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RONALD DWORKIN
must in the end make sense to us; they must not depart too far from
our previous paradigms. We could not accept any interpretation of
equality, no matter how otherwise compelling, if it declared slavery
to be an egalitarian institution. We could not accept any account of
liberty that declared a community of forced labour a free society.
But these firm paradigms leave room for many different interpret-
ations of both ideals, and we must fix on one for each value that we
think provides its best grounding in more fundamental values.
Only then can we decide more controversial questions about
whether some act offends the ideal, or whether, so interpreted, the
two ideals conflict.
Ethical individualism
what you do with your own life, not just because you happen to
want to make something of it, but because you should want to make
something of it. You think that, if for some reason you ceased to care
how your life went, you would be making a mistake. If so, you
believe it is objectively important how you live. Is there anything
different about you that could make that true for your life but not
everyone's? You might toy with a positive answer. Yes, it is because I
am a member of God's chosen people. Or because I have been given
a great talent that must not be wasted. There is nothing logically
wrong with these answers, nothing that shows them to be irrational.
But that is not what you think, at least on reflection. We know we
are different from one another. We have different backgrounds,
traditions and talents, and each of us should live in a way that is
appropriate to who and what he is. But these personal qualities are
part of the challenge we face in living well, not reasons why we face
that challenge. We do not think that it would not matter how we
lived if we were not Jews or muscular or French or poets. We think
it is important how we live for no more concrete reason than that we
have a life to lead, because we are humans and mortal.
The second principle of ethical individualism—the principle of
special responsibility—declares that the connection between you
and your life is nevertheless a special one. Someone who treated his
own life as having no different place in his plans and no greater call
on his attention than the life of any stranger would be not a saint but
a Martian. The second principle insists that this special relationship
is best understood as one of special responsibility, that living is an
assignment we can execute well or badly. The assignment includes
an intellectual challenge: to live out of a conception of what makes
a life successful that is personal, in the sense that the agent has
embraced it, rather than political in the sense that it has been thrust
upon him. Living well, on this view, requires both personal com-
mitment and a social environment in which that commitment is
encouraged and respected.
I shall try to defend interpretations of equality and liberty that
are rooted in these two principles of ethical individualism. But since
the first principle seems more egalitarian in content than the
44 Ronald Dworkin
Equality
Liberty
Conflict?
We can resolve this dilemma in only one way. We must choose a third
version of the principle we are considering, according to which
prohibitions or constraints are compromises of liberty only if they
limit the use of property, or other resources in the hands of their
rightful owner, not according to the community's own theory of
just distribution, whatever it is, but according to the best or soundest
such theory. So the draconian regulations would indeed compro-
mise liberty because they are not required by justice. But it is im-
portant to notice that this is a solution to our dilemma only because
we have settled on a theory of justice—equality of resources—that
would not require or justify the centralist government I just
described. Our interpretation of liberty, in other words, has now
begun to depend on our prior interpretation of equality. We should
not be surprised at this, because the two principles of ethical in-
dividualism we have been drawing on are part of the same overall
ethical attitude, and so must be understood in the light of one
another. Nevertheless, building our theory of equality into our
interpretation of liberty might be thought grounds for an objection
to the argument as a whole, and I shall have to consider that
objection later.
In any case, the liberal conception of equality we defined does
allow us to escape the dilemma, by adopting the third version of our
principle, without producing a counter-intuitive account of liberty.
Equality of resources does not require a dirigiste or socialist econ-
omy; on the contrary it cannot be achieved in such a society. It re-
quires essentially a free market in capital, labour and consumption,
54 Ronald Dworkin
vidualism, are not conflicting ideals. Some critics may say, however,
that the argument through which I reached that conclusion is a
sham because (as they might p u t it) 1 begged the question by simply
defining each virtue so that it would not conflict with the other. My
argument did show, it is true, that we cannot interpret the great
Enlightenment virtues of liberty and equality (or, I would add,
community) in isolation from one another. We must interpret each,
so far as possible, in the light of what we think about the other. We
saw that, most dramatically, when we were trying to decide among
alternate formulations of the third principle of liberty. We found
that we could not avoid bringing the idea of distributive justice, and
hence of equality, into the very formulation of what liberty means.
The charge of circularity or rigging is misplaced, however. Any
competent interpretation of a political ideal must aim, as I said, to
show why dishonouring it, even when this is justifiable, is always an
occasion for moral regret. If we accept that requirement, then we
cannot avoid asking, just in the process of interpreting liberty,
whether measures like minimum-wage laws or redistributive taxes
are such occasions, and we may find, on reflection, that this depends
on whether such measures are just. We could avoid merging our in-
terpretations of equality and liberty in that way only by abandoning
the interpretative project altogether, and simply stipulating some
'descriptive' account of liberty like the negative-liberty conception.
But there is no gain in clarity or in anything else—quite the
contrary—in insisting on a definition that neither tracks the way an
ideal figures in real politics nor shows us what is good about it. If
that kind of stipulation really is necessary to produce a conflict
between the two ideals, the conflict is a toothless one.
So we have come, by different routes, beginning in different tra-
ditions and paradigms, to conceptions of liberty and equality that
seem not only compatible but mutually necessary. The two political
virtues are only different aspects of the same fundamental human-
ist attitude—ethical individualism—that we began by inspecting,
and which we now see to lie at the heart of liberalism itself.