Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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warrant of arrest. The spouses then filed a motion to quash and sought the nullification of subsequent orders. They alleged that the MTCC had no jurisdiction and authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of a complaint filed by an offended party directly with the court. The authority to conduct a preliminary investigation was vested solely on the Office of the City Prosecutor. - While waiting for the resolution of their motion to quash, the spouses did not post bail. On April 10, 2002 Corazon Ribaya was apprehended by arresting officers in the public market by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge. - The complainant filed this administrative case against Judge Parcia. The motions basically questioned respondents authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. - In her answer, respondent judge claimed that complainant was not a party in Criminal Case No. 8617. Respondent explained that she conducted the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint against the spouses because the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Office of the City Prosecutor was too busy to do so. - To support her claim, respondent attached the affidavit of OIC City Prosecutor Vasquez of the then newly-created Ligao City. Vasquez stated that the City Prosecutors Office was still undergoing reorganization when the subject criminal complaint was filed. It had neither enough manpower nor office space in the Hall of Justice. Positions had not yet been filled. His workload as Asst Provincial Prosecutor and OIC City Prosecutor was so heavy that time constraints did not permit him to conduct preliminary investigations. Thus, it was the respondent judge who conducted the preliminary investigation. - the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that respondent erred when she conducted the preliminary investigation of the subject criminal complaint even after the Municipality of Ligao, Albay had been converted into a city. The OCA recommended that: (1) the complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (2) the respondent be reprimanded, directed to concentrate her time and effort on performing her judicial tasks and warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely. - A motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent on October 1, 2003. This time, respondent claimed that what she conducted
Ratio A court can only take cognizance of a case that falls within its jurisdiction. Reasoning - April 15, 1994 is the date of effectivity of RA 7691. RA 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the first-level courts by providing that first-level courts shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases in which the offense is punishable with imprisonment not exceeding 6 years, regardless of the amount of the fine. - January 30, 1995 was the date the information was filed. The case had to do with the violation of BP 22 which is penalized by an imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than one year. Thus when the information was filed, RA 7691 was already in effect. - During the tenure of the former presiding judge, the issue of jurisdiction over the case was already pending resolution. He also displayed indecisiveness by relying on the public prosecutors assurance that his court had acquired jurisdiction. - Aside from this instance, there were two other occasions when Beltran was charged and found guilty of gross ignorance of the law (in De Austria v. Beltran and Andres v. Beltran). DISPOSITION Judge Beltran was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law for which he is fined P20,000 as recommended by the OCA and is warned that a repetition of the same act would merit a graver penalty.
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judge rendering it must at all times maintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality. - Considering all this, respondent judge committed simple misconduct in office. Misconduct in office has a well-defined meaning. It refers to misconduct that affects the judges performance of her duties and not just her character as a private individual. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. 3. YES - Respondent correctly observed that it was not needed in the estafa case. The maximum penalty for the crime allegedly committed there (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months) did not meet the minimum penalty (at least 4 years, 2 months and 1 day) required to make a preliminary investigation part of the spouses right to due process. 4. YES - As long as the constitutional mandate was complied with, that is, the warrant of arrest was issued upon a finding of probable cause personally by the judge after an examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, the warrant of arrest was valid. - Respondent judge examined the complainant Pedro Vega on the day the complaint was filed and she was satisfied that probable cause existed. The warrant of arrest she issued against the spouses Ribaya was, therefore, justified and no violation of their constitutional rights occurred. DISPOSITION Respondent Judge Aurora Binamira-Parcia is hereby found guilty of simple misconduct and a fine of P11,000 is imposed on her. She is hereby directed to devote her time and effort exclusively to discharging her judicial functions. She is furthermore warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will merit a more severe penalty.
instituted by filing the complaint only with the City Prosecutor. The rule implies that the task of conducting preliminary investigation in these cities is now lodged with the Office of the City Prosecutor. Consequently, inferior court judges of cities whose charters authorize only the fiscal to conduct preliminary investigation are no longer allowed to perform this function. - The Municipality of Ligao was converted into a city by RA 9008 which took effect on Feb 21, 2001. This law, also known as the charter of the City of Ligao, provides in Sec. 50 that: (a) There shall be established in the city a prosecution service to be headed by a city prosecutor and such number of assistant prosecutors as may be necessary, who shall be organizationally part of the DOJ (b) The City Prosecutor shall handle the criminal prosecution in the MTC in the city as well as in the RTC for criminal cases originating in the territory of the city, and shall render to or for the city such services as are required by law, ordinance or regulation of the DOJ - Clearly, respondent judge had no more authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of the subject criminal complaint. The officer authorized to conduct preliminary investigations in the then newly-created City of Ligao was its City Prosecutor. At that time, the duty devolved upon OIC City Prosecutor Vasquez, despite the administrative difficulties he was encountering. 2. YES - We noticed the contradiction between her answer and her motion for reconsideration as to what she actually conducted on November 29, 2001. In her answer, she justified her authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. In her motion for reconsideration of the OCAs resolution, however, she declared that she conducted a preliminary examination to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest -There appear just too many intriguing uncertainties surrounding the filing of the estafa case. We therefore direct our attention to respondent judges failure to erase our doubts over how she administers justice in her jurisdiction. - Respondent judge must be reminded that she should do honor to her position not only by rendering just, correct and impartial decisions but doing so in a manner free from any suspicion as to their fairness and impartiality, and as to her integrity. A spotless dispensation of justice requires not only that the decision rendered be intrinsically fair but that the
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orders should be set aside and that the Feb. 1 Decision should be reinstated. ISSUES 1. WON the trial court, upon motion by a private complainant, can set aside a previous judgment of conviction and remand the records of a case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and the filing of the corresponding charge 2. WON the manifestation by the accused that he is not appealing from the trial courts Decision render the judgment final 3. WON the trial court err in granting private complainants motion for reconsideration/retrial 4. WON the assailed orders violate petitioners constitutional right against double jeopardy HELD 1. NO Ratio Only the accused may ask for a modification or setting aside of a judgment of conviction which he must do before the said judgment becomes final or before he perfects his appeal. Reasoning - Sec. 7 Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides: Sec. 7. Modification of judgment - A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. - It is thus clear that only the accused may ask for a modification or setting aside of a judgment of conviction. And this he must do before the said judgment becomes final or before he perfects his appeal. Such judgment becomes final in any of the following ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonably filed by the accused, except in case of automatic review of the decision imposing the capital penalty; (b) when he has partially or totally served his sentence; (c) when he expressly waives his right to appeal the judgment, except when the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when he applies for probation. When a judgment becomes final, the trial court which rendered the judgment of conviction loses jurisdiction to alter, modify, or revoke it. 2. YES
POTOT v PEOPLE
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institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Considering that the offended party had paid the corresponding filing fee for the estafa cases prior to the filing of the BP 22 cases with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), the RTC allowed the private prosecutor to appear and intervene in the proceedings. ISSUE WON a private prosecutor can be allowed to intervene and participate in the proceedings of the above-entitled estafa cases for the purpose of prosecuting the attached civil liability arising from the issuance of the checks involved which is also subject mater of the pending B.P. 22 cases HELD YES. Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two distinct criminal offenses: estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22). The Rules of Court allow the offended party to intervene via a private prosecutor in each of these two penal proceedings. However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising from the single act of issuing a bouncing check in either criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in the other criminal action. While the law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the offended party, it authorizes recovery in only one. In short, while two crimes arise from a single set of facts, only one civil liability attaches to it. Reasoning - Petitioner theorizes that the civil action necessarily arising from the criminal case pending before the MTC for violation of BP 22 precludes the institution of the corresponding civil action in the criminal case for estafa now pending before the RTC. She hinges her theory on the following provisions of Rules 110 and 111 of Rules of Court. - Based on the foregoing rules, an offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a crime, except in the following instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor of a private offended party; and (2) when, from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity, but (a) they waive the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the right to do so or (c) the suit has already been instituted. In any of these instances, the private complainants interest in the case disappears and criminal prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor. None of these exceptions apply to the instant case. Hence,
pleaded guilty to the charge. On the basis of his plea, petitioner was convicted and meted the corresponding penalty. As petitioner has been placed in jeopardy for the crime of homicide, he cannot be prosecuted anew for the same offense, or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense charged. DISPOSITION The petition is granted. The assailed orders dated May 3, 2000 and May 26, 2000 issued by the trial court are set aside. Its decision dated Feb. 1, 2000 is reinstated.
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1979, a restraining order was issued by the CA against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused. However, in a decision of October 25 1979, the CA dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of Jan 23,1979. The motion for reconsideration of the accused was denied in a resolution. ISSUE WON the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits HELD YES Ratio Once an information is filed in court, the courts prior permission must be secured if fiscal wants to reinvestigate the case. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court, whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. DISPOSITION Petition dismissed
STA. ROSA MINING v ZABALA 153 SCRA 367 BIDIN; August 31, 1987
NATURE Mandamus to compel respondent Fiscal to prosecute Criminal Case No. 821 of the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte until the same is terminated. FACTS - On March 21, 1974, petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft of materials (scrap iron) forming part of the installations on its mining property at Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte against private respondents Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. - The case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for preliminary investigation who, after conducting said investigation, issued a resolution dated August 26, 1974 recommending that an information for Attempted Theft be filed
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compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer" (Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil. 556). - Accordingly, if the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he simply cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to prosecute the same. He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the criminal action. He cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. At least what he can do is to continue appearing for the prosecution and then turn over the presentation of evidence to another fiscal or a private prosecutor subject to his direction and control (U.S. vs. Despabiladeras, 32 Phil. 442; U.S. vs. Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289). Where there is no other prosecutor available, he should proceed to discharge his duty and present the evidence to the best of his ability and let the court decide the merits of the case on the basis of the evidence adduced by both parties. - The mere fact that the Secretary of Justice had, after reviewing the records of the case, directed the prosecuting fiscal to move for the dismissal of the case and the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to said directive is denied by the trial court, is no justification for the refusal of the fiscal to prosecute the case. It is the court where the case is filed and not the fiscal that has full control of it. - In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court." DISPOSITION petition is hereby Granted Public respondent or any other person who may be assigned or appointed to act in his place or stead, is hereby ordered to continue prosecuting Criminal Case No. 821 until the same is terminated.
disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear therein. Hence, this petition for mandamus. - In this action, petitioner prays for the issuance of the writ of mandamus "commanding respondent fiscal or any other person who may be assigned or appointed to act in his place or stead to prosecute Criminal Case No. 821 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte" There is no question that the institution of a criminal action is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating fiscal. He may or he may not file the information according to whether the evidence is in his opinion sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. (Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance, 63 Phil. 846) and when he decides not to file the information, in the exercise of his discretion, he may not be compelled to do so (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748). However, after the case had already been filed in court, "fiscals are not clothed with power, without the consent of the court, to dismiss or nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted and pending further proceedings. The power to dismiss criminal actions is vested solely in the court" (U.S. vs. Barredo, 32 Phil. 444, 450; Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance, supra). ISSUE WON the fiscal can be compelled to prosecute the case after his motion to dismiss has been denied HELD YES - This court is of the view that the writ prayed for should issue. Notwithstanding his personal convictions or opinions, the fiscal must proceed with his duty of presenting evidence to the court to enable the court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to the culpability of the accused. The fiscal should not shirk from his responsibility much less leave the prosecution of the case at the hands of a private prosecutor. At all times, the criminal action shall be prosecuted under his direction and control (Sec. 4, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Otherwise, the entire proceedings will be null and void (People vs. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361). - "In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the government since an offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. IV, 1980 Ed., p. 10). This is so because "the prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy but of a sovereignty where obligation to govern impartially is as
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retains the right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own name in criminal proceedings before the courts of law. Reasoning - In the case of Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals,we held that: "In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in (the) name of the said complainant." - Furthermore, our ruling in the case of Dee v. Court of Appeals allowing the private offended party to file a special civil action for certiorari to assail the order of the trial judge granting the motion to dismiss upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice is apropos. It follows, therefore, that if the private respondent in this case may file a special civil action for certiorari, then with more reason does it have legal personality to move for a reconsideration of the order of the trial court dismissing the criminal charges against the petitioner. In fact, as a general rule, a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors.
on the ground of insufficient evidence. The private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the Secretary of Justice, which motion, however, was denied with finality by the latter.Pursuant to the said resolution, the prosecutor filed a motion in the RTC praying for the dismissal of the case against herein petitioner and the admission of an amended information excluding petitioner as one of the accused which motion was granted by the RTC. Private respondent assailed the dismissal of the case against the petitioner in a motion for reconsideration filed in the RTC which motion was denied by the RTC after finding that the private respondent, as private complainant, had no legal personality to question the dismissal of the criminal charges against the petitioner. ISSUES 1. WON Judge Masadao, presiding judge of RTC Branch 9, Malolos, Bulacan, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutor's motion to dismiss the criminal case against petitioner without an independent assessment of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence against the latter 2. WON the private respondent, as private complainant, in a criminal case has the legal personality to question the dismissal by the trial judge of the criminal charges against herein petitioner upon the motion filed by the prosecutor HELD 1. YES, Judge Masadao acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutor's motion to dismiss the criminal charges against the petitioner on the basis solely of the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reasoning - As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make an independent finding of the merits of the case and merely anchoring the dismissal on the revised position of the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In effect, it was the prosecution, through the Department of Justice which decided what to do and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in violation of the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul.. 2. YES Ratio While it is only the Solicitor General that may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the private offended party
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2. WON respondent Judge should be disqualified from further proceeding with the criminal cases HELD 1. NO Ratio Private prosecutors cannot intervene independently of and take a position inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General. Reasoning - Participation of the private prosecution in the instant case was delimited by this Court in its Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with the Solicitor General in the preparation of the Answer and pleadings that may be required by this Court." To collaborate means to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor General. It was never intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a stand independent of or in contravention of the position taken by the Solicitor General. - Since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it is but natural that the representatives of the State should direct and control the prosecution. > Suarez v Platon: the prosecuting officer "'is the representative not of, an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall he done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." > People v Esquivel: that there is an absolute necessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay "before the court the pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state." - It is for the purpose of realizing the aforementioned objectives that the prosecution of offenses is placed
NATURE Original action for certiorari and prohibition FACTS - Solicitor General Estilito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Alicia Simpio-Diy and Solicitor Eduardo L. Kilayko for respondents. Estanisloo A. Fernandez and Dakila F. Castro & Associate as private prosecutors. - petitioners seek the annulment of respondent Judge's Orders in the Criminal Case People of the Philippines v Jorge Tan, Jr, Cesar Tan, Teofanis Bondoc, Osmundo Tolentino, Mariano Bartido and Librado Sode for frustrated murder and Double Murder of the son and uncle of Mayor Inigo Larazzabal. - Judge Pedro Gallardo made the two life sentences to death penalty allegedly after meeting with Mayor Larazzabal and receipt of other paraphernalia such as whisky and wine according to the court stenographer. - Jan 14, 1976 - SolGen, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, submitted his Comment to the petition. They are "persuaded that there are bases for stating that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice therefore, they interpose no objection to the remand of the aforementioned criminal cases "for the rendition of a new decision by another trial judge." - Jan 30, 1976 - private prosecutors submitted their Comment in justification of the challenged Orders of the respondent Judge and objected to the remand of this case. - Feb 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike out the "Motion to Admit Attacked Comment" and the "Comment" of the private prosecutor on the ground that the latter has "absolutely no standing in the instant proceedings before this Honorable Court and, hence, without any personality to have any paper of his entertained by this Tribunal - private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this Court, to take part in the proceedings, and to adapt a position in contravention to that of the Solicitor General. ISSUES 1. WON private prosecutors have the right to intervene independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the latter
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It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent the State or the People of the Philippines the interest of the private prosecutors is subordinate to that of the State and they cannot be allowed to take a stand inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General, for that would be tantamount to giving the latter the direction and control of the criminal proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled rules on the matter. 2. It is already moot because the judge is no longer in the judicial service DISPOSITION SC grants the petition and hereby remands the case to the trial court in order that another Judge may hear anew petitioners' motion for new trial and to resolve the issue accordingly on the basis of the evidence
Islands in the prosecution of a public offense, or to control the proceeding once it is commenced, and as his right to intervene therein is subject to the promotor fiscal's right of control, it cannot be stated that an order of dismissal decreed upon petition of the promoter fiscal himself deprives the offended party of his right to appeal from an order overrruling a complaint or information, which right belongs exclusively to the promotor fiscal by virtue of the provisions of section 44 of General Orders, No. 58. To permit a person injured by the commission of an offense to appeal from an order dismissing a criminal case issued by a Court of First Instance upon petition of the promoter fiscal, would be tantamount to giving said offended party of the direction and control of a criminal proceeding in violation of the provisions of the above-cited section 107 of General Orders, No. 58. - from the nature of the offense, or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense. - Solicitor General represents the People of the Philippines or the State in criminal proceedings pending either in the Court of Appeals or in this Court. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478, "Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General", provides: SECTION 1. Function and Organization, (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. * * * The office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government, and as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: (a) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is the party. (k) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body or commission in any matter, action or proceeding which, in his opinion, affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.
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parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. - Section 5 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure states: The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. In case the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she could file the complaint and has no known parents, grandparents, or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf. The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution for the above offenses, independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority. Where the offended party who is a minor fails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents or guardian may file the same. - A complaint of the offended party or her relatives is required in crimes against chastity out of consideration for the offended woman and her family, who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. The law deems it the wiser policy to let the aggrieved woman and her family decide whether to expose to public view or to heated controversies in court the vices, fault, and disgraceful acts occurring in the family. - The complaint in the instant case has complied with the requirement under the Revised Penal Code and the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which vest upon JONALYN, as the offended party, the right to institute the criminal action. As signed by JONALYN, the complaint started the prosecutory proceeding. The assistance of JONALYNs aunt, or even of her mother, was a superfluity. JONALYNs signature alone suffices to validate the complaint. - If a minor under the Rules of Court can file a complaint for rape independently of her parents, JONALYN, then 20 years of age who was found to have the mentality of an 8-year-old girl, could likewise file the complaint independently of her relatives. Her complaint can be rightfully considered filed by a minor. 2. YES - The determination of the competence of witnesses to testify rests primarily with the trial judge who sees them in the witness stand and observes their behavior or their possession or lack of intelligence,
PEOPLE v DELA CRUZ 384 SCRA 375 DAVIDE; July 11, 2002
FACTS - Upon a complaint signed by JONALYN with the assistance of her aunt Carmelita Borja, two informations were filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor before the RTC of Malolos charging Bienvenido Dela Cruz with rape. BIENVENIDO entered a plea of not guilty. - When JONALYN was presented as its first witness, the prosecution sought to obtain from the trial court an order for the conduct of a psychiatric examination to determine her mental and psychological capability to testify in court. Trial court allowed the prosecutor to conduct direct examination on JONALYN so that if in its perception she would appear to be suffering from mental deficiency, the prosecutor could be permitted to ask leading questions. Noticing that
JONALYN had difficulty in expressing herself, the trial court decided to suspend the proceedings to give the prosecution sufficient time to confer with her. - Trial court allowed the prosecution to put on the witness stand a Medical Officer of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tuazon testified that she found that JONALYN was suffering from a moderate level of mental retardation and that although chronologically the latter was already 20 years of age, she had the mental age of an 8-yearold child under the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. - The trial court issued an order allowing leading questions to be propounded to JONALYN. Thus, JONALYN took the witness stand. She declared in open court that BIENVENIDO raped her twice. She stated that BIENVENIDO placed himself on top of her and inserted his private part into her womanhood. - The defense filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted. It admitted that it could have moved to quash the information but it did not because the complaint on which the information was based was on its face valid, it having been signed by JONALYN as the offended party. However, the undeniable truth is that JONALYN had no capacity to sign the same considering her mental deficiency or abnormality. The defense also insisted on assailing the competency of JONALYN as a witness. It claimed that JONALYNs testimony, considering her mental state, was coached and rehearsed. - The trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence and set the dates for the presentation of the evidence for the defense. Trial court convicted BIENVENIDO of the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96, but acquitted him in Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96 for insufficiency of evidence. ISSUES 1. WON the complaint for rape filed was valid 2. WON Jonalyn was competent to testify 3. WON Jonalyn was credible as a witness 4. WON leading questions should have been allowed to be asked to Jonalyn HELD 1. YES - The pertinent laws existing at the time the crimes were committed were Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code (prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 8353 which took effect on 22 October 1997) and Section 5 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. - The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her
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NATURE Appeal from the decision of the RTC
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superiority in strength, enough proof was adduced, however, to show that the attackers had cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage of their superiority in strength certainly out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. - Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules. - object of informing an accused in writing of the charges against him: First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 542). In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged DISPOSITION appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty of the crime of murder for the killing of Jonathan Calpito. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., are found guilty as accomplices in the commission of the crime.
FACTS - Calpito was a student from Baguio city. One time, he wanted some fishballs so he and Gosil bought some fishballs worth P15. When Calpito counted his change, he found out that he only received P35 for his P100. Confronted by Calpito and Gosil, the fishball vendor would not admit that he had shortchanged Calpito. The 3 men kept arguing. Moments later, Soriano saw eight men rushing towards Gosil and Calpito. Calpito got stabbed and fell to the ground. - The RTC found Ronnie Quitlong, Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto guilty of murder for the killing of Jonathan Calpito. Accused-appellants, shortly after the filing of the information, submitted a motion for reinvestigation alleging that it was a certain Jesus Mendoza who stabbed the victim. The trial court acted favorably on the motion. The City Prosecutor filed a motion to admit an amended information on the basis of affidavits. The information, as amended, included Jesus Mendoza among the named accused. But unlike accused-appellants who were immediately arrested after the commission of the crime, Jesus Mendoza remained at large. At their arraignment, the detained accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. - On 21 April 1995, the trial court, following his evaluation of the respective submissions of the prosecution and the defense, including their rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence, rendered its now assailed decision. ISSUES
1. 2.
WON the RTC abused its discretion and/or acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in finding that there was conspiracy between and among the accused-appellants WON the RTC gravely abused its discretion and/or acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in finding the accused-appellants guilty of the crime of Murder instead of Homicide
HELD 1. YES, Quitlong is guilty of murder while the other 2 are only accomplices. 2. NO, the crime was qualified The crime committed was qualified by abuse of superiority. While superiority in number would not per se mean
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case. However, in the matter of relevancy of those books and documents to the pending criminal cases that petitioner miserably failed to discharge his burden. - Based on the records below and as correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioner had been issued by Cals with temporary receipts in the form of yellow pad slips of paper evidencing his payments, which pad slips had been validated by the corporation itself. It is clear that the production of the books and documents requested by petitioner are not indispensable to prove his defense of payment. DISPOSITION the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
books of accounts were already burned, they did not maintain the requested sales ledger and that other documents could not be produced because of the recent computerization of records was still in the process of completion. They also maintained that the documents requested are immaterial and irrelevant to the crimes for which the petitioner was being prosecuted. - In a resolution, the MTCC, thru its Judge Edward B. Contreras, denied petitioners request on the following grounds: (a) the requested documents, book ledgers and other records were immaterial in resolving the issues posed before the court; and (b) the issuance of the subpoenas will only unduly delay the hearing of the criminal cases. - Judge Contreras similarly denied the MFR. RTC denied due course to petition for failure to prove grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, it denied MFR. Petitioner went to CA via certiorari. The petition was still dismissed. MFR was still dismissed. Petitioners claim The denial of the request for the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum is violative of his constitutional rights ISSUE WON the lower courts erred in denying the subpoena requested by Roco HELD Ratio NO. Before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness). Reasoning - A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition. The first, subpoena ad testificandum, is used to compel a person to testify, while the second, subpoena duces tecum, is used to compel the production of books, records, things or documents therein specified. - The books and documents that petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are designated and described in his request with definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of definiteness, therefore, is satisfied in this
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- Petitioner was arraigned on August 18, 1998, and pleaded not guilty to both charges. Pre-trial ensued and the cases were jointly tried. The prosecution presented its witnesses, after which the Siguion Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law Offices (SRMO) as private prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of Evidence.7 Petitioner opposed the pleading, contending that the private complainant was represented by the ACCRA Law Offices and the Balgos and Perez Law Office during trial, and it was only after the prosecution had rested its case that SRMO entered its appearance as private prosecutor representing the PCIB. Since the ACCRA and Balgos and Perez Law Offices had not withdrawn their appearance, SRMO had no personality to appear as private prosecutor. Under the Informations, the private complainant is Caltex and not PCIB; hence, the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by SRMO should be stricken from the records. - Petitioner further averred that unless the Informations were amended to change the private complainant to PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced. He pointed out, however, that the Informations can no longer be amended because he had already been arraigned under the original Informations.8 He insisted that the amendments of the Informations to substitute PCIB as the offended party for Caltex would place him in double jeopardy. - PCIB, through SRMO, opposed the motion. It contended that the PCIB had re-credited the amount to Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as private complainant. Consequently, the PCIB is entitled to receive any civil indemnity which the trial court would adjudge against the accused. Moreover, the re-credited amount was brought out on cross-examination by Ramon Romano who testified for the Prosecution. PCIB pointed out that petitioner had marked in evidence the letter of the ACCRA Law Office to PCIBank dated October 10, 1997 and the credit memo sent by PCIB to Caltex - On July 18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of the private prosecutor for the substitution of PCIB as private complainant for Caltex. It however denied petitioners motion to have the formal offer of evidence of SRMO expunged from the record. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied on November 14, 2001. - Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Urgent Application for Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of
DISPOSITION REVERSED. Petitioner Benito Astorga is ACQUITTED of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE v TULIN
RICARZE v CA (PEOPLE, CALTEX) G.R. No. 160451 CALLEJO, SR; February 9, 2007
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was employed as a collector-messenger by City Service Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in messengerial services. He was assigned to the main office of Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Makati City. His primary task was to collect checks payable to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier. He also delivered invoices to Caltexs customers. - On November 6, 1997, Caltex filed a criminal complaint against petitioner before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. Romano alleged that, on October 16, 1997, while his department was conducting a daily electronic report from Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank (PCIB) Dela Rosa, Makati Branch, one of its depositary banks, it was discovered that unknown to the department, a company check, Check No. 74001 dated October 13, 1997 in the amount of P5,790,570.25 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, had been cleared through PCIB on October 15, 1997, notwithstanding two missing checks and two other check forgeries, one of which amounted to P1,790,757.25. All of these were never issued by Caltex. - Further investigation revealed that said savings account had actually been opened by petitioner; the forged checks were deposited and endorsed by him under Gutierrezs name. - In the meantime, the PCIB credited the amount of P581,229.00 to Caltex on March 29, 1998. However, the City Prosecutor of Makati City was not informed of this development. After the requisite preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor filed two (2) Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial documents on June 29, 1998 against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
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designation by which it is known or by which it may be identified, without need of averring that it is a juridical person or that it is organized in accordance with law. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, for further proceedings.
HELD 1. NO - The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. - In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the same, and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before
the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution. 2. YES - The Court agrees with respondent PCIBs comment that petitioner failed to make a distinction between legal and conventional subrogation. Subrogation is the transfer of all the rights of the creditor to a third person, who substitutes him in all his rights. It may either be legal or conventional. Legal subrogation is that which takes place without agreement but by operation of law because of certain acts. Instances of legal subrogation are those provided in Article 1302of the Civil Code. Conventional subrogation, on the other hand, is that which takes place by agreement of the parties. Thus, petitioners acquiescence is not necessary for subrogation to take place because the instant case is one of legal subrogation that occurs by operation of law, and without need of the debtors knowledge. 3. NO - The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or information to state the name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known and if there is no better way of Identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name (Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court; now Rule 110, Section 12 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] In case of offenses against property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified. - Legal Basis: Section. 12. Name of the offended party. The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name. (a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged. (b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be inserted in the complaint or information and the record (c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or any name or
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- Subsection 5 of section 6 of General Orders No. 58 declares that a complaint or information shall show, among others things, the names of the persons against whom, or against whose property, the offense was committed, if known. The complaint in this case therefore properly contained an averment as to the ownership of the property; and upon principle, in charging the crime of robbery committed upon the person, the allegation of the owner's name is essential. But of course if his name cannot be ascertained, it may be alleged that it is unknown. - From the fact that the name of the injured person may, in case of necessity, be alleged as unknown it should NOT be inferred that the naming of such person, when known, is of no importance. Where the name of the injured party is necessary as matter of essential description of the crime charged, the complaint must invest such person with individuality by either naming him or alleging that his name is unknown. It is elementary that in crimes against property, ownership must be alleged as matter essential to the proper description of the offense. To constitute robbery, the property obtained must be that of another, and indictments for such offenses must name the owner; and a variance in this respect between the indictment and the proof will be fatal. It is also necessary in order to identify the offense. A complaint charging the commission of the complex offense of robbery with homicide must necessarily charge each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. It is well recognized in this jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offenses the defendant can be convicted of the other. The mere circumstance that the two crimes are so related as to constitute one transaction in no way affects the principles of pleading involved in the case. To permit a defendant to be convicted upon a charge of robbing one person when the proof shows that he robbed an entirely different person, when the first was not present, is violative of the rudimentary principles of pleading; and in addition, is subject to the criticism that the defendant is thereby placed in a position where he could not be protected from a future prosecution by a plea of former conviction or acquittal. If we should convict or acquit these defendants today of the robbery which is alleged to have been committed upon the property of Roman Estriba, it is perfectly clear that they could be prosecuted tomorrow for robbery committed upon
issue of the credibility of the witnesses cannot be raised. Also, the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to support a finding of guilt even without the said extra-judicial confession. 4. NO -No element of ransom exists as no ransom note was presented in court. Neither was there a demand for money in exchange for Priscillas safe return. Besides, the Amended Information failed to allege that the kidnapping was for the purpose of extorting a ransom. The rule is that an accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that charged in the complaint or information. -Hence, Bustamante can only be convicted of kidnapping of a female under Article 267 with the aggravating circumstances of (a) the use of a motor vehicle and (b) the aid of armed men bringing the penalty up to the maximum. However, due to Article 3 Sec. 19 of the Constitution, the death penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
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- It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Reasoning. The offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. There are other statutes (SECTION 26 OF ACT NO. 1780, ORDINANCE NO. 3820 OF THE CITY OF MANILA) which may be charged against the accused for their acts to constitute a crime. It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act fans within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so warrant. -ON SUFFICIENCY OF THE INFORMATION: for a complaint or information to be sufficient it must, inter alia, state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. It is necessary that the particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial difference between the statute and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the commission of the crime and the penalty imposed for the offense.(PD 9 punishes the offender with 5-10 yrs imprisonment; Sec26, Act 1780 with a fine of P500 or by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or both; Ordinance 3820 with a fine of not more than P200 or imprisonment for not more than 1 month or both). But since it was specified in the Informations that the accused were charged with violation of Par3, PD 9, it was necessary for the Court to elucidate the elements of the said PD to differentiate it from other statutes (see above) the rest of the discussion was on the intent of the PD: to justify their decision that Par3 should be interpreted with the Whereas clause. - there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the
under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate release unless held on other charges. -ON PD 9:THIS CASE INVOLVES THE INTERPRETATION AND THE EXPLANATION OF THE INTENT OF THIS P.D. The pertinent paragraphs of the said PD is its Whereas clause ("WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons) and par3 (It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as 'fan knife,' 'spear,' 'dagger,' 'bolo,' 'balisong,' 'barong,' 'kris,' or club, except where such articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.) -Petitioners Contention: (1) Par 3, PD 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to the subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy; (3) that since it is malum prohibitum, the intention of the accused who commits it is immaterial; (4) that PD was enacted to eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-martial law days; and (5) that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. ISSUE WON the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon penalized under PD 9 HELD NO. The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. Ratio. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.
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defendant a necessary knowledge of the charge so that he may not be confused in his defense. (a) BUT it is likewise the rule that if ever duplicity of offenses is committed, the same constitutes a ground for a motion to quash the complaint; failure of the accused to interpose the objection constitutes waiver. Neither can he claim that he was denied information that he was to be tried for two crimes. The acts complained of were stated in ordinary and concise language that any person of common intelligence would be able to understand and thereby know what acts he was to defend himself against. (b) As clearly found by the trial court: Both accused have, obviously, conspired and confederated to commit the crime, considering that they entered the bathroom where Rebecca was, together and at the same time. Accused Fernandez then tied her with a piece of cloth tightly around her neck, while accused Conrado held her hands placing them behind her body. Then after Fernandez had raped Rebecca, Conrado raped her. Both fled from the scene of the crime together and at the same time. 2. NO - Appreciating the aggravating circumstance of ignominy is correct because of the greater perversity displayed by the offenders. The act of "plastering" mud on the victim's vagina right after she was raped is adequately described as "ignominy" (rather than cruelty or ignominy) 3. NO - The original death sentence was correctly imposed: Art 335 RPC states that when the crime of rape is committed by 2 or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death; Art 63 RPC states that when the penalty prescribed is composed of 2 indivisible penalties and the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. - However, since the original death penalties imposed by the trial court are no longer imposable under the present Constitution and are reduced to reclusion perpetua, the sentence on appellant Conrado has to be reduced to 2 penalties of reclusion perpetua. But the indemnity he has to pay to the victim must be increased to P20T in line with prevailing jurisprudence. Dispositive Appeal has no merit. Decision affirmed.
the house to report the tragic incident to Amelita, Teofilos daughter. - TEOFILO stated that upon being informed that his housemaid Rebecca was raped by the accused, they all proceeded to the office of the INP Police Station of Malasiqui to report the crime and had Rebecca physically examined in that same afternoon. - In defense, the 2 denied any involvement in the offense, both claiming they were nowhere at the scene of the crime when it was committed. - CFI decision: Each of the accused MELQUIADES FERNANDEZ and FEDERICO CONRADO is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of rape, aggravated by cruelty or ignominy. Court sentences each of them to suffer 2 penalties of death. - Appeal before SC: The accused filed this appeal to reduce penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. However, in light of the 1987 Consti specifically Sec 19(1), Art III, under which a death penalty already imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua, Fernandez withdrew his appeal. The lone appellant therefore is Conrado who insists on his appeal, notwithstanding the advice of his counsel de officio to discontinue. ISSUES 1. WON CFI erred in convicting them for 2 crimes of rape 2. WON CFI erred in holding that the rape was attended by the aggravating circumstance of cruelty or ignominy 3. WON CFI erred in sentencing each to suffer 2 penalties of death HELD 1. NO Ratio The imposition on each of the accused of the penalty corresponding to 2 crimes of rape is proper, because of the existence of conspiracy. In multiple rape, each defendant is responsible not only for the rape personally committed by him, but also for the rape committed by the others, because each of them cooperated in the commission of the rape perpetrated by the others, by acts without which it would not have been accomplished. Reasoning CFI is accused of violating the rule against duplicity of offenses in that, the accused were convicted for 2 crimes of rape even when under the criminal complaint against them, there is only 1 crime of rape alleged. The rule invoked is Sec 13, Rule 110 of the ROC which states that there should be only 1 offense charged in a criminal complaint or information, the purpose of which is to afford the
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Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder, is defective, and their conviction for Murder, Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder, is irregular. - However, such defect in the Information and the irregular conviction of appellants, does not invalidate the criminal proceedings had in the trial court because the appellants waived their right to quash the Information, and they effectively defended themselves against the charges for murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder. - While the Information specifically states that appellants are being accused of the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder in violation of P.D. No. 1866, its text is so worded that it describes at least three (3) crimes: illegal possession of firearms, murder, and attempted/frustrated murder. - The Information is undeniably duplicitous. Sec. 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in cases where the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses. Duplicity or multiplicity of charges is a ground for a motion to quash under Sec. 2 (e), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court. The accused, however, may choose not to file a motion to quash and be convicted of as many distinct charges as are alleged in the information and proved during the trial. In the same vein, failure to interpose any objection to the defect in the information constitutes waiver. - In the instant case, appellant did not file any motion to quash the Information. More significantly, the bulk of the evidence that they presented during the trial was intended to disprove their complicity in the murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder of the victims. -As such, appellants cannot pretend that the Information did not fully apprise them of the charges against them as to cause them surprise in the event of conviction. The appellation of the crime charged as determined by the provincial fiscal may not exactly correspond to the actual crimes constituted by the criminal acts described in the Information to have been committed by the accused, but what controls in the description of the said criminal acts and not the technical name of the crime supplied by the provincial fiscal. Since appellants defended themselves not only against the offense of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder as specified in the Information, but also, and more
firearm or ammunition, whether or not homicide or murder resulted from its use, on one hand, and murder or homicide, on the other, are offenses different and separate from and independent of, each other. While the former is punished under a special law, the latter is penalized under the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, the prosecution for one will not bar prosecution for the other, and double jeopardy will not lie. - Sec. 4. Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an accused may not be convicted of an offense other than that with which he is charged in the Information, unless such other offense was both established by evidence and is included in the offense charged in the Information. Since murder or homicide neither includes or is necessarily included in qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder or homicide, the trial court may not validly convict an accused for the former crime under an Information charging the latter offense. Conversely, an accused charged in the Information with homicide or murder may not be convicted of qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder or homicide, for the latter is not included in the former. -Further, a significant change was introduced to Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1866 by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, such that now, where an accused uses an unlicensed firearm in committing homicide or murder, he may no longer be charged with what used to be the two separate offenses of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in homicide or murder under P.D. No. 1866. -As amended by R.A. No. 8294, P.D. No. 1866 now mandates that the accused will be prosecuted only for the crime of homicide or murder with the fact of illegal possession of firearms being relegated to a mere special aggravating circumstance. - The Information charging appellants with Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder, violates Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, which obliterated the now obsolete concept of qualified illegal possession of firearms or illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form, i.e., where the penalty for illegal possession is increased to reclusion perpetua or death by the attendance of homicide or murder. In fact, qualified illegal possession of firearms, which used to be a distinct offense, no longer exists in our statute books. - Whether considered in the light of our ruling in Tacan and its progeny of cases or in the context of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294 to P.D. No. 1866, the Information charging appellants with
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objective of Presidential Decree No. 133 is to place a strong deterrent on workers from sabotaging the productive efforts of the industry where they are employed, it is essential, to qualify the offense and to justify the imposition of the heavier penalty prescribed by said Decree, that the information should aver that the articles stolen were materials or products which the accused was "working on or using or producing," and that a statement in the preamble of the information that the accused is charged with the crime of simple theft "in relation to Presidential Decree No. 133," does not suffice for the purpose envisioned by the constitutional guarantee that the accused should be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Supreme Court said that the appropriate penalty is that under Article 309 (3) of the RPC-prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods if value of property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos. But with the mitigating plea of guilty, penalty is in its minimum period.
mutually aided one another, with intent of gain and without knowledge and consent of their employer, in stealing the articles mentioned therein belonging to their employer. Although the preamble of said informations stated that petitioner was charged with the crime of simple theft "in relation to Presidential Decree No. 133," nowhere was it alleged in the body of said information that the articles stolen were materials or products which petitioner was "working on, or using or producing" as employee or laborer of the complainant, as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 133. Except for the dates of commission and the amounts involved, the aforesaid three (3) informations uniformly stated that said accused were charged with the crime of qualified theft, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 133, committed as follows: "That on or about the 14th day of November, 1973 in the Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then laborers working at the Markes Agro-Chemical Enterprises, conspiring and confederating together with one Renato Matuto y Ann, who is still at large, all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent of gain, grave abuse of confidence, and without the knowledge and consent of the said firm, its President and General Manager, Marciano K. Espiritu, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following, to wit: . . ." - When the informations were amended from Qualified Theft to Simple theft and deleting from the body of Information the phrase Grave abuse of confidence, Matilde pleaded GUILTY but the Court imposed the penalty under PD 133 and not those by Article 309 (3) of the RPC. From this decision, Matilde sought from the Court a quo a reconsideration contending that in the absence of any allegation in the body of information alleging specifically all the elements of the offense defined and penalized under PD. 133, he cannot be conviceted and penalized under the aforesaid decree. ISSUE WON the information that the accused is charged with the crime of simple theft in relation to PD 133 suffices HELD NO - The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari and set aside the judgment, and directed that another one be rendered. It held that since the
BALITAAN v CFI (DE LOS REYES) 115 SCRA 729. GUERRERO; July 30, 1982
FACTS - Luz Balitaan owns a baby dresses mending shop. Rita de los Reyes is the manager of her business. - Luz, thru Special Counsel Aguila, filed with the MTC of Bauan, Batangas an Information charging Rita of the crime of estafa. The information contains that Rita misappropriated P127.58, through grave abuse of confidence, despite of repeated demands of Luz. (See original for exact wording of Information.) - During trial at the MTC, Luz testified that Rita delivered the baby dresses to Uniware, and for this she (Rita) obtained 3 checks totaling P1,632.97. A cash voucher evidencing the receipt of said amount was entered into evidence. The lawyer for the defense moved: (1) to strike the testimonies with regard to the voucher evidence on the ground that said testimonies are at variance with the allegations in the information, that there is no allegation in the
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Court of Balingasag, Misamis Oriental on January 9, 1995. MCTC Judge Alfredo Cain found sufficient ground to prosecute the appellant for the crime of rape. This was the same finding of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Misamis Oriental upon examination of the records of the preliminary investigation forwarded to it. Consequently, on March 21, 1995, the corresponding Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court reading as follows: "INFORMATION "The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor II, upon sworn complaint of the offended party, Neddy Calayca, accuses ARTEMIO CALAYCA of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows: That on or about the 29th day of January, 1994 at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, at Barangay Solo, Municipality of Balingasag, Province of Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation, succeeded in having carnal knowledge (sexual intercourse) with her (sic) own daughter, Neddy Calayca, against her will and consent. "CONTRARY TO and in VIOLATION OF Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. "Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, March 6, 1995. (SGD.) ROBERTO S. CASIO "Asst. Provincial Prosecutor II" - When arraigned under the above-quoted Information, the appellant entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. - The evidence for the prosecution was anchored mainly on the testimony of 16-year old Neddy Calayca who, on May 2, 1995, narrated that at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning of January 29, 1994, she was sound asleep inside their house at Barangay Solo, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental when she was awakened by the weight of her father, herein appellant Artemio Calayca, who was already on top of her, naked and armed with a bolo. He forcibly undressed her, inserted his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull motion. Feeling the pain in her vagina, she resisted his onslaught by kicking and hitting him, telling him with bitter tears, "I wish you would die. You are a father without good morals." But she was helpless to resist his lustful desire as he threatened her with a knife saying, "I will kill you if
or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (b) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it; (c) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and (d) that there be demand for the return of the property. - The position of the defense is that the testimonies tend to prove another kind of estafa --- using false pretenses or fraudulent acts (Art 315 par 2a RPC)--and not thru abuse of confidence (Art 315 par 1b RPC). The elements of these two are different. Under par 2a, demand is not necessary and deceit or false representation must be shown. But this doesnt mean that proof of deceit is not allowed for par 1b. Abuse of confidence and deceit may co-exist. Even if deceit may be present, the abuse of confidence will characterize the estafa as the deceit will be merely incidental or, is absorbed by abuse of confidence. - As long as there is a relation of trust and confidence between the complainant and the accused and even though such relationship has been induced by the accused thru false representations and pretense and which is continued by active deceit without truthfully disclosing the facts to the complainant, the estafa committed is by abuse of confidence although deceit co-exists in its commission. - The presence of deceit would not change the whole theory of the prosecution that estafa with abuse of confidence was committed. Dispositive CFI decision to strike out testimonies is reversed and set aside.
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HELD NO - While the Court agrees that the penalty of death should be imposed on him, regrettably this is not in accord with the law and jurisprudence. Although the matter of the proper imposition of the penalty is not assigned as an error by the appellant, nevertheless, it is a well-established rule in criminal procedure that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct an error as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether it is made the subject of assignment of errors or not. - The trial court imposed the death penalty on appellant because of the presence of the circumstance of minority of the victim (she was only 15 years old at the time she was raped on January 29, 1994) as well as the relationship of the offender (father) and the victim (daughter), pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 30 which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Section 11 provides, inter alia, that where the victim of the crime of rape is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent of the victim, the death penalty shall be imposed. This is among the seven (7) circumstances enumerated in Section 11 which, as we have held in the recent case of People v. Garcia, 32 are considered special qualifying circumstances specifically applicable to the crime of rape. - There being no allegation of the minority of the victim in the Information under which the appellant was arraigned, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape as he was not properly informed that he is being accused of qualified rape. Appellant's conviction of qualified rape violates his constitutional right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. In a criminal prosecution, it is the fundamental rule that every element of the crime charged must be alleged in the Information. The main purpose of this constitutional requirement is to enable the accused to properly prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. - The failure to allege the fact of minority of the victim in the Information for rape is fatal and consequently bars the imposition of the death penalty. Having been informed only of the elements of simple rape, the appellant can be convicted only of such crime and be punished accordingly with reclusion perpetua.
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- Moleros alibi was readily refuted. - Trial court found Molero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape. - A double jeopardy issue arose because there were two complaints filed: - filed March 22, 1977: rape was committed Feb 13, 1976 - filed March 30, 1978: rape was committed Feb 5, 1976 - Molero was arraigned under the first complaint, he pleaded not guilty. - During trial, the provincial fiscal filed motion for leave to amend the complaint. This was granted. Thus, the new complaint. - Molero filed motion to quash 2nd criminal complaint on ground of double jeopardy. This was denied. ISSUES 1. WON Molero was under double jeopardy 2. WON Molero committed the rape HELD 1. NO - Section 9, Rule 117 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure: Conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged - Here, the case was not terminated because the dispositive portion of the order expressly directed the Provincial Fiscal and/or prosecuting fiscal to file a new complaint and/or information. - The case was dismissed for no other reason except to correct the date of the crime. - This dismissal did not amount to an acquittal. - There was no need for trial court to have used such procedure. It should just have denied motion for reconsideration of the order granting the prosecutions motion for leave to amend the complaint. After arraignment and where appellant pleaded not guilty, is it still proper to amend date of commission of crime? Applying Sections 10 and 13 of Rule 110 of Revised Rules of Court, amendment sought by prosecution should have been granted. The precise time is not an essential element of rape. The amendment was only a matter of form and did not prejudice the rights of the appellant. 2. YES - Molero argues that if a crime was committed by him at all, it was qualified seduction. - SC didnt agree. Appellant was shown to have employed force and intimidation against daughter. Also, he had moral ascendancy and influence over the victim. The victim is illiterate and unschooled,
- It does not authorize the total omission of a date or such an indefinite allegation with reference thereto as amounts to the same thing. - SC: the variance bet the date of the commission of the crime as alleged in the info and that as proved on trial DOES NO warrant necessarily the acquittal of the accused. IF such variance occurs and it is shown that the defendant is surprised thereby, and that, by reason of that surprise, he is unable to defend himself properly, the court may in the exercise of sound discretion based on ALL circumstances, order the information amended so as to set forth the correct date and may grant an adjournment for such a length of time as will enable the defendant to prepare himself to meet the variance in date which was the cause of his surprise. Dispositive Decision affirmed.
PEOPLE v MOLERO 144 SCRA 397 GUTIERREZ JR.; September 24, 1986
NATURE Appeal from decision of CFI FACTS - Molero was charged with rape by daughter in complaint filed in CFI Negros Oriental. Molero told daughter to go with him to the river to catch shrimps and fish. She was barely 17. She was hugged fr behind by Molero and she fell to the ground. He unsheathed his bolo. He succeeded in having sexual intercourse and warned her not to tell anyone. - The mother learned of the incident and told daughter to keep quiet for the moment; they were secretive of their plan to report because Molero is a fierce man. - Mother and daughter went to Station Commander. They were advised to report to the PC Headquarters. At the PC Headquarters, complaint was investigated, but accused didnt want investigation to continue because accdg to him, this was their own problem. - Internal and external exam of victim showed she had previous sexual intercourse. - Molero denied the charge, saying he couldnt have done it because he was already committed in the provincial jail that time. He also denied the sworn statement he made, saying hes illiterate. He said he was not informed of his rights to remain silent and to counsel; that he was not assisted by counsel during investigation.
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- Furthermore, Section 10, Rule 110 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided: Sec. 10. Time of the commission of the offense.-It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense' was committed as the information or complaint will permit. 2. NO Ratio Art. 344(3) of the Revised Penal Code prohibits a prosecution for seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, except upon a complaint made by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. It does not prohibit the continuance of a prosecution if the offended party pardons the offender after the cause has been instituted, nor does it order the dismissal of said cause. The only act that riding to Article 344 extinguishes the penal action and the penalty that may have been imposed, is the marriage between the offender and the offended party. Reasoning - The rationale of the law on the prosecution of private crimes is simple: The law deems it the wiser policy to let the aggrieved woman and her family decide whether to expose to public view or to heated controversies in court the vices, faults and disgraceful acts occurring in the family. However, when, as in the case at bar, the pardon is given after the filing of the complaint in court, it comes too late to hide the shameful occurrence from public notice. Dispositive Decision of trial court affirmed
PEOPLE v LUALHATI 171 SCRA 277, 283 GRINO-AQUINO; March 16, 1989
NATURE Petition for review of the Decision of the Trial court FACTS - Complainant Josephine Dimaunahan was born on January 7, 1967 - In 1970, her mother separated from her father and started to live with appellant Vicente Lualhati without the benefit of marriage. She likewise lived with appellant who supported her, took care of her studies and treated her like his own daughter. - Sometime in June, 1978, while complainant's mother was at work, appellant and complainant were alone in the house. Appellant had sexual intercourse with complainant. It appeared that even prior to June, 1978, appellant had already several sexual relations with complainant - Upon arraignment on, the accused pleaded not guilty - The defense filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint charged more than one offense, namely: That on or about the month of June, 1978, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, ... the accused Vicente Lualhati wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant Josephine M. Dimaunahan ... - Fiscal alleged that the accused was being tried on the Information which charged only one offense committed "in or about the month of June 1978." - Trial judge denied motion to dismiss. - The accused filed another Motion to Dismiss, alleging that he had been pardoned by the offended party, her mother and grandmother. Attached, to the Motion to Dismiss was the joint affidavit of desistance signed by the offended party, her mother and grandmother - -The offended party executed and filed an affidavit alleging that her father abandoned her at the age of two years and three months, without providing for her support and studies, and that the same were provided by her mother and grandmother who, on
the same date, executed a joint affidavit to the same effect - The Prosecuting Fiscal filed an Addendum to the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. He alleged that the express pardon given the accused was invalid for the offended party did not have "a will of her own," being merely eleven years old when the crime was committed; that the father of the offended party, executed an affidavit objecting to the pardon given to the accused; and that, as the father, he still possessed the "patria potestas" over the offended party in spite of his having abandoned her. - Trial court denied the motion to dismiss on account of the insistence of the victim's father to prosecute the accused, absent judicial pronouncement depriving him of parental authority over the offended party, a child below twelve years old. - Accused filed Motion to Quash, which was denied by the trial court - Trial court convicted the accused of rape, and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. ISSUES 1. WON there was a valid complaint against the appellant 2. WON the pardon given to him by the offended party, her mother, and grandmother extinguished his criminal liability, in spite of the objection of the victim's father. HELD 1. YES Ratio Discrepancies between the accusation and the complaint as to time of occurrence of the carnal copulations in rape do not affect any essential right of the accused, where the acts occurred within the period of time alleged in both writings and the difference noted in other respects was of a formal, rather than a substantial, character. Reasoning - Appellant contends that the complaint is void because it charges at least three crimes of rape, namely: (1) that which was committed "on or about the month of June, 1978;" (2) that which was committed "sometime prior to said period;" and (3) that which was committed "subsequent thereto." - Argument has no merit. Attached to Josephine's complaint was her sworn statement wherein, she categorically affirmed that Vicente abused her before the start of classes in June 1978. That affidavit, which may be considered part of the complaint required by law, cures any ambiguity in the complaint regarding the number of offenses committed by the accused.
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living alone for a long time. It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the appearance of their assailant and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often, the face and body movements of the assailant create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory. The impression becomes more profound where the malefactor is the victim's own father. - The fact that Maria Fe continued to live with Razonable will not likewise crumple her credibility. At the time of the incident, she was a simple, nave and hapless child of twelve years. She was living by her lonesome self with her father, entirely dependent on him for all her needs. Her mother was in Isabela and her nearest sibling lived in another town. It could hardly be expected that such a child of tender age would know what to do and where to go under the circumstances. It is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone traumatic experiences by the norms of behavior expected under the circumstances from mature persons. - The delay in the filing of the cases does not necessarily impair the credibility of the victim. Experience teaches us that many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against the rapist, for they prefer to silently bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offender's making good on his threats. Dispositive Considering that the acts were committed prior to the effectivity of RA 7659, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of the three cases. However, consistent with recent rulings, the amount of P50,000 for each count of rape should be awarded by way of moral damages, and hence the award given by the trial court should be reduced to P150,000. Likewise, current case law dictates that the victim shall be entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 for each count of rape. - Decision of the RTC AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Ratio The rationale of the rule (Section 11, Rule 110 of the ROC) is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To claim this substantive right protected by no less than the Bill of Rights, the accused is duty bound to follow our procedural rules which were laid down to assure an orderly administration of justice. Reasoning - Firstly, it behooved the accused to raise the issue of a defective information, on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form, in a motion to quash said information or a motion for bill of particulars. An accused who fails to take this seasonable step will be deemed to have waived the defect in said information. The only defects in an information that are not deemed waived are where no offense is charged, lack of jurisdiction of the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and double jeopardy. Corollarily, we have ruled that objections as to matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. Razonable did not raise either in a motion to quash or a motion for bill of particulars the defect in the Information regarding the indefiniteness of the allegation on the date of the commission of the offense. - Secondly, during the trial, the defense never objected to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution to prove that the offense was committed in the middle of June 1987. It has not been shown that Razonable was taken by surprise with the testimony of Maria Fe that she was raped in the middle of June 1987, and hence could not properly defend himself. On the contrary, he was able to give an alibi as to his whereabouts at that particular time. In fine, he cannot pretend that he was unable to defend himself in view of the vagueness of the allegation in the information as to when the crimes were committed. 2. NO Reasoning Appellant claims that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt on the following grounds: (1) the identity of the perpetrator has not been established with certitude since the room was dark and it has not been shown that it was properly illuminated; (2) it was unnatural for Maria Fe to remain in their house if it was true that she was threatened and intimidated; and (3) there was an unreasonable delay in the filing of the complaint which rendered the rape charges doubtful. - It is highly inconceivable that Maria Fe would not recognize her own father with whom she has been
ALMEDA v VILLALUZ PEOPLE v CASEY and FELIX 103 SCRA 21 GUERRERO; February 24, 1981
NATURE Automatic review of the judgment of the Circuit Criminal Court imposing upon Casey and Felix the capital c\punishment for the death of Alfredo Valdez.
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Reasoning - Indeed, accused-appellant Joseph Casey gave an extrajudicial sworn statement that he met accusedappellant Ricardo Felix and another person named Rudy in Cubao, Quezon City on that fateful day. However, there is no showing that this meeting was purposely arranged to plan the killing of the victim. In fact, the following questions and answers in the said sworn statement show that there was no preconceived design to kill the victim. - There is evident premeditation when the killing had been carefully planned by the offender or when he had previously prepared the means which he had considered adequate to carry it out, when he had prepared beforehand the means suitable for carrying it into execution, when he has had sufficient time to consider and accept the final consequences, and when there had been a concerted plan. 16 It has also been held that to appreciate the circumstances of evident premeditation, it is necessary to establish the following; (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) the act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to snow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warning. - From the answers of accused-appellant Casey in said sworn statement, it can be gleaned that the killing was not a preconceived plan. It was not preceded by any reflection or deep thought. It was just a spontaneous decision reached when the victim started to run away upon being approached by accused-appellant Ricardo Felix. - There are indeed two accused-appellants in this case charged with the murder of not one victim but superiority in number does not necessarily mean superiority in strength. It is necessary to show that the aggressors "cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from their superiority in strength." 3. YES Reasoning - Although there is no direct showing that the accused had conspired together, but their acts and the attendant circumstances disclose that common motive that would make accused Ricardo Felix as a co-principal with the actual slayer, Joseph Casey. Without doubt, he performed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. - Ricardo Felix's overt acts consist in instigating the pursuit of the deceased, in firing a shot at him and in giving Joseph Casey encouragement by his armed
1. WON the Court a quo erred in illegally trying appellant Casey on the amended information without arraignment 2. WON the Court a quo erred in holding that appellants acted with evident premeditation and abuse o of superior strength, and in qualifying the crime committed as aggravated murder 3. WON whether or not there is conspiracy between the two accused in the commission of the crime 4. WON the Court erred in discounting Caseys defense that he acted in legitimate self-defense HELD 1. NO Reasoning The lack of arraignment under the amended information is objected to by accused-appellant Joseph Casey allegedly on the ground that there is a violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the charge against him. There can be a violation of such right, however, only when the amendment pertains to matters of substance. In the case at bar, the alterations introduced in the information refer to the inclusion of accused appellant Ricardo Felix to the same charge of murder. They do not change the nature of the crime against accused-appellant Casey. Conspiracy, evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength are similarly alleged in both informations. No extenuating circumstance is likewise alleged in both. Thus the amendment of the information as far as accusedappellant Casey is concerned is one of form and not of substance as it is not prejudicial to his rights. - The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an information has been said to be whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an amendment to an information introduced after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not expose the accused to a charge which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court. 2. YES
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the offense was committed in 1964. The defense refused to cross-examine witness Alcantara, asked respondent Court to strike off the testimony of Alcantara because it referred to an offense not mentioned in the information, and asked for a ruling by respondent Court on the prosecution's verbal motion to amend the information. - Respondent Judge required the prosecution and the defense to submit memoranda. The contested order of July 22, 1970, denying the prosecution's verbal motion to amend information on the ground that said amendment would prejudice the substantial rights of the accused was issued. ISSUE WON the respondent Court abused its discretion when it refused an amendment to the information to change the date of the alleged commission of the offense from "August 1969" to "August 1964", on the ground it would constitute an impairment of the substantial rights of the accused as guaranteed by the Constitution. HELD NO Ratio While it has been held that except when time is a material ingredient of an offense, the precise time of commission need not be stated in the information, this Court stated that this does not mean that the prosecuting officer may be careless about fixing the date of the alleged crime, or that he may omit the date altogether, or that he may make the allegation so indefinite as to amount to the same thing. The prosecution is given the chance to allege an approximation of time of the commission of the offense and the precise date need not be stated but it does not mean that it can prove any date remote or far removed from the given approximate date so as to surprise and prejudice the accused. Reasoning - The period of almost five years between 1947 and 1952 covers such a long stretch of time that one cannot help but be led to believe that another theft different from that committed by the co-defendants in 1952 was also perpetrated by them in 1947. Under this impression the accused, who came to Court prepared to face a charge of theft of large cattle allegedly committed by them in 1952, were certainly caught by sudden surprise upon being confronted by evidence tending to prove a similar offense committed in 1947. The variance is certainly unfair to them, for it violates their constitutional rights to be informed before the trial of the specific charge
PEOPLE v REYES 108 SCRA 203 CONCEPCION, JR; October 23, 1981
NATURE Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction on the order dated July 10, 1970, of the respondent Judge, (Hon. Alfredo C. Reyes of the Circuit Criminal Court, 4th Judicial District, Cabanatuan City) in Criminal Case No. CCC-IV-170NE, "People v Francisco Estrella," which denied petitioner's verbal motion for the amendment of the information in said case, by deleting the year "1969" as alleged therein, and in lieu thereof to put the year "1964 ". FACTS - Sometime in October, an information for qualified theft was filed against private respondent Francisco Estrella and three others, as Criminal Case No. 6799,
in the Municipal Court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, pertinent portion as follows: That in the month of August, 1964, in the municipality of San Jose, province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused Narciso Mananing being the driver of complainant Maria Ignacio- Francisco, Florentino Alcantara, repair shop owner where the truck hereinafter described was found and recovered, Francisco Estrella, a Philippine Constabulary soldier stationed at Bulacan, and Melecio Guevarra, all conspiring together, without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away one (1) Bedford truck with Chassis No. 153559, with Motor No. 2/54/5/6, with Plate No. T-35049, Series of 1964, to the damage and prejudice of the owner, Maria Ignacio-Francisco in the amount of P23,000.00, value of said vehicle. - On November 15, 1969, the Acting City Fiscal of San Jose City, (converted into city) Nueva Ecija, filed an information (Crim. Case No. CCC-IV-170) with the respondent Court, charging private respondent Francisco Estrella and three others, with qualified theft. This time the information contained Aug. 1969 instead of Aug. 1964 in the previous information and alleged grave abuse of confidence and that accused dismantled the vehicle. - On January 28, 1970, private respondent Francisco Estrella was arraigned, and he pleaded not guilty. During the arraignment, respondent-Judge required his clerk to read the information to Francisco Estrella. From January 28, 1970, up to May 21, 1970, the latter date being the scheduled trial of the case, the prosecution never moved to amend the information. - On May 21, 1970 when the prosecution was scheduled to present its evidence, it verbally moved that it be allowed to amend the information so as to change the date of the commission of the offense from "August 1969" to "August 1964." Private respondent Francisco Estrella, having come to the trial court ready to defend himself from an offense allegedly committed in "August 1969", vigorously objected to the verbal motion. - Respondent Judge withheld his ruling on the prosecution's motion to amend, and instead, required the prosecution to present its first witness, to determine whether the sought amendment in the information would constitute a change of substance affecting the rights of the accused or merely of form. - Florentino Alcantara, originally a co-accused but discharged as a prosecution witness, testified that
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As a result of a shooting incident, two informations for frustrated homicide were filed against Sixto Ruiz in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. In Criminal Case No. 4747, Ernesto Bello was named as the victim, while in Criminal Case No 4748, Rogelio Bello was the complainant. Upon arraignment, Sixto Ruiz pleaded not guilty to the two informations. A reinvestigation of these two cases was made in the Dept. of Justice, following which State Prosecutor filed a motion for leave of court to amend the informations on the ground that the evidence disclosed a prima facie case against Luis Padilla and Magsikap Ongchenco who acted in conspiracy with Ruiz. Ruiz filed his opposition to the motion. The trial Judge denied the motion to amend the information saying that allowance of the amendment alleging conspiracy would be amending the manner of committing the crime and thereby would constitute substantial amendment. As a consequence, State Prosecutor filed two new informations for frustrated homicide against Luis Padilla and Magsikap Ongchenco (Criminal Cases Nos. 9673 and 9674) alleging that the two conspired with Ruiz who was referred to as accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4747 and 4748. Padilla and Ongchenco moved to quash the two new informations. The motion was denied by the lower court. Ruiz also filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 9673 and 9674 a motion to permit to quash and/or strike out the allegation of conspiracy in the two informations. The trial Judge ordered the striking out from the records the aforesaid motion and clarified that the allegation of conspiracy does not alter the theory of the case, nor does it introduce innovation nor does it present alternative imputation nor is it inconsistent with the with the original allegations. From these orders of the lower court, Ruiz, Padilla, and Ongchenco went to the CA on a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction alleging that the trial Judge exceeded his jurisdiction or abused his judicial discretion in issuing the orders in Criminal Cases Nos. 9673 and 9674.
WON an information for the crime of homicide can be amended so as to charge the crime of murder after the accused had entered a plea of not guilty HELD NO. - The provision which is relevant to the problem is Rule 110, Sec. 13 of the Rules of Court - The petitioner invokes the first paragraph, whereas the respondent relies on the second. - To amend the information so as to change the crime charged from homicide to the more serious offense of murder after the petitioner had pleaded not guilty to the former is indubitably proscribed by the first paragraph of the above-quoted provision. For certainly a change from homicide to murder is not a matter of form; it is one of substance with very serious consequences. - Can the amendment be justified under the second paragraph? The answer is, No. For the provision speaks not of amendment but of dismissal of the information. in other words the provision contemplates the filing of a substitute, not an amended information - Can not the information for homicide against the petitioner be dismissed since no judgment has yet been rendered and another information for murder be filed? The answer, again, is, No. For the petitioner having pleaded not guilty to homicide, to dismiss the charge against him so as to file another charge for murder will place him thereby in double jeopardy. Aquino concur: - respondent Judge relied on Dimalibot vs. Salcedo - The Dimalibot case is different from the instant case. The plea in the Dimalibot case was made during the preliminary investigation to a complaint for homicide filed in the justice of the peace court. That is not the plea contemplated in Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The plea in the instant case was made to an information filed in the Court of First Instance.
DIONALDO v DACUYCUY 108 SCRA 736 ABAD SANTOS; October 30, 1981
NATURE Petition to nullify orders of respondent judge FACTS -Petitioner Rolando Dionaldo stands charged with the crime of homicide. After he entered a plea of not guilty, the prosecution filed a motion for leave to amend the information, attaching thereto an amended information charging the accused with murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation-a more serious offense. -No explanation was given in the motion for alleging evident premeditation but as to the allegation of treachery it was explained that, "the affidavit of the complaining witness indicates that the attack was sudden and it was only after they sustained the wounds consequent to the treacherous attack that they were forced to fight back to repel further aggression." It can thus be seen that all along this claimed circumstance was known to the prosecution but it was not alleged. -Counsel for the accused opposed the motion to amend the information but the respondent judge granted the motion ISSUE
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merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information, and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime. - The proposed amendments in the amended information, in the instant case, are clearly substantial and have the effect of changing the crime charged from "Robbery" punishable under Article 209 to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place" punishable under Art. 302 of the Revised Penal Code, thereby exposing the private respondents-accused to a higher penalty as compared to the penalty imposable for the offense charged in the original information to which the accused had already entered a plea of "not guilty" during their arraignment. - Moreover, the change in the items, articles and pieces of jewelry allegedly stolen into entirely different articles from those originally complained of, affects the essence of the imputed crime, and would deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet all the allegations in the amended information, in the preparation of their defenses to the charge filed against them. It will be observed that private respondents were accused as accessories-after-thefact of the minor Ricardo Cabaloza who had already been convicted of robbery of the items listed in the original information. To charge them now as accessories-after-the-fact for a crime different from that committed by the principal, would be manifestly incongruous as to be allowed by the Court. - The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-accused, which was not previously included in the original information, is likewise a substantial amendment saddling the respondents with the need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial court. To allow at this stage the proposed amendment alleging conspiracy among all the accused, will make all of the latter liable not only for their own individual transgressions or acts but also for the acts of their co-conspirators. Dispositive Petition is DISMISSED. Orders of the respondent court AFFIRMED. TRO lifted.
ISSUE WON the CA erred in granting the petition of (Ruiz, Padilla, and Ongchenco) HELD YES -
First and foremost, the trial Judge should have allowed the amendment in Criminal Cases Nos. 4747 and 4748 considering that the amendments sought were only formal. The amendments of Criminal Cases Nos. 4747 and 4748 would not have prejudiced Ruiz whose participation as principal in the crimes charged did not change. But the fact that the trial court erred in denying the motion of the prosecution to amend the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 4747 and 4748 was no bar to the filing of the new informations. The allegation in Criminal Cases Nos. 9673 and 9674 filed against Padilla and Ongchenco that the two conspired and confederated with Ruiz merely describe the fact that the latter was already charged with the same offense. It is incorrect to say that the allegations of conspiracy include Ruiz as a defendant in the said case. Thus, he cannot file a motion to quash the same. Dispositive Decision and resolution of the CA are SET ASIDE. Decisions of lower court allowing retention of the allegation of conspiracy and the reference to Criminal Cases Nos. 4747 and 4748 in the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 9673 and 9674 are SUSTAINED.
Antonio Cimarra, Ulpiano Villar, Bayani Catindig and Avelino de Leon. Said accused (now private respondents) were all members of the police force of Quezon City and were charged as accessories-afterthe-fact in the robbery committed by the minor Ricardo Cabaloza, who had already pleaded guilty and had been convicted in a crimial case before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City. Ricardo Cabaloza was convicted for the robbery of the same items, articles and pieces of jewelry belonging to Ding Velayo, Inc. valued at P75,591.40. - Upon arraignment, all of the accused (now private respondents) entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge filed against them. - However, before the trial could proceed, the prosecuting fiscal filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information seeking to amend the original information by: (1) changing the offense charged from "Robbery" to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place," (2) alleging conspiracy among all the accused, and (3) deleting all items, articles and pieces of jewelry alleged to have been stolen in the original Information and substituting them with a different set of items valued at P71,336.80. - Private respondents opposed the admission of the Amended Information. The respondent court resolved to deny the proposed amendments contained in the Amended Information. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid order but the respondent court denied said motion; hence, this petition. ISSUE WON the amended information should be admitted HELD - Amendment of an information under Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (formerly, Section 13, Rule 110 of the old Rules on Criminal Procedure) may be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge. Thereafter and during the trial, amendments to the information may also be allowed, as to matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. - The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended. On the other hand, an amendment which
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effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case. - As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared. - As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extracontractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to . . . Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted . . . and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso." - But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasidelict by petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal. 2. YES, because the action in fact satisfies the elements of quasi-delict.
filed by the Chief of Police and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver. - The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. et. Al. and dismissed the complaint ISSUES
1.
WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages on the ground that since no express reservation was made by the complainants, the civil aspect of the criminal case would have to be determined only after the termination of the criminal case WON the lower court erred in saying that the action is not based on quasi-delict since the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages
2.
HELD 1. YES Ratio An action based on quasi-delict may be maintained independently from a criminal action. By instituting a civil action based on a quasi-delict, a complainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case. Reasoning - In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused. - It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in
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before the RTC, Branch 12, seeking to set aside the MTC order of suspension. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-26195. - Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petition was filed by the private complainant, instead of the government prosecutor representing the People of the Philippines in criminal cases. RTC dismissed the petition for lack of conformity or signature of the government prosecutor. Petitioner moved MFR but was denied. From these orders, petitioner filed the instant petition for review. Petitioners Claim That a person aggrieved may file a special civil action for certiorari and that person includes the complainant or the offended party. A special action on an order issued by a lower court in a criminal case may be filed by the private offended party. Respondentss Comment In all criminal cases, all initiatory pleadings, as well as subsequent proceedings, must be initiated by the government counsel because the injured party is the People of the Philippines and the private complainant is a mere witness to the offense allegedly committed by the accused. People v. Dacudao and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Veridiano II apply, such that a private prosecutor in a criminal case has no authority to act for the People of the Philippines. It is the governments counsel, the Sol-Gen, who appears in criminal cases or incidents before SC. ISSUE WON a private offended party in a criminal proceeding may file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing an interlocutory order, without the conformity of the public prosecutor HELD YES Ratio If criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability of the private complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect of the case. (Metrobank v. Veridiano II). But if the order which is assailed is not one dismissing the case or acquitting respondents / defendants, there is no limitation to the capacity of the private complainant to seek judicial review of the assailed order. Reasoning - [1] A special civil action for certiorari may be filed by an aggrieved party alleging grave abuse of
however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made.
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-Private respondents contend that since petitioner did not comply with the agreement, he was not entitled to the 10% rebate in price, and as a consequence, the previous payments made by petitioner did not amount to full payment as required for all the lots and which would have entitled petitioner to the issuance and delivery of the certificates of title to all the lots. -On 26 July 1984, petitioner, filed a complaint for specific performance with damages, with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch LX, docketed as Civil Case No. 4224. In his complaint, petitioner prayed, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering private respondents to deliver to him the transfer certificates of title covering the three (3) lots which he had allegedly fully paid for, and which private respondents had refused to do so. Also, it was prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the private respondents to jointly and severally pay the petitioner, actual damages equal to P320,000.00, representing unrealized gross profits; moral damages at the discretion of the court; and, attorney's fees equal to P15,000.00, plus the costs of the action. -Before the civil action was filed, petitioner also filed on 5 June 1984 with the City Fiscal of Angeles City a criminal complaint against herein respondent Manuel Lazatin, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, specifically Section 25 thereof, which provides: "PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 957 REGULATING THE SALE OF SUBDIVISIONS LOTS AND CONDOMINIUMS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF. SEC. 25. Issuance of Title. The owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit. No fee, except those required for the registration of the deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds shall be collected for the issuance of such title. In the event a mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding at the time of the issuance of the title to the buyer, the owner or developer shall redeem the mortgage or the corresponding portion thereof within six months such issuance in order that the title over any fully paid lot or unit may be secured and delivered to the buyer in accordance herewith. SEC. 39. Penalties. Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Decree and/or any rule or regulation that may be issued pursuant to this Decree, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years: Provided, that in the case of
NAGUIAT v IAC (TIMOG SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT CORP) 164 SCRA 505 PADILLA; August 18, 1988
NATURE Petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court FACTS -Timog Silangan Development Corporation (TSDC, for short) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of developing and selling subdivision lots in
"Timog Park," located in Angeles City, with Manuel P. Lazatin (Lazatin, for short) as its President. - Antolin T. Naguiat purchased, on installment basis, four (4) lots from TSDC, identified as Lots Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16, of Block 26 of Timog Park. Each lot consists of 300 square meters. The four (4) lots have a total area of 1,200 square meters, with a price of P60.00 per square meter. On the same date (7 February 1983) petitioner made a down payment of P7,200.00, representing 10% of the alleged total price of P72,000.00 for the four (4) lots. A corresponding receipt for the downpayment was issued by TSDC to the petitioner. While the Contract to Sell between TSDC and the petitioner stipulated a two-year period within which to pay the total contract price, the latter made substantial payments in the months of June to August 1983. On 10 August 1983, he paid the sum of P12,529.30 as his alleged full payment for Lot. No. 16, after which, TSDC caused to be issued in the name of the petitioner the title to said lot. On 7 November 1983, petitioner paid TSDC the amount of P36,067.97, which was allegedly his full payment for the remaining three (3) Lots, namely, Lots Nos. 13, 14 and 15. A corresponding receipt for said amount was also issued by TSDC to the petitioner. -Thereafter, from December 1983 up to June 1984, petitioner demanded from TSDC the issuance in his favor of the certificates of title for the three (3) lots, last paid for, but the private respondents (TSDC and Lazatin) refused on the ground that the petitioner had not fully paid for said three (3) lots. -Sometime in January, 1983, TSDC's Board of Directors approved the petitioner's contemplated purchase of the aforesaid lots. To confirm the agreement, respondent Lazatin wrote petitioner a letter reiterating standard conditions of the sale, which the petitioner allegedly accepted by affixing his conformity to said letter. The conditions for the sale of the lots were among others, "(i) 10% down payment with a commitment to commence construction therefrom (thereon) in one month's time; (ii) said construction to be finished within a period of six (6) months; and, (iii) the effective price was P70 per square meter with a rebate of P10.00 per square meter upon completion of the house in six (6) months." But, as alleged by the private respondents, petitioner commenced the construction of a house on one lot but failed to finish it within the stipulated period of six (6) months. And as to the other lots, petitioner allegedly failed altogether to construct houses on them.
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the same, which are, the Contract to Sell, the letter which contains the conditions for the purchase of the lots and, to which petitioner allegedly affixed his conformity, the official receipts for the alleged payments made by the petitioner, and other related documents. - Based on the foregoing, and considering that the criminal action filed is one for violation of a special law where, irrespective of the motives, mere commission of the act prohibited by said special law, constitutes the offense, then the intervention of the petitioner's counsel, as private prosecutor in the criminal action, will not prejudice the substantial rights of the accused. - The consolidation of the two cases in question, where petitioner's counsel may act as counsel for the plaintiff in the civil case and private prosecutor in the criminal case, will instead be conducive to the early termination of the two (2) cases, and will redound to the benefit and convenience of the parties; as well as to the speedy administration of justice. - As a ground for the consolidation of the criminal and civil cases, petitioner invokes Rule 111, Sec. 3(a), Rules of Court, which provides: "Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, as contemplated in the first paragraph of Section 1 hereof, the following rules shall be observed: (a) 'After a criminal action has been commenced, the pending civil action arising from the same offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. However, if no final judgment has been rendered by the trial court in the civil action, the same may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the criminal action. If the application is granted, the evidence presented and admitted in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action, without prejudice to the admission of additional evidence that any party may wish to present. Under the aforequoted provision, the civil action that may be consolidated with a criminal action, is one for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal offense, or ex delicto. In the case at bar, the civil action filed by the petitioner was for specific performance with damages. The main relief sought in the latter case, i.e., the delivery of the certificates of title to the lots which petitioner had allegedly fully paid for, was grounded on the
2. WON the civil and criminal case should be consolidated HELD 1. NO - In the case at bar, the petitioner filed his motions for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration on 30 October 1985 and 15 November 1985, both within the periods sought to be extended. Hence the Habaluyas ruling did not yet apply to bar said motions for extension. As admitted by petitioner himself, he filed with the respondent appellate court two (2) motions for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration of the latter court's decision, with the justification that the two (2) motions were timely and properly presented, since they were filed before the expiration of the respective periods sought to be extended. - The case of Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, has ruled that: "Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court." - Based on the aforequoted ruling of the Habaluyas case, motions for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may no longer be filed before all courts, lower than the Supreme Court. The rule in Habaluyas applies even if the motion is filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended, because the fifteen (15) day period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration with said courts, is non-extendible. But as resolved also in the Habaluyas case, the rule that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court, shall be strictly enforced "beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution." The Court promulgated the Habaluyas resolution on 30 May 1986. Thus, the Habaluyas ruling became effective, and strictly enforced, only beginning 1 July 1986. 2. YES - In the cases at bar, the nature of the issues involved, at least, the factual issues in the civil and criminal actions are almost identical, i.e., whether or not petitioner had fully paid for the lots he purchased from the private respondents, so as to entitle him to the delivery of the certificates of title to said lots. The evidence in both cases, likewise, would virtually be
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reservation therefore (Judgment in such a proceeding becomes binding as res judicata, according to Roa v Dela Cruz. Thus, plaintiff is barred). ISSUE WON intervention of private prosecution and failure to make a reservation bars plaintiff from filing a separate civil action for damages against the accused HELD NO, plaintiff is not barred. Ratio The mere appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case does not necessarily constitute such intervention on the part of the aggrieved party as could only import an intention on her part to press her claim for damages in said criminal case and a waiver of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. Reasoning - In the Roa case, there was a full-blown hearing where a private prosecutor participated actively and there could be no question that the aggrieved party's participation through the private prosecutor in said case clearly indicated her intention to have her claim for damages litigated in the criminal action against the accused. It was only after the trial of the case on the merits that a decision was rendered finding the accused guilty of slight slander and sentencing her to pay a fine of P50.00 but making no award of damages in favor of the aggrieved party. The reason for the Court's not making any award of damages is because of the failure of the aggrieved party to submit evidence to support her claim for damages. - In the present case, while it is true that Reyes was represented by a private prosecutor for the purpose of proving damages, the unexpected plea of guilt by the accused and her being sentenced immediately to a fine of P50.00 prevented petitioner from proving her claim for damages and making a reservation to file a separate civil action. Controlling case should be Meneses v Luat, and not Roa v Dela Cruz. In the Roa case, not only was the offended party represented by a private prosecutor in the criminal action, the action went through trial on the merits. In the Luat case, defendant Luat did not proceed to trial, as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment. The mere appearance of private counsel in representation of the offended party did not constitute such active intervention as could only import an intention to press a claim for damages in the same action.
NATURE Direct appeal on a question of law from a resolution of the Regional Trial Court (Malabon). FACTS - MTC (Navotas): Cristina Malicsi was charged with the crime of intriguing against honor. Zenaida Cruz Reyes (petitioner) was the aggrieved party. In said criminal case, Reyes was represented by a private prosecutor named Atty. Barayang. - Malicsi pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced to pay P50. Because of her plea of guilty, the aggrieved party was unable to present evidence to prove damages against the accused. Reyes was not able to make a reservation of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. - Instead, she filed a new action against Cristina Malicsi and her husband with the Regional Trial Court for damages arising from defamatory words which were the subject of the information in the Criminal action. - At the pre-trial plaintiff admitted that she was represented by a private prosecutor in the criminal case against defendant Cristina Malicsi and in said case she did not reserve the right to file a separate action for damages. There was also admission that the private prosecutor was for proving damages against the accused. - The issue in the RTC was WON the plaintiff, represented by a private prosecutor and the failing to make a reservation to file a separate action, was barred from filing a separate civil action for damages against the accused Cristina Malicsi. RTC ruled in favor of the defendant. - RTC: There is no question that in defamation cases (such as the present) as in cases of fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party, and such action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. An exception to the above rule; when the offended party actually intervenes in the criminal action by appearing therein through a private prosecutor for the purpose of recovering indemnity for damages, he is deemed to have waived his right to file a separate civil action for damages if he failed to make a
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failed to file MR within the reglementary period. Plaintiffs claimed that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1983 and the amplificatory motion for reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed by only some of the lawyers. -September 21, 1984: RTC issued order dealing with both motions (1) to reconsider its order of May 11, 1984 declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of November 8, 1983 had already become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of November 8, 1983 granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. In effect, the case against the defendants (except for Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balabaere) was dismissed. -March 15, 1985: petitioners (plaintiffs below) filed the instant petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside RTC's resolution of November 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. -Respondents filed comment on the petition, November 9, 1985. -A reply was filed by petitioners on August 26, 1986. ISSUES 1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution 2. WON a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated 3. WON RTC was correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin, on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file a motion for reconsideration of the court's resolution of November 8, 1983, granting the respondent's motion to dismiss HELD 1. NO - The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to
-Defendants filed motion to dismiss alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants. -Plaintiffs filed two separate oppositions to the motion to dismiss. -Defendants filed a Consolidated Reply. -RTC NCR Branch 95 Judge Willelmo C. Fortun issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. "After a careful study of defendants' arguments, the court finds the same to be meritorious and must, therefore, be granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs' arguments in their opposition are lacking in merit." -Plaintiffs filed motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for reconsideration. -Defendants filed a comment on the aforesaid motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to the attorneys of all the plaintiffs. -December 15, 1983: Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the case and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising, "to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no authority or jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." -Plaintiffs resolved an amplificatory motion for reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid Committee. -May 2,1984: defendants filed a comment on said amplificatory motion for reconsideration. -May 11, 1984: RTC Judge Esteban Lising, without acting on the motion to set aside order of November 8, 1983, issued an order declaring that since certain plaintiffs failed to file a motion to reconsider the Order of November 8, 1983, dismissing the complaint, nor interposed an appeal therefrom within the reglementary period, as prayed for by the defendants, said Order is now final against said plaintiffs. -on May 28,1984: plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that it was not true that the plaintiffs mentioned in the order of May 11, 1984
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meaning and a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. -RTC was therefore mistaken in dropping defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the acts of their subordinates. -The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. -Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of action the complaint against all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code. 3. NO -A timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filed by plaintiffs, through counsel. True, the motion was not signed by all the counsels for the several plaintiffs but the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs.This must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs. -In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse
constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. - In carrying out this task and mission to protect the Republic from its enemies, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed. -Moreover, petitioners' right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text: However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year. -Even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment. -However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The question therefore has become moot and academic. 2. YES -The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates. -Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. -By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added
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- Respondents Comment The decision of the trial court carries with it the final adjudication of her civil liability. Since petitioner chose to actively intervene in the criminal action without reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages, he assumed the risk that in the event he failed to recover damages he cannot appeal from the decision of the lower court. ISSUES 1. WON the decision of the MCTC constitutes the final adjudication on the merits of private respondent's civil liability 2. WON petitioner is entitled to an award of damages HELD 1. NO - The decision of the MCTC has not yet become final due to the timely appeal filed by petitioner with respect to the civil liability of the accused in said case. It was only the unappealed criminal aspect of the case which has become final. - People vs. Coloma: from a judgment convicting the accused, two (2) appeals may, accordingly, be taken. The accused may seek a review of said judgment, as regards both civil and criminal actions; while the complainant may appeal with respect only to the civil action, either because the lower court has refused to award damages or because the award made is unsatisfactory to him. The right of either to appeal or not to appeal in the event of conviction of the accused is not dependent upon the other. Petitioner may, as he did, appeal from the decision on the civil aspect which is deemed instituted with the criminal action and such appeal, timely taken, prevents the decision on the civil liability from attaining finality. 2. YES - Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses are governed by Article 100 of the RPC which provides that "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable," in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict, the provisions for independent civil actions in the Chapter on Human Relations and the provisions regulating damages, also found in the Civil Code. - Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character: (1) as an offense against the state because of the disturbance of the social order; and
the precepts of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. More than this, pursuant to our Constitution which the people decisively ratified on February 2, 1987, the independent office of the Commission on Human Rights has been created and organized with ample powers to investigate human rights violations and take remedial measures against all such violations by the military as well as by the civilian groups.
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whether on reasonable doubt or not, is not a bar to a subsequent civil action for recovery of civil liability, arising not from criminal negligence, but from a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. - It has been held that Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in referring to "fault or negligence" covers acts "not punishable by law" as well as acts that may be criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores. - Article 29 of the Civil Code does not state that the right to file an independent civil action for damages (under said article) can be availed of only in offenses not arising from a tortious act. The only requisite for the exercise of the right to file a civil action for damages is that the accused must have been acquitted in the criminal action based on reasonable doubt. - The respondents argument that the applicable provision is Article 33 is devoid of merit because of the abovementioned argument. In addition, Article 33 assumes defamation, fraud, or physical injuries were intentionally committed. - In the case at bar, Rule 111 of the former Rules of Criminal Procedure (i.e., that a reservation be made in the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action) is not applicable because Article 29 does not require it. - The requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal Procedure, that there be a reservation in the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action, has been declared as not in accordance with law. It is regarded as an unauthorized amendment to the substantive law, in this case the Civil Code. In fact, the reservation of the right to file an independent civil action has been deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, in consonance with the decisions of this Court declaring such requirement of a reservation as ineffective. - The active participation of the Bonite heirs does not act as a bar from pursuing a civil action for damages because the civil action based on criminal liability and a civil action under Article 29 are two separate and independent actions. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the orders of the respondent court are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered reinstating the complaint in the civil case directing said court to
NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Br. III. Zosa, J. FACTS - September 24, 1968, 2 PM Bonite, a caminero of the Bureau of Public Highways was killed when he was hit by a truck driven by Abamonga. A complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed by the surviving heirs of Bonite but Abamonga was acquitted because of insufficient evidence. - In the course of the trial, the petitioners actively participated in the proceedings through their lawyer, private prosecutor Atty. Dulalas. - December 28, 1970 The Bonite heirs filed an action for recovery of damages against Abamonga based on the same act but the court dismissed the complaint for damages because the Court believes that the Bonite heirs did not reserve the right to do so. ISSUE WON an independent civil action for damages, under Article 29 of the Civil Code, is deemed barred by petitioners' failure in the criminal action to make a reservation to file a separate civil action and by their active participation in the prosecution of such criminal action. HELD YES Ratio When the accused in a criminal case is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may still be instituted against him, and only a preponderance of evidence is required to hold the accused liable. The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal of the accused, where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (based on Article 29 of the Civil Code). Reasoning - In the criminal case against Abamonga, the accused was acquitted because there was insufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, the Bonite heirs have the right to file an independent civil action for damages despite the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case. - Aside from basing their action for damages in Article 29 of the Civil Code, the petitioners may also rely on Article 2176 which provides that acquittal of the accused from a charge of criminal negligence,
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for the injury sustained by reason of the same, are preserved and remain in force, and it is therein expressly provided that the court, upon conviction of the accused, may enter judgment in favor of the injured person, against the defendant in the criminal case for the damage occasioned by the wrongful act." - Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co.: "According to article 112 (Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure) the penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or been expressly reserve by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished." - Almeida vs. Abaroa (8 Phil. Rep., 178), was a civil action for damages brought the plaintiff against a person who had been previously acquitted on a criminal charge. It was held that his acquittal in the criminal action was a complete bar to a civil action for damages based upon the alleged criminal act of which the defendant had been accused. In the course of this decision it was said: - "Instituting a criminal action only, it will be understood, brings the civil action as well, unless the damaged or prejudiced person waives the same or expressly reserves the right to institute the civil action after the termination of the criminal case, if there be any reason therefor. (Art. 112 of the said Law of Criminal Procedure.) - "The right to bring the civil action, as reserved by the person damaged or prejudiced, after the termination of the criminal case, is only permitted, if there be any reason therefore, and so says the law, in the event that the judgment rendered in the criminal cause is a finding of guilt against the accused; but if the accused be acquitted, then the compliant in the civil action must be based on some fact and or cause distinct and separate from the criminal act itself." - The court then quotes from article 114 of the Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure provides: "When a criminal proceeding is instituted for the judicial investigation of a crime or misdemeanor, no civil action arising from the same act can be prosecuted; but the same shall be suspended, if there be one, in whatever stage or state it may be found, until final sentence in the criminal proceeding is pronounced.
defendant are to be considered as a modification of the punishment, by increasing the penalty or otherwise, meted out to the defendant for the commission of the crime. (WON there is double jeopardy) 2. WON award was excessive HELD 1. NO. - Civil damages are no part of the punishment for the crime. - What was the effect of the action of this court in affirming that judgment as to the guilt and punishment of the accused and of reversing it as to the question of civil damage, with instructions to execute the punishment imposed and to try the civil branch of the case? Bearing in mind the broad line of demarcation between the civil liability of the accused and his criminal liability, the bare fact that his civil liability was determined and fixed had nothing whatever to do with the punishment imposed. The latter was not thereby affected. This time intervening between the judgment of guilt and the judgment of civil damages could in no way give to the latter the character of the former. - (That) the defendant might serve the term of imprisonment fixed by the court as the punishment for his crime, and after the sentence for civil damages and in case of his insolvency, he would have to return to prison to serve the subsidiary imprisonment by reason of his insolvency, being argued that this would constitute double jeopardy. It is well settled that execution against the person will issue in civil actions in case of personal injuries, and that this is not imprisonment for debt or punishment for crime. It is in lieu of the payment of the indemnity and is considered as a discharge thereof. If the payment of the indemnity is not punishment for the crime, the imprisonment in lieu thereof is not punishment for the crime. - As the civil liability is no part of the punishment for the crime, there would have been no question of double jeopardy... In the present case, the civil liability of the defendant was established, and the sole question determined upon the second trial was the amount of civil damages. The plea of double jeopardy can not be allowed. -On civil liability of persons accused of crime: - Springer vs. Odlin: "By General Orders, No. 58, section 107, the privileges secured by the Spanish law to persons claiming to be injured by the commission of an offense to take part in the prosecution of the offense and to recover damages
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impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately, and that, inasmuch as petitioner had failed to expressly reserve her right to institute the civil action separately, she may not now institute another action under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code based on the act or omission complained of in the criminal action. ISSUES 1. WON CFI was correct in considering and applying Sec 1, Rule 107, of the Rules of Court 2. WON respondent judge erred in suspending the hearing HELD 1. NO - The present civil case is based upon a cause of action not arising from the civil liability involved in the criminal case instituted against the accused. The civil case is based on alleged culpa contractual incurred by PAL because of its failure to carry safely Richard Parker to his place of destination, whereas the criminal case involves the civil liability of the accused. - Rule 107 contemplates a case where the offended party desires to press his right to demand indemnity from the accused in the criminal case which he may assert either in the same criminal case or in a separate action. - The failure of Parker to reserve her right to institute the civil action in the criminal case cannot in any way be deemed as waiver on her part to institute a separate civil action against PAL based on its contractual liability. 2. NO - The present civil case is directly interwoven with the criminal case in the sense that the main issue involved in both cases is the determination of the failure of Richard Parker to reach safely his destination or the determination of the cause of his death. This was the main reason that guided the lower court in postponing the hearing of the civil case until final judgment in the criminal case has been rendered. - Inasmuch as the power to grant or refuse continuances is inherent in all courts unless expressly limited by statute, and there is no showing that the lower court has abused its discretion is suspending the hearing, the petition for certiorari must fail. Dispositive Petition denied
introduced as evidence and was not, therefore, considered by that court. If it had been introduced as evidence, the government would have had the right to meet it and be heard upon it in that court. To permit the question to be raised here for the first time, and in the resolution thereof, to consider evidence that was never introduced in the trial court and which the government has never had an opportunity to meet in an orderly way, is not only to take the prosecution by surprise but is to establish a precedent which may be dangerous in practice and subversive of orderly procedure.
PARKER v PANLILIO and PHIL AIR LINES 91 PHIL 1 BAUTISTA ANGELO; March 5, 1952
NATURE Certiorari and mandamus FACTS - Asuncion Parker and her minor daughter Kathleen filed a complaint for damages against Philippine Air Lines, Inc., based on the alleged failure of PAL to carry safely Richard Parker from Daet, Camarines Norte to Manila. - PAL set up as special defense that the plane exploded in mid-air due to dynamite surreptitiously introduced into said air craft by criminal hands. A criminal case was already filed in CFI Camarines Norte against the supposed guilty parties. - When the case was set for the continuation of the hearing, PAL presented an oral motion for the suspension of the hearing, invoking (then) sec 1 Rule 107, of the Rules of Court, which provides that no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. Parker vehemently opposed. - CFI suspended the hearing until the final determination of the criminal case which was then pending appeal in the SC. Petitioners Claim It was a mistake on the part of respondent judge to consider and apply Sec 1, Rule 107 of the Rules of Court, as her cause of action in the civil case is based on culpa contractual and not on the civil liability arising from the offense involved in the criminal case. Respondents Comments When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged is
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- Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver. But the trial court denied petitioners motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused in the criminal case. - CA dismissed his petition - There is no dispute that private respondent, as offended party in the criminal case, did not reserve the right to bring a separate civil action, based on the same accident, either against the driver, Herminio Andaya, or against the latters employer, herein petitioner Ruben Maniago. - petitioner argues that the civil action against him was impliedly instituted in the criminal action previously filed against his employee because private respondent did not reserve his right to bring this action separately. (The records show that while this case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the criminal action was dismissed on July 10, 1992 for failure of the prosecution to file a formal offer of its evidence, with the consequence that the prosecution failed to prosecute its case. Accordingly, it seems to be petitioners argument that since the civil action to recover damages was impliedly instituted with the criminal action, the dismissal of the criminal case brought with it the dismissal of the civil action.) - Private respondent admits that he did not reserve the right to institute the present civil action against Andayas employer. He contends, however, that the rights provided in Arts. 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code are substantive rights and, as such, their enforcement cannot be conditioned on a reservation to bring the action to enforce them separately. ISSUE WON despite the absence of reservation, Boado may nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the Art.2176, 2180 and 2177 of the Civil Code and Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
action was duly informed thereof, such that no damages was awarded in the disposition of the criminal action. Reasoning - Under the aforecited provisions of the rule, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. - Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. It is also provided that the reservation of the right to institute the separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. ** The SC considered the actual filing of the civil action far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence. It added that the purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission. Dispositive petition DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED.
MANIAGO vCA (BOADO) 253 SCRA 674 MENDOZA; February 20, 1996
FACTS - Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, Inc. from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority in Loakan, Baguio City. - One of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed against petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City - A month later, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner himself
HELD NO Ratio The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule 111, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. 1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to
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- Nor does it matter that the action is against the employer to enforce his vicarious liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Though not an accused in the criminal case, the employer is very much a party, as long as the right to bring or institute a separate action (whether arising from crime or from quasi delict) is not reserved. The ruling that a decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to its civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee is true not only with respect to the civil liability arising from crime but also with respect to the civil liability under the Civil Code. Dispositive The decision appealed from is REVERSED and the complaint against petitioner is DISMISSED.
arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code. - Through all the shifts or changes in policy as to the civil action arising from the same act or omission for which a criminal action is brought, one thing is clear: The change has been effected by this Court. The new rules require reservation of the right to recover the civil liability, otherwise the action will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal action. - Contrary to private respondents contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure. - It is the conduct of the trial of the civil action - not its institution through the filing of a complaint - which is allowed to proceed independently of the outcome of the criminal case. B. There is a practical reason for requiring that the right to bring an independent civil action under the Civil Code separately must be reserved. It is to avoid the filing of more than one action for the same act or omission against the same party. Any award made against the employer, whether based on his subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code or his primary liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable from the accused. - In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the driver been convicted and found insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable for damages. But if the right to bring a separate civil action (whether arising from the crime or from quasi-delict) is reserved, there would be no possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused. In such a case the institution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil Code would not result in the employee being held liable for the same act or omission. The rule requiring reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition against double recovery for the same act or omission.
SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC. v CA (PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION) 300 SCRA 484 MARTINEZ; April 24, 1998
NATURE Petition for review after a motion for reconsideration of respondent court judgment was denied FACTS - In the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) collided with each other at the intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2) passengers in the process. - A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991 charging the driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries. - About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00 (P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney's fees;
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is bound to observe the procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil case. Dispositive The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April 3,1995 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof are reversed. The "manifestation and motion to suspend civil proceedings" filed by petitioners is granted.
1. 2.
WON an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code can be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case WON a subrogee of an offended party can maintain an independent civil action during the pendency of a criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action was made in the criminal action and despite the fact that the private complainant is actively participating through a private prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal case
HELD 1. NO - On the chief issue of "reservation", at the fore is Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads: "Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. -- In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence." - Even though these so-called "independent civil actions" based on the aforementioned Civil Code articles are the exceptions to the primacy of the criminal action over the civil action as set forth in Section 2 of Rule 111, it is easily deducible from the present wording of Section 3 as brought about by the 1988 amendments to the Rules on Criminal Procedure -- particularly the phrase " which has been reserved" -- that the "independent" character of these civil actions does not do away with the reservation requirement. In other words, prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action. - According to Justice Jose Y. Feria, remedial law expert and a member of the committee which drafted the 1988 amendments, whose learned explanation on the matter was aptly pointed out by petitioners, the 1988 amendment expands the scope of the civil action which is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived, reserved or previously instituted. Under the present Rule as amended, such a civil action includes not only recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, but also damages under Article 2176 (quasi-delicts) of the said code. - It should be noted that while it was ruled in Abella vs. Marave (57 SCRA 106) that a reservation of the right to file an independent civil action is not necessary, such a reservation is necessary under the amended rule. Without such reservation, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless previously waived or instituted. - Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caos v. Peralta":" to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants." 2. NO - Private respondent PISC, as subrogee, is not exempt from the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasi-delict arising from the same act or omission of petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case. As private respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then it
MARCIA v CA (PAJE and VICTORY LINER) 120 SCRA 190 RELOVA; January 27, 1983
NATURE Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioners against private respondents in the concept of an independent civil action for damages for physical injuries resulting from reckless imprudence.
FACTS - On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee, private respondent Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje in the CFI of Pampanga. - On January 23, 1957, an action for damages was filed in the CFI of Rizal by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, together with their respective parents, against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, alleging that the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus. - While said Civil Case was in progress in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the criminal action proceeded in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. The accused Felardo Paje was convicted of the offense charged. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted with the CA holding that "CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this case, and that appellant was NOT even guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE.
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returned which humiliated Zenaida and compelled her to go back to her parents. Respondents Comment Conrado Bunag Jr.and Zenaida Cirilo had earlier made plans to elope and get married (same as first set of facts) . And that the reason why Conrado broke off their plan to get married was their bitter disagreements over money and Zenaidas threats to his life. - The Cirilos filed a complaint for damages against Conrado Bunag Jr. and his father Conrado Bunag Sr. (Zenaidas uncle claims that Bunag Sr. assured them that the couple were to be married). The Trial Court ordered Bunag Jr. to pay damages (80Kmoral damages,20K-exemplary damages, 20ktemperate damages and 10k attorneys fees) Bunag Sr. was absolved from any and all liability.CA affirmed in toto - Bunag Jr contends that both the trial court awarded the damages on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape,despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefore filed by Zenaida with the Pasay City Fiscals Office. ISSUE WON the Fiscals dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape extinguished the civil liability of Conrado Bunag Jr HELD NO - The dismissal did not in any way affect the right of Zenaida Cirilo to institute a civil action arising from the offense. - Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Reasoning -Generally, every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Criminal Liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. -The two proceedings involved are not between the same parties (the criminal action is between the State and the defendant and the civil case is between the offended party and the defendant). Also, there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings.(criminal action proof beyond reasonable doubt; civil actionpreponderance of evidence)
finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing of an independent civil action if it is based on the crime. As early as 1952, We have held in the case of Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company, 91 Phil. 672, that "the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Where the court states 'that the evidence throws no light on the cause of fire and that it was an unfortunate accident for which the accused cannot be held responsible,' this declaration fits well into the exception of the rule which exempts the accused, from civil liability." - Also, the charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and physical injuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three (3) crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.
BUNAG JR. v CA (CIRILO) 211 SCRA 440 REGALADO; July 10, 1992
NATURE Petition for review from the decision of the CA FACTS - On Sept. 8, 1973 Conrado Bunag Jr. brought Zenaida Cirilo to a motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse and later that evening he brought Zenaida to the house of his grandmothers house where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days until Sept. 29, 1973. They filed their application for marriage license with the Local Civil Registral of Bacoor, Cavite. However, after a few days, Conrado filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license. Plaintiffs Claim Conrado Bunag Jr. abducted her in the vicinity of San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped. Afterwhich he said that he would not let her go unless they get married, as he intended to marry her , so much so that she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him. They went to his gradmothers house and lived together as husband and wife for 21 days until Bunag Jr. left and never
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exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasidelict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused . . . - The aforecited case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. involved virtually the same factual situation. The Court, in arriving at the conclusion hereinbefore quoted, expressly declared that the failure of the therein plaintiff to reserve his right to file a separate civil case is not fatal; that his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing a separate civil action for damages, especially considering that the accused therein was acquitted because his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that the two cases were anchored on two different causes of action, the criminal case being on a violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code while the subsequent complaint for damages was based on a quasi-delict; and that in the judgment in the criminal case the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved. Consequently, said civil case may proceed as authorized by Article 29 of the Civil Code. - Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on reasonable doubt, it could very well make a pronounce ment on the civil liability of the accused and the complainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. And that the failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable. Dispositive Decision of CA affirmed, petion denied.
- Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of therein defendant, the trial court issued on April 3, 1975 an order of denial. Petitioner thereafter filed in this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-40992, assailing the aforesaid order of the trial court. Said petition was dismissed for lack of merit in the Court's resolution of July 23, 1975, and a motion for reconsideration thereof was denied for the same reason in a resolution of October 28, 1975. - After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of the herein private respondent and ordering herein petitioner to pay damages. Thus, petitioner appealed said decision to the CA but said respondent court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court with a few changes in the amount of the damages to be paid. ISSUE WON the private respondent, who was the complainant in the criminal action for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and who participated in the prosecution thereof without reserving the civil action arising from the act or omission complained of, can file a separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission where the herein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal action on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of acquittal HELD YES - The action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages. Ratio The allegations of the complaint filed by the private respondent supports and is constitutive of a case for a quasi-delict committed by the petitioner. The Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano vs. Hill that: ... a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is also actually charged criminally, to recover damages on both scores; and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers
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on the civil action for the revocation of the management contract. He contended that a prejudicial question was involved, thus he could no longer be tried pending the termination of the civil suit. The respondents, in turn, contended that the resolution of the civil case will not determine the liability of Rojas in the criminal case (not a prejudicial question); and even granting that there was a prejudicial question, the cases could proceed independently pursuant to Art.33 of CC, which provides: In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. ISSUE WON the is a prejudicial question, thus requiring the resolution of the civil action for the determination of the criminal case HELD NO Ratio: A prejudicial question, which is must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court, is not present in this case. Reasoning: - It is indispensable then for this petition to succeed that the alleged prejudicial question must be determinative of the criminal case before respondent Judge. It is not so in this case. - Pisalbor. v. Tesoro: CFI erred in holding that the criminal case should be suspended. In the present proceedings, the civil case does not involve a question prejudicial to the criminal case, for to whomsoever the land may be awarded after all the evidence has been presented in the civil case, may not affect the alleged crime committed by the notary public, which is the subject of the criminal case. But, even supposing that both the civil and the criminal case involve the same question and one must precede the other, it should be the civil case which should be suspended rather than the criminal, to await the result of the latter. - Dela Cruz v City Fiscal: Regardless of the outcome of the pending civil case for annulment of the affidavit of adjudication, determination of the charge of falsification would be based on the truth or falsity of the narration of facts in the affidavit of adjudication, * * *. Therefore, the civil case
parties charged with estafa, because even on the assumption that the execution of the receipt whose annulment they sought in the civil case was vitiated by fraud, duress or intimidation, their guilt could still be established by other evidence showing, to the degree required by law, that they had actually received from the complaint the sum of P20,000.00 with which to buy for him a fishing boat, and that, instead of doing so, they misappropriated the money and refused or otherwise failed to return it to him upon demand. The contention of the private respondents herein would be tenable had they been charged with falsification of the same receipt involved in the civil action. - If the ruling were otherwise, there would hardly be a case for estafa that could be prosecuted speedily, it being the easiest thing for the accused to block the proceedings by the simple expedient of filing an independent civil action against the complainant, raising therein the issue that he had not received from the latter the amount alleged to have been misappropriated.
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involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. - If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or fictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would be innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed to proceed ahead) would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in the civil action that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was a forgery and spurious. Dispositive Order of respondent judge in Criminal Case dated December 12, 1978 is hereby set aside. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on May 16, 1979 is hereby made permanent and respondent judge is enjoined from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of the criminal case unless the civil case shall have been finally decided and terminated adversely against petitioner.
> therefore the alleged deed of sale in Pichel's favor sought to be declared valid was fictitious and inexistent - September 5, 1978 - while Civil Case was being TRIED before CFI Basilan, the Provincial Fiscal of Basilan filed an INFORMATION for Estafa (criminal case) in the same court against Ras arising from the same double sale subject matter of the civil complaint filed by Luis Pichel. - November 6, 1978 - petitioner filed a MOTION FOR SUSPENSION OF ACTION in said Criminal Case claiming that same facts and issues were involved in both the civil and criminal case and that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would necessarily be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. - December 4, 1978 - Provincial Fiscal of Basilan filed his opposition on - December 12, 1978 - respondent judge saw no prejudicial question and accordingly denied the motion ISSUE WON civil case would be prejudicial to the criminal case given that they would discuss same facts and issues HELD YES - there appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering that Ras' defense in Civil Case of the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in favor of Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witness in the criminal case) is based on the very same facts which would be necessarily determinative of Ras' guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case. Ratio A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Reasoning - For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil, it must appear not only that the civil case
LIBRODO v COSCOLLUELA, JR. (GUANTERO) 116 SCRA 303 MELENCIO-HERRERA; August 30, 1982
NATURE Petition for certiorari to review Negros CFI order FACTS - Felipe Rivera died leaving certain properties in San Carlos, Negros Occidental. His estate was settled in a special proceeding on November 24, 1976 and was terminated on the basis of a Project of Partition among Rufino Rivera Damandaman, Democrata Guantero, and Zosimo Guantero. - Rufinos share of the estate comprise of lots designated as Lots 559-B, 1906-B, 1910-B, and a901B which were all sugar lands. On January 18, 1977, Rufino leased the properties to Dr. Librodo, the petitioner, for a period of ten agricultural crop years. - On August 31, Democrata filed a petition to re-open the intestate proceeding on the ground that she was not present when the subdivision plan was submitted and that the judgment has not become final as the boundaries on the partition have not been platted. - In the meantime, according to the petitioner, private respondents, Guanteros, harvested the sugar canes he planted on the land he leased from Rufino. On August 10, 1978, a Criminal Case (the Criminal Case) was filed against the respondents for theft
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a motion for reinvestigation in the Tanodbayan. The same was granted. - The Tanodbayan ordered to dismiss the case for lack of merit and to withdraw the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 11414 as soon as possible in the interest of justice. - Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to withdraw the information against petitioners. This was denied. - BAlgos et al filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the criminal case against them on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question in Civil Case No. 5307. This was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan. ISSUE WON the denial by the Sandiganbayan of the motion to withdraw the information and of another motion to suspend proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question in a pending civil action constitute a grave abuse of discretion. HELD NO. - While the public prosecutor has the sole direction and control in the prosecution of offenses, once the complaint or information is filed in court, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case and all subsequent actions that may be taken by the public prosecutor in relation to the disposition of the case must be subject to the approval of the said court. Before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be secured. And if after such reinvestigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course of action must be addressed to the sound discretion of the court. - The only instance when the appellate court should stay the hand of the trial court in such cases is when it is shown that the trial court acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction or otherwise committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to such lack or excess of jurisdiction. - Petitioners are public officers charged with having violated Section 3(c) of RA 3019, for evident bad faith and manifest partiality in enforcing the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 4047 against a Mustang car registered in the name of Leticia Acosta-Ang (complainant) who is not the judgment debtor thereby causing undue injury to said complainant
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. - In the case at bar, the issues raised would not constitute a prejudicial question to the Criminal Case. The Intestate Case involves only the co-heirs and the facts involved are totally unrelated to the Criminal Case. Even if the Intestate Court should annul the division and uphold the co-ownership, that would not be determinative of the criminal responsibility of private respondents for theft of the sugar cane, which petitioner claims he planted in good faith by virtue of the valid lease agreement. The Ejectment Case also does not constitute a prejudicial question to the Criminal Case. It involves the issue of possession between co-owners. A decision therein in favor of Democrata would not affect the rights of Librodo, which spring from the lease contract. With regard the Damages case, it is actually the civil aspect of the Criminal Case as the two cases are of the same facts, and the entitlement to damages being predicated on the unlawful taking treated of in the Criminal Case, no necessity arises for that civil Case to be determined ahead of the Criminal Case. Dispositive In the absence of a prejudicial question, the order of the judge is set aside and he is instructed to proceed without delay with the trial of the criminal case.
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was set on September 4, 1981 but petitioners failed to appear. It was reset to October 5, 1981 but this was postponed upon motion of petitioners. - On October 14, 1981, OROSEA filed a Complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon against the Edano spouses for the annulment/rescission of the Contract of Sale for which the petitioners issued the checks, subject of the criminal case. - The estafa case was again set for arraignment. This was postponed. With the entry of a new counsel, petitioners filed a motion to quash the estafa case, on ground of improper venue, but this motion was withdrawn by petitioners before it could be resolved. - The arraignment was again postponed thrice. Petitioners then filed a 'Motion to Suspend Arraignment and Further Proceedings, with a Supplemental Motion To Suspend Proceedings. This was opposed by the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon. Resolving the motion to suspend, respondent Judge issued his orders, now under question, denying the motion. CFI of Zambales also denied the same motion. A petition for certiorari is filed with CA and CA affirmed. ISSUE WON proceedings should be suspended until the civil case is disposed of, since CV No. 8769 involves a prejudicial question. HELD NO. - CV No. 8769 seeks the annulment of the deed of sale in favor of Orosea on the gound that there was fraud in misrepresenting that the land is free from all liens and encumbrances, and that it is not tenanted, when in truth and fact, the land is covered by the land reform program and that vast portions thereof are timber land, hence, allegedly indisposable public land. Therefore, according to petitioners, CV No. 8769 involves issues, the resolution of which will determine whether or not petitioners are criminally liable in CR No. 1423-I. They further argue that, if and when the court hearing CV No. 7869 annuls the subject deed of sale, then, their obligation to pay private respondents under the said deed would be extinguished, resulting in the dismissal of CR No. 1423-I. The contracts are thus voidable with the existence of fraud vitiating their consent. - However, it cannot be denied that at the time the acts complained of in the estafa case were committed, the deed of sale they seek to be annulled, was still binding to the parties.
civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. - The pending civil case for the annulment of the sale of the car to Leticia Ang is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners for the acts allegedly committed by them in seizing the car. Even if in the civil action it is ultimately resolved that the sale was null and void, it does not necessarily follow that the seizure of the car was rightfully undertaken. The car was registered in the name of Leticia Ang six months before the seizure. Until the nullity of the sale is declared by the courts, the same is presumptively valid. Thus, petitioners must demonstrate that the seizure was not attended by manifest bad faith in order to clear themselves of the charge in the criminal action. Dispositive The petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the restraining order dated June 6, 1989 is hereby lifted. No costs.
UMALI v IAC (EDANO) 219 SCRA 339 PADILLA; June 21, 1990
NATURE Review on certiorari FACTS - Petitioners (Umali, Calleja, Ledesma) are officers of the Orosea Devt Corporation. Sometime on Sept. 4, 1979, Umali purchased from spoused Homorio and Solina Edano a lot in Mulanay, Province of Queazon for P1, 036,500 payable on 4 installments (P225,000, P271,500, P270,000, P 270,000) They issued for this purpose 4 checks drawn against the Chartered Bank, Manila Branch. The first check for P225,000.00 was honored upon its presentment. By arrangement the petitioners made with the Edano spouses, a deed of absolute sale in the name of Orosea Devt Corp. was executed even of the full purchase price has not yet been fully paid. Thereafter, OROSEA secured a loan of P1,000,000.00 from the Philippine Veterans Bank using this property as security. When the check for the second installment fell due, petitioners twice asked for deferment. The checks they have issued were dishonored. As a consequence of the dishonor of these checks, the Edano spouses filed a complaint for estafa against petitioners. - The information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal against petitioners on May 21, 1981, and it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1423-I. Arraignment
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guilty parties. And such condition has been imposed "out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial." - The gist of petitioner's pretense is that there are some elements of the latter which are not included in the former, and, not alleged, according to him, in the complaint filed herein, namely: 1) that the offended party is a virgin; and 2) that she is over 12 and under 18 years of age. The second element is clearly set forth in said complaint, which states that Ester Ulsano is "a minor . . . 17 years of age . . .", and, hence, over 12 and below 18 years of age. - As regards the first element, it is settled that the virginity mentioned in Art 343 RPC, as an essential ingredient of the crime of abduction with consent, should not be understood in its material sense and does not exclude the idea of abduction of a virtuous woman of good reputation because the essence of the offense "is not the wrong done to the woman, but the outrage to the family and the alarm produced in it by the disappearance of one of its members." - The complaint in the case at bar alleges not only that Ester Ulsano is a minor 17 years of age, but also that petitioner "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously" took her by force and violence . . . against her will and taking advantage of the absence of her mother" from their dwelling and carried "her to a secluded spot to gain carnal intercourse with the offended party against her will, using force, intimidation and violence, with lewd designs." This allegation implies that Ester is a minor living under patria protestas, thus leading to the presumption that she is a virgin apart from being virtuous and having a good reputation. The presumption of innocence includes that of morality and decency, and of chastity. Dispositive Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner Maximino Valdepenas. It is so ordered.
matter of the action wrt the offense of abduction with consent. MFR was denied Petitioners claims there was no complaint for abduction with consent filed and that the lower court acquired no jurisdiction over his person or over the crime of abduction with consent. ISSUE WON CA erred in not reversing he decision of the TC for lack of jurisdiction over the accused and the subject matter of the action for the offense abduction with consent HELD NO. - Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his apprehension, with or without warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction of the court. It is not claimed that petitioner had not been apprehended or had not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. His actions show that he never questioned the judicial authority of the CFI, the justice of peace and the CA. He is deemed to have waived whatever objection he might have had to the jurisdiction over his person, and, hence, to have submitted himself to the Court's jurisdiction. His behavior - particularly the motions therein filed by him implied, not merely a submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but also, that he urged the courts to exercise the authority thereof over his person. - On the other hand, it is well settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is and may be conferred only by law. That jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by law upon a particular court, may not be conferred thereto by the parties involved in the offense; and that, under an information for forcible abduction, the accused may be convicted of abduction with consent. Art 344 (3) RPC states that: ". . . the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offended has been expressly pardoned by the above- named persons, as the case may be". - Art 344 RPC does not determine the jurisdiction of our courts over the offense therein enumerated. It could not affect said jurisdiction, because the same is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by RPC, which deals primarily with the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprits. The complaint required in said Article 344 is merely a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the
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between the decision of the Court of Appeals and this Court's decision in the instant murder case inasmuch as the victims in the two cases are different. The attempted murder case decided by the Court of Appeals involved the wounding of a certain Tomas Metucua whereas, in the instant murder case the victim was Pedro Candel. The acquittal of Lahoy in connection with the wounding of Metucua would not affect the determination of his guilt or innocence in connection with the death of Pedro Candel. - This holding does not in anyway emasculate the rule in section 17(1) that criminal cases appealed to the Court of Appeals, involving offenses which arose out of the same occurrence, or which were committed on the same occasion as the offense punished by death or reclusion perpetua should be certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals. It is this Court that would determine whether or not the cases appealed to the Court of Appeals should be decided together with the case appealed to this Court. 2. YES The feeble denials of Plateros and Lahoy (who admittedly were near the owns of the crime, when it was perpetrated) cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal declarations of the eyewitnesses, Aora and Piquero, that the appellants were the authors of the stab wounds which caused Candal's death. Their guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. 3. YES. There was a conspiracy between Plateros and Lahoy as shown in their concerted efforts to injure Candel. Plateros and Lahoy, as boon companions, had been together since four o'clock in the afternoon. They had gone to different places and repaired twice to the kitchenette. They were together when they left the scene of the stabbing. 4. NO Lahoy and Plateros, who could have stabbed Candel or Metucua inside the kitchenette, did not do so. They waited for Metucua and the pedicab drivers to leave the kitchenette. Their intention was to make a surprise attack without any risk to themselves. The assault was deliberate, sudden and unexpected. That is the characteristics manifestation of treachery (alevosia). Hence, the killing was properly categorized as murder by the trial court (Art. 14(16), Revised Penal Code). Dispositive WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellants. They are entitled to credit for their preventive
imposed is death or life imprisonment; and those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that giving rice to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused are charged as principals, accomplices or accessories, or whether have been tried jointly or separately; x x x." - In other words, the attempted murder case like the instant murder case, comes within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the SCt and should have been decided together with the instant murder case. ISSUES On Attempted Murder Case 1. WON the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting Lahoy of attempted murder should be set aside for lack of appellate jurisdiction or as a lawless thing On Murder case 2. WON the guilt of Lahoy and Plateros was proven beyond reasonable doubt 3. WON there was conspiracy between Lahoy and Plateros 4. WON the crime should be categorized as simple homicide only and not murder HELD 1. NO. Ratio: The rule in section 17(1) is designed to avoid conflicts between the decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals in cases involving offenses which arose from the same occurrence or which were committed on the same occasion usually by the same accused. However, that general rule has an exception. Where, by allowing the Court of Appeals to decide a can involving an offense, which is not punishable by death or reclusion perpetua but which arose out of the same occurrence or was committed on the same occasion, as the case involving an offense punishable by death or reclusion perpetua pending in this Court, there will be no conflict between the decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals, the former case need not be elevated to this Court (People vs. Cario, 101 Phil. 1206). The rationale of that exception to the general rule is found in the maxim: Cessanie ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex. (The reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases.) Reasoning: - The doctrine of the Cario case may be applied in this case because here there can be no conflict
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prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months. Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. - Petitioner concludes that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground prescription. Prosecutions position The prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the OPP. The SolGen invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (RCP), providing as follows: Section 1. How Instituted For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows: b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the MTC and MCTC, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal. In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. Respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the OPP comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the RSP. ISSUE WON the offense has prescribed HELD YES - The filing of the complaint in the MTC, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only
offense which carries a penalty that would otherwise fall within the jurisdiction of an inferior court. -In the instant case, should the information be refiled with the RTC, the court may not impose a more onerous penalty upon Lagon. Although the RTC retains subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decide the refiled case under PD 818, given the date of the commission of the crime (before effectivity of PD 818), the lower penalty provided in Art 315 (otherwise within the jurisdiction of the City Court) should be imposed. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the petition
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charging petitioners with crime of falsification of private document. Allegedly, Aurora and Angelina made it appear that they were the guardians of minors George and Alexander Meijia (sons of the spouses?) when they werent the guardians at the date of the execution of the document, a certain Carolina M. de Castro was the judicial guardian of the said minors). -Petitioners asked for a reinvestigation. Angeles City Fiscal reinvestigated to give them opportunity to present exculpatory evidence. After reinvestigation, parties charged moved for the dismissal of the case mainly on the ground that the City Court of Angeles had no jurisdiction over the offense because the private document that contained the alleged false statement of fact was signed by them outside the territorial limits of said city (One in Makati, the other one in QC). -However, the resolution of their motion to dismiss was delayed and the City Court already set their criminal case for arraignment. Petitioners secured several postponements of the arraignment. But since City Fiscal continually failed to act on their motion to dismiss, petitioners filed a motion to quash instead, on the ground that court had no jurisdiction. Respondents (with conformity of City Fiscal) filed an opposition to the motion to quash. Respondent judge denied motion to quash, set arraignment. So petitioners filed present action. ISSUE 1. WON City Court of Angeles City had jurisdiction to try and decide the criminal case for alleged falsification of a private document allegedly done by the parties named in the info even if the acts of falsification was allegedly done in Makati and QC, and thus outside the jurisdiction of said court Other procedural issues 2. WON the motion to quash was improper, and should not be allowed since by filing the said motion, the petitioners necessarily assumes the truth of the allegation of the information to the effect that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City 3. WON the prayer for writs of certiorari and prohibition is proper HELD 1. NO. Ratio. The place where the criminal offense was committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction [US vs. Pagdayuman].
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the SolGen that they include administrative proceedings. At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the RSP and the RCP, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and the RCP, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. - The prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the OPP on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the MTC of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed. Dispositive Petition is GRANTED. Case is DISMISSED on the ground of prescription.
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who was also charged with estafa, in his capacity as the President of Yabut Transit Lines. The exact same thing happened in his case (motion to quash -> improper venue reason -> quashed -> MFR denied). ISSUE 1. WON CFI Bulacan had jurisdiction over the case 2. WON new law punishes the postdating or issuance thereof in payment of a pre-existing obligation 3. WON facts charged in the informations constitute estafa HELD 1. YES Ratio Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Art. 315 par 2(d) of the RPC may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its basic elements of deceit and damage may independently arise in separate places. In the event of such occurrence, the institution of the criminal action in either place is legally allowed. - The venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered to the payee. Reasoning Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the ROC: In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the Court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. - The estafa charged in the 2 informations involved here appear to be transitory or continuing in nature. Deceit has taken place in Malolos (thru issuance and delivery of worthless checks), while the damage in Caloocan, where the checks were dishonored by the drawee banks there. - The place where the bills were written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place where they were executed. What is decisive is the delivery of the instrument which is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. - The receipt of the bad checks by a certain Yambao in Caloocan cannot be taken as delivery of the checks to Freeway Tires because he did not take delivery of the checks as holder. - Place of business of Freeway Tires is at Malolos, Bulacan from where the tire and gas purchases were made by the private respondents. Payment should then be considered effected there. 2. YES - Due to the absence of concrete evidence on the specific nature of the obligation assumed or supposedly discharged by the issuance of the bad checks, resolution of this controversial issue on the
undergo trial in said court and suffer all the embarrassment and mental anguish that go with it. Dispositive WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the offense charged in the information filed in Criminal Case No. C-2268 of the City Court of Angeles City is not within the jurisdiction of said court and that, therefore, said court is hereby restrained and prohibited from further proceedings therein. Costs against the private respondents.
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"The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: "Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published "Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such actions may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article. ". . . ." (As amended by Republic Act Nos. 1289 and 4363) - Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed. Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue. -Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place. -Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-oftown libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts -The rules on venue in article 360 may be restated thus: 1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city
made defamatory imputations against Mahinan on or about February 17, 1976 in Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. -Quoted in the information were the affidavits of Pascual and Bautista signed at Cauayan, Isabela, Bautista's undated letter asking for Mahinan's dismissal, and Agbayani's "unusual incident report" subscribed and sworn to before a Manila notary and enclosing documentary evidence to support his charges of malversation and falsification against Mahinan and praying for the latter's separation from the service. -According to the information, all those documents allegedly depicted Mahinan "as an incorrigible managerial misfit, despoiler of public office, spendthrift of GSIS funds, inveterate gambler, chronic falsifier", and an "unreformed ex-convict". -The four accused filed a motion to quash contending that the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya has no jurisdiction over the offense charged because Mahinan was a public officer holding office at Cauayan, Isabela when the alleged libel was committed and, under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense charged comes within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Isabela. They argued that the provincial fiscal of Nueva Vizcaya had no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and to file the information. -It was denied by the trial court in its order of April 25, 1977 on the ground that Mahinan was not a public officer within the meaning of article 203 of the Revised Penal Code since the insurance business of the GSIS is not an inherently governmental function. -After petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of that order was denied, they filed in this Court the instant petition. ISSUE WON the CFI of Nueva Ecija was the proper venue of the criminal action for written defamation filed by Mahinan HELD NO -There is no issue as to whether Mahinan is a public officer. As GSIS branch manager, he is unquestionably a public officer. -Article 360, which lays down the rules on venue in cases of written defamation and which specifies the officer or court that should conduct the preliminary investigation, reads as follows: ART. 360.Persons responsible. . . .
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WON CFI of Manila has jurisdiction to continue with the trial of the offense as charged in view of the evidence presented by the prodecution HELD YES. - Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 14(a) provides: "Sec. 14. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. -Petitioner could have been charged and tried in Cagayan de Oro City for it is not disputed that he received the sweepstakes tickets from the PCSO, Cagayan de Oro branch. The essential ingredient of receiving the sweepstakes tickets took place in Cagayan de Oro City. He could also be charged in the City of Manila since the final accounting must be rendered in the Central Office, Manila. This is therefore, a case of concurrent jurisdiction by the proper court of the place wherein "anyone of the essential ingredients thereof took place." But the choice of venue lies with the prosecuting officer and not with the accused. Dispositive Decision of CA Affirmed. Remand to the trial court for further proceedings in the ordinary course of law
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public or official document. The trial court adjudged petitioner Bala in Criminal Case No. 24443, guilty of the crime of falsification of a public document. The petitioner seasonably appealed, but the Court of Appeals, on April 9, 1980, affirmed in toto the lower court's decision. After the case had been remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, the petitioner applied for and was granted probation by the respondent judge in his order dated August 11, 1982. The petitioner was then placed under probation for a period of one (1) year, subject to the terms and conditions enumerated therein. - The probationer (petitioner) asked his supervising probation officer for permission to transfer his residence from BF Homes to Phil-Am Life Subdivision in Las Pias specifically 33 Jingco Street. The probation officer verbally granted the probationer's request as he found nothing objectionable to it. - By the terms of the petitioner's probation, it should have expired on August 10, 1983, one year after the order granting the same was issued. But, the order of final discharge could not be issued because the respondent probation officer had not yet submitted his final report on the conduct of his charge. Subsequently, the respondent People of the Philippines, through Assistant City Fiscal Jose D. Cajucom of Manila, filed a motion to revoke the probation of the petitioner before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, presided over by the respondent judge. The motion alleged that the petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of his probation. - On January 4, 1984, the petitioner filed his opposition to the motion on the ground that he was no longer under probation, his probation period having terminated on August 10, 1983, as previously adverted to. As such, no valid reason existed to revoke the same, he contended. As if to confirm the Manila Assistant City Fiscal's motion to revoke the petitioner's probation, the respondent probation officer filed on January 6, 1984, a motion to terminate Manuel Bala's probation, at the same time attaching his progress report on supervision dated January 5, 1984. The same motion, however, became the subject of a "Manifestation," dated January 10, 1984, which stated that the probation officer was not pursuing the motion to terminate dated January 6, 1984; instead, he was submitting a supplemental report which recommended the revocation of probation "in the light of new facts, information, and evidences." - Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and/or strike out the motion to revoke probation,
- In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is committed by the very fact of its performance; and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check. The case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. The determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. However, it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another. Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga. - Jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling. The Information filed herein specifically alleges that the crime was committed in San Fernando, Pampanga, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court below. 2. NO The case was dismissed not on merits but on the erroneous conclusion of the judge that his court had no jurisdiction over the case. The dismissal being null and void, the proceedings before the RTC cant be said to have been lawfully terminated. Therefore, there is no second proceeding to place the accused in double jeopardy. Dispositive Petition granted. Judge is ordered to reassume jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 2800 and 2813 of his Court and to render judgment of either conviction or acquittal in accordance with the evidence already adduced during the joint trial of said two cases.
Art. 315, par. 2(d) states: 'By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check
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temporary release. Sola, Garcia and Cabral posted bail and have since been released. -The witnesses informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the CFI Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses. - February 11, 1981: petition for cancellation of bail bonds and change of venue was filed. - February 12, 1981: the Court required the comment of the Solicitor General as well as of the private respondents. - March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Mendoza. It opened with this preliminary statement: "The present petition was filed by the private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the CFI of Negros Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this Honorable Court on behalf of the People of the Philippines can, under the law, be instituted only by the Solicitor General. The assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors that they are instituting the action 'subject to the control and supervision of the Fiscal' will not, therefore, improve their legal standing." Nonetheless, it adopted the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice. - March 15, 1981: The Court Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor General on the urgent petition for change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the 7 Criminal Cases, and (2) the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of Justice; (b) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, presided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at Himamaylan has an
compels change of venue, and necessarily, control over the petitioner, to the Executive Judge of the RTC of his new residence. Thus, in the apportionment of the regional trial courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Las Pias is one among the municipalities included in the National Capital Judicial Region (Metro Manila) with a seat at Makati. 18 Needless to say, the Regional Trial Court in Makati, like the Manila Regional Trial Court, forms part of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region. 19 Accordingly, the various branches of the regional trial courts of Makati or Manila under the National Capital Region, are coordinate and co-equal courts, the totality of which is only one Regional Trial Court. Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. In other words, the case does not attach to the branch or judge. Therefore, in this case, RTC Branch XX of Manila, which granted the probation, has not lost control and supervision over the probation of the petitioner. Dispositive Petition dismissed
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- Municipal Judge Alfredo V. Granados of the Municipal Court of Pulilan received the complaint and conducted a preliminary investigation, first stage. - October 25, 1974: the Complaint was amended. - Rufino Bulanadi and Feliciano Gorospe were again named but Gerardo Fajardo was dropped and Oscar Alvaran was named instead. -The date when the crime was said to have been committed was changed from September 30, 1974 to September 25, 1974. - Again Judge Granados conducted a preliminary investigation and on November 18, 1974, he issued an order for the arrest of Bulanadi, Gorospe and Alvaran and fixed their bail at P15,000.00 each. -Bulanadi and Gorospe posted the requisite bail. Alvaran remained at large. -The second stage of the preliminary investigation was set on February 5, 1975, but on that day, neither Bulanadi or Gorospe appeared for which reason, Judge Granados declared that they had waived their right thereto and elevated the case to the CFI of Bulacan. - March 19, 1975: Provincial Fiscal Pascual C. Kliatchko filed with the CFI of Bulacan an Information for forcible Abduction with Rape against Gorospe and Bulanadi. But said information was later on amended. -Judge Nelly L. Romero Valdellon started the trial of the case on October 15, 1975. -The accused and their counsel de parte had long been notified that the case was to be tried on that day but they did not appear so the former were tried in absentia. -After hearing part of the testimony of Anastacia de Jesus, the complainant, Judge Valdellon was transferred to Metro Manila and she was replaced by Judge Fidel P. Purisima who finished the trial. -But Judge Purisima inhibited himself from deciding the case because J. Granados is his first cousin by affinity (to make sure that the decision to be rendered in this case shall be above suspicion) -So it was Judge Jesus R. de Vega who decided the case CFI: found Gorospe and Bulanadi guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape committed against Anastacia de Jesus as charged in the information; sentenced each of the accused to suffer 2 perpetual penalties of reclusion perpetua to be served in accordance with Art. 70 of the RPC, with all the accessory penalty of the law; to indemnify de Jesus in the amount of P40,000.00 for actual exemplary and moral damages, and to pay the costs. ISSUES
- People v. Gutierrez: To compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established." It may be added that there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue. As a matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this character filed before this Court. Such a plea could have been done administratively. In this particular case, however, there is justification for the procedure followed in view of the fact that along with the change of venue, the cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought. Dispositive The assailed order of Judge Gasataya granting bail to private respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be without force and effect. Exec. Judge Alfonso Baguio of the CFI of Negros Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been transferred is directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private respondents, with the prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the respondents is strong. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
PEOPLE v FELICIANO GOROSPE and RUFINO BULANADI 129 SCRA 233 ABAD SANTOS; May 15, 1984
FACTS - In a verified Complaint filed on October 8, 1974 with the Municipal Court of Pulilan, Bulacan, Anastacia de Jesus (14 yrs old) accused Gerardo Fajardo, Rufino Bulanadi and Feliciano Gorospe of the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape. - The crime was said to have been committed on September 30, 1974, starting in Plaridel, Bulacan, thru Pulilan, and thence to Talavera, Nueva Ecija (in a hut where she was detained for 9 days and sexually abused during the night. She was made to lose her consciousness first by waiving a hankerchief on her face before they abducted her and eventually taking her to said place.)
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Petition for certiorari to annul orders of the City Court of San Carlos FACTS - October 19, 1980: Respondents entered the store and dining room of the Pacita Tandoc without her permission. There was an altercation between Tandoc and respondent, Arnold Payopay, regarding the stoning of the store and house. Payopay picked up stones and struck Tandoc but instead her helper, Bonifacio Menor, was hit and suffered physical injuries which according to the medico-legal certificate will heal in more than 30 days. Beda Acosta, who was behind Arnold Payopay, picked up the stone and struck Tandoc but her helper, Fred de la Vega, was hit instead and suffered injuries which injury will heal in less than 9 days. - 19 October 1980: a criminal complaint was lodged with the Office of the City Fiscal with the charges of Serious Physical Injuries, filed by Bonifacio Menor against Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay; Slight Physical Injuries, filed by Fred de la Vega against Beda Acosta, and Trespass to Dwelling, filed by Pacita Tandoc against Arnulfo Payopay, Beda Acosta, Manuel Cancino, Nadong Fernandez and Arturo Syloria. - 2 December 1980: Arnulfo Payopay and his father Conrado Payopay, Sr., together with Manuel Cancino, also filed a complaint with the Office of the City Fiscal, against Pedro Tandoc, Pacita Tandoc, Rudy Diaz, Fred Menor, Rogelio Ercella, Juan Rosario and Fred de la Vega, with the charges of Trespass to Dwelling, Serious Oral Defamation, Grave Threats and Physical Injuries - 10 December 1980: the investigating fiscal found reasonable ground to believe that respondents Arnulfo Payopay, Beda Acosta, Manuel Cancino, Nadong Fernandez and Arturo Syloria committed the crimes charged. Informations were filed with the City Court. - With respect to the criminal complaint filed by Arnulfo Payopay and Manuel Cancino against petitioners for Serious Oral Defamation, Grave Threats and Physical Injuries, the Office of the City Fiscal recommended the dropping of said charges because they "were found to be in the nature of a counter charge, the same having been filed after more than 1 month from the date of the alleged incident." However, as to the charge of Trespass to Dwelling filed by Conrado Payopay, Sr. against Pedro Tandoc, a prima facie case was found by the investigating fiscal. Thus, an information was filed with the City Court.
and after investigation of fiscal, information was lodged. Case was docketed and Judge issued arrest warrant. Petitioners counsel filed motion asking fiscal to furnish clerk of court w/ testimony of witnesses who testified at preliminary investigation. Fiscal opposed. - Counsel for petitioner put in motion that should his first motion be acted upon adversely, that Court itself conduct the investigation under Sec 4 of Rule 108. Fiscal opposed. - Petitioners counsel asked that warrant of arrest be cancelled and the court conduct preliminary investigation. Judge denied motions and the MFRs. Hence the instant certiorari and mandamus petition. ISSUE WON in prelim investigation by fiscal, accused is entitled to be informed of substance of testimony and evidence against him HELD NO - Prelim investigation by fiscal is not within purview of Sections 13 and 11 of Rule 108. Sec 13 deals with transmission of records requirements and Sec 11 deals with prelim investigation by justices of peace and judges for purpose of issuance of warrant. - Sec 2, Act No 612: In cases triable only in CFI, defendant shall have speedy trial, but shall not be entitled as of right to a prelim investigation where prosecuting attorney, after investigation, shall have presented an information against him. - THE RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS STATUTORY, NOT CONSTITUTIONAL. Its purpose is to secure the innocent against hasty prosecutions and protect him from public accusation, and also to protect the State from useless prosecutions. This investigation is called preliminary, to be followed by trial proper. Investigating judge or prosecuting officer acts upon probable cause and reasonable belief, not upon proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In this case, to ask for abstract of testimony at that stage for no other purpose than to scrutinize the same is, in effect, to ask for another prelim investigation.
HASHIM v CITY FISCAL OF MANILA 71 Phil 216 LAUREL; January 13, 1941
NATURE Certiorari and mandamus FACTS - Hashim was caught in possession of counterfeit treasury certificates, but was released upon filing of bond. Complaint was filed with Office of City Fiscal
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not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy. - Under Section 10, Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court, as well as in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city courts or municipal courts with Courts of First Instance, the accused was not entitled to be heard in a preliminary investigation proper. The reason behind this rule is as follows: " The loss of time entailed in the conduct of preliminary investigations, with the consequent extension of deprivation of the accused's liberty, in case he fails to post bail, which at times outlasts the period of the penalty provided by law for the offense, besides the mental anguish suffered in protracted litigations, are eliminated with the assurance of a speedy and expeditious trial for the accused, upon his arraignment (without having to undergo the second stage of the preliminary investigation), and of a prompt verdict on his guilt or innocence. On the other hand, the so-called first stage of preliminary investigation or the preliminary examination, conducted by the duly authorized officer, as borne out by the examination and sworn written statement of the complainants and their witnesses, generally suffices to establish the existence of reasonable ground to charge the accused with having committed the offense complained of." - The result of a preliminary investigation can neither constitute nor give rise to the defense of double jeopardy in any case, because such preliminary investigation is not and does not in itself constitute a trial or even any part thereof. In order that the defense of jeopardy may lie, there must be a former judgment, either of acquittal or of conviction, rendered by a court competent to render the same, not only by reason of the offense committed, which must be the same or at least comprised within it, but also by reason of the place where it was committed. Dispositive Petition dismissed.
investigation proper conducted by the City Fiscal could have been dispensed with. Neither did the earlier order of dismissal of the complaints by the investigating fiscal bar the filing of said complaints with the city court on the ground of double jeopardy. - The prescriptive period of a crime depends upon the penalty imposed by law. The penalties for the crimes charged are: arresto mayor for Trespass to Dwelling, Grave Threats and Less Serious Physical Injuries; and arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period for Serious Physical Injuries. The prescriptive period of offenses punishable by arresto mayor is 5 years, while crimes punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in 10 years. The complaints were filed with the City Court only 9 months from said occurrence. - The re-investigation sought by petitioners applies only to instances where a case is cognizable by the Court of First Instance but filed with the City Court for purposes of preliminary investigation only and thereafter dismissed by the latter on the ground that no prima facie case exists. However, for cases cognizable by inferior courts and filed with the same not only for purposes of preliminary investigation but for trial on the merits, the Office of the City Fiscal has no authority to re-investigate. On Preliminary Investigation: - Purpose: to protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer; and to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. - Stages: (1) the preliminary examination of the complainant and his witnesses prior to the arrest of the accused to determine whether or not there is ground to issue a warrant of arrest; (2) preliminary investigation proper, wherein the accused, after his arrest, is informed of the complaint filed against him and is given access to the testimonies and evidence presented, and he is also permitted to introduce evidence in his favor. The purpose of this stage of investigation is to determine whether or not the accused should be released or held before trial. - Nature: merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information; not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does
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This is an appeal by the offended party, Petra Flores, from the order of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. FACTS - ORDER OF CFI:"The provincial fiscal having filed a motion in the above entitled case praying for the dismissal of the case, and the court having found meritorious the reasons alleged therein, add case is hereby dismissed, as prayed, with costs de oficio, and the bond filed for the temporary release of the accused is hereby ordered cancelled. It is so ordered." ISSUE WON the provincial fiscal has authority to conduct another preliminary investigation and thereafter ask the Court of First Instance to dismiss the criminal case remanded by the justice of the peace, after the latter had conducted the preliminary investigation and issued an order to the effect that there was probable cause to prosecute the offense charged which falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance." HELD After a criminal case has been remanded by the justice of the peace to the Court of First Instance which has jurisdiction to try it on the merits, and before the provincial fiscal has filed the necessary information, the latter not only has the power but also the duty to investigate the facts upon which the complaint filed in the justice of the peace court was based, to examine the evidence submitted to the justice of the peace and such other evidence as the parties may deem proper to submit on their own free will or on demand of the fiscal, for the purpose of determining whether there is at least prima facie evidence establishing the guilt of the accused and overcoming the presumption of innocence in his favor. If after he has done all this and considering all the circumstances of the case, the fiscal believes that the evidence is not sufficient to establish prima facie the guilt of the accused, he should submit to the court before which the case is pending the corresponding motion for dismissal. The provincial fiscal of Laguna complied with all these requirements before asking for the dismissal of the present case, thereby keeping within the powers conferred upon him by section 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code.
accused is prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Reasoning The accused was brought to trial, over his objection without having been committed or remanded for trial by an investigating magistrate. The justice of the peace who held the preliminary investigation dismissed the original complaint against the accused, being of opinion that there was no probable cause to believe him guilty of the offense; and although a so-called report of the proceedings was forwarded to the fiscal and doubtless submitted to the trial judge, original jurisdiction to commit the accused for trial as result of those proceedings was vested exclusively in the justice of the peace before whom they were had. - The order of the justice of the peace discharging the accused did not operate as a final acquittal, and was not a bar to re-arrest and prosecution for the offense originally charged. If the fiscal was not satisfied with the action of the justice of the peace, he could have secured the arrest of the accused upon a new complaint, and sought an order remanding the accused for trial in a second preliminary investigation had before either the justice of the peace who held the first investigation or before the judge of the CFI in the exercise of his functions as a committing magistrate. (Act 1627, Sec. 37) - But it would manifestly defeat the end sought to be attained by the provisions of law for the holding of preliminary investigations if either the fiscal, or the trial judge, or both acting together were permitted to make use of the record of the proceedings had before a justice of the peace at a preliminary trial, as a result of which the accused was discharged, for the purpose of bringing the accused to trial despite the order of discharge and over his objection based on the ground that he has not been remanded for trial as a result of a preliminary trial. Dispositive Judgment convicting and sentencing the accused REVERSED with the costs of both instances de officio and the record REMANDED to the court below for further proceedings.
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Atilano and two other unidentified persons, Richard Doe and John Doe. The prosecution also certified under oath that they conducted a preliminary investigation of the case Upon arraignment, Jesus Atilano, Prudencio Cichon and Lorenzo Delantar pleaded not guilty.
ISSUE WON the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the case for want of preliminary investigation HELD NO Reasoning - When Judge Templo set the case for preliminary investigation to afford the accused occasion to confront the witnesses against him, the accused instead filed a manifestation waiving his right to present evidence at the second stage of the preliminary investigation. When the case was forwarded to the CFI, the accused entered his plea without raising the question of lack of preliminary investigation. The aforesaid constitute waiver of the accuseds right to preliminary investigation. It is wellsettled that the right to preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right and that the same may be waived expressly or by silence. Such waiver carried with it the waiver of any procedural error or irregularity that may have attended the preliminary investigation. Dispositive The judgment under review is hereby affirmed
PEOPLE v VELOSO 112 SCRA 173 PER CURIAM; February 25, 1982
NATURE Automatic review of CFI decision imposing the capital penalty of death on accused Veloso for the crime of robbery with homicide and double serious physical injuries FACTS - Veloso and others entered the Odiamars house and robbed them around 7:30 in the evening. They stole money, tear gas gun, jewelry, old coins. - Hermenegildo Odiamar was shot and killed during the robbery, while the Odiamar spouses sustained serious physical injuries. - Veloso, among others, was charged for robbery with homicide and double serious physical injuries - July 5, 1970 (the case says july but I think its a typo probably june) : Judge Templo conducted preliminary examination - June 22, 1970 Judge Templo set the case for preliminary investigation to afford the accused the occasion to confront the witnesses against him and to present his own evidence - instead of availing himself of this opportunity, he filed a manifestation stating that he Waives his right to present evidence at the second stage of the preliminary investigation. - the case was forwarded to the CFI, and it appears that accused entered his non-guilty plea without raising the question of lack of preliminary investigation. Petitioners' Claim (1) the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the case for want of preliminary investigation (2) the extrajudicial confession he executed was obtained through force and intimidation and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence, and (3) in the absence of adequate proof that it was he who killed the deceased Hermenegildo Odiamar, he should be held guilty of the offense of robbery only, and not of the complex crime of robbery with homicide and double serious physical injuries.
3.
Criminal Case No. 3088.-- Estafa thru falsification of public/official documents was filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City against Prudencio Cichon and Paulino Duma, Also has certification of the State Prosecutors that they had conducted a preliminary investigation in the case The two accused pleaded not guilty.
1.
Criminal Case No. 3083.-- Edilberto Gomez, Prudencio N. Cichon, Cesar V. Castillo, Pedro Cuento and John Doe charged with Estafa thru falsification of public/official documents. The prosecuting officers certified under oath that they had conducted a preliminary investigation of the case in accordance with law; and that they believed that the offense charged had been committed and the accused were probably guilty thereof. The corresponding warrant of arrest for each of the accused was accordingly issued. The accused Pedro Cuento and Cesar Castillo pleaded not guilty. Criminal Case No. 3084.-- Estafa thru falsification of public/official documents against Lorenzo Delantar, Prudencio Cichon, Jesus F.
Criminal Case No. 3128.-- Prudencio Cichon, Jesus F Atilano and Pedro Cuento were charged with Estafa thru falsification of public/official documents. No certification that a preliminary investigation of the case had been made by the prosecutors. So District Judge himself made the preliminary investigation and once satisfied that a prima facie case against the three accused existed, issued warrants for their arrest on the same day. At the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. - On June 22, 1966, the accused in the four (4) cases, thru their counsel, filed a MOTION TO DECLARE INFORMATIONS AND WARRANTS OF ARREST null and void on the ground that the prosecution failed to observe the provisions of Section 13 and 14 of Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court regarding preliminary investigation and prayed the court to cancel the warrants of arrest issued. - On September 27, 1966, the lower court, for lack of merit, denied the aforesaid motion. - Upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the accused, thru counsel, the lower court, on November 2, 1966, reversed its former ruling and ordered the dismissal of all the four (4) cases against them, without prejudice to the refiling of the same. ISSUE WON the trial court erred in dismissing these cases on the ground that the preliminary investigations conducted therein were not in accordance with Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 112, in relation to Rule 144 of the Revised Rules of Court. HELD YES Ratio The preliminary investigations in these four (4) cases were terminated in 1962, or before the New
4.
2.
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-The primary requirement for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of probable cause (Sec. 3, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution). P.D. No. 911 authorizes the fiscal or state prosecutor to determine the existence of probable cause. - There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But this does not bind the judge to issue a warrant - Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:: "Warrant of arrest, when issued. - If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest." -the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of longstanding practice had been attached to the informations filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable cause -Also, Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, is applicable to some of the crimes in the said informations. This rule requires that the complaint or information must be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are defendants plus two (2) copies for the court's files -judge also did not commit grave abuse of discretion in remanding some of the cases to the City Fiscal for further investigation. From the informations and affidavits presented to him, he found the charges patently without basis or merit. For respondent to issue the warrants of arrest and try the accused would only expose the latter to unnecessary harrassment, anxiety and expense. And as already pointed out, under the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, the respondent judge has the power to order the outright dismissal of the charge if, from the information and the affidavits attached thereto, he finds the same to be patently without basis or merit
-petitioners the City Fiscal of Butuan City and his assistants filed in the City Court of Butuan certain informations and certified them as follows: that a preliminary examination has been conducted by me in this case, having examined the complainant and his witnesses; that on the basis of the sworn statements and other evidence submitted before this Office, there is reasonable ground to believe that the crime charged has been committed and that herein accused is probably guilty thereof. -respondent judge set a hearing to determine the propriety of issuing warrants of arrest. After hearing, judge issued orders requiring petitioners to submit to the court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners -petitioners filed two separate motions for reconsideration stating that they were authorized to determine the existence of probable cause ni a preliminary investigation and that their findings constitute sufficient basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest. -respondent justifies his order as an exercise of his judicial power to review the fiscal's findings of probable cause. He further maintains that the failure of petitioners to file the required affidavits destroys the presumption of regularity in the performance of petitioners' official duties, particularly in the light of the long standing practice of the Office of the City Fiscal of Butuan of attaching to the informations filed with the court the affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation -judge denied motion. And asked the submission of documents earlier asked for. *eventually, petitioners submitted the documents rendering the case mute (haha) and academic. But the Court decided to tackle the issue nonetheless. Some warrants were granted, some were remanded to ISSUE WON the respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation HELD NO.
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Respondents Comments: Go had been validly arrested because the crime had been committed 6 days before he was arrested. - Invoking Umali vs. Ramos where the Court upheld that a warrantless arrest was valid 14 days after the crime was committed. - The prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. Go was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. ISSUES 1. WON the warrantless arrest was lawful 2. WON the accused Go had waived his right to preliminary investigation HELD 1. NO, the warrantless arrest was not lawful Ratio Rule 112, Sec. 7 states that a complaint for information can be filed sans preliminary investigation when a person has been lawfully arrested without a warrant except than an affidavit should be executed by the person who was responsible for the arrest. But the person arrested can ask for preliminary investigation by the proper officer before the complaint or information can be filed. In this case, the person arrested must waive the provisions of A125, RPC with the assistance of counsel (a lawyer or another person of his choice if a lawyer is not available). He may also apply for bail despite the waiver and the investigation must terminate within 15 days. Reasoning - Umil vs. Ramos only applies to continuing crimes so it does not apply in the case at bar. Murder is not a continuing crime because it happens in one place at a particular point in time and ends there as well. - The warrantless arrest does not follow the requisites in Rule 113, Sec. 5 because: >The arrest took place 6 days after Maguan was shot whereas the RoC provide that the crime should have been just committed, is about to be committed or is being committed. >None of the arresting officers had personal knowledge of the facts indicating that Go was the gunman as required in the RoC. The information that the police had was derived from eyewitness accounts.
5. Go filed an urgent EX-PARTE MOTION FOR SPECIAL RAFFLE in order to expedite action on the bail recommendation. The cash bond was approved and Go was released from jail. - July 16, 1991: 6. Prosecutor filed a MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION and prayed that the court proceedings be suspended momentarily. 7. The trial court granted LEAVE to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelled the arraignment scheduled on August 15, 1991. - July 19, 1991: 8. Go contended through a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS that the information was null and void because no preliminary investigation had been conducted. - July 23, 1991 Go surrendered to the police and the judge set the arraignment on August 23. - August 23, 1991: 9. Respondent judge issued a commitment order for Go. Upon arraignment, a plea of not guilty was entered because Go refused to enter a plea. 10. Go filed a PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS and the CA issued the writ. The petition for habeas corpus was consolidated with the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. - September 19, 1991 The trial started and the prosecution presented its first witness. This was followed by three more witnesses on October 3, 1991. - September 23, 1991 The CA dismissed the petition for habeas corpus and the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus on the following grounds, among others: a) Validity of the warrantless arrest because the crime had been freshly committed. He was positively identified by the witness and his identity had been established when he came to the police station. b) Waiver of the right to preliminary investigation when he did not invoke it properly and waiver of any irregularity in his arrest when accused posted bail. c) Validity of the information against the accused precluded the grant of the petition for habeas corpus Petitioners Claim: Go contends that the crime had not been just committed because of the 6-day disparity. - None of the police officers who arrested him had any personal knowledge of the crime.
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- Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to issue, should the any lawful order that the trial court Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of all at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial. - Gos act of posting bail cannot be deemed to be a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation. Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release. Obiter - However, contrary to petitioner's contention, the failure to accord preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. - In the case at bar, a trial for merits had already commenced and the prosecution had already presented 4 witnesses. > This, however, still entitles the accused to preliminary investigation. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation should accorded to petitioner, even if eventually, the prosecutor may or may not find probable cause. The point is that Go was not accorded his proper rights. > As for bail, Go is still entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence against the accused be strong, the bail can then be cancelled. > To hold that the rights of Go were obliterated by the presentation of evidence in the proceedings in the trial court would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process. Dispositive ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED. - The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
GUTIERREZ [concurring]
- The need for a trial court to follow the Rules and to be fair, impartial, and persistent in getting the true facts of a case is present in all cases but it is particularly important if the accused is indigent; more so, if he is one of those unfortunates who seem to spend more time behind bars than outside.
GRIO-AQUINO [dissenting]
- After 4 witnesses have already testified, among them an eyewitness who identified the accused as the gunman and a security guard who identified the plate number of the gunman's car, there is no need to conduct a preliminary investigation the sole purpose of which would be to ascertain if there is sufficient ground to believe that a crime was committed (which the petitioner does not dispute) and that he (the petitioner) is probably guilty thereof
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Ombudsman. The petitioners right to a preliminary investigation of the new charge is secured to him by Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. That right of the accused is substantial and its denial over his opposition is a prejudicial error in that it subjects the accused to loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Since the right belongs to the accused, he alone may waive it. If he demands it, the State may not withhold it. However, as the absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the complaint or information, the proceedings upon such information in the Sandiganbayan should be held in abeyance and the case should be remanded to the office of the Ombudsman for him or the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation. 2. NO - Since the petitioner is an incumbent public official charged in a valid information with an offense punishable under the Constitution and the laws, the laws command that he shall be suspended from office pendent lite must be obeyed. His approved leave of absence should not be a bar to his preventive suspension for, as indicated by the Solicitor General, and approved leave, whether it be for a fixed of indefinite period may be cancelled or shortened at will by the incumbent. However, since the preventive suspension has exceeded the reasonable maximum period of ninety days provided in Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, it should now be lifted. Dispositive Petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted.
against petitioner, Quintin Doromal, a former commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation which submitted bids to supply equipment to the DECS and the National Manpower and Youth Council. - January 25, 1988, Special Prosecution Officer filed in the Sandiganbayan an information against petitioner. - The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the SC questioning the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan to file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. - June 30, 1988, the SC annulled the information - Upon the annulment of the information against the petitioner, the Special Prosecutor sought clearance from the Ombudsman to refile it - The Ombudsman granted clearance but advised that some changes be made in the information previously filed - A new information was filed in the Sandiganbayan - Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information for being invalid because there had been no preliminary investigation and defective because the facts alleged do not constitute the offense charged. - The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash - The Special Prosecutor filed a motion to suspend accused pendente lite. Over the objection of the accused the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension pendente lite from his position as PCGG Commissioner and from any other office he may be holding. ISSUES 1. WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the information 2. WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending the petitioner from office despite the Presidents having previously approved his indefinite leave of absence until final decision in the case HELD 1. YES - A new preliminary investigation of the charge against the petitioner is in order not only because the first was a nullity but also because the accused demands it as his right. Moreover, the charge against him had been changed as directed by the
DOROMAL v SANDIGANBAYAN (OMBUDSMAN and SPECIAL PROSECUTOR) 177 SCRA 1989 GRINO-AQUINO; September 7, 1989
NATURE Petition for Certiorari FACTS - October 1987, the Special Prosecution Officer conducted a preliminary investigation of the charge
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preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is a function of the prosecutor. - ALLADO DOCTRINE: If upon the filing of the information in court, the trial judge, after reviewing the information and the document attached thereto, finds that no probable cause exists, he must either call for the complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an open and public accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists. Dispositive Petition granted
highly improbable, if not ridiculous. A human body cannot be pulverized into ashes by simply burning it with the use of gasoline and rubber tires in an open field. Even crematoria use entirely closed incinerators where the corpse is subjected to intense heat. Thereafter, the remains undergo a process where the bones are completely ground to dust. - Strangely, if not awkwardly, after Van Twest's reported abduction which culminated in his decimation by cremation, his counsel continued to represent him before judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Hence, even Asst. Solicitor General Estoesta believes that counsel of Van Twest doubted the latter's death. - Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for the arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed. For, otherwise, he would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners. - In Soliven v. Makasiar, we said that the judge (a) shall personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence of probable cause. - In People v. Inting, we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the
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for the filing of the information, or both, would suffice in the judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. - In the present case, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing with the trial court. Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order directing, among other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only the information, amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutors finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of warrants of arrest. It may, however, be argued that the directive presupposes a finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional requirement for the protection of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic.
ISSUE WON the CA erred in finding that no probable cause exists to merit the filing of charges against private respondent Billy Cerbo
PEOPLE v CA (CERBO) (Republic v CA in page 5 of the outline) 301 SCRA 475 PANGANIBAN; January 21, 1999
NATURE Petition for Review FACTS - Private Respondent Jonathan Cerbo shot, at pointblank range, Rosalinda Dy in the presence and at the office of his father private respondent Billy Cerbo. - An information for murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo. - The daughter of the victim executed an affidavitcomplaint charging private respondent Billy Cerbo of conspiracy in the killing. - Accordingly, the prosecution filed an amended information including Billy Cerbo in the murder case. A warrant for his arrest was later issued. - Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash warrant of arrest arguing that the same was issued without probable cause. - The respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case against Billy Cerbo and recalling the warrant for his arrest. - The Court of Appeals debunked the petitioners assertion that the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion and that the evidence presented thus far did not substantiate the charge.. Hence this petition.
HELD YES - The petition is meritorious. - The determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function. - The public prosecutor has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. - The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy, and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent office designated by law for that purpose.6 - Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the state from the burden of the unnecessary expense of an effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous, or groundless charges.7 - The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial must be distinguished from the determination of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, which is a judicial function. - A judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so. - Corrollarily, the judge should not override the public prosecutors determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial, on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient, as in the present case. - Therefore, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, the trial court should respect such determination. Dispositive Reversed.
The issuance of the warrants of arrest by a judge solely on the basis of the prosecutors certification in the information that there existed probable cause, without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause, is null and void.
CASTILLO v VILLALUZ
6 7
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FERNANDO; May 13, 1981
NATURE Writ of Certiorari FACTS -Counsel for Reynaldo Rodil who was charged with murder, asks to recall witnesses for the prosecution to enable such counsel to cross-examine them, on, to quote his words, "clarificatory and amplificatory matters" which was denied by Municipal Judge Segundo M. Garcia of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. -What is prayed for is not only that such order denying counsel's request to recall government witnesses be set aside and nullified, but also that bail be granted petitioner, a petition to that effect having been denied with a subsequent motion for reconsideration still undecided. -Respondents were required to comment and the Court likewise issued a temporary restraining order. Such a comment was submitted on behalf of respondents by the Solicitor General seeking the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the right to cross-examine in a preliminary investigation is not a right granted an accused and that the exercise of discretion by respondent Judge considering the evidence of record sufficed to justify denial of the application for bail. -An examination of the record, as well as the pertinent doctrines, makes evident that the jurisdictional issue posed arises from the failure to accord petitioner a hearing on his application for bail. -A resolution of that question in the sense of respondent Judge affording petitioner his day in court is equally decisive of the other issue, whether or not counsel for petitioner could recall witnesses for the prosecution for the purpose of asking clarificatory questions. That he could very well do when they testify to prove evidence of guilt is strong. Under the present state of the law, it cannot be said that the right to cross-examine is guaranteed an accused at the stage of preliminary investigation. ISSUE WON counsel for petitioner could recall witnesses for the prosecution for the purpose of asking clarificatory questions (that he could very well do when they testify to prove evidence of guilt is strong) HELD
112 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure no longer authorizes RTC Judges to conduct PIs. [b] The assignment of PI function to judges of inferior courts and to a very limited extent to courts of first instance was dictated by necessity and practical considerations, and the consequent policy, was that wherever there were enough fiscals or prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigations, courts were to leave that job which is essentially executive to them. It follows that the conclusions derived by a judge from his own investigation cannot be superior to and conclusively binding on the fiscal or public prosecutor, in whom that function is principally and more logically lodged. 2. YES The power to conduct PI is lodged in the fiscal. It is grave abuse of discretion on a judge to seek to foreclose the fiscal's prerogative to conduct his own preliminary investigation to determine for himself the existence or non-existence of probable cause, and to require him to show cause for not filing the information within 24 hours, on the sole basis of the Judge's conclusions. The fiscal has the duty to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause, and could not shirk or be made to evade it by an unreasoning and indiscriminate reliance on the judge's investigation. Dispositive: Petition GRANTED. Challenged Orders annulled and set aside.
BALGOS v SANDIGANBAYAN [SUPRA, PAGE 34] RODIL v GARCIA 104 SCRA 362
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was on its way to another place, Lalabuan, also in Masiu, had been ambushed - The next day, a lawyer (Atty. Batuampar) of one of the widows filed a letter-complaint with the fiscal, asking for a full blast preliminary investigation. The letter adverted to the possibility of innocent persons being implicated by the parties involved on both sides none of whom was, however, identified and promised that supporting affidavits would shortly be filed. Immediately the Provincial Fiscal addressed a "1st indorsement" to the respondent Judge, transmitting Atty. Batuampar's letter and requesting that "all cases that may be filed relative .. (to the incident) that happened in the afternoon of July 27, 1985," be forwarded to his office, which "has first taken cognizance of said cases. - On August 10, 1985, a criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed. On the same day, respondent Judge examined personally the 3 witnesses. Thereafter, the Judge approved the complaint and issued a warrant of arrest against the 14 petitioners (who were named by the witnesses) and 50 "John Does. - On Aug 14, 1985, an ex-parte motion was filed by Atty. Batuampar seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent holding of a "thorough investigation" on the ground that the Judge's initial investigation had been "hasty and manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions" having been propounded. The respondent Judge denied the motion for "lack of basis;" hence the present petition. ISSUE WON the respondent Judge had the power to issue the warrant of arrest without completing the entire prescribed procedure for preliminary investigation HELD YES. - What the Rule provides is that no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court may be filed without completing that procedure. Sec. 6 of Rule 112 clearly authorizes the MTC to issue a warrant even before opening the second phase. - This was equally true under the former rules, where the first phase of the investigation was expressly denominated "preliminary examination" to distinguish it from the second phase, or preliminary investigation proper - Sec 3 of rule 112 consists of 2 phases: - The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint and the affidavits
sound discretion of the Judge or investigating officer concerned (People v. Ramilo, \Dequito v. Arellano, Bustos v. Lucero) it could still be argued that the judge is not a ministerial officer reduced to recording what takes place and what witnesses say in the examination. Above all, his is the great responsibility of safeguarding the accused from groundless or vindictive prosecution. If the justice of the peace is to ascertain, as he must, whether a crime has been committed and, if so, whether there is probable cause that the accused committed it, his authority cannot be confined as in a straight jacket to the stiffness of medieval and outmoded technicalities of practice. It thus appears clearly that in the exercise of his discretion respondent Judge could have granted the request and thus avoided the necessity of a petition of this character having to be filed. The interest of a more speedy and a more efficient administration of justice would be best served if there is a greater awareness on the part of judges that in addition to safeguarding the express rights of an accused person, a matter mandated by the Constitution or the Rules of Court, they should likewise exercise their discretion in such a way that the purpose of a preliminary investigation, the avoidance of groundless or vindictive prosecutions, could be attained in as fair and objective manner as possible. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The order of respondent Judge denying bail is set aside. He, or whoever is now the Municipal Judge of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, must set forthwith the hearing on the application for bail of petitioner, to be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and this opinion. No costs.
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Ratio 3 conditions must concur for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The investigating judge must: (a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and answers; (b) be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and (c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Reasoning The mandatory provision that the investigating judge "must issue a warrant of arrest" if he finds probable cause that the respondent committed the crime charged, found in all previous rules of criminal procedure, from General Orders No. 58 down to Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, is absent in Section 1 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused, for the determination of whether a probable cause exists and whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. In this particular case, since the robbery charge was the offshoot of a boundary dispute between two property owners, the investigating judge did not believe there was any danger of the accused absconding before the filing of the information against him by the fiscal, hence, he found no need to place him under immediate custody. Dispositive The appealed decision is SET ASIDE.
TANDOC v RESULTAN [SUPRA, PAGE 43] LIM vFELIX 194 SCRA 292 GUTIERREZ; February 19, 1991
NATURE Review for certiorari. FACTS - March 17, 1989: at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport (Masbate, Masbate), Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante, another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.
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- What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. - Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examinations and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. - The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper - whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial - is the function of the Prosecutor. - The power to make a preliminary examination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest (or search warrant) has been and remains vested in every judge by the provisions in the Bill of Rights in the 1935, the 1973 and the present [1987] Constitutions securing the people against unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere Court Rule or Statute to revoke. - The problem lies with warrants of arrest especially in metropolitan or highly urban areas. If a Judge has to personally question each complainant and witness or go over the records of the Prosecutor's investigation page by page and word for word before he acts on each of a big pile of applications for arrest warrants on his desk, he or she may have no more time for his or her more important judicial functions. Dispositive Petition is granted.
ISSUE WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists. HELD NO Ratio A Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest. Reasoning - Respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause. If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion. - The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification - Art. III, Sec. 2. (Constitution) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
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specific offense had been alleged in said applications. It was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, which presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions in violation of a given penal provision. -General search warrants are outlawed because they place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. -To prevent the issuance of general search warrants, SC amended Sec. 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in the Revised Rules of Court that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense." -Search warrants authorizing the seizure of books of accounts and records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal contravene the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized should be particularly described and defeat its major objective of eliminating general warrants. -SC resolved to adopt the doctrine in Mapp v Ohio (1961) and to finally abandon the 1948 ruling in Moncado vs. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1.
(*The latter case (citing Wigmore) held that illegally seized evidence is admissible, as long as it is relevant, but without prejudice to the criminal liability of the peace officers who made the seizure, for violation of domicile or under any other provision of the Penal Code. Justices Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones & Paras dissented from the majority opinion. ~marge~*)
Procedure: -March 22, 1962: SC issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. -June 29, 1962: the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners. NOTE: The ponencia splits the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question into two (2) major groups: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners. ISSUES 1. As regards the first group, WON petitioners have a cause of action 2. As regards the second group, WON the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid (and, WON said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners) HELD 1. NONE. -The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. -Petitioners may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 2. NO. -1935 Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3) provides (a) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (b) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. -Search warrants, issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed offenses as abstract as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code" do not satisfy the constitutional requirements because no
-The exclusionary rule is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. -The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. If there is competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. If he has no such evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
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(b) ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive -- of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing." -An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same as those declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other search warrants. -Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control. -SC, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners. -If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners, and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations.
SEPARATE OPINION
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court, under the rules and precedents, must be deemed final and binding upon this Court. 2. YES. - As provided in Republic Act No. 3828 Before a municipal judge may issue a warrant of arrest, the following conditions must first be fulfilled: (1) he must examine the witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. - The first condition was fulfilled. The trial court found as a fact that "the respondent judge personally examined the witnesses for the prosecution; that respondent judge adopted as his own personal examination the questions asked by T-Sgt. Patosa as appearing in the written statements, which he read over again to the witnesses together with the answers given therein, asking the witnesses whether said answers were theirs, and whether the same answers were true, to which the witnesses answered in the affirmative. Republic Act No. 3828 does not prohibit the municipal Judge from adopting the questions asked by a previous investigator. - The second condition was also fulfilled. The trial court found that the complaint was "supported by statements of the witnesses under oath." The record also shows there were documents to have been subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge. - The third condition was likewise fulfilled. The examination of the witnesses was written down, in the form of searching questions and answers. The term searching questions and answers" means only, taking into consideration the purpose of the preliminary examination which is to determine "whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial," such questions as have tendency to show the commission of a crime and the perpetrator thereof. What would be searching questions would depend on what is sought to be inquired into, such as: the nature of the offense, the date, time, and place of its commission, the possible motives for its commission; the subject, his age, education, status, financial and social circumstances, his attitude toward the investigation, social attitudes, opportunities to commit the offense; the victim, his age, status, family responsibilities, financial and social circumstances, characteristics, etc. The points that are the subject of inquiry may differ from case to case. - The questions, therefore, must to a great degree depend upon the Judge making the investigation. At
- The respondent Judge examined the prosecution witnesses by reading to them "all over again the questions and answers" in their statements in writing, and the witnesses-affiants declared before said Judge that the questions were propounded by TSgt. Candido Patosa, and that the answers were made by them. - The affiants signed their respective affidavits in the presence of the respondent Judge, who also signed after the usual procedure of administering the oath. - Considering the answers of the affiants to the, questions contained in their sworn statements, together with the postmortem and autopsy report on the dead body of the victim Jaime Diaz Ng, the certificate of death, the sketch showing the position of the victim and the accused, the respondent Judge opine that there was reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder had been committed and the amused was probably guilty thereof. - Respondent Judge issued the order and warrant of arrest, specifying therein that no bail should be accepted for the provisional release of the accused. - Upon motion of petitioner upon the ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong, respondent Judge issued an order, granting bail,; which order, however, respondent Judge later revoked, and petitioner was denied bail. - The case was subsequently remanded to the CFI of Surigao del Sur, after petitioner filed a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation. - Respondent Provincial Fiscal filed an information charging petitioner with the crime of murder. The petitioner was detained in the provincial jail. - Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the CFI of Surigao del Sur, claiming that he was being deprived of liberty without due process of law, on the ground that the imprisonment and detention was the result of a warrant of arrest issued by respondent Judge in violation of Republic Act No. 3828, and praying for the annulment of the order for his arrest and his discharge from confinement. - Respondents filed their answer, alleging that Republic Act Nor. 3828 had been substantially complied with; that a motion to quash, and not a petition for habeas corpus was the proper remedy, and that petitioner's application for bail constituted a
waiver of the right to question the validity of the arrest. - The CFI of Surigao del Sur ruled that respondent Municipal Judge had substantially complied with Republic Act No. 3828, and consequently denied the application for the writ of habeas corpus, and dismissed the case. - Hence the appeal. Petitioners Claim Republic Act No. 3828 imposes on a municipal judge, before he can issue a warrant of arrest, two specific duties, to wit: (1) personally examine the complainant and witnesses with "searching questions and answers," which means that the judge must cross-examine them in case their affidavits are presented; and (2) said examination must be reduced to writing and form part of the records of the case. The record of the instant case, does not show that said examination was performed by respondent Judge notwithstanding his testimony to the effect that he adopted the questions propounded to each of the prosecution witnesses by T-Sgt. Patosa. And assuming that the adoption of the questions made by T-Sgt. Patosa constituted substantial compliance with the requirement that the judge should examine the witnesses by asking searching questions, still the second requirement, that of reducing to writing the said procedure of adoption, has not been compiled with; and so, Republic Act No. 3828 was still violated, and the issuance of the warrant of arrest was in violation of said Act and the Constitution and constituted denial of due process. ISSUES 1. WON the trial court erred in giving absolute credence to the testimony of respondent Municipal Judge. 2. WON the requirements of Republic Act No. 3828 was satisfied. 3. WON the issuance of the warrant of arrest was a violation of the Constitution and of procedural due process. 4. WON the trial court erred in denying the writ of habeas corpus. HELD 1. NO - As a general rule, the lower court's findings, as to the credibility of witnesses will not be interfered with by appellate courts. Since petitioner appealed directly to this Court he must, raise only questions of law and he has thereby waived the right to raise any question of fact, and the findings of facts of the trial
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- September 29: While this case was pending, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information against Rosario, private respondent, for double physical injuries; double less serious physical injuries; and damage to property thru reckless imprudence, in CFI Urdaneta. - Rosario was prosecuted and convicted by the trial court in the criminal case. CA acquitted him from the crime charged on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. - April 3, 1972: Respondents filed a "Request for Admission" in the civil case, requesting petitioners to admit the truthfulness of the facts set forth as well as the correctness and genuineness of the documents attached. - May 5,1972: Petitioners filled a "Manifestation", admitting the allegations in the "Request for Admission" with some qualifications. Later, both parties submitted their respective memoranda. - December 28, 1972: On the basis of the testimonies and evidence submitted by the petitioners, as well as the records of the criminal case attached in the "Request for Admission" of the private respondents, CFI Manila rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint of the petitioners against private respondents as well as the counterclaim of private respondents against the petitioners. - February 13, 1978: CA affirmed Petitioners Version Bernabe Castillo was driving his jeep on the northbound lane of the McArthur Highway with his wife, father, and child at the rate of 25 kph. Just past San Nicolas bridge, he noticed, from a distance of 120 meters more or less, a speeding oncoming car along the same lane he was driving, overtaking a cargo truck ahead of it. - He switched on his headlights to signal the car to return to its own right lane as the way was not clear for it to overtake the truck. The signal was disregarded, as the car proceeded on its direction. - To evade the collision, he swerved his jeep to the right towards the shoulder and applied on the brakes, leaving his feet on it, even, immediately after the impact. The car rested on the shoulder of the right lane. The jeep's rear left wheel was on the road, leaving short tire marks behind it; while the car left long tire marks, specially its left rear wheel. Respodents Version Juanito Rosario who was driving the car, with his wife and daughter, were along MacArthur Highway going southwards. They saw ahead of them a big heavily loaded cargo truck. The truck was moving very slowly because of its heavy load so that Rosario decided to overtake it. But before doing so, he first saw to it that the road was clear and as additional precautionary measure,
validity of the warrant of arrest for allegedly having been issued in violation of Republic Act No. 3828 which was found to be untenable. - The remedy available to the petitioner herein, under the circumstances stated in this opinion, is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the respondent Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal. - The Court stressed that what has been stated in the opinion was not intended to sanction the return to the former practice of municipal judges of simply relying upon affidavits or sworn statements that are made to accompany the complaints that are filed before them, in determining whether there is a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. - That practice is precisely what is sought to be voided by the amendment of Section 87 (c) of Republic Act 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) which requires that before a municipal judge issues a warrant of arrest he should first satisfy himself that there is a probable cause by examining the witnesses personally, and that the examination must be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. - It is obvious that the purpose of this amendment is to prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest against a person based simply upon affidavits of witnesses who made, and swore to, their statements before a person or persons other than the judge before whom the criminal complaint is filed. Dispositive The decision of the trial court appealed from, was affirmed. Costs against petitionerappellant.
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counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Dispositive Petition denied
contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasidelictos or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case. - But this rule is not without exception. Thus, Section 2 (c) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides: Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration from a final judgment that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. - In a previous case, CA-G.R. No. 07684-CR, People v. Rosario, the CA after a painstaking analysis of. (a) the testimonial evidence; (b) the relative positions of the two vehicles as depicted in the sketches; (c) the distance of each of the two vehicles from the cemented edge of the road; (d) the point of impact; (e) the visible tire marks, and (f) the extent of the damage caused upon each of the two vehicles, ruled that it was the driver of the jeep and not the accused driver of the car who was negligent and accordingly acquitted the latter. - Negligence, being the source and foundation of actions of quasi-delict, is the basis for the recovery of damages. In the case at bar, the CA found that collision was not due to the negligence of Rosario but rather it was Castillo's own act of driving the jeep to the shoulder of the road where the car was, which was actually the proximate cause of the collision. With this finding, the CA exonerated Rosario from civil liability on the ground that the alleged negligence did not exist. - During the trial of the case before the CFI, respondents were not present because they were abroad. Their counsel introduced as part of their evidence, the records in the criminal case, in accordance with Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These records, mostly composed of transcripts of the hearing in the criminal case, were attached to their "Request for Admission" and were substantially admitted by petitioners. Petitioners raised, as one of their objections, the propriety and correctness of admitting and adopting these transcripts as part of the record in the civil case. According to them, this is a violation of Section 41, Rule 130, on the ground that petitioners were not given the opportunity to cross-examine. We disagree. A careful reading of the transcripts would reveal that counsel for petitioners actively participated during the proceedings of the criminal case. He raised various objections, in the course of the trial. Petitioners, therefore, thru
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that the books (etc) relating to the activities of . . . as usurer, are being kept and concealed in the house. . . all of which is contrary to the statute of law." ISSUE WON the search warrant and the seizure were illegal HELD YES -Reason 1: it appears that the affidavits, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrants, are insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oaths were made and, therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrants in question and the subsequent seizure of the documents and papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioners were subjected. -The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. -Sec 1, par 3, of Art III, Constitution: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Sec 97 of General Orders No. 58: "A search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized." - Both provisions require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully.
Evangelista. The text of both affidavits reads as follows: "Victor D. Villamiel having taken the oath prescribed by law, appears and states: that he has and there is just and probable cause to believe and he does believe that the books, lists, chits, receipts, documents, and other papers relating to the activities of Juan Evangelista, as usurer, are being kept and concealed in the house of said Juan Evangelista situated at Lucena, Tayabas, all of which is contrary to the statute of law." -The justice of the peace of the provincial capital issued the two search warrants against the petitioners (see original for the wording of the warrant) -Villamiel, with other agents and a constabulary soldier, executed the warrants, went to the residences of the petitioners, searched them and seized documents and papers belonging to petitioners. Villamiel issued a receipt to each of the petitioners, without specifying the documents and papers seized by him, which were taken to his office in Manila, keeping them there until he was ordered by the CFI to deposit them in the office of the clerk of court. -Petitioners filed a petition praying that the search warrants be declared null and void and illegal; that Villamiel be punished for contempt of court for having conducted the searches and for having seized the documents and papers without issuing detailed receipts and for not having turned them over to the court, and that said documents and papers be ordered returned to the petitioners. -the CFI found Villamiel guilty of contempt of court and fined him P10. The court declared the search warrants and the seizure of the documents and papers VALID, authorizing the agents of the AntiUsury Board to examine them and retain those that are necessary and material to whatever criminal action they may wish to bring against the petitioners. -Petitioners appealed. They contend that the search warrants issued by the court are illegal because they have been based on the affidavits of special agent Villamiel wherein he affirmed and stated that he had no personal knowledge of the facts that were to serve as basis for the issuance of the search warrants, but merely confined himself to asserting that he believed and there was probable cause to believe that the documents and papers were related to the activities of the petitioners as usurers. As has been seen, the special agent's affirmation in this respect consisted merely in the following: "that he has and there is just and probable cause to believe and he does believe
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3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. > although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles belonging to his copetitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized. > real properties were seized under the disputed warrants. > that documents relied on by respondents could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution ISSUES WON the two search warrants are: 1. defective for stating only one and the same place to be searched 2. null and void for including properties not owned by the person named in the warrants 3. null and void for including real properties 4. null and void for being violative of the constitution, thus encroaching on petitioners' fundamental rights HELD 1. NO - The defect pointed out is a typographical error. Two search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. The addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent than real. - In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit. And it has also been said that the executing
BURGOS SR v CHIEF OF STAFF 133 SCRA 800 ESCOLIN; December 26, 1984
NATURE Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction FACTS - December 7, 1982 Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued two search warrants under
which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, business address of Metropolitan Mail newspaper, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business address of the "We Forum" newspaper were searched. - office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. - The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla, Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982. - Respondents aver that the case should be dismissed on the ground that petitioners had come to SC without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before the issuing judge. But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, SC took cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised, not to mention the public interest generated by the search. - Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches, since said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, but the instant petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983. However, SC found that the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them. Petitioners' Claims > Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the constitution as well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. However, SC found that as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses, this issue is moot and academic. > Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20-82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road
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Masamlok to join the NPA. He later attended an NPA seminar where Burgos, the first speaker, said very distinctly that he is an NPA together with his companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he encouraged the group to overthrow the government. To prove illegal possession, a person in charge of firearms and explosives of the PC HQ in Davao testified that accused was not among the list of firearm holders - On the other hand, accused-appellants claims that he was taken to the PC barracks and when he denied ownership of the gun, he was beaten, tortured, mauled and subjected to physical agony. He was forced to admit possession or ownership of the gun. 2 witnesses as well as Rubens wife Urbana, were presented by the defense in support of the accuseds denial of the charge against him. Urbana claimed that it was Masamlok who left the firearm there. - The RTC after considering the evidences presented by both prosecution and defense convicted accused Ruben Burgos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of subversion. The RTC justified the warrantless arrest as falling under one of the circumstances when arrests may be validly made without a warrant, under Rule 113 Sec.6 of the Rules of Court. It stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that the authorities received an urgent report of accused's involvement in subversive activities from a reliable source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest, even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the ambit of Sec. 6(a) of Rule 113 and applicable jurisprudence on the matter. If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the alleged subversive documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Sec. 12. A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. ISSUES 1. WON the arrest was lawful and WON the search of his house and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and documents conducted in a lawful manner. 2. WON there is enough evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. HELD 1. NO Art.III Sec.2 of the Constitution safeguards against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." - the search warrants are in the nature of general warrants. - As a consequence of the search and seizure, the premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. Dispositive Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 2082[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are null and void. All articles seized thereunder are ordered released to petitioners.
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surrendered to the military, certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with subversion. Masamlok may be considered as an interested witness. His testimony cannot be said to be free from the opportunity and temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom. Moreover, despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA seminar who could have corroborated Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in furtherance of subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never presented any other witness. Dispositive Judgment of conviction is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused Burgos is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.
they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. - The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok who was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest. Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein. 2. NO. Since the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents are inadmissible in evidence, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge is the testimony of Masamlok, which is inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. Reasoning Although it is true that the trial court found Masamloks testimony credible and convincing, the SC is not necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated in People v Cabrera (100 SCRA 424): When it comes to question of credibility the findings of the trial court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious reason that it was able to observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the witnesses during the trial. But We have also said that this rule is not absolute for otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must reject the findings of the trial court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and substance which were not properly appreciated by the trial court. In the instant case, Masamloks testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlok
FACTS - On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine marines and elements of the home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. - The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a "zona," which was like the feared practice of the kempeitai during the Japanese Occupation of rounding up the people in a locality, arresting the persons fingered by a hooded informer, and executing them outright (although the last part is not included in the modern refinement). - The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion with a burst of gunfire. The soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in a number of casualties. - 16 male occupants were arrested, later to be fingerprinted, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several rounds of ammunition found in the premises.
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hereby declared ILLEGAL and all the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners in any proceedings. However, the said articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the criminal cases that have been or may later be filed against the petitioners.
searches and seizures. There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the repressions committed therein against the petitioners. - The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or fugitives from justice. At the time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily pronounced by the military. - lacking the shield of innocence, the guilty need the armor of the Constitution, to protect them, not from a deserved sentence, but from arbitrary punishment. Every person is entitled to due process. It is no exaggeration that the basest criminal, ranged against the rest of the people who would condemn him outright, is still, under the Bill of Rights, a majority of one. - The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. - Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the search and seizure be nonetheless considered valid because it was incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not. If all the law enforcement authorities have to do is force their way into any house and then pick up anything they see there on the ground that the occupants are resisting arrest, then we might as well delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy. - If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor. - It follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is
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circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated. Dispositive The petition is denied
HELD NO Ratio - The argument of the Solicitor General that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was actually committing or had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police officers and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is untenable. At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant. However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa (to quote: Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Where,
for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions ? which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times.) - In this case, the warrantless search and seizure is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late. - In People vs. CFI of Rizal, the Court held as follows: . . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the mechanics prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be followed and satisfied. But We need not argue that there are exceptions. Thus in the extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
ALLADO v DIOKNO [supra, page 48] MALALOAN v CA (FINEZA) 232 SCRA 249 REGALADO; May 6, 1994
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA. FACTS - 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, QUEZON CITY. On March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of KALOOKAN CITY issued Search Warrant No. 95-90. - On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research (EILER) was then taking place. According to CAPCOM's 'Inventory of Property Seized,' firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents, among others, were seized and taken during the search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises searched were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were later released, with the exception of the herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who were indicted for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco. - On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a 'Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence'
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witnesses to and their examination in said places, with the attendant risk, danger and expense. Also, a further well-founded precaution, obviously born of experience and verifiable data, is articulated by the court a quo, as quoted by respondent court: "This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of information which is of utmost importance in the issuance of a search warrant is secured (against) where the issuing magistrate within the region does not hold court sessions in the city or municipality, within the region, where the place to be searched is located." - The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were taken into account in the foreign judicial pronouncement that, in the absence of statutory restrictions, a justice of the peace in one district of the county may issue a search warrant to be served in another district of the county and made returnable before the justice of still another district or another court having jurisdiction to deal with the matters involved. In the present state of our law on the matter, we find no such statutory restrictions both with respect to the court which can issue the search warrant and the enforcement thereof anywhere in the Philippines. - NONETHELESS, TO PUT DOUBTS TO REST, THE SUPREME COURT LAID DOWN THE FOLLOWING POLICY GUIDELINES; 1. The Court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover. 2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived. 3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the
Transitional Rules and Guidelines, certain specified writs issued by a regional trial court are now enforceable only within its judicial region. - PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it is extremely difficult, as it undeniably is, to detect or elicit information regarding the existence and location of illegally possessed or prohibited articles. The Court is accordingly convinced that it should not make the requisites for the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of such illicit items, once detected, more onerous if not impossible by imposing further niceties of procedure or substantive rules of jurisdiction through decisional dicta. For that matter, we are unaware of any instance wherein a search warrant was struck down on objections based on territorial jurisdiction. - We do not believe that the enforcement of a search warrant issued by a court outside the territorial jurisdiction wherein the place to be searched is located would create a constitutional question. Nor are we swayed by the professed apprehension that the law enforcement authorities may resort to what could be a permutation of forum shopping, by filing an application for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It need merely be recalled that a search warrant is only a process, not an action. Furthermore, the constitutional mandate is translated into specifically enumerated safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for the issuance of a search warrant, and all these have to be observed regardless of whatever court in whichever region is importuned for or actually issues a search warrant. Said requirements, together with the ten-day lifetime of the warrant would discourage resort to a court in another judicial region, not only because of the distance but also the contingencies of travel and the danger involved, unless there are really compelling reasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it does seem odd that such constitutional protests have not been made against warrants of arrest which are enforceable indefinitely and anywhere although they involve, not only property and privacy, but persons and liberty. - On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the authorities have to contend now and then with local and national criminal syndicates of considerable power and influence, political or financial in nature, and so pervasive as to render foolhardy any attempt to obtain a search warrant in the very locale under their sphere of control. Nor should we overlook the fact that to do so will necessitate the transportation of applicant's
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favor of the unlimited power of a court to issue search warrants. - I have serious misgivings on the majority decision on the matter where another court may, because of extreme and compelling circumstances, issue a search warrant in connection with a criminal case pending in an appropriate court. To illustrate this exception, the Municipal Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, may validly issue a warrant for the search of a house in Davao City and the seizure of any property therein that may have been used in committing an offense in Manila already the subject of an information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. I submit that the exception violates the settled principle that even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the first court which acquires jurisdiction over the case acquires it to the exclusion of the other. (People vs. Fernando, 23 SCRA 867, 870 [1968]). This being so, it is with more reason that a court which does not have concurrent jurisdiction with the first which had taken cognizance of the case does not also have the authority to issue writs or processes, including search warrants, in connection with the pending case. Moreover, since the issuance of a search warrants is an incident to a main case or is an exercise of the ancillary jurisdiction of a court, the court where the main case is filed has exclusive jurisdiction over all incidents thereto and in the issuance of all writs and processes in connection therewith. Furthermore, instead of serving the ends of justice, the exception may provide room for unwarranted abuse of the judicial process, wreak judicial havoc and procedural complexities which effective law enforcement apparently cannot justify. I cannot conceive of any extreme and compelling circumstance which the court that first acquired jurisdiction over the case cannot adequately meet within its broad powers and authority. - In the light of the foregoing, and after re-examining my original view in this case, I respectfully submit that: 1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed may validly entertain an application for and issue a search warrant in connection with said crime. However, in the National Capital Judicial Region, Administrative Circulars No. 13 of 1 October 1985, and No. 19 of 4 August 1987 must be observed. 2. After the criminal complaint or information is filed with the appropriate court, search warrants in connection with the crime charged may only be issued by said court.
Philippines. Simply put, all courts of justice in the Philippines have, for purposes of issuing a search warrant, jurisdiction over the entire archipelago. - I cannot subscribe to this view since, in the first place, a search warrant is but an incident to a main case and involves the exercise of an ancillary jurisdiction therefore, the authority to issue it must necessarily be co-extensive with the court's territorial jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be to add an exception to the statutory provisions defining the territorial jurisdiction of the various courts of the country, which would amount to judicial legislation. The territorial jurisdiction of the courts is determined by law, and a reading of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 discloses that the territorial jurisdiction of regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts are confined to specific territories. In the second place, the majority view may legitimize abuses that would result in the violation the civil rights of an accused or the infliction upon him of undue and unwarranted burdens and inconvenience as when, for instance, an accused who is a resident of Basco, Batanes, has to file a motion to quash a search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with an offense he allegedly committed in Itbayat, Batanes. - Nor can Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383) be an authoritative confirmation of the unlimited or unrestricted power of any court to issue search warrants in connection with crimes committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. While it may be true that the forty-two search warrants involved therein were issued by several Judges ---- specifically Judges (a) Amado Roan of the City Court of Manila, (b) Roman Cansino of the City Court of Manila, (c) Hermogenes Caluag of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch), (d) Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig Branch), and (e) Damian Jimenez of the City Court of Quezon City (Footnote 2, page 387) ---- there is no definite showing that the forty-two search warrants were for the searches and seizures of properties outside the territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts. The warrants were issued against the petitioners and corporations of which they were officers and some of the corporations enumerated in Footnote 7 have addressed in Manila and Makati. (pp. 388-89). Rizal (which includes Makati) and Quezon City both belonged to the Seventh Judicial District. That nobody challenged on jurisdictional ground the issuance of these search warrants is no argument in
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or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. It is not for instance permitted for an accused, upon the filing of the information against him by the public prosecutor, to preempt trial by filing a motion with the Trial Court praying for the quash or dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the evidence upon which the same is based is inadequate. Nor is it permitted, on the antipodal theory that the evidence is in truth inadequate, for the complaining party to present a petition before the Court praying that the public prosecutor be compelled to file the corresponding information against the accused. xxx xxx xxx - Indeed, the public prosecutor has broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he or she believes to have committed the crime as defined by law. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case list be filed in court. - Crespo v. Mogul: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence, in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private persons. Judicial Determination of Probable Cause - The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial must be distinguished from the determination of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, which is a judicial function. The judicial determination of probable cause in the issuance of arrest warrants has been emphasized in numerous cases. - The rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim, Sr. were iterated in Allado v. Diokno, where we explained again what probable cause means. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the
ISSUE WON the Trial Court had the authority to reverse the public prosecutor's finding of probable cause to prosecute accused and thus dismiss the case filed by the latter on the basis of a motion to quash warrant of arrest HELD NO Ratio The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function, the correctness of the exercise of which is matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. - If the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for 'want of evidence,' because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial. The functions and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in "the proper scheme of things" in our criminal justice system should be clearly understood. Reasoning: Executive Determination of Probable Cause - The Separate (Concurring) Opinion of former Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Roberts v. Court of Appeals : xxxthe Court is being asked to examine and assess such evidence as has thus far been submitted by the parties and, on the basis thereof, make a conclusion as to whether or not it suffices "to engender a well founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial." - It is a function that this Court should not be called upon to perform. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor., one that, as far as crimes cognizable by a Regional Trial Court are concerned, and notwithstanding that it involves an adjudicative process of a sort, exclusively pertains, by law, to said executive officer, the public prosecutor. It is moreover a function that in the established scheme of things, is supposed to be performed at the very genesis of, indeed, prefatorily to, the formal commencement of a criminal action. The proceedings before a public prosecutor, it may well be stressed, are essentially preliminary, prefatory and cannot lead to a final, definite and authoritative adjudgment of the guilt or innocence of the persons charged with a felony or crime. Whether
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damaging publicity against him." The rulings in the two aforementioned cases cannot apply to it.
PEOPLE v USANA and LOPEZ 323 SCRA 754 DAVIDE; January 28, 2000
NATURE Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting the two accused together with Julian D. Escano for the violation of R.A. 6425, as amended FACTS - On the 5th of April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban, some law enforcers of the Makati Police were manning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway. They were checking the cars going to Pasay City, stopping those they found suspicious, and imposing merely a running stop on the others. At about past midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride car with Plate No. TBH 493. One of the policemen saw a long firearm on the lap of the person seated at the passenger seat, who was later identified as Virgilio Usana. They asked the driver, identified as Escao, to open the door. PO3 Suba seized the long firearm, an M-1 US Carbine, from Usana. When Escao, upon order of the police, parked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the other passengers were search for more weapons. Their search yielded a .45 caliber firearm which they seized from Escao. - The three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station Block 5 in the Kia Pride driven by PO3 Nonato. Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned over the key to the desk officer. Since SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious of the vehicle, he requested Escao to open the trunk. Escao readily agreed and opened the trunk himself using his key. They noticed a blue bag inside it, which they asked Escao to open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape, which, upon examination by National Bureau of Investigation, was found positive for hashish. - An information for violation of RA 6425 thereafter was filed against them. The trial court found the three accused guilty of the said crime. - Accused-appellants assail the manner by which the checkpoint in question was conducted. They contend that the checkpoint manned by elements of the Makati Police should have been announced. They also complain of its having been conducted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. Also, they question the validity of the search.
ISSUES 1. WON the check point was illegal 2. WON the search was valid 3. WON the accused are guilty of violation of RA 6425 HELD 1. NO - Not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. Ratio This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicles occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. - The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs. - The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening the cars doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands. We see no need for checkpoints to be announced, as the accused have invoked. Not only would it be impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend
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committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; - Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." - In the case, Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buybust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. - However, the warrantless arrest, search and seizure of Gaddao is invalid - Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught redhanded during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." 114 In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. - Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." In case, there was no reasonable suspicion especially as she was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her coaccused - Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs as Doria may have left the money in her house, with or without her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria 's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. - As the arrest was illegal, the search and seizure is not incidental to the arrest 2. NO - The marijuana was not in plain view of the police officers and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution as the contents of the box where the marijuana was partially hidden was not readily apparent to PO Manlangit, one of the arresting officers.
FACTS - Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. They decided to entrap him via a buy-bust operation. -The poseur-buyer, PO2 Manlangit set aside 1600 pesos as marked money for the entrapment operation, which was then handed to Jun upon transaction. Jun returned an hour later bringing marijuana where he and his associates subsequently arrested Jun but did not find the marked bills on him. Jun said he left the bills to his associate Neneth. Jun led the police to Neneths house. - The police went to Neneths house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. They also found the marked bills. They arrested Jun and Neneth and brought them to headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. - The trial court found them guilty. ISSUES 1. WON the warrantless arrest of Doria and Gaddao, the search of the latters person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom is valid 2. WON the marijuana was seized validly for being in plain view of the police officers HELD 1. YES - We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accusedappellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
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are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary. -in many cases, drug pushers did sell their prohibited articles to prospective customers, be they strangers or not, in private as well as in public places, even in the daytime. Indeed, some drug pushers appear to have become exceedingly daring, openly defiant of the law. Hence, what matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, or the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement as well as the act constituting sale and delivery of prohibited drugs 2. YES Ratio: The arrest was within the purview of Sec5 (a), Rule 113, Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: Arrest without warrant, when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; Reasoning: -Elamparo assails the legality of his arrest for failure of the apprehending officers to secure a search warrant. - for warrantless arrests, 2 elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating the he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Thus, when he was seen repacking the marijuana, the police officers were not only authorized but also duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. Re: warrantless seizures: -However, not being absolute, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is subject to exceptions. Thus, for example, Sec.12, Rule 126, Rules on CrimPro, provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. -5 generally accepted exceptions to the right against warrantless searches and seizures have also been judicially formulated, viz: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. - this case falls squarely under the plain view doctrine People v Doria: Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have
happened on the same day (12 Feb 1995), while the information for illegal possession of drugs was filed on 15 Feb 1995. - Arraignment: plea of not guilty. - Trial: prosecution presented the ff witnesses: police officer who was also poseur-buyer, another officer who took part in buy-bust, and NBI chemist who examined and confirmed the confiscated drugs to be marijuana. Defense presented as witnesses boarders of Elamparos house, saying that Elamparo was at their house when somebody knocked at their door. His father opened the same and was informed that somebody was looking for him. He went out and saw Spencer with handcuffs and being held by an arresting officer. When Elamparo persistently questioned Spencer as to why he was arrested, the arresting officers got mad at him prompting them to likewise bring him to the police station where he was detained. The officers demanded P15,000.00 for his release which he did not give. On the other hand, Spencer gave the sum and was released. - RTC: Guilty, under RA 6425. penalty of reclusion perpetua and fine of P9million. Elamparo appealed. ISSUE: 1. WON RTC was correct in the assessment of credibility of witnesses 2. WON the arrest of Elamparo was valid 3. WON the penalty imposed was correct HELD: 1. YES Ratio: Unless the trial court overlooked substantial facts which would affect the outcome of the case, we accord the utmost respect to their findings of facts. Reasoning: -Elamparo contends that it is highly unusual for arresting officers to act on an information of an unknown source without confirming the veracity of the report, and that it is incredible that a peddler of marijuana would be so brazen as to approach total strangers and offer to sell them marijuana. He insists that he was charged with illegal possession of marijuana because he failed to pay the police officers P15,000.00 for his release. - it is well-settled that the assessment of credibility of witnesses is within the province of the trial court which had an opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during their testimonies. As compared to the baseless claims of Elamparo, the version of the prosecution witnesses appears worthy of belief, coming as it does from law enforcers who
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- January 13, 1995 - TC convicted the accused of murder - February 10, 1995 - both accused appealed to SC where accused questioned TCs failure (a) to hear the petition for bail (b) to consider defense of relative in favor of Ramil Manes and (c) to take note that Sergon Manes was a mere victim of Tamorite's unlawful aggression According to the prosecution > June 23, 1991 5 in the afternoon, ALAN Catequista with NICANOR Tamorite and JOSE Cubita, went to see a basketball game at the barangay plaza. When the game was over, Alan approached and invited Nicanor to go home; at that time, he was still seated. Accused RAMIL Manes approached Nicanor and pointed a 38 caliber revolver at him, saying "It is a bad luck you did not kill me during the fiesta in Barangay Cabayugan. Now I will be the one to kill you." Nicanor ran to Alan and used him as a shield from Ramil. At that point, Alan heard a thud and as he looked back, he saw accused SERGON Manes with a gory knife and he also saw Nicanor running away, with blood on his back. Ramil Manes pursued Nicanor and shot him hitting him at the back, just above the waistline. Both accused continued to chase Nicanor who ran towards the premises of the house of ADING Ablado. Ramil Manes fired two more shots. It could not be determined whether those shots hit Nicanor as he and the accused were already inside the premises of the fence of Ading. Jose who was near Nicanor when the two accused chased him did not render assistance to him. After Alan heard the two shots, he and Jose ran home. Alan told his father and uncle that Sergon stabbed Nicanor and that Ramil shot him. Alan, his father, uncle, Jose and the mother of Nicanor then went to where the body of Nicanor was in the downhill portion of the premises of the house of Ading. Nicanor was lying on his back, with 2 wounds on the breast, 1 gunshot wound and 1 stab wound. According to the accused(Ramil) > June 23, 1991 in the afternoon, he was at home cooking. At around 5:00 to 5:30, he heard shouts coming from the direction of the barangay basketball court, which was about ten (10) meters away from his house. He went to the window to check what it was. He saw his younger brother Sergon lying on the concrete pavement and several persons were ganging up on him, three of whom he identified as Nicanor, Alan and Jose. They kept on boxing and kicking his brother prompting him to come to the latter's aid. On his way out, he saw a gun on top of
imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Dispositive Petition AFFIRMED with modification.
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ISSUE - WON the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse despite a showing by the prosecutor that there is strong evidence proving respondents guilt for the crime charged. HELD YES - The SC held that the CA and the lower court failed to mention and include some facts which are significant factors and circumstances which are strong, clear, and convincing. Consideration of the said factors and circumstances would have resulted in the denial of bail. Reasoning - Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. - Section 7 Rule 4 of the Rules of court provides: No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of criminal prosecution. - In the case at bar, bail is discretionary and not a matter of right considering that the punishment for the offense is reclusion perpetua. the grant of the bail is dependent on the evidence of the guilt which should which should be strong to justify denial. this determination is a matter of judicial discretion. - By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong. Proof evident or evident proof is this connection, has been held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that an offense has been committed as charged, that the accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is administered. Presumption great exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion. In other words, the test is not whether
not harbor any fear in presenting himself to the proper authorities. - even though prosecution failed to show evident premeditation, trial court correctly considered treachery as qualifying the killing of the victim to murder. Dispositive we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court convicting accused-appellants Sergon Manes and Ramil Manes of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties of the law and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Nicanor Tamorite in the amount of P50,000.00, plus P21,250.00, as actual damages.
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d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused; - Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him. Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled. He then filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his arraignment. - Trial court denied petitioners motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend arraignment. - Petitioner was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions and the "hold-departure" order. The pretrial conference was set. - Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in CA, assailing the trial courts orders. - While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations were filed against petitioner, bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which were all consolidated. - CA: a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases; b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;] - CA invalidated the first two conditions imposed in the May 16, 1997 order for the grant of bail to petitioner but ruled that the issue concerning the validity of the condition making arraignment a prerequisite for the approval of petitioners bail bonds to be moot and academic. It noted "that petitioner has posted the cash bonds; that when arraigned, represented by lawyers, he pleaded not guilty to each offense; and that he has already been released from detention." CA thought that the aforesaid conditions in the May 16, 1997 order were contrary to Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution which provides that "[a]fter arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable." - With respect to the denial of petitioners motion to quash the informations against him, CA held that petitioner could not question the same in a petition
LAVIDES v CA (PISON and PEOPLE) 324 SCRA 321 MENDOZA; February 1, 2000
FACTS - Lavides was arrested for child abuse under R.A. 7610. His arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. - Parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioners room at the Metropolitan Hotel. This was not the first time the police received reports of petitioners activities. An entrapment operation was therefore set in motion. The police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. 7610 was filed. - Petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged." - Nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn Talingting. In all the cases, it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations, petitioner had sexual intercourse with complainants who had been "exploited in prostitution and . . . given money [by petitioner] as payment for the said [acts of] sexual intercourse." - No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for bail in the nine cases. - Trial court granted the right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under the following conditions: a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases; b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia; c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and
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PEOPLE v MARK JIMENEZ G.R. No. 148571 PANGANIBAN; September 24, 2002
NATURE Petition for certiorari praying for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody FACTS - The US govt through diplomatic channels sent to the Phil. govt a note requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of the Extradition Law. - Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a TRO by the RTC of Manila, which prohibited the DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The TRO was assailed byt the Sec. of Justice. Initially, the court dismissed the petition but after acting upon the motion for reconsideration, it reversed its earlier decision. It held that Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. - Finding no more legal obstacle, the US govt, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC the appropriate Petition for Extradition. The Petition alleged that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the US District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses; (2) tax evasion; (3) wire fraud (4) false statements, and (5) illegal campaign contributions. - In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069 - Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,"which prayed that application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. RTC grantes the motion of Jimenez. In that hearing, he manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, the court a
accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under Rule 114, 2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia." - Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt,9 [Rule 116, 1(b)] (b) during trial whenever necessary for identification purposes, and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case the accused may appear by counsel or representative.11 [Rule 120, 6.] At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived. - Although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the arraignment of petitioner on May 23, 1997 was also invalid. Contrary to petitioners contention, the arraignment did not emanate from the invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment." Even without such a condition, the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum, although the condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are valid. - Petitioner concedes that the rule is that the remedy of an accused whose motion to quash is denied is not to file a petition for certiorari but to proceed to trial without prejudice to his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash during trial on the merits or on appeal if an adverse judgment is rendered against him. However, he argues that this case should be treated as an exception. He contends that the Court of Appeals should not have evaded the issue of whether he should be charged under several informations corresponding to the number of acts of child abuse allegedly committed by him against each of the complainants. Dispositive The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and another one is RENDERED declaring the orders dated May 16, 1997 and May 23, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City to be valid, with the exception of condition (d) in the second paragraph of the order of May 16, 1997 (making arraignment a prerequisite to the grant of bail to petitioner), which is hereby declared void.
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Art.III Sec 5, par (a), subpar (5) of RA 7610 8 stating that, said Fitzgerald, actuated by lust, and by the use of drugs willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induced complainant AAA, a minor, 13 years of age, to engage in prostitution by then and there showering said AAA with gifts, clothes and food and thereafter having carnal knowledge of her in violation of the aforesaid law and to her damage and prejudice. - RTC rendered a decision finding respondent Guilty of Sec 5, par (a), subpar (5) of RA 7610 and sentenced to an indeterminate term of prision mayor min (8Y 1D) to prision temporal max (17Y 4M 1D). Upon completion of his sentence, he shall be deported immediately and forever barred from entry to the Philippines. He was acquitted on the case of rape. On the basis of the evidence adduced, the court considered the view that the the circumstances of the accused indicate a probability of flight and that there is undue risk that the accused may commit a similar offense, if released on bail pending appeal. - On appeal, CA affirmed the conviction, modifying the penalty to imprisonment of prision temporal (14Y 8M 1D) to reclusion perpetua (20Y 1D) - Fitzgerald filed for a Motion for a New Trial and a supplemental appeal to the motion on the ground that new material of evidence not previously available has surfaced. CA granted the motion for new trial. The original records of the case were remanded to the RTC, which was also directed to receive new evidence. The motion to transfer the respondent to the National Penitentiary was denied. - The people file a MFR, while Fitzgerald filed a Motion to fix bail with Manifestation. Both motions were denied by CA. The bail application was denied pursuant to Sec.7 Rule 114 ROC. The maximum penalty imposable in accordance with RA 7610 is reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong. - The people filed a petition fro review on certiorari. It was dismissed which became final and executory. - Fitzgerald filed with CA a Motion for Early Transmittal of the Records and for the ReExamination of the Penalty Imposed and a Motion for Bail. CA issued the assailed resolution granting bail. It stated that although the evidence of guilt is strong, Fitzgerald is of old age and not in the best of health. Bail was granted premised not on the grounds stated in the motion for bail, but on substantial justice and considering new trial was granted in the case.
8
distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court. - Also, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors. > - The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition. Dispositive the Petition is GRANTED. The bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law.
Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act
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witnesses for the prosecution; all of the other defendants were present, were duly arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and were represented by a lawyer; that after the prosecution had closed its case against all of the said defendants except Rufino Lavarias, the court discovered that Rufino Lavarias was outside the court room. Upon discovering this fact the court ordered the said defendant Rufino Lavarias to appear in the court room, and then and there recalled one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Regino Maminta, and proceeded to examine him with reference to the part Rufino Lavarias took in the said robbery charged in the complaint, without arraigning the said Rufino Lavarias, reading to him the complaint, or informing him that he had the right to be represented by an attorney during the trial, in accordance with the provisions of sections 16, 17, and 18 of General Orders, No. 58. ISSUE WON the court did not comply with the provisions of sections 16, 17, and 18 of General Order No. 58 HELD YES. Rufino Lavarias was not arraigned. Dispositive The judgment of the court with reference to Rufino Lavarias is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the CFI Pangasinan for the purpose of a new trial. The court is affirmed as to the sentence of Fabiano Diadib and Inocencio Valerio on the ground of sufficiency of evidence.
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is strong. 9 - RTC and CA were unanimous in their findings of the existence of strong evidence of guilt. Under Sec 6(b) Rule 121, the grant of a new trial allows for reception of newly discovered evidence, but maintains evidence already presented or on record. In the present case, no new evidence had been introduced negating the earlier findings of the RTC and CA. Bail was not a matter of right but a mere privilege subject to the discretion of CA. - However, the CA admitted that the bail was based on health reasons disregarding the substantive and procedural requirements on bail. - CA made no specific findings that the respondent suffered from an ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. - Moreover, there is finding on the record on the potential risk of respondent committing a similar offense. Dispositive petition is granted and the CA resolution annulled and set aside. The bail bond posted is cancelled. Let an order of arrest issue against the person of the accused.
PEOPLE v AMBROSIO 56 Phil 801 PEOPLE v CARIAGA 64 Phil 1057 CONCEPCION; June 29, 1937
NATURE Appeal from the judgment of the CFI of Manila FACTS - Appellant Deogracias Cariaga was convicted of the crime of theft and sentenced to 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P1.50. - Cariaga alleges that the court erred in having found him guilty of the crime based of the fact that the appealed judgment states: Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of guilty. The appellant without
Sec 4 and 5 Rule 114 ROC, and Sec 13 Art III 1987 Consti
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comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea. Dispositive. WHEREFORE, the judgment under automatic review is hereby SET ASIDE and the case REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.
a fisherman when the former stole their P80 and on the occasion killed the 2 victims. -the 2 were charged with Robbery with Double Homicide, with the aggravating circumstances of use of motorized banca as a means for flight or concealment, plus recidivism as regards Serna since he was previously convicted by final judgment in CFI of Manila, and was sentenced to an imprisonment from 10 to 17 years in 1958. -upon arraignment, both pleaded guilty, invoking the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt. Immediately, CFI of Samar found the 2 guilty, considering the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt and the aggravating circumstance cited above. Cipriano was sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua (MC offset AC) while Serna was sentenced to death (1MC to 2AC), therefore sent to SC for automatic review. -the information was read to the appellants in English and translated in Samar dialect, thereafter, the 2 pleaded guilty. After the plea, the Fiscal asked the plea of guilty to be considered mitigating then asked the court to consider the 2 aggravating circumstance against Serna. The court did not explain the import of the plea to the 2 accused, did not even bother to ask if they understood their plea, and just imposed on Serna the death penalty. ISSUE WON the trial court erred in automatically rendering the penalty of death to Serna HELD NO. Ratio. Considering that the appellant was charged with an offense punishable by death, the trial court should have required the prosecution to present its evidence to prove the extent of his culpability. The taking of such testimony is the prudent and proper course to follow for the purpose of establishing not only the guilt but also the precise culpability of the defendant. Where a plea of guilty is entered by the defendant, in cases where the capital penalty may be imposed, the court should make certain that defendant fully understands the nature of the charge preferred against him and the character of the punishment provided by law before it is imposed. The trial court should therefore call witnesses for the purposes of establishing the guilt and degree of culpability of the defendant, not only to satisfy the trial judge, but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and
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MENDOZA; February 2, 2000
NATURE Automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro FACTS -On April 28, 1996, Oleby and Maricris, assisted by a neighbor, Lita Macalalad, told their mother that they had been raped by their father, herein accusedappellant. Thereupon, they went to the police authorities of Naujan and filed a complaint against accused-appellant -After preliminary examination, on June 6, 1996, four informations charging accused-appellant with rape on various dates were filed in the Regional TrialCourt, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. -The record shows that at his arraignment on July 23, 1996, accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney's Office, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against him. -However, on August 5, 1997, after the prosecution had presented Dr. Cynthia S. Fesalbon, accusedappellant pleaded guilty to the crime charged in all the informations. -On August 12, 1997, the prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence and rested its case thereafter. -Accused-appellant did not present any evidence in his defense. -On August 27, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of four counts of rape against his daughters. -Nadera appealed ISSUES 1. WON the trial court erred when it accepted his plea of guilty to a capital offense without making a searching inquiry to determine whether he understood the consequences of his plea 2. WON the conviction must be set aside HELD 1. YES - Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the Court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
- It does not appear how and in what position the victim was when he was killed so that it cannot be said for certain that the accused had adopted a mode or means of attack tending directly to insure or facilitate the commission of the offense without risk to himself arising from the defense or retaliation which the victim might put up. - Pat. Garcia of the Bulalacao police force merely declared that he was in his house, about 15 meters away from the municipal building when the accused Rudy Tiongson and his companions escaped from prison, and he did not see the accused shoot Pat. Gelera. Pat. Gelera was already dead when the other witness saw him. - Treachery is also not present in the killing of PC Constable since the deceased was actually warned by another PC not to remain standing but seek cover because of the known presence of the accused in the vicinity, but that the said deceased disregarded the warning. - Since treachery, which would qualify the killing of Pat. Gelera and PC Constable Canela to Murder, was not present, the crimes may only be punished as Homicide. 3. NO. Reasoning (a) Evident premeditation must be ruled out in view of the absence of sufficient proof that a plan to kill the victims existed, the execution of which was preceded by deliberate thought and reflection. (b) That the crimes were committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities cannot be appreciated since they are not persons in authority, but merely agents of a person in authority. (c) In order that commission of a crime in an uninhabited place may be considered, it is necessary that the place of occurrence be where there are no houses at all, a considerable distance from the village or town, or where the houses are a great distance apart. (d) Abuse of superior strength must also be ruled out since there is no direct evidence that the accused employed it. Dispositive Petition is affirmed with the modification that the accused Rudy Tiongson should be sentenced to suffer imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each homicide committed by him. The indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the victims is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in each case.
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their mother, Daisy, and the physician who conducted the medical examination of the two girls, Dr. Cynthia Fesalbon. Certain circumstances present in this case, however, persuade us that a remand of this case is necessary. -First, a perusal of the decision of the court reveals that the trial judge failed to state the factual and legal reasons on which he based accused-appellant's conviction. Except for the narration of the prosecution's evidence and a bare recital of R.A. No. 7659, amending Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, there is nothing else to indicate the reason for the decision. There is no evaluation of the evidence and no reason given why the court found the testimonies of the witnesses credible. -Second, the cavalier attitude of accused-appellant's counsel, Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney's Office, cannot go unnoticed. It is discernible in (a) his refusal to cross examine Oleby Nadera; (b) the manner in which he conducted Maricris Nadera's cross examination; and, (c) his failure not only to present evidence for the accused but also to inform the accused of his right to do so, if he desires. Dispositive The appealed decision is set aside.
warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient. For more often than not, an accused pleads guilty upon bad advice or because he hopes for a lenient treatment or a lighter penalty. The trial judge must erase such mistaken impressions. He must be completely convinced that the guilty plea made by the accused was not made under duress or promise of reward. The judge must ask the accused the manner the latter was arrested or detained, and whether he was assisted by counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations. In addition, the defense counsel should also be asked whether he conferred with the accused and completely explained to him the meaning and the consequences of a plea of guilt. Furthermore, since the age, educational attainment and socio-economic status of the accused may reveal insights for a proper verdict in the case, the trial court must ask questions concerning them. -In this case, absent any showing that these questions were put to accused-appellant, a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been undertaken by the trial court. -In People v. Sevillano, this Court held that: In every case where the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, especially where he is an ignorant person with a little or no education, the proper and prudent course to follow is to take such evidence as are available and necessary in support of the material allegations of the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea. -Clearly, the plea of guilty of accused-appellant in this case was made improvidently. 2. Yes. -Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged. -The prosecution evidence consisted of the testimonies of Oleby and Maricris Nadera, the results of their medical examinations, and the testimonies of
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certificate, thereby directly incriminating or imputing to said Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime of bribery." -defendants filed a motion to quash saying that (1) the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense (because the two crimes cannot be complexed); and (2) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged -CFI granted motion to dismiss agreeing with defendants -MFR was denied -appeal by fiscal before SC ISSUE WON the CFI erred in granting motion to quash HELD YES - It is very apparent that by the use of the phrase "thru unlawful arrest" in the information an idea is conveyed that the unlawful arrest was resorted to as a necessary means to plant evidence in the person of the offended party, thereby incriminating him. From a reading of the info the SC finds a close connection between the act of the accused in first unlawfully arresting the offended party and then investigating him; and it was during that investigation that they plated incriminatory evidence against him. SC agrees with the Solicitor General in his contention that the accused first had to resort to unlawful arrest in order to be able to plant the P1.00 bill among the money taken from the offended party. Also the court a quo has jurisdiction to try the accused of the offense charged in the information. The crime of unlawful arrest is punishable with arresto mayor or imprisonment of from one month and one day to six months, and a fine not exceeding P500.00; 5 and the crime of incriminatory machinations is punishable with arresto mayor, or imprisonment of from one month and one day to six months. Dispositive The order appealed from is reversed and set aside
exigencies of military strategy, or the confusion usually resulting from the situation. While the infringement of constitutional precepts and privileges is not to be tolerated, war necessities and consequences cannot be overlooked. At any rate, no reasons are shown why the irregularity, if any, committed by others, should be visited upon defendants-appellees. The acts imputed to them, do not, of themselves, constitute a punishable offense. Dispositive Appealed decision affirmed.
LOPEZ v CITY JUDGE [supra, page 41] GAMBOA v CRUZ 162 SCRA 642 PADILLA; June 27, 1988
NATURE
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-that illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is still penalized under PD No. 1866 which was not repealed by said EO NO. 107 and 222. ISSUES 1. WON J. Asuncion erred in holding that the possession of loose firearms and explosives is not illegal per se during the period covered by EO Nos. 107 and 222 2. WON it was not necessary for the prosecution to allege in the information that the firearms and ammunition, subject matter of this case, were brought out of the residence of the accused or were used by him in the commission or another offense, since these circumstances are not essential ingredients of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition 3. WON under the allegation in the information, prosecution may prove that the accused earned the firearms and ammunition outside of his residence HELD 1. EO NO. 107, as amended by EO No. 222, is similar to RA Nos. 4 and 482. SC did NOT give it a different meaning because there is no basis for such a difference. 2. NO. IT IS NECESSARY TO ALLEGE IT IN THE INFO. 3. NO. The information, in this particular charge against Abadilla, is fatally defective. It would be fatally defective against any other accused charged with the same offense. J. Asunction, in dismissing the information, committed no reversible error or grave abuse of discretion. Ratio (citing People vs. Austria) the presentation of evidence "cannot have the effect of validating a void information, or proving an offense which does not legally exist. ... The information was not merely defective but it does not charge any offense at all. Technically speaking, that information does not exist in contemplation of law." -Abadilla is regarded with unusual ease and facility as the "hit man" of the Marcos regime. But the Court cannot be swayed by appellations for it has a duty, as a temple of justice, to accord to every man who comes before it in appropriate proceedings the right to due process and the equal protection of the laws. Reasoning 1. It may be true that there is nothing in EO Nos. 107 and 222 that expressly legalizes the unlicensed possession of firearms and ammunition, but this Court, applying statutes similar to the executive orders in question, and which also provided for a period within which a holder or possessor of
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and replaced as collector of customs. Office of State Prosecutors sustained filing of information against Layosa. - Layosa did not submit memorandum. Respondent fiscal alleged that petitioner had abandoned contention as to lack of jurisdiction. Fiscal stressed that case had been scheduled for trial at instance of petitioner and that latter manifested his willingness to proceed. ISSUE WON trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering suspension HELD NO - Lower court acquired jurisdiction upon filing of information. Petitioner was notified of presuspension hearing. His counsel participated. Requirements of due process were observed. Public interest demands a speedy determination of that question. - It is true that petitioner was not yet arrested or taken into custody when pre-suspension hearing was held. However, voluntary appearance through counsel was submission to lower court's jurisdiction. (Note that in civil cases, defendant's voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons.) - "Where a court has jurisdiction of the offense or subject matter, the objection that it has no jurisdiction of the person of the accused may be waived. One who desires to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person must appear in court for that purpose only, and if he raises other questions, he waives the objection." Layosa waived the objection based on lack of jurisdiction over his person when, as already noted, he appeared at the presuspension hearing and his counsel cross-examined the prosecution witness.
LOPEZ v CITY JUDGE [supra, page 41] LAYOSA v RODRIGUEZ 86 SCRA 300 AQUINO; November 10, 1978
NATURE Certiorari from order of CA FACTS - This is about suspension of Layosa, collector of customs, who was charged by city fiscal in CFI w/ having violated AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Law (Republic Act No. 3019). Information was based on complaint filed by assistant director of District AntiSmuggling Action Center. It was one of 5 cases filed against Layosa, aside from malversation case. - Gravamen is that he demanded and received from M/V Lady Angelita I 2 to 3 cases of beer & soft drinks as consideration for giving preferential berthing facilities. - Fiscal, pursuant to sec 13 of RA No. 3019, filed motion for Layosa's suspension. Respondent Judge granted motion. He found that a valid information had been filed against Layosa. - Layosa filed instant petition for certiorari. He prayed that suspension be set aside. He contended that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because no warrant of arrest had as yet been issued when hearing on his suspension was held and the case was not raffled to respondent Judge, that the Chief State Prosecutor in a telegram to the fiscal directed that the record of the case be elevated for review, and that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion. - Because Layosa defied suspension, lower court adjudged him in contempt of court and penalized him by imprisonment for 3 mos and fine of P500. Layosa appealed to CA. - Respondent Judge explained that, to avoid delay, he acted on motion for suspension because case was filed after raffling between 2 branches of court had been terminated. He was scheduled to hold sessions and the other Judge was to begin one-month vacation. Judge pointed out that his action was sanctioned by Administrative Order No. 6 of SC which empowers Executive Judge to act on interlocutory matters prior to raffling. Case was eventually raffled to sala of respondent Judge. Layosa posted bail bond. He was arraigned
PEOPLE v CITY COURT OF MANILA 121 SCRA 637 RELOVA; April 27, 1983
NATURE Petition to review the order of the City Court of Manila, Branch XI FACTS - October 17, 1971: The incident occurred. - October 18, 1971: An information for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed
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a military viewpoint, it was technically impossible to get inside such a cordon." The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman, although he was the personal friend of accused Col. Arturo Custodio who picked him up from his house on August 17, 1983) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. - Marcos was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate. Both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version as propounded by the chief investigator, respondent Gen. Olivas, that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the evidence shows [to the contrary] that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations." They were in agreement that "only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the military's "fall guy" was "not the assassin of Sen. Aquino" and that "the SWAT troopers who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who escorted Sen. Aquino down the service stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with one another, gave a perjured story to us regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino and the mowing down, in turn, of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. The only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the 26 private respondents headed by then AFP Chief General Fabian Ver involved in the military conspiracy while the chairman's minority report would exclude 19 of them and limit as plotters "the 6 persons who were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending" and "General Luther Custodio because the criminal plot could not have been planned and implemented without his intervention." - As the accused were tried in the Sandiganbayan, Marcos through all his recorded public acts and statements from the beginning disdained and rejected his own Board's findings and insisted on the military version of Galman being Ninoy's assassin. [Note: His private acts in trying to control the outcome of the case were to be known much later after he was already deposed.] - Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and 29 other petitioners, composed of three former Justices of this Court, five incumbent and former university presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding members of the Philippine Bar and solid
after the accident and the arrest of the respondent Gapay" and that on October 20, 1972, the accused was arraigned, pleaded guilty and sentenced accordingly. Thus, jeopardy had attached and no new fact supervened after the arraignment and conviction of the accused. Dispositive Order of dismissal of lower court affirmed.
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remedy is a direct action to annul the judgment where the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish by clear, competent and convincing evidence the cause of the nullity. - The Supreme Court appointed a three-member commission composed of retired SC Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman, and retired IAC Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members, to hear and receive evidence, testimonial and documentary, of the charges of collusion and pressures and relevant matters, upon prior notice to all parties, and to submit their findings to this Court for proper disposition. The Commission submitted the following recommendation: Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing that the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case, the Commission is of the considered thinking and belief, subject to the better opinion and judgment of this Honorable Court, that the proceedings in the said case have been vitiated by lack of due process, and hereby respectfully recommends that the prayer in the petition for a declaration of a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled 'People vs. Luther Custodio, et al.,' be granted." ISSUES 1. WON the petition for a declaration of a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled 'People vs. Luther Custodio, et al.,' be granted 2. WON a retrial would constitute double jeopardy HELD 1. YES Reasoning - The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of
Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. [Note: the word used by the Sandiganbayan was innocent instead of not guilty!] Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. On February 4, 1986, the same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. [Note that EDSA I happened before the month ended.] - On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration. The thrust of the second motion for reconsideration was the startling and therefore unknown revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," that the then President had ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused and produce a verdict of acquittal. - Tanodbayan Fernandez claimed he never succumbed to any alleged attempts to influence his actuations in the premises, having instead successfully resisted perceived attempts to exert pressure to drop the case after preliminary investigation and actually ordered the filing and prosecution of the two murder cases against privateparty respondents. Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their collective comment of April 9, 1986 stated that the trial of the criminal cases by them was valid and regular and decided on the basis of evidence presented and the law applicable, but manifested that "if it is true that the former Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the Prosecution Panel, were pressured into suppressing vital evidence which would probably alter the result of the trial, Answering Respondents would not interpose any objection to the reopening of those cases, if only to allow justice to take its course." - Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and prayed for its denial. The accused-respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that the issues had become moot and academic because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all respondents-accused on December 2, 1985, with counsels for respondents Ver and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing that assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, the
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thereof, judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther Custodio, et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process, so that the truth may be finally known and justice done to all.
total absolution as innocent of all the respondentsaccused. Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice Herrera which saw him near the end "deactivating" himself from the case, as it was his belief that its eventual resolution was already a foregone conclusion, they could not cope with the misuse and abuse of the overwhelming powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its witnesses, secure their recantation or prevent them from testifying. Fully aware of the prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to appear and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and announced its intention to terminate the proceedings in about 6 months time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The prosecution complained of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)" and their being the subject of warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings as compared to the nil situation for the defense. Herrera likewise complained of being "cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on making assurances that if given a certain period, they will be able to produce their witnesses," Herrera pleaded for "a reasonable period of preparation of its evidence" and cited other pending cases before respondent court that were pending trial for a much longer time where the "dizzying tempo" and "fast pace" were not maintained by the court. Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. To paraphrase Brandeis: If the authoritarian head of the government becomes the lawbreaker, he breeds contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a law unto himself, he invites anarchy. Dispositive Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. The resolutions of November 28, 1985 dismissing the petition and of February 4, 1986 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside and in lieu
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Petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED. Let the civil action for related civil liability be remanded to the CFI of Batangas City for further proceedings.
where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute. The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. The question of Identity of the acts which are claimed to have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the location of such acts in time and space. When the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national statute). DISPOSITION
PEOPLE v GROSPE [supra, page 43] CANIZA v PEOPLE (AGLORO) 159 SCRA 16 FELICIANO; March 18, 1988
NATURE Petition for Prohibition and certiorari directed at 1) the CFI Order of Nov. 27, 1979 issued by Branch 23 of CFI of Manila in Criminal Case 46768 and 2) said courts Order of March 20, 1980 in the same case denying Canizas Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - March 20, 1974: Assistant City Fiscal of Manila filed an Information for falsification of public documents allegedly committed on Nov. 5, 1968 by Caniza. - May 24, 1974: Caniza filed Motion to Quash saying that allegations in the information did not constitute an offense, and that the information contained averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification - trial court granted Motion to Quash, dismissed case against Caniza - Fiscals Motion for Reconsideration of this Order was denied - June 13, 1979: a second Information (docketed as Criminal Case 46768) was filed charging Caniza with substantially the same offense as that charged under the previous information - Caniza moved to quash this second information on the grounds that 1) the offense charged had already prescribed, 2)quashal of the first Information had been on the merits, 3)the allegations of the second Information did not constitute and offense - Respondent judge issued an order denying the motion to quash - He also denied Canizas motion for reconsideration ISSUES 1. WON the offense charged had already prescribed 2. WON the filing of the second Information has placed the accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense a second time HELD 1. NO
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- During the trial for the estafa case, Atty. Rodriguez Dadivas, counsel for the accused Devera and Machado, orally moved for the inhibition of the presiding Judge Suplico on the ground that he had some doubts as to the impartiality of the judge against whom he and some nineteen (19) other practicing lawyers had filed serious administrative charges with the President of the Philippines, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Minister of Justice. Following Atty. Dadivas, Atty. Roberto Barrios, former private prosecutor, also moved for the inhibition of the judge for the same reason alleged by Atty. Dadivas. The presiding judge, however, ruled Attys. Dadivas and Barrios out of order and asked the City Fiscal to present the evidence for the prosecution. Thereupon, the City Fiscal manifested that he was authorizing the private prosecutor to actively handle the prosecution of the case. Atty. Roberto Barrios, however, insisted that the presiding judge should first rule on their previous motion for inhibition. Instead of resolving the motion for inhibition, the presiding judge asked the comments of Atty. Lorenzo E. Coloso, counsel for the accused Bernabe Que and Amelia Que, and Atty. Alberto Villarruz, counsel for the accused Paz L. Martelino, who both invoked the constitutional right of their clients to a speedy trial. The presiding judge asked again the prosecution to present its evidence but the private prosecutor insisted that a ruling be made by the presiding judge with regard to the pending motion for inhibition. As a result, the presiding judge issued the order dated November 10, 1986 dismissing this case. - On November 21, 1986, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration from the order of dismissal. This was opposed by the defense. - In the meantime, the case was re-raffled to Judge Rodrigo Cosico. Judge Cosico in an order dated May 22, 1987, granted the prosecution's motion for reconsideration and caused the case to be reopened. The subsequent motion for reconsideration flied by the defense was denied in an order dated November 27, 1987. - G.R. No. 83114 - accused Martelino filed before the CA a petition for certiorari praying that the order of Judge Cosico reinstating the case be declared null and void on the ground of double jeopardy. CA found merit in the petition and set aside Judge Cosico's order as "it amounts to double jeopardy on the part of the petitioner." The decision of the appellate court is based on precedents which discuss the failure of the prosecution to appear for trial, produce its witnesses, or present its evidence.
constitutional right against double jeopardy for the reason that he effectively prevents the trial court from proceeding to trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him - Application of the aforestated doctrine of waiver, however, is subject to two (2) sine qua non conditions: first, dismissal must have been sought or induced by the defendant, either personally or through counsel; and second, such dismissal must not have been on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. In this respect, the record shows that petitioner Caiza moved to quash the first Information (Criminal Case No. 16879) on grounds that the allegations made therein did not constitute an offense and/or that the first Information contained allegations which, if true, constituted a legal excuse or justification. These grounds, upon which the trial court anchored its 27 November 1974 Order of dismissal, are clearly directed at the sufficiency of said information to sustain the conviction of petitioner Caniza and, hence, indicate the absence of the first requisite in double-jeopardy. Furthermore, and more importantly, dismissal of a criminal action on this basis is not properly considered as amounting to an acquittal on the merits; from a legal standpoint, the defendant is deemed as not having been charged with the commission of any offense whatsoever under the deficient information. Consequently, petitioner Caizas plea of second jeopardy cannot be sustained: he effectively waived his right to assert that plea when he moved to quash the first Information filed against him. Dispositive Petition for Prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED. The 8 December 1980 Resolution of this Court giving due course to the Petition is withdrawn and the disputed Orders dated 27 November 1979 and 20 March 1980 issued by respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 46768 are hereby AFFIRMED. This case is remanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits.
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with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of two checks of the Philippine National Bank and were found guilty. Sentence for each of the three defendants to suffer in each case a penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day and not more than 9 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision mayor, to pay a fine of P2,500 and the costs. In addition, they were sentenced to indemnify the Philip-pine Ryukyus Command, the payee of the checks, in the sum of P5,417.11 in each of the two cases - On appeal before the CA, Cruz and Vergara were given reduced penalties. Smason was only found guilty of committing the crime through gross imprudence and was accordingly sentenced to 4 months of arresto mayor in each of the two cases. ISSUES 1. WON the acts done by him, as found by the Court of Appeals constitute gross imprudence 2. WON he was correctly found guilty of the offense estafa through (falsification by) negligence HELD 1. YES - Appellant was, or must have been aware that the claim was for a sizeable amount, totalling over twelve thousand pesos, and ordinary prudence required that he should satisfy himself by all proper and adequate means of the identity of the persons claiming said amounts, since they we personally unknown to him. The mere assurance of a former class, mate would certainly not be a satisfactory identification to justify disbursement of such a large amount - appellant as a Lieutenant of the Army is sufficiently intelligent and educated to foresee the possibility that the certificates could be forged or stolen - appellant cooperated in the commission of the complex offense of estafa through falsification by reckless imprudence by acts without which it could not have been accomplished, and this being a fact, there would be no reason to exculpate him from liability 2. YES - counsel contends that: Samson cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa through falsification by imprudence for the reason that the information filed against him charges only a willful act of falsification and contains no reference to any act of imprudence on his part; the alleged imprudent act does not include or is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the information because a deliberate
appears that Atty. Lorenzo Coloso also asked for at least two (2) postponements. In invoking the right of the accused to speedy trial, Atty. Coloso is not therefore coming to this court with clean hands. Considering the two (2) postponements requested by Atty. Coloso, the accused in effect waived their right to speedy trial." Dispositive WHEREFORE, the petition docketed as G.R. 81861 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The petition docketed as G. R. No. 83114 is GRANTED and the questioned orders of Judge Cosico dated May 22, 1987 and November 27, 1978 are AFFIRMED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1988 is SET ASIDE.
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People of the Philippines v. Panfilo Lacson, et al. pending before Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City. - On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General Recaredo Sarmiento II announced, in a press conference, the killing of eleven (11) members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) in a shootout with police elements near the fly-over along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City at about 4:00 A.M. that day. - On May 22, 1995, morning papers carried the news that SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that the killing of the eleven (11) gang members was a rubout or summary execution and not a shootout. - In an affidavit he executed the following day, delos Reyes stated that he was part of a composite police team called the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Force Group (ABRITFG) composed of elements of the National Capital Region Commandand headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson; Traffic Management Command, headed by Senior Superintendent Francisco Subia, Jr.; Presidential AntiCrime Commission (PACC), headed by Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command, headed by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC), headed by Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop - Delos Reyes claimed that the police team arrested the eleven (11) gang members in early morning of May 18, 1995 at the gangs safe house in Superville Subdivision, Paraaque; that after their arrest, the gang members were made to board two vans, their hands tied behind their backs, and brought initially to Camp Crame where a decision to summarily execute them was made, and later to Commonwealth Avenue where they were shot to death by elements of the Anti-Bank Roberry Intelligence Task Force Group - On May 26, 1995, SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, another CIC investigator, executed an affidavit corroborating the material allegations of delos Reyes - On May 31, 1995, Armando Capili, a reporter of Remate, executed an affidavit stating that he was present when the KBG members were arrested in Superville Subdivision - On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director for Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against ninetyseven (97) officers and personnel of ABRITFG. The next-of-kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the same officers and personnel. - Ombudsman Aniano Desierto then created a panel of investigators to conduct a preliminary
that case that while willful crimes are punished according to their result in crimes of negligence, what the law punishes is the carelessness itself, the failure to take the precautions that society has a right to expect will be taken under the circumstances of each case - that intentional falsification and falsification by negligence not only differ in seriousness, but in essence; they are, by their nature, two different offenses altogether. Wherefore, an offender who is accused of intentional falsification cannot be held to answer for falsification by negligence, because the essential element of the latter offense, the ingredient that characterizes it and separates it from all other offenses, to wit, the criminal negligence or carelessness, is not involved in the elements of the crime charged. Not only is it not included: it is excluded by incompatibility, because malice or intent cannot co-exist with negligence - On the procedural side, the objections to appellant's conviction of estafa by falsification through negligence are much more serious. Section 5, Rule 116 (now 120), upon which the majority relies as justifying the conviction, expresses the following rule: An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. (Italic mine) It is not enough, therefore, that the elements of the crime for which an accused is convicted should be proved, but then must also be charged or alleged
PEOPLE v PANFILO LACSON G.R. No. 149453 RESOLUTION: May 28, 2002
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS The assailed Decision of the appellate court granted respondent Lacsons Second Amended Petition for Prohibition with application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, (1) assailing the Order issued by Judge Herminia Pasamba of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, that allowed the continuation of the reinvestigation of the Kuratong Baleleng cases; and (2) praying for the dismissal of Criminal Cases entitled
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to attend the investigation of said Criminal Cases - On May 28, 2001, respondent Lacson, et al., invoking, among others, their constitutional right against double jeopardy, filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, primarily to enjoin the State prosecutors from conducting the preliminary investigation. - The plea for temporary restraining order was denied - On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing of the same members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City - The new Informations charged as principals thirtyfour (34) people, including respondent Lacson and his twenty-five (25) other co-accused in the original informations. The criminal cases were assigned to Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao. - On the same day, respondent Lacson filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari against Judge Pasamba, the Secretary of Justice, the PNP Chief, State Prosecutors Ong and Zacarias, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Jamolin, and the People of the Philippines. The said petition was amended to implead as additional party-respondents State Prosecutor Claro Arellano and the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 81 - In the meantime, on June 8, 2001, respondent Lacson also filed with the RTC-QC Branch 81 (presided by Judge Ma. Theresa Yadao), a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and in the absence thereof, to dismiss the cases outright. Respondent Lacson, however, filed a Manifestation and Motion dated June 13, 2001 seeking the suspension of the proceedings before the trial court. - The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Yadao from issuing a warrant of arrest or conducting any proceeding or hearing in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112. - On August 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the now assailed Decision. It characterized the termination of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q99-81689 as provisional dismissal, and considered Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 as mere revivals of the same. Applying Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the criminal cases against the respondent ISSUE WON Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the respondent Lacson
committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No. 8249. - The Criminal Cases were raffled off to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, then presided by Judge, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. - Before the accused could be arraigned, prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Corazon de la Cruz, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez recanted their affidavits which implicated respondent Lacson in the murder of the KBG members. - On the other hand, private complainants also executed their respective affidavits of desistance declaring that they were no longer interested to prosecute these cases. - Due to these developments, the twenty-six (26) accused, including respondent Lacson, filed five separate but identical motions to: (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause. - The records of the case before us are not clear whether the private offended parties were notified of the hearing on March 22, 1999 held by Judge Agnir to resolve the motions filed by respondent Lacson and the other accused. - During the said hearing, the private offended parties who desisted do not appear to have been presented on the witness stand. In their stead, Atty. Godwin Valdez testified that he assisted them in preparing their affidavits of desistance and that he signed said affidavits as witness. On the other hand, Atty. Aurora Bautista of the Philippine Lawyers League presented the affidavits of recantation of prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez. Only prosecution witness Corazon de la Cruz testified to affirm her affidavit. - On March 29, 1999, Judge Agnir issued a Resolution dismissing the Criminal Cases - On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding the Kuratong Baleleng incident for preliminary investigation. On the strength of this indorsement, Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez formed a panel to investigate the matter. - On April 17, 2001, the respondent was subpoenaed
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to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2-year bar. - In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various requirements to determine the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a position to rule whether or not the re-filing of the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be enjoined. Fundamental fairness requires that both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the predicate facts upon which the application of the new rule depends. They involve disputed facts and arguable questions of law. The reception of evidence on these various issues cannot be done in this Court but before the trial court. Dispositive Case remanded
desistance executed by the relatives of the three other victims. The same records do not show whether they were notified of the hearing or had knowledge thereof. To be sure, it is not fair to expect the element of notice to be litigated before then Judge Agnir for Section 8, Rule 117 was yet inexistent at that time. - The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in the petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction filed by respondent Lacson in the RTC of Manila, to enjoin the prosecutors from reinvestigating the said cases against him. The only question raised in said petition is whether the reinvestigation will violate the right of respondent Lacson against double jeopardy. Thus, the issue of whether or not the reinvestigation is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by the litigants. - Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the eleven (11) informations for murder against respondent Lacson and company were revived in the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding conducted in the case for respondent Lacson immediately filed a petition for certiorari in the appellate court challenging, among others, the authority of Judge Yadao to entertain the revived informations for multiple murder against him. - The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of Appeals where respondent Lacson raised for the first time the argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple murder cases against him. But even then, the appellate court did not require the parties to elucidate the crucial issue of whether notices were given to the offended parties before Judge Agnir ordered the dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson and company. - Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual issue of whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. The reckoning date of the 2-year bar has to be first determined - - whether it is from the date of the Order of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order were received by the various offended parties or from the date of the effectivity of the new rule. - If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with said timeline. The new rule fixes a timeline to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can therefore present compelling reasons
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for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal. - Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent. A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations. - In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the Criminal Cases. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise of the Criminal Cases. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. - The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section
and not retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the States substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder. ISSUES 1. WON Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to the Criminal Cases 2. WON the time-bar in said rule should be applied retroactively HELD 1. YES - Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely: 1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; 2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; 4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. - The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy
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and the defendants filed their affidavit and counteraffidavits respectively. - In Jan. 1985, petitioners Bulaong and his counsel de Guzman submitted to City Fiscal of Pasay a replyaffidavit containing statements which are alleged to be libelous. Hence, Vistan and Buenaventura filed a complaint for libel against Bulaong and his counsel de Guzman with the City Fiscal. The latter conducted an investigation, and thereafter, filed an information for libel against petitioners. The said information was later amended on. - Petitioners moved to quash the Information on the ff. grounds: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and 2) that the fiscal has no authority to file the Information. They further argue that the reply-affidavit was submitted and sworn to by petitioner Bulaong not only because he was required to do so by the investigating fiscal but also because it was in compliance with his legal and moral duty as complainant in the case for estafa against Vistan and Buenaventura and hence, the reply-affidavit belongs to the class of absolutely privileged communications - The assistant city fiscal filed an opposition to the motion to quash filed by petitioners. RTC of Pasay City denied the motion to quash. Petitioners filed MFR but was denied. Petitioners filed with CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, with preliminary injunction. CA dismissed petition for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed ISSUE WON the procedure availed by petitioners after denial by the RTC of the motion to quash (MTQ) was correct HELD NO Ratio: Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are not the correct remedies against an order denying a motion to quash. The defendant should instead, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law Reasoning: [a] Sec. 1, Rule 117 of the ROC provides that, upon arraignment, defendant shall immediately either move to quash the complaint or information or plead thereto, or do both and that, if the defendant moves to quash, without pleading, and the motion is withdrawn or overruled, he should
prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice. The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation of the twoyear period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period under the new rule. To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given a period of one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not reviving the case before the effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to justice and fairness, so is the State. Dispositive Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED
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accused cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable doubt. -Consequently, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the ends of justice require that evidence be presented to determine the culpability of the accused. When a judgment has been entered by consent of an attorney without special authority, it will sometimes be set aside or reopened (Natividad vs. Natividad). Dispositive WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby ordered RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, for further reception of evidence. SO ORDERED.
the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-appellant. -On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment of conviction. 1 ISSUE WON CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel HELD YES. The CA committed a mistake. -The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on January 1, 1985, applicable to this case since the pre-trial was held on August 8, 1985, provides: "SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel." (Rule 118) The Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory (McGee vs. Republic). The use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador). And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused (People vs. Terrado). -The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the accused did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the
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penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. Thus, the imposable penalty on James Andrew, by reason of his minority, is 1 degree lower than the statutory penalty. Reasoning - The penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape being death, one degree lower therefrom is reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower therefrom is reclusion temporal. There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on James Andrew is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of 12 years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to 17 years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. Dispositive The MFR is GRANTED. For the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape, James Andrew Uy is sentenced to reclusion perpetua; For the crime of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the penalty of 12 years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to 17 years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
doubt on the conformity of the accused to the facts agreed upon. - Nevertheless, Uy cannot take advantage of the absence of his and his counsels signatures on the pre trial order. They did not object when the prosecution presented the plastic bags and said that it contained shabu. Uy cannot now raise it for the first time on appeal. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Dispositive Decision affirmed in toto
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attract attention. In addition, there was a police outpost near the market. Dispositive Decision is reversed, and the accused is acquitted.
- In Cabanatuan City the accused Antonio was detained in jail, by virtue of the complaint brought by Virginia against him. When he was in jail, Virginia visited him. She apologized to him and told him that she did not want what had happened to him, but she had to do it because she was afraid of her husband. ISSUE WON Quiazon is guity of abduction with rape. HELD NO, his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, and according to the Manifestation of the Acting Solicitor General, the evidence supports Quiazons innocence. Ratio Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime has been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. Moral certainty is required. Reasoning - Art. 3, Section 14 (2) (Constitution) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved xxx - It is precisely because of such notorious lack of any persuasive force in the testimony of complainant that the Manifestation asserted most emphatically that appellant could rely on the constitutional presumption of innocence, one of the most valuable rights of an accused person - The complainant alleges that on July 3, 1973 the accused, whom the complainant had never met before, suddenly grabbed her while she was in the public market of San Jose City and forced her to board a tricycle. Then he took her to the house of his parents where he ravished her. The abduction occurred in broad daylight, or at about 10:00 in the morning. The improbability of the complainant's charge is immediately visible from the time and locus where the crime was supposed to have been committed. The market, being a public place, was at its busiest at 10 in the morning. Virginia was also with a niece at the time. Any commotion would easily
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Petitioners Claim It is the contention of petitioner that the failure to arraign him is violative of his constitutional right to procedural due process, more specifically of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and of his right to be heard by himself and counsel. - The Solicitor General, when asked to comment, agreed that the procedural defect was of such gravity as to render void the decision of the City Court affirmed by the Court of First Instance. The comment was considered as answer, with the case being submitted for decision. ISSUE WON the accuseds constitutional right to procedural due process was violated. HELD YES. The Constitution requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why be was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. - It is at that stage of arraignment where in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. It is a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. It is not useless formality, much less an idle ceremony. - Petitioner was not arraigned at all and was not represented by counsel throughout the whole proceedings in the respondent City Court. It is indisputable then that there was a denial of petitioner's constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel. - An equally fatal defect in the proceeding had before respondent Judge Senining was that notwithstanding its being conducted in the absence of petitioner, he was convicted. It was shown that after one postponement due to his failure to appear, the case was reset for hearing. When that date came, without petitioner being present, although his bondsman were notified, respondent Judge, as set forth in the comment of the Solicitor General, "allowed the prosecution to present its evidence. Thereupon, respondent City Court promulgated thedecision.
HELD YES. Since the criminal case was ultimately dismissed, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the appellant should be applied. Castillos innocence need no longer be proved, since under the fundamental law his innocence is presumed. -While it is true that Castillo was convicted of the offense of slight physical injuries by MTC Makati, it is undisputed that on appeal, CFI Rizal dismissed the case for failure of the prosecution witnesses to appear. -ROC Rule 123, Sec 7: Trial de novo on appeal. An appealed case shall be tried in all respects anew in the courts of first instance as if it had been originally instituted in that court. -Applying this rule, the judgment of conviction rendered by MTC Makati was vacated upon perfection of the appeal, to be tried de novo in the CFI as if it were originally instituted therein. The phrase "to vacate" applied to a judgment means "to annul, to render void." -People vs. Dramayo: The starting point is the constitutional presumption of innocence - a right safeguarded the accused. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard this Court has always been committed. -There is need for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate
tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by person on trial under such an exacting test could sentence be one of conviction. -It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. So it has been held from the 1903 decision of United States v. Reyes. Interpretation of par. 4 of Return to Work Agreement -FILTEX: said paragraph requires an express finding of innocence by the court in order to entitle an employee to reinstatement and back wages; no such finding of innocence had been made because the criminal case was dismissed on a mere technicality; interpretation of said agreement should not be stretched to include a "mere presumption of innocence under the law." -SC: Constitutional provision on protection to labor constrains courts to interpret the agreement in question in favor of the claim of the laborer and against that of management. Those who are less fortunate in terms of economic well-being should be given preferential attention. States obligation to protect labor is welfare state concept vitalized. (Art. 4, Labor Code. Art. 1700, NCC. ^_^ hehe! ) Dispositive CFI Rizal decision set aside. Remand to Labor Arbiter of NLRC for determination of the amount of back wages.
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- This rule is a restatement of the doctrine laid down in People vs. Apduhan. The searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. - The questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. > The records do not clearly illustrate the personality profile of the accused. > The age, socio-economic status and educational background of the accused were not examined. > With regard to voluntariness, questions regarding the presence or absence of maltreatment of the accused are deemed insufficient when a record of events in the penal facility indicate that Alicando suffered a hematoma from being locked up in a cell with violent inmates upon his arrest. > With regard to comprehension, the trial court inadequately warned Alicando that a plea of guilt would result to a mandatory of penalty of death without explaining to him what mandatory meant. - The rule requires that after a free and intelligent plea of guilt the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 116, Sec. 3 modifies priorituis prudence that a plea of guilt even in capital offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof. 3. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant, were inadmissible, yet were considered by the trial court convicting the appellant. Ratio Fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine: once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. In other words, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. Reasoning - The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
> At around 5:30 PM, Rebada, one of Penecillas neighbors, spotted Khazie by the window of Alicandos house. Khazie offered to buy yemas from Rebada but Alicando closed the window. Rebada then heard Khazie crying so she approached the house and saw through an opening between the floor and the door that Khazie was being raped. > Khazie did not come home so Romeo and his wife looked for her. Rebada did not tell them what she saw. > In the morning, Khazies corpse was found under the house of Santiago, another neighbor. Rebada then told the Penecillas what she knew. > Alicando was arrested and her verbally confessed his guilt to PO3 Tan without the assistance of counsel. Based on his confession and follow-up interrogations, Khazies slippers were recovered from Alicandos home along with a stained T-shirt and pillow. - June 29, 1994 Alicando was arraigned and pleaded guilty. After the plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. - July 20, 1994 The trial court sentenced Alicando to death by electric chair or, if the penal facilities would be available by then, by gas poisoning. ISSUE WON the accused was properly meted the sentence of death HELD NO 1. Arraignment of the accused was null and void Ratio During arraignment, the complaint or the information should be read in a language or dialect which the accused understands. Reasoning - The trial judge failed to follow the procedure outlined in Rule 116 of the RoC. - The information was written in English and it was unknown whether or not the accused could understand English well. It could not be said with certainty that the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 2. The plea of guilt was null and void. Ratio Rule 116, Sec. 3 provides that in a plea of guilt, the court should ascertain that the accused voluntarily entered into the plea and fully comprehends the ramifications of such a plea and, in addition, the prosecution should also be required to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. Reasoning
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the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability. Nowhere in the rules does it state that an extra-judicial confession is a prerequisite for a conviction based on a plea of guilty. - The physical evidence objected to falls under the exclusionary rule. > The 1987 Constitution's exclusionary rules absolutely forbid evidence obtained from illegal searches and seizures or evidence resulting from uncounseled custodial investigations of accused individuals. > The doctrine is not without its exceptions, and the evidence in dispute in the instant case falls within those exceptions. + The discovery of the victim's body near the house of the accused would have naturally led authorities to undertake a more thorough investigation of the site, particularly in those areas where the victim was last seen. + Under one of the recognized exceptions of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the more appropriate question in such cases is whether the evidence to which the objection is made would not have been discovered at all but for the illegality or would have been discovered anyway by sources or procedures independent of the illegality. + Another exception refuses to treat the doctrine as absolutely sacred if the evidence in question would have been inevitably discovered under normal conditions. - There is adequate legal evidence to sustain the trial courts conviction with moral certainty. The testimony of a lone witness, free from signs of impropriety or falsehood, is sufficient to convict an accused even if uncorroborated.
that the bulk of proceedings in our trial courts, including the process of arraignment is conducted in the vernacular > Three things which need to be accomplished after the accused in a criminal case enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, which have all been complied with in this case: 1. the court should conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the accused's plea. There is no rule on conducting inquiry except that in People vs. Dayot, it was held that a searching inquiry ... compels the judge to content himself reasonably that the accused has not been coerced or placed under a state of duress - and that his guilty plea has not therefore been given improvidently - other by actual threats of physical harm from malevolent quarters or simply because of his, the Judge's, intimidating robes. 2. the lower court should require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability 3. the court should inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and should allow him to do so if he so desires - The plea of guilt was not improvident. > When the appellant pleaded guilty in open court, the appellant was clearly assisted by counsel. > The trial court, on its own, in fact went out of its way to repeatedly inform the defendant of the nature of his plea and the implications of the plea he was making. He was asked a number of times if he was sure of the plea he was making. > The records fail to indicate that appellant questioned his plea of guilty at any stage of the trial. He did not put up any defense with regard to the evidence and the testimonies and even directed the police to the location of the evidence. > The accuseds silence can counter the assertion of the Court that the plea of guilt was improvident. Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and specific accusation of crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a quasi-confession. An innocent person will defend himself so silence can be understood as a person deferring to do just that. > The absence of an extra-judicial confession does not detract from the efficacy or validity of appellant's plea of guilty. It does not affect the requirement compelling the prosecution to prove
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of, incident to or in connection with the commission of said crimes" which were pending in the civil courts were ordered transferred to the military tribunals. This jurisdiction of the tribunal, therefore, operates equally on all persons in like circumstances. - The guarantee of due process is not a guarantee of any particular form of tribunal in criminal cases. A military tribunal of competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and opportunity to defend and trial before an impartial tribunal, adequately meet the due process requirement. Due process of law does not necessarily mean a judicial proceeding in the regular courts. The procedure before the Military Commission, as prescribed in PD No. 39, assures observance of the fundamental requisites of procedural due process, due notice, an essentially fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of the defense. - It is asserted that petitioner's trial before the military commission will not be fair and impartial, since the President had already prejudged petitioner's cases and the military tribunal is a mere creation of the President, and "subject to his control and direction." We cannot, however, indulge in unjustified assumptions. Prejudice cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the great confidence and trust reposed by the people upon the President and the latter's legal obligation under his oath to "do justice to every man". Nor is it justifiable to conceive, much less presume, that the members of the military commission, the Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Board of Review and the Secretary of National Defense, with their corresponding staff judge advocates, as reviewing authorities, through whom petitioner's hypothetical conviction would be reviewed before reaching the President, would all be insensitive to the great principles of justice and violate their respective obligations to act fairly and impartially in the premises. This assumption must be made because innocence, not wrongdoing, is to be presumed. 3. NO - It was precisely because of petitioner's complaint that he was denied the opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation of his charges .The President created a Special Committee to reinvestigate the charges filed against him in the military commission. It is intended that the Committee should conduct the investigation with "utmost fairness, impartiality and objectivity" ensuring to the accused his constitutional right to due process, to determine whether "there is reasonable ground to believe that the offenses
5. WON the taking of testimonies and depositions were void 6. WON petitioner may validly waive his right to be present at his trial HELD 1. YES - The court denied the motion, since all matters in issue in this case have already been submitted for resolution, and they are of paramount public interest, it is imperative that the questions raised by petitioner on the constitutionality and legality of proceedings against civilians in the military commissions, pursuant to pertinent General Orders, Presidential Decrees and Letters of Instruction, should be definitely resolved. 2. YES - Military Commission No. 2 has been lawfully constituted and validly vested with jurisdiction to hear the cases against civilians, including the petitioner. Reasoning - The Court has previously declared that the proclamation of Martial Law is valid and constitutional and that its continuance is justified by the danger posed to the public safety. - To preserve the safety of the nation in times of national peril, the President of the Philippines necessarily possesses broad authority compatible with the imperative requirements of the emergency. On the basis of this, he has authorized in GO No. 8 the Chief of Staff of the AFP, to create military tribunals & try and decide cases "of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them." In GO No. 12, the military tribunals were vested with jurisdiction "exclusive of the civil courts", among others, over crimes against public order, violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, violations of the laws on firearms, and other crimes which, in the face of the emergency, are directly related to the quelling of the rebellion and preservation of the safety and security of the Republic. - Petitioner is charged with having conspired with certain military leaders of the communist rebellion to overthrow the government, furnishing them arms and other instruments to further the uprising. Under GO No. 12, jurisdiction over this offense has been vested exclusively upon military tribunals. It cannot be said that petitioner has been singled out for trial for this offense before the military commission. Pursuant to GO No. 12, all "criminal cases involving subversion, sedition, insurrection or rebellion or those committed in furtherance of, on the occasion
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presence at all stages of his trial, there appears, therefore, no logical reason why petitioner, although he is charged with a capital offense, should be precluded from waiving his right to be present in the proceedings for the perpetuation of testimony, since this right, like the others aforestated, was conferred upon him for his protection and benefit. - It is also important to note that under Section 7 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court (Deposition of witness for the prosecution) the "Failure or refusal on the part of the defendant to attend the examination or the taking of the deposition after notice hereinbefore provided, shall be considered a waiver" - Presidential Decree No. 328 expressly provides that the failure or refusal to attend the examination or the taking of the deposition shall be considered a waiver. "
"(2) The requirements as to the interval of time are now everywhere regulated by statute * * *; the rulings in regard to the sufficiency of time are thus so dependent on the interpretation of the detailed prescriptions of the local statutes that it would be impracticable to examine them here. But whether or not the time allowed was supposedly insufficient or was precisely the time required by statute, the actual attendance of the party obviate any objection upon the ground of insufficiency, because then the party has actually had that opportunity of crossexamination for the sole sake of which the notice was required." 6. YES - Under the present Constitution, trial even of a capital offense may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused. It is now provided that "after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." - On the basis of the aforecited provision of the Constitution which allows trial of an accused in absentia, the issue has been raised whether or not petitioner could waive his right to be present at the perpetuation of testimony proceedings before respondent Commission. - As a general rule, subject to certain exceptions, any constitutional or statutory right may be waived if such waiver is not against public policy. The personal presence of the accused from the beginning to the end of a trial for felony, involving his life and liberty, has been considered necessary and vital to the proper conduct of his defense. The "trend of modern authority is in favor of the doctrine that a party in a criminal case may waive irregularities and rights, whether constitutional or statutory, very much the same as in a civil case." - There are, certain rights secured to the individual by the fundamental charter which may be the subject of waiver. The rights of an accused to defend himself in person and by attorney, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to a speedy and public trial, and to meet the witnesses face to face, as well as the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, are rights guaranteed by the Constitution. They are rights necessary either because of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial, or of the need of protecting the individual from the exercise of arbitrary power. And yet, there is no question that all of these rights may be waived. Considering the aforecited provisions of the Constitution and the absence of any law specifically requiring his
SEPARATE OPINION (on waiver of presence only) CASTRO [concur and dissent]
- My understanding of the provisions of the new Constitution on waiver of presence in criminal proceedings is that such waiver may be validly implied principally in cases where the accused has jumped bail or has escaped, but certainly may not be asserted as a matter of absolute right in cases where the accused is in custody and his identification is needed in the course of the proceedings. - Thus, I voted for qualified waiver.- the accused may waive his presence in the criminal proceedings except at the stages where identification of his person by the prosecution witnesses is necessary. I might agree to the proposition of "total" waiver in any case where the accused agrees explicitly and unequivocally in writing signed by him or personally manifests clearly and indubitably in open court and such manifestation is recorded, that whenever a prosecution witness mentions a name by which the accused is known the witness is referring to him and to no one else.
TEEHANKEE [dissent]
- Petitioners presence at the proceedings could not be compelled by virtue of his express waiver thereof as explicitly allowed by the Constitution and by P.D. No. 328 itself. - Petitioner's submittal that he cannot be compelled to be present at the proceedings even against his will by virtue of his express waiver is meritorious. Whereas previously such right of waiver of the
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Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2 and held that "he cannot be validly compelled to appear and be present during the trial of this case." - Petitioner prays that the order of respondent judge be annulled and set aside and that private respondent Rodolfo Valdez, Jr. be compelled to appear during the trial of the criminal case whenever required to do so by the trial court. - Private respondent claims that Sec 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution grants him absolute right to absent himself from the trial of the case filed against him despite the condition of his bail bond that he "will at all times hold himself amenable to the orders and processes of the Court." ISSUE WON the judge erred in granting private respondents manifestation to waive his right to be present during trial HELD YES - Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, Section 19 thereof provides: SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. - The 1973 Constitution now unqualifiedly permits trial in absentia even of capital offenses, provided that after arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the purpose of Identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, or provided he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in the case on trial. - The reason for requiring the presence of the accused, despite his waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all the stages of the proceedings without giving the People's witnesses the opportunity to Identify him in court, he may in his defense say that he was never Identified as the person charged in the information and, therefore, is entitled to an acquittal.
for the authorities to enforce execution of any adverse judgment. But I cannot see why an accused should be compelled to be present at the trial when he prefers perhaps the solitude of his cell to pray either for forgiveness, if he knows he is guilty, or, if he is innocent, for God to illumine the court so there would be unerring justice in his case. (hehehe) - My understanding is that the problem of identification of an accused may be adequately solved without violating the justified wishes of the accused to be left alone. To start with, if he is referred to by the witnesses of the prosecution by name, the court may presume that the amused who has acknowledged his true name at the arraignment is the one indicated.
BORJA v MENDOZA [SUPRA, PAGE 78] PEOPLE v PRESIDING JUDGE OF URDANETA 125 SCRA 269 RELOVA; October 26, 1983
NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS - Private respondent Rodolfo Valdez, Jr. is charged with murder before the RTC of Pangasinan, in Urdaneta. He is out on a P30,000.00 bail bond which contains the following conditions: The aforenamed, as bondsmen, hereby jointly and severally undertake that the above-mentioned defendant, as principal therein will appear and answer the charge above-mentioned in whatever Court it may be tried, and will at all times hold himself amenable to the orders and processes of the Court, and if convicted, will appear for judgment, and render himself to the execution thereof; or that if he fails to perform any of these conditions will pay to the Republic of the Philippines the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) ... - After his arraignment, Valdez, thru his counsel, manifested orally in open court that he was waiving his right to be present during the trial. The prosecuting fiscal moved that Valdez be compelled to appear and be present at the trial so that he could be identified by prosecution witnesses. Respondent judge sustained the position of private respondent who cited the majority opinion in Aquino,
BARREDO [concur]
- Petitioner has the right to waive his presence at the perpetuation proceedings before the respondent Commission.I find eminent merit in the contention of petitioner that even for identification purposes he cannot be made to be present at the trial against his will. Since under the Constitution, trial of criminal cases in the absence of the accused is allowed, when after the arraignment and in spite of due notice he fails to appear without justification, pursuant to Section 19 of the Bill of Rights or Article IV. - I can understand why an accused has to be present at the arraignment and at the reading of the sentence. In the former, it has to be known to the court that he is indeed the person charged and that he personally understands the accusation against him. More importantly, the plea must be entered by him personally to avoid any misconstruction or misrepresentation, innocent or otherwise. In the latter, it is essential that the accused himself, should be aware from personal knowledge what is the verdict of the court, and if it be conviction, what is the penalty to be served by him. These are matters too personal to permit delegation. At the same time, his presence makes it simpler in the public interest
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prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances. The respondent judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. ISSUE WON the judge erred in suspending the proceedings HELD YES Ratio Under Art.IV Sec.19, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified. Reasoning - The rule is found in the last sentence of Article IV, Section 19, of the 1973 Constitution: In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to he informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. - The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's escape. - the fugitive is now deemed to have waived such notice precisely because he has escaped, and it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear at his trial unjustified. Escape can never be a legal justification. - The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will Identify the accused. - the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice.
ISSUE WON the accused, despite having waived his presence at the trial, may still be compelled to be present in the same trial when he is to be identified HELD YES. Stare Decisis. Reasoning - The rule adopted by the Court in the case of Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2 (supra) is that while the accused may waive his presence at the trial of the case, his presence may be compelled when he is to be identified. The Court said: Since only 6 Justices are of the view that petitioner may waive his right to be present at all stages of the proceedings while five 5 Justices are in agreement that he may so waive such right, except when he is to he identified, the result is that the respondent Commission's Order requiring his presence at all times during the proceedings before it should be modified, in the sense that petitioners presence shall be required only in the instance just indicated. Dispositive Petition GRANTED, orders of respondent Judge ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Judge is ordered to issue the necessary process to compel the attendance of the accused at the hearing of the criminal case for purposes of identification. Temporary TRO lifted and set aside.
PEOPLE v SALAS (ABONG, DE LEON, ET AL) 143 SCRA 163 CRUZ; July 29, 1986
NATURE Certiorari and Mandamus FACTS - Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the CFI of Cebu but before he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. - While trial was in progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release; and so he escaped. - Respondent judge Salas, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest. But he was gone. Nonetheless, the
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August 22, 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by the lower Court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the Police Blotter that private respondent escaped from his detention center. No explanation for his failure to appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court considered his absence unjustified - The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard. INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE: . . . The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a provision as there were quite a number of reported instances where the proceedings against a defendant had to be stayed indefinitely because of his non- appearance. What the Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial, not continued enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be proved. With the categorical statement in the fundamental law that his absence cannot justify a delay provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified, such an abuse could be remedied. That is the way it should be, for both society and the offended party have a legitimate interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. 3. NO - The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 1 (c) of Rule 115 clearly reflects the intention of the framers of our Constitution, to wit: ... The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an accused under custody had been notified of the date of the trail and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody in regained.... - An escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him. Dispositive The judgment of the trial court in so far as it suspends the proceedings against the private
dismissing the case against the five accused while holding in abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent. On November 16,1973 the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the above-quoted dispositive portion on the ground that it will render nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier. However, this was denied by the lower court in an Order dated November 22, 1973. Hence, this petition. ISSUES 1. WON a court loses jurisdiction over an accused who after being arraigned, escapes from the custody of the law 2. WON trial in absentia is warranted 3. WON under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, an accused who has been duly tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him HELD 1. NO - It is not disputed that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused-private respondent when he appeared during the arraignment on August 22,1973 and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. In cases criminal, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by his arrest for voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in this case. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated. To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and this continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law. 2. YES - Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution aforecited a "trial in absentia"may be had when the following requisites are present: (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. As the facts show, the private respondent was arraigned on
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The defendant was found guilty on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 and was sentenced to death and to pay a fine of P20,000. ISSUE WON the judgment must be reversed because of the trial court's failure to appoint "another attorney de oficio for the accused in spite of the manifestation of the attorney de oficio (who defended the accused at the trial) that he would like to be relieved for obvious reasons." HELD NO - The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions, in favor of the legality and regularity of all the proceedings of the trial court, including the presumption that the accused was not denied the right to have counsel. (U. S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.) It is presumed that the procedure prescribed by law has been observed unless it is made to appear expressly to the contrary. (U. S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney appointed by the trial court to aid the defendant in his defense expressed reluctance to accept the designation because, as the present counsel assumes, he did not sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not sufficient to overcome this presumption. The statement of the counsel in the court below did no necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect the interest of the accused. As a matter of fact, the present counsel "sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin did his best, although it was not the best of a willing worker." We do not discern in the record any indication that the former counsel did not conduct the defense to the best of his ability. If Attorney Carin did his best as a sworn member of the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was enough; his sentiments did not cut any influence in the result of the case and did not imperil the rights of the appellant.
escapee could not be held because he could not be duly notified. He forgets that the fugitive is now deemed to have waived such notice precisely because he has escaped, and it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear at his trial unjustified. The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused.11 Under [Sec.14(2), 1987 Const.], the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law. - ABONG should be prepared to bear the consequences of his escape, including forfeiture of the right to be notified of the subsequent proceedings and of the right to adduce evidence on his behalf and refute the evidence of the prosecution, not to mention a possible or even probable conviction. Dispositive Order of J. SALAS was SET ASIDE, and he was directed to continue hearing ABONGs case in absentia as long as he has not reappeared, until it is terminated.
PEOPLE v PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA) 80 Phil 138 TUASON: January 29, 1948
NATURE APPEAL from a judgment of the People's Court FACTS - The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7 counts. After pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea as to counts 4, 5 and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. - The attorney de officio manifested that he would like to be relieved from his assignment.
11
1973 Const, ART. IV, Sec.19. Now, ART. III, Sec.14(2), 1987 Const.
Citing Aquino v. Mil. Commission No. 2 and People v. Presiding Judge. See p.9 of outline.
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his conviction to a sufficient extent to test the jurisdiction of the state court to proceed to judgment against him. ... '... it is open to the courts of the United States, upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus, to look beyond forms and inquiry into the very substance of the matter ....' - If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus. A judge of the United States-to whom a petition for habeas corpus is addressed-should be alert to examine 'the facts for himself when if true as alleged they make the trial absolutely void.' - It must be remembered, however, that a judgment cannot be lightly set aside by collateral attack, even on habeas corpus. When collaterally attacked, the judgment of a court carries with it a presumption of regularity. Where a defendant, without counsel, acquiesces in a trial resulting in his conviction and later seeks release by the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus, the burden of proof rests upon him to establish that he did not competently and intelligently waive his constitutional right to assistance of Counsel. If in a habeas corpus hearing, he does meet this burden and convinces the court by a preponderance of evidence that he neither had counsel nor properly waived his constitutional right to counsel, it is the duty of the court to grant the writ. Dispositive The cause is reversed and remanded to the District Court for determination whether petitioner did not competently and intelligently waive his right to counsel. If court finds for petitioner the decision of the district court convicting petitioner must be declared void.
conviction and sentence. If the accused, however, is not represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty. Ratio The purpose of the constitutional guaranty of a right to counsel is to protect an accused from conviction resulting from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights, and the guaranty would be nullified by a determination that an accused's ignorant failure to claim his rights removes the protection of the Constitution. True, habeas corpus cannot be used as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities-not involving the question of jurisdiction-occurring during the course of trial; and the 'writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a writ of error.' These principles, however, must be construed and applied so as to preserve-not destroy-constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty. The scope of inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings has been broadened-not narrowed-since the adoption of the Sixth Amendment. In such a proceeding, 'it would be clearly erroneous to confine the inquiry to the proceedings and judgment of the trial court' and the petitioned court has 'power to inquire with regard to the jurisdiction of the inferior court, either in respect to the subject-matter or to the person, even if such inquiry involves an examination of facts outside of, but not inconsistent with, the record.' Congress has expanded the rights of a petitioner for habeas corpus and the '... effect is to substitute for the bare legal review that seems to have been the limit of judicial authority under the common-law practice, and under the act of 31 Car. II, chap. 2, a more searching investigation, in which the applicant is put upon his oath to set forth the truth of the matter respecting the causes of his detention, and the court, upon determining the actual facts, is to 'dispose of the party as law and justice require.' - 'There being no doubt of the authority of the Congress to thus liberalize the common-law procedure on habeas corpus in order to safeguard the liberty of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States against infringement through any violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty established thereunder, it results that under the sections cited a prisoner in custody pursuant to the final judgment of a state court of criminal jurisdiction may have a judicial inquiry in a court of the United States into the very truth and substance of the causes of his detention, although it may become necessary to look behind and beyond the record of
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and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel specially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court. Dispositive The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below for a new arraignment and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by counsel. So ordered.
the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor. - IN THE CASE, Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure or assign an attorney de oficio. - The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney before arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was so framed that it could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead guilt if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause contained in our Constitution. - One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. - It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. - in the instant case, that the accused who was unaided by counsel pleaded guilty but with the following qualification: "but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo." The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of this qualification. the record does not show whether the supposed instructions was real
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constitutional rights when he answered the questions, it is idle to talk of waiver of rights. - in this case, Joves did not say what specific rights he mentioned to Nicandro, neither did he state the manner he advised her of her rights so as to make her understand them. This is particularly impt because Nicandro was illiterate and cant be expected to be able to grasp the significance of her rights merely by hearing an abstract statement thereof. - As it is the obligation of the investigator to inform a person under investigation of his rights, so is it the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigator with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative showing, admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence. - Miranda v Arizona: we will not presume that defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and that his privilege vs self incrimination has been adequately safeguarded on a record that doesnt show that any warnings have been given or any effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a waiver of these rights be assumed on a silent record Dispositive decision SET ASIDE. Acquitted for reasonable doubt
- above provision is an expanded version of the right vs self-incrimination, formally incorporating the doctrine in Miranda v Arizona: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self- incrimination. xxx As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the ff measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an atty, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive those rights, provided such is made voluntarily, knowingly & intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner & at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an atty before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone & indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney & thereafter consents to be questioned. (the court points out that the Miranda doctrine rests on the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be compelled to be a witness vs himself) - since right to be informed implies comprehension, degree of explanation required will necessary vary, depending upon the education, intelligence & other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. A simpler & more lucid explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered - Like other constitutional rights, the right vs selfincrimination, including the right of a person under investigation to remain silent & to counsel, and to be informed of such right, may be waived. To be valid, however, a waiver must not only be voluntary; it must be made knowingly & intelligently, which presupposes an awareness or understanding of what is being waived. It stands to reason that where the right has not been adequately explained and there are serious doubts as to whether the person interrogated knew and understood his relevant
BATAAN SHIPYARD & ENGINEERING CO INC (BASECO) v PCGG 150 SCRA 181 NARVASA; May 27, 1987
NATURE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the Presidential Commission on Good Government FACTS - Challenged in this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition by a private corporation known as the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc. are: (1) Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2, promulgated by President Aquino on February 28, 1986 and March 12, 1986 (2) the sequestration, takeover, and other orders issued, and acts done, in accordance with said executive orders by the Presidential Commission on Good Government and/or its Commissioners and agents, affecting said corporation. - BASECO prays that this Court 1) declare unconstitutional and void Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2;
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Philippines or abroad, in their names as nominees, agents or trustees, to make full disclosure of the same to the Commission on Good Government within thirty (30) days from publication of * (the) Executive Order, " Executive Order No. 14 > PCGG is empowered, "with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other government agencies, * * to file and prosecute all cases investigated by it * * as may be warranted by its findings.'"34 All such cases, whether civil or criminal, are to be filed "with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." > "(c)ivil suits for restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential damages, forfeiture proceedings provided for under Republic Act No. 1379, or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws, in connection with * * (said Executive Orders Numbered I and 2) may be filed separately from and proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence;" and that, moreover, the "technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly applied to* *(said) civil cases." 2. NO, there is No Violation of Right against SelfIncrimination Ratio It is elementary that the right against selfincrimination has no application to juridical persons. Reasoning - BASECO contends that its right against selfincrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures had been transgressed by the Order of April 18, 1986 which required it "to produce corporate records from 1973 to 1986 under pain of contempt of the Commission if it fails to do so." The order was issued upon the authority of Section 3 (e) of Executive Order No. 1, treating of the PCGG's power to "issue subpoenas requiring the production of such books, papers,contracts, records, statements of accounts and other documents as may be material to the investigation conducted by the Commission," and paragraph (3), Executive Order No. 2 dealing with its power to "(r)equire all persons in the Philippines holding * *(alleged "ill-gotten") assets or properties, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, in their names as nominees, agents or trustees, to make full disclosure of the same **. " - While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges
subpoenae ad testification and duces tecum; administer oaths; punish for contempt. It was given power also to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of (its creation). " Executive Order No. 2 > gives additional and more specific data and directions respecting "the recovery of ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime." It declares that: 1) "* * the Government of the Philippines is in possession of evidence showing that there are assets and properties purportedly pertaining to former Ferdinand E. Marcos, and/or his wife Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees which had been or were acquired by them directly or indirectly, through or as a result of the improper or illegal use of funds or properties owned by the government of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of their office, authority, influence, connections or relationship, resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and 2) " * said assets and properties are in the form of bank accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of stocks, buildings, shopping centers, condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of real and personal properties in the Philippines and in various countries of the world." Upon these premises, the President 1) froze "all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation" 2) prohibited former President Ferdinand Marcos and/or his wife * *, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees from transferring, conveying, encumbering, concealing or dissipating said assets or properties in the Philippines and abroad 3) prohibited "any person from transferring conveying, encumbering or otherwise depleting or concealing such assets and properties or from assisting or taking part in their transfer, encumbrance. concealment or dissipation under pain of such penalties as are prescribed by law;" and 4) required "all persons in the Philippines holding such assets or properties, whether located in the
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YES - Sections 1 and 2, Rule 13212 of the rules of Court clearly require that the testimony of a witness shall be given orally in open court. Reasoning - The main and essential purpose of the rule is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity to crossexamine the witness presented. The opponent demands confrontation for the purpose of cross examination which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers. - There is also the advantage obtained in the personal appearance of the witness in open court as it affords the judge to assess the weight and value that can be given to any of the testimony based on his perception of the witness countenance, manner, and expression. In deed, the great weight given the findings of fact of the trial judge in the appellate court is based precisely upon the judge having had the opportunity and the assumption that he took advantage of it to ascertain the credibility of the witness. - Rules governing the examination of witnesses are intended to protect the rights of the litigants and to secure orderly dispatch of the business of the courts. Hence only questions directed to the eliciting of testimony which, under the general rules of evidence, is relevant to and competent to prove, the issues of the case, may be propounded to the witness. Dispositive Petition granted. The order of the judge is set aside.
information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony, or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order." Dispositive petition is dismissed Voting Yap, Fernan, Paras, Gancayco and Sarmiento concur Teehankee, concurs in a separate opinion. Melencio-Herrera, concurs with qualifications in a separation opinion. Gutierrez, Jr. see concurring and dissenting opinion. Cruz dissents in a separate opinion. Feliciano joins M. Herrera's qualified concurring opinion. Padilla see concurring opinion. Bidin joins Gutierrez in his concurring and dissenting opinion. Cortes joins Gutierrez in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
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Section 1. Testimony to be given in open court.- the testimony of witnesses shall be given orally in open court and under oath or affirmation. Section 2. Testimony in Superior Courts to be reduced in writing.- In superior courts, the testimony of each witness shall be taken in shorthand or stenotype, the name, residence, and occupation of the witness being stated, and all the questions put the witness and his answers thereto being included. If a question put is objected to and the objection is ruled on, the nature of the objection and the ground on which it was sustained or overruled must be stated, or if the witness declines to answer a question out, the fact and the proceedings taken thereon shall be entered in the record. A transcript of the record made by the official stenographer so stenotypist and certified as correct by him shall be prima facie a correct statement of such testimony and proceedings.
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he had already been convicted of rebellion, he cannot now be prosecuted for subversion 4. WON the decision should have been promulgated in the CFI of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, considering that he was then detained or confined at Camp Crame, Quezon City, and not in the Pasig Branch of said Court HELD 1. NO - The Constitution guarantees an accused person the right to meet the witnesses against him face to face. This provision "intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex-parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witnesses in the exercise of the right of cross-examination." - Here, the testimony sought to be made part of the evidence in chief are not ex-parte affidavits, but testimony of witnesses taken down by question and answer during the preliminary investigation in the presence of the accused and his counsel who subjected the said witnesses to a rigid and close cross-examination. The inclusion of said testimony was made subject to the right of the defendant to further cross-examine the witnesses whose testimony are sought to be reproduced and, pursuant to said order, the witnesses were recalled to the stand during the trial and again examined in the presence of the appellant. Upon the facts, there was no curtailment of the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. 2. NO - Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1700, provides that "No person shall be convicted of any of the offenses penalized herein with prision mayor to death unless on the testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act or on confession of the accused in open court." - Appellant's being an officer or ranking leader of the CPP and its military arm, the HMB, is borne out by the testimony of former associates of the appellant in the CPP and the HMB. There is his sworn statement wherein the appellant admitted membership in the Central Committee of the CPP and recounted his prismatic rise in the "Hukbalahap" and later in the HMB, as well as the numerous armed clashes he and
warrant for the arrest and thereafter set the case for trial. - Upon being arraigned, Liwanag, assisted by his counsel, waived the reading of the information and entered a plea of not guilty. In view of the desire of his counsel to file a motion to quash, the court granted Liwanag twenty (20) days within which to do so. - Liwanag filed a motion to quash the information upon the grounds that he has been previously convicted of rebellion based upon the same overt acts as in the instant case, and that Republic Act No. 1700 is an ex post pacto law (bill of attainder) in that it changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment or penalty than that annexed to the crime when committed. The court denied the motion. - The case was subsequently set for trial, the prosecution moved that the testimony of the witnesses presented during the preliminary investigation of this case be adopted as part of the evidence in chief of the prosecution. The trial court granted the motion subject to the condition that the witnesses be further cross-examined by counsel for the accused. - At the trial, the witnesses for the prosecution who testified at the preliminary investigation were recalled and were again cross-examined by counsel for the appellant. To bolster their case, the prosecution presented three additional witnesses. The defense, presented the appellant himself who stated that after his apprehension, he was charged with rebellion before the CFI of Pampanga and found guilty thereof; and he was also charged with murder before the CFI of Tarlac and acquitted; and that he surrendered to the PC patrol. However, he admitted membership in the Hukbalahap, and later in the HMB, from 1948 to 1960, and did not take advantage of the amnesty offered in 1948. - The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of subversion, as charged. ISSUES 1. WON Liwanag was deprived of his fundamental right to confront the witnesses against him when the trial court granted the motion of the Fiscal that the testimony of the witnesses presented during the preliminary investigation be adopted and made part of the evidence for the prosecution 2. WON trial court erred in finding Liwanag guilty 3. WON having been charged with rebellion and subversion based upon the same overt act, and since
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because Basilio, Talino and Macadangdang were granted separate trials and they did not cross examine Ulat because, as a matter of fact, they were not even required to be present when the other accused were presenting their defenses, the latter's testimonies can not now be considered against said three accused. - The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is not a matter of right to the accused, especially where, as in this case, it is sought after the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution. The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost circumspection in granting a motion for separate trial, allowing the same only after a thorough study of the claimed justification therefor, if only to avoid the serious difficulties that may arise, such as the one encountered and regretted by the respondent court, in according the accused the right of confrontation. - The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. In United States v. Javier confrontation is essential because cross-examination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. ISSUE WON the decision of the court violates Talinos right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution HELD NO - The court have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the respondent court did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting Talino. The part of that decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat at all but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in approving the questioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle the government. Talino makes much of the statement in the Comment that the petitioner's guilt could be deduced "from the evidence for the prosecution and from the testimony of Pio Ulat," but that was not the respondent court speaking. That
twice in jeopardy for the same act cannot be sustained. 4. NO - The records show that he had been confined at Fort Bonifacio (then known as Fort William Mckinley), Makati, Rizal, since November 20, 1962 and continued to be detained therein during the continuation of the trial, up to its termination. Dispositive UPON THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is, hereby affirmed, with costs.
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such a case is from the interpretation thereof which is given by another person. - The prosecution should have presented Emateo himself to testify on what actually transpired. The lower court ignored the right of the accused to meet the witness face to face. - Prosecution revealed not to know anything about the informants background. Although there is a policy of non-disclosure of an informants identity, it cannot be invoked in this case. The informants failure to take the witness to stand to confirm the correctness of his interpretations not only rendered the testimonies as hearsay and inadmissible, but also deprived the appellant of his right to cross-examine him. - Non-presentation of an informer is a privilege that has its own inherent limitation. Where in the disclosure of an informers identity is relevant and helpful to the defense of the accused, or is essential to the proper disposition of the case, the privilege must give way. - Although the identity of the informer was disclosed, prosecution failed to present him as witness on the assertion that his whereabouts are unknown. No subpoena has been issued by the prosecution to Emateo, the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced (Sec 5(e), Rule 131) arises. - The appellants claim that the ownership of the sack of marijuana was previously deposited by Emateo was never contradicted by prosecution. Bare assertion of Baganos delivery of the bag does not, by itself indicate ownership nor even illegal possession absent any other evidence. - Apellants signature appearing on the sack and individual bundles containing marijuana do not signify, much less evidence, guilt for they are mere procedural steps undertaken after arrest. Furthermore, it appearing that appellant was not informed of his right to counsel at the time he affixed his signature, the same has been obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense and is therefore inadmissible. - It is a cardinal rule that in order to merit conviction, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of evidence presented by the defense. An accused must always be deemed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to so establish the guilt of herein appellant.
told appellant that he will pay for the marijuana after weighing it in the hotel, to which the appellant agreed. On the way back to the hotel in Baguio, the NBI was signaled that the transaction took place. The NBI team blocked Bosticks car and arrested the appellant and Emateo. - Prosecution claims that according to Emateo, appellant would only sell to a foreigner, preferably an American. Suspects Claim - He went to the house of Emateo to collect P4000, which the latter borrowed him. Emateo told him to wait for Emateos visitor, from whom he would get the money to pay for his debt. After being introduced to Bostick, they proceeded to Irisan to get the bag Emateo would five the American as gift. Emateo asked Bagano to get the bag because Emateo did not want to get wet. On the way back to Baguio, the NBI team came out and made the arrests. - He claims that the court erred: in finding that he agreed to sell 10kgs of marijuana when he had no knowledge of the alleged sale. In not holding as hearsay the alleged conversation between Bolstick and the appellant when Emateo, the informant who interpreted the conversation was never presented to testify In appreciating the bag and not the sack against the appellant that which Emateo owned and deposited in the quarter of the appellant at irisan earlier the same day of the alleged buy-bust operation. In not appreciating the defense that it was Emateo who owns the Marijuana in question ISSUE WON the Bolstick testimonies were hearsay HELD YES - From Bolsticks testimonies as principal witness for the prosecution, such were mere translations and/or interpretations of what Bagano supposedly said in the dialect and interpreted by Emateo. The only exception is the testimony on what Bolstick saw. - Where a witness is offered to testify to statements of another person, spoken in a language not understood by him, but translated to his by an interpreter, such witness is not qualified, because he does not speak from personal knowledge. All that he can know as to the testimony which is in fact given in
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the law excuses no one. The right against selfincrimination is not automatically operational but must be claimed. Failure to claim it is an implied waiver of said right. - The second right, or rather, group of rights, are a persons rights in custodial interrogation, which means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. These section can be broken down into 3 rights: (1) the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right (2) no force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him (3) any confession obtained in violation of this shall be inadmissible in evidence. - The accused must be informed of these rights prior to any questioning, after which the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. Statements not made under custodial interrogation are not protected. - It is important now to inquire whether the rights mentioned apply to persons under preliminary investigation or already charged in court for a crime. It is evident that a defendant under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation, and there is thus no occasion to speak of such rights under custodial interrogation; however, the accused still possesses the right against self-incrimination. - Under the Rules of Court, the accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness and is entitled, among others: (1) not be a witness against himself (2) to testify as a witness on his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness, he may be cross-examined as any other witness; his neglect of refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. Thus, unlike an ordinary witness, the accused may refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, or answer any question altogether. The accused, if he chooses to testify, may refuse to answer only questions which could incriminate him of a crime for which he isnt charged. - It appears that respondent Judge mistakenly applied the rights set forth in Sec 20 Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution. It is clear from the undisputed facts that Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, and thus his constitutional rights in relation thereto dont apply. Also, Ramos had voluntary answered the questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation and agreed that the proceedings be recorded and filed as exhibits A and K, spontaneously offering to
rights to remains silent and have counsel. The private prosecutors filed an MFR, but respondent Judge justified his order citing the constitutional precept that the rights in custodial investigation cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. - Said orders are now assailed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. The Court required respondent Judge Ayson and Ramos to comment, and directed the issuance of a TRO enjoining respondents from further proceeding with the trial/hearing. The Solgen, who was also required to comment, sided with petitioner, praying that respondent judges orders be set aside and further ordering the admittance of exhibits A and K of the prosecution. ISSUE WON it was grave abuse of discretion for respondent judge to exclude exhibits A and K HELD YES - At the core of the controversy is Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. - There are 2 rights dealt with in the section: the right against self-incrimination (now embodied in Sec. 17 Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution) and the rights of a person in custodial interrogation (Sec 12 Art. 3). - The first right, against self-incrimination, is NOT to be compelled to be a witness against himself and applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal or administrative. It prescribes an option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry. However, it can only be claimed when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness and cannot be claimed at any other time. The witness thus may not disregard a subpoena or refuse to testify altogether. - The provision of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge or any other presiding officer, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of this right, which the witness should know, as ignorance of
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fourteen separate occasions without objection on their part, and without an iota of evidence to substantiate any claim as to any other person so minded being excluded from the premises. It is thus evident that what took place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy. - The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of this petition explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. As a matter of fact, that was one constitutional provision that needed only a single, terse summation from Justice Jose P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was stressed by him: "Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal and unjust manner." It would have been surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights had provoked any discussion, much less a debate. It was merely a reiteration what appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly known as the Jones Law. Earlier, such a right found expression in the Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an organic act of the then government of this country as an unincorporated territory of the United States. Historically as was pointed out by Justice Black, in the leading case of In re Oliver: This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in the English common law heritage, but it likely evolved long before the settlement of the US as an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial. The guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial appeared in a state constitution in 1776. Later it was embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution ratified in 1791. Today almost without exception every state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that all criminal trials be open to the public. - The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. Accdg to J. Laurel, the importance of this right is its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a right is deemed
accused, thru counsel, asked for and were granted time to submit memoranda. Respondents Calo and Carbonnel, thru counsel, Atty. Rafael Consengco, submitted a 14-page memorandum in support of their prayer for exoneration, and conviction of petitioner Lorenzana in respect of their countercharges against the latter. It is worthy of note that up to this late date, said respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not objected to or pointed out any supposed irregularity in the proceedings thus far; the memorandum submitted in their behalf is confined to a discussion of the evidence adduced in, and the merits of the cases. - The promulgation of judgment scheduled on Sep 23, 1968 was postponed to Sep 28, 1968 at the instance of Atty. Consengco, , and again to Oct 1, 1968. The applications for postponement were not grounded upon any supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings. - However, on October 1, 1968, Calo and Carbonnel, thru their counsel, filed with the CFI of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction alleging jurisdictional defects. Respondent Judge Felix Domingo issued a restraining order thus causing the deferment of the promulgation of the judgment. After proceedings duly had, there was an order from him declaring that 'the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been violated, adversely affecting their 'right to a free and impartial trial, noting 'that the trial of these cases lasting several weeks held exclusively in chambers and not in the court room open the public';" and ordering the city court Judge Garcia, "to desist from reading or causing to be read or promulgated the decisions he may have rendered already in the criminal cases pending in his Court, until further orders of this Court. - The MR was denied. Hence, on January 28, 1969, the matter was elevated to the SC by means of the present suit for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE WON respondent Judge commit a grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the holding of the trial of the accused inside the chambers of petitioner ,city court Judge Gregorio Garcia, as violative of the constitutional right to public trial HELD YES - The procedure had been agreed to beforehand by accused. The hearings have been thus conducted on
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WON the right of the petitioners to a speedy trial has been accorded HELD NO Ratio. The constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays [Acebedo v. Sarmiento, Conde v. Rivera]. Thus, if the person accused were innocent, he may within the shortest time possible be spared from anxiety and apprehension arising from a prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense as to the fate in store for him, within a period of course compatible with his opportunity to present any valid defense. -"The Government should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of this court to see that the criminal proceedings against the accused come to an end and that they be immediately discharged from the custody of the law." [People v. Castaeda] - An accused person is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. . . . He cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed. xxx The Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced. [Mercado v. Santos] - remedies available to the accused: The remedy in the event of a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case. [Acebedo v. Sarmiento] Reasoning - In the absence of any valid decision, the stage of trial has not been completed. Thus, when they moved to dismiss in the CA, they could contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. It was not the pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases that should be deemed material. It is at times unavoidable that appellate tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to suits elevated to
from the knowledge that a judge, with the eyes of the alert court alert to his demeanor and his rulings, would run the risk of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just because, as did happen here, it was in the air-conditioned chambers of a city court judge rather than in the usual place that the trial took place. Dispositive Writ of certiorari is granted.
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subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the trial of the petitioners was being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance of those imperative decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with due process. - Even granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity. 2. YES Ratio Each of the 23 petitioners (accused before the general court-martial) is entitled to one peremptory challenge, irrespective of the number of specifications and/or charges and regardless of whether they are tried jointly or in common. The right to challenge is in quintessence the right to reject, not to select. If from the officers who remain an impartial military court is obtained, the constitutional right of the accused to a fair trial is maintained. Reasoning - It is the submission of the petitioners that "for every charge, each side may exercise one peremptory challenge," and therefore because there are eleven charges they are entitled to eleven separate peremptory challenges. The respondents argue that although there are actually a total of eleven specifications against the petitioners, three of these should be considered as merged with two other specifications, "since in fact they allege the same offenses committed in conspiracy, thus leaving a balance of eight specifications." The general courtmartial thereof takes the position that all the 23 petitioners are entitled to a total of only eight peremptory challenges. (a) A peremptory challenge is afforded to an accused who, whether rightly or wrongly, honestly feels that the member of the court peremptorily challenged by him cannot sit in judgment over him, impartially. Every accused person is entitled to a fair trial. It is not enough that objectively the members of the court may be fair and impartial. It is likewise necessary that subjectively the accused must feel that he is being tried by a fair and impartial body of officers. Because the petitioners may entertain grave doubts as to the fairness or impartiality of distinct, separate and different individual members of the court-martial, it follows necessarily that each of the accused is entitled to one peremptory challenge. (b) Article of War 18 does not distinguish between common trials and joint trials, nor does it make the nature or number of specifications and/or charges a
- They then raised peremptory challenges against Col. Alejandro, as president of the court-martial, and Col. Olfindo, Lt. Col. Camagay, Lt. Col. Valones, Lt. Col. Blanco and Col. Malig, as members. There was also an issue as to the number of peremptory challenges that can be raised by each accused. - SC then restrained court-martial from proceeding with the case. Respondents asserted that despite the publicity which the case had received, no proof has been presented showing that the court-martial's president's fairness and impartiality have been impaired. As a preliminary consideration, the respondents urge this Court to throw out the petition on the ground that it has no power to review the proceedings of the court-martial, "except for the purpose of ascertaining whether the military court had jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, and whether, though having such jurisdiction, it had exceeded its powers in the sentence pronounced." ISSUES 1. WON the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as to prejudice their right to a fair trial 2. WON each accused was entitled to one peremptory challenge HELD 1. NO Reasoning - The trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused. And appellate tribunals have the duty to make an independent evaluation of the circumstances. Where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity. If publicity during the proceeding threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be ordered. - The spate of publicity in this case before us did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the release of information or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have
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- In the main, appellant's contention in this appeal is that the evidence of the prosecution is weak and insufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in the manner he was Identified as one of the alleged perpetrators of the four (4) crimes herein charged. He would then argue that such weakness of the state evidence would commensurately strengthen his defense of alibi which, as he claims, the trial court erroneously rejected. - What is indubitably clear is that the state witnesses who pointed to appellant as among the culprits are the ones with no motive sufficient to urge them to testify falsely against appellant who would be punished with no less than death in consequence of their perjured testimony. - First to Identify appellant was Antonio Bejic the lone survivor in the carnage against the Bejic family and household. He Categorically stated that he recognized the voice that shouted: "Hoy", to be that of appellant whom he had known very well because appellant used to sleep in Antonio's grandfather with whom he was residing. Moreover, Antonio also testified having seen appellant stab his cousin, Roberto Bejic He was however candid enough to admit that he did not see who actually killed the rest of his relatives, nor who actually burned the house. This fact would tend to negate appellant's claims that the testimony of the state witnesses were scripted and merely rehearsed. - That the appellant and his companions were the perpetrators of the killing of Jesus Limen and also the burning of his house was positively established by the testimony of Ramon Jimenez. Ramon was with Jesus Limen when the latter was killed and his house burned. That he was taken along by appellant apparently as a hostage to prevent him from reporting to the authorities, and so he was arrested with appellant together is, undeniably, one circumstance strongly lending credence to all that Ramon Jimenez testified to, particularly on appellant's complicity in the commission of the four (4) crimes. - The testimony of Ramon Jimenez of course did not escape the very keenly scrutinizing examination to which appellant's counsel subjected the testimonies of all the other state witnesses, in a zealous effort to show their want of credibility with the inconsistencies, improbabilities and contradictions they supposedly contained. Suffice it to say that the alleged contradictions and inconsistencies were on minor and inconsequential details that would not in any way affect Ramon's credibility.
PEOPLE v ORSAL 113 SCRA 226 PER CURIAM; March 29, 1982
NATURE Automatic review FACTS - Vicente Orsal is one of four accused in four separate cases filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City - The three (3) other accused are Ramon Gutierrez, Generoso Abapo and Romeo Flores, but the two (2) last named accused having gone at large, only appellant Vicente Orsal and Ramon Gutierrez stood trial - The cases stemmed from the ff acts: *On April 13, 1974 appellant, together with Generoso Abapo, Ramon Gutierrez and Romeo Flores, killed Crisanto Bejic, his wife Eduarda, as well as his grandchildren Atanacia Legazpi and Roberto Bejic, and burned his house *On April 14, 1974, the same accused ransacked the house of Jesus Limen, taking his shoes and clothes, one paltik revolver, two paltik shotguns and a hand grenade, killed Jesus Limen, and burned his house - The court found Orsal and Gutierrez guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crimes, attended by two (2) aggravating circumstances, namely, that the crimes were committed at nighttime and by a band, without any mitigating circumstances to offset the same, and sentenced them accordingly: (1) Criminal Case No. 471 (1183) for Arson-penalty of Ten (10) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor as the minimum to Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as the maximum, to indemnify Francisco Limen the amount of P8,000.00, and to pay of the costs of this suit (2) Criminal Case No. 472 (1184) for Arson- penalty of Ten (10) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor as
the minimum to Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as the maximum, to indemnify Francisco Limen the amount of P8,000.00, and to pay of the costs of this suit (3) Criminal Case No. 473 (1185) for Robbery in Band with Multiple Homicide- four separate and distinct imprisonment's of Ten (10) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor as the minimum to Seventeen (17) years and Five (5) months of Reclusion Temporal as the maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Cristino Bejic, Eduarda Bejic, Roberto Bejic and Atanasia Legazpi the total amount of P48,000.00 and to pay of the costs of this suit in each of these four cases (4) Criminal Case No. 432 (1157) for Robbery in Band with Homicide- Supreme penalty of 'DEATH', to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Jesus Limen the amount of P12,000.00, and to pay one fourth of the costs in each of these four cases - In the case of Gutierrez, owing to the fact that he is a youthful offender, as he is only 18 years old, the Court ordered his commitment to the Department of Social Services and Development, Region IX, Zamboanga City - The sentence of death having been imposed in Criminal Case No. 432 (1157), which was heard jointly with the other three (3) cases, the single decision rendered for all the four (4) cases is before the SC for automatic review. ISSUES 1. WON the appellant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial 2. WON the evidence is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt HELD 1. NO - Appellant first contends that he has been denied his constitutional right of speedy trial because the information was filed only about nine (9) months after his arrest and investigation. - There was no such denial. As correctly set forth by the Solicitor General, the test of violation of the right to speedy trial has always been to begin counting the delay from the time the information is filed, not before the filing. The delay in the filing of the information, which in the instant case has not been without reasonable cause, is, therefore, not to be reckoned with in determining whether there has been a denial of the right to speedy trial. 2. YES
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- The right to a speedy trial means that the accused is free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. - The delays in the prosecution of the offenses were all caused by the accused so he cannot invoke constitutional right to speedy trial. By his own deliberate acts, he is deemed to have waived or abandoned his right to a speedy trial 2. NO - The dismissal of the criminal cases against the accused by the respondent court on the ground that his right to speedy trial had been violated was devoid of factual and legal basis. - In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an accused, the following requisites must be present in the first prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. - The last requisite is not present because the order of the CFI judge was null and void. Dispositive Petition granted. The criminal cases are reinstated and the proper regional trial court is ordered to proceed with all deliberate speed in these cases.
PEOPLE v JARDIN 124 SCRA 167 GUTIERREZ JR; August 17, 1983
NATURE Petition for certiorari on decision of CFI Quezon dismissing the criminal cases against accused Demetrio Jardin because his constitutional right to speedy trial was allegedly violated. FACTS - The criminal prosecutions originated from a lettercomplaint of the Provincial Auditor of Quezon requesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the necessary criminal action under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public documents on six counts. (1967) - {This case is full of delaying tactics} - PI 1: accused moved to postpone 4 times, and failed to appear everytime. - PI was nevertheless conducted. And the six criminal informations were filed in CFI. - AR 1: accused moved to postpone 4 time, never appeared; counsel asked for reinvestigation on the ground that the accused was not given the opportunity to present his defense during the preliminary investigation. Court granted motion. - PI 2: accused moved to postpone many times, failed still to appear. When he finally appeared with his counsel, they asked for 15 days to file memorandum. The memorandum was never filed, so the investigating fiscal filed a manifestation before the court that the records of these cases be returned and the trial on the merits of the same be set. - The court transferred the case to new branch of CFI Quezon without acting on manifestation. Arraignment date was set. - AR 2: more postponements at instance of accused; moved for reinvestigation again. Court granted. - PI 3: reset because no show. Counsel then asked for 5 days to file written sworn statement of accused as defense. No statement was submitted so the records of the case were returned to court. A date was set for arraignment. - AR 3: accused asked for postponement. - Arraignment finally happened on Sept 8, 1970. Accused pleaded NOT GUILTY and asked for trial to be postponed. On postponed date, accused asked for another postponement. - Oct 1970, accused and counsel were at trial; but no one appeared for prosecution, except for a state witness. Counsel moved (orally) for dismissal, invoking accused right to a speedy trial. Court granted motion and dismissed the cases. ISSUES 1. WON accused can invoke right to speedy trial 2. WON this appeal places the accused in double jeopardy HELD 1. NO - The respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the cases and in basing the dismissal on the constitutional right of the accused to speedy trial.
PEOPLE v ANG GIOC 73 PHIL 336 ABAD SANTOS; October 31, 1941
NATURE Petition for a writ of certiorari FACTS - Ang Gioc, together with Sio Go, Gang Kan, Kee Ya and Chua Chui, was charged with the crime of frustrated murder in the Court of First Instance of Manila. He was released on bail. After a protracted trial, which lasted several months, Ang Gioc and one of his co-accused, Sio Go, were found guilty and sentenced to twelve years and one day of cadena temporal. Ang Gioc and his sureties were duly notified to appear before the court for the reading of
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in crimes that shock the conscience. This concern cannot be diluted. - We have always reviewed the imposition of the death penalty regardless of the will of the convict. Our unyielding stance is dictated by the policy that the State should not be given the license to kill without the final determination of this Highest Tribunal whose collective wisdom is the last, effective hedge against an erroneous judgment of a one-judge trial court. This enlightened policy ought to continue as our beacon light for the taking of life ends all rights, a matter of societal value that transcends the personal interest of a convict. The importance of this societal value should not be blurred by the escape of a convict which is a problem of law enforcement. Neither should this Court be moved alone by the outrage of the public for the rise in statistics of heinous crimes for our decisions should not be directed by the changing winds of the social weather. Let us not for a moment forget that an accused does not cease to have rights just because of his conviction. This principle is implicit in our Constitution which recognizes that an accused, to be right, while the majority, even if overwhelming, has no right to be wrong.
execution. This action of the court amounted to a judicial declaration that Ang Gioc was a fugitive from justice, and such declaration cannot after the lapse of nearly thirteen years be controverted by proof aliunde. A contrary view would encourage accused persons to trifle with the administration of justice, and provide means for guilty parties to escape punishment. We reject it without the least hesitation by declaring that Ang Gioc had waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. The law will not allow a person to take advantage of his own wrong. - Ang Gioc has waived his right of appeal. Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction of the appeal filed by him, except to dismiss it; and that court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the cause to be remanded to the court of origin for a new trial Dispositive remanding order must be set aside, and the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila declared final and executory.
SAMSON v CA [SUPRA, PAGE 84] PEOPLE v CITY COURT OF MANILA [SUPRA, PAGE 72] GALMAN v SANDIGANBAYAN [SUPRA, PAGE 82] CAES v IAC 179 SCRA 54 CRUZ; November 6, 1989
FACTS - Joel Caes was charged in 2 separate informations with ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA before the CFI of Rizal. (SHORT version: this guy stayed in prison for 3 yrs coz nothing was happening with his case-trial was postponed 11 times-the court then decided to dismiss it provisionally but was later on revived. ***But if maam wants details, read on!) - The cases were consolidated on Dec 10, 1981.
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motion was granted just the same, and ex parte at that and without hearing, and the petitioner's subsequent objection was brushed aside. 2. YES - Fittingly described as "res judicata in prison grey," the right against double jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of a person for a crime of which he has been previously acquitted or convicted. The purpose is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. - People v. Ylagan, Mendoza v. Almeda Lopez, People v. Obsania ~ To constitute double jeopardy, there must be: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) filed before a competent court; (c) to which the defendant had pleaded; and (d) of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. - There is no question that the first three requisites are present in the case at bar. WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE PROV. DISMISSAL? - People v Ylagan: It is settled that a case may be dismissed if the dismissal is made on motion of the accused himself or on motion of the prosecution with the express consent of the accused. Such a dismissal is correctly denominated provisional. But a dismissal is not provisional even if so designated if it is shown that it was made without the express consent of the accused. This consent cannot be presumed nor may it be merely implied from the defendant's silence or his failure to object. - Pendatum v. Aragon, People v. Hinaut, Solis v. Agloro: Such consent must be express, so as to leave no doubt as to the defendant's conformity. Otherwise, the dismissal will be regarded as final, i.e., with prejudice to the refiling of the case. - There are instances in fact when the dismissal will be held to be final and to dispose of the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused himself. - The first is where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested. Such dismissal has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal. - The other exception is where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. This is in effect a failure to prosecute. - SC said that this case is similar to Conde v. Rivera (so this doctrine applies in this case too) where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
ISSUES 1. WON the motion to revive the cases was invalid because it was not filed by the proper party nor was a copy served to CAES 2. WON the revival of the cases would place the petitioner double jeopardy in violation of the Bill of Rights HELD 1. YES - The trial judge erred in ordering the revival of the cases against Caes and that CFI also erred in affirming that order. Caes having been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and not having expressly consented to the "provisional" dismissal of the cases against him, he was entitled to their final dismissal under the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Reasoning - Rule 110, See. 5, par.1: It is axiomatic that the prosecution of a criminal case is the responsibility of the govt prosecutor and must always be under his control. - Herrero v. Diaz: This is true even if a private prosecutor is allowed to assist him and actually handles the examination of the witnesses and the introduction of other evidence. - The witnesses, even if they are the complaining witnesses, cannot act for the prosecutor in the handling of the case. Although they may ask for the filing of the case, they have no personality to move for its dismissal or revival as they are not even parties thereto nor do they represent the parties to the action. Their only function is to testify. - In a criminal prosecution, the plaintiff is represented by the government prosecutor, or one acting under his authority, and by no one else. - It follows that the motion for the revival of the cases filed by prosecution witnesses (who never even testified) should have been summarily dismissed by the trial judge. - The mere fact that the government prosecutor was furnished a copy of the motion and he did not interpose any objection was not enough to justify the action of these witnesses. -The prosecutor should have initiated the motion himself if he thought it proper. The presumption that he approved of the motion is not enough, especially since we are dealing here with the liberty of a person who had a right at least to be notified of the move to prosecute him again. - The fact that he was not so informed made the irregularity even more serious. It is curious that the
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- Rivera pleaded not guilty to all 13 cases. A pre-trial was conducted. Prosecution presented its witnesses and offered documentary exhibits. - September 29, 2003: The defense was scheduled to present evidence; however, during the hearing, petitioners former counsel, Atty. Benjamin C. Belarmino, Jr., informed the court that they have not yet received the resolution on the prosecutions Formal Offer of Exhibits, further manifesting that upon receipt of the resolution, they will ask for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence. - The court directed Atty. Belarmino to file a demurrer to evidence even without leave of court but the latter manifested that he would still discuss the matter with his collaborating counsel. However, in the order issued by the Sandiganbayan, it was stated that petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he would be filing a demurrer to evidence without leave of court within 10 days. - October 20, 2003: Demurrer to Evidence was filed without leave of court - October 27, 2003: Prosecution filed its Opposition. - Pursuant to Section 23, Rule 119 of The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Sandiganbayan considered the right of petitioner to present evidence waived and deemed the case submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. - May 3, 2004: the Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty in all 13 cases. - May 17, 2004: Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision and further moved that he be allowed to present evidence. - June 10, 2004: MFR denied ISSUE WON the decision and resolution of the Sandiganbayan should be set aside to allow petitioner to present evidence despite the demurrer to evidence filed
- Father of victim filed Petition for Certiorari before CA. CA nullified the orders of TC and held that Godoys Motion to Acquit was a demurrer to evidence. ISSUE WON the Motion to Acquit is the same as a motion to dismiss on demurrer to evidence HELD NO - Section 15 Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Crim Pro is relevant. The rule is explicit that in filing a Motion to Dismiss on ground of insufficiency of evidence, an accused waives the right to present evidence. There is no material difference between the Motion to Acquit by Godoy and a demurrer to evidence. A different label doesnt change the true nature of pleading. - The rationale is that when accused moves for dismissal on ground of insufficiency of evidence, he does so in belief that evidence is insufficient to convict and any need for him to present evidence is negated. Accused cannot be allowed to wager on outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints. - HOWEVER, in this case, this rule is inapplicable. First, because the prosecution has not yet rested its case. The documentary exhibits are still in issue. Second, the TC lost no time in denying Motion to Acquit and Godoy was ready to present evidence but prosecution moved to disqualify him. The practice sought to be avoided by the rule is inexistent.
PEOPLE v PANFILO LACSON [SUPRA, PAGE 74] GODOY v CA MELENCIO-HERRERA; August 30, 1988
NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA FACTS - Godoy is one of 6 accused of homicide. All pleaded not guilty. Trial proceeded until prosecution concluded presentation of evidence after which prosecution formally offered documentary exhibits. Before defense submitted objections to offer, petitioner filed Motion to Acquit on ground of lack of evidence proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. - TC denied Motion to Acquit and admitted Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits for prosecution. - Prosecution moved for disqualification of Godoy from presenting evidence as well as his exclusion from proceedings on ground that the Motion to Acquit is equivalent to a demurrer to the evidence so he had already waived his right to present evidence. TC denied the disqualification and allowed Godoy to present evidence. Prosecution filed MFR but this was denied.
HELD YES - A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is
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Riveras were personally encashed by her while she was allegedly accompanied by Garcia. Witnesses who owned the forged receipts testified that they handed the blank receipts to Garcia and not to petitioner. Then, after receipt of the cash, the disbursement vouchers and other forms required to liquidate the amount were allegedly prepared by Lim and thereafter, transmitted to Rivera for approval, and finally to the provincial Government. It has not been satisfactorily established whether petitioner has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to the taking by another person, of such funds. - The presentation of evidence by the defense would resolve any doubt as to petitioners complicity and avoid possible miscarriage of justice. - Clearly, when transcendental matters like life, liberty or State security are involved, suspension of the rules is likely to be welcomed more generously. The Rules on procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. When they are rigid and strict in application, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, the Court is empowered to suspend the rules. Dispositive Petition is GRANTED. Sandiganbayan resolutions SET ASIDE. Records of Criminal Case Nos. 26686-98 REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
a. ask the defense counsel a series of question to determine whether he had conferred with and completely explained to the accused that he had the right to present evidence and be heard as well as its meaning and consequences, together with the significance and outcome of the waiver of such right. If the lawyer for the accused has not done so, the trial court shall give the latter enough time to fulfill this professional obligation. b. inquire from the defense counsel with conformity of the accused whether he wants to present evidence or submit a memorandum elucidating on the contradictions and insufficiency of the prosecution evidence, if any, or in default theory, file a demurrer to evidence with prior leave of court, if he so believes that the prosecution evidence is so weak that it need not even be rebutted. If there is a desire to do so, the trial court shall give the defense enough time to this purpose. c. elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed waiver. d. all questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter, hence, the record must state the language used for this purpose as well as reflect the corresponding translation thereof in English. - People v. Flores: Though the Rules require no such inquiry to be undertaken by the court for the validity of such waiver or any judgment made as result of the waiver, prudence, however, requires the Court to ascertain the same to avoid any grave miscarriage of justice. Any lawyer worth his salt ought to know that the filing of a demurrer to evidence with leave of court has the beneficial effect of reserving the movants right to present evidence if the demurrer is denied by the court. Thus, a counsel who files a demurrer with leave of court, but at the same time expressly waives his right to present evidence should put a judge on guard that said counsel may not entirely comprehend the consequences of the waiver. - The evidence on record do not clearly show where and to whom the allegedly malversed money were given after it was encashed. What is clear is that the calamity fund was released to Almeda O. Lim, the Municipal Treasurer of Guinobatan, Albay to which Official Receipt No. 8749242H was issued. Thereafter, checks bearing her signature and that of
HUN HYUNG PARK v EUNG WON CHOI CARPIO-MORALES; February 12, 2007
FACTS - Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of BP 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing PNB Check No. 0077133 postdated August 28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. He pleaded not guilty. - After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise. - (2/27/03) The MeTC of Makati, Branch 65 granted the demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecutions motion for reconsideration was denied. - Park appealed the civil aspect of the case to the RTC of Makati, contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect. The
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accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Reasoning - The materiality of those documents is very apparent since the civil aspect of the case, from which Park is appealing, was likewise dismissed by the trial court on account of the same Demurrer. The Rules require that the petition must be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate original or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court [Sec 2(d) Rule 42]. - The only duplicate original or certified true copies attached as annexes to the petition are the RTC Order granting respondents MFR and the RTC Order denying petitioners MFR. The copy of the September 11, 2003 RTC Decision, which petitioner prayed to be reinstated, is not a certified true copy and is not even legible. Petitioner later recompensed though by appending to his MFR a duplicate original copy. - While petitioner averred before the CA in his MFR that the February 27, 2003 MeTC Order was already attached to his petition as Annex G, Annex G bares a replicate copy of a different order. It was to this Court that petitioner belatedly submitted an uncertified true copy of the said MeTC Order as an annex to his Reply to respondents Comment. The copy of the other MeTC Order, dated May 5, 2003, which petitioner attached to his petition before the CA is similarly uncertified as true. Since both Orders were adverse to him even with respect to the civil aspect of the case, petitioner was mandated to submit them in the required form. 3. YES Reasoning - The MeTC acquitted respondent. As a rule, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Either the offended party or the accused may, however appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. The acquittal ends his work. The case is terminated as far as he is concerned. The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused. 4. YES Reasoning - In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such
- Park argues that the word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence, hence, he chose to affirm in his petition he filed before the court a quo that its contents are true and correct of my own personal knowledge, and not on the basis of authentic documents. On the other hand, Choi counters that the word or may be interpreted in a conjunctive sense and construed to mean as and, or vice versa, when the context of the law so warrants. - A pleading may be verified under either of the two given modes or under both. The veracity of the allegations in a pleading may be affirmed based on either ones own personal knowledge or on authentic records, or both, as warranted. The use of the preposition or connotes that either source qualifies as a sufficient basis for verification and, needless to state, the concurrence of both sources is more than sufficient. Bearing both a disjunctive and conjunctive sense, this parallel legal signification avoids a construction that will exclude the combination of the alternatives or bar the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone. - However, the range of permutations is not left to the pleaders liking, but is dependent on the surrounding nature of the allegations which may warrant that a verification be based either purely on personal knowledge, or entirely on authentic records, or on both sources. Authentic records as a basis for verification bear significance in petitions where the greater portions of the allegations are based on the records of the proceedings in the court of origin, and not solely on the personal knowledge of the petitioner. - To sustain petitioners explanation that the basis of verification is a matter of simple preference would trivialize the rationale and diminish the resoluteness of the rule. It would play on predilection and pay no heed in providing enough assurance of the correctness of the allegations. 2. NO Ratio Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
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reception of further evidence after the parties have closed their evidence, such action is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, to be exercised only on valid and justifiable reasons (which are absent in this case). REASONING: The failure of the accused to complete his testimony was of his own making, on the initiation, confirmation and reiteration of his own counsel. Verily, the present stance of the accused is a blatant disregard of solemn agreements submitted to and approved by a court of justice and would make a mockery of the judicial process. Coming now to the conclusion of the trial court that the accused raped and, on the occasion thereof, killed Teresita Gumapay, the Court has painstakingly scrutinized the record, with the concomitant calibration of the evidence and the consequent determination as to whether the quantum thereof passes the test of moral certainty of guilt. There is no doubt that it was the accused who killed Teresita Gumapay, the evidence thereon being capped by his own written confession of the same before the investigating officers. The authenticity of and the fact that he and the witnesses thereto knowingly affixed their signatures on said extrajudicial confession were never questioned. Buttressing the foregoing evidence is the positive identification of the accused at the situs and during the occurrence of the crime. We agree with the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to the exempting circumstance of insanity. Against the effete efforts in the accused's afterthought to create an insanity defense is the whole weight of the presumption of sanity provided by law, amply supported by convincing circumstances laudably pointed out by the trial court. DISPOSITION WHEREFORE, with the modifications that the death sentence imposed by the trial court is reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Section 19(l), Article III of the Constitution, and the indemnification for the death of Teresita Gumapay is hereby increased from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00, consonant with present jurisprudence.
right to present evidence must be positively demonstrated. Any ambiguity in the voluntariness of the waiver is frowned upon; hence, courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against it. Dispositive Petition is DENIED.
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According to Judge Maceda, since the prosecution was not able to present its evidence on the first four hearing dates and there was either no return on the subpoenas subsequently issued or there was no subpoena issued at all to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen, the prosecution should have been given a last chance to present the alleged eyewitness and the doctor. - Judge Maceda denied Cabarless MFR and set the case for hearing on May 8, 2003 to hear the testimonies of Pedrosa and Dr. Salen. The subpoena issued to Pedrosa for that hearing was duly served, but service upon Dr. Salen failed since the doctor was no longer assigned to the SPD Crime Laboratory. Notwithstanding the service upon Pedrosa, the prosecution still failed to present a witness during the May 8, 2003 hearing. Nonetheless, Judge Maceda, upon motion, again decided to extend to the prosecution another chance, giving the People June 19 and July 3, 2003 as additional hearing dates. Finally, on June 19, 2003, Pedrosa took the witness stand and completed her direct examination. A few days thereafter, Cabarles filed the present petition questioning Judge Macedas order, alleging that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Since trial in the lower court continued, on July 3, 2003, the Public Attorneys Office conducted its crossexamination of Pedrosa. Cabarles was then given a chance to adduce further evidence on his behalf.1avvphi1.net On August 9, 2004, Judge Maceda deferred the promulgation of judgment and ordered the case archived pending this Courts resolution of the case. ISSUES 1. WON respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order 2. WON petitioners right to due process and speedy disposition of his case was violated HELD 1. YES Ratio Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements for reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order. Reasoning
That on or about the 25th day of April, 1999, in the City of Las Pias, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justifiable motive with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and stab with a deadly weapon (fan knife) one Antonio Callosa, which directly caused his death. - Cabarles pleaded not guilty. The trial court scheduled the case for hearing on the following dates, to wit: pre-trial on November 22, 2000; presentation of prosecutions evidence on April 18, May 4, 11, 18, and 23, 2001; and presentation of defense evidence on June 20 and 27, July 4 and 18, and August 1, 2001. -The prosecution had subpoenas issued to its witnesses: Flocerfina Callosa, the mother of the deceased; Imelda Pedrosa, the alleged eyewitness; Carlos Callosa, brother of the deceased; and Dr. Romeo T. Salen, Police Senior Inspector of the Southern Police District (SPD) Crime Laboratory to testify on the contents of the death certificate of Antonio Callosa. - Through no fault of its own, the prosecution was unable to present its evidence on the first four hearing dates. - A day before the scheduled promulgation of judgment on April 2, 2003, Judge Maceda motu proprio issued the questioned order reopening the case. In it, he observed that the prosecution may not have been given its day in court resulting in a miscarriage of justice. He explained that because there was a mix-up in the dates specified in the subpoena and the hearing dates of when the case was actually heard, the prosecution was unable to present its evidence on the first four of the five hearing dates: April 18, May 4, 11 and 18, 2001 assigned to it. Judge Maceda found that there was no hearing conducted on April 18, 2001. Thereafter, the subpoena issued to Pedrosa required her to appear on April 11, 2001, which was not a date assigned for the prosecution but May 11, 2001. Also, Judge Maceda noted that another subpoena was issued to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen requiring them to appear on May 11 and June 20, 2001. But, the May 11, 2001 hearing was reset to May 25, 2001 because the judge was indisposed, and insofar as the June 20, 2001 setting was concerned, it was not one of the days set by the court for the prosecution. Judge Maceda further observed that the May 18, 2001 hearing was never scheduled and May 25, 2001 was likewise not a hearing date set by the court.
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(6) months' imprisonment and to pay complainant the amount of P200.00, plus costs the
provision, and considering the irregularities in the issuance of the April 1, 2003 Order, it is necessary to resolve the issues raised in this petition. - In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime charged; but justice must be dispensed with an even hand. Regardless of how much we want to punish the perpetrators of this ghastly crime and give justice to the victim and her family, the protection provided by the Bill of Rights is bestowed upon all individuals, without exception, regardless of race, color, creed, gender or political persuasion whether privileged or less privileged - to be invoked without fear or favor. Hence, the accused deserves no less than an acquittal; ergo, he is not called upon to disprove what the prosecution has not proved. Dispositive instant petition is GRANTED. We hold that the assailed Order dated April 1, 2003 was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Said Order is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, any evidence received and offered in this case as a result of the April 1, 2003 Order is hereby stricken off the record. Let the records of this case be REMANDED immediately to the trial court concerned for its appropriate action without further delay.
ISSUES 1. WON the application of the Rules on Summary procedure was valid 2. WON he was afforded due process HELD NO - The Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases applies only to criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both - The crime of Theft as charged herein is penalized with arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or, from two (2) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. 6 Clearly, the Rule on Summary Procedure is inapplicable - But even assuming that the case falls under the coverage of said Rule, the same does not dispense with trial "Section 11. When case set for arraignment and trial.- Should the court, upon a consideration of the complaint or information and the affidavits submitted by both parties, find no cause or ground to hold the defendant for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the case; otherwise, the court shall set the case for arraignment and trial. "Section 14. Procedure of Trial.- Upon a plea of not guilty being entered, the trial shall immediately proceed. The affidavits submitted by the parties shall constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses who executed the same. Witnesses who testified may be subjected to cross-examination. Should the affiant fail to testify, his affidavit shall not be considered as competent evidence for the party presenting the affidavit, but the adverse party may utilize the same for any admissible purpose. "No witness shall be allowed to testify unless he had previously submitted an affidavit to the court in accordance with Sections 9 and 10 hereof." - since petitioner-accused had pleaded not guilty, trial should have proceeded immediately. But not only was petitioner unrepresented by counsel upon arraignment; he was neither accorded the benefit of trial
COMBATE v SAN JOSE 135 SCRA 693 MELENCIO-HERRERA; April 15, 1985
NATURE Petition for Certiorari FACTS - petitioner was charged with the crime of Theft of one (1) Rooster [Fighting Cock] color red, belonging to Romeo Posada worth P200.00. - Following the procedure laid down in the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, respondent Judge required petitioner and his witnesses to submit counter-affidavits to the supporting affidavits of the complainant - On June 5, 1984, petitioner was subpoenaed to appear before respondent Judge and was arraigned without the assistance of counsel. He pleaded not guilty. - Subsequently, in an Order dated July 5, 1984, respondent Judge deemed the case submitted for resolution purportedly pursuant to the Rule on Summary Procedure. - In a Decision promulgated on July 16, 1984, without benefit of trial, petitioner was sentenced to suffer six
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(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence. - The power to prosecute includes the initial discretion to determine who should be utilized by the government as a state witness. The prosecution has gathered the evidence against the accused and is in a better position to decide the testimonial evidence needed by the State to press its prosecution to a successful conclusion. Under our Rules, however, it is the courts that will finally determine whether the requirements have been satisfied to justify the discharge of an accused to become a witness for the government. - The testimony of dela Cruz was an absolute necessity. - Neither does dela Cruz appear to be the most guilty of the accused. The trial court held that dela Cruz was not privy to the kidnap plan and was merely taken in later by the group because they suspected that she already knew too much. - Did the lower courts properly consider the testimony of dela Cruz? It is a jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof with a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime. The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest. The testimony of dela Cruz was substantially corroborated by no less than the victim himself, Oliver, as well as Pedro. - As noted by the trial court, there may have been inconsistencies in the narration of dela Cruz. These, however, were minor details and simply could be attributed to the frailty of human memory. It cannot be expected that her testimony would be entirely flawless. Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor the veracity or weight of their testimonies. Such minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen their credibility as they negate any suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed. Moreover, the testimony of dela Cruz coincides with that of Oliver and Pedro relating to the
Philippine National Police. It appears that one of the suspects was a member of an NPA rebel returnee group headed by Armando Rodrigo, Jr. Upon the killing of Bert Liwanag, his girlfriend, dela Cruz, who was a suspected member of the group, was invited for questioning. On that occasion, she admitted her participation in the kidnapping of Oliver Caparas and implicated appellants. - An Information was filed on 11 March 1997 against appellants Plata, Fajardo and Rodrigo, together with dela Cruz, Armando Rodrigo, Helen Joven, Boyong Catindig, Jun Parubrob, and a John Doe. - Four of the accused were apprehended, namely: Plata, Rodrigo, Fajardo and dela Cruz. The rest remained at large. The trial court, upon motion of the prosecution, discharged Dela Cruz to serve as state witness. - On arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty. - On 31 May 2000, the RTC rendered its decision finding all appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt. - Appellants elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. - The appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision except that it acquitted Rodrigo. - Appellants Plata and Fajardo submitted their individual appeal briefs. ISSUE WON Dela Cruz was eligible to be a state witness HELD - Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides: When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that: (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
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right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion, the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court, is given the power to discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function. Moreover, the Rules of Court have never been interpreted to be beyond change by legislation designed to improve the administration of our justice system. R.A. No. 6981 is one of the much sought penal reform laws to help government in its uphill fight against crime, one certain cause of which is the reticence of witnesses to testify. - The rationale for the law is well put by the Department of Justice, viz.: "Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic dislocation, usually refuse to appear and testify in the investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases. Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases have been dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a more effective administration of criminal justice, there was a necessity to pass a law protecting witnesses and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure their appearance in investigative bodies/courts." Petitioner Webb's challenge to the validity of R.A. No. 6981 cannot therefore succeed. Dispositive Petitions dismissed
desires to a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following circumstances are present: (a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the R.P.C. or its equivalent under special laws; (b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony; (c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed; (d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points; (e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and (f) he has not at anytime been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused so that he can be used as a Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. - Upon qualification of Alfaro to the program, Section 12 of the said law mandates her non-inclusion in the criminal Complaint or Information, thus: Sec. 12. Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the Program. The certification of admission into the Program by the Department shall be given full faith and credit by the provincial or city prosecutor who is required NOT TO INCLUDE THE WITNESS IN THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION and if included therein, to petition the court for his discharge in order that he can be utilized as a State Witness. The court shall order the discharge and exclusion of the said accused from the information. - Admission into the Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from criminal prosecution for the offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given or used and all the rights and benefits provided under Section 8 hereof - Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The
PEOPLE v BUBAN [SUPRA, PAGE 6] PEOPLE v SAPAL 328 SCRA 417 KAPUNAN; December 22, 1997
NATURE Automatic Review of the Decision FACTS - The RTC of Manila sentenced accused-appellant
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NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition FACTS - Petitioner Tarcisio Icao was a provincial guard employed by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte. His chief function was to guard prisoners confined in the provincial jail located in Dipolog City. He was charged with the felony of infidelity in the custody of prisoners in the CFI Dipolog City, and after due arraignment and trial, was convicted. - On the same day that the judgment was promulgated, private respondent Icao filed a petition for probation pursuant to the provisions of the Probation Law of 1976, and was released from custody on his own recognizance. He never thereafter sought to take an appeal or have the verdict reversed or modified. According to Sol-Gen., Icao's application for probation was approved. Nothing in the record clearly supports this assertion. Whether or not probation was granted is not, however, material. The case will be resolved on other considerations. - A month later, the respondent Judge's attention was drawn to a letter of the Probation Officer of Dipolog City, replying to an inquiry of the Office of the Provincial Governor, stating that pending final action on his petition for probation, Icao could continue performing his duties as provincial guard in accordance with the spirit and intent of the Probation Law. The respondent Judge issued an order, announcing his amendment of the judgment of conviction by specifying the period of temporary special disqualification of Icao, and requiring the latter's presence for the promulgation of the amended decision. - Icao moved for reconsideration, arguing that the Court had already lost jurisdiction over the case, the judgment having become final, and the alteration by the respondent Judge of the decision under the circumstances would place him in double jeopardy. His motion was denied, as was, too, a second MFR. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition now before this Court. ISSUE WON respondent Judge had the authority to modify the judgment of conviction HELD NO Ratio A judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before the
which explicitly stated that said accused Jimmy Sapal be brought before him as soon as possible. However, contrary to the clear directive of the warrant, the law enforcers never brought him before the said judge. Gomez himself admitted the same and did not offer any convincing explanation for this omission. - Moreover, the records reveal that the documents relating to the arrest of the accused and his wife were prepared three (3) days after the arrest. - Further, the case was submitted to the inquest prosecutor only on April 25, 1995 and the information against accused and his wife was subsequently filed on April 26, 1995. - It was not likewise shown that accused was fully apprised of his rights under custodial arrest. Specifically, accused was not assisted by counsel when he was under custodial investigation. - Admittedly, accused is deemed to have waived his right to question the irregularities attending his arrest for his failure to raise the same before he entered his plea. Nonetheless, the peculiar factual circumstances surrounding the case effectively destroy the presumption of regularity in the performance by Gomez and his colleagues of their duties. Such being the case, the presumption of regularity cannot be made the sole basis of the conviction of the accused. - It has been sufficiently established that several withdrawals were made from the Far East Bank account of accused through ATM on April 22, 1995 and these withdrawals could not have been made by the accused and his wife because they were then already under arrest. - The Court cannot completely disregard this piece of evidence as it strongly corroborates the testimony of accused that law enforcers were able to withdraw money from is Far East Bank account through ATM. - It is well-settled that where the circumstances shown to exist yield two (2) or more inferences, one of which consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other or others may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused: for the evidence does not fulfill the test or moral certainty and is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction. Dispositive Reversed.
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constitutes a grave abuse of discretion which calls for relief from this Court. - We do not question the correctness of the findings of the Court of Appeals that the evidence sought to be presented by the petitioner do not fall under the category of newly-discovered evidence because the same his alleged appointment as an agent of the Philippine Constabulary and a permit to possess a handgrenade were supposed to be known to petitioner and existing at the time of trial and not discovered only thereafter. - It is indeed an established rule that for a new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) it must go to the merits as ought to produce a different result if admitted. - However, petitioner herein does not justify his motion for a new trial on newly discovered evidence, but rather on broader grounds of substantial justice under Sec. 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which provides: "Power of appellate court on appeal. Upon appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance, the appellate court may reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the case to the Court of First Instance for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case." - Petitioner asserts, and correctly so, that the authority of respondent appellate court over an appealed case is broad and ample enough to embrace situations as the instant case where the court may grant a new trial or a retrial for reasons other than that provided in Section 13 of the same Rule, or Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. While Section 13, Rule 124, and Section 2, Rule 121, provide for specific grounds for a new trial, i.e. newly discovered evidence, and errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial, Section 11, Rule 124 quoted above does not so specify, thereby leaving to the sound discretion of the court the determination, on a case to case basis, of what would constitute meritorious circumstances warranting a new trial or retrial. - Thus, admittedly, courts may suspend its own rules or except a case from them for the purposes of justice or, in a proper case, disregard them. In this jurisdiction, in not a few instances, this Court ordered
lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the perfection of the appeal by the accused on the very date the decision was promulgated. - The records were then elevated to the Court of Appeals where petitioner as accused-appellant raised the issues of (1) an erroneous conviction for illegal possession of explosives when there was no proof of an essential element of the crime, and (2) erroneous denial of his motion to reopen the case for the reception of his permit to possess the handgrenade. Jose prayed for his acquittal or in the alternative for the remand of the case back to the trial court for a new trial. CA affirmed RTC. - A motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed but was denied. - Jose filed before the SC but was denied. Thus this Motion for Reconsideration. - Manifestation was submitted by the Solicitor General informing the Court that in view of the "persistence of accused petitioner Lorenzo Jose both before this Honorable Court and respondent Court of Appeals as to his alleged existing appointment as PC Agent and/or authority to possess handgrenade," in the interest of justice, he was constrained to make pertinent inquiries from the PC Chief, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos who in reply sent his letter dated December 27, 1974 that states that Mr. Lorenzo Jose was appointed as PC Agent. The Solicitor General now concedes that the interests of justice will best be served by remanding this case to the court of origin for a new trial. ISSUE WON CA committed an error of law and gravely abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner's motion for new trial "for the reception of (1) the written permit of petitioner to possess and use handgrenade, and (2) the written appointment of petitioner as PC agent with Code No. P-36-68 and Code Name 'Safari' (both documents are dated 31 January 1968)" HELD YES - This is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice to render justice where justice is due to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged. The failure of the Court of Appeals to appreciate the merits of the situation, involving as it does the liberty of an individual, thereby closing its ear to a plea that a miscarriage of justice be averted,
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- The respondents appealed to the DOJ. The DOJ reversed the resolution and ordered that the informations be withdrawn. The corporation moved to reconsider but was denied by the DOJ. They then assailed the DOJ order before the CA. - In the meantime, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the criminal cases. Judge Baybay granted the motion. ISSUES 1. WON the judge correctly dismissed the criminal case 2. WON the only remedy for the petitioners was a petition fro certiorari, not an ordinary appeal HELD 1. NO - As to what mode of review petitioners may avail of after a court grants an accuseds motion to withdraw information and/or to dismiss the case, Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure instructs: "Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy." - In availing of the remedy of certiorari before the RTC, petitioners claim that they had no plain, adequate and speedy remedy to question the MeTCs grant of the motion. -The records of the cases show, however, that the motion was granted by the MeTC before respondents were arraigned. Thus, the prohibition against appeal in case a criminal case is dismissed as the accused would be placed in double jeopardy does not apply. - Petitioners not having availed of the proper remedy to assail the dismissal of the cases, the dismissal had become final and executory. On this score alone, the present petition must fail. 2. YES - The judge made a finding independent of that of the DOJs. - The trial court did stress in its December 3, 2002 Order denying the motion for reconsideration that it was bound to make, as it did, a preliminary finding independently of those of the Secretary of Justice. - The trial judge need not state with specificity or make a lengthy exposition of the factual and legal foundation relied upon by him to arrive at his decision. It suffices that upon his own personal evaluation of the evidence and the law involved in the case, he is convinced that there is no probable cause to indict the accused. Dispositive Petition denied
First Womens Credit Corp filed a petition before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against the corporations officers Jacinto, Colayco, Sangil and Cruz, for alleged mismanagement of the corporation. - The SEC, in SEC Case No. 11-97-5816, created an Interim Management Committee (IMC) for the corporation by Order of November 17, 1999. The Order was upheld by the SEC en banc on July 4, 2000. - The IMC thereupon issued directives to the corporations president Antonio Tayao and corporate secretary and treasurer Glicerio Perez. - Allegedly in conspiracy with Jacinto and Colayco, Tayao and Perez defied the implementation of the SEC November 17, 1999 Order6 when IMC attempted to enter the main office of the corporation in Makati on December 3, 1999, December 29, 1999 and January 28, 2000 - The IMC then preventively suspended Tayao and Perez. However, Tayao and Perez continued to issue memoranda to the employees to disobey the IMC. Later, the IMC dismissed them both. - The corporation, represented by Katayama (minority stockholder), filed before the Makati City Prosecutor criminal complaints against Jacinto, Colayco, Tayao and Perez for: a) Article 151 which punishes resistance and disobedience to person in authority or the agents of such person (20 counts); b) Article 154 which punishes the unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances (2 counts); c) Article 172(2) which punishes falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents (2 counts); d) Article 315, paragraph 2(a) Estafa by falsely pretending to be officers of FWCC (23 counts) - The investigating prosecutor found no probable cause for violations under A151, A154 and A315. However, it found probable cause for 2 counts of violation of A 172(2) against Jacinto, Colayco and Perez, and 3 counts of grave coercion against Tayao and 3 secuirty guards.. The City prosecutor approved the investigating prosecutors resolution.
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- Martinez filed a "Motion for Reinvestigation" which was denied by Judge Manuel E. Yuzon. The case was set for arraignment and pre-trial conference on July 31, 1990, but this setting was cancelled in view of Judge Yuzon's retirement. - Martinez filed a petition with the DOJ seeking review of the resolution of the City Prosecutor finding a prima facie case of libel against him. Accordingly, 3rd Asst. City Prosecutor Lourdes C. Tabanag filed before the trial court a motion to suspend proceedings pending resolution by the DOJ of Martinez' petition for review, which was granted by Judge Pepito. - Complainant Laurel attempted once more to have the case set for arraignment and trial. No action was taken on his said motion. - August 16, 1991: Acting Justice Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III declared inter alia that while the language used in the article may be unsavory and unpleasant to complainant, the same was not actionable as libel, as it embodied merely an opinion protected as a privileged communication under Article 354 of the RPC. The appealed resolution was set aside and the City Prosecutor was directed to cause the dismissal of the information filed against Manuel F. Martinez. Consequently, a motion to dismiss was filed on August 26, 1991 and set for hearing on December 17, 1991. At the hearing, upon manifestation of complainant's counsel, as private prosecutor, that he had received no copy of the motion to dismiss, the trial court directed the case prosecutor to furnish said counsel the desired copy, giving the latter ten (10) days to respond thereto. - Motion to dismiss was granted by Judge Roberto Barrios. - Laurel went to CA ascribing error to the lower court. - CA issued a Resolution granting the appeal and remanding the case for arraignment of the accused and trial on the merits. The Appellate Court ruled that private complainant had "sufficient personality and a valid grievance against the order of dismissal before arraignment" and that the remedy of appeal was property available because the order of dismissal was a final order which terminated all proceedings in the case. - The fault or error tainting the order of dismissal of the lower court consists in its failure to observe procedural due process and to exercise its discretion properly and judiciously. - The dismissal was based merely on the findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice that no libel was committed. The trial judge did not make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case.
time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. We summarize our ruling herein: 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 3. Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action 4. The private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Dispositive The appeal is DISMISSED.
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- Warden of Bilibid Prison says Cruz is now serving the subsidiary imprisonment on account of his failure to pay the P1,000 fine in case#1. At the rate of P2.50 a day, said subsidiary imprisonment will expire about the 9th of July, 1911. - Oct 21, 1910: writ as prayed for was issued. Hearing was set the next day. ISSUE WON that part of the sentence of the CFI condemning Cruz to subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of the P1,000 fine is legal HELD NO - CFI had jurisdiction of the offense complained of. It had jurisdiction of the prisoner who was properly brought before it. It had jurisdiction to hear and decide upon the defense offered by him, but it did not have power to sentence the petitioner to subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of the fine imposed. It is therefore clear that that part of the judgment is void. - Act No. 1732 (effective November 1, 1907): when a fine is imposed as a whole, or as any part of the punishment for any criminal offense made punishable by any Act of the Philippine Commission, the court shall also sentence the guilty person to subsidiary imprisonment until the fine is satisfied; provided that such subsidiary imprisonment shall not, in any case, exceed one year; but in case the court imposes both a fine and imprisonment the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of imprisonment imposed by such sentence. - This provision is not applicable to Cruz because the penalty was imposed upon him long before Act No. 1732 went into effect. Penal statutes can not have a retroactive effect for the reason that such effect would not be beneficial to the petitioner. (Art. 22, Penal Code; US v Macasaet) - Prior to the passage of Act No. 1732, CFIs had no authority to impose subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay fines in cases of conviction for violations of the Acts issued by the Philippine Commission. Such errors (regarding authority to impose the penalty of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency) when committed have been corrected by SC in those cases which were appealed: US v Hutchinson, US v Lineses, and US v Macasaet, among them.
- The remedy against such a judgment is an appeal, regardless of the questions sought to be raised on appeal, whether of fact, or of law, whether involving jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of the Trial Court. . . . (T)he party aggrieved . . . did not have the option to substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 for the remedy of appeal provided for in Rule 41. Indeed, the existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of certiorari. - The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. (Crespo v. Mogul) Dispositive Petition is denied.
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exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters Dispositive Judgment appealed from was affirmed with the modification.
of the appellate court to correct an error in the appealed judgment, whether this is assigned as an error or not. - In the case at bar, the trial court, pursuant to Section 11 of Republic 7659, imposed the penalty of death upon accused-appellant Manuel Cula, taking into account the minority of Maricel as she is said to have been only 16 years old at the time of the rape incident, as well as the relationship of father and daughter between them. - People vs. Javier: However it is significant to note that the prosecution failed to present the birth certificate of the complainant. Although the victims age was not contested by the defense, proof of age of the victim is particularly necessary in this case considering that the victim's age which was then 16 years old is just two years less than the majority age of 18. - At all events, it is the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was below 18 when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty. The record of the case is bereft of any independent evidence, such as the victim's duly certified Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private complainant's age. - The fact that accused-appellant Manuel has not denied the allegation in the complaint that Maricel was 16 years old when the crime was committed cannot make up for the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden in this regard. - Because of this lapse, as well as the corresponding failure of the trial court to make a categorical finding as to the minority of the victim, we hold that the qualifying circumstance of minority under Republic Act No. 7659 cannot be appreciated in this case, and accordingly the death penalty cannot be imposed. - The award of damages made by the trial court should likewise be modified. As regards the civil indemnity, this Court has to date consistently ruled that if, in the crime of rape, the death penalty is imposed, the indemnity ex delicto for the victim should be in the amount of P75,000.00; and if the death penalty is not decreed by the Court, the victim would instead be entitled to P50,000. Accordingly, accused~appellants shall each pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape. In addition, as held in People vs. Prades, both accused-appellants must each indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape without the need of pleading or proof as the basis thereof. Lastly, accused~appellant Manuel is also liable to pay the sum of P20,000.00 as