rendered thereon were void
because the court had never acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant or over the
subject of the action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject
matter of the action
Whether or not due process of law was
observed
RULING:
On Jurisdiction
The word “jurisdiction” is used in several
different, though related, senses since it may
have reference (1) to the authority of the court
to entertain a particular kind of action or to
administer a particular kind of relief, or it may
refer to the power of the court over the
parties, or (2) over the property which is the
subject to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a
court determines the nature and extent of its
powers in general and thus fixes its
competency or jurisdiction with reference to
the actions which it may entertain and the
relief it may grant.
How Jurisdiction is Acquired
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the
voluntary appearance of a party in court and
his submission to its authority, or it is acquired
by the coercive power of legal process exerted
over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the
subject of the litigation may result either from
a seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into the actual custody
of the law, or it may result from the institution
of legal proceedings wherein, under special
provisions of law, the power of the court over
the property is recognized and made effective.
In the latter case the property, though at all
times within the potential power of the court,
may never be taken into actual custody at all.
An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by
actual seizure is found in attachment
proceedings, where the property is seized at
the beginning of the action, or some
subsequent stage of its progress, and held to
abide the final event of the litigation. An
illustration of what we term potential
jurisdiction over the res, is found in the
proceeding to register the title of land under
our system for the registration of land. Here
the court, without taking actual physical
control over the property assumes, at the
instance of some person claiming to be owner,
to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the
property and to adjudicate the title in favor of
the petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action
to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a
proceeding quasi in rem, by which is
expressed the idea that while it is not strictly
speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of
that nature and is substantially such. The
expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow
application, used only with reference to certain
proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the
property alone is treated as responsible for the
claim or obligation upon which the
proceedings are based. The action quasi rem
differs from the true action in rem in the
circumstance that in the former an individual
is named as defendant, and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interest therein to
the obligation or lien burdening the property.
All proceedings having for their sole object the
sale or other disposition of the property of the
defendant, whether by attachment,
foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a
general way thus designated. The judgment
entered in these proceedings is conclusive
only between the parties.
xxx
It is true that in proceedings of this character,
if the defendant for whom publication is made
appears, the action becomes as to him a
personal action and is conducted as such. This,
however, does not affect the proposition that
where the defendant fails to appear the action
is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be
considered with reference to the principles
governing actions in rem.
On Due Process
xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding,
however, it may be laid down with certainty
that the requirement of due process is
satisfied if the following conditions are
present, namely; (1) There must be a court or
tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it; (2)
jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the
person of the defendant or over the property
which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the
defendant must be given an opportunity to be
heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered
upon lawful hearing.
Passing at once to the requisite that the
defendant shall have an opportunity to be
heard, we observe that in a foreclosure case
some notification of the proceedings to the
nonresident owner, prescribing the time within
which appearance must be made, is
everywhere recognized as essential. To
answer this necessity the statutes generally
provide for publication, and usually in addition
thereto, for the mailing of notice to the
defendant, if his residence is known. Though
commonly called constructive, or substituted
service of process in any true sense. It is
merely a means provided by law whereby the
owner may be admonished that his property is
the subject of judicial proceedings and that it
is incumbent upon him to take such steps as
he sees fit to protect it.
It will be observed that this mode of
notification does not involve any absolute
assurance that the absent owner shall thereby
receive actual notice. The periodical
containing the publication may never in fact
come to his hands, and the chances that he
should discover the notice may often be very
slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the
probability of his receiving it, though much
increased, is dependent upon the correctness
of the address to which it is forwarded as well
as upon the regularity and security of the mail
service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the
provision of our law relative to the mailing of
notice does not absolutely require the mailing
of notice unconditionally and in every event,
but only in the case where the defendant's
residence is known. In the light of all these
facts, it is evident that actual notice to the
defendant in cases of this kind is not, under
the law, to be considered absolutely
necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in
recognizing the efficacy of a means of
notification which may fall short of actual
notice is apparently this: Property is always
assumed to be in the possession of its owner,
in person or by agent; and he may be safely
held, under certain conditions, to be affected
with knowledge that proceedings have been
instituted for its condemnation and sale.
Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to
defendant’s last known address constitute
denial of due process?
The observations which have just been made
lead to the conclusion that the failure of the
clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail
in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as
amounts to a denial of due process of law; and
hence in our opinion that irregularity, if
proved, would not avoid the judgment in this
case. Notice was given by publication in a
newspaper and this is the only form of notice
which the law unconditionally requires. This in
our opinion is all that was absolutely
necessary to sustain the proceedings.
It will be observed that in considering the
effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference
whether it be viewed as a question involving
jurisdiction or as a question involving due
process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction
there can be no distinction between the much
and the little. The court either has jurisdiction
or it has not; and if the requirement as to the
mailing of notice should be considered as a
step antecedent to the acquiring of
jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the
conclusion that the failure to take that step
was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the
application of the idea of due process of law,
on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to
be so rigorous. The jurisdiction being once
established, all that due process of law
thereafter requires is an opportunity for the
defendant to be heard; and as publication was
duly made in the newspaper, it would seem
highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail
the notice was fatal. We think that in applying
the requirement of due process of law, it is
permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the
provision which is supposed to have been
violated and the principle underlying the
exercise of judicial power in these
proceedings. Judge in the light of these
conceptions, we think that the provision of Act
of Congress declaring that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process
of law has not been infringed.
SEC OF JUSTICE VS JUDGE RALPH
LANTION
Due Process
Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes
ranging from tax evasion to wire tapping to
conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was
then wanted in the US. The US government,
pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty
requested to have Jimenez be extradited
there. Jimenez requested for a copy of the
complaint against him as well as the
extradition request by the USA. The DOJ sec
refused to provide him copy thereof advising
that it is still premature to give him so and
that it is not a preliminary investigation hence
he is not entitled to receive such copies.
Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and the lower court
ruled in favor of Jimenez.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jimenez is deprived of
due process.
HELD: The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower
court. The case against Jimenez refer to an
impending threat of deprivation of one’s
property or property right. No less is this true,
but even more so in the case before us,
involving as it does the possible deprivation of
liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, is placed
second only to life itself and enjoys
precedence over property, for while forfeited
property can be returned or replaced, the time
spent in incarceration is irretrievable and
beyond recompense.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION
322 SCRA 160 (2000)
Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the
Manila RTC
FACTS:
On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice
received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The
Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his
arrest, and other supporting documents for
said extradition were attached along with the
request. Charges include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud
the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a
designated panel proceeded with the technical
evaluation and assessment of the extradition
treaty which they found having matters
needed to be addressed. Respondent, then
requested for copies of all the documents
included in the extradition request and for him
to be given ample time to assess it.
The Secretary of Justice denied request on the
ff. grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies
prior to the completion of the evaluation. At
that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of
evaluating whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069
—Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US
Extradition Treaty) have been complied with
by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by
the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary
investigation like in criminal cases making the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of
unauthorized disclosure of the information in
the documents.
3. Finally, country is bound to Vienna
convention on law of treaties such that every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties.
The respondent filed for petition of mandamus,
certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR
ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of
Justice was made to issue a copy of the
requested papers, as well as conducting
further proceedings.
ISSUES:
1. WON private is respondent entitled to the
two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing
Yes. §2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as
“the removal of an accused from the
Philippines with the object of placing him at
the disposal of foreign authorities to enable
the requesting state or government to hold
him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him in
connection with any criminal investigation
directed against him or the execution of a
penalty imposed on him under the penal or
criminal law of the requesting state or
government.” Although the inquisitorial power
exercised by the DOJ as an administrative
agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply
lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets
the wheels for the extradition process which
may ultimately result in the deprivation of the
liberty of the prospective extradite. This
deprivation can be effected at two stages: The
provisional arrest of the prospective extradite
pending the submission of the request & the
temporary arrest of the prospective extradite
during the pendency of the extradition petition
in court. Clearly, there’s an impending threat
to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as
during the evaluation stage. Because of such
consequences, the evaluation process is akin
to an administrative agency conducting an
investigative proceeding, the consequences of
which are essentially criminal since such
technical assessment sets off or commences
the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation
of liberty of a prospective extradite. In
essence, therefore, the evaluation process
partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation. There are certain constitutional
rights that are ordinarily available only in
criminal prosecution. But the Court has ruled
in other cases that where the investigation of
an administrative proceeding may result in
forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the
administrative proceedings are deemed
criminal or penal, & such forfeiture partakes
the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar,
similar to a preliminary investigation, the
evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings which may result in the filing of
an information against the respondent, can
possibly lead to his arrest, & to the deprivation
of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be
accorded due process rights of notice &
hearing according to A3 §14(1) & (2), as well
as A3 §7—the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern & the
corollary right to access to official records &
documents
The court held that the evaluation process
partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation, having consequences which will
result in deprivation of liberty of the
prospective extradite. A favorable action in an
extradition request exposes a person to
eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus
exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The
evaluation process itself is like a preliminary
investigation since both procedures may have
the same result – the arrest and imprisonment
of the respondent.
The basic rights of notice & hearing are
applicable in criminal, civil & administrative
proceedings. Non-observance of these rights
will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are
entitled to be notified of any pending case
affecting their interests, & upon notice, may
claim the right to appear therein & present
their side.
Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3
cases:
a. When there is an urgent need for immediate
action (preventive suspension in
administrative charges, padlocking filthy
restaurants, cancellation of passport).
b. Where there is tentativeness of
administrative action, & the respondent isn’t
prevented from enjoying the right to notice &
hearing at a later time (summary distraint &
levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer,
replacement of an appointee)
c. Twin rights have been offered, but the right
to exercise them had not been claimed.
2. WON this entitlement constitutes a breach
of the legal commitments and obligation of the
Philippine Government under the RP-US
Treaty?
No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual
concern about the suppression and
punishment of crime in their respective
jurisdictions. Both states accord common due
process protection to their respective citizens.
The administrative investigation doesn’t fall
under the three exceptions to the due process
of notice and hearing in the Sec. 3 Rules 112
of the Rules of Court.
3. WON there’s any conflict between private
respondent’s basic due process rights &
provisions of RP-US Extradition treaty
RULING:
No. Doctrine of incorporation under
international law, as applied in most countries,
decrees that rules of international law are
given equal standing with, but are not superior
to national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal
statute and statute can repeal treaty. No
conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial.
Request should impose veil at any stage.
Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
Kapunan, separate concurring opinion: While
the evaluation process conducted by the DOJ
is not exactly a preliminary investigation of
criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary
investigation because it involves the basic
constitutional rights of the person sought to be
extradited. A person ordered extradited is
arrested, forcibly taken from his house,
separated from his family and delivered to a
foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy,
liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken
away from him—a fate as harsh and cruel as a
conviction of a criminal offense. For this
reason, he is entitled to have access to the
evidence against him and the right to
controvert them.
Puno, dissenting: Case at bar does not involve
guilt or innocence of an accused but the
interpretation of an extradition treaty where at
stake is our government’s international
obligation to surrender to a foreign state a
citizen of its own so he can be tried for an
alleged offense committed within that
jurisdiction.
administrative due process:
cases:
SERRANO VS NLRC / ISETANN
FACTS:
Serrano was a regular employee of Isetann
Department Store as the head of Security
Checker. In 1991, as a cost-cutting measure,
Isetann phased out its entire security section
and engaged the services of an independent
security agency. Petitioner filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal among others. Labor
arbiter ruled in his favor as Isetann failed to
establish that it had retrenched its security
section to prevent or minimize losses to its
business; that private respondent failed to
accord due process to petitioner; that private
respondent failed to use reasonable standards
in selecting employees whose employment
would be terminated. NLRC reversed the
decision and ordered petitioner to be given
separation pay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the hiring of an independent
security agency by the private respondent to
replace its current security section a valid
ground for the dismissal of the employees
classed under the latter.
RULING:
An employer’s good faith in implementing a
redundancy program is not necessarily put in
doubt by the availment of the services of an
independent contractor to replace the services
of the terminated employees to promote
economy and efficiency. Absent proof that
management acted in a malicious or arbitrary
manner, the Court will not interfere with the
exercise of judgment by an employer.
If termination of employment is not for any of
the cause provided by law, it is illegal and the
employee should be reinstated and paid
backwages. To contend that even if the
termination is for a just cause, the employee
concerned should be reinstated and paid
backwages would be to amend Art 279 by
adding another ground for considering
dismissal illegal.
If it is shown that the employee was dismissed
for any of the causes mentioned in Art 282,
the in accordance with that article, he should
not be reinstated but must be paid backwages
from the time his employment was terminated
until it is determined that the termination of
employment is for a just cause because the
failure to hear him before he is dismissed
renders the termination without legal effect.
ANG TIBAY VS COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS
Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIR
TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a
leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather,
Toribio caused the lay off of members of
National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that
Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within the
CBA. That there are two labor unions in Ang
Tibay; NLU and National Worker’s
Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by
Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU
wishes for a new trial as they were able to
come up with new evidence/documents that
they were not able to obtain before as they
were inaccessible and they were not able to
present it before in the CIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due
process of law.
HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a
new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all
administrative bodies cannot ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process. They are;
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something
to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a
place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence
to support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected.

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any
of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should,
in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the vario issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon
it.
MACIAS V. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioners are four members of the House of
Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis
Oriental and Bulacan, and the provincial
Governor of Negros Oriental. They are
requesting that the respondent officials be
prevented to implement RA 3040, an act that
apportions representative districts in the
country. They alleged that their respective
provinces were discriminated because they
were given less representation. Furthermore,
they allege that RA 3040 is unconstitutional
and void because:
1. It was passed without printed final copies
which must be furnished to the members of
the HOR at least 3 calendar days prior to
passage
2. It was approved more than 3 years after the
return of the last census of the population
3. It apportioned districts without regard to the
number of inhabitants of the several
provinces.
Respondents Comelec and Vicente Gella
(National Treasurer) contend that they
1. were merely complying with their duties
under the statute which they presume and
allege to be constitutional
2. petitioners have no personality to bring
such action
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the
personality to bring such action.
2. Whether or not the act conformed to the
printed form and 3 day requirement.
3. Whether or not the act of apportionment is
within the 3 year requirement.
4. Whether or not the apportionment of
members of the HOR is valid.
HELD: The petitioners as voters and as
congressmen and governor of the aggrieved
provinces have the personality to sue. The
passage of the act did not conform to the
printed-form and the 3 day requirement, and
that there is no certificate of urgency from the
President was received by the HO. The
requirement that the apportionment must be
done within 3 year following the last census is
complied with. The apportionment of members
of the HOR is not valid because it is not based
on the number of inhabitants a province has.
Some provinces were given more
representation despite the inferior in number
of inhabitants. The Court held that RA 3040
infringed the provisions of the Constitution and
is therefore void.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
cases:
UNITED STATES VS. LUIS TORIBIO
Police Power
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a
license to have his carabao be slaughtered.
His request was denied because his carabao is
found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless
slaughtered his carabao without the necessary
license. He was eventually sued and was
sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one
way or the other argued that the law
mandating that one should acquire a permit to
slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of
police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC
explained that it “is not a taking of the
property for public use, within the meaning of
the constitution, but is a just and legitimate
exercise of the power of the legislature to
regulate and restrain such particular use of the
property as would be inconsistent with or
injurious to the rights of the publics. All
property is acquired and held under the tacit
condition that it shall not be so used as to
injure the equal rights of others or greatly
impair the public rights and interests of the
community.”
CITY OF MANILA MAYOR ALFREDO LIM v.
JUDGE LAGUIO & MTDC
Facts:
The petitioners seek to reverse the
ruling of the ruling of the RTC regarding the
unconstitutionality of Ordinance No. 7783
which is entitled- AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING
THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND
FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Private respondent, Malate Tourist
Development Corporation (MTDC), contends
that the City Council has no power to prohibit
the operation of motels and that the
Ordinance does not constitute a proper
exercise of police power as the compulsory
closure of the motel business has no
reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal
interests sought to be protected.
The petitioners, on the other hand, argues that
the City Council had the power to "prohibit
certain forms of entertainment in order to
protect the social and moral welfare of the
community" [Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the
Local Government Code] and that the
Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of
Manila to protect the social and moral welfare
of the community in conjunction with its police
powers [Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic
Act No. 409].
Judge Laguio issued an ex-parte temporary
restraining order against the enforcement of
the Ordinance. He also granted the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC.
Hence, the appeal by the petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance No.
7783 is constitutional
Held: NO
There is a clear invasion of personal or
property rights, personal in the case of those
individuals desirous of owning, operating and
patronizing those motels and property in
terms of the investments made and the
salaries to be paid to those therein employed.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to
prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it
can instead impose reasonable regulations
such as daily inspections of the establishments
for any violation of the conditions of their
licenses or permits; it may exercise its
authority to suspend or revoke their licenses
for these violations; and it may even impose
increased license fees. In other words, there
are other means to reasonably accomplish the
desired end.
Police power legislation of such
character deserves the full endorsement of we
reiterate our support for it. But inspite of
itsthe judiciary virtuous aims, the enactment
of the Ordinance has no statutory or
constitutional authority to stand on. Local
legislative bodies, in this case, the City
Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the
enumerated establishments or order their
transfer or conversion without infringing the
constitutional guarantees not even under the
guiseof due process and equal protection of
laws of police power.
The petition is DENIED and the decision
of the Regional Trial Court declaring the
ordinance void is AFFIRMED.
YNOT VS. IAC
G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS: (1) notice; (2) hearing;
exceptions
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: (1) public
interest requires government interference; (2)
reasonable means necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose
FACTS:
Petitioner’s 6 carabaos were confiscated by
the police for having been transported from
Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He
brought an action for replevin, challenging the
constitutionality of said EO. The trial court
sustained the confiscation of the animals and
declined to rule on the validity of the law on
the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its
decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this
petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the confiscation of the
carabaos amounted to arbitrary confiscation of
property without due process of law
RULING:
Minimum Requirements of Due Process: Notice
and Hearing
The minimum requirements of due process are
notice and hearing which, generally speaking,
may not be dispensed with because they are
intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on
our judicial system that the jurisprudence of
this country is rich with applications of this
guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of
law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We
have consistently declared that every person,
faced by the awesome power of the State, is
entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel
Webster described almost two hundred years
ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as
"the law which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the
rights of every person are to be secured
beyond the reach of officials who, out of
mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would
degrade the due process clause into a worn
and empty catchword.
Exceptions to Notice and Hearing
This is not to say that notice and hearing are
imperative in every case for, to be sure, there
are a number of admitted exceptions. The
conclusive presumption, for example, bars the
admission of contrary evidence as long as
such presumption is based on human
experience or there is a rational connection
between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed therefrom. There are
instances when the need for expeditions
action will justify omission of these requisites,
as in the summary abatement of a nuisance
per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may
be killed on sight because of the immediate
danger it poses to the safety and lives of the
people. Pornographic materials, contaminated
meat and narcotic drugs are inherently
pernicious and may be summarily destroyed.
The passport of a person sought for a criminal
offense may be cancelled without hearing, to
compel his return to the country he has fled.
Filthy restaurants may be summarily
padlocked in the interest of the public health
and bawdy houses to protect the public
morals. In such instances, previous judicial
hearing may be omitted without violation of
due process in view of the nature of the
property involved or the urgency of the need
to protect the general welfare from a clear and
present danger.
Due Process is a Restraint on Police Power
The protection of the general welfare is the
particular function of the police power which
both restraints and is restrained by due
process. The police power is simply defined as
the power inherent in the State to regulate
liberty and property for the promotion of the
general welfare. By reason of its function, it
extends to all the great public needs and is
described as the most pervasive, the least
limitable and the most demanding of the three
inherent powers of the State, far outpacing
taxation and eminent domain. The individual,
as a member of society, is hemmed in by the
police power, which affects him even before
he is born and follows him still after he is dead
from the womb to beyond the tomb in
practically everything he does or owns. Its
reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous
and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as
long as the activity or the property has some
relevance to the public welfare, its regulation
under the police power is not only proper but
necessary. And the justification is found in the
venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est
suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, which call for the subordination of
individual interests to the benefit of the
greater number.
First Requisite of Substantive Due Process:
Interests of the Public Generally Require
Interference
xxx we hold with the Toribio Case that the
carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to
speak, has a direct relevance to the public
welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive
Order No. 626. The method chosen in the
basic measure is also reasonably necessary for
the purpose sought to be achieved and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals, again
following the above-cited doctrine. There is no
doubt that by banning the slaughter of these
animals except where they are at least seven
years old if male and eleven years old if
female upon issuance of the necessary permit,
the executive order will be conserving those
still fit for farm work or breeding and
preventing their improvident depletion.
Second Requisite of Substantive Due Process:
Reasonable Means Necessary for the
Accomplishment of Purpose, not Unduly
Oppressive Upon Individuals
But while conceding that the amendatory
measure has the same lawful subject as the
original executive order, we cannot say with
equal certainty that it complies with the
second requirement, viz., that there be a
lawful method. We note that to strengthen the
original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A
imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter
of the carabaos but on their movement,
providing that "no carabao regardless of age,
sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no
carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another." The object of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable
connection between the means employed and
the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-
provincial transport of carabaos can prevent
their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that
they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one
province will not prevent their slaughter there,
any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to
apply to it as otherwise, so says executive
order, it could be easily circumvented by
simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However,
if the movement of the live animals for the
purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot
be prohibited, it should follow that there is no
reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not
to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the
means and the end were to be assumed, we
would still have to reckon with the sanction
that the measure applies for violation of the
prohibition. The penalty is outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported, to be meted out by the executive
authorities, usually the police only. In the
Toribio Case, the statute was sustained
because the penalty prescribed was fine and
imprisonment, to be imposed by the court
after trial and conviction of the accused. Under
the challenged measure, significantly, no such
trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the
police and declared, by the measure itself, as
forfeited to the government.
EO 626-A is unconstitutional
In the instant case, the carabaos were
arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner
only after he had filed a complaint for recovery
and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00,
which was ordered confiscated upon his failure
to produce the carabaos when ordered by the
trial court. The executive order defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was
carried out forthright. The measure struck at
once and pounced upon the petitioner without
giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying
him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary
fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are
occasions when notice and hearing may be
validly dispensed with notwithstanding the
usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded
that summary action may be validly taken in
administrative proceedings as procedural due
process is not necessarily judicial only. In the
exceptional cases accepted, however, there is
a justification for the omission of the right to a
previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the
problem sought to be corrected and the
urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such
pressure of time or action calling for the
petitioner's peremptory treatment. The
properties involved were not even inimical per
se as to require their instant destruction.
There certainly was no reason why the offense
prohibited by the executive order should not
have been proved first in a court of justice,
with the accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.
Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in
nature, the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a
court of justice, which alone would have had
the authority to impose the prescribed
penalty, and only after trial and conviction of
the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the
questionable manner of the disposition of the
confiscated property as prescribed in the
questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall "be
distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may see
fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase
"may see fit" is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is
laden with perilous opportunities for partiality
and abuse, and even corruption. One searches
in vain for the usual standard and the
reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe
when they make their distribution. There is
none. Their options are apparently boundless.
Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of
their generosity and by what criteria shall they
be chosen? Only the officers named can
supply the answer, they and they alone may
choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their
own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is
here a "roving commission," a wide and
sweeping authority that is not "canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing," in
short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid
delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged
measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is
violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in
his defense and is immediately condemned
and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby
declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.
YNOT v. IAC
Police Power – Not Validly Exercised
There had been an existing law which
prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO
626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO
626-A which not only banned the movement of
carabaos from interprovinces but as well as
the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984,
Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in
violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A
as unconstitutional for it violated his right to
be heard or his right to due process. He said
that the authority provided by EO 626-A to
outrightly confiscate carabaos even without
being heard is unconstitutional. The lower
court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a
valid exercise of police power in order to
promote general welfare so as to curb down
the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as
it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A
ctreated a presumption based on the
judgment of the executive. The movement of
carabaos from one area to the other does not
mean a subsequent slaughter of the same
would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend
himself and explain why the carabaos are
being transferred before they can be
confiscated. The SC found that the challenged
measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is
violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in
his defense and is immediately condemned
and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken.
LUPANGO v. CA
FACTS: PRC issued a resolution directing that
no examinee for the CPA Board Exam shall
attend any review class, briefing, conference
or the like conducted by, or shall receive any
hand-out, review material, or any tip from any
school, college or university, or any review
center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer,
instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similars institutions during
the 3 days immediately proceeding every
examination day including examination day.
HELD: Such resolution is unreasonable. The
unreasonableness is more obvious in that one
who is caught committing the prohibited acts
even without any ill motives will be barred
from taking future examinations conducted by
the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is
inconceivable how the Commission can
manage to have a watchful eye on each and
every examinee during the three days before
the examination period.
Administrative authorities should not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of
rules and regulations. To be valid, such
rules and regulations must be reasonable
and fairly adapted to the end in view. If
shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they are authorized to be
issued, then they must be held to be invalid.
PRC has no authority to dictate on the
reviewees as to how they should prepare
themselves for the licensure examinations, as
this will infringe n the examinees’ right to
libery.
Such resolution also violates the academic
freedom of the schools concerned. The
enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a
guarantee that the alleged leakages in the
licensure examinations will be eradicated or at
least minimized. What is needed to be done by
the respondent is to find out the source of
such leakages and stop it right there.
BALACUIT v. CFI
FACTS:
At issue in the petition for review before Us is
the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance
No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the
City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, the title and
text of which are reproduced below
ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP
OF PERSONS, ENTITY OR CORPORATION
ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF SELLING
ADMISSION TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER
PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES, CONTESTS OR
OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE
CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE
(12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT
FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT
SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE
SAID TICKET
Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan,
and Sergio Yu Carcel managers of the theaters
and they attack the validity and
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the
grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid
exercise of police power.
ISSUE:
Does this power to regulate include the
authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of
admission to these places of exhibition and
amusement whether under its general grant of
power or under the general welfare clause as
invoked by the City?
RULING:
No, the power to regulate and fix the amount
of license fees for theaters and other places of
amusement has been expressly granted to the
City of Butuan under its charter.
However, the ordinance is not justified by any
necessity for the public interest. The police
power legislation must be firmly grounded on
public interest and welfare, and a reasonable
relation must exist between purposes and
means.
The evident purpose of the ordinance is to
help ease the burden of cost on the part of
parents who have to shell out the same
amount of money for the admission of their
children. A reduction in the price of admission
would mean corresponding savings for the
parents; however, the petitioners are the ones
made to bear the cost of these savings.
The ordinance does not only make the
petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it
likewise penalizes them for failure to comply
with it.
The ordinance does not provide a safeguard
against this undesirable practice and as such,
the respondent City of Butuan now suggests
that birth certificates be exhibited by movie
house patrons to prove the age of children.
This is, however, not at all practicable. We can
see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable
if not unduly oppressive upon the business of
petitioners.
Further, there is no discernible relation
between the ordinance and the promotion of
public health, safety, morals and the general
welfare.
Furthermore, there is nothing pernicious in
demanding equal price for both children and
adults. The petitioners are merely conducting
their legitimate businesses. The object of
every business entrepreneur is to make a
profit out of his venture. In fact, no person is
under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a
totally voluntary act on the part of the
purchaser if he buys a ticket to such
performances
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the
personal and property rights of petitioners
WHEREFORE, a new judgment is hereby
rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
cases:
INT'L. SCHOOL ALLIANCE VS.
QUISUMBING [333 SCRA 13; G.R. NO.
128845; 1 JUN 2000]
FACTS:
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts
hired abroad, the local-hires of private
respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry
discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires
are paid more than their colleagues in other
schools is, of course, beside the point. The
point is that employees should be given equal
pay for work of equal value.
Private respondent International School, Inc.
(the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential
Decree 732, is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for
dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel
and other temporary residents. To enable the
School to continue carrying out its educational
program and improve its standard of
instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree
authorizes the School to employ its own
teaching and management personnel selected
by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or
other nationalities, such personnel being
exempt from otherwise applicable laws and
regulations attending their employment,
except laws that have been or will be enacted
for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and
local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires
and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain
benefits not accorded local-hires. These
include housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance.
Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate
twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-
hires. The School justifies the difference on
two "significant economic disadvantages"
foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the
"dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the grants provided by the
school to foreign hires and not to local hires
discriminative of their constitutional right to
the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The foregoing provisions impregnably
institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long
honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal
work." Persons who work with substantially
equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should
be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the
School, its "international character"
notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not
adduced evidence that local-hires perform
work equal to that of foreign-hires. The Court
finds this argument a little cavalier. If an
employer accords employees the same
position and rank, the presumption is that
these employees perform equal work. This
presumption is borne by logic and human
experience. If the employer pays one
employee less than the rest, it is not for that
employee to explain why he receives less or
why the others receive more. That would be
adding insult to injury. The employer has
discriminated against that employee; it is for
the employer to explain why the employee is
treated unfairly.
While we recognize the need of the School to
attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be
used as an enticement to the prejudice of
local-hires. The local-hires perform the same
services as foreign-hires and they ought to be
paid the same salaries as the latter. For the
same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the
foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve
as valid bases for the distinction in salary
rates.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect
the rights of workers and promote their
welfare," "to afford labor full protection." The
State, therefore, has the right and duty to
regulate the relations between labor and
capital. These relations are not merely
contractual but are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts, collective
bargaining agreements included, must yield to
the common good. Should such contracts
contain stipulations that are contrary to public
policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down
these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire
classification employed by respondent School
to justify the distinction in the salary rates of
foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid
classification. There is no reasonable
distinction between the services rendered by
foreign-hires and local-hires.
Wherefore, the petition is given due course.
The petition is hereby granted in part. The
orders of the secretary of labor and
employment dated June 10, 1996 and march
19, 1997, are hereby reversed and set aside
insofar as they uphold the practice of
respondent school of according foreign-hires
higher salaries than local-hires.
FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR No.147387
December 10,2003
FACTS:
Before the court is a petition to declare as
unconstitutional Sec.14 of RA 9006 (The fair
election act) insofar as it expressly repeals
Sec.67 of BP 881 (The Omnibus Election Code)
filed by Farinas et al, minority members of the
minority bloc in the HR. Impleaded as
respondents are the Executive sec, Speaker of
the House etal.
ISSUE:
1. WON the effectivity clause which states
“This Act shall take effect upon its approval”
(Sec.16) is a violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution
RULING:
1. An effectivity clause which provides that
the law “shall take immediately upon its
approval” is defective, but it does not render
the entire law invalid, the law shall take effect
fiftten days after its publication in the OG or
newspaper of general circulation. In Tanada vs
Tuvera, the court laid down the rule: “The
clause, unless otherwise provided refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself”… Publication is
indispensable in every case..
PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS
G.R. NO. 132875-76, FEBRUARY 3, 2000
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a
full-fledged member of Congress who is
confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-
appellant filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis
of popular sovereignty and the need for his
constituents to be represented.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant should be
allowed to discharge mandate as member of
House of Representatives
RULING:
Election is the expression of the sovereign
power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising
from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of
Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege
cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended
by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any
reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if
the reason for the absence is a legitimate one.
The confinement of a Congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of
more than six years is not merely authorized
by law, it has constitutional foundations. To
allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant’s status to that of a special class, it
also would be a mockery of the purposes of
the correction system.
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY INC. VS ORMOC
CITY ET AL
“Equal Protection”
FACTS:
In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read:
“There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on
any and all productions of centrifugal sugar
milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company
Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax
equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export
sale to the United States of America and other
foreign countries.” Though referred to as a
“production tax”, the imposition actually
amounts to a tax on the export of centrifugal
sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
For production of sugar alone is not taxable;
the only time the tax applies is when the sugar
produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the
tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the
same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides: “It shall
not be in the power of the municipal council to
impose a tax in any form whatever, upon
goods and merchandise carried into the
municipality, or out of the same, and any
attempt to impose an import or export tax
upon such goods in the guise of an
unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of
bridges or otherwise, shall be void.” And that
the ordinance is violative to equal protection
as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable
for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is
found in the city.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a violation of
equal protection.
HELD:
The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC
noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC had
already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec
2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs
to tax goods and merchandise carried in and
out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still
violative of equal protection. The ordinance is
discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal
sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the
time of the taxing ordinance’s enactment,
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the
only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still,
the classification, to be reasonable, should be
in terms applicable to future conditions as
well. The taxing ordinance should not be
singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the
same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of
the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar
company is set up, it cannot be subject to the
tax because the ordinance expressly points
only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the
entity to be levied upon.
TRILLANES IV VS. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008
Election to Congress is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement as
the functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift one from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement.
Justification for confinement with its
underlying rationale of public self-defense
applies equally to detention prisoners like
petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants
like Jalosjos.
FACTS:
Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etat
in relation to the “Oakwood Incident.” In the
2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate
with a six-year term commencing at noon on
June 30, 2007. Petitioner now asks the Court
that he be allowed to attend all official
functions of the Senate, alleging mainly that
his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his
case is still pending resolution whereas that in
the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not valid classification between
petitioner and Jalosjos exists
RULING:
The petition is bereft of merit.
In attempting to strike a distinction between
his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly
points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos
(Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his
conviction was pending appeal, when he filed
a motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus
Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere
detention prisoner. He asserts that he
continues to enjoy civil and political rights
since the presumption of innocence is still in
his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was
charged with crimes involving moral turpitude,
i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six
counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is
indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded as a
"political offense."
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor
the presence of noble causes in expressing
legitimate grievances against the rampant and
institutionalized practice of graft and
corruption in the AFP.
A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise,
however.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not
elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos
that election to Congress is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement as
the functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift one from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement.
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged
with a crime is taken into custody for purposes
of the administration of justice. No less than
the Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required. (Underscoring supplied)
The Rules also state that no person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the
stage of the criminal action.
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape
and coup d'etat cases, both being punishable
by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within
the class of offenses covered by the stated
range of imposable penalties, there is clearly
no distinction as to the political complexion of
or moral turpitude involved in the crime
charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that
petitioner's application for bail and for release
on recognizance was denied. The
determination that the evidence of guilt is
strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an
application for bail or imported from a trial
court's judgment of conviction, justifies the
detention of an accused as a valid curtailment
of his right to provisional liberty. This
accentuates the proviso that the denial of the
right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the
stage of the criminal action." Such justification
for confinement with its underlying rationale of
public self-defense applies equally to
detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted
prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos
who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight
risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the
proper authorities and such can be proven by
the numerous times he was allowed to travel
outside his place of detention.
Subsequent events reveal the contrary,
however. The assailed Orders augured well
when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went
past security detail for some reason and
proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel
to issue certain statements. The account,
dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident,"
proves that petitioner's argument bites the
dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to
be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause
for foreboding became real.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability
of flight find relevance as a factor in
ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail
and in cancelling a discretionary grant of bail.
In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what
is controlling is the determination of whether
the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is
established that it is so, bail shall be denied as
it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.
ART. 3 Sec. 2 RIGHTS OF UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURE
cases:
VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA
FACTS:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital
Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction
02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters,
AFP, with the mission of conducting security
operations within its area of responsibility and
peripheral areas, for the purpose of
establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic
and political development of the National
Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain
peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of
the installation of said checkpoints, the
residents of Valenzuela are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at
the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the
checkpoints, considering that their cars and
vehicles are being subjected to regular
searches and check-ups, especially at night or
at dawn, without the benefit of a search
warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear
for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9
July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of
the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was
gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the
members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at
Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or
refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint
and for continuing to speed off inspire of
warning shots fired in the air.
ISSUE:
WON the installation of checkpoints violates
the right of the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures
RULING:
Petitioner's concern for their safety and
apprehension at being harassed by the
military manning the checkpoints are not
sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints
per se, illegal. No proof has been presented
before the Court to show that, in the course of
their routine checks, the military, indeed,
committed specific violations of petitioners''
rights against unlawful search and seizure of
other rights. The constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right invocable only by those whose
rights have been infringed, or threatened to be
infringed. Not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. The setting up of the questioned
checkpoints may be considered as a security
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its
mission of establishing effective territorial
defense and maintaining peace and order for
the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not
also be regarded as measures to thwart plots
to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public
security. Between the inherent right of the
state to protect its existence and promote
public welfare and an individual’s right against
a warrantless search w/c is, however,
reasonably conducted, the former should
prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by
the military is susceptible of abuse by the
military in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse.
But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen,
the checkpoints during these abnormal times,
when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.
PROBABLE CAUSE: (definition)
cases:
HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE
RAUL E. DE LEON
G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department
of Justice a letter-complaint charging
petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian,
Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons
with the crime of Rape and Homicide of
Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie
Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W.
Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro
Manila on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a
panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct
the preliminary investigation.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of
probable cause. They assail the credibility of
Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and
uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies
between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995
sworn statements. They criticize the procedure
followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not
examine witnesses to clarify the alleged
inconsistencies.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul
de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita
Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against
them without conducting the required
preliminary examination.
Petitioners complain about the denial of their
constitutional right to due process and
violation of their right to an impartial
investigation. They also assail the prejudicial
publicity that attended their preliminary
investigation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise
gravely abused its discretion in holding that
there is probable cause to charge them with
the crime of rape and homicide
2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon
and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion
when they failed to conduct a preliminary
examination before issuing warrants of arrest
against them
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them
their constitutional right to due process during
their preliminary investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully
intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed
to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as
an accused.
RULING:
1. NO.
2. NO.
3. NO. There is no merit in this contention
because petitioners were given all the
opportunities to be heard.
4. NO.
REASONS:
1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it found
probable cause against the petitioners. A
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not, a crime has
been committed and was committed by the
suspects. Probable cause need not be based
on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt.
2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did
not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest
cases, there must be a probable cause that a
crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested committed it. Section 6
of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of
an information, the Regional Trial Court may
issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the,
our laws repudiate the submission of
petitioners that respondent judges should
have conducted “searching examination of
witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest
against them.
3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to
adduce more evidence in their behalf and for
the panel to study the evidence submitted
more fully.
4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies
on the faulty assumption that the decision
whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the
sole prerogative of the courts and beyond
executive and legislative interference. In truth,
the prosecution of crimes appertains to the
executive department of government whose
principal power and responsibility is to see
that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of this power is the right
to prosecute their violators (See R.A. No. 6981
and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).
With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn
statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court
believes that these have been sufficiently
explained and there is no showing that the
inconsistencies were deliberately made to
distort the truth.
With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about
the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation, the Court finds
nothing in the records that will prove that the
tone and content of the publicity that attended
the investigation of petitioners fatally infected
the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel.
Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal
effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of
the DOJ Panel, for these are basically
unbeknown and beyond knowing.
LIM, SR. VS JUDGE FELIX
GR NOS. 95954-7 (FEBRUARY 19, 1991)
FACTS:
-On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in
the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road
of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at
the municipality of Masbate province of
Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr.
and his security escorts, namely Provincial
Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and
Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a
lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security
escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived
the assassination plot, although, he himself
suffered a gunshot wound.
-An investigation of the incident then followed.
-Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary
investigation, the designated investigator,
Harry O. Tantiado, TSg, of the PC Criminal
Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon
Legazpi City filed an amended complaint with
the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing,
among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana
Lim of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T.
Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor
Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the
crime of multiple murder and frustrated
murder in connection with the airport incident.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
9211.
-After conducting the preliminary
investigation, the court issued an order dated
July 31, 1989 stating therein that:
“. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers
given by the witnesses for the prosecution
during the preliminary examination in
searching questions and answers, concludes
that a probable cause has been established for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named
accused in the amended complaint, namely,
Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon
Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio
Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana Lim,
Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy
Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy.”
- Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim
filed with the respondent court several
motions and manifestations which in
substance prayed that an order be issued
requiring the transmittal of the initial records
of the preliminary inquiry or investigation
conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of
Masbate for the best enlightenment regarding
the existence of a probable cause or prima
facie evidence as well as the determination of
the existence of guilt, pursuant to the
mandatory mandate of the constitution that no
warrant shall be issued unless the issuing
magistrate shall have himself been personally
convinced of such probable cause.
- In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated
that the court conduct a hearing to determine
if there really exists a prima facie case against
them in the light of documents which are
recantations of some witnesses in the
preliminary investigation.
- It should also be noted that the Lims also
presented to the respondent Judge documents
of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies
were used to establish a prima facie case
against them.
-On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued
an order denying for lack of merit the motions
and manifestations and issued warrants of
arrest against the accused including the
petitioners herein. The judge wrote, “In the
instant cases, the preliminary investigation
was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of
Masbate, Masbate which found the existence
of probable cause that the offense of multiple
murder was committed and that all the
accused are probably guilty thereof, which was
affirmed upon review by the Provincial
Prosecutor who properly filed with the
Regional Trial Court four separate informations
for murder. Considering that both the two
competent officers to whom such duty was
entrusted by law have declared the existence
of probable cause, each information is
complete in form and substance, and there is
no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it
just and proper to rely on the prosecutor's
certification in each information…”
-Petitioners question the judgment of Judge
Felix (statement immediately preceding this
paragraph, italicized).
ISSUE:
WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest
without bail by simply relying on the
prosecution's certification and
recommendation that a probable cause exists.
RULING:
The questioned Order of respondent Judge
Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial
Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared
NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE.
As held in Soliven v. Makasiar, the Judge does
not have to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor
can perform the same functions as a
commissioner for the taking of the evidence.
However, there should be necessary
documents and a report supporting the Fiscal's
bare certification. All of these should be before
the Judge.
We cannot determine beforehand how cursory
or exhaustive the Judge's examination should
be. Usually, this depends on the circumstances
of each case. The Judge has to exercise sound
discretion; after all, the personal
determination is vested in the Judge by the
Constitution. However, to be sure, the Judge
must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification
and investigation report whenever necessary.
As mentioned in the facts (stated above), the
Lims presented documents of recantations of
the witnesses. Although, the general rule is
that recantations are not given much weight in
the determination of a case and in the
granting of a new trial the respondent Judge
before issuing his own warrants of arrest
should, at the very least, have gone over the
records of the preliminary examination
conducted earlier in the light of the evidence
now presented by the concerned witnesses in
view of the "political undertones" prevailing in
the cases.
In making the required personal
determination, a Judge is not precluded from
relying on the evidence earlier gathered by
responsible officers. The extent of the reliance
depends on the circumstances of each case
and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion.
However, the Judge abuses that discretion
when having no evidence before him, he
issues a warrant of arrest.
Indubitably, the respondent Judge (Felix)
committed a grave error when he relied solely
on the Prosecutor's certification and issued the
questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without
having before him any other basis for his
personal determination of the existence of a
probable cause.
CONDUCT OF CHECK POINTS:
cases:
VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA
FACTS:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital
Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction
02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters,
AFP, with the mission of conducting security
operations within its area of responsibility and
peripheral areas, for the purpose of
establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic
and political development of the National
Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain
peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of
the installation of said checkpoints, the
residents of Valenzuela are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at
the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the
checkpoints, considering that their cars and
vehicles are being subjected to regular
searches and check-ups, especially at night or
at dawn, without the benefit of a search
warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear
for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9
July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of
the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was
gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the
members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at
Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or
refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint
and for continuing to speed off inspire of
warning shots fired in the air.
ISSUE:
WON the installation of checkpoints violates
the right of the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures
RULING:
Petitioner's concern for their safety and
apprehension at being harassed by the
military manning the checkpoints are not
sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints
per se, illegal. No proof has been presented
before the Court to show that, in the course of
their routine checks, the military, indeed,
committed specific violations of petitioners''
rights against unlawful search and seizure of
other rights. The constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right invocable only by those whose
rights have been infringed, or threatened to be
infringed. Not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. The setting up of the questioned
checkpoints may be considered as a security
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its
mission of establishing effective territorial
defense and maintaining peace and order for
the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not
also be regarded as measures to thwart plots
to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public
security. Between the inherent right of the
state to protect its existence and promote
public welfare and an individual’s right against
a warrantless search w/c is, however,
reasonably conducted, the former should
prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by
the military is susceptible of abuse by the
military in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse.
But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen,
the checkpoints during these abnormal times,
when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO
234 SCRA 246; G.R. NO. 109633; 20 JUL 1994
Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by
the trial court of illegal possession of firearms
and illegal possession and sale of drugs,
particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After
the issuance of the search warrant, which
authorized the search and seizure of an
undetermined quantity of methamphetamine
and its paraphernalia’s, an entrapment was
planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario
and to the seizure of the shabu, its
paraphernalia’s and of a .22 caliber pistol with
3 live ammunition.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the
firearms was proper.
Held: No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution
specifically provides that a search warrant
must particularly describe the things to be
seized. In herein case, the only objects to be
seized that the warrant determined was the
methamphetamine and the paraphernalia’s
therein. The seizure of the firearms was
unconstitutional.
Wherefore the decision is reversed and the
accused is acquitted.
MANALILI V. COURT OF APPEALS
280 SCRA 400
FACTS:
Narcotics officers were doing surveillance and
chanced upon the accused in a cemetery who
seemed to be high on drugs. He tried to resist
the police officers and upon inquiry, found
that the accused was possessing what
seemed to be crushed marijuana leaves.
HELD:
A stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular
designation of the right of a police officer to
stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him,
and pat him for weapons. It has been held as
one of the exceptions to the general rule
against searches without warrant.
PEOPLE VS. ARUTA
288 SCRA 626
G.R. NO. 120515; 13 APR 1998
FACTS:
On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off
by his informant that a certain “Aling Rosa”
will be arriving from Baguio City with a large
volume of marijuana and assembled a team.
The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal
they waited for the bus coming from Baguio,
when the informer pointed out who “Aling
Rosa” was, the team approached her and
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents.
When Abello asked “aling Rosa” about the
contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to
the police. They found dried marijuana leaves
packed in a plastic bag marked “cash
katutak”.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense
filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the
illegality of the search and seizure of the
items. In her testimony, the accused claimed
that she had just come from Choice theatre
where she watched a movie “Balweg”. While
about to cross the road an old woman asked
her for help in carrying a shoulder bag, when
she was later on arrested by the police. She
has no knowledge of the identity of the old
woman and the woman was nowhere to be
found. Also, no search warrant was presented.
The trial court convicted the accused in
violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the police correctly searched
and seized the drugs from the accused.
RULING:
The following cases are specifically provided or
allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing
jurisprudence
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the
elements of which are: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest
in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence
was inadvertently discovered by the police
who had the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly
regulated by the government, the vehicle's
inherent mobility reduces expectation of
privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that
the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
The essential requisite of probable cause must
still be satisfied before a warrantless search
and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
The accused cannot be said to be committing
a crime, she was merely crossing the street
and was not acting suspiciously for the
Narcom agents to conclude that she was
committing a crime. There was no legal basis
to effect a warrantless arrest of the accused’s
bag, there was no probable cause and the
accused was not lawfully arrested.
The police had more than 24 hours to procure
a search warrant and they did not do so. The
seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible
evidence.
RULE 113, RULES OF COURT
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.
— A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed,
and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b)
above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.
RULE 126, RULES OF COURT
Section 2. Court where application for search
warrant shall be filed. — An application for
search warrant shall be filed with the
following:
a) Any court within whose territorial
jurisdiction a crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the
application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of
the commission of the crime is known, or any
court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already
been filed, the application shall only be made
in the court where the criminal action is
pending.
Section 7. Right to break door or window to
effect search. — The officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search
after giving notice of his purpose and
authority, may break open any outer or inner
door or window of a house or any part of a
house or anything therein to execute the
warrant or liberate himself or any person
lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained
therein.
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory
thereof to court; return and proceedings
thereon.
(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the
property seized to the judge who issued the
warrant, together with a true inventory thereof
duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search
warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the
return has been made, and if none, shall
summon the person to whom the warrant was
issued and require him to explain why no
return was made. If the return has been made,
the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of
this Rule has been complained with and shall
require that the property seized be delivered
to him. The judge shall see to it that
subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be
filed and kept by the custodian of the log book
on search warrants who shall enter therein the
date of the return, the result, and other
actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute
contempt of court
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. vs.
SOLUTA
FACTS:
Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of
the hotel, stayed overnight at the female
locker room at the basement of the hotel. At
dawn, she heard pounding sounds outside, she
saw five men in barong tagalog whom she
failed to recognize but she was sure were not
employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the
door of the union office. In the morning, as
union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open
the door of the union office, Loida narrated to
him what she had witnessed at dawn.
Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before
the Security Officer. And he fetched a
locksmith. At that instant, men in barong
tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started
hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio
thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open
the door, and the latter did. Once inside,
Panlilio and his companions began searching
the office, over the objection of Babay who
even asked them if they had a search warrant.
A plastic bag was found containing marijuana
flowering tops.
As a result of the discovery of the presence of
marijuana in the union office and after the
police conducted an investigation of the
incident, a complaint against the 13 union
officers was filed before the Fiscal’s Office of
Manila. RTC acquitted the accused. On appeal,
the CA affirmed with modification the decision
of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent individual can recover
damages for violation of constitutional rights.
RULING: Article 32, in relation to Article
2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable
to the latter for damages:
In the present case, petitioners had, by their
own claim, already received reports in late
1987 of illegal activities and Maniego
conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of
January 11, 1988, petitioners and their
companions barged into and searched the
union office without a search warrant, despite
ample time for them to obtain one.
The course taken by petitioners and company
stinks in illegality. Petitioners’ violation of
individual respondents’ constitutional right
against unreasonable search thus furnishes
the basis for the award of damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code. For respondents,
being the lawful occupants of the office had
the right to raise the question of validity of the
search and seizure.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or
person "directly or indirectly" responsible for
the violation of the constitutional rights and
liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor
alone who must answer for damages under
Article 32; the person indirectly responsible
has also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party. Such being the
case, petitioners, together with Maniego and
Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the
illegal search, are jointly and severally liable
for actual, moral and exemplary damages to
herein individual respondents in accordance
with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of
Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and
(10) of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered
in the following and analogous cases, among
others, (6) Illegal search and (10) Acts and
action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 32, 34 and 35.
DECISION: Denied.
PACIS VS. PAMARAN
G.R. No. L-23996 March 15, 1974
Doctrine:
It is a well-settled principle that for violations
of customs laws, a warrant issued by the
Collector of Customs is conceded. It is not
necessary, in these cases, that the warrants
be issued by a judge, as what is required in
the Constitution.
FACTS:
Respondent Ricardo Santos is the owner of a
Mercury automobile, model 1957. It was
brought into this country without the payment
of customs duty and taxes, its original owner
Donald James Hatch being tax-exempt. On
June 25, 1964, respondent paid P311.00 for
customs duty and taxes.
Petitioner Pacis, on July 22, 1964 received
from the Administrator, General Affairs
Administration of the Department of National
Defense, a letter to the effect that the Land
Transportation Commission reported that such
automobile was a "hot car." By virtue thereof,
petitioner, through his subordinates, looked
into the records of his office and ascertained
that the amount collectible on said car should
be P2,500.00, more or less. Based on such
discrepancy, petitioner instituted seizure
proceedings and issued a warrant of seizure
and detention and thus the subject automobile
was taken. Respondent requested for the
withdrawal or dissolution of the warrant of
seizure but petitioner denied it.
Thereafter, respondent Santos filed a criminal
complaint for usurpation of judicial functions
with the City Fiscal of Manila. As the
respondent Fiscal Pamaran was bent on
proceeding with the charge against petitioner,
an action for prohibition was filed with the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Constitutional provision
which states that only a judge could issue a
search warrant applies to warrants issued in
lieu of violations of customs laws.
HELD:
In a recent decision of this Court, Papa v.
Mago, where the seizure of alleged smuggled
goods was effected by a police officer without
a search warrant, this Court, through Justice
Zaldivar, stated: "Petitioner Martin Alagao and
his companion policemen had authority to
effect the seizure without any search warrant
issued by a component court. The Tariff and
Customs Code does not require said warrant in
the instant case. The Code authorizes persons
having police authority under Section 2203 of
the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass
through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a
dwelling house and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package, box or envelope or any person on
board, or stop and search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding
or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law,
without mentioning the need of a search
warrant in said cases. But in the search of a
dwelling house, the Code provides that said
"dwelling house may be entered and searched
only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice
of the peace ... ." It is our considered view,
therefore, that except in the case of the
search of a dwelling house, persons exercising
police authority under the customs law may
effect search and seizure without a search
warrant in the enforcement of customs laws."
The plenitude of the competence vested in
customs officials is thus undeniable. No such
constitutional question then can possibly arise.
So much is implicit from the very language of
Section 2205 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
It speaks for itself. It is not susceptible of any
misinterpretation. The power of petitioner is
thus manifest. It being undeniable then that
the sole basis for an alleged criminal act
performed by him was the performance of a
duty according to law, there is not the
slightest justification for respondent Assistant
City Fiscal to continue with the preliminary
investigation after his attention was duly
called to the plain and explicit legal provision
that did not suffer at all from any
constitutional infirmity.
WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition prayed for
is granted and the successor of respondent
Manuel R. Pamaran, now a criminal circuit
court judge, or any one in the City Fiscal's
Office of the City of Manila to whom the
complaint against petitioner for usurpation of
judicial functions arising out of the issuance of
the warrant of seizure and detention, subject-
matter of this litigation, has been assigned, is
perpetually restrained from acting thereon
except to dismiss the same. No costs.
STOP AND FRISK RULE:
cases:
Malacat vs. Court of Appeals
GR 123595, 12 December 1997
FACTS:
On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m.,
allegedly in response to bomb threats reported
seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western
Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the
Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3,
Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three
other police officers (all of them in uniform)
along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near
the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They
chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking
men, with each group, comprised of three to
four men, posted at opposite sides of the
corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury
Drug Store. These men were acting
suspiciously with “their eyes moving very
fast.” Yu and his companions positioned
themselves at strategic points and observed
both groups for about 30 minutes. The police
officers then approached one group of men,
who then fled in different directions. As the
policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and
apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who
Yu recognized, inasmuch as allegedly the
previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at
Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others
attempt to detonate a grenade). Upon
searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation
grenade tucked inside the latter’s “front waist
line.” Yu’s companion, police officer Rogelio
Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from
whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered.
Malacat and Casan were then brought to
Police Station 3 where Yu placed an “X” mark
at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter
gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue any
receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered
from Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat
was charged with violating Section 3 of
Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment on 9
October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel
de officio, entered a plea of not guilty. Malacat
denied the charges and explained that he only
recently arrived in Manila. However, several
other police officers mauled him, hitting him
with benches and guns. Petitioner was once
again searched, but nothing was found on him.
He saw the grenade only in court when it was
presented. In its decision dated 10 February
1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994,
the trial court ruled that the warrantless
search and seizure of Malacat was akin to a
“stop and frisk,” where a “warrant and seizure
can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest” and “whose object is
either to maintain the status quo momentarily
while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information”; and that the seizure of the
grenade from Malacat was incidental to a
lawful arrest. The trial court thus found
Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD
1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not
more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as
maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed
a notice of appeal indicating that he was
appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the
record of the case was forwarded to the Court
of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of
24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for
review with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid,
pursuant to the exception of “stop and frisk.”
HELD:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches
and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same. The
Constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures
refers to those effected without a validly
issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions.
As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are
found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court. A warrantless arrest under the
circumstances contemplated under Section
5(a) has been denominated as one “in
flagrante delicto,” while that under Section
5(b) has been described as a “hot pursuit”
arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches,
they are limited to the following: (1) customs
searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent
searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful
arrest; and (6) a “stop and frisk.” The concepts
of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental
to a lawful arrest must not be confused. These
two types of warrantless searches differ in
terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their
allowable scope. In a search incidental to a
lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental
search. Here, there could have been no valid
in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of
personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the
arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on
the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had
just been committed, was being committed or
was going to be committed. Plainly, the search
conducted on Malacat could not have been
one incidental to a lawful arrest. On the other
hand, while probable cause is not required to
conduct a “stop and frisk,” it nevertheless
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not
validate a “stop and frisk.” A genuine reason
must exist, in light of the police officer’s
experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a
“stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1)
the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2)
the more pressing interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to
take steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against the police officer. Here, there are
at least three (3) reasons why the “stop-and-
frisk” was invalid: First, there is grave doubts
as to Yu’s claim that Malacat was a member of
the group which attempted to bomb Plaza
Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is neither
supported by any police report or record nor
corroborated by any other police officer who
allegedly chased that group. Second, there
was nothing in Malacat’s behavior or conduct
which could have reasonably elicited even
mere suspicion other than that his eyes were
“moving very fast” — an observation which
leaves us incredulous since Yu and his
teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it
was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk.
Malacat and his companions were merely
standing at the corner and were not creating
any commotion or trouble. Third, there was at
all no ground, probable or otherwise, to
believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he
admitted, the alleged grenade was
“discovered” “inside the front waistline” of
Malacat, and from all indications as to the
distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale
bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed
hiding a grenade, could not have been visible
to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant
violations of Malacat’s rights solemnly
guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article
III of the Constitution.
WARRANTLESS ARREST
cases:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN
(SUBJECT: DELEGATION OF QUASI JUDICIAL
POWER; ESTOPPEL.
FACTS:
ON 18 MARCH 1986, ATTY. RAMIREZ AND
ATTY. ABELLA, PCGG AGENTS, ISSUED A
SEQUESTRATION ORDER AGAINST THE
RESTHOUS THE SOLE ISSUE PRESENTED IS
WHETHER OR NOT THE MARCH 18, 1986
SEQUESTRATION ORDER AGAINST PROPERTIES
OF IMELDA IN LEYTE INCLUDING THE
RESTHOUSE AT OLOT. THEIR ORDER WAS NOT
SIGNED BY ANY PCGG COMMISSIONERS.
ISSUE:
IS THEIR ORDER VALID?
RULING:
NO. JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS
MAY NOT BE DELEGATED. IN PCGG V. JUDGE
PEÑA,[1][17] THE COURT HELD THAT THE
POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF THE
PCGG AMOUNT TO THE EXERCISE OF QUASI-
JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS, AND THE EXERCISE OF
SUCH FUNCTIONS CANNOT BE DELEGATED BY
THE COMMISSION TO ITS REPRESENTATIVES
OR SUBORDINATES OR TASK FORCES
BECAUSE OF THE WELL ESTABLISHED
PRINCIPLE THAT JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL
POWERS MAY NOT BE DELEGATED.
PETITIONER REPUBLIC ARGUES THAT MRS.
MARCOS SHOULD BE DEEMED ESTOPPED
FROM QUESTIONING THE SEQUESTRATION OF
HER OLOT RESTHOUSE BY HER ACTIONS IN
REGARD TO THE SAME. BUT A VOID ORDER
PRODUCES NO EFFECT AND CANNOT BE
VALIDATED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
ESTOPPEL. FOR THE SAME REASON, THE
COURT CANNOT ACCEPT PETITIONER’S VIEW
THAT MRS. MARCOS SHOULD HAVE FIRST
SOUGHT THE LIFTING OF THE SEQUESTRATION
ORDER THROUGH A MOTION TO QUASH FILED
WITH THE PCGG. BEING VOID, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN HAS THE POWER TO STRIKE
IT DOWN ON SIGHT.
RULING OF THE COURT:
The Court’s Ruling
Under Section 26, Article XVIII of the
Constitution, an order of sequestration may
only issue upon a showing “of a prima facie
case” that the properties are ill-gotten wealth
under Executive Orders 1 and 2.[2][11] When
a court nullifies an order of sequestration for
having been issued without a prima facie case,
the Court does not substitute its judgment for
that of the PCGG but simply applies the law.[3]
[12]
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co, Inc. v.
PCGG,[4][13] the Court held that a prima facie
factual foundation that the properties
sequestered are “ill-gotten wealth” is required.
The power to determine the existence of a
prima facie case has been vested in the PCGG
as an incident to its investigatory powers. The
two-commissioner rule is obviously intended to
assure a collegial determination of such fact.
[5][14]
Here, it is clear that the PCGG did not make a
prior determination of the existence of a prima
facie case that would warrant the
sequestration of the Olot Resthouse. The
Republic presented no evidence before the
Sandiganbayan that shows differently. Nor did
the Republic demonstrate that the two PCGG
representatives were given the quasi-judicial
authority to receive and consider evidence
that would warrant such a prima facie finding.
Parenthetically, the Republic’s supposed
evidence does not show how the Marcoses
acquired the sequestered property, what
makes it “ill-gotten wealth,” and how former
President Marcos intervened in its acquisition.
Taking the foregoing view, the resolution of
the issue surrounding the character of the
property sequestered – whether or not it could
prima facie be considered ill-gotten – should
be necessary.
The issue in this case is not new. The facts
are substantially identical to those in the case
of Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Dio Island
Resort, Inc.).[6][15] There, the same Atty.
Ramirez issued a sequestration order on April
14, 1986 against Dio Island Resort, Inc. and all
its assets and properties which were thought
to be part of the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.
Alerted by a challenge to his action, the PCGG
passed a resolution “to confirm, ratify and
adopt as its own all the Writs of Sequestration”
that Attys. Ramirez and Abella issued “to
remove any doubt as to the validity and
enforceability” of their writs. Still, the Court
struck them down as void:
It is indubitable that under no circumstances
can a sequestration or freeze order be validly
issued by one not a Commissioner of the
PCGG.
The invalidity of the sequestration order was
made more apparent by the fact that Atty.
Ramirez did not even have any specific
authority to act on behalf of the Commission
at the time he issued the said sequestration
order. x x x
Even assuming arguendo that Atty. Ramirez
had been given prior authority by the PCGG to
place Dio Island Resort under sequestration,
nevertheless, the sequestration order he
issued is still void since PCGG may not
delegate its authority to sequester to its
representatives and subordinates, and any
such delegation is invalid and ineffective.
Under Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2, PCGG is
the sole entity primarily charged with the
responsibility of recovering ill-gotten wealth. x
x x The power to sequester, therefore, carries
with it the corollary duty to make a preliminary
determination of whether there is a reasonable
basis for sequestering a property alleged to be
ill-gotten. After a careful evaluation of the
evidence adduced, the PCGG clearly has to
use its own judgment in determining the
existence of a prima facie case.
The absence of a prior determination by the
PCGG of a prima facie basis for the
sequestration order is, unavoidably, a fatal
defect which rendered the sequestration of
respondent corporation and its properties void
ab initio. Being void ab initio, it is deemed
non-existent, as though it had never been
issued,
The Court is maintaining its above ruling in
this case.
Although the two PCGG lawyers issued the
sequestration order in this case on March 18,
1986, before the passage of Sec. 3 of the
PCGG Rules, such consideration is immaterial
following our above ruling.
In PCGG v. Judge Peña,[8][17] the Court held
that the powers, functions and duties of the
PCGG amount to the exercise of quasi-judicial
functions, and the exercise of such functions
cannot be delegated by the Commission to its
representatives or subordinates or task forces
because of the well established principle that
judicial or quasi-judicial powers may not be
delegated.
It is the Republic’s theory of course that
Commissioner Daza’s letter, directing Attys.
Ramirez and Abella to search and sequester all
properties, documents, money and other
assets of respondents, should be considered
as the writ of sequestration while the order
issued by Attys. Ramirez and Abella should be
treated merely as an implementing order.
But the letter did not have the tenor of a
sequestration order covering specific
properties that the lawyers were ordered to
seize and hold for the PCGG. Actually, that
letter is of the same kind issued to Attys.
Ramirez and Abella in Dio Island Resort.
Consequently, there is no reason to depart
from the Court’s ruling in the latter case where
it said:
The invalidity of the sequestration order was
made more apparent by the fact that Atty.
Ramirez did not even have any specific
authority to act on behalf of the Commission
at the time he issued the said sequestration
order. Thus, the respondent Court noted:
Contrary to plaintiff’s representation, nothing
exists to support its contention that the Task
Force had been given prior authority to place
DIO under PCGG control. On the contrary, as
the text of the above letters clearly show,
Attys. Jose Tan Ramirez and Ben Abella, had
acted on broad and non-specific powers: ‘By
authority of the commission and the powers
vested in it. x x x.’”[9][18]
Petitioner Republic argues that Mrs. Marcos
should be deemed estopped from questioning
the sequestration of her Olot Resthouse by her
actions in regard to the same. But a void
order produces no effect and cannot be
validated under the doctrine of estoppel. For
the same reason, the Court cannot accept
petitioner’s view that Mrs. Marcos should have
first sought the lifting of the sequestration
order through a motion to quash filed with the
PCGG. Being void, the Sandiganbayan has the
power to strike it down on sight.
Besides, the lifting of the sequestration order
will not necessarily be fatal to the main case
since it does not follow from such lifting that
the sequestered properties are not ill-gotten
wealth. Such lifting simply means that the
government may not act as conservator or
may not exercise administrative or
housekeeping powers over the property.[10]
[19] Indeed, the Republic can be protected by
a notice of lis pendens.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition
for lack of merit and AFFIRMS the challenged
resolutions of the Fourth Division of the
Sandiganbayan dated February 28, 2002 and
August 28, 2002 in Civil Case 0002, which
granted respondent Imelda R. Marcos’ Motion
to Quash the March 18, 1986 Sequestration
Order covering the Olot Resthouse.
Further, the Court DIRECTS the Register of
Deeds of Leyte to immediately annotate a
notice of lis pendens on the certificate of title
of the Olot Resthouse with respect to the
Republic of the Philippines’ claim over the
same in Civil Case 0002 of the Sandiganbayan.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PADILLA V. CA
129 S 558 (1990)
Where in the complaint for Grave Coercion
against the mayor and policemen, they were
acquitted on the ground that their guilt has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt, such
acquittal will not bar a civil case for damages
arising from the demolition of petition¬er's
market stalls. The acquittal on the ground that
their guilt has not been proven beyond
reasona¬ble doubt refers to the element of
Grave Coercion and not to the fact of that the
stalls were not demolished.
Under the Rules of Court, the extinction of
penal action carries with it the extinction of
civil only if there is a declaration that facts
from which civil may arise did not exist. Also,
Art. 29 of the Civil Code does not state that
civil liability can be recovered only in a
separate civil action. The civil liability can be
recovered either in the same or a separate
action. The purpose of recovering in the same
action is to dispense with the filing of another
civil action where the same evidence is to be
presented, and the unsettling implications of
permitting reinsti¬tuttion of a separate civil
action. However, a separate civil action is
warranted when (1) addition¬al facts are to be
established; (2) there is more evidence to be
adduced; (3) there is full termina¬tion of the
criminal case and a separate complaint would
be more efficacious than a remand. Hence, CA
did not err in awarding damages despite the
acquittal.
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO
234 SCRA 246; G.R. NO. 109633; 20 JUL 1994
Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by
the trial court of illegal possession of firearms
and illegal possession and sale of drugs,
particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After
the issuance of the search warrant, which
authorized the search and seizure of an
undetermined quantity of methamphetamine
and its paraphernalia’s, an entrapment was
planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario
and to the seizure of the shabu, its
paraphernalia’s and of a .22 caliber pistol with
3 live ammunition.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the
firearms was proper.
Held: No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution
specifically provides that a search warrant
must particularly describe the things to be
seized. In herein case, the only objects to be
seized that the warrant determined was the
methamphetamine and the paraphernalia’s
therein. The seizure of the firearms was
unconstitutional.
Wherefore the decision is reversed and the
accused is acquitted.
VALIDITY OF A WARRANT ISSUED BY THE
JUDGE
cases:
PEOPLE v. TEE
"rights of the accused to speedy trial"
FACTS:
The case involves an automatic review of
judgment made against Tee who was
convicted for illegal possession of marijuana
and sentenced to death. The defense assailed
the decision of the court for taking admissible
as evidence the marijuana seized from the
accused by virtue of allegedly general search
warrant. They further contend that the
accused was deprived of his right to speedy
trial by failure of the prosecution to produce
their witness who failed to appear during the
20 hearing dates thereby slowing down the
trial procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the substantive right of the
accused for a speedy trial prejudiced during
the hearing of the case.
RULING:
The court ruled that the substantive right of
the accused for a fair and speedy trial was not
violated. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of
1998 provides that the trial period for the
criminal cases should be in general 180 days.
However, in determining the right of an
accused to speedy trial, courts should do more
than a mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the scheduled
hearings of the case.The right to a speedy trial
is deemed violated only when: (1) the
proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when
unjustified postponements are asked for and
secured; or (3) when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried.
It was shown by the records that the
prosecution exerted efforts in obtaining a
warrant to compel the witness to testify. The
concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative
where several factors are weighed such as the
length of time of delay, the reason of such
delay, and conduct of prosecution and the
accused and the prejudice and damaged
caused to the accused of such delay. The court
did not find the 20 days of delayed hearing
unreasonable length of time as to constitute
deprivation of the constitutional rights of the
accused for a speedy trial in addition to the
fact that court trial may be always subjected
to postponement for reasonable cause of
delay. In the absence of showing that the
reason for delay was capricious or oppressive,
the State must not be deprived of reasonable
opportunity in prosecuting the accused.
PANGANDAMAN V. CASAR
FACTS:
The case originated in Lanao. The offended
party was ambushed in Lanao, but he
survived. Based on his description, there were
around 50 persons who staged the ambush
from both sides of the hill. However, he could
not recognize anyone of the 50. But he filed a
case against all 50 ambushers, all “JOHN
DOES”. So the court issued a warrant of arrest
against the 50 John Does.
ISSUE:
W/N the warrant of arrest is valid? Can a court
issue a warrant of arrest against an unknown
accused?
HELD:
NO it is not valid. It is of the nature of a
general warrant, one of a call of writs long
prescribed as unconstitutional and once
anathematized as totally subversive of the
liberty of the subject. Clearly violative of the
constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest
should particularly describe the person or
persons to be seized. The warrant as against
unidentified subjects will be considered as null
and void.
EXAMINATION OF BANK ACCOUNTS/
DEPOSITS
cases:
PNB VS. GANCAYCO
G.R. No. L-18343 September 30, 1965
FACTS:
Defendants Emilio Gancayco and Florentino
Flor, as special prosecutors of the Department
of Justice, required the plaintiff Philippine
National Bank to produce at a hearing the
records of the bank deposits of Ernesto
Jimenez, former administrator of the
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
Administration, who was then under
investigation for unexplained wealth. In
declining to reveal its records, the plaintiff
bank invoked Section 2 of Republic Act No.
1405.
On the other hand, the defendants cited
Section 8 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) in
support of their claim of authority,which
allegedly provides an additional ground for the
examination of bank deposits.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019
provides an additional ground for the
examination of bank deposits.
HELD:
Yes. The truth is that these laws are so
repugnant to each other than no reconciliation
is possible. x x x. The only conclusion possible
is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is
intended to amend section 2 of Republic Act
No. 1405 by providing additional exception to
the rule against the disclosure of bank
deposits.
W]hile section 2 of Republic Act 1405 declares
bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential,"
it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the
following instances:
(1) Upon written permission of the depositor;
(2) In cases of impeachment;
(3) Upon order of a competent court in cases
of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials;
(4) In cases where the money deposited is the
subject matter of the litigation. Cases of
unexplained wealth are similar to cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty.
MARQUEZ VS. DISIERTO
G.R. No. 135882 June 27, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Ombudsman Desierto ordered
petitioner Marquez to produce several bank
documents for purposes of inspection in
camera relative to various accounts
maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines,
Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the
branch manager.
The order is based on a pending investigation
at the Office of the Ombudsman against
Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A.
No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the
Joint Venture Agreement between the Public
Estates Authority and AMARI.
Petitioner wanted to be clarified first as to how
she would comply with the orders without her
breaking any law, particularly RA. No. 1405.
ISSUE:
Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have
an in camera inspection of the questioned
account is allowed as an exception to the law
on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405).
HELD: No.
We rule that before an in camera inspection
may be allowed, there must be a pending case
before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Further, the account must be clearly identified,
the inspection limited to the subject matter of
the pending case before the court of
competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel
and the account holder must be notified to be
present during the inspection, and such
inspection may cover only the account
identified in the pending case