Professional Documents
Culture Documents
General Principles.................................................................................................... 6
Magic Marketing v. Mailing Services of Pittsburgh, 634 F.Supp. 769 (W.D.Pa
1986) [76]................................................................................................................................ 6
Sebastian International, Inc. v. Consumer Contact (PTY) Ltd., 664 F.Supp. 909
(D.N.J. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988) [79]..............6
The Idea/Expression Dichotomy.......................................................................... 6
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) [97]..........................................................................6
Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) [103]................7
Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 816 (1958) [105]....................................................................................................7
Bibbero Systems, Inc. v. Colwell Systems, Inc., 893 F.2d 1104 [106].......................7
ABR Benefits Services Inc. v. NCO Group, 52 U.S.P.Q.2D 1119 (E.D.Pa 1999)
[110]..........................................................................................................................................7
Facts and Compilations............................................................................................7
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, 499 U.S. 340 [112].................7
Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Service Co., 768 F.2d 145 (7th Cir.
1985) [123]..............................................................................................................................8
Nash v. CBS, 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990) [124].........................................................8
Wainwright Securities v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.
1977) [128]..............................................................................................................................8
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970) [131]....8
Sem-Torq, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 936 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991) [132].......................8
Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1992) [133]............................9
Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998)
[135]..........................................................................................................................................9
Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998)
[137]..........................................................................................................................................9
CCC Information Services v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61
(2d Cir. 1994) [140]...............................................................................................................9
Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc) [147].10
1
BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing,
Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc) [149]..................................................10
Assessment Technologies of Wisconsin, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640
(7th Cir. 2003) [152]...........................................................................................................10
Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky & Skelly Engineers LLP, 303 F.3d 460 (2d Cir. 2002)
[156]........................................................................................................................................10
Derivative Works.................................................................................................... 10
L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) [164]................10
Schiffer Publications v. Chronicle Books, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1090 (E.D.Pa. 2004)
[177]........................................................................................................................................11
Maljack Productions, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 964 F.Supp. 1416 (C.D.Cal. 1997) [180]
................................................................................................................................................... 11
Computer Programs............................................................................................... 11
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983)
[185]........................................................................................................................................11
Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems, 825 F.Supp. 340 (D.Mass. 1993) [194]
................................................................................................................................................... 12
Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir.
1995) [195]............................................................................................................................12
Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997) [203]................................12
American Dental Association v. Delta Dental Plans Association, 126 F.3d 977
(7th Cir. 1997) [205]...........................................................................................................13
Pictorial, Graphic, and Sculptural Works......................................................... 13
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F.Supp.2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) [206]..........13
Masquerade Novelty Inc. v. Unique Industries, 912 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1990) [228]
................................................................................................................................................... 13
Pivot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir.
2004) [231]............................................................................................................................13
Architectural Works.............................................................................................. 14
Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F.Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) [253]........................14
Characters................................................................................................................ 14
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) [259]..................14
Warner Brothers Pictures v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954) [260].................14
Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (C.D.Cal. 1989) [261]............................15
Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004) [265].......................................15
Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003) [270].......................................... 15
Government Works and Other Public Policy Issues........................................15
County of Suffolk, New York v. First American Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d
2
179 (2d Cir. 2001) [276].....................................................................................................15
Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th
Cir. 2002) (en banc) [280]..................................................................................................15
Mitchell Brothers Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.
1979) [295]............................................................................................................................16
OWNERSHIP.......................................................................................................... 16
Initial Ownership.................................................................................................... 16
Lindsay v. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) [301]..........16
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) [305].........16
Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992) [317].................................................. 17
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995) [317]..............................17
Martha Graham School & Dance Foundation, Inc. v. Martha Graham Center of
Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) [318]................................17
Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998) [329].............................................18
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000) [339]..................................... 18
Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004) [340].......................................18
Transfer of Copyright Ownership...................................................................... 18
Effects Associates v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990) [347].............................18
Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988) [356]..............19
Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co. [360].....................19
Random House, inc. v. Rosetta Books, LLC [368]...................................................... 19
Bassett [373] (come back later)........................................................................................20
Foad Consulting [374] (come back later)......................................................................20
New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini [375].....................................................................20
In re Marriage of Susan M. & Frederick L. Worth [385] come back later.........20
Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty [386] come back later............................................................ 20
Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir.
1999) [471]............................................................................................................................20
Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Creative House Promotions, Inc.,
944 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) [477]................................................................................21
BMG v. Gonzalez [482].....................................................................................................21
Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com [489]................................................................................. 22
Kahle v. Ashcroft [495] (come back later).....................................................................22
EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS UNDER COPYRIGHT................................................22
3
Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc. [521] (come back later)....................................... 23
Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc. [524]............................................................................23
Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc. [526]...........................................23
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp. [528]...............................................23
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian [529].................................................24
Educational Testing Services v. Katzman [534]..........................................................24
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. [537].................................................................... 24
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp. [542]....................................................... 25
Boisson v. Banian, Ltd. [555]............................................................................................25
Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. [559].................................... 25
Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries [572]........................................................ 25
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc. [591]...................................................... 26
Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films [598]............................................................... 26
The Right to Prepare Derivative Works Under § 106(2)................................26
Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc. [605]......................................................................................26
Lee v. A.R.T. Co. [610]....................................................................................................... 27
Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc. [614]................................................................................. 27
Krause v. Titleserv, Inc. [620].......................................................................................... 27
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc. [621].......................................................27
Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine, Inc. [630].........................................................28
Pollara v. Seymour [630]................................................................................................... 28
Pavia v. 1120 Avenue of the Americas Associates [640]...........................................28
Wojnarowicz v. American Family Association [643]................................................. 28
The Right to Distribute Under § 106(3)............................................................ 29
Fawcett Publications v. Elliot Publishing Co. [651]...................................................29
Rights of Public Performance and Display Under §§ 106(4)–(6)..................29
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Aveco, Inc. [669]............................................. 29
4
THE CONCEPT OF COPYRIGHT
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951) [52]
A work is original (and therefore eligible for copyright) as long as it exhibits
more than a “merely trivial” variation from preexisting works. Bell asserted
copyright protection for handmade reproductions of public-domain paintings.
The reproductions had been made through a labor-intensive process known as
the “mezzotint method.” The court found that the mezzotint method allowed
the reproducer to exercise enough discretion to make the result an original
work.
5
right to the recordings.
General Principles
Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) [103]
Copyright protection does not extend to subject matter which is so narrow that
the topic “necessarily requires” one or a few forms of expression. At issue were
6
sweepstakes instructions which directed entrants to submit social security num-
bers and to comply with certain other rules. Finding the instructions to be so
specific as to be expressible in only a few ways, the court held that the instruc-
tions were uncopyrightable.
Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958) [105]
A particular printed form may be copyrightable even if the ideas underlying that
form are not copyrightable. The court found an insurance form to be copyright-
able because it contained “explanatory” information concerning the policy
offered by the authoring company.
Bibbero Systems, Inc. v. Colwell Systems, Inc., 893 F.2d 1104 [106]
Blank forms are generally uncopyrightable, even if they feature highly particu-
larized fields. Bibbero produced “superbills,” detailed forms which doctors used
to obtain reimbursement from insurance companies. Colwell produced virtually
identical superbills, which differed from Bibbero’s only in shading and other
trivial aspects. Despite Colwell’s near-copying of the forms, the court found that
blank forms are never copyrightable. The court declined to state that forms
“convey information” because they list “some categories of information but not
others” and cautioned that such a principle would be “potentially limitless.”
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, 499 U.S. 340 [112]
A compilation of facts may be copyrighted only if the selection of facts shows
“some minimal degree of creativity.” The court found that Rural’s telephone
directory was not copyrightable because the selection of telephone numbers was
“entirely typical.”
Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Service Co., 768 F.2d 145 (7th
Cir. 1985) [123]
Copyright protection does not depend on the amount of effort expended in cre-
ating the work.
7
right purposes. Nash had written several books on the bank robber John
Dillinger. These books claimed that Dillinger—contrary to conventional ac-
counts—had escaped a supposedly fatal ambush by the FBI and was living incog-
nito. Nash sued CBS copyright infringement after CBS produced a television
program based on Nash’s theory. Ruling for CBS, the court noted that “Nash
does not portray [his account] . . . as fiction,” so that “Nash’s rights lie in his ex-
pression . . . but not in the naked ‘truth.’ ”
Wainwright Securities v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.
1977) [128]
Paraphrasing written reports of facts may amount to copyright infringement.
Wainwright produced “in-depth analytical reports on industrial, financial, utility,
and railroad corporations.” Wall Street published a weekly newspaper contain-
ing “abstracts of institutional research reports,” include those produced by
Wainwright. Rejecting Wall Street’s theory that the abstracts were nothing but
facts, the court found that “[Wall Street] did not bother to distinguish between
the events contained in the reports and the manner of expression used by the
Wainwright analysts.”
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970)
[131]
A work must be analyzed as a whole to determine whether it qualifies for copy-
right protection. The court upheld Roth’s copyright to greeting cards even
though the text within the card was “prosaic.” The court found that “proprer
analysis of the problem requires that all elements of each card, including ar-
rangement of text, art work, and association between art work and text, be con-
sidered as a whole.”
Sem-Torq, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 936 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991) [132]
The mere bundling of individual works may not be sufficient to create a copy-
rightable compilation. Sem-Torq produced double-sided signs, which read “For
Rent” on one side and “For Sale” on the other. Sem-Torq bundled these signs
into sets of five. The court found that the bundled sets were not compilations
because “[t]he whole of a compilation is greater than the sum of its parts.” For
the court, each bundled set was nothing more than five individual signs.
Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1992) [133]
A work may be copyrightable even if the individual elements comprising the
work are not. The court found that the video game Breakout was copyrightable
even though the on-screen images consisted of basic geometrical shapes. The
court found that “the requisite level of creativity [can be] met by either the indi-
vidual screens or the relationship of each screen to the other and/or the accom-
8
panying sound effects.”
Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998)
[135]
Minimal enhancements to existing works may not qualify for copyright protec-
tion. West argued for copyright to certain elements of its editions of court
opinions. These elements included (1) the arrangement of information specify-
ing the parties, (2) the selection and arrangement of attorney information, (3)
the arrangement of information relating to subsequent procedural develop-
ments, and (4) the selection and arrangement of “parallel and alternative cita-
tions” to other reporters. The court found that no element West to exercise
enough discretion to give rise to the originality required for copyright protec-
tion.
Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998)
[137]
“Star pagination” markings within West’s editions of court opinions are not
copyrightable because West exercised no discretion in the placement of those
markings.
Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc)
[147]
Part numbers generated formulaically are not copyrightable because they are the
results of a mechanical process. The formula itself is not copyrightable because
it is an idea.1
9
so as to concentrate information about purchasers of BellSouth’s advertising
space. The extracted information was then used to construct a database, which
assigned to each advertiser a numerical code that mirrored that advertiser’s clas-
sification in BellSouth’s directory. The court found no infringement on the part
of Donnelley. The court found that the classifications (“Banks,” “Attorneys,”
etc.) were so generic as to lack originality. Further, the court observed that there
were few alternatives to organizing a business directory in the manner used by
BellSouth.
The dissent argued that BellSouth had exercised enough discretion in the selec-
tion of category headings to make the directory original.
Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky & Skelly Engineers LLP, 303 F.3d 460 (2d Cir.
2002) [156]
Architectural plans are copyrightable. (see old case briefs for now)
Derivative Works
L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) [164]
“Trivial variations” of existing works do not give rise to copyright protection.
Batlin and Snyder were competing manufacturers of “Uncle Sam” coin banks.
The basic design of the “Uncle Sam” banks did not originate from either busi-
ness. Rather, the design had been created and popularized many years earlier.
Snyder based its particular version on a cast-iron exemplar but made several
design adjustments to facilitate manufacturing the bank from plastic. Upon a
challenge by Batlin, the court invalidated Snyder’s copyright to its version of the
bank. The court found that copyright required the work to show “substantial
variation [from the original], not merely a trivial variation such as might occur
in the translation to a different medium.”
The dissent argued that Snyder’s modifications of the cast-iron exemplar
showed enough originality to make Snyder’s bank copyrightable.
10
“visually interesting” images rather than precise reproductions of the fabrics
themselves.
Maljack Productions, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 964 F.Supp. 1416 (C.D.Cal. 1997)
[180]
A slightly modified re-release of a public-domain film is copyrightable. Maljack
modified the film McClintock! by cropping the picture to fit conventional televi-
sion screens, deleting some scenes, and improving the sound quality of the ori -
ginal soundtrack. The court found that the modifications showed enough origin-
ality to make the re-release copyrightable.
Computer Programs
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983) [185]
Computer programs are copyrightable. Franklin manufactured “Apple clones,”
computers that were designed to be completely compatible with software written
for Apple’s own machines. In order to achieve the requisite level of compatibil-
ity, Franklin copied Apple’s operating system as well as several ancillary pro-
grams. The court found that Apple was entitled to an injunction enjoining
Franklin from making and distributing copies of Apple’s software. The court
found that computer programs were “literary works” under § 101 because they
constituted “expression not only in words but also numbers [or] other numeric-
al symbols or indicia.” The court further rejected Franklin’s contention that
Apple’s software was merely a method of operating Apple’s computers. Finally,
the court rejected Franklin’s contention that Apple’s programs were not unpro-
tectable ideas.
Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems, 825 F.Supp. 340 (D.Mass. 1993)
[194]
Copyright law makes no distinction between “source code” and “object code” rep-
resentations of computer programs. Grumman copied the object code of Data
General’s software and subsequently claimed that the copying was not infringe-
ment because Data General had registered only the program’s source code.
Finding infringement, the court emphasized that source code and object code
were equivalent representations of the same program.
11
popularity. Borland, a relative newcomer to the market, sought to enhance the
appeal of its software by copying the menu hierarchy used in Lotus 1-2-3. Be-
cause many users had already grown accustomed to using Lotus’s menu com-
mands, Borland calculated that duplicating the menu hierarchy would ease the
transition from Lotus 1-2-3 to its own product. Comparing the menu options to
VCR buttons, the court rejected Lotus’s claim that Borland had committed copy-
right infringement. According to the court, “[h]ighlighting the ‘Print’ com-
mand . . . or typing the letter ‘P,’ is analogous to pressing a VCR button labeled
‘Play.’ ” Emphasizing the functional aspect of the menu options, the court fur-
ther stated that “the Lotus command terms are not equivalent to the labels on
the VCR’s buttons, but are instead equivalent to the buttons themselves.”
The concurrence noted the possibility that a dominant player in a software mar-
ket might “holder users hostage” to a widespread user interface.
Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997) [203]
The court found that “although an element of a work may be characterized as a
method of operation, that element may nevertheless contain expression that is
eligible for copyright protection.”
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F.Supp.2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) [206]
The composition of a photograph can be copyrightable. Mannion took a photo-
graph of basketball player Kevin Garnett. 2 Coors subsequently developed a bill-
board advertisement featuring a photograph with similar composition. Recog-
nizing that photography complicated the analysis under the idea/expression di-
chotomy, the court found that (1) rendition, (2) timing, and (3) creation of the
subject can influence the copyrightability of a photograph. Ultimately, the court
stated that “there would be infringement . . . if the subject and rendition were
2 See pages 208–09 of the casebook for the photographs in question.
12
sufficiently like those in the copyrighted work.”3
Masquerade Novelty Inc. v. Unique Industries, 912 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1990)
[228]
Costume masks are copyrightable and are not “useful articles.” The court found
that “the only utilitarian function of the nose masks is in their portrayal of an-
imal noses . . . . [N]ose masks have no utility that does not derive from their ap-
pearance.”
Pivot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th
Cir. 2004) [231]
Mannequin heads are copyrightable even though they are also “useful articles.”
Pivot Point manufactured the “Mara” mannequin head, which was designed to
“imitate the ‘hungry look’ of high-fashion, runway models.” Charlene Products
subsequently began marketing its own “Liza” mannequin head, which bore a
striking similarity to the “Mara” head. After reviewing the doctrine of separab-
ility, the court found that Charlene had infringed Pivot’s copyright to the “Mara”
head. The court held that copyrightability should “depend on the extent to
which the work reflects artistic expression uninhibited by functional considera-
tions” and that “[c]onceptual separability exists [ ] when the artistic aspects of
an article can be conceptualized as existing independently of their utilitarian
function.” Applying this standard to the “Mara” head, the court observed that
“one is not only able to conceive of a different face than that portrayed on the
Mara mannequin, but one easily can conceive of another visage that portrays the
‘hungry look’ on a high-fashion runway model.”
The dissent challenged the court’s conclusion that the face of a mannequin is
conceptually separable its function.
Architectural Works
3 See also Diodato v. Spade, 388 F.Supp.2d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) [218]; Kisch v. Ammirati &
Puris Inc., 657 F.Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) [579].
13
Characters
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) [259]
The plot of a dramatic work is copyrightable. The court, however, cautioned
that copyrights to plots implicate the idea/expression dichotomy.
Warner Brothers Pictures v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954) [260]
The rights to use characters from a literary work may be granted separately
from the right to use the work itself. The author and publisher of the story
“The Maltese Falcon” granted to Warner Brothers the right to make a movie
version of the story. Subsequently, the author and publisher granted to CBS the
right to use characters from the story in radio programs as long as those pro-
grams did not duplicate the original plot. Warner Brothers challenged the ar-
rangement with CBS on the ground that CBS’s use of the characters infringed
its rights to use the original story. Ruling for CBS, the court found that the
rights to characters could be granted separately from the rights to any work in
which they originally appeared.
County of Suffolk, New York v. First American Real Estate Solutions, 261
F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2001) [276]
State governments may own copyrights to works produced to facilitate adminis-
trative functions. The government of Suffolk County produced “tax maps,”
which showed “the ownership, size, and location of real property parcels” for the
purpose of calculating taxes. First American distributed copies of the maps in
printed form and on CD-ROMs. Finding that First American had committed
14
copyright infringement, the court found that “[t]here is nothing inconsistent
between fulfilling [state laws’] goal of access and permitting a state agency to
place reasonable restrictions on the redistribution of its copyrighted works.”
The court drew a distinction between “permit[ting] a member of the public to
copy a public record” and “the right of a private entity to distribute commer-
cially what it would otherwise, under copyright law, be unable to distribute.”
Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., 293 F.3d 791
(5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) [280]
Model codes produced by private organizations enter the public domain upon be-
coming part of the law.
Mitchell Brothers Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1979) [295]
Obscenity does not prevent a work from being copyrightable. Cinema Adult
Theater made and distributed unauthorized copies of a pornographic film pro-
duced by Mitchell Brothers. While Cinema Adult conceded copying, it argued
that the movie was uncopyrightable because of its obscenity. After reviewing
the legislative history of the Copyright Act, the court concluded that the Act did
not prohibit the copyrighting of obscene works. Further, the court noted that
deciding the question of obscenity would require courts to engage in difficult
line-drawing with regard to societal standards of decency.4
OWNERSHIP
Initial Ownership
4 See also Devils Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video, 29 F.Supp.2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) [299].
15
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) [305]
In deciding whether a particular work was made for hire, the reviewing court
should first determine whether the creator of the work was an employee of the
hiring party under common-law principles of agency. Once this determination
has been made, the reviewing court should then analyze the work’s authorship
under the appropriate paragraph of § 101. The Community for Creative Non-
Violence (CCNV) conceived of a crèche-style structure depicting a homeless
family huddled on the street. CCNV hired Reid to create the sculpture, and the
parties engaged in preliminary discussions concerning the sculpture’s basic
design and the material from which it would be made. While Reid was creating
the sculpture, he employed assistants, who were paid by CCNV. A dispute then
arose as to whether the sculpture should be taken on a touring exhibit. The
parties disagreed as to who retained the final say over the disposition of the
sculpture. CCNV contended that the sculpture was a work for hire, and Reid
claimed the contrary. The court observed since “[s]culpture does not fit within
any of the nine categories of ‘specially ordered or commissioned works’ enumer-
ated in [§ 101]” and there was no written agreement between the parties as to
Reid’s status, “[t]he dispositive inquiry in this case [ ] is whether [the sculp-
ture] is ‘a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employ -
ment.’ ” After reviewing the factors tending to establish an employer–employee
relationship,5 the court found that Reid was not an employee of CCNV. The
sculpture was therefore not a work for hire made for CCNV, though the court ob-
served that CCNV might qualify as a co-author.
16
Martha Graham School & Dance Foundation, Inc. v. Martha Graham
Center of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) [318]
During her life, Martha Graham had been employed by the Center as a choreo-
grapher. After her death, the court applied an “instance and expense” standard
to determine whether Graham’s choreographic works were works for hire
owned by the Center.
17
Transfer of Copyright Ownership
Effects Associates v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990) [347]
A transfer of copyright ownership must be set forth in writing, as required by §
204(a). Effects Associates had created special-effects footage for certain scenes in
a movie that Cohen produced. Although Cohen agreed to pay Effects Associates
a fee for the footage, the parties did not discuss the ownership of the copyright
to the special-effects footage. When Cohen subsequently refused to pay the fee
in full, the ensuing lawsuit centered on whether Effects Associates had trans-
ferred ownership of the footage to Cohen. Citing § 204, the court found that the
lack of a written agreement to transfer any copyright meant that Effects Associ-
ates had only granted Cohen an implied license to use the footage in his movie.
The court concluded that Cohen therefore had committed no copyright infringe-
ment but might nonetheless face liability for a breach of contract.
Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988) [356]
A license to show television broadcasts of a movie does not confer the right to
distribute videotape copies of that movie. Cohen owned the copyright to a mu-
sical composition that was included in the soundtrack of a movie distributed by
Paramount. Negotiations between Cohen and Paramount had produced a license
granting Paramount the right to “exhibit [the] motion picture by means of tele-
vision.” When Paramount subsequently sold copies of the movie on videotape,
Cohen sued Paramount on the theory that the license did not grant Paramount
the right to distribute the movie on tape. Ruling for Cohen, the court found that
the terms of the license explicitly excluded any form of distribution other than
television broadcasts. The court further observed that Paramount should not be
allowed to reap a “windfall” from the development of technology that could not
have been foreseen at the time the license was made.
Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co. [360]
The scope of a license may be a factual issue when the language of the license is
ambiguous with respect to the distribution of the licensed content through later-
developed media. Boosey & Hawkes owned the copyright to Igor Stravinsky’s
“The Rites of Spring,” which was featured in the movie Fantasia. Although
Stravinsky’s work had already entered the public domain in the United States,
Disney decided to obtain a license in order to distribute the movie in countries
where Stravinsky’s works were still protected by copyright. When Disney sub-
sequently distributed video recordings of Fantasia, Boosey & Hawkes sued on
the ground that the distribution violated the terms of the license. Finding that
the language of the license could be plausibly interpreted in either party’s favor,
the court remanded the case for a trial. Disney eventually settled the case by
paying $3M to Boosey & Hawkes.
18
Random House, inc. v. Rosetta Books, LLC [368]
The right to publish paper copies of a book is distinct from the right to distrib-
ute e-book copies of that book. Several authors had executed with Random
House contracts that granted Random House the right to publish their works “in
book form.” When those authors subsequently granted Rosetta the right to
publish e-book versions of the same works, Random House sued on the theory
that the paper-book contracts implicitly covered the right to distribute e-books.
Ruling for Rosetta, the court found that the phrase “in book form” could not be
read so broadly as to include the works in any format whatsoever. The court ob-
served that the rights for Braille editions and other alternative formats were
routinely negotiated separately, so that e-books should be treated in the same
manner.
Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir.
1999) [471]
The public delivery of a speech does not amount to a “general publication” of
that speech under the Copyright Act of 1909, even if the audience for that
speech was very large. The estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., sued CBS for in-
fringing the copyright to King’s “I Have a Dream” speech. CBS had featured
19
portions of the speech in a documentary without first obtaining the consent of
King’s estate. The court found that general publication occurred under only two
circumstances: (1) when “tangible copies of the work are distributed to the gen-
eral public in such a manner as allows the public to exercise dominion and con-
trol over the work” and (2) when the work is “exhibited or displayed in such a
manner as to permit unrestricted copying by the general public.” The court spe-
cifically rejected CBS’s contention that the presence of a large audience for the
speech converted the delivery of the speech into a general publication. Accord-
ing to the court, “general publication depends, not on the number of people in-
volved, but rather on the fact that the work is made available to the public
without regard to who they are or what they propose to do with it.”
Judge Cook (concurring) stated that he would have based the outcome solely on
the rule that general publication requires the distribution of tangible copies.
Judge Roney (dissenting) stated that the factual circumstances supported a find-
ing of general publication.
20
Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com [489]
A work is not “registered” within the meaning of § 411(a) until the Register of
Copyrights actually issues the registration for that work. Merely filing for the
registration of a work does not grant the putative copyright owner from suing
for the infringement of that work.
21
one phrase.”
22
cized Rosenthal for failing to articulate a tenable basis for his infringement claim.
The court observed that “although plaintiff ’s counsel asserted that the original-
ity of plaintiff ’s bee pin lay in a particular arrangement of jewels on the top of
the pin, the elements of this arrangement were never identified.” The court fur-
ther noted that “[p]laintiff ’s counsel . . . was unable to suggest how jewels might
be placed on the back of a pin in the shape of a bee without infringing plaintiff ’s
copyright.” Ultimately, the court characterized the lawsuit as an attempt by
Rosenthal to obtain improperly a monopoly on bee-shaped jewelry.
23
lover’s drink and berates him as he dies. When Metro-Goldwyn later produced a
movie with similar plot points, Sheldon sued for copyright infringement. In find-
ing the movie to infringe the play, the court observed that Metro-Goldwyn had
borrowed the aforementioned plot elements from the play.10
10 See pages 549–50 of the casebook for the court’s detailed discussion of the similarities
between the plots.
11 See pages 574–75 of the casebook for Steinberg’s illustration and the movie poster. See also
page 581 of the casebook for illustrations depicting other cities in the same style.
24
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc. [591]
Karaoke recordings that feature on-screen lyrics do not fall within the scope of
the compulsory license granted in § 115. Stellar Records produced a karaoke
rendition of a song recording owned by ABKCO. The court found that “com-
pulsory licenses do not give [the maker of a recording] the right to publish the
compositions’ lyrics on a screen.”
25
those levels on CD-ROM. The court found that Micro Star infringed the Duke
Nukem storyline by selling the add-on levels. Rejecting Micro Star’s argument
that the levels were only transient modifications of the original game, the court
compared the level files to sheet music, pointing out that both encoded a user ex-
perience in abstract form.
26
mural was damaged. Emphasizing that the work had been created for a promo -
tional purpose, the court found that Pollara could not recover under VARA. The
concurrence (Judge Gleeson) stated that the work lacked the “recognized stature”
needed for recovery under VARA.
27
performance of the videos, the court emphasized that “[t]he Copyright Act
speaks of performances at a place open to the public. It does not require that the
public place be actually crowded with people.” Furthermore, the court stated
that the term “authorize” in § 106(4) was plainly meant to authorize secondary
liability against Aveco for providing the tapes used in the unauthorized public
performances.
28